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TALKING PAST EACH OTHER: THE STRATEGIC UTILITY OF LEADERSHIP ROLES IN CONTRIBUTION WARFARE

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Master of Defence Studies

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ABSTRACT

Canadian foreign policies in the post-Cold War era are filled with aspirations for global leadership, but they have seldom been aligned with defence, where establishing criteria for employment, seeking operational clarity and managing resource constraints have dominated the policy discourse. So it is perhaps unsurprising that senior military officers assign value to leadership for reasons different than politicians. Dismayed by the seeming indifference of governments to operational outcomes, officers such as Rick Hillier and Jonathan Vance have promoted leadership roles as a means to improve the strategic impact of deployments whose frequency had been increased to exhausting levels by post-Cold War Prime Ministers. But in doing so, they have not only considered the government's strategic objectives too narrowly, but also have at times gone to enormous lengths to solve a problem the political leadership has not recognized as legitimate.

This paper examines whether military leadership roles improve Canadian strategic outcomes abroad, especially within the context of Canada's traditional contributory approach to international operations. The first chapter describes how leadership was conceptualized in Canadian international policies during the post-Cold War. This provides context for the military actions of the period and frames the motivations of government. A model is then derived as an effectiveness framework to evaluate leadership action against a larger set of strategic objectives. In the subsequent chapters, three case studies examine Canadian operations in Eastern Zaire in 1996, Kandahar in 2005-06, and Libya in 2011. These cases illustrate different circumstances where Canadian military leadership was executed, and analyze the extent to which these roles contributed to achieving the government's stated goals.

This paper argues that military leadership roles have utility, but only where they achieve strategic objectives broader than improved military outcomes and at an acceptable cost. The case studies demonstrate that assuming military leadership roles, while escalatory, can prompt international action, improve the legitimacy of the operation, and control risk. They also show that Canadian political leaders can achieve national strategic goals without having to run a good military campaign.

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INTRODUCTION

Is global leadership a Canadian national interest? Considered broadly, it can create the ability to set the international agenda on issues of national interest, stimulate collective action among states toward the accomplishment of a national objective, and generate new global norms or standards of behaviour. More self-interestedly, it can result in a higher global profile and greater international prestige. Canadian global leadership has been exercised on all manner of issues, such as the political leadership that innovatively applied military power to defuse an international crisis in the Suez in the 1950s, the moral leadership displayed in the fight to dismantle apartheid in the 1980s, the diplomatic leadership that resulted in a treaty ban on landmines in the 1990s, and the intellectual leadership that helped create new norms around humanitarian intervention in the 2000s. On the surface, then, the simple answer is yes.

Assigning value to global military leadership or, more specifically, leadership during expeditionary military operations, is more complicated. Any military deployment requires not only an outlay of human, financial and materiel resources, but also an acceptance of the risk that those same resources will be lost or destroyed. A leadership role might make it easier to define operational objectives and establish the pace, direction and methods of the campaign; however, the responsibility for outcomes is difficult to avoid, as is the reputational damage of failing to achieve the mission's objectives. For Canada, whose geostrategic location confers enduring security advantages, the pursuit of military leadership roles represents a discretionary and escalatory decision - costs and benefits must therefore be analyzed carefully.

In the international environment, states must not only address a relational power dynamic with other states, systems and actors, but also consider the limits to action imposed by their own

capacity.¹ According to the political scientist Kim Richard Nossal, the understanding of Canadian power has been distracted by conceptions of national identity, such as the image of Canada as a ‘middle power’. The debate is centered on who we are on the world stage, as opposed to the goals we are trying to achieve. In Nossal’s words, “this introspective focus on power tended to obscure the link between ends and means.”² Canada emerged from the Second World War with potent military capacity, a strong economy and an expectation, borne from sacrifice, of elevated status in the international community.³ Canadian diplomats advocated a functional concept of representation, under which influence was derived from issue-based interests and willingness to contribute, rather than size conferring broad-based power.⁴ As a ‘middle power,’ Canada’s foreign policy during the Cold War was focused on maintaining stability in the international system. Diplomatic power was employed in mediatory roles, often within the Western Alliance. Military power contributed to collective defence in North America and Europe, and threat-reduction through United Nations (UN) peacekeeping internationally.⁵ Military operational leadership, however, was difficult due to, among other factors, the dichotomous security framework of the Cold War.

Possessing limited means of hard power, Canada has traditionally pursued its international objectives inside multilateral fora where military weakness is mitigated and stronger competitors can be constrained. Operationally, the principle of ‘forward defence’ has

¹ Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 4th ed. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 60.

² *Ibid.*

³ Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot, “The New ‘Can-do’ Foreign Policy,” in *Canada Among Nations 1998: Leadership and Dialogue*, ed. Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1998), 4.

⁴ Nossal et al, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy...*, 61-62.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 63-64.

historically guided Canada's security posture⁶ Invariably, Canadian military action has been pursued in concert with allies or as part of a coalition. This has resulted in the investment of considerable national resources, in the lives of its citizens and the wealth of its treasury, on distant battlefields with limited control over the outcomes. This reality was perhaps more acceptable to Canadians under circumstances where the desired political outcome – the defeat of the Soviet Union – hinged on an existential threat and was universally accepted. The end of the Cold War, however, fundamentally changed how Western states applied military power to achieve political objectives. Like many of its NATO allies, Canada became heavily involved in the discretionary application of military power where the deployed force was often required to implement ambiguous mandates for non-traditional missions under dangerous operational conditions. In places like the Balkans, Somalia and Central Africa, political objectives not only became harder to define in the first instance, but their achievement by the operational force was also further constrained by institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), that could not adapt and a low public appetite for risk. Under these changed circumstances, the ability to influence political outcomes became more attractive to smaller powers such as Canada. This was reflected in Canadian foreign policy statements as early as 1986, and the strong desire to exercise leadership on the international stage has remained remarkably consistent in government policy pronouncements since then.⁷

Senior Canadian military leaders, veterans of these new wars, have been highly critical of the Canadian approach to applying hard power. In 2005, Jonathan Vance, then a colonel, characterized it derisively as “contribution warfare.” He observed that Canada was comfortable

⁶ David J. Bercuson and J.L. Granatstein, “From Paardeberg to Panjwai: Canadian National Interests in Expeditionary Operations,” in *Canada's National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests, and Threats*, ed. David S. McDonough (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 199.

⁷ Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, Independence and Internationalism (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1986).

assigning its own tactical military units to the control of an allied or coalition commander, and it was this officer who was then responsible for translating the action of these forces to achieve a strategic objective. In short, Canada was satisfied by participating in the achievement of outcomes developed by someone else. “In general terms, therefore,” he concluded, Canadian Armed Forces “mission success is defined by its tactical *presence* in a theatre of operations rather than its tactical *performance* in achieving Canadian strategic objectives”⁸ [emphasis added]. It is perhaps obvious that participation does not require a capacity to perform a theatre-level military leadership role. While this might be acceptable, Kim Richard Nossal has warned that small countries contributing to coalitions accept the risk of becoming trapped by evolved mandates with no serious capacity to influence, as was the case for Canada in the Gulf War and Kosovo.⁹

General Rick Hillier, who served extensively in the Balkans, understood this phenomenon. He was frustrated by the perceived lack of strategic benefits accrued to Canada despite a heavy and sustained commitment of its forces in the Former Yugoslavia. He believed that in order to derive influence commensurate with a military contribution, the deployed forces needed to be scaled up and concentrated, located within the theatre of operations for maximum international profile, enabled with robust employment authorities, and focused by an integrated “whole of government” approach.¹⁰ The central argument of these officers, however, is perhaps ultimately immaterial, because political decision makers define the strategic usefulness, or utility, of military power in a different manner. In his attempt to locate an operational-level of

⁸ J.L. Vance, “Tactics without strategy or why the Canadian Forces do not campaign,” in *Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives: Context and Concepts*, eds. Allan English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs and Laurence M. Hickey (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 273.

⁹ Kim Richard Nossal and Stéphane Roussel, “Canada and the Kosovo War: The Happy Follower,” in *Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO’s War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?*, ed. Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 181-182.

¹⁰ Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and Politics of War* (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009), 156-157.

war, Vance had difficulty rationalizing how tactical actions by deployed Canadian military forces were achieving the country's strategic objectives without a traditional operational-level linkage. He hesitantly identified the missing middle as the ability to influence the direction, sequence and pace of a campaign, or operational leadership, to more precisely match the military results to Canada's national goals. Yet, like Hillier, he was confusing ends and ways. Improved military outcomes are potentially not as important to government, so long as the application of power achieves *Canadian political outcomes at an acceptable cost*. Indeed, expeditionary military leadership matters, but only to the extent to which it addresses efficiently a more holistic basket of strategic objectives.

This paper will examine the utility of military leadership within the context of Canada's contributory approach to expeditionary operations. What benefit does Canada derive from occupying such roles? As senior Canadian military commanders have suggested, do they improve strategic outcomes? And can the additional resource cost and political risk associated with such roles be rationalized by the results? These questions will be answered through a comparative analysis of three Canadian military operations, during which the nature and degree of the leadership commitment varied. In order to provide context to the subsequent argument, the first chapter will examine how leadership was conceptualized in Canadian foreign and defence policies during the post-Cold War. This will provide context for the Canadian military actions of the period, and frame the motivations of the government. From this context, a model will be derived as a leadership effectiveness framework to evaluate action in terms of the intended strategic goals.

The subsequent chapters will examine three military operations where the relationship between leadership and operational responsibility differed. During the 1996 operation in Eastern

Zaire, Canada accepted the primary responsibility for mounting and leading a multinational force for humanitarian intervention. In its deployment into Kandahar in 2006, Canada occupied an important, albeit limited, leadership role, but did so within a coalition operation of vast scale and duration. As a result, the responsibility for operational outcomes is shared. The final operation will be the 2011 intervention in Libya. Here, a Canadian general served as the operational commander of the NATO campaign, but Canada's strategic responsibilities were limited. After briefly considering the background to the operation, each case study will identify the Canadian goals, as communicated by the government, and attempt to ascertain the measures by which performance and effectiveness were evaluated. The events will then be summarized as a general timeline with emphasis on the resources committed and risks assumed. Finally, an analysis will be offered to determine whether the goals were met, at what cost, and examine to what extent leadership contributed their achievement. This paper will argue that military leadership roles have utility, but only where they achieve strategic objectives broader than improved military outcomes and at an acceptable cost. Soldiers and politicians, however, approach the exercise of leadership differently and this divergence can be consequential.

CHAPTER 1 – CONTEXT AND FRAMEWORK

This chapter will begin by describing how Canadian governments have conceptualized the country's international role since the end of the Cold War. More specifically, drawing on official foreign and defence policy publications, it will describe how governments in Ottawa have considered the role of leadership in the pursuit and fulfillment of Canadian national interests. In so doing, it will help frame the ends and ways, that is, the desired political outcomes for which military power was applied. From this historical perspective, a framework will be constructed to illustrate the basket of strategic objectives that often motivate government behaviour, and upon which the usefulness of military leadership roles can be evaluated.

Conceptions of Leadership

The Mulroney Years

The end of the Cold War initiated a highly disruptive period of strategic change, one which policymakers struggled to navigate. Through decades of confrontation with the Soviet Union, Canada had stood as a steadfast ally to the Western cause. During this period, two strategic imperatives tightly bound Canadian security policies: first, collective defence, within the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), as a means to mitigate Canadian weaknesses and balance Soviet power; and second, contributing to tension reduction in the East-West divide, through arms control efforts, multilateralism and conflict prevention.¹¹ As the Soviet Union began to collapse in the late 1980s, so too did the military threat from the east. Yet, while the public demanded a concomitant reduction in defence spending as a kind of “peace dividend,” the political demand

¹¹ Department of External Affairs, *Canada's International Relations: Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1986), 11-12.

for military interventions by Western countries exploded in the decade following.¹² Canada's government under Prime Minister (PM) Brian Mulroney was similarly active.

According to John Kirton, Mulroney's foreign policy can be explained through three lenses. The first is continentalism, which was rationalized by both the Prime Minister's personal desire to reset relations with the United States after a long period of deterioration under Pierre Trudeau and as a rational mitigation of Canada's security weaknesses. After an initial period focused on North America, Mulroney began to employ a second approach: constructive internationalism. This was evidenced by his embrace of multilateral institutions and the primacy of the United Nations (UN). The final approach, assertive globalism, came to the fore in the ashes of the Cold War and was manifested by his desire to expand Canadian influence as a middle power.¹³ The latter two globalist approaches were combined with a thematic focus on good governance and human rights, which Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal contend became an essential characteristic of Mulroney's foreign policy.¹⁴ Importantly, this focus prompted a reexamination of the traditional notions of state sovereignty and a consequent embrace of humanitarian determinants for intervention.¹⁵ Pursuit of an interventionist humanitarian doctrine had been constrained by the political and security framework of the Cold War. Now freed from this dynamic, Mulroney began to assert a more prominent international role for Canada.¹⁶

¹² David B. Dewitt and Jeffrey P. Plante, "National defence vs. foreign affairs: Culture clash in Canada's international security policy?", *International Journal* 59, no. 3 (Summer 2004), 3/14.

¹³ John Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007), 141-142.

¹⁴ Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal, "Out of the Blue: The Mulroney Legacy in Foreign Policy," in *Transforming the Nation: Canada and Brian Mulroney*, ed. Raymond B. Blake (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), 124.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 124-125.

¹⁶ Nicholas Gammer, *From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 64, 80.

Post-Cold War Canadian international security policies were shaped by a formal review conducted in the mid-1980s. In 1986, a Special Joint Committee of parliamentarians tabled an influential report entitled *Independence and Internationalism*. Although it advanced a sanguine view of Canada's power position to justify greater activism, it offered clear-headed prescriptions: "to operate effectively in this difficult world, Canadians must assess carefully how far the country is capable of pursuing its interests and concerns abroad."¹⁷ It identified the need to calibrate the nation's ambitions to its capabilities – a concept that became the central theme of the government's subsequent defence policy.¹⁸ The report spoke confidently of Canada's potential and responsibilities as an international actor. "Canada has considerable capabilities," it declared, "enabling it to sustain a substantial involvement in international affairs and shoulder a considerable degree of responsibility for finding solutions to many international problems."¹⁹ Importantly, the report concluded that Canada possessed a latent leadership capacity that could be used to harness and mobilize multilateral institutions to confront security challenges.²⁰ The Mulroney government incorporated the majority of the report's recommendations into its 1986 foreign policy statement *Canada's International Relations*, which was underlined by a theme of "active internationalism."²¹ While still limited by the dichotomous framework of the Cold War, it recognized the opportunities for leadership articulated in the SJC report: "The government recognizes that our international goals may be achieved by means of concerted action, unilateral action, or the exercise of leadership and coalition-building."²² This view, however, proved too forward-leaning and it did not translate well into defence policy.

¹⁷ The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, *Independence and Internationalism* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1986), 25.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 30.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 30.

²¹ Department of External Affairs, *Canada's International Relations...*, 1.

²² *Ibid.*, 37.

In 1987, the Mulroney government published a new defence policy document that Douglas Bland characterized as the “most aggressive in Canadian history.”²³ *Challenge and Commitment* sought to redress the commitment-capability gap through modernized military capabilities and a re-organized but strengthened Canadian contribution to conventional deterrence within NATO’s central region in West Germany.²⁴ Peacekeeping represented the mechanism for international military action outside the scope of NATO and NORAD. Described as a wholly discretionary activity, the policy demanded strict employment conditions. In contrast to *Canada’s International Relations*, there was a subtle avoidance of leadership responsibility. Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations would be dependent on “whether there is a single identifiable authority competent to support the operation and influence the disputants...”²⁵

Challenge and Commitment was outdated as soon as it was published. Indeed, its ambitious and expensive prescriptions were fatally undermined by a strategic rationale that was weakening alongside the indicators of Soviet decline.²⁶ According to Douglas Bland and Sean Maloney, “it failed as public policy and it was irrelevant in a world turned upside down by President Gorbachev.”²⁷ Policy planners struggled to re-conceptualize Canadian security. *Defence Update 1988-1989* provided a progress report on the implementation of the White Paper. It acknowledged the geostrategic shift, but was unwilling to accept its policy

²³ Douglas Bland, ed., *Canada’s National Defence: Volume 1 Defence Policy* (Kingston: Queen’s University School of Policy Studies, 1997), 186.

²⁴ Government of Canada, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1987), 60-62.

²⁵ *Ibid*, 24.

²⁶ Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security: Canada’s Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 104.

²⁷ Bland, *Canada’s National Defence...*, 188-189.

implications.²⁸ A policy reaction finally materialized in 1992. *Canadian Defence Policy* struggled to characterize the new strategic environment and reflected a certain incoherence in its identification of new security factors, such as nationalism, religion, globalization, the environment and inequities in the developing world.²⁹ It also recognized the deteriorating state of the government's balance sheet. "The two certainties in Canadian defence planning over the next decade," it described with understatement, "will be international change and fiscal restraint."³⁰ Importantly, it accepted that the nature of peacekeeping had changed and that the criteria for participation in international security operations outlined in *Challenge and Commitment* were too strict.³¹ This painful recalibration was understandable for Bland: "a department that had only known how to respond to cold war images found itself unable to respond to a new situation. No one knew how to construct policy on a blank piece of paper."³² Policy planners would have to adapt more quickly, though, as Mulroney was busy committing the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to military action abroad.

The Persian Gulf War was the first major example of the application of Canadian military force in the post-Cold War era. For Mulroney, it was an opportunity to test the UN as a mechanism for international crisis response, especially as the organization was being called upon in a seldom employed peace enforcement role. Leveraging Canada's temporary position on the UN Security Council (UNSC), Mulroney expended his influence to safeguard a prominent role for the UN and to ensure the US acted within its multilateral framework.³³ Canadian officials worked hard to achieve both goals, but it became apparent that a military commitment was

²⁸ Department of National Defence, *Defence Update 1988-1989* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1988), 5.

²⁹ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Defence Policy* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1992), 3.

³⁰ *Ibid*, 12.

³¹ *Ibid*, 34.

³² Bland, *Canada's National Defence...*, 189.

³³ Jean H. Morin and Richard H. Gimblett, *Operation Friction: The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997), 17-18.

necessary. Diplomatic efforts were insufficient to achieve Canada's desired strategic outcomes. As the official history noted, "for either of these actions to be credible on the international political scene, Canada had to accompany its recommendations with a supportive military response."³⁴ While the Mulroney government did approve a comparatively modest deployment, the military was hampered by severe capability deficiencies in the Navy and Air Force that relegated them to marginal roles.³⁵ Maloney argues that Canada's participation in the Persian Gulf War was an early indicator of its willingness to contribute military forces in response to post-Cold War crises; however, he is harshly skeptical of the influence Canada gained within the UN: "[It] remains open to debate, given the failure of the UN as an institution by 1995..."³⁶ During this conflict, Canada applied military power to support both military and political outcomes: the expulsion of Saddam Hussein's army from Kuwait, legitimized by a UN-sanctioned multilateral response that simultaneously strengthened the international organization while constraining US power. In the Balkans, the situation was not as clear-cut.

During the Cold War, the Canadian government adhered to the belief that a humanitarian crisis presented insufficient grounds to violate state sovereignty, but this policy began to shift as the situation in Yugoslavia deteriorated during the summer of 1991.³⁷ According to Nicholas Gammer, Mulroney was on the forefront of redefining the parameters of intervention and was eager to advance a role for Canada. He lobbied hard for action at the UN in the face of skepticism and buttressed these efforts with an offer to contribute military forces to a peacekeeping mission.³⁸ Mulroney encouraged the UN to modify its conception of peacekeeping in order to adjust to new realities, but he wanted to adapt the tool without abandoning the

³⁴ *Ibid*, 18-19.

³⁵ Maloney, "Better Late Than Never...", 151.

³⁶ Maloney, "Better Late Than Never...", 151.

³⁷ Gammer, *From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking...*, 63, 80.

³⁸ *Ibid*, 80-81.

institution. Addressing the UN General Assembly in September 1992, the External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall called on members to re-evaluate the traditional definition of state sovereignty: “I believe that states can no longer argue sovereignty as a license for internal repression, when the absolutes of that sovereignty shield conflicts that eventually could become international in scope.”³⁹

The initial Canadian military contribution was amongst the largest. The deployment was pursued in the face of escalating violence and readily apparent difficulties in enforcing the mandate, which emphasized Mulroney’s commitment to this ‘new ethic of intervention.’ Despite this ambition, there were growing tensions in the application of military power using the traditional conception of inter-positional Chapter VI peacekeeping. According to David Dewitt and Jeffrey Plante, “there was no clear policy as to how Canada would handle the ‘new world order’ of peacekeeping.”⁴⁰ The utility of force was changing, but the policy basis for action lagged behind. The deteriorating situation in Somalia in 1992 appeared to fit within Mulroney’s new conception of armed humanitarian intervention. After twice rejecting UN requests to participate in the Chapter VI mission, Canadian reticence dissolved once a more robust mission was approved.⁴¹ When Mulroney committed the CAF to the US-led multinational Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the government did not appear to consult even its evolved criteria for participation. This discrepancy was highlighted in the Somalia Commission’s report.⁴²

In the aftermath of the Cold War, PM Mulroney embarked on an activist international role for Canada. During the Persian Gulf War, he discovered that military power was necessary to achieve his political goals. While the unpreparedness of the Canadian military for

³⁹ As quoted in *Ibid*, 100.

⁴⁰ Dewitt and Plante, “National Defence v. Foreign Affairs...”, 4/14.

⁴¹ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), 721.

⁴² *Ibid*, 763.

expeditionary operations was exposed, the forces that were deployed helped him achieve his desired outcomes. Dangerous operational environments did not yet serve as a brake to military employment, as demonstrated in Somalia where the Canadian government insisted on additional authorities as a precondition, but a leadership role was not one of them. In the former Yugoslavia, Mulroney sought to establish a new international norm of military intervention for humanitarian purposes and, learning from the Gulf War experience, his employment of military power was prompt and robust. While Canada was content to operate as a participant within the UN's operational chain-of-command, the public was introduced to assertive military leadership, personified by the charismatic and media-savvy Canadian General assigned to the Sarajevo sector.

The Chrétien Years

The *1994 Defence White Paper* was respectful of the Chrétien government's untenable fiscal position yet pragmatic in its approach to the challenges of the post-Cold War security environment. "It is impossible to predict what will emerge from the current period of transition," it affirmed, "but it is clear that we can expect pockets of chaos and instability that will threaten international peace and security."⁴³ While ushering in debilitating cuts to the Canadian military, the new policy authorized the retention of a "multi-purpose combat capable armed forces."⁴⁴ This decision was based more on a recognition of peacekeeping's changed nature and ambition and the government's desire to remain actively engaged in the world, than on a commitment to properly resource the department.⁴⁵ But the country was broke and, following intensive global engagements in the Persian Gulf, Cyprus, Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia, its military was tired.

⁴³ Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1994), 3.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 2.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 12.

“Canada cannot, and need not, participate in every multilateral operation,” declared the Chrétien government. “Moreover, Canada is not obliged to take on a major portion of every operation or to contribute forces for longer than seems reasonable.”⁴⁶

After the quick ‘high’ of the 1987 defence renewal plan, the Canadian military had come crashing back to earth. Yet the Chrétien government was unrelenting in its deployment of the CAF to international theatres of operation throughout the 1990s. They continued to muddle through in Croatia and Bosnia, where the vulnerability of Canadian troops grew in lockstep with the expanding mandate of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the increasing potential for punitive airstrikes against Serbia.⁴⁷ Controversially, Canada did not participate in the Contact Group peace initiative, despite the scale and duration of its military commitment. Some authors assert that Ottawa was “virtually ignored”⁴⁸; for General Rick Hillier, a veteran of the Balkan campaign and later the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), it laid bare Canada’s feckless approach to hard power.⁴⁹ Michael Manulak argues instead that Canada squandered its influence; indeed, senior diplomat Paul Heinbecker had succeeded in prompting an invitation to join the group, but was over-ruled by the minister of foreign affairs, who “...balked at the commitment it implied.”⁵⁰ In Africa, Canada failed to respond forcefully to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, despite the presence of a Canadian Army General Officer as UN Force Commander. In his memoir, Paul Heinbecker asserted that “Ottawa was aware of the unfolding tragedy, but it was slow to register the size and nature of the issue and the need to exercise leadership.”⁵¹ Partly

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Lenard J. Cohen and Alexander Moens, “Learning the Lessons of UNPROFOR: Canadian peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia”, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 6, no. 2 (1999), 92-96.

⁴⁸ Cohen and Moens, “Learning the Lessons of UNPROFOR...”, 93.

⁴⁹ Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First...*, 156.

⁵⁰ Michael Manulak, “Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: A “golden moment” in Canadian foreign policy?”, *International Journal* 64, no. 2 (Spring 2009), 567.

⁵¹ Paul Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Playbook for Canada* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2010), 94.

as a consequence, Chrétien initiated a Canadian-led humanitarian intervention two years later in Eastern Zaire. This ill-fated deployment exposed major doctrinal and capability deficiencies in Command and Control (C2), and in military intelligence.⁵²

Ironically, the Liberals' foreign outlook, published in 1995, was grander than their Conservative predecessors. *Canada in the World* saw much opportunity on the post-Cold War global stage. It claimed that "Canada occupies a position of leadership among the open, advanced societies which are becoming increasingly influential as world power is dispersing..."⁵³ It identified the need for bespoke arrangements to international security issues instead of a singular reliance on traditional alliances. Multilateralism was no longer viewed solely as a method of limiting the unilateral actions by large powers, but instead as a mechanism to achieve Canadian foreign policy objectives.⁵⁴ *Canada in the World* endorsed a global approach to security, with a broad focus on human security. The UN was identified as "the key vehicle for pursuing Canada's global security objectives"; in this vein, Ottawa would support this institution's capacity for preventive action and improve its rapid reaction capabilities.⁵⁵ The theme of human security began to gain traction in the Chrétien cabinet in the mid-1990s.

Lloyd Axworthy did not invent the notion of human security, indeed there were antecedents in Mulroney's views on human rights, good governance and the limits of state sovereignty, but the foreign minister fashioned it into a powerful doctrine.⁵⁶ Axworthy described the genesis of his idea:

⁵² Michael Hennessy, *Operation Assurance: NSSC Case Study* (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 1999), A-17/29; Bland and Maloney, *Managing the Unexpected...*, 137.

⁵³ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada in the World: Government Statement* (Ottawa: Publishing, Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1995), 9.

⁵⁴ DFAIT, *Canada in the World...*, 6.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 27.

⁵⁶ Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick, "The Axworthy Revolution", in *Canada Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy* (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001), 69.

During my time at Foreign Affairs a number of international challenges... suggested the need for a new approach that would emphasize the human and humanitarian dimension and also promote Canada as an innovative player. The concept of human security emerged as the lens through which to view the international scene. The security risk to individuals was our focal point, and around that we developed a strategy for working towards new standards of international behaviour...⁵⁷

The human security doctrine derives its strength, in part, from the assumption that Canada has always been uncomfortable wielding discretionary military power, especially under circumstances that are not vitally important to the national interest. According to defence analysts Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, the inherent morality of the position appealed “to the various national myths Canadians hold about their political culture and the role of the country in the world...”⁵⁸ More importantly, it allowed Canada to assume a leadership role that ostensibly moved beyond backroom mediation and consensus-building toward setting international agendas for action.⁵⁹ Although not all directly attributable to Axworthy, the human security doctrine achieved successes, such as the convention to ban the use of landmines, the International Criminal Court, and protocols outlawing the use of child soldiers.⁶⁰

There were detractors who argued the doctrine was exceedingly moralistic: a foreign policy that sought renown without having to invest material resources.⁶¹ Yet, the Kosovo crisis would demonstrate human security also required hard power, and here, Canada was an early and eager participant. Manulak argues the mission fit within a political agenda framed by Axworthy’s doctrine, and that Canada provided important diplomatic leadership throughout the

⁵⁷ Lloyd Axworthy, *Navigating a New World: Canada’s Global Future* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2003), 4-5.

⁵⁸ Joe Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, “Lloyd Axworthy’s legacy: human security and the rescue of Canadian defence policy,” *International Journal* 56, no. 1 (2001), 6/15.

⁵⁹ Hillmer and Chapnick, “The Axworthy Revolution”..., 77.

⁶⁰ Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game*..., 93.

⁶¹ Hillmer and Chapnick, “The Axworthy Revolution”..., 78.

campaign while having assumed the rotating presidency of the UN Security Council.⁶²

Importantly, the Canadian response was driven in some measure by the desire to stem an erosion of international influence: “Noting the perceived snub from the contact group...many at Foreign Affairs felt that Canada’s participation [in the former Yugoslavia] was underappreciated...This context contributed to a growing desire within Foreign Affairs to play an important role in the resolution of the Kosovo conflict.”⁶³ Operationally, Canada was far less prominent. A small package of CF18 fighter aircraft participated in the aerial bombing campaign, albeit with few employment caveats, and an Army battlegroup was deployed into Macedonia as part of the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.⁶⁴ US General Wesley Clark, the NATO operational commander, does not refer to Canada once in his memoir.

One of the most important reflections of the human security agenda was the *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P) doctrine, which extended the concept to its logical conclusion:

If this new norm of humanitarian protection of people was to become a prime responsibility, and when necessary trump the long-held principle of national sovereignty, then was international military intervention justified to enforce this standard, and if so, under what conditions?⁶⁵

The task of answering Axworthy’s question fell to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which was established with support from the Canadian government. Its final report, entitled *Responsibility to Protect*, articulated a framework for international intervention under circumstances where states were unable or unwilling to protect their own populations, or where they were responsible for the atrocities themselves.⁶⁶ Spawned from the failures of the international community in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, R2P

⁶² Manulak, “Canada and the Kosovo Crisis...”, 567, 569.

⁶³ Ibid, 572.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 575-576.

⁶⁵ Axworthy, *Navigating a New World...*, 157.

⁶⁶ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: The International Development Research Centre, 2001), xi.

established a robust intellectual basis for military action. Canada fulfilled a key role in its development, promotion and implementation.⁶⁷

Through the human security doctrine, Axworthy had established a post-Cold War framework within which Canada could feasibly exercise expeditionary military leadership. Unfortunately, it was neither formally codified in government policy nor coherently resourced. As Heinbecker explains:

There was a perceptible reluctance on the part of the Chrétien government...to recognize that protecting people from violence required military capacity. Human security is not a pacifist doctrine; nor is it cost-free. It takes a lot of money to pay for the combat-capable ground forces on whom intervention to save lives often depends – as the ill-fated Canadian intervention in the Congo showed. The Chrétien government sometimes seemed to think that it was enough for Canada to be innovative diplomatically – Ideas Were Us! Muscles were someone else.⁶⁸

During his tenure, Chrétien stripped the military of much of its resources, but he continued to call repeatedly on its forces to deploy internationally in complex environments often under ambiguous mandates. *Canada in the World* represented a strong argument for the utility of leadership roles, but the government was simply unwilling pay for a military capable of exercising them. According to Bland and Maloney, “the government’s unwillingness or inability to recalibrate or balance its policy ends and means, if not the ideas underlying those policies as expressed in 1994, was the chief failing of its defence policy throughout the volatile 1990s.”⁶⁹ Evidenced by the Eastern Zaire operation and those in the Persian Gulf and Somalia, the Canadian military was adept at developing options to contribute to a force led by a powerful ally or institution; however, the CAF was neither structured nor prepared to assume the responsibility

⁶⁷ Heinbecker, *Getting Back into the Game...*, 115.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 95.

⁶⁹ Bland and Maloney, “Managing the Unexpected...”, 134.

for designing and implementing an operational-level plan.⁷⁰ The government displayed much willingness to participate effectively on the international stage, but was hampered by a limited capacity to execute.⁷¹ In the Bosnian example, Canada appeared to have gained influence at great military cost, but the government was either unable or unwilling to recognize the opportunity. During the Kosovo conflict, the government was motivated by the desire to bolster its international position and understood that military power was a necessary adjunct to diplomatic leadership; however, participation was shown to be insufficient to achieve Canadian objectives. “Simply being there,” observed Bland and Maloney, “is hardly enough to protect against a fall from international prestige and influence.”⁷²

The Martin Years

Paul Martin came to power in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington D.C., an event which had profound implications for Western approaches to security. In the estimation of Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, “the Government of Canada was rocked to its foundation on September 11th, 2001.”⁷³ As the first post-9/11 prime minister, Martin recognized the urgent need to update Canada’s security policies. He called for an integrated international policy. Importantly, he was willing to fund the exercise, providing the policies were innovative and could address the challenges of the new security environment.⁷⁴ Martin believed Canada could exploit an international leadership role by focusing its resources in geographic areas, such as Africa and the Caribbean, where the US maintained a smaller presence

⁷⁰ Hennessy, *Operation Assurance...*, A-17/29; Bland and Maloney, *Managing the Unexpected...*, 132, 143; Somalia Commission, *Dishonoured Legacy...*, 762.

⁷¹ Bland and Maloney, *Managing the Unexpected...*, 137.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 4.

⁷⁴ Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War...*, 138; Bill Graham, *The Call of the World: A Political Memoir* (Vancouver: On Point Press, 2016), 352; Philippe Lagasse, “A mixed legacy: General Rick Hillier and Canadian defence, 2005-08,” *International Journal* 64, no. 3 (Summer 2009), 608.

and was less concerned.⁷⁵ He properly understood, however, the military capacity limitations he himself exacerbated during the fiscal cuts of the 1990s. “The real problem with our foreign policy,” he recounted, “has not been, as some have had it, that we have cast ourselves in the role of the world’s stern grandmother but rather that we talk a good game but don’t deliver. This view led me to the conviction that Canada had to re-energize its military.”⁷⁶

At the Defence department, Minister Bill Graham could not motivate his policy planning staff, which was jaded by the consistent failure of government to fund successive defence policies.⁷⁷ Graham became exasperated: “Time passed. We made various attempts to get the process under way, but it was clear that nobody’s head or heart was in it. The more people I talked to, the more confused I became. We were all going around in circles.”⁷⁸ He finally stumbled on the solution by inverting his plan. Instead of completing the policy review, securing the funding, then installing a new military chief, Graham sought out new leadership first.⁷⁹ General Rick Hillier, who had recently returned from Kabul as the ISAF Commander, presented him a compelling vision for a Canadian Armed Forces transformed to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 international security environment.⁸⁰ Determining the need for greater military expertise, Graham granted his CDS unprecedented authority to shape the new defence policy.⁸¹

The defence section of the 2005 *International Policy Statement* (hereafter, the *Defence Policy Statement*) was intended to provide “our military with a bold new vision to deal with an

⁷⁵ Paul Martin, *Hell or High Water: My life in and out of politics* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2008), 328-329.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 329.

⁷⁷ Graham, *The Call of the World...*, 353; Lagasse, “A mixed legacy...”, 608; Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War...*, 140-143.

⁷⁸ Graham, *The Call of the World...*, 354.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 354.

⁸⁰ Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War...*, 146-147; Lagasse, “A mixed legacy...”, 608-609.

⁸¹ Graham, *The Call of the World...*, 354; Lagasse, “A mixed legacy...”, 617.

increasingly uncertain world.”⁸² The international security environment was characterized by dangerous and increasing regional instability caused by failed and failing states. Terrorist groups, that in many cases were harboured and supported by these states, represented a key threat. The global reach of some was further amplified by risk of weapons of mass destruction proliferating to them.⁸³ Although greater emphasis was placed on continental defence, this was simply reflective of a critical need to support and mirror US security policies in the post-9/11 environment. Internationally, the CAF would be asked to stabilize dangerous regions, deny safe haven to terrorist groups, and provide assistance to local populations.⁸⁴ In order to meet these challenges, the CAF would reorganize its command and control (C2) structures, emphasize interoperability with key allies, and promote integration among its component services and with other government departments.⁸⁵ The policy explicitly endorsed Hillier’s conception of integrated operations: “...today’s complex security environment will require, more than ever, a ‘whole of government’ approach to international missions, bringing together military and civilian resources in a focused and coherent fashion.”⁸⁶ Three new types of joint formations were created, two of which would be specifically designed to enable a leadership role within a multinational force.⁸⁷

The 9/11 attacks prompted the first invocation of NATO’s Article 5 – the collective defence provision of the North Atlantic Treaty.⁸⁸ In a security environment transformed by terrorist groups with global reach and ambition, expeditionary defence commitments became

⁸² Department of National Defence, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in the Right of Canada, 2005), 2.

⁸³ *Ibid*, 5-6.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 24.

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, 8-13.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 26.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 25.

⁸⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Collective Defence – Article 5”, accessed at www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm.

somewhat less discretionary. The Martin government's *Defence Policy Statement* (DPS) was different than its Mulroney and Chrétien-era predecessors. The document reflects a military conception of the strategic environment, and it articulates a practitioner's implementation plan to enhance the effectiveness and utility of military power under these new conditions. With a promise from the Prime Minister to resource this vision, Canadian defence policy had finally become aligned with the foreign ambitions of the Government of Canada. Hillier had developed a plan to create the military organization and capacity to enable the international leadership sought by Canadian political leaders. The *Defence Policy Statement* (DPS) was tested in Kandahar, where the CDS attempted to establish a new approach to Canadian operational behaviour – one that derived influence from commitment. Martin acceded to the deployment but he and his successor both valued leadership for different reasons.

The Harper Years

Stephen Harper was elected Prime Minister in 2006. During the campaign, he promised to strengthen Canada's capacity to act in its own defence, which would develop the credibility necessary to act abroad. "Greater strength at home," the platform declared, "will also lead to greater confidence abroad within Canada's longstanding global role."⁸⁹ Large infusions of people and resources were pledged in order to fortify the continental posture.⁹⁰ From the beginning of his mandate, Harper's messaging was permeated with references to assertive leadership. In the spring of 2006, he travelled to Kandahar where he delivered to Canadian soldiers a speech with a powerful message:

Your work is about more than just defending Canada's interest. It's also about demonstrating an international leadership role for our country. Not carping from

⁸⁹ Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada: Federal Election Platform 2006*, accessed at https://www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformes/can2006pc_plt_en._14112008_165519.pdf

⁹⁰ Stein and Land, *The Unexpected War...*, 230-231.

the sidelines, but taking a firm stand on the big issues that matter. You can't lead from the bleachers. I want Canada to be a leader.⁹¹

He defined leadership not only in terms of the traditional concepts of multilateralism, but also in a greater willingness to assume difficult duty under hazardous conditions. He deliberately acknowledged the risks and the potential for loss, but this only reinforced his image of a warrior nation for which “cutting and running...[was] not the Canadian way.”⁹² Although the Conservatives had been largely silent on Afghanistan during the campaign, Harper rapidly took ownership of the mission. Barely two months after the Canadian battlegroup became operational in Kandahar, he undertook considerable political risk by ramrodding a two-year extension to the mission through Parliament.⁹³ For political scientist John Kirton, this decision confirmed “...Canada's willingness to take global military leadership in distant theatres.”⁹⁴ In October 2007, his second Throne Speech further amplified his conception of leadership as derived from a robust military capacity, strong positions on international issues and a willingness to employ hard power:

Rebuilding our capabilities and standing up for our sovereignty have sent a clear message to the world: Canada is back as a credible player on the international stage. Our Government believes that focus and action, rather than rhetoric and posturing, are restoring our influence in global affairs. Guided by our shared values of democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law, our Government will continue Canada's international leadership through concrete actions that bring results.⁹⁵

Some of these ‘concrete actions’ manifested in the government's early decisions to withdraw funding for the Palestinian Authority, which now included Hamas, and to designate the Tamil

⁹¹ Prime Minister's Office, “Prime Minister rallies Canadian troops in Afghanistan,” 13 March 2006.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War...*, 234-241.

⁹⁴ John Kirton, “Harper's “Made in Canada” Global Leadership,” in *Canada Among Nations 2006: Minorities and Priorities*, eds. Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands (Montreal : McGill-Queens University Press, 2006), 45.

⁹⁵ Government of Canada, Speech from the Throne to Open the Second Session of the 39th Parliament of Canada (16 October 2007), accessed at <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=information&sub=publications&doc=aarchives/sft-ddt/2007-eng.htm>.

Tigers as a terrorist group.⁹⁶ According to Kirton, the Harper government's foreign policy was characterized by "leadership for global democratic development, based on interest and value based initiatives in demographic diversity, defence, democratization, development and human rights around the world."⁹⁷

The Conservative government ultimately formulated Canada's international policies within a new defence document. For the prime minister, the *Canada First Defence Strategy* (CFDS) fulfilled an important function by "ensuring that Canada can return to the international stage as a credible and influential country, ready to do its part."⁹⁸ The CFDS represented a more traditional policy document in its broader treatment of roles, missions and resourcing. Although it mirrored the Martin-era DPS in its evaluation of the strategic environment, it was consistent with three historical Canadian defence obligations: the defence of Canada, the protection of the continent, and the making of a contribution to international security.⁹⁹ It was in the latter role that an explicit call was made for projecting military leadership abroad. In recognition of Canada's status as a trading nation in a highly-globalized world, it reaffirmed the need to address threats to the nation at their source.¹⁰⁰ According to the Harper government, this would demand a greater global military role. "Providing international leadership is vital if Canada is to continue to be a credible player on the world stage"¹⁰¹ announced the government. Although preferring to operate within existing multilateral organizations, Harper also made clear that he would not permit the strictures of UN and NATO membership to restrict Canada's ability to act on the global stage.¹⁰²

⁹⁶ Kirton, "Harper's "Made in Canada" Global Leadership"..., 35.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa: National Defence, 2008), 3.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 6-9.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

In part, the CFDS reflected Harper's conception of his government's international priorities and Canada's place in the world. Adam Chapnick argues that it was not so much a repudiation of Martin's defence plans, but rather of the altruistic internationalism of Axworthy. The defence policy would authorize a well-resourced military establishment mandated with a robust international role to assert Canadian distinctiveness.¹⁰³ Yet the government's rhetoric faltered in the face of real events. The situation in Kandahar became so fraught that Harper commissioned a non-partisan panel of eminent Canadians to provide recommendations on the mission's future and to re-establish political cover. During the 2011 Libya crisis, the Canadian government's decision to engage not only founded on the preservation of human rights and the prevention of crimes against humanity, but also on democratic transition for the Libyan people.¹⁰⁴ An ostensible example of the Axworthian doctrine in action, Andrew Cooper and Bessma Momani argue that a key divergence was the NATO effort to remove the Gaddafi regime. This illustrates "the Harper government's normative shift towards a value-based foreign policy, one that views key aspects of R2P as incompatible with the current period of Canadian engagement in international affairs."¹⁰⁵ Operating within the multilateral confines of NATO under UN authorization, Harper moved decisively but contributed only a limited package of military naval and air assets.¹⁰⁶ The presence of a senior Canadian military officer in the NATO chain-of-command, who was designated as the operational commander, allowed Harper to promote the government's contribution as an international leadership role.

¹⁰³ Adam Chapnick, "A diplomatic counter-revolution: Conservative foreign policy, 2006-2011", *International Journal* 67, no. 1 (Winter 2011-2012), 152-153.

¹⁰⁴ Andrew F. Cooper and Bessma Momani, "The Harper government's messaging in the build-up to the Libyan Intervention: Was Canada different than its NATO allies?", *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 20, no. 2 (2014), 178.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 179.

¹⁰⁶ Kim Richard Nossal, et al., *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*..., 101.

Summary

In the post-Cold War period, concepts of global leadership were driven by foreign policy and they did not translate explicitly into the defence realm until Paul Martin's 2005 *Defence Policy Statement*. Mulroney and Chrétien's foreign policies were forward leaning in their conceptions of Canadian power, but DND was entirely fixated on its NATO obligations in the first case and pre-occupied by the implementation of draconian resource cuts in the second. Throughout this period, peacekeeping represented the sole policy mechanism for international military action, even though its changing nature was recognized as early as the 1992 *Canadian Defence Policy* document.

For his part, Mulroney quickly understood the implications of the 'new world order' to the exercise of Canadian power. He displayed diplomatic leadership in reinforcing the authority of the UN during the Persian Gulf War, and in re-evaluating traditional notions of state sovereignty to justify armed humanitarian intervention in the Balkans. In both cases, he discovered that military contributions were necessary to reinforce the credibility of his diplomacy within the corridors of international power. The mere deployment of forces seemed sufficient to achieve the government's goals. In any case, there was limited awareness of the potential value of military leadership roles until Major General Lewis Mackenzie became an international celebrity during the siege of Sarajevo.

Jean Chrétien employed the CAF even more frequently despite a steady erosion of resources. He continued to apply military power in the Balkans, but there is some evidence his government avoided an ensuing role of influence among the peacemakers. His government, along with many others, ignored the slaughter in Rwanda until it was too late. Not long afterwards, Chrétien overcompensated by hastily launching a Canadian-led operation in Eastern

Zaire. Here, the military proved insufficiently organized and resourced to fulfill such a role. Later in his mandate, Chrétien's conceptions of leadership became reflected in the human security doctrine of his foreign minister. Cynically described, it was moralistic and cheap, but in Kosovo Canada committed hard power in the absence of UN Security Council authorization. Canadian leadership in this case retreated into the diplomatic arena, where UN resolutions were co-sponsored and mediation was pursued.

During Paul Martin's brief tenure as prime minister, the Canadian military was powerfully enabled by a visionary commander who was granted unprecedented control over the policy process. The prime minister's ambitions for global leadership were interpreted by General Hillier into a compelling plan to mold the CAF into an organization at last capable of assuming such duties. The deployment into Kandahar, which was designed in large measure by the CDS, represented a dangerous field test. The military had now defined Canada's leadership capacity. Stephen Harper regained control of the policy process for the civilian authority, and initially refocused the defence department on a strong continental posture as the basis for international credibility. Early on, he delivered powerful messages of leadership laden with values and interests; however, his rhetoric proved somewhat hollow as a gradual retreat from Afghanistan was soon initiated. Notwithstanding military action in Libya, Iraq and the Ukraine, the Conservative government sought to maximize the visibility of Canada's limited contributions while limiting the scale of the intervention.

Leadership Effectiveness Framework

As shown in the preceding section, successive Canadian governments in the post-Cold War era have pursued leadership roles to advance national and political interests abroad. In several cases, the application of military power was found to be useful; however, its impact was

limited by the capacity of the CAF and the often discretionary nature of the deployments, which circumscribed the level of Canadian political will to achieve difficult operational objectives. In order to amplify the effect of these expeditionary deployments and derive influence commensurate with the effort, political leaders and military commanders sometimes sought out leadership roles. They did so, however, to achieve dissimilar ends. As emphasized by Hillier and Vance, military leadership was necessary to influence the direction of the campaign – that is, the ability to affect military objectives. Canadian politicians defined the utility of military power differently.

The following framework is an attempt to illustrate how the Canadian government has typically defined the utility of military power, as conceptualized by four motivators – political, military, branding, and fulfilment of obligation. Each is affected by the competing need to be acceptable to domestic Canadian audiences while also remaining credible to military partners (see figure 1.1). The motivators are expressed as a Venn diagram, within which the objectives of any given deployment are graphed in relation to their emphasis on either the credibility or acceptability requirement. For example, the objective of degrading ISIS’ combat power in Syria through offensive air strikes as part of Operation Impact - the initial Canadian contribution to the campaign against ISIS - is graphed as a military motivation with high credibility to military partners but low acceptability to domestic audiences. When the Canadian government refocused the counter-ISIS mission in 2015 to emphasize training the Kurdish Peshmerga, the activity shifts along Y-axis and increases in acceptability while retaining credibility due to the increased ground force commitment.

Military motivations occupy the top left quadrant on the graph; therefore, objectives related to this motivation have difficulty achieving high acceptability among Canadians. The

location of this motivator is a function of ‘contribution warfare’, wherein Canada is almost never responsible for creating solutions to the operational problem and therefore the government is unlikely to be held accountable by the Canadian public for failing to do so. Assuming a leadership responsibility for the attainment of purely military objectives, as the CAF did in Kandahar province in 2006, would likely improve Canada’s level of credibility with its partners, but measuring effectiveness is essential in determining its relative value. This point will be discussed below.




Figure 1.1 – Conceptualizing the Strategic Utility of Canadian Military Power

The level of acceptability increases if the objective of the deployment is related to the fulfillment of an obligation or to a responsibility. These include alliance commitments, such as air defence activities within NORAD, or a response to a humanitarian disaster, such as the DART deployment to the Philippines in 2013. Responding to the NATO Article 5 invocation, the initial

Canadian deployment to Afghanistan in 2001 was “probably as non-discretionary as one could conceive” while being broadly popular.¹⁰⁷ Not all obligations hold equal weight. The financial commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence is an important if imprecise metric that helps retain credibility with Canada’s closest military partners; however, spending to this level has far less acceptability to domestic audiences. A state can also shoulder an enduring military leadership obligation. Canada has historically occupied the rotating force command of the Standing NATO Maritime Group One (SNMG1) and more recently accepted responsibility for the leadership of the NATO enhanced forward presence battlegroup in Latvia.

Political motivators are located in the bottom right quadrant. These motivators are related to values, such as the employment of military force to alleviate human suffering in Somalia in the early nineties, or those relating to ‘doctrines’, such as the *Responsibility to Protect*, which was used as the underlying rationale for action against Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. These motivators may also serve larger geopolitical goals such as the desire to maintain regional stability in Southern Europe, which was a major ‘impulse’ for Canadian action in Kosovo, or to reinforce the authority of the UN, as Mulroney attempted during the Persian Gulf War. Objectives with political motivation have higher potential for acceptability. In these cases, Canadian governments can tailor their actions for domestic impact. Deployments may also be influenced by diaspora politics - for example, the repeated commitment of the Canadian military to operations in Haiti; others may be targeted to avoid commitments elsewhere, such as the Chrétien government’s decision to deploy an army battlegroup to Kabul in 2003 as a more palatable destination than Iraq for Canadian soldiers. Military leadership is associated to this motivator when occupying such roles furthers a political narrative. During an award ceremony

¹⁰⁷ Eric Tremblay and Bill Bentley, “Canada’s Strategic Culture: Grand Strategy and the Utility of Force,” *Canadian Military Journal* 15, no. 3 (Summer 2015), 15.

for Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard, the Canadian who commanded the NATO air war over Libya, PM Harper described his performance as evidence of a willingness to shoulder difficult military tasks abroad.

Finally, military power can be applied with branding motivations. These may include deployments to promote the image of a ‘warrior nation’ that does not “cut and run”, or to signal a return to the powerfully mythologized peacekeeping role. Leadership itself can be pursued as a brand, as the Harper government so explicitly declared in its various foreign policy pronouncements and as Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has more recently done in his mandate letters to his Foreign and Defence ministers.¹⁰⁸ While branding motivators can be popular, they are also fragile. Peacekeeping became discredited in the mid-1990s in the face of mounting operational difficulties in the Balkans. The fiercely rhetorical posture taken by the Harper government in Afghanistan quickly eroded in the face of sustained combat losses. Branding has limited effectiveness in developing credibility with Canadian military partners, but political leaders will claim otherwise. Several governments, including the current one, have argued that Canada provides a qualitatively superior contribution in high profile military roles, which is more valuable to our partners than a larger commitment assigned to a safe area of operations with restricted tactical parameters.¹⁰⁹ The effectiveness of this logic with our partners is debatable. As a result, this motivator is located in the bottom left quadrant of the graph.

Military leadership roles can be expressed within each of the primary motivators, but their effectiveness must be measured to ascertain whether they improve strategic outcomes. The

¹⁰⁸ Government of Canada, “Minister of Foreign Affairs Mandate Letter”, Office of the Prime Minister, accessed at <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-foreign-affairs-mandate-letter>; Government of Canada, “Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter”, Office of the Prime Minister, accessed at <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-national-defence-mandate-letter>.

¹⁰⁹ Matthew Fisher, “Pressure for more Canadian defence spending will come from both the U.S. and Europe”, *National Post* (4 March, 2017), accessed at <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/world/matthew-fisher-pressure-for-more-canadian-defence-spending-will-come-from-both-the-u-s-and-europe>.

link to leadership effectiveness is contained within the acceptability and credibility requirements (see figure 1.2). The degree to which military operations are deemed acceptable to domestic Canadian audiences is expressed as a simple formula of *legitimacy – risk to force – cost + leadership*. Legitimacy is the most important variable and refers to the operation’s underlying or perceived legality as derived from a UN mandate, treaty provision, or collective decision by a coalition. Legitimacy can also be associated to the battlefield behaviour of Canadian units and the nature of the tactical tasks assigned to them. Risk to force is a reflection of the level of danger faced by deployed Canadian service members and the probability or eventuality of their loss. The cost of a mission can be evaluated in financial terms and also in its duration. A military leadership role can offset weakness in the latter two variables, but will provide no added benefit if the perceived legitimacy of the operation is the subject of controversy or absent. In fact, leadership under this circumstance may further degrade the acceptability to Canadians.




Figure 1.2 – Leadership as a Function of Strategic Utility

The credibility of a Canadian military deployment to its Allies and partners is also expressed as a formula: *commitment + willingness + capability*. Commitment refers to the level of resources devoted to the operation, which may be drawn from the military, the diplomatic corps and, increasingly, the whole-of-government. Changes to bureaucratic processes, such as the creation of a mission-specific inter-departmental task force, are also indicators of commitment.

Willingness is the antidote to risk; it is reflected in the government's public communications plan and in the employment parameters, or 'caveats', imposed on the Canadian tactical element.

Finally, capability is the qualitative component of the military contribution. These three variables added together produce credibility. The effectiveness of a leadership role is directly proportional to the credibility of the underlying military commitment.

CHAPTER 2 – CASE STUDY: EASTERN ZAIRE 1996

Background

In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, huge numbers of Hutus fled into Eastern Zaire to escape the advancing Tutsi Rwanda People's Front (RPF). Led by Paul Kagame, the RPF gained control of the country in July 1994 and drove former members of les Forces armées rwandaises (FAR), including key genocidaires and their Interahamwe militia, into hiding among the displaced Hutu population.¹¹⁰ The refugee population initially settled in a region occupied by Zairian Tutsis known as the Banyamulenge. Although the United Nations (UN) devoted much effort through its refugee agency to deliver humanitarian aid, it was not able to address the growing tensions and violence in the Great Lakes region. During 1995-1996, hundreds of thousands of Hutus and Tutsis crisscrossed the border while armed factions on all sides fought one another.¹¹¹ In October 1996, the Zairian rebel group of Laurent Kabila began to target UN personnel and supply centres, which precipitated their withdrawal by UN Secretary General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali.¹¹² Continued fighting then prompted a new group of refugees, whose scale and condition would become highly significant and intensely controversial, to move further west into the Zairian jungle. Limited accurate information contributed to a sense of pending humanitarian catastrophe.¹¹³

Crisis

Active Canadian involvement in the crisis began in the final week of October, when Ambassador Raymond Chrétien, nephew to the Prime Minister (PM), was appointed by the

¹¹⁰ Michael A. Hennessy, "Operation 'Assurance': Planning a Multi-National Force for Rwanda/Zaire," *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no. 1 (Spring 2001), 12.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² United Nations, "Letter Dated 7 November 1996 from the Secretary General Addressed to the President of the Security Council," S/1996/916, 1.

¹¹³ James Bartleman, *Rollercoaster: My Hectic Years as Jean Chretien's Diplomatic Advisor 1994-1998* (Toronto: Douglas Gibson, 2005), 181.

UNSG as Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region. With accurate information in short supply, he was dispatched to the continent with the mission to “establish the facts” on the ground.¹¹⁴ On the day of his departure, African regional leaders met in Nairobi to call for a neutral military intervention force to establish “safe corridors and temporary sanctuaries” for humanitarian purposes.¹¹⁵ On 7 November, Boutros-Ghali called for its authorization and recommended that it be structured as a multinational force (MNF) led by a member-state.¹¹⁶ That same day, two senior US government officials transmitted to their Canadian counterparts the unusual offer to place US military forces under Canadian command should Canada accept leadership of the MNF.¹¹⁷ In New York, the UNSC passed Resolution 1078, endorsing the MNF and calling on member states to develop a plan for humanitarian intervention.¹¹⁸

During the weekend of 8-10 November, PM Jean Chrétien received several updates from his nephew regarding the situation and, after determining significant international interest existed to mount an operation, he decided to act.¹¹⁹ Chrétien publicly announced Canadian willingness to lead the MNF, with the critical stipulation of US support, and called on the international community to act.¹²⁰ US officials immediately began to qualify their support, which prompted a Canadian delegation to visit Washington to “put the train back on the tracks.”¹²¹ Over a series of difficult late-night meetings, US and Canadian officials hammered out a framework for a

¹¹⁴ United Nations, “Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to the Great Lakes region”, S/1996/1036, 12 Dec 96, 2.

¹¹⁵ *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1078*, S/RES/1078 (1996), 2.

¹¹⁶ Boutros-Ghali, “Letter Dated 7 November...”, 1-2.

¹¹⁷ Bartleman, *Rollercoaster...*, 183.

¹¹⁸ *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1078*, 3.

¹¹⁹ John B. Hay, *Conditions of Influence: A Canadian Case Study in the Diplomacy of Intervention*, Occasional Paper 19 (Ottawa: Norman Patterson School of International Relations, 1999), 7-8; Bartleman, *Rollercoaster...*, 185-187.

¹²⁰ “Chretien Challenges World Leaders: Seeks Support for Force to Help Starving Refugees,” *The Spectator*, 13 Nov 1996.

¹²¹ Bartleman, *Rollercoaster...*, 187.

circumscribed American military participation under Canadian leadership. On 15 November, UNSCR 1080 authorized the MNF with a Chapter VII mandate under Canadian leadership.

The facts on the ground began to change on the same day. Not wanting to cede control of Eastern Zaire to an international force, the Banyamulenge Tutsis along with Kabila's rebels successfully targeted former members of the FAR and the Interahamwe in the camps, thereby allowing the refugee population to begin returning to Rwanda.¹²² The momentum of international diplomacy carried mission preparations forward, but the rapidly evolving situation hampered multinational planning efforts. Indeed, a three-day conference of participating nations in Stuttgart, Germany succeeded only in developing a set of limited options, none of which would actually achieve the operational goal. Two days later, Canadian diplomats delivered an ultimatum to their partners on a modified option, and on 28 November, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy and Minister of National Defence Doug Young announced the formal creation of the coalition.¹²³

On the ground, Force Commander Lieutenant General Maurice Baril struggled to develop a military solution to the evolving situation. In a 29 November report to Boutros-Ghali, he wrote "it is difficult at the present stage to provide...a comprehensive concept of operations for a humanitarian task force."¹²⁴ Diplomatic willingness began to crumble and, in the words of Chrétien foreign policy advisor James Bartleman, the mission "died the death of a thousand cuts..."¹²⁵ The governments of Zaire and Rwanda withdrew their consent to the deployment, key members of the coalition became increasingly skeptical and even obstructionist, and humanitarian agencies could not explain why the returning refugees appeared in television

¹²² Hay, *Conditions of Influence...*, 19.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 23-24.

¹²⁴ As quoted in Hay, *Conditions of Influence...*, 26.

¹²⁵ Bartleman, *Rollercoaster...*, 199.

reports to be in such good condition.¹²⁶ The issue was settled for the Canadian government when it became clear US support had vanished.¹²⁷ On 13 December, Canada formally notified the UNSC that it would end its commitment.

Goals

As a result of assuming the leadership role early in the crisis, the operational goals of the Government of Canada (GoC) were closely aligned with those articulated in UN documents. The preamble to UNSCR 1078 describes language from the 5 November African regional conference that urged the “establishment of safe corridors and temporary sanctuaries” and identified the repatriation of refugees as a “crucial element for the stability of the region.”¹²⁸ In his 7 November letter to the Security Council, Boutros-Ghali called for an intervention force mandated to stabilize the local security situation; enable the return of humanitarian agencies and their personnel to deliver aid; and set the conditions for the rapid repatriation of refugee populations.¹²⁹ Resolution 1080, which was drafted with Canadian input, described the objectives of the MNF as enabling the immediate return of humanitarian relief organizations, supporting their delivery of aid to displaced persons, and facilitating the “voluntary, orderly repatriation of refugees...”¹³⁰

Speaking in the House of Commons (HoC) on 18 November, PM Chrétien defined the Canadian objective as facilitating the “delivery of humanitarian aid by civilian relief organizations to alleviate the immediate suffering we have all seen in our homes on our television screens every night and to facilitate the return to their homes in Rwanda of those

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 200.

¹²⁸ *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1078*, 2.

¹²⁹ United Nations, “Letter Dated 7 November...”, 2.

¹³⁰ *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1080*, S/RES/1080 (1996), 2.

refugees who want to return.”¹³¹ In the same session, Minister Axworthy informed parliamentarians that Canada had mobilized an international coalition and was prepared

to offer direct assistance for a multinational force which could provide a secure environment within eastern Zaire to ensure that any humanitarian aid could be effectively delivered and at the same time to support and facilitate the voluntary repatriation and movement of refugees back to their homes in Rwanda.¹³²

In recognizing the immediacy of the problem, Axworthy nonetheless argued for a broader and longer commitment aimed at addressing “the root causes of the problems.”¹³³ The Minister of Defence echoed the dominant theme by explaining Canada’s intention to “lead a force that would help stabilize central Africa and save hundreds of thousands of lives.”¹³⁴ Despite later criticism of an unclear mandate, the mission’s goals were coherent and consistent.

Actor	Objectives	Tasks
United Nations Secretary General	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Stabilize the situation ▪ Create secure conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance (HA) to refugees and displaced persons (RDP) ▪ Create the necessary conditions for the orderly and secure repatriation RDP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Securing airfields and border crossing points ▪ Protection of logistics supply bases in eastern Zaire ▪ Identifying and protecting accessible locations where RDP can be concentrated
UNSCR 1078	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Enable the return of humanitarian agencies ▪ Secure prompt and safe delivery of HA to those in need ▪ Set conditions for voluntary, orderly and secure repatriation of refugees ▪ Regional stability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Establish safe corridors and temporary sanctuaries ▪ Deliver HA and shelter to RDP ▪ Assist UNHCR in protection and repatriation of RDP
UNSCR 1080	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Facilitate the immediate return of HA organizations ▪ Support delivery of aid by HA organizations ▪ Facilitate the repatriation of RDP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not specified
Government of Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Provide a secure environment within Eastern Zaire ▪ Facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid by civilian relief organizations ▪ Facilitate the voluntary return of refugees 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not specified

Table 2.1 – Zaire Mission Goals

Adapted from *United Nations* and *House of Commons*

Analysis

The Canadian government’s actions during this crisis were framed by the four strategic motivators identified in the leadership effectiveness framework (see fig 1.2). Foremost was the

¹³¹ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 35th Parliament, 2nd Session, 18 Nov 96, 6381.

¹³² House of Commons, *Hansard*, 18 Nov 96, 6345.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 18 Nov 96, 6355.

humanitarian imperative, supercharged by the desire to avert what was widely believed to be an impending disaster. In his case study on the intervention, John Hay summarizes the grave concerns of the international community and quotes the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata warning the situation could become a “catastrophe greater than the one we knew in 1994.”¹³⁵ Canadian political leaders were imbued with the same urgency: “...the entire world, including all Canadians,” declared Lloyd Axworthy, “recognized that we stood on a precipice of one of the most tragic human disasters the world has ever faced.”¹³⁶ In the Canadian government’s acceptance of MNF leadership, humanitarian obligation was described as the impulse: “action by the international community is required now to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe.”¹³⁷ PM Chrétien employed highly moralistic language when he explained to Parliament, “we are not entering into combat with an enemy. Our only enemy is human suffering. Our only foe is hunger and disease. Our only adversary is pain and misery.”¹³⁸

There is little doubt Canadian motivations in this case were amplified by Rwandan echoes. James Bartleman is explicit in making this connection, explaining how PM Chrétien and other world leaders “developed a sense of impending tragedy, heightened by the guilty knowledge that the international community had stood by just two years earlier...”¹³⁹ Bartleman also describes with poignancy his personal encounter with General Roméo Dallaire upon his return from Africa: “I remember thinking, however, that it was not only the United Nations that had let him down. His own country could have done more... I found it difficult to look into Dallaire’s eyes.”¹⁴⁰ As a key official in the Privy Council Office, it is not improbable these

¹³⁵ As quoted in Hay, *Conditions of Influence...*, 5.

¹³⁶ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 18 Nov 96, 6345.

¹³⁷ United Nations, “Letter dated 14 November 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General”, S/1996/941, 14 November 1996.

¹³⁸ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 18 Nov 96, 6381.

¹³⁹ Bartleman, *Rollercoaster...*, 181.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 177.

sentiments coloured his advice to the Prime Minister during the crisis. John Hay and David Black both argue that the Rwandan experience was highly relevant to the government's actions during the Zaire crisis; not only had Canadian political leaders internalized the belief the genocide had been preventable by the international community, but they were also committed to averting the reoccurrence of its collective failure to do so.¹⁴¹ Thus, the GoC possessed an action imperative for the fulfillment of a moral humanitarian obligation.

The fulfilment of obligation explains Canada's desire to participate in the intervention, but not to lead it. According to Bartleman, the proposal to place US military forces under Canadian command was a catalyst for leadership. He interpreted the US offer as a desire to act without assuming overall responsibility for the mission and, distrustful of French motives, they believed Canada represented a non-threatening alternative credible to regional governments and international stakeholders.¹⁴² This interpretation is reinforced by James Appathurai and Ralph Lysyshyn, two GoC officials who worked in the Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force (ZITF) during the crisis. "Canada was well placed to lead the formation of this MNF," they wrote in an after-action report, and was acceptable to all parties due to a lack ulterior motives and no colonial baggage.¹⁴³ Throughout the weekend of 8-10 November and in the days following the passage of UNSCR 1078, Chrétien embarked on a sustained lobbying campaign to generate international commitment for a multinational force. He succeeded in gaining troops pledges, but found that no other country was interested in taking a leadership role.¹⁴⁴ Energized by situational reports from his nephew on the ground, legitimized by the UNSCR 1078 call for interest, and

¹⁴¹ David R. Black, *Canada & Africa in the New Millennium: The Politics of Consistent Inconsistency* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2015), 69; Hay, *Conditions of Influence...*, 4.

¹⁴² Bartleman, *Rollercoaster...*, 183-184.

¹⁴³ James Appathurai and Ralph Lysyshyn, *Lessons learned from the Zaire mission* (Ottawa: Dept. of National Defence and Dept. of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1997), 2.

¹⁴⁴ Bartleman, *Rollercoaster...*, 186; Jeff Sallot and Paul Knox, "Canada pushes for U.S. support, Intense lobbying to get humanitarian mission to Zaire off the ground also aimed at the UN," *The Globe and Mail* (13 Nov 96), A1.

galvanized by the US offer of support, but with limited prospects of external initiation, the PM determined that a Canadian leadership role was critical to achieving his *political objective* of generating a visible, tangible international response to prevent a second genocide. The contention that Chrétien employed leadership principally as a mechanism to achieve his objectives is supported by his comments to *The Globe and Mail* on 13 November, “Canada is willing to surrender leadership and play a secondary role if any other country, including the United States, wants to organize and command the mission.”¹⁴⁵ The theme of Canada as a mobilizer of action is ubiquitous in Parliamentary statements. “We have already won an early battle against moral blindness and self-interest by galvanizing the world community into action,” declared Chrétien in the House, “Let us now do what is required to complete the work.”¹⁴⁶

Canadian political leaders employed branding strategies during the crisis, primarily in terms of peacekeeping and constructive internationalism. During the Parliamentary take note debate, Foreign Minister Axworthy described the government’s actions as consistent with a “long Canadian tradition of involvement as a major peacekeeper...”¹⁴⁷ Defence Minister Doug Young explained, “that Canada should take a lead in this endeavor should come as no surprise. Canada has a long and proud tradition of promoting international stability and coming to the aid of those in need.”¹⁴⁸ PM Chrétien described Canada as a dependable actor on the international stage, declaring that “when it is time to stand up and be counted, Canada is there. That is the way it was through two world wars and 40 years of peacekeeping.”¹⁴⁹ Branding was not a primary motivator of Canadian strategic behaviour in this case, but it does help explain why Canada was prepared to contribute forces, even before the mission had taken shape and as both

¹⁴⁵ Sallot and Knox, “Canada pushes for U.S. support...”, A1.

¹⁴⁶ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 18 Nov 96, 6381.

¹⁴⁷ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 18 Nov 96, 6345.

¹⁴⁸ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 18 Nov 96, 6354.

¹⁴⁹ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 18 Nov 96, 6380.

the Foreign and Defence departments anticipated.¹⁵⁰ Branding as a motivator for action, however, is inadequate to explain expeditionary military leadership, especially as such a role was inconsistent with Canada's prevailing contributory approach. Rather, it was employed by political leaders to help publicly justify the decisions already taken, the risks being assumed and the resources that needed to be expended.

The military objectives, or ends, were quite clearly defined by the UN; they even suggested several methods of achieving them, such as "safe corridors and temporary sanctuaries." While important, these ways were secondary, at least initially, to the GoC. Gen Baril expressed frustration at the lack of operational guidance from Ottawa, stating "...the only apparent elements of a national strategy were the objectives inferred from UNSC Resolution 1080."¹⁵¹ Perhaps not understanding the important role of Canadian officials in shaping the resolution itself, his frustration nonetheless exposed a deficiency of strategic culture within the Defence department and the CAF. As Dr. Michael Hennessy explains so clearly in his analysis of the operation, Canadian military doctrine was built on the critical supposition that an external actor would supply the strategy and Canada would furnish elements to execute it.¹⁵² But, if Gen Baril could not relate the tactical ways to the strategic ends, it was a failure of interpretation at NDHQ and MNF HQ, not a lack of political guidance. The importance of military objectives relative to the government's goals became sharper as the crisis developed. At the Stuttgart meetings in November, Canadian officials struggled to forge consensus for action amongst the participants. At that point, the US and UK were not prepared to take any steps beyond the establishment of the force headquarters. This course of action, labelled 'option B', left the Canadians exasperated. In Hay's words: "To the prime minister and officials in Foreign Affairs,

¹⁵⁰ Bartleman, *Rollercoaster...*, 182.

¹⁵¹ As quoted in Hennessy, "Operation Assurance...", 18.

¹⁵² Hennessy, "Operation Assurance...", 18.

option B was unacceptable because it would not allow for the delivery of humanitarian assistance...¹⁵³ This necessitated a decisive engagement by Canadian officials, who engineered a hard-headed diplomatic compromise that enabled the mission to continue.¹⁵⁴ Canada's leadership role required a level of attention and commitment to the military objectives that was abnormal to the government's strategic culture.

In generating acceptability to Canadian audiences, the GoC was in a position of strength regarding the mission's legitimacy. It was sanctioned explicitly by the UN in two Security Council Resolutions and possessed the consent, at least initially, of national governments in the region. A broad coalition of nations had been assembled by the PM consisting of both Western and African troop contributors, which mitigated the optics of yet another foreign intervention on the continent. The risks, however, were prominent, and were widely recognized by government, parliament and the media. During the initial public announcement of Canadian leadership on 12 November, PM Chrétien deliberately qualified his willingness to lead with six conditions that limited Canada's responsibility and controlled its exposure.¹⁵⁵ These conditions were reaffirmed by the Defence Minister a week later in Parliament, where he spent more time articulating the limitations he was imposing on the CAF than on selling the mission. "Let me take a moment to tell the House what [the MNF] will not do," he avowed, then proceeded to list seven non-approved military tasks.¹⁵⁶ While minimizing the risk exposure of the force, his restrictions also drastically curtailed Gen Baril's flexibility in achieving his objectives. Costs were controlled by limiting the military commitment to 1,500 personnel, which included the force headquarters and token engineering, medical, and air transport elements, and the limiting duration of the mandate

¹⁵³ Hay, *Conditions of Influence...*, 23.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 23-25.

¹⁵⁵ Bartleman, *Rollercoaster...*, 186-187.

¹⁵⁶ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 18 Nov 96, 6355.

to six months. Further, Chrétien was able to generate approximately \$100 million in financial contributions from the international community.¹⁵⁷ Overall, the government generated a level of acceptability to Canadian audiences that was more than adequate. The mission was legitimate and costs were controlled. Strict parameters mitigated the operational risk exposure, despite a healthy degree of skepticism and concern on the opposition benches and in the media. Finally, occupying a leadership role further strengthened the government's hand and elicited a powerful domestic response. "The Canadian media went wild," recalled Bartleman, "for once it seemed that the United States was following Canada's lead on a major international event rather than the other way around."¹⁵⁸

Generating credibility amongst Canada's military partners was more difficult. First, the level of resources committed to the mission was wholly inadequate for a lead nation. This fact was well understood, particularly by senior defence officials, who informed Bartleman, "at most, a thousand soldiers might be scraped together; certainly not enough to give Canada the credibility to take the lead, even supported by the Americans, in such a major operation."¹⁵⁹ The nature of the elements committed was also a big problem. In their after-action review, Apparuthai and Lysyshyn noted that "by taking the lead of the mission without contributing combat troops, Canada was in a weak military and political position."¹⁶⁰ At the Stuttgart meetings in November, the Canadian delegation discovered it possessed limited leverage to prompt action because Canada did not have the means to execute a tactical manoeuvre on the ground. The Canadian operational headquarters could not even confirm the facts on the ground

¹⁵⁷ Bartleman, *Rollercoaster...*, 186.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 195.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 185.

¹⁶⁰ Apparuthai and Lysyshyn, *Lessons Learned...*, 11.

as it was entirely reliant on foreign aerial surveillance to supply the intelligence necessary to do so.

Second, the Canadian government's willingness to act was strong, but qualified. The ability of Canadian political leaders to generate collective action was powerfully enabled by its acceptance of the leadership responsibility and the attendant employment authorities granted to it by the UN, such as the ability to use "all necessary means" to achieve the mission's objectives.¹⁶¹ The long list of provisos imposed by Minister Young and others certainly undercut the Force Commander's ability to act; however, these conditions represented the political cost of mounting the mission and were reflective of the limited capacity of the Canadian military. In addition, it was the Americans themselves who insisted on a restricted terms of reference. Bartleman describes the impact of limitations imposed by US officials during the 12 November White House meetings: "the [force] commander, we realized, would have no more authority than General Dallaire had had in the spring of 1994 to stop another massacre."¹⁶²

Third, military capability impacted Canada's ability to lead the MNF effectively. Apparuthai and Lysyshyn remarked the government benefited from "few levers, beyond moral suasion, to pressure larger nations..." and recommended that Canada not attempt coalition leadership without "guaranteed access to key military resources..."¹⁶³ In a startling admission, LGen Baril reported to the Chief of the Defence Staff that the CAF was in over its head and lacked "the tools or knowledge necessary to control either specific events or the general situation."¹⁶⁴ John Hay is quite scathing in his assessment of Canada's credibility, noting France

¹⁶¹ *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1080*, 2.

¹⁶² Bartleman, *Rollercoaster...*, 193.

¹⁶³ Apparuthai and Lysyshyn, *Lessons Learned...*, 4.

¹⁶⁴ As quoted in Hennessy, "Operation Assurance...", 17.

and Britain both harboured serious reservations of the Canadian capacity to lead.¹⁶⁵ For their part, “the Americans were...unconvinced that Canada was ready and competent to take command of an intervention in Zaire.”¹⁶⁶ Bartleman counters by arguing persuasively that US senior officials used limited Canadian capability as a negotiating tactic to extricate themselves from overcommitment¹⁶⁷ In the end, it is safe to conclude the Canadian government benefited greatly from the early termination of the mission.

Analysts have described the key government failing in this crisis as an ends-means mismatch. David Black concludes, “the Canadian Forces lacked the resources and experience to successfully fulfill the role for which its political masters had volunteered.”¹⁶⁸ Douglas Bland is harshly critical of Canadian performance and suggests the government embarrassed itself in front of US and UK allies.¹⁶⁹ These authors, however, have only considered success within a narrowly defined military frame and have also ignored the ends- ways relationship. The political goals of the Canadian government were achieved. While it is true the voluntary return of refugees largely solved the humanitarian crisis, the international community was mobilized into action in a manner and with the speed that was shamefully absent in 1994. As Black concedes, “government officials subsequently claimed, not entirely without reason, that the international initiative Canada briefly led helped break the regional impasse and bring an end to the looming crisis.”¹⁷⁰ Operational military leadership was the critical lubricant to achieve the Prime Minister’s objectives.

¹⁶⁵ Hay, *Conditions of Influence...*, 17-18.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁶⁷ Bartleman, *Rollercoaster...*, 191-2.

¹⁶⁸ Black, *Canada and Africa...*, 71.

¹⁶⁹ Douglas Bland, *Canada and Military Coalitions* (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2002), 12.

¹⁷⁰ Black, *Canada and Africa...*, 72.

CHAPTER 3 – CASE STUDY: TRANSITION TO KANDAHAR 2005-06

Background

Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the Canadian government immediately joined the nascent US-led campaign against global terrorism. The initial Canadian military contribution was dispatched to South West Asia in October. In February 2002, an infantry Battle Group (BG) was deployed to Kandahar under US tactical command to conduct a six month combat mission to help destroy al-Qaeda and the Taliban.¹⁷¹ After the stunning collapse of the Taliban regime, the international community began to reestablish legitimate authority in Afghanistan. The Bonn Agreement called for an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to be focused first in Kabul and then expanded to other parts of the country as circumstances permitted.¹⁷²

In the summer 2003, Canada returned to Afghanistan, serving for two and a half years in a stabilization role in the capital. A number of factors contributed to this decision. First, the government had always been keen to serve in Kabul, even after it was rebuffed by the Europeans in 2001 as ISAF was being formed. Second, Ottawa was searching for a way to contribute under a multinational framework that was broader than the American-dominated Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Third, the government was responding to a US request, which provided the secondary benefit of balancing a decision to not participate in the Iraq invasion.¹⁷³

Transition

The transition of the Canadian Forces from Kabul to Kandahar began as early as spring 2003 when the government started contemplating the provision of a Provincial Reconstruction

¹⁷¹ Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, “Canadian Forces in Afghanistan,” (Ottawa: House of Commons, June 2007), 42; Government of Canada (GoC), “Canadian Forces Commitment in Afghanistan to Date,” Backgrounder (Department of National Defence, 16 May 2005), accessed at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=canadian-forces-commitment-in-afghanistan-to-date/hnocfoj8>.

¹⁷² United Nations, *Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions*, S/2001/1154 (5 December 2001); see also United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386, S/RES/1386 (2001) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1510, S/RES/1510 (2003).

¹⁷³ Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War...*, 15-17, 48-51, 65.

Team (PRT). In his memoir, Bill Graham explains how the Martin government viewed ISAF through a whole-of-government (WoG) lens. The PRT offered an attractive sequel to the Kabul commitment. It represented a small deployment, integrated across an innovative three-pillar governance model, and it did not require an offensive combat role; it also fit neatly within the context of the government's review of Canada's international policies.¹⁷⁴ Finally, the PRTs were a key part of NATO's plan to expand its footprint throughout the country and transition the Alliance to a nation-building posture in Afghanistan.¹⁷⁵

Various authors have considered the motives behind the transition of the Canadian commitment from Kabul to Kandahar, but they can be refined to five main reasons. First, the Martin government had difficulty deciding where to place the PRT.¹⁷⁶ As a result, the options became narrower as NATO members filled in locations in the North and West. Second, Kandahar occupied a strategic location that offered high international visibility for the troop contributing nation. This was attractive to and endorsed by all three departments with significant interests: Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).¹⁷⁷ Canadian Ambassador Chris Alexander remarked, "we recommended Kandahar from the start. Everyone knew it was going to be a pivotal province. As Kandahar goes, so goes Afghanistan."¹⁷⁸ Third, Canada was drawn into Kandahar through a combination of multilateral and bilateral commitments, where previous decisions on Afghanistan shaped the options available to government in 2005.¹⁷⁹ Fourth, the Martin government's decision not to sign onto the Bush Administration's Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program created tension in the US-

¹⁷⁴ Graham, *The Call of the World...*, 380; Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War...*, 107-108

¹⁷⁵ David Bercuson and J.L. Granatstein, *Lessons Learned? What Canada Should Learn from Afghanistan* (Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2011), 6; Kimberly Marten, "From Kabul to Kandahar...", 217.

¹⁷⁶ Graham, *The Call of the World...*, 380.

¹⁷⁷ David Bercuson and J.L. Granatstein, *Lessons Learned?...*, 21-22; Marten, "From Kabul to Kandahar...", 219.

¹⁷⁸ As quoted in Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War...*, 133.

¹⁷⁹ Matthew Willis, "An unexpected war, a not-unexpected mission: the origins of Kandahar 2005," *International Journal* 67, no.4 (Autumn 2012), 979.

Canada relationship that necessitated a counter-balancing concession. Although the rift was likely overstated, its perception elicited a powerful response within the Canadian policymaking apparatus. As Stein and Lang argue,

A new consensus, led by DND, was rapidly emerging in Ottawa, Canada, and in particular the Canadian Forces, needed to do something significant for Washington – something that the Pentagon really valued – to compensate for the refusal to participate in Ballistic Missile Defence.¹⁸⁰

Government officials, however, “implied that Canada’s intention to create a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar would not be enough.”¹⁸¹ Enter General Rick Hillier, who provides the final reason.

The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) has been widely blamed for the Canadian involvement in Kandahar, and Philippe Lagassé is harshly critical of his role in the defence policy process.¹⁸² Hillier was not responsible for the government’s decision, but he was influential in framing it and he advocated forcefully the dramatic expansion of the mission’s scope and scale. Minister Bill Graham, then in the Defence portfolio, explains that Hillier approached him in March 2005 with an ambitious five-piece proposal that included, along with the PRT, an innovative advisory team embedded within the Afghan government. In addition, he pitched a 12-month combat role conducted by an infantry Battle Group and a Special Operations component overseen by a tactical headquarters responsible for coordinating US Coalition and later NATO actions throughout the Kandahar region. For his part, Graham describes feeling comfortable: “It fit our foreign policy objectives and had a clear realistic mandate; it had adequate resources, international allies and a multi-stage rollout; and, perhaps most necessary of

¹⁸⁰ Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War...*, 181.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸² Philippe Lagassé, “A mixed legacy...”, 618; see also Stein and Lang, and Willis.

all, it had a definite exit strategy.”¹⁸³ Hillier argued that this expanded role would generate valuable influence in Washington and provide valuable burden-sharing within the NATO alliance.¹⁸⁴ The deployment decision also served his internal transformation objectives. As Kimberly Marten argues, it “fit Hillier’s strategic vision of what the Canadian Forces should be doing.”¹⁸⁵ In the end, Cabinet approved the full package, but only after the CDS insisted on including the leadership role and had promised Martin that it would not affect the military’s capacity to deploy elsewhere.¹⁸⁶

Goals

The Canadian national goals in Afghanistan after 2005 remained consistent, even though the 2006 election, which was held after Martin’s decision to expand but before the CAF could deploy their complete package into Kandahar, produced a new government. Little more than two weeks before the Liberals fell on a vote of non-confidence, Minister of Foreign Affairs Pierre Pettigrew rose in the House to participate in a take note debate on the mission. He articulated the government’s goals succinctly: “our country plays a leading role in the international action to help Afghanistan become a stable, democratic, self-sufficient state that respects human rights and that will never harbour terrorists again.”¹⁸⁷ These three elements, stability and reconstruction, human rights promotion, and counter-terrorism were repeated in Parliamentary statements by both Liberal and Conservative Ministers (see Table 3.1). Burden-sharing was an underlying theme and its unifying quality, especially in the post-9/11 era, is evident even in the position of

¹⁸³ Graham, *The Call of the World...*, 382-383.

¹⁸⁴ Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War...*, 183-184; Graham, *The Call of the World...*, 382.

¹⁸⁵ Marten, “From Kabul to Kandahar...”, 220.

¹⁸⁶ Stein and Land, *The Unexpected War...*, 192, 195.

¹⁸⁷ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 38th Parliament, 1st Session, 15 Nov 05, 1855.

the Bloc Quebecois which expressed its support through the prism of “international solidarity.”¹⁸⁸

Actor	Objectives
Bill Graham, MND 16 May 05	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reinforce authority of the Afghan government ▪ Strengthen security
Bill Graham, MND 15 Nov 05	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assist in providing security and stability ▪ Extend Afghan government authority throughout the country ▪ Prevent Afghanistan from becoming a failed or narco-state
Peter Mackay, MFA 10 Apr 06	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven for terrorist organizations ▪ Assist Afghanistan become a stable, secure and self-sustaining democratic state
Gordon O'Connor, MND 10 Apr 06	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Protect the safety and prosperity of Canadians ▪ Address threats away from Canadian borders ▪ Burden-sharing
Jose Verner, Minister of International Cooperation 10 Apr 06	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Humanitarianism ▪ Equal rights for women
Peter Van Loan, Parliamentary Secretary to MFA 10 Apr 06	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reconstruction and nation-building
Stephen Harper, PM 17 May 06	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Prevent the return of al-Qaeda and the Taliban ▪ Ensure a stable, safe, self-sufficient, democratic Afghanistan ▪ Promote human rights and the rights of women

Table 3.1 – Afghanistan Mission Goals (2005-06)
Adapted from *House of Commons*

These goals were also reflected in the various reports commissioned to measure progress. In February 2007, the Harper government reiterated its goals: “to improve the security situation, help extend the authority of the Government of Afghanistan, and facilitate the delivery of programs and projects that support the economic recovery and rehabilitation of the country.”¹⁸⁹ Despite a change in the domestic political atmosphere surrounding the mission, the Manley Commission expressed Canadian goals in 2008 as: “countering the terrorist threat, by foreclosing the regression of Afghanistan as a haven again for terrorists...[and] to help build a stable and developing country in which the rights of all citizens are respected and their security is protected by their own government.”¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁸ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, 10 Apr 06, 2055.

¹⁸⁹ Report to Parliament, *Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan: Measuring Progress*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada, Feb 07), 7.

¹⁹⁰ Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, *Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008), 20.

Analysis

The Canadian government's actions during the transition of the mission into Kandahar were framed by the four strategic motivators identified in the leadership effectiveness framework (see fig 1.2). For the Martin Liberals, the primary motivator was political: their first goal was to operationalize the International and Defence Policy statements (IPS/DPS). They saw in the Afghan mission an opportunity to demonstrate a new type of strategic response, based on the concept of integrated whole-of-government action, applied to threat vectors identified within their own strategic analysis. During their May 2005 submission to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT) announcing the force expansion, Ministers Pettigrew and Graham both explicitly framed the commitment in the language of the IPS/DPS.¹⁹¹ Later that fall, the Defence minister expanded on this theme in the House:

Several months ago the government published its new defence and international policy statements. These statements were not academic exercises...I want to leave my colleagues with the statement that this mission to Afghanistan is consistent with Canada's new international defence policies. In fact, it is the most significant, tangible expression of these policies in action.¹⁹²

The importance of supporting the international system is borne out by the government's emphasis on burden-sharing, which constitutes the second political goal. By 2005, the international community was deeply involved in the Afghan campaign and, due in some measure to Canada's diplomatic efforts, NATO had assumed responsibility for the ISAF mission.¹⁹³ Canada needed to contribute. "Our presence in Afghanistan is a good thing for us," argued Minister Graham during the Nov 2005 take note debate, "in order to regularize our status as members of the international community as a whole, particularly since this is a NATO mission

¹⁹¹ Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT), *Evidence*, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, 16 May 05, 1010-1015.

¹⁹² House of Commons, *Hansard*, 15 Nov 05, 2025-2035.

¹⁹³ Willis, "An unexpected war, a not unexpected mission..." 985.

under UN authorization.”¹⁹⁴ Hillier’s force package represented a significant contribution and was designed, in part, to gain attention from Canada’s allies. The Defence minister drew this connection during a speech in Vancouver: “nor should we underestimate just how much this participation contributes to Canada’s standing in the international community, where there is universal appreciation of the threat posed by an unstable Afghanistan.”¹⁹⁵ The operational challenges became starkly apparent as the insurgency gained strength, and supporting Alliance efforts became ever more important. Indeed, the Manley Panel advised the Conservative government in their 2008 report: “Afghanistan represents a challenge to NATO’s credibility...[and] NATO’s success in that conflict will serve Canada’s own security interests.”¹⁹⁶ Operational leadership is evident here, but only as a by-product of the Canadian military’s heavy commitment of forces. It was required more to service the deployment than to guide the mission.

The third political goal was to improve the international legitimacy of the operation itself. Initially, ISAF had been responsible for stability operations in Kabul while the American-led OEF mission conducted a largely counter-terrorism mission through the rest of the country. NATO gradually expanded its responsibility, but when the Canadians first deployed to Kandahar in 2005, the Americans were still in charge. This posed a political problem for the government, especially in the context of widespread anti-American sentiment following the invasion of Iraq.¹⁹⁷ NATO expansion was the answer, and it was a factor considered from the start. Consider Graham’s comments to the SCFAIT on 16 May 05: “[Canada] will also play a key role

¹⁹⁴ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 15 Nov 05, 1950.

¹⁹⁵ Bill Graham (speech), “The Canadian Forces Mission in Afghanistan: Canadian Policy and Values in Action,” Vancouver, Canada, 09 Nov 05.

¹⁹⁶ Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan..., 21.

¹⁹⁷ Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War...*, 187.

in completing the transition from coalition to NATO leadership in Afghanistan.”¹⁹⁸ Expansion into Kandahar also met an Afghan Presidential goal of broadening the international presence in that area.¹⁹⁹ Leadership was important in achieving this goal, even though it represented an enabling objective. A significant Canadian presence in Kandahar, including the headquarters component, undoubtedly facilitated the transfer of responsibility from OEF to ISAF. As Graham declared to the House,

By taking the lead in this mission...[Canada] is enabling the very thing which the critics of the mission ignore; that is a transfer from being a coalition American mission to a NATO mission. In fact, it is the courageous acts of the Canadians that will allow this to become a truly international mission...²⁰⁰

The fulfilment of obligation was important to the initial commitment of Canadian military forces to the campaign in Afghanistan. Indeed, the NATO Article 5 collective defence provision was invoked for the first time in the Alliance’s history following the 9/11 attacks.²⁰¹ As the mission matured, however, obligation was regarded by Canadian government in a more limited manner. To some extent, Canada needed to deploy a PRT because such a commitment had been promised to NATO.²⁰² The Conservatives approached obligation similarly. While debating the extension of the mission, both Prime Minister Harper and Defence Minister Gordon O’Connor identified the Afghanistan Compact, which established outcomes, benchmarks and mutual obligations for international donors, as a reason for remaining until 2011.²⁰³ The government’s first progress report on the mission stated: “Canada has become a key contributor to the Afghanistan Compact, which commits the international community...to achieve progress

¹⁹⁸ SCFAIT, *Evidence*, 16 May 05, 1015.

¹⁹⁹ Graham, *The Call of the World...*, 382.

²⁰⁰ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 10 Apr 06, 1825.

²⁰¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Collective Defence – Article 5”, accessed at www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm.

²⁰² Graham, *The Call of the World...*, 381; Willis, “An unexpected war, a not-unexpected mission..”, 988.

²⁰³ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 17 May 06, 1745, 1850.

in three critical and interrelated areas...²⁰⁴ Finally, O'Connor expressed obligation in terms of tactical solidarity in Southern Afghanistan: "The planned contributions of the U.K. and the Netherlands...are predicated upon Canadian participation in this mission."²⁰⁵ Leadership in this case was expressed *as* obligation, although the Conservatives used the term rhetorically to emphasize responsibility. "Canada, one of the oldest democracies and one of the richest countries on earth," intoned the Defence minister, "has a global responsibility as a member of the international community to show leadership in helping overcome the problems of Afghanistan."²⁰⁶

Branding was used by both governments, but for the Conservatives it represented a primary motivator. As described in Chapter 1, Harper expressed his international policies in terms of an assertive values-laden internationalism, wherein Canada would shoulder difficult duty under hazardous circumstances as a means to regain lost credibility. "Canada does not shrink or shirk duty in the face of adversity," he told Parliamentarians, "in times of turmoil, in places where security is at risk, Canada has always been there. We step up, we step in, we carry our load, we keep faith, and we do not break our word."²⁰⁷ Equally important was the desire to promote the image of Canada as a warfighter. The Conservative-dominated Standing Committee on National Defence tabled a report on the mission, in which it declared "Canada has taken sides in this issue. Along with its allies, Canada has decided to stand with the democratically elected government of Afghanistan. Therefore, the mission is not, and never has been, anything akin to a peacekeeping mission."²⁰⁸ Branding influenced even the Manley report. Indeed, one of the

²⁰⁴ *Canada's Mission in Afghanistan...*, 3.

²⁰⁵ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 17 May 06, 1845; see also Willis, "An unexpected war, a not-unexpected mission...", 989.

²⁰⁶ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 17 May 06, 1820.

²⁰⁷ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 17 May 06, 1745.

²⁰⁸ Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, "Canadian Forces in Afghanistan...", 14.

five recommendations called for a rationalization of Canadian development assistance into a direct donor-recipient architecture that resulted in a “signature” project that could be visibly tied to Canada.²⁰⁹ In the end, leadership *was* the brand for the Harper government.

Achieving military operational objectives was the least significant of the four motivators. As one of many partners within a very large coalition, Canada did not possess much influence or leverage over campaign direction. Moreover, tactical actions in the Kandahar region were integrated by ISAF Headquarters in Kabul, not PCO or NDHQ in Ottawa. So, the government communicated security and stability gains in general terms, and preferred to describe the mission as unfinished.²¹⁰ General Hillier fully understood this coalition dynamic and its implication for Canadian operational behaviour identified by Colonel Jonathan Vance, but he refused to accept participation-as-effect. The CDS purposefully created in this deployment the tools necessary to exert greater influence over military outcomes. Key components of his force package were designed to provide intelligence on the Taliban, create a better understanding of the operating environment in Kandahar, and generate influence over Afghan decision-making.²¹¹ The headquarters provided a structural means to apply military leadership over coalition operations in Kandahar province, and the PRT permitted Canada to affect the prioritization of development programming and governance assistance. Yet, it is not at all clear Canadian political leaders were interested in “running a good [operational] campaign,” as Vance argued they should. When Martin needed to reduce the size of Hillier’s original force package to lower the financial cost, he attempted to cut the headquarters. At best, this displayed his ambivalence to the mechanics of military force employment; at worst, the action suggests that Martin viewed the headquarters as

²⁰⁹ Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan..., 36, 38.

²¹⁰ Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, “Canadian Forces in Afghanistan...”, 84-86; Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan..., 22-29; *Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan...*, 5-7.

²¹¹ Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War...*, 183-184.

unable to provide a tangible strategic output the way the PRT so neatly reflected the spirit of his international policies. The value of leading the PRT was itself questioned in the Manley Report, whose members were perhaps not as invested in the Martin-era IPS: “In 2005 Canada chose, *for whatever reason*, to assume leadership of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar City and security obligations that went with it”²¹² [emphasis added]. Finally, the Manley Panel identified the need to derive better strategic outcomes in Afghanistan, but most damningly for military leaders like Hillier and Vance, it was not through the application of the operational art. The panelists, all august members of Canadian political and civil society, concluded that Canadian military participation had generated the conditions for the credible exercise of diplomatic leadership.²¹³

The GoC struggled to generate acceptability for the mission in Kandahar from domestic audiences. The international deployment was authorized by numerous UN Security Council resolutions, military forces were present with the explicit consent of the Afghan government, and reconstruction efforts were governed by an international agreement of over sixty states and a dozen international organizations. Although, the American-led OEF mission caused political problems at first, these were largely resolved by ISAF expansion. The Kandahar mission’s risk envelope, on the other hand, proved very difficult for both governments to manage. In the first instance, the Liberals did not adequately understand the threat environment in Southern Afghanistan: “What we underestimated,” recalled Bill Graham, “was the scale, intensity and duration of the fighting our troops would face.”²¹⁴ This led to risk reduction exercises, such as the emergency purchase of additional military equipment. Under pressure from the Opposition, the Martin government quickly endorsed a precipitous procurement strategy for the military:

²¹² Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan..., 23.

²¹³ Ibid, 34, 37.

²¹⁴ Graham, *The Call of the World...*, 384.

“Whatever else they need they will get,” declared the Defence Minister’s Parliamentary Secretary.²¹⁵ More famously, the Manley Report predicated their recommendation for continued participation in the Afghan mission on a new fleet of helicopters intended to reduce the number of ground convoys exposed to roadside bombs.²¹⁶ The costs of the mission escalated rapidly. In a 2008 report by the Parliamentary Budget Officer, costs to-date were estimated within a range of \$7.66 to \$10.47 billion, which was a far cry from the Martin government’s initial estimate of \$1.2 billion.²¹⁷ And by 2007-2008, the average annual cost of keeping a single Canadian soldier in Afghanistan had reached more than \$675,000.²¹⁸ The Prime Minister tried to downplay the numbers: “I know this is a lot of money but nobody in Canada is going to say you are spending too much for Canadians who are putting this lives on the line.”²¹⁹ The impact of leadership to acceptability is difficult to gauge. The popularity of the Harper government could act as a barometer in this regard primarily due to its aggressive leadership branding. In the end, the political rhetoric of a warrior nation that no longer “led from the bleachers” could not adequately counterbalance to the mission’s personnel, financial and materiel costs.

The GoC was more successful in generating credibility amongst Canada’s military partners. First, the resource commitment was enormous. Matthew Willis describes it as “the fullest mobilization of Canadian men and materiel since the Korean War...”²²⁰ Although its size relative to overall troop-levels declined over time, the Canadian Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (JTF-Afg) constituted one of the most potent military elements in the South when it became operational in 2006. At its height, JTF-Afg numbered almost 3000 service members comprising

²¹⁵ House of Commons, *Hansard* 2310, 15 Nov 05, 2310.

²¹⁶ Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan..., 37-38.

²¹⁷ Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, *Fiscal Impact of the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan*, 09 Oct 08, 7; Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War...*, 187.

²¹⁸ *Fiscal Impact of the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan*, 17.

²¹⁹ As quoted in “Afghanistan mission to cost Canada \$18B: report”, *CTV News*, 9 Oct 08, accessed at www.ctvnews.ca/afghanistan-mission-to-cost-canada-18b-report-1.331267.

²²⁰ Willis, “An unexpected war, a not-unexpected mission”..., 979.

a tactical mentoring group, a field hospital, an air wing and a large logistics element in addition to the components of Hillier's original package.²²¹ Some authors argue that the Canadian contribution was never large enough to be operationally significant to the Americans.²²² The US could not have been dissatisfied, however, with a combat force that was far from symbolic in its composition, holding ground in a strategically important location in the country, and whose employment was unencumbered by tactical "caveats." Furthermore, the quality of the force improved with successive rotations as additional capabilities were added, such M777 howitzers, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and Main Battle Tanks. In the end, the Standing Committee on National Defence described the deployment as "the most combat effective, best trained, best led, best equipped and best supported mission of its kind that Canada has ever deployed. It is among the best national contingents in ISAF..."²²³

It is hard to argue that the Government of Canada achieved its operational goals prior to the final withdrawal of Canadian Forces in 2014. Indeed, the war in Afghanistan continues today in its sixteenth year. Some authors have argued that Canada overcommitted to the mission. "If the political ends can only be symbolic," writes Willis, "it remains to be seen what additional benefits, if any, will be achieved by the more robust military approach inherent in the 2006-11 mission in Kandahar."²²⁴ Or despite Hillier's best efforts, the mission could simply be another example of participation as a strategic goal in itself. This analysis has shown, however, that Canadian political leaders were motivated by deliberately calculated policy objectives. The Liberals wished to demonstrate a new integrated approach to international conflict resolution

²²¹ Department of National Defence, "Joint Task Force – Afghanistan", accessed at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/op-athena-jtf-afghanistan.page>.

²²² David S. McDonough, "Afghanistan and renewing Canadian leadership: Panacea or hubris?", *International Journal* 64, no.3 (Summer 2009), 657

²²³ Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, "Canadian Forces in Afghanistan...", 115.

²²⁴ McDonough, "Afghanistan and renewing Canadian leadership...", 659.

centred on the three pillars of defence, diplomacy and development; and, a charismatic and experienced CDS was savvy enough to recognize an opportunity to operationalize his own transformational goals. Initially, the mission suited the Conservative government's political purposes as well. Harper was quite happy to support Hillier's desire to weaken the peacekeeping myth, and his government leveraged Afghanistan to promote Canada as a warrior nation that followed through on its international commitments. Leadership was omnipresent in its public communications and policy statements, but it was primarily a branding exercise. Hillier's attempt to cohere the ends-ways-means calculation was to offer a scaled-up force package, integrated delivery and an operational leadership role to affect campaign objectives. Combined, these branding and military objectives proved to be a weak basis for Canadian strategic behaviour. The government was simply unable to justify the mission's spiraling costs, leading it to end the combat role in 2011 before both of its key allies.

CHAPTER 4 – CASE STUDY: LIBYA 2011

Background

In the midst of a growing popular revolt across North Africa and the Middle East, later characterized as the Arab Spring, Libyans rose against Muammar Gadhafi's autocratic rule. On 15 February 2011, violent protests began in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi.²²⁵ Escalating unrest spread rapidly and reached the capital less than a week later. Reinforced by helicopter gunships, snipers and African mercenaries, the Libyan security services were unleashed against the population, causing a large number of civilian casualties. These measures proved insufficient and the regime began to crumble as military officers defected, powerful tribes allied themselves against Gadhafi, and protesters gained control of military arsenals. Libyan diplomats even denounced the brutal crackdown by their own government at the United Nations (UN) in New York.²²⁶ Western countries began to evacuate their citizens as Gadhafi postured his forces outside the rebel-held Benghazi. In a televised address on 22 February, the Libyan leader threatened to slaughter the protesters and clear them "house by house."²²⁷ The international community began to mobilize. On 26 February, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1970 condemning Gadhafi's "gross and systematic violation of human rights."²²⁸

Crisis

The Canadian government was an early advocate for a robust international response. "The Libyan authorities must show restraint," stated Minister of Foreign Affairs Lawrence

²²⁵ Alan Cowell, "Protests Take Aim at Leader of Libya", *The New York Times*, 17 Feb 2011, A14.

²²⁶ David Kirkpatrick and Mona el-Naggar, "Libyan civil war looms: Gadhafi's son; Rebels take control of military bases," *The Gazette*, 21 Feb 2011, A4; David Kirkpatrick and Mona el-Naggar, "Qaddafi's Forces Strike with Fury as Unrest Grows," *The New York Times*, 22 Feb 2011, A1.

²²⁷ Richard Spencer, "Rambling despot vows bloody fight; In televised address, Gaddafi refuses to leave Libya, promises retribution," *National Post*, 23 Feb 2011, A1.

²²⁸ *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970*, United Nations, S/RES/1970 (2011).

Cannon on 21 February, “and stop the use of lethal force against protesters.”²²⁹ Five days later, Prime Minister Harper announced the evacuation of Canadians from Libya and declared the actions of the Libyan regime “appalling.”²³⁰ Harper voiced unequivocal support for the measures included in UNSCR 1970, including an arms embargo, travel restrictions, and asset freezes against key members of the regime. Calling for the country’s suspension from the UN Human Rights Council and the referral of Gadhafi’s actions to the International Criminal Court (ICC), Harper declared firmly: “the Libyan regime must and will be held accountable for its violation of human rights atrocities committed against the Libyan people.”²³¹ The PM continued the government’s hardline by imposing bi-lateral sanctions on top of those approved by the UN and calling for the removal of the Libyan leader from power.²³² Several days later, the navy frigate *HMCS Charlottetown* was dispatched from Halifax to join a NATO flotilla in the Mediterranean.²³³

The situation in Libya continued to deteriorate. Amid calls for further action, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 authorizing the use of “all necessary means” to protect civilians and implementing a no-fly zone.²³⁴ The initial air campaign was organized under a coalition Joint Task Force led by US Africa Command. On 19 March, aircraft assigned to Operation Odyssey Dawn began enforcing the no-fly zone by destroying the Libyan air-defence

²²⁹ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), “Statement by Minister Cannon on Situation of Civil Unrest in Libya,” News Release no. 73, 21 February 2011.

²³⁰ Prime Minister’s Office, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the Current Situation in Libya,” 25 February 2011.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Prime Minister’s Office, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on Implementing Sanctions Against Libya,” 27 February 2011.

²³³ Department of National Defence (DND), “HMCS Charlottetown Deploys in Response to the International Crisis in Libya,” News Release, 01 Mar 2011, accessed at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=hmcs-charlottetown-deploys-in-response-to-the-international-crisis-in-libya/hnps1vau>.

²³⁴ *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973*, United Nations, S/RES/1973 (2011).

system.²³⁵ Canada joined the coalition on the same day and augmented its military contribution with an air wing that ultimately comprised CF-18 fighters, CC-150 and CC-130 air refuelers, and CP-140 surveillance aircraft.²³⁶ The naval component enforcing the maritime embargo was established on 22 March under NATO command as Operation Unified Protector (OUP). By the end of the month, the Alliance assumed control of the air war as well. On 31 March, Lieutenant General Charlie Bouchard, a Canadian senior officer assigned to NATO duty in Naples, Italy, took command of Combined Joint Task Force Unified Protector.²³⁷

As the fighting continued through the summer, Libyan opposition coalesced around the National Transitional Council (NTC). Canada officially recognized the NTC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people on 14 June as part of the government's "enhanced engagement strategy."²³⁸ In early September, Tripoli was captured by rebel forces and the Canadian diplomatic mission was re-established. "Canada is proud to have 'punched above its weight'," stated foreign minister John Baird, "by leading the way in providing humanitarian, diplomatic and military support to the Libyan people and their cause."²³⁹ On 20 October, Gadhafi was dragged from a culvert by rebel forces and summarily executed. Less than two weeks later, NATO declared the country liberated and the enforcement mission was officially suspended.²⁴⁰ In Ottawa, PM Harper offered his congratulations: "The Libyan people have

²³⁵ US Department of Defence (DoD), "Coalition Launches 'Operation Odyssey Dawn'," 19 Mar 2011, accessed at <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=63225>.

²³⁶ DND, "Statement by Minister MacKay on the Deployment of CF-18s to Enforce a No-Fly Zone over Libya," 18 Mar 2011; DND, "Operation Mobile: Mission metrics," accessed at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/op-mobile-metrics.page>.

²³⁷ Rachel Bryson et al., *Canada in Libya: Strategic Lessons Learned* (Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2012), 1-2.

²³⁸ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, 14 Jun 2011, 313.

²³⁹ DFAIT, "Statement by Minister Baird Updating Canada's involvement in Libya," News Release no. 262, 13 Sept 2011; Mike Blanchfield, "Canada to reopen embassy in Tripoli," *Toronto Star*, 12 Sept 2011, accessed at https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2011/09/12/canada_to_reopen_embassy_in_tripoli.html.

²⁴⁰ British Broadcasting Corporation, "Muammar Gaddafi: How he died," 31 Oct 2011, accessed at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15390980>; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO Secretary General

courageously risen up against decades of tyranny. Canada's involvement, as sanctioned by the United Nations and led by NATO, has supported their aspirations for the future."²⁴¹ In the end, Canadian jets conducted almost 950 air-to-ground strikes; naval frigates were active in conducting boardings and gathering intelligence as part of the embargo, and in providing air defence protection for mine clearance operations.²⁴²

Goals

During the Libyan crisis, mission goals were initially focused on consequence management: halting attacks by the Gadhafi regime on its own population, and evacuating foreign civilians. UN Security Council Resolution 1970 demanded "an immediate end to the violence and [called] for steps to fulfil the legitimate demands of the population," and urged the Libyan authorities to "ensure the safety of all foreign nationals...and facilitate [their] departure..."²⁴³ The Government of Canada (GoC) pursued a parallel effort to assure the safety of Canadians through a non-combatant evacuation and to bring diplomatic pressure against the regime. During the first parliamentary debate on 21 March, Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Lawrence Cannon described the government's normative approach. Canada's aim was:

...to isolate the Gadhafi regime, cut it off from its financial resources, deprive it of its legitimacy and ensure that there will be no impunity for crimes against humanity committed against the civilian population and for violations of international humanitarian law.²⁴⁴

Throughout the crisis, Canadian objectives centred on the protection of civilians, the respect for human rights, including the right to free speech and assembly, and enabling a peaceful transition of power. It was this last objective, left ambiguous in both UNSC resolutions,

Statement on end of Libya mission," Press Release (2011) 136, 28 Oct 2011, accessed at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_80052.htm.

²⁴¹ Prime Minister's Office, "Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on Libya's liberation," 23 Oct 2011.

²⁴² Department of National Defence, "Operation Mobile," accessed at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/op-mobile.page>.

²⁴³ *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970*, S/RES/1970 (2011).

²⁴⁴ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 40th Parliament, 3rd Session, 21 Mar 2011, 9051.

which became controversial. Indeed, the international community wanted to orchestrate a rapid end to the violence and, in the context of the Arab Spring, preserve the right of the Libyan people to protest peacefully against the regime. Since the coalition had been mandated to protect civilians and populated areas, airstrikes against regime targets provided indirect support to opposition political efforts; regime change thus became an inevitable, if second order, consequence of the operation.²⁴⁵ The Canadian government had difficulty threading this needle. As early as 27 February, Harper began calling for Gadhafi's ouster. In his statement announcing the implementation UNSCR 1970, the Prime Minister described his objective: "Far from protecting the Libyan people against peril, [Gadhafi] is the root cause of the dangers they face. It is clear that the only acceptable course of action for him is to halt the bloodshed and to immediately vacate his position."²⁴⁶ The opposition parties, in particular the New Democrats, demanded that the government to clarify its stance on regime change – an outcome not explicitly authorized by the UNSCR – but their messaging was muddled. The Conservatives conceded that it was for the Libyan people to decide their own political future and the role of the coalition was to provide them the opportunity to make such choices.²⁴⁷

After NATO assumed responsibility for the air campaign, the Canadian government adopted a refined set of Alliance objectives (see Table 4.1). From the outset, NATO was clear in its desire to remove Gadhafi from power and, in a strongly worded communique on 14 April, declared that it would devote "all necessary resources" to execute robust enforcement actions.²⁴⁸

The Canadian position was well aligned with that of its allies. Minister of National Defence

²⁴⁵ Chris De Cock, "Operation Unified Protector and the Protection of Civilians in Libya," in *Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law*, Vol 14, eds M.N. Schmitt and L. Arimatsu (The Hague: Asser Press, 2012), 217.

²⁴⁶ Prime Minister's Office, "Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on Implementing Sanctions against Libya," 27 Feb 2011.

²⁴⁷ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 21 Mar 2011, 9043, 9051, 9062.

²⁴⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Statement on Libya following the working lunch of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs with non-NATO contributors to Operation Unified Protector," Press Release (2011) 045, 14 Apr 2011.

(MND) Peter MacKay read the NATO objectives into the parliamentary record during the second debate on 14 June.²⁴⁹

Actor	Objectives	Tasks
UNSCR 1970 26 February 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ End to the violence ▪ Address the legitimate demands of the Libyan people 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Arms embargo ▪ Asset freeze of Gadhafi & associates ▪ Travel restriction of Gadhafi & associates ▪ ICC referral
UNSCR 1973 17 March 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ End to all attacks against civilians and civilian populated areas ▪ Respond to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people ▪ Ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas ▪ Ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and humanitarian personnel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No-fly zone ▪ Intensified arms embargo ▪ Expanded asset freeze
Government of Canada February 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ End to the use of force against civilians ▪ Provide access for human rights monitors ▪ Allow safe passage of humanitarian supplies ▪ Respect freedom of speech and right to assembly ▪ Regime change ▪ Protection of Canadians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Non-combatant evacuation ▪ Implementation of UNSCR 1970 measures ▪ Expanded asset freeze and travel restrictions on Government of Libya ▪ Seek suspension of Libya from UN Human Rights Council
Government of Canada March 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ End to attacks on civilians ▪ Protect Libyan rights to freedom of speech and assembly ▪ Enable a peaceful transition to democracy ▪ Restore peace and stability in Libya 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Implementation of UNSCR 1973 measures
Government of Canada June 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Protect the Libyan civilian population ▪ Degrade the regime capability to target opposition and civilians ▪ Create the conditions for a genuine political opening ▪ NATO goals (see below) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Implementation of UNSCR 1973 measures
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 14 Apr 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ End to all attacks and threats of attack against civilians and civilian populated areas ▪ Verifiable withdrawal of all regime military forces to bases ▪ Immediate, full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all Libyans in need 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Robust enforcement of UNSCR 1973 measures

Table 4.1 – Libya Mission Goals

Adapted from *United Nations, House of Commons, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Government of Canada*.

Analysis

The Canadian government's actions during the 2011 Libyan crisis were framed by the four strategic motivators identified in the leadership effectiveness framework (see fig 1.2). First and foremost, there existed a compelling humanitarian action imperative, which was expressed normatively as the responsibility of governments to respect the rights of their citizens and

²⁴⁹ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 14 Jun 2011, 323.

safeguard their own population from attack. As the Prime Minister stated on 25 February, “the killing of innocent civilians – the citizens of its own country – constitutes a gross violation of human rights and must carry serious consequences.”²⁵⁰ The UNSC resolutions, to which the Canadian government firmly subscribed, are filled with the language of humanitarian obligation. For example in the preamble to UNSCR 1973, the Libyan authorities were reminded of their responsibilities toward their own population: “parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians...”²⁵¹ Canadian Defence Minister Peter MacKay alluded to these obligations during the first Parliamentary debate: “In this situation,” he said, “we are compelled to intervene, both in a moral duty and by duty of NATO and the United Nations... In this situation, deploying the Canadian Forces is the right thing to do...”²⁵² These sentiments were strongly supported by most Parliamentarians; indeed, “it was Colonel Gadhafi’s determination to take the life of his own people that led to the decision of the international community to respond,” explained Liberal Foreign Affairs critic Bob Rae, “and that provides us with the justification for the response.”²⁵³ In addition to the military contribution to the coalition operation, the government included a symbolic aspect to the fulfillment of its obligation by seeking the removal of Libya from the UN Human Rights Council and the referral of the Gadhafi regime’s actions to the ICC. “It would be an affront to the courageous people of Libya,” declared Minister Lawrence Cannon, “for the Qadhafi regime to continue to have a voice on the Human Rights Council... [It] is no place for a regime that commits gross violations of human rights.”²⁵⁴

²⁵⁰ Prime Minister’s Office, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the Current Situation in Libya,” 25 Feb 2011.

²⁵¹ *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973*, S/RES/1973 (2011).

²⁵² House of Commons, *Hansard*, 21 Mar 2011, 9040.

²⁵³ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 21 Mar 2011, 9044.

²⁵⁴ DFAIT, “Canada Applauds Suspension of Libya from UN Human Rights Council,” News Release no. 87, 01 Mar 2011.

In the Libyan example, leadership was significant primarily as a means to highlight decisive action, as the Prime Minister explained toward the end of the conflict: “We saw a blatant wrong being perpetrated by a brutal regime and took a leadership role with our allies to help set it right.”²⁵⁵ The Canadian government’s political goals were two-fold. First, it wished to occupy a role of importance on the international stage and be seen as a strong, moral actor unafraid to commit hard power during crisis. On 20 September in New York, the Prime Minister described Canada as “committed to promoting peace and stability around the globe. In keeping with this objective, it has been playing a major role in protecting the people of Libya...”²⁵⁶ Importantly, the government credited its early public advocacy and muscular military role against the Gadhafi regime for generating political influence. In a vivid counter to the perceived diplomatic snub in Bosnia, the Canadian government not only gained membership to the Libya Contact Group, but was also invited to participate in ‘High-level’ meetings of coalition members discussing mission-specific strategic issues.²⁵⁷ Canadian political leaders also eagerly embraced the trope of the country ‘punching above its weight;’ PM Harper used it during a speech to the Canadian air wing in Sicily on 01 September, and alluding to the influence gained: “...in the job of neutralizing Gaddafi, Canada played a part well out of all proportion.”²⁵⁸

Second, the Conservatives viewed multilateralism as a method to achieve a specific outcome rather than pursuing it for its own sake. Minister Baird articulated this stance in his speech to the UN General Assembly as the Libyan air campaign drew to a close:

Multilateral institutions and multilateral action result from a collection of sovereign decisions based on individual states’ own interests: Not narrow self-interest in sovereignty’s name, but an expanded view of mutual interest in which

²⁵⁵ Prime Minister’s Office, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada On the End of NATO-led Libyan Mission,” 28 Oct 2011.

²⁵⁶ Prime Minister’s Office, “High-level Meeting on Libya,” 20 Sep 2011.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Prime Minister’s Office, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada while in Trapani, Italy,” 01 Sept 2011.

there is room for all to grow and to prosper. Canada calls this “enlightened sovereignty.”²⁵⁹

This may help explain why the government was motivated to embrace an offensive combat role in support first of the Odyssey Dawn coalition and subsequently to NATO’s more expansive interpretation of UNSCR 1973, which accelerated the removal of Gadhafi from power. As University of Calgary researchers explain in their report on Canadian lessons learned in Libya: “PM Harper has shown a preference for NATO and its priorities over extensive participation with the UN.”²⁶⁰

The Conservative government employed a branding strategy during the Libya crisis that was complementary to its initial messaging on Afghanistan, and it provided useful mitigation to the optics of Canada’s withdrawal from Kandahar. Canadian political leaders employed action-oriented language that offered a binary moral absolutism. “For the Gaddafis of this world pay no attention to the force of argument,” declared the Prime Minister in his September speech to the troops, “the only thing they get is the argument of force. And that you have delivered in a cause that is good and right.”²⁶¹ The internationalism of high principle was on display during a speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the UN General Assembly where, perhaps feeling scorned by the recent failure to secure a rotating seat on the UNSC, he declared, “this is the Canadian tradition. Standing for what is principled and just, regardless of whether it is popular, or convenient, or expedient.”²⁶² The government was quick to recycle its Afghanistan-era position of backing principle and rhetoric with action. According to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Defence Minister, “...we can talk about supporting freedom, or we can act to support freedom.

²⁵⁹ DFAIT, “Address by the Honourable John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the United Nations General Assembly,” No. 2011/30, 26 Sept 2011.

²⁶⁰ Rachel Bryson et al., *Canada in Libya...*, 10.

²⁶¹ Prime Minister’s Office, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada while in Trapani, Italy,” 01 Sept 2011.

²⁶² DFAIT, “Address by the Honourable John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the United Nations General Assembly,” No. 2011/30, 26 Sept 2011.

This is what we are doing along with our allies.”²⁶³ Libya allowed the Prime Minister to reaffirm his conception of principled commitment, despite having ordered the end to Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan. “So let no-one ever question whether Canada is prepared to stay the course in defence of what is right,” he declared during his ‘Day of Honour’ speech in Ottawa, “those who talk the talk of human rights must from time to time be prepared to likewise walk the walk.”²⁶⁴

Military objectives in this case were not insignificant strategic motivators, in so far as the reduction of attacks on civilians could be correlated to the status of Gadhafi’s offensive capabilities. The government was keen to demonstrate a significant commitment of combat forces unrestricted by tactical employment limitations, as the Prime Minister emphasized in both of his September speeches and was reflected positively in the media.²⁶⁵ The military operational leadership appeared to be an important factor in deriving influence, as a Canadian officer occupied the role of NATO operational commander; however, Harper did not recognize military leadership as having created disproportionate strategic outcomes. Instead, the impact of Bouchard’s role was viewed as an amplifying, if fortuitous, by-product of participation. The Prime Minister praised the individual performance, not the derived outcome: “I want to...commend [Lieutenant General Bouchard] for his pivotal role in leading the combined NATO military mission. He has represented our country with distinction.”²⁶⁶

²⁶³ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 21 Mar 2011, 9061.

²⁶⁴ Prime Minister’s Office, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada paying tribute to troops who served on Libyan mission,” 24 November 2011.

²⁶⁵ Tom Blackwell, “The hunt is on for Gaddafi; Canada ‘punching above its weight’; Libya effort lauded; Disproportionate contribution,” *National Post*, 26 Aug 2011, A1.

²⁶⁶ Prime Minister’s Office, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada On the End of NATO-led Libyan Mission,” 28 Oct 2011.

An Ipsos poll conducted in May 2011 found a huge majority of Canadians supportive of the NATO military intervention.²⁶⁷ While the mission's overall legitimacy was built on a strong foundation of international norms surrounding the protection of civilians and two UNSC Resolutions, the execution of the military campaign was more controversial. General air strikes on Gadhafi's ground forces were not interpreted by all NATO members as consistent to the enforcement of the no-fly zone, and these differences had to be resolved deliberately prior to the transition from the US-led Operation Odyssey Dawn to NATO's Unified Protector.²⁶⁸ These tensions were reflected in the House of Commons, where during the mission debates, Opposition members repeatedly sought clarification from the government regarding its operational intentions. "The mission and goal of protecting civilians had changed to something different," submitted Jack Harris, the New Democratic Party's (NDP) defence critic, "we were into some sort of regime change as an objective of the NATO mission... It is not for this country to do that."²⁶⁹ Importantly, it was military operational leadership that resolved the Official Opposition's concerns and engendered their support for the government's motion. The previous day, LGen Bouchard had been quoted in *The Globe and Mail* noting that although "[Gadhafi] has lost his moral authority to lead his nation... my job is not regime change."²⁷⁰ In subsequent statements to the House, Harris referred to this comment by the operational commander: "I thank General Bouchard for stating that so emphatically and clearly, so that we will not be confused,

²⁶⁷ Ipsos, "Ipsos Global Advisory: Majority (60%) of Global Citizens Support NATO's Military Intervention in Libya," 12 May 2011, accessed at <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news-polls/pressrelease.aspx?id=5234>.

²⁶⁸ British Broadcasting Corporation, "Libya: Nato to take command of no-fly zone," 25 Mar 2011, accessed at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12856665>; Ian Traynor and Nicholas Watt, "Libya: Nato to control no-fly zone after France gives way to Turkey," *The Guardian*, 25 Mar 2011, accessed at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/24/france-turkey-nato-libya>.

²⁶⁹ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 14 Jun 2011, 332.

²⁷⁰ As quoted in Paul Koring, "'It's a knife-fight in a phone booth' / Canadian directing the war in Libya speaks," *The Globe and Mail*, 13 Jun 2011, A1.

regardless of the kind of statements that we hear from the Minister of National Defence.”²⁷¹ The NDP supported the government motion.

Canada’s military commitment to the operation in Libya was credible to its allies and partners. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) mobilized quickly. The navy arrived first, in early March, and maintained a modern surface combatant fully integrated within the NATO flotilla off the coast for the better part of eight months. Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) fighters, properly equipped with precision munitions, joined the Odyssey Dawn mission on its first day and were assigned to conduct offensive strikes. Canada was one of only eight NATO members to accept such a role. Despite their small size, the air wing completed approximately 10% of all strike sorties. Finally, the CAF supported LGen Bouchard’s targeting responsibilities with surveillance aircraft and intelligence processing functions.²⁷² As this crisis commenced while the Canadian military was still fully engaged in Afghanistan, opening a second theatre of combat operations must have represented a significant additional commitment for the CAF. A strategic lessons learned report commissioned by Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), supports this finding in spite of criticism for the small force package: “When evaluated in appropriate context, however,” it concludes, “the Canadian contribution is proportionate to that of the other allies.”²⁷³ The size of the contribution was offset by the robust employment authorities granted to it by government. The Prime Minister proudly highlighted the absence of tactical limitations in a speech in September: “...it bears repeating that the RCAF has flown – without caveats... a good 10 percent of the strikes.”²⁷⁴ The media appeared to agree with the

²⁷¹ House of Commons, *Hansard*, 14 Jun 2011, 332.

²⁷² Department of National Defence, “Operation Mobile: Mission metrics,” accessed at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/op-mobile-metrics.page>; Rachael Bryson et al., *Canada in Libya...*, 22.

²⁷³ Rachael Bryson et al., *Canada in Libya...*, 22.

²⁷⁴ Prime Minister’s Office, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada while in Trapani, Italy,” 01 Sept 2011.

overall conclusion: “It seems clear...” reported Tom Blackwell of the *National Post*, “that for better or worse this country has well exceeded the peripheral role that many observers expected it to play.”²⁷⁵

The Canadian government achieved its political objectives during the Libyan crisis. It responded rapidly and decisively to fulfil a humanitarian obligation and, importantly for the Conservatives, did so as part of a bespoke coalition of like-minded states acting on a values-based issue. Displaying a high level of public commitment, fortified by a military component empowered with assertive tactical authorities, the Canadian government succeeded in deriving strategic influence. It filled a significant international political role as a member of Libya Contact Group and as a party to the ‘High level’ discussions. In the Libyan conflict, Harper scaled Canada’s military commitment appropriately to the Conservative government’s political objectives; the force package was ‘just enough’ to validate Canadian inclusion in the mission’s political decision-making structure. In the end, military operational leadership during the Libyan crisis was important because it helped sustain domestic acceptability by enhancing the mission’s legitimacy and it had an impact in abating political risk through the exercise of control over the targeting process. The optics of leadership also proved beneficial to the government’s strategic objectives. Examining the body of public statements by government during the Libyan conflict, one can conclude LGen Bouchard was at times used as a prop for branding purposes. Nevertheless, his command role was offered as supporting evidence to validate Canada’s position as an important international actor. In this, leadership had utility.

²⁷⁵ Blackwell, “The hunt is on for Gaddafi...”, A1.

CONCLUSION

The Canadian political elite and the country's senior military officers hold different conceptions of leadership. For politicians, leadership can refer to being first on an issue, such as changing norms surrounding humanitarian intervention and the limits of state sovereignty – a position developed by Mulroney and more famously adopted by Chrétien and Axworthy. It can refer to mobilizing international action, such as the intervention in Eastern Zaire considered in the first case study. It can be used to support an established international structure, as demonstrated when Mulroney sought to constrain US action through the UN during Gulf War 1 and by Martin in Afghanistan where NATO's cohesion was called into question. Canadian politicians have also employed the term, or concept of, leadership to display commitment in the face of uncertainty and adversity, as Harper championed Canada's role during the hard years of Kandahar duty. Finally, leadership is used by politicians of all stripes to emphasize a particular interest or position. The Harper government was well known for its values-based rhetoric, but the Liberals have also employed imagery to support their international priorities in human security and, most recently, in the Trudeau government's desire to lead improvements in the behaviour and accountability of deployed UN peacekeepers.²⁷⁶

Canadian foreign policies in the post-Cold War era are filled with aspirations for global leadership, but they have seldom been aligned with defence, where establishing criteria for employment, seeking operational clarity and managing resource constraints have dominated the policy discourse. So it is perhaps unsurprising that senior military officers assign value to leadership for reasons different than politicians. Dismayed by the seeming indifference of governments to operational outcomes, officers such as Rick Hillier and Jonathan Vance have

²⁷⁶ Prime Minister's Office, "Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter", 2015, accessed at www.pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-national-defence-mandate-letter.

promoted leadership roles as a means to improve the strategic impact of deployments whose frequency had been increased to exhausting levels by post-Cold War Prime Ministers. But in doing so, they have at times gone to enormous lengths to solve a problem the political leadership has not recognized as legitimate. There is a danger when political and military leaders use the same language to describe dissimilar outcomes and the consequences of this divergence can have important consequences.

In the 1996 Zaire operation, leadership proved critical. The Chrétien government's political goal was to mobilize international action in response to a compelling and time-sensitive humanitarian situation. In this case, the Prime Minister found that assuming military operational leadership was the only way to achieve his objective; however, the CAF did not possess the doctrine, structures or experience to execute. Political conceptions of leadership overwhelmed the military, and it was fortunate that conditions changed on the ground. During the transition of the Canadian Afghan deployment to Kandahar, leadership was not nearly as important a factor to Ottawa. Martin and Graham were intent on operationalizing their new international policies and demonstrating an innovative approach to solving security issues that integrated the whole of government. The military was well aligned in policy as General Hillier had been granted sweeping authority to devise the defence supplement, and it was here that the CDS restructured the CAF to be more responsive and effective in meeting the challenges of the contemporary security environment. Once NATO assumed responsibility for the entire country, its membership split on sharing the burden of difficult ISAF duty in the restive South. The Canadian government was strongly motivated to assist the Alliance in meeting its operational goals. Assuming a military leadership role may have helped facilitate a smooth transition from American to NATO command in the Kandahar region, thus improving the mission's legitimacy,

but this represented an enabling objective and it was Hillier who convinced the Prime Minister to expand the scale of the commitment. For him, military leadership was key to deriving influence commensurate with the contribution, a view shared by neither Martin nor the Manley Panel. When he took power, Harper was quick to exploit the Canadian position to advance his muscular and moralistic view of leadership in international affairs, but he could not reconcile the size and duration of the campaign to its human, financial and political costs. In Kandahar, military conceptions of leadership overwhelmed the politicians.

The Libyan case study suggests the existence a middle ground. The Prime Minister employed the rhetoric of leadership as evidence of high principle and decisive action. He was fortunate that a Canadian officer on NATO duty was assigned operational command of the mission, because it is not certain that Canada would have been granted such a role if LGen Bouchard had not be so perfectly situated. The government skillfully leveraged Bouchard's role, and combined it with robust employment authorities for the military package to bolster the impact of the Canadian position, while simultaneously keeping the size of commitment modest. The position of leadership also improved the mission's domestic acceptability by helping control political risk. Conceptions of leadership were aligned.

Implications

Senior military officers, defence planners and some academics tend to ignore the relationship between ends and ways, instead focusing on the persistent ends-means mismatch in the Canadian defence setting. If only Canada possessed more ships, planes and battalions, then it would be able to meet its policy commitments and regain a position of influence in global

affairs.²⁷⁷ This is the argument that found its most famous policy expression in the 1987 White Paper. But as Joel Sokolsky has written, “Canadian leaders have proven extremely adept at matching the limited real political benefits of defence spending to the limited contributions, particularly when it comes to overseas operations.”²⁷⁸ Despite the criticism of officers like Jon Vance, the concept of employment, or ways, is often more carefully crafted than mere tactical participation. The capability, nature, location, duration and timing of a military overseas commitment all send signals regarding government intentions and contribute to the achievement of strategic goals. Military operational leadership does not necessarily imply the need to run good campaigns, because the government can regulate its exposure through the size of the contribution and its employment parameters. As Hillier discovered in the Balkans, the relationship between resources expended and influence gained is nonlinear. Military officers must understand how and under what conditions their political leaders intend to employ force; and they should recognize the hazard of inadvertently conflating strategic and operational goals.

Political and military leaders define winning differently. The Eastern Zaire crisis illustrates this point clearly. Prime Minister Chrétien achieved his political goals in spite of the operation’s later characterization as the ‘bungle in the jungle.’ The military may have been deeply frustrated by the perceived lack of strategic guidance, the challenges inherent to coalition-management, and its own capacity limitations, but the exercise of military leadership, however fragile and rudimentary, had strategic utility. Libya demonstrated how the optics of leadership can be leveraged for political and branding objectives. The Conservative government could point to Canada’s early and vocal diplomatic leadership to isolate the Gadhafi regime, to CF-18s

²⁷⁷ Sean Maloney, “Helpful fixer or hired gun? Why Canada goes overseas,” *Policy Options*, 01 Jan 2001, accessed at <http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/2001-odysee-espace/helpful-fixer-or-hired-gun-why-canada-goes-overseas/>

²⁷⁸ Joel J. Sokolsky, “Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chrétien Legacy,” *Policy Matters* 5, no. 2 (Jun 2004), 11.

conducting offensive strike sorties, and to a Canadian officer as operational commander for evidence of Canada's strong commitment to free the Libyan people from an oppressive dictator. In so doing, Canadians gained access to the exclusive multilateral crisis-based deliberative bodies that were denied to Canada in the Balkans.

The Canadian government's permanent bureaucracy does not appear well structured to support leadership roles and manage operational campaigns. The dominant strategic culture of contributing forces for employment by others has resulted in the need to establish adhoc coordination committees within the Privy Council Office (PCO) to support a more substantial role. When the government found itself in charge of the Zaire operation, the Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force (ZITF) was created after the Prime Minister's foreign policy advisor realized the issue was too large to handle on his own. This case study also demonstrated that operational leadership demands attention to military objectives; the Canadian government was unprepared for this reality and a hasty intervention was required of its officials and diplomats following the failed Stuttgart planning conference to salvage the coalition. During the Afghan campaign, the integrated delivery of cross-government effects in the theatre of operations required a parallel machinery to support it in Ottawa, but the Afghanistan Task Force (ATF) was not fully constituted until after the Manley Report. These examples suggest that even should the Canadian government accept an operational leadership role, it would be difficult to sustain in the absence of a strategic culture shift and a more permanent structural architecture to support campaign management.

Finally, force scaling is critical. The Zaire example demonstrates that both the size and nature of the contingent was important, as operational leadership requires both to achieve credibility. In Kandahar, the military footprint was enormous, but so was the concomitant risk

exposure. Yet the benefits accrued to Canada directly by its operational leadership over so many difficult fighting seasons in the Kandahar region are difficult to discern in the public record.

Despite its size, Joint Task Force Afghanistan was never properly resourced to realize the tactical aim of establishing a secure environment throughout the southern region, but this did not prevent criticism for its failure to do so. Ultimately, it is possible the government could have achieved similar strategic outcomes without the heavy responsibilities of leadership and with a much smaller force package. In Libya, Canada achieved the right type of proportionality. An out-sized strategic outcome was derived from a modest air and naval contribution, albeit one that was modern, well configured, interoperable and empowered.

This paper has determined that Canada *can* improve its strategic outcomes by occupying military operational leadership roles, but the conditions matter a great deal. Framed by four motivators of strategic behaviour, military force is employed to fulfil an obligation, and to achieve political, branding and military objectives. These motivators are affected by the often competing demands of domestic acceptability and international credibility. Leadership can improve the former and it derives effectiveness from the latter. But this is where the discrepancy between military and political conceptions of success becomes evident. Soldiers define leadership effectiveness in terms of their ability to achieve military objectives, manifested within a traditionally conceived campaign that links tactical actions to strategic goals. Hillier and Vance were wrong because their conception of success was too narrow; they pursued leadership as an end in itself. The Canadian approach to military operations – ‘contribution warfare’ – often works to the benefit of political leaders by absolving them of the responsibility to solve the operational problem. Politicians also understand that leadership roles are both discretionary and escalatory, and therefore must be approached with caution. The application of military force

overseas holds wider political utility. To them, military leadership offers a method of achieving national strategic goals considered much more broadly, and they can do so without having to run a good military campaign.

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