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CANADA AND DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: IS IT TIME TO BE MORE INVOLVED?

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Association of Southeast Asian Nations	ASEAN
Amphibious Helicopter Dock Ships	LHDS
Canadian Dollars	CAD
Canadian Armed Forces	CAF
Canadian Defence Attaché	CDA
Chief of the Defence Staff	CDS
Canada First Defence Strategy	CFDS
Canadian Review Services	CRS
Defence Cooperation Program	DCP
Deputy Commander	D/Comd
Department of National Defence	DND
Defence Diplomacy Program	DPD
Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation	DMTC
Papua New Guinea Defence Force	PNGDF
Foreign Military Sales	FMS
Gross Domestic Product	GDP
Global Engagement Strategy	GES
Global Affairs Canada	GAC
Military Cooperation and Training Program	MCTP

Minister of National Defence	MND
North American Air Defence	NORAD
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	NATO
Operation	Op
Operational Support Hub	OSH
Peace Support Training Centre	PSTC
Strategic Policy and Intelligence Group	SP&I
United Nations	UN
United Nations Military Observer	UNMILOBS
United Nations Peace Support Operations	UNPSO
United States Dollars	USD

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ABSTRACT

Considered in the context of ministerial responsibilities, the Canadian Forces defence diplomacy program plays a vital role in advancing the interests of Canada. However, with the low resource levels currently committed to defence diplomacy the success of the program has been somewhat underwhelming. This paper argues that an expansion of the CAF's defence diplomacy program would have a disproportionately positive impact on the Government of Canada's ability to foster and enhance relationships with allies and partners, strengthen the capacity of partner countries' defence and security institutions to prevent and manage crises, and significantly improve the ability of DND, on behalf of the Government of Canada, to make informed, timely decisions regarding defence and security matters abroad. These effects could be leveraged to enhance the Government's articulated diplomatic priorities. Finally, providing the CAF with more robust defence diplomacy capabilities would enhance the military's contribution to Canada's defence priorities of increasing support to UNPSOs, protecting Canadian sovereignty, and contributing to the security of Canadian allies. This paper compares Canada's defence diplomacy program to that of Australia's much more robust program to illustrate the positive impacts that can be achieved with proper resources and priorities applied. It concludes with options to enhance the defence diplomacy program the Canadian Armed Forces may wish to consider.

CANADA AND DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: IS IT TIME TO BE MORE INVOLVED?

Defence Diplomacy

In November 1996, under the auspices of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1080, Canada volunteered to lead a multinational coalition tasked to provide relief to Rwandan refugees in Eastern Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). Hutu refugees were escaping Rwanda in order to avoid Tutsi reprisals resulting from the recent genocide.¹ From the start, the Canadian contingent was under-resourced, understaffed, and lacked local knowledge regarding the complex tribal relations in the region. Lieutenant-General Maurice Baril, then Multinational Commander of what was in Canada named Op ASSURANCE, recommended that the mission be terminated on 03 December 1996. In his recommendation to the Chief of the Defence Staff, he stated “We are dealing with big players in a very complex situation without the tools or knowledge necessary to control either specific events or the general situation.”² A subsequent review conducted by a Joint Staff Steering Committee determined that had the mission not been terminated when it was, there would have been significant potential for a foreign policy embarrassment to Canada.³

Had the government of Canada and the CAF had defence diplomacy assets operating in the region prior to the start of Op ASSURANCE, this story might have ended differently. The local knowledge, relationships, and regional understanding that

¹ <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=1&CdnOpId=1>

² Michael Hennessy, “Operation ‘Assurance’: Planning a Multi-National Force for Rwanda/Zaire”, *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no.1 (Spring, 2001): 17.

³ *Ibid.*

such assets might have provided could have allowed the Government and the CAF to make more informed decisions regarding the mission.

The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy defines defence diplomacy as “Empowerment, without duress, in time of peace of the resources of Defence to achieve specific national goals, primarily through relationships with others.”⁴ Noted academics Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster define it as “The peacetime cooperative use of armed forces and related infrastructure as a tool of foreign and security policy.”⁵ Defence diplomacy is not, it should be noted, military diplomacy. As Anton du Plessis has explained “Military Diplomacy refers strictly to the actions of military diplomats like military attaches while defence diplomacy encompasses the entirety of a nation's defence establishment.”⁶

The government of Canada has established its own variation on the meaning of defence diplomacy. According to Canada’s National Defence Global Engagement Strategy, defence diplomacy is “The focused and tailored engagement undertaken by the defence team with partner countries and organizations around the world in order to build and maintain cooperative relationships.”⁷ The “Defence Team” includes both the Department of National Defence and the Global Affairs Canada (GAC). Both DND and GAC work closely with a number of other government departments in the prosecution of their defence diplomacy responsibilities. This paper, however, is most concerned with the much neglected contributions of the Canadian Armed Forces.

⁴ Andrew Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur, *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, (London: Oxford University Press), 2013: 369

⁵ Andrew Cottey, Anthony Foster, *Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance*, (New York: Oxford University Press), 2004: 6

⁶ Anton du Plessis, "Defence Diplomacy: Conceptual and Practical Dimensions with Specific Reference to South Africa." *Strategic Review For Southern Africa* Vol 30, no. 2 (November 2008): 87-119.

⁷ Chief of The Defence Staff and Deputy Minister of National Defence, *National Defence Global Engagement Strategy: Strategic Guidance*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence), 16 April, 2015.

The role of the CAF in defence diplomacy must be understood in the context of ministerial responsibility. According to his mandate letter, the Minister of National Defence (MND) is responsible for protecting Canadian sovereignty, the defence of North America, increasing support to United Nations Peace Support Operations (UNPSO), and contributing to the security and stability of Canadian allies as well as any allied or coalition operations in which Canada participates in abroad.⁸ The minister of foreign affairs has been called on to improve relations with the United States, revitalize cooperation and engagement with partners abroad, and re-energize Canadian diplomacy and leadership on international issues and within multinational institutions. Canada will increase support to United Nations Peace Support Operations and involvement in activities related to mediation, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction.⁹

In this context, the CAF has pledged to maintain its unique relationship with the United States, cultivate relationships with countries with which Canada is likely to share sensitive information and operate alongside of in international engagements, and foster new and budding relationships with countries in the Americas and the Asia-Pacific regions. As will be discussed in later chapters of this work, each of the priorities outlined in the Global Engagement Strategy (GES) is linked to one or more government defence and diplomacy strategic objectives.

From 2010 to 2013, the CAF spent approximately \$96 million per year on defence diplomacy.¹⁰ This money supported Canadian defence attachés, capacity building

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Government of Canada. "Minister of Foreign Affairs Mandate Letter": <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-foreign-affairs-mandate-letter> (accessed 01 February 2017)

¹⁰ Government of Canada. *Evaluation of Defence Policy and Diplomacy*. (Ottawa : Government of Canada), November 2013. <http://www.crs-csex.forces.gc.ca/reports-rapports/2013/213p0976-eng.aspx> (accessed 08 November 2016)

programs, bilateral defence relations, and participation in military forums abroad.¹¹ The Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP), with its \$18 million annual budget, served as a major diplomatic tool. It provided language training, professional development, staff courses, and training in Peace Support Operations to foreign military personnel. In spite of its relatively small budget, the MTCP effectively supported Canada's interoperability with foreign militaries, particularly on UNPSOs. This impact was significant because members of these states trained by Canadians to Canadian standards are often partner participants in UN operations.¹² Further, the capacity building programs and training programs undertaken through the MTCP contributed to the strengthening of the military and security apparatus in partner countries and provided them with increased ability to prepare for, prevent, and combat future security threats.

In spite of such positive effects, the resources the CAF commits towards diplomatic activities are limited. An internal government report in 2014 determined that the 0.64% of total CAF budget allocated to defence diplomacy efforts has effectively flat-lined since 2008.¹³ Nonetheless, military personnel charged with carrying out these activities have seen the volume of their work and the scope of their responsibilities increase by a staggering amount.¹⁴ While it would be difficult in the current fiscal environment for the CAF to be allocated additional funding in order to augment its defence diplomacy activities, it would certainly be within the authority levels of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) to reallocate a small portion of the CAF's current budget.

There are also challenges associated with resourcing that go beyond the strictly financial.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² My own experience with the Peace Support Operations course supports this. Foreign military members that attended the course with me were also participating in UNMISS where we continued to work together.

¹³ Government of Canada. *Evaluation of Defence Policy and Diplomacy*. (Ottawa : Government of Canada), November 2013

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

Personnel and training challenges must also be overcome in order to properly allocate additional resources to a program such as the DPD. This is also a consideration that will be highlighted through this paper. Such thinking is becoming increasingly popular among defence experts like the Ottawa University professor and former DND analyst Thomas Juneau and Queen's University's Stéfanie Von Hlatky. "While defence diplomacy has not featured prominently in the Canadian Defence Lexicon," they recently wrote, "it is an essential but vastly underexploited tool for a medium sized country like Canada to expand its influence abroad."¹⁵ On the other hand, as Juneau also concedes, the overall lack of security threat to Canada it is unlikely that the CAF will be allocated additional resources in the foreseeable future. As such, the CAF will be expected to do "less with less". One of the casualties of this approach is the CAF's engagement activities abroad as their benefit is difficult to defend when considering the CAF's overall personnel, infrastructure and procurement challenges.¹⁶

Taking into consideration the strategic objectives promulgated by the Government of Canada, the effects that the Canadian military attempts to achieve in order to enhance and forward the government's objectives, and the limited financial resources currently committed to defence diplomacy activities, this paper asks: (1) what effects could the Canadian Government, Department of National Defence, and the military potentially realize with an increase to the resources allocated to its already-existing defence diplomacy activities? (2) How would those effects forward the strategic objectives assigned to the Minister of Foreign Affairs? And, finally, (3) how would those effects

¹⁵ Stephanie Von Hlatky, and Thomas Juneau, "Diplomacy Should Be at the Heart of Defence Policy", *The Hill Times*, 29 August 2016.

¹⁶ Thomas Juneau, "Canadian Forces Reality Check: Time to do Less with Less", *The Globe and Mail*, April 14, 2016.

help realize Canada's defence priorities as articulated in the Minister of National Defence's mandate letter?

This paper will argue that an expansion of the CAF's defence diplomacy program would have a disproportionately positive impact on the Government of Canada's ability to foster and enhance relationships with allies and partners, strengthen the capacity of partner countries' defence and security institutions to prevent and manage crises, and significantly improve the ability of DND, on behalf of the Government of Canada, to make informed, timely decisions regarding defence and security matters abroad. Moreover, these effects could be leveraged to enhance the Government's articulated diplomatic priorities of improving relations with the US and re-energizing Canada's leadership abroad in the areas of conflict prevention, mediation, and post-conflict reconstruction. Finally, providing the CAF with more robust defence diplomacy capabilities would enhance the military's contribution to Canada's defence priorities of increasing support to UNPSOs, protecting Canadian sovereignty, and contributing to the security of Canadian allies through coalition operations.

The first chapter of this paper reviews the current state of defence diplomacy in Canada. Included in this discussion are the scope of work and responsibilities placed on those who conduct these activities; how the scope has changed over the last decade; and how these activities contribute to the achievement of the government's defence and diplomacy priorities. Taken as a whole, the chapter illustrates how a lack of resources is curtailing the ability of Canadian defence diplomacy to achieve its intended effects. The second chapter considers how one of Canada's key allies, Australia, employs defence diplomacy in the pursuit of its strategic objectives. Australia is similar to Canada in terms

of population size, gross domestic product and military personnel numbers. As will be illustrated, however, Australia's commitment to defence diplomacy, as can be understood from its resource allocation, is greater than that of Canada for a nation of essentially equal resource capabilities. Australia was used as a single basis of comparison because its activities are of an order of magnitude and nature that would be reasonable for Canada to aspire to. Comparisons with other similar states such as the United Kingdom and France, while informative and interesting, would not produce additional unique conclusions. Comparison with the United States, which commits vast resources towards defence diplomacy, would provide insight in terms of what could be accomplished; however, to assume that Canada could achieve similar effects would be unrealistic. The final chapter argues that should the CAF increase its commitment to defence diplomacy, it could realize enormous benefits.

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY IN CANADA

Defence Policy and Diplomacy Program

DND's Defence Policy and Diplomacy Program (DPDP) encompasses all of the activities intended to support the ability of the CAF, DND and the Canadian Government to make decisions regarding international and domestic military affairs, and to assist in the planning and conduct of military operations. The activities generally fall into two categories. The first, traditional defence policy issues will not be considered in this paper. Rather, this paper will focus on the functions that both DND and the CAF engage in as part of the military component of the defence diplomacy effort: foreign military training, exchanges by senior military personnel, and cooperation programs with several partner countries.

National Defence Global Engagement Strategy

The CAF defence diplomacy functions and their associated activities are outlined in the National Defence Global Engagement Strategy (GES). As a DND document, promulgated jointly by the Deputy Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), its purpose is to guide defence diplomacy activities at all levels within the Canadian Armed Forces while providing for synchronization and coherence in resource allocation among the various DND departments.¹⁷ The GES outlines seven defence strategic interests, each of which can be linked to one of the priorities within the Canada First Defence Strategy and to the mandate letters of the ministers of National Defence and Global Affairs Canada. The GES also outlines the mechanisms through

¹⁷ Cover letter to Canada's Global Engagement Strategy, signed by the CDS and Deputy MND. Available upon request.

which these interests will be achieved.¹⁸

GES Strategic Objectives

Canadian Sovereignty

The sovereignty of Canada and its territory will always be paramount to government.¹⁹ Canada does not have the resources to ensure its sovereignty alone and depends on cooperative defence partnerships to secure its borders. Perhaps the most important partnership Canada has to this end is with the US in the form of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). Another important multinational partnership is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a collective defence organization currently with 28 member states and an additional 22 who participate in what is known as the Partners for Peace Program.²⁰ Since the states involved in both agreements have agreed that their militaries will work cooperatively in the name of collective defence, Canadian military defence diplomacy activities with these states critical.

Canadian Prosperity

The long term prosperity of Canadians is another core priority. A prosperous society allows Canada to project leadership abroad and also ensures the resources

¹⁸ Chief of The Defence Staff and Deputy Minister of National Defence, *Department of National Defence Global Engagement Strategy: Strategic Guidance*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence), 16 April, 2015: 5-7.

¹⁹ Government of Canada, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada), 2008: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/canada-first-defence-strategy.page> (accessed 01 February 2017) ; Government of Canada. “Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter.” (<http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-national-defence-mandate-letter>), (Accessed 05 December 2016).

²⁰ A list of all current members and Partnership for Peace participants is available online at the NATO homepage: http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm (accessed 02 Feb 2017)

required to meet its defence and security goals are available. As a trading nation whose GDP is very much dependent on international trade, prosperity for Canada also depends on positive relationships with the nations Canada conducts trade with. The CAF defence diplomacy activities also contribute to this objective.

Regional and International Stability

As a trading nation, Canada's prosperity depends in part on the security and stability of its trading partners. Without stability, nations are unlikely to have the capacity or the institutions needed to negotiate and support trade relations with other countries such as Canada. Regional stability is also desirable as trade with a stable nation in an unstable region also presents many complications and challenges. That stability is linked directly to the MND priority of ensuring the security and stability of Canada's allies and partners as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs' conflict prevention and resolution priority. The defence diplomacy mechanisms the CAF has in place greatly contribute to the achievement of this objective. Contributions to international stability allow the CAF to collaborate with key allies and create opportunities to project leadership abroad. The latter fulfills the foreign affairs priority of re-energizing Canadian diplomacy and leadership on international issues and within multinational institutions.

Primacy of a Rules Based International Order

The maintenance of a rules-based international order is critical to the government's national defence goals. CAF defence diplomacy activities provide key capabilities to multinational institutions such as the UN. Such institutions enable the promotion of effective global governance and international accountability and legitimacy.

While this strategic objective links to all of the priorities assigned to the ministers of defence and foreign affairs, there are a couple of key direct links to be made, namely, the foreign affairs minister's priority of re-energizing Canadian diplomacy and leadership on international issues and within multinational institutions, and the MND's priorities of contributing to UNPSOs and international security and stability.

Maintenance of a Network of Defence Partners

In order for the CAF to meet any of the government's priorities it must maintain a strong network of defence partners. This network extends to the group of allies and partners the CAF is most likely to join in the conduct of operations. CAF defence diplomacy activities to this end are aimed at fostering relationships, interoperability, material cooperation, joint technology exploitation, intelligence and doctrine cooperation.

Mobility and Reach

In order to be able to operate globally, the CAF must have the ability to reach potential areas of operation. This requires relationships with allies and partners that create mutually beneficial support advantages. Diplomatic clearances provide freedom of movement and access to the capabilities to store and transport personnel and equipment. The network of Operational Support Hubs (OSH) the CAF is building is an obvious example. Housed within partner states, the hubs allow the CAF to store equipment, house personnel, and stage operations abroad. Defence diplomacy activities are vital to the establishment of these hubs as they require significant support from the host nation's defence apparatus.

Access to Advanced Technologies

In order to maintain a technological advantage over potential adversaries and to ensure interoperability with Canada's allies and partners, the CAF requires access to advanced technologies. Relationships with allies provide means to develop joint capabilities, material cooperation, and the sharing of skills and technical expertise. An example of this type of cooperation is illustrated by the CAF's current CF-188 Hornet aircraft. Developed by Boeing in the US, the aircraft was bought through a Foreign Military sales (FMS) arrangement by Canada and several countries worldwide. This has allowed Canada to be interoperable with several of its key allies. Upgrades and modifications through its operational life have increased its lifespan considerably while adding capability. In most cases, the design costs and work associated with these projects have been shared amongst the nations flying the Hornet. The coordination and collaboration that has allowed this to happen has, to some extent been supported and enabled through the efforts of defence diplomacy activities.

Mechanisms to Achieve Strategic Objectives

The Department of National Defence Global Engagement Strategy outlines ten defence diplomacy tools. The ones that include a significant military component and that account for the majority of the \$96 million allocated to defence diplomacy are outlined here.²¹

²¹ Chief of The Defence Staff and Deputy Minister of National Defence, *Department of National Defence Global Engagement Strategy: Strategic Guidance*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence), 16 April, 2015: 13-14.

Diplomatic Network

The Canadian Defence Attaché (CDA) network forms a large component of the CAF's overall Defence Policy and Diplomacy Program. Consisting of defence liaison staffs in Washington and London and CDAs located around the world, the CDA network aims to advance government priorities by establishing relationships and networks with the defence attaché apparati of the countries for which they are accredited. As of November 2013, there were a total of 30 CDA accredited with 138 countries worldwide.²²

The CDA network also assists in the implementation of the MTCP. As part of their duties, CDAs promote the MTCP training amongst accredited nations, seek opportunities to provide the training, and carry out the administrative aspects of all student participation such as travel and accommodations.²³ They typically work closely with fellow military attaches from the US, the UK, and Australia who assist them in the establishment and the maintenance of their networks.²⁴

The CDAs use their network of contacts to build understanding and promote cooperation between Canada and its partners and allies. One of the primary uses of this network is to provide the Government of Canada and the CDS with background and contextual information that informs decision making as it relates to military matters and operations around the world. The CDA network is the main source of such information and thus contributes directly towards the enhancement of a number of government priorities. Cultural particularities of individual nations, relationships among the

²² Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Defence Policy and Diplomacy*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada), November 2013, <http://www.crs-csex.forces.gc.ca/reports-rapports/2013/213p0976.aspx> (accessed 08 Nov 2016).

²³ E-mail from South African Defence Attaché, 28 February, 2017.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

accredited nations, distance and difficulties associated with travel all contribute to the myriad challenges of being a CDA.²⁵

International Placements

International placements are exchanges and short term assignments that CAF members partake in with select allies and partners. In 2013, the CAF had a total of approximately 1,300 personnel on what were mostly reciprocal exchanges with NATO, NORAD, and the US and UK militaries.²⁶

These exchange positions with close allies provide a means of building closer relations and ties with allied militaries. The relationship building that occurs has significant benefits in terms of supporting defence interests. It also has operational and foreign policy benefits. These effects continue well after the exchanges end.²⁷

The exchanges provide a way for the CAF and its allies to gain an in depth understanding of how their respective militaries operate. Such understanding has enormous benefits in terms of interoperability during coalition operations and UN missions. Technological interoperability does not become complete interoperability without a common understanding of operations, practices, doctrine, and employment methodologies.

Some exchanges result in officers contributing to operations in which Canada is not otherwise involved.²⁸ Deploying on operations as a member of a foreign country's

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Chief of The Defence Staff and Deputy Minister of National Defence, *Department of National Defence Global Engagement Strategy: Strategic Guidance*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence), 16 April, 2015

²⁷ Government of Canada. "Minister of Foreign Affairs Mandate Letter": <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-foreign-affairs-mandate-letter> (accessed 01 February 2017)

²⁸ This is not an uncommon occurrence for Canadian soldiers on exchange with other nations. Whether it is

military provides a unique perspective on that state's approach to real-world operations. Often, the Canadian soldiers deployed in this manner act as a liaison with other Canadian organizations in the operating region, be they military or otherwise. Such work further enhances the effectiveness of the unit. These programs pay substantial dividends throughout the officers' time away from Canada and upon their return to a Canadian unit.²⁹

The exchange of military personnel with close allies provides a means for the CAF to develop skill sets and experience amongst its personnel that would otherwise not be possible, or at the very least, prohibitively difficult to achieve. As an example, in 1997 then Major-General Rick Hillier was appointed Deputy Commanding General of III Corps (D/Comd III Corps), United States Army, in Fort Hood Texas. At the time, III Corps was comprised of approximately 50,000 active US army personnel, nearly the size of the entire regular force component of the CAF. Besides providing Gen Hillier with experience commanding a large formation he would not have been able to acquire in Canada at his rank level, the relationships he built and the understanding he gained with the US army were, in his own estimation, instrumental in his successful command of the International Stability and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2004. A large percentage of the ISAF personnel were US Army, many of whom had served under Hillier when he was D/Comd III Corps.³⁰

an operation Canada is involved in or not, such participation may include some national caveats if deemed appropriate by the MND.

²⁹ My personal experience supports this. Upon my return to Canada after having spent two years on exchange in the US, I was regularly able to advance projects I or my colleagues were involved in by contacting members of the US military I had worked with while on exchange. Similarly, while in the US I was able to help advance projects by making contact with my Canadian brethren at home. Further confirmation came when I deployed to Afghanistan a few years later as part of ISAF. A number of my US counterparts were individuals I had worked with during my time on exchange.

³⁰ Rick Hillier, *Leadership: 50 Points of Wisdom for Today's Leaders* (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers

While Canada runs an active exchange program with the international five eyes community, its international placements with other nations are few. This is an area in which benefits that arise from the program are not being as fully exploited as they could be. A modest increase in the number of personnel placements globally provide a significant impact. While there would be increased pressures on personnel and financial resources they would be, in relative terms, insignificant.

The effects achieved by international placements are a vital component of the CAF's defence diplomacy program. The benefits gained in terms of relationship building, mutual understanding, interoperability, and the development of specialized skills and expertise bring enormous benefit to CAF operations around the world. The international placement program, in turn, supports and advances the Canadian Government priorities of both the Ministers of National Defence and Foreign Affairs.

Directorate of Military Cooperation and Training

The Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation (DMTC) develops policies and implements training programs for foreign military personnel.³¹ Its primary objective is to enhance peace support operations interoperability among Canada's partners. The secondary effect of lessening the operational burden on Canada is also valuable.³² This objective is tied directly to the GES objective of building interoperability with Canada's allies and in turn has the direct effect of advancing the national objective of contributing to international peace and security.³³

Ltd), 2010.

³¹ Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation Home Page <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-international-policy/index.page> (accessed 09 February, 2017)

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Government of Canada, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada), 2008:

Of the annual \$96 million DND allocated to Defence Diplomacy activities from 2010-2013, approximately \$18 million was committed to the Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP).³⁴ Despite its relatively small budget, the MTCP conducts a large number of training activities for foreign military personnel. In 2014, this money was divided among 62 active MTCP countries, including many of the NATO Partners for Peace nations.

Approximately 475 foreign military personnel attend language training at one of a number of Canadian cities each year, while an additional 200 attend one of several professional staff courses.³⁵ These courses are intended to provide knowledge on a number of core military competencies related to communication, battle procedures, leadership, and ethics.³⁶

One of the larger training programs conducted by the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) is the United Nations Military Observers Course (UNMILOBS). Running several serials annually, the course includes students and instructors from both Canada and several other countries. Both the student and instructor body are made up primarily of foreign personnel. The course is designed to provide attendees with key skills required to serve in multinational peacekeeping missions. It also fosters self-sufficiency in mounting such operations within the participating countries and prepares individuals to be assigned as United Nations Military Observers.³⁷

Canadian personnel also offer courses at the Staff and Language Training Centre

<http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/canada-first-defence-strategy.page> (accessed 01 February 2017)

³⁴ MTCP Webpage: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-international-policy/activities.page> (accessed 30 January 2017).

³⁵ MTAP Junior Command Course Joining Instructions, MTCP.

³⁶ MTCP Webpage: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-international-policy/activities.page> (accessed 30 January 2017).

³⁷ *Ibid.*

in Kabul; they contribute to the Tactical Operations Staff Courses in Africa; they support Jamaica's Military Aviation School; and they are a part of the Counter-Terrorism Operations Training Centre (also in Jamaica). In addition, the PSTC conducts a number of seminars that teach members of Latin American militaries the principles and practices of civil control of military forces.³⁸

The defence diplomacy effects achieved by the MTCP training program are significant, and disproportionate in relation to the funding that is allocated.³⁹ The students who attend the courses offered acquire key skill sets and knowledge related to the profession of arms. These skill sets are then applied in their home countries where they are further passed on to members of their own military and security forces. Over time, this process can greatly increase the effectiveness of these forces and better equip them to manage crises. The improved capabilities also allow them to make meaningful contributions within other nations. This has the twofold effect of promoting peace and security while reducing the burden on Canada to provide personnel and resources to achieve this effect. In this way, the training provided by the MTCP provides skills and knowledge amongst the attendees that contribute directly to the promotion of international peace and security in line with the Government of Canada's priorities.

The effects of the MTCP at the strategic level are underwhelming. A stagnant budget and a significant increase in demand has led to the MTCP training to become diffused throughout the participant countries. Thus, the impact is not as significant as it could be. An increase in funding back to 2008 levels, adjusted for inflation and percentage of total defence expenditure, would restore some of this impact.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Defence Policy and Diplomacy*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada), November 2013

The training provided by the MTCP also contributes to the GES priority of enhancing interoperability with Canada's partners. Many of the students that attend the courses offered by the MTCP end up deploying in multinational operations that include Canadians. The relationships that have been built and the common understanding greatly enhance interoperability.⁴⁰ The knowledge and training passed on by those who attend the MTCP courses also enhances the understanding of Canadian practices within their own armed forces, further strengthening their interoperability with Canada.

The MTCP program directly enhances the MND priority of supporting UNPSOs. As the skills developed among Canada's partners make a concrete contribution to the partner nation's ability to participate in and conduct UN operations, the burden on Canada to contribute to UN missions decreases. The MTCP also makes a direct contribution to the Minister of Foreign Affairs' priority of revitalizing cooperation with partners abroad and asserting Canadian leadership in multinational institutions. Participating and contributing to the training and development of a partner nation's security apparatus promotes cooperation and also gives Canada influence within these nations.

Multinational Operations

The GES priority of participating in multinational operations is a significant contributor to the priorities of the Canadian government. Canada is participating in, or about to begin, three significant operations that illustrate how Canadian government

⁴⁰ My own experience confirms the benefit. I attended the UNMILOBS course in 2008 and subsequently deployed to the Sudan as a UN Military Observer. Several of the non-Canadian students that attended the course with me were fellow MILOBS in the mission. As I had built relationships with them during the course, we were able to operate as a cohesive team rapidly.

priorities are enhanced by multinational operations. While not necessarily part of the Defence Diplomacy Program, these operations contribute directly to the priorities of both the GES and the Canadian Government. In addition, they illustrate the benefits of the DPD as diplomacy efforts provide regular and significant assistance in the conduct of these operations. An example of defence diplomacy and cooperation at work is Operation UNIFIER. This mission is Canada's contribution to the capacity building efforts in the Ukraine. In cooperation with the US and several other nations, approximately 200 CAF personnel are providing small team combat training, language, medical, explosive ordinance disposal and logistics training to Ukrainian military and security forces.⁴¹ The conduct of this work involved cooperation military personnel from all participating nations enabled by relationships and cooperation that has been fostered through continuous engagement.

Importance and Challenges of the DPD

When the CRS reviewed the DPD in 2012, it found that the program, particularly those activities conducted by the CDAs, is the main source of defence policy advice for the MND, CDS, ADM(Pol) and the 21 senior DND divisional heads (referred to as the Level 1 organizations or the L1s). In particular, the advice provided is key in the areas of critical policy support, in providing analytical insight into defence options, and in advice on issues and priorities for Canada's federal cabinet.⁴² Other related findings highlighted that these activities strongly support the Government of Canada's ability to make well

⁴¹ <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/07/12/operation-unifier-canadian-armed-forces-support-canadas-effort-ukraine> (accessed 29 April 2017)

⁴² Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Defence Policy and Diplomacy*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada), November 2013, <http://www.crs-csex.forces.gc.ca/reports-rapports/2013/213p0976.aspx> (accessed 08 Nov 2016).

informed defence policy decisions and decisions regarding military operations.⁴³ The review further determined that there is a continuing need for the military to deliver the effects achieved through defence diplomacy.

The DPD also has other beneficial effects. The review found that “The cooperative defence engagements can also open the door to enhanced economic relationships with partner countries”⁴⁴ Anecdotal evidence from currently servicing CDAs confirms this to be the case. CDAs often engage in activities on behalf of Canadian industry that allow senior Canadian industry personnel to meet with key government and industry players within their accredited countries.

One of the core challenges associated with the Defence Diplomacy Program in Canada is that its limited funding envelope is spread thinly, and has been flat lined since 2008.⁴⁵ The resource challenges of the DPD program were one of the key findings of the review of the program undertaken by CRS.⁴⁶ Consider the workload of the CDAs. In 2008, 28 CDA officers were responsible for (accredited) 55 countries. In 2013, the number of CDA offices increased to 30; however, the number of countries they were responsible for ballooned to 138. The CDA for South Africa is accredited to 10 countries.⁴⁷ Requests for Information (RFI) for each CDA have also grown substantially.⁴⁸ The current resource allocation makes meeting this demand particularly

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Government of Canada. “Minister of International Trade Mandate Letter.” (<http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-national-defence-mandate-letter>), (Accessed 05 December 2016).<http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-international-trade-mandate-letter> (accessed 15 February 2017).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Defence Policy and Diplomacy*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada), November 2013, <http://www.crs-csex.forces.gc.ca/reports-rapports/2013/213p0976.aspx> (accessed 08 Nov 2016).

⁴⁷ High Commission of Canada - South Africa: <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/southafrica-afriquedusud/contact-contactez.aspx?lang=eng> (accessed 01 February 2017).

⁴⁸ Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Defence Policy and Diplomacy*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada), November 2013, <http://www.crs-csex.forces.gc.ca/reports-rapports/2013/213p0976.aspx>

challenging.⁴⁹ While there are a couple of notable exceptions, in general each CDA office consists of a senior military officer of the rank of Colonel and a Senior Non-Commissioned member (NCM) at the rank of Sergeant. The influx of RFIs and the number of countries with which they engage has limited the depth of the engagement in most cases. It is not uncommon for CDAs to be responsible for a country that they will never visit during their tenure as travel resources and time are scarce. This lack of physical engagement makes it difficult to build the relationships and cooperative benefits to any significant extent and limits the effects achieved by one of the key aims of the program. Thus the lack of depth, or full engagement, is a potential area where the benefits of the DPD are not being as fully exploited as they could be.

A similar argument can be made regarding the depth of MTCP. Spreading resources among 62 registered participating nations means that few individuals are being trained in each country. While each of those individuals in turn provides increased capacity within their own state, the overall effects achieved are limited, and take a significant amount of time to manifest. Once again, the lack of resources available results in a lack of depth in the MTCP program as a whole.

Royal Military College professor Walter Dorn believes that the lack of depth that results from the spreading of Canada's defence diplomacy resources is detrimental to Canada's ability to deliver meaningful contributions toward its priorities and is potentially damaging to Canada's international reputation.⁵⁰ Given the important effects

(accessed 08 Nov 2016).

⁴⁹ In 2016, the CDA for the Ukraine was provided with an additional position for an ACDA. Additionally, a small number of military staff was provided to some of the more engaged CDAs in recognition of the workloads. However, holistically, this has not increased the capacity of the CDA program to achieve the desired effects.

⁵⁰ Kathleen Harris, "Canada's Defence Diplomacy Hurt by Tight Budget, Report Says", *CBC News*, 25 July, 2014: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-s-defence-diplomacy-hurt-by-tight-budget-report->

the activities are aimed at achieving and the realities associated with the limits of those effects imposed by the lack of resources the CAF allocated to the DPD, the obvious question becomes: how can the defence diplomacy program achieve more depth?

Depth could come from conducting DPD activities with a smaller number of countries. For the MTCP, the provision of training to fewer partners would mean that an increased number of participants could be trained from the remaining nations. The associated benefits of the training would then spread more rapidly through those countries' defence and security apparatus. For the CDA program, reducing the number of countries for which each CDA is accredited would allow more in depth engagement with the remaining nations. This increased depth would significantly enhance the effects achieved by each CDA and in turn of the CDA network as a whole. This approach has two advantages. First, the current resource allocation would not have to change. Second, the increased effectiveness of the DPD program activities would provide better, fuller decision making information for the government of Canada and DND.

This "better bang for the buck" approach also has some potentially serious shortcomings. One must consider the potential damage that would be caused to Canada's reputation abroad and its relationships with its partners, particularly the ones that Canada would no longer be supporting. Another disadvantage would be a potential reduction in international stability and security. The partner countries that would lose out on the training may struggle to address defence and security crises as they arise. As a result, international peace and security could be diminished, and the burden to Canada would increase. In this context, a more focused approach to DPD activities would seem to be

less desirable.

Alternatively, the CAF could allocate more resources to the DPD program. Several states have observed that the beneficial effects achieved by defence diplomacy activities are positively disproportionate to the resources allocated.⁵¹ There are some academics who believe that funding for both the MTCP and Canada's Defence Diplomacy program as a whole should be increased given the importance they have in terms of advancing both the government's security interests and trade interests abroad. Dorn advocates such an approach, stating "The military co-operation program does essential work in training and educating officers from abroad, particularly in peace operations...For the cost of one fighter jet, Canada can run its defence diplomacy program for years."⁵²

In order to gain some appreciation for what a defence diplomacy program in Canada could be achieving with an increase in allocated resources, the focus of the next section is on one of Canada's key allies, Australia.

⁵¹ UK Ministry of Defence,, *Ministry of Defence Policy Paper No.1 Defence Diplomacy*, (London: DCCS Media), 2014.

⁵² Harris, K, "Canada's Defence Diplomacy Hurt by Tight Budget, Report Says", CBC News, 25 July, 2014: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-s-defence-diplomacy-hurt-by-tight-budget-report-says-1.2718025> (Date Accessed: 08 Nov, 2016)

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY IN AUSTRALIA

Background

The Australian Department of Defence diplomacy program was selected as an appropriate basis of comparison to Canada's based on a number of factors. Both countries have instituted parliamentary forms of liberal democracy.⁵³ Militarily and politically Canada and Australia are close allies: both are members of the international five eyes community and have agreed to share nationally sensitive intelligence assets and information. In terms of population size and economy, Canada and Australia are also similar. As of the 2016 census, Canada's population is 35 million, while as of the 2011 census, Australia's population is 24 million.⁵⁴ Canada's GDP in 2015 was approximately \$1.53 trillion USD and the Australian GDP for the same year was \$1.25 trillion USD.⁵⁵ These similarities are summarized in table 2.1.

In terms of defence spending, the picture is somewhat different. Canada's defence budget for fiscal year 2015-2016 was \$18.6 billion Canadian dollars, or approximately 0.94% of the nation's GDP.⁵⁶ The Canadian defence budget supports a regular force of 68,000 personnel and 31,000 reserve personnel.⁵⁷ Australia's defence budget for the same period was \$32.7 billion Canadian dollars which represented % 1.88 of its GDP.⁵⁸ As of 2016, the Australian military was made up of 58,000 regular force and 19,000 reserve

⁵³ Munroe Eagles, Christopher Holoman and Larry Johnson, *The Institutions of Parliamentary Liberal Democracy*, (Peterborough : Broadview Press Ltd), 2004.

⁵⁴ Statistic Canada Website: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/150929/dq150929b-eng.htm>, accessed 29 March, 2017 ; Australian Bureau for Statistics website: <http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/94713ad445ff1425ca25682000192af2/1647509ef7e25faaca2568a900154b63?OpenDocument>, accessed 30 March, 2017.

⁵⁵ World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/Canada>, accessed 01 April, 2017 ; World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/Australia>, accessed 01 April 2017.

⁵⁶ World Bank data: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS>, accessed 28 March, 2017.

⁵⁷ The number quoted for the reserves includes the 5,000 personnel that comprise the Canadian Rangers.

⁵⁸ World Bank data: World Bank data: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS> accessed 28 March, 2017.

force personnel.⁵⁹

Table 2.1 – Population and Defence Spending Data for Canada and Australia

	Canada	Australia
Population (Million)	35	24
GDP (Trillion USD)	\$1.53	\$1.25
Defence Budget (Billion CAD)	\$18.6	\$32.2
% GDP on Defence	0.94	1.88
Military Personnel (Total)	99,000	79,000

Australia’s Defence Strategic Interests and Objectives

In 2016 Australia’s Department of Defence published a white paper outlining the country’s strategic interests and objectives, the regional security challenges it faced and how the defence force would be postured and funded in order to achieve its goals.⁶⁰ The white paper identified three strategic interests all of which require, to some degree, defence diplomacy in order to be realized. Those interests identified are similar to those expressed in Canada’s Defence First Strategy.⁶¹ Nonetheless, in the context of military diplomacy there are some striking differences in terms of how each nation pursues its strategic priorities, and resources the effort.

The first strategic interest identified by Australia’s white paper is “A secure, resilient Australia, with secure northern approaches and proximate sea lines of

⁵⁹ Australia Defence Force Website: <http://www.defence.gov.au/>, accessed 01 February 2017.

⁶⁰ Department of Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper*, (Sydney : Australian Government), 2016.

⁶¹ Government of Canada, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada), 2008: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/canada-first-defence-strategy.page> (accessed 01 February 2017).

communication.”⁶² The second is “A secure nearer region, encompassing maritime South East [*sic*] Asia and the South Pacific.”⁶³ Finally, Australia must promote “A stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order.”⁶⁴

The white paper also identifies the strategic objectives that must be achieved in order to pursue their interests. The first is “Deter, deny and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and its national interests, and northern approaches.”⁶⁵ This is similar to the first priority identified by the Canada First Defence Strategy and speaks to the primary responsibility of all governments to defend their citizens and the nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Like Canada, and in spite of its larger defence budget, defending Australian territory and ensuring the security of its northern maritime approaches requires multiple allies and partners. Moreover, Australia lacks a friendly neighbour nation with the military strength of the US and there are a number of potentially hostile states close by. As a result, Australia invests significantly in developing relationships with states that support the defence of its territory.

The second strategic objective is to “make effective military contributions to support the security of maritime South East Asia and support the governments of Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and of Pacific Island Countries to build and strengthen their security.”⁶⁶ While similar to the CDFS priority of contributing to international peace and security, Australians take this more seriously. Within its “nearer region” which includes the indo-pacific, south-pacific, and Southeast Asia, the country is in relative proximity to a large number of states whose stability and security are at times precarious. Several

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Department of Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper*, (Sydney : Australian Government), 2016.

countries in the south-pacific region in particular have security and stability challenges that are associated with slow economic growth, social and governance complications, rapid population growth and climate change. While Australia's economic growth and prosperity depends on trade with stable and secure nations in its immediate region, its security is to a large extent dependent on it. Instability in Australia's immediate neighborhood creates the conditions for other actors, that either may not share Australia's interests or might be outright hostile, to gain influence within the region.⁶⁷ Australian leaders consider this to be an existential threat to national security. This makes regional stability a strategic imperative for the nation that it is for Canada. The wording and context of the white paper supports this notion. Australia lists the specific countries within which these efforts will be focused. Moreover, it describes, for each individual country, what efforts are to be pursued and the resources that will be allocated to these efforts.⁶⁸ The importance associated with this objective is one of the driving factors for Australia's current overall defence spending levels.

The final strategic objective identified in the Australian defence white paper is to "contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia's interests in a rules-based global order."⁶⁹ Here again we see the relative importance of security. A rules based global order ensures that Australia is able to represent and defend its interests in multinational institutions, supported by nations that have similar interests. Like Canada, Australia leverages its involvement in global bodies as a means of gaining

⁶⁷ Department of Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper*, (Sydney : Australian Government), 2016

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

influence disproportionate to its status as a middle power.⁷⁰

Australia's Defence Diplomacy Program

Within the Australian Department of Defence, the Defence Strategic Policy and Intelligence Group (SP&I) is responsible for managing and administering the entire defence diplomacy program. Specifically, the SP&I is responsible for defence diplomacy, strategic policy, international security, and military intelligence coordination. It also provides advice on military engagement and decision making to the Prime Minister of Australia, the Minister of Defence, Secretary of the Department of Defence, and Chief of the Defence Force.⁷¹ In this regard, Australia is similar to Canada in that its defence diplomacy activities are a significant source of decision making advice to the nation's governing body as it relates to military operations and engagements abroad. In support of the government's strategic objectives, the SP&I is assigned the priorities of conducting international engagement activities, ensuring interoperability through the development of international defence relationships, and enhancing participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).⁷²

The defence diplomacy activities managed by the SP&I are generally associated with one of three endeavours. The first is related to capacity building and training of foreign military and security personnel and is conducted by the Defence Cooperation Program (DCP). International Engagements manages all remaining military diplomacy activities including Australian defence attaches and the Australian military exchange

⁷⁰ David Smith, Dorothy Solinger, and Steven Topic, *States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy*, (New York : Routledge), 1999.

⁷¹ Australian Government Defence Strategic Policy and Intelligence Group website located at <http://www.defence.gov.au/SPI/> , accessed 25 March 2017.

⁷² Defence Strategic Policy and Intelligence Group website: www.defence.gov.au/SPI/, accessed 15 March, 2017.

program. The final endeavour is the management and conduct of humanitarian efforts, development projects and disaster assistance.

Australia's Defence Cooperation Program

Much like Canada's MTCP, the DCP works in support of Australia's strategic interest of ensuring its security through the pursuit of three primary goals. Number one is the building and promotion of the capacity of its international partners. Number two is the enhancement of interoperability between the Australian defence apparatus and foreign countries in order to more effectively respond collectively to common security challenges. Number three is the development of strong ties at the tactical, operational and strategic levels in order to build foreign nations' capacity to protect their own sovereignty while also contributing to international security.⁷³ The DCP provides language training, staff courses and military skills to foreign military personnel. Again, as is the case in Canada, foreign members may attend the training in Australia, or Australian personnel may provide the training in locations within the target country.

The differences between Canada and Australia are quantitative and are summarized in table 1.2. Whereas 62 registered nations are eligible for training through Canada's MTCP, Australia's DCP is available to just 28, the majority of which are regional partners. In addition, while Canada budgets \$18 million per year for its program, the Australian Department of Defence provides the DCP with approximately \$90 million CAD each year.⁷⁴ The DCP is also the vehicle through which Australia purchases and

⁷³ Australian Department of Defence, *Defence Cooperation Annual Report 2015-2016* available at <http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/15-16/Features/20-DefenceCooperation.asp> , accessed 29 March, 2017.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

supports a fleet of offshore patrol vessels for a number of partner countries. Considered primarily a capacity building program, the program seeks to invest a total of \$590 million CAD over a number of years, \$22 million of which was spent in 2015-2016.⁷⁵

Table 2.2 – Defence Diplomacy Program Spending in Canada and Australia

	Canada	Australia
Capacity Building (millions)	\$18 (MTCP)	\$112 (DCP)*
Registered Nations	62	28
Other Activities (millions)	\$78	\$93
Total Spending DPD	\$96	\$183

*** Includes \$22 million spent in 2015-16 on offshore patrol vessels for a number of partner nations.**

In terms of the effects achieved, the combination of significantly more resourcing and concentration on smaller numbers of partners allows Australia to achieve significantly more depth in its activities. For example, Brigadier General Gilbert Toropo, current commander of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF), was trained by Australia through the DCP.⁷⁶ John Blaxland, a professor of Intelligence Studies and International Security at the Australian National University, argues that examples such as this demonstrate the importance of the impact defence diplomacy can have.⁷⁷ The investment Australia has made in its relationship with the PNGDF has been of great value in three ways. First, it has resulted in interoperability and mutual understanding between the two nations fostered in the form of training exercises and regular exchanges. Second, it has allowed Australia to maintain a restraining influence on the PNGDF, and more

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ John Blaxland, “Defending Defence Diplomacy”, The Centre of Gravity Series Policy Paper (Sydney : Australian National University Strategic and Defence Studies Centre), 2014.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

readily manage the risk of hostilities erupting within the region. Third, it has facilitated Australia's involvement in South Pacific-oriented operations.⁷⁸ Similar effects and benefits have been enjoyed by Australia in its relations with many of the other countries with which it engages.

It would be difficult for Canada to achieve such depth because the MTCP is so poorly supported.⁷⁹ And while Canada's budgetary concerns are real, when defence diplomacy works well, as it has in the Australian-Papua New Guinea example, it becomes a force multiplier, achieving outcomes far in excess of the resources expended.⁸⁰ As Canada has relatively limited depth with its engagement and training programs this force multiplying aspect is not something it is able to achieve or exploit. As an overall middle power, Canada should be seeking opportunities to achieve disproportionate effects in defence diplomacy activities as it does in other aspects of its international engagements.

International Engagement

The second manner in which the SP&I pursues its priorities is through international engagement. Similar to Canada, this is primarily comprised of a defence attaché network, exchange programs with various nations, and high level engagements. It is difficult to discuss specific expenditures of this aspect of the Australian program as the

⁷⁸ Peter Leahe, "Military Diplomacy", *The Centre of Gravity Series*, (Sydney : Australian National University Strategic and Defence Studies Centre), 2014.

⁷⁹ Fen Hampson, and Roland Paris, *Rethinking Canada's International Priorities*, (Ottawa : University of Ottawa), 2010.

⁸⁰ Peter Leahe, "Military Diplomacy", *The Centre of Gravity Series*, (Sydney : Australian National University Strategic and Defence Studies Centre), 2014.

details of Australia's international engagement activities are classified.⁸¹ International engagement, not including the DCP, was funded at \$93 million dollars in 2014-2015.⁸²

Similar to Canada, Australia's defence attachés and their staffs are involved in traditional formal diplomatic activities such as high level meetings and negotiations. They provide a great deal of assistance in the delivering individual defence cooperation program training activities. They offer advice on military capability development options, assist in disaster and humanitarian relief operations, and directly participate in evacuation and intervention operations.⁸³

These efforts have had significant impact on the interoperability of Australian military forces with allied countries as the program has greatly assisted the familiarization of Australian defence personnel with the environments, operating procedures, culture and capabilities of state actors in the region.⁸⁴ The knowledge obtained regarding these nuances greatly assist in the decision making ability of the Department of Defence and the Australian government. This in turn reduces operational risk and enhances the effectiveness of Australian operations abroad.

In its white paper, the Australian government claims that "international engagement forms a critical component of the government's overall strategy to manage the risks associated with the evolving security environment in the immediate region."⁸⁵ One significant example often cited as an illustration of the direct benefits this type of military diplomacy can have is Australia's leadership of a United Nations mission to

⁸¹ Walter Bateman, Anthony Bergin and Hayley Channer. *Terms of Engagement: Australia's Regional Defence Diplomacy*. (Adelaide : Australian Strategic Policy Institute), 2013.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ Peter Leahe, "Military Diplomacy", *The Centre of Gravity Series*, (Sydney : Australian National University Strategic and Defence Studies Centre), 2014.

⁸⁴ Department of Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper*, (Sydney : Australian Government), 2016.

⁸⁵ Department of Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper*, (Sydney : Australian Government), 2016.

East-Timor in 1999.⁸⁶ Australia's investment and relationships with Indonesia and Thailand helped the UN regain control of the situation. As East Timor belonged to Indonesia at the time, Australia's involvement in the crisis ostensibly put them on opposing sides. However, the many years of defence diplomacy activities that Australia had invested in with Indonesia and the positive relationships that had been fostered as a result significantly curbed the risk of a military confrontation between the ADF and the Indonesian Armed forces. Additionally, Australia's decades of investment in defence diplomacy activities in Thailand resulted in that country being the first ASEAN member to support the UN mission. The combined benefits of these two relationships, meticulously managed over several decades, enabled the UN mission to succeed and allowed Australia to demonstrate leadership and influence while making a tremendous contribution to the security and stability of the region.⁸⁷

It has been argued that Canada lacks the type of long-term, committed and focused engagement demonstrated by the East Timor example and if placed in a similar position would find it difficult to achieve the same result.⁸⁸ The failure of the Canadian-led Op Assurance UN mission to Zaire in 1999 would seem to support this argument.⁸⁹ A local ally would have been valuable, as would knowledge of the challenges and nuances associated with the local culture and practices that existed in Zaire at the time. A stronger defence diplomacy program might have helped.

⁸⁶ Details regarding the East-Timor crisis of 1999 can be found in: Nevins, Joseph, *A Not-So-Distant Horror: Mass Violence in East Timor*. (Ithaca : Cornell University Press), 2005

⁸⁷ Hugh White, "Grand expectations, Little Promise", *The Centre of Gravity Series*, (Sydney : Australian National University Strategic and Defence Studies Centre), 2014.

⁸⁸ Gordon Smith, "An Opportunity and a Problem", *Rethinking Canada's International Priorities*, (Ottawa : University of Ottawa), 2010.

⁸⁹ Michael Hennessy, "Operation 'Assurance': Planning a Multi-National Force for Rwanda/Zaire", *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no.1 (Spring, 2001): 17.

Humanitarian Aid and Development Assistance

Australia considers its humanitarian aid and development assistance as contributors to its broader national security strategy, of which defence diplomacy activity is also a part.⁹⁰ Australia aims to undertake “mutually agreed to development assistance projects with several countries within their immediate region.”⁹¹ Such projects generate good will and bolster regional stability and security which in turn reduces the likelihood of short notice calls for assistance. In this manner, Australia is able to pursue its strategic interest of contributing to international stability using its military in a non-combat effort. Development assistance of this nature is one of the proposed mechanisms through which Australia’s new Amphibious Helicopter Dock Ships (LHDS) may be used to foster regional security through defence diplomacy in Australia’s nearer region.⁹²

Challenges For Australia

Australia’s defence diplomacy program is not without its detractors. Hugh White argues that while many believe that security related international problems can be resolved through interactions between national military personnel, in many cases this interaction does little to manage deep rooted strategic risks.⁹³ One of the reasons that defence diplomacy is popular in government circles is that it “offers a reassuring model of how the armed forces can protect a nation without actually going to war.”⁹⁴ It is also

⁹⁰ The united states considers humanitarian assistance as a significant joint shaping activity. For details, see :Government of the United States of America, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, (Washington : White House Publishing), 2012.

⁹¹ John Blaxland, “Defending Defence Diplomacy”, *The Centre of Gravity Series* (Sydney : Australian National University Strategic and Defence Studies Centre), 2014.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ Hugh White, “Grand expectations, Little Promise”, *The Centre of Gravity Series*, (Sydney : Australian National University Strategic and Defence Studies Centre), 2014.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

politically popular as it provides the government with the ability to make it appear that something is being done when often the government does not know what else to do. Nick Bisley adds that the idea that while defence diplomacy can ease tensions, build trust and improve communications between nations, its capabilities are in fact severely limited as its boundaries to do so are determined politically. As such, defence diplomacy has no definitive attribute that allows it to reliably overcome deep rooted political tensions.⁹⁵ Defence diplomacy may be effective at the tactical and operational levels; however, its success in achieving desired strategic effects is much more difficult to measure.⁹⁶ A similar argument can be made in the Canadian context as well. With 34 personnel participating in UN missions in 2015-16 a case can be made that the CAF is making a positive contribution globally. However, given the small numbers of participants within each mission this number represents, the impact and influence on regional outcomes achieved is questionable at best.

These arguments seem to suggest that one should consider the strategic benefits of defence diplomacy with caution. However, as Leahe points out, no one form of diplomacy will work in every situation. Defence diplomacy has had success resolving situations that could not have been, or were not, resolved through other diplomatic means.⁹⁷ As such, military diplomacy should be considered a tool the government must have available. It should be resourced with the investments required to ensure that it is able to answer when called upon.

⁹⁵ Nick Bisley, "The possibilities and limitations of defence diplomacy in Asia", *The Centre of Gravity Series*, (Sydney : Australian National University Strategic and Defence Studies Centre), 2014.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ Peter Leahe, "Military Diplomacy", *The Centre of Gravity Series*, (Sydney : Australian National University Strategic and Defence Studies Centre), 2014.

Summary

This section has considered how defence diplomacy is resourced and executed in Australia with particular emphasis on what effects these efforts have achieved and how they advance the Australian government's strategic priorities and objectives. As identified by the Australian government in its 2016 Defence White Paper, the investments made in the DCP, defence engagement and humanitarian assistance have been positive. The importance of the program has been highlighted by the government as a strategic necessity in order to manage and mitigate risk at the strategic level. The East Timor Crisis demonstrated how long-term focused investments on defence diplomacy activities can be critical to the success of some stability operations as the relationships developed can aid in the avoidance of hostilities and garner international support from allies.

Investments in Australian defence diplomacy far exceed the situation in Canada. Australia's focused approach and greater investment has provided the country with a series of stronger relationships than Canada has developed with any country other than perhaps the United States. The next chapter will explore the potential costs and benefits to Canada of both an increase in investment and a more focused approach. It will also explore some of the strategies that may be adopted to achieve these goals.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA

This chapter considers some of the reasons why Canada may wish to expand its defence diplomacy program viewed through the lenses of the articulated strategic objectives of the CAF. It begins by illustrating an example where a lack of engagement cost Canada significant influence on the world stage. A contrast will be made through an example that illustrates how successful engagement has enabled Canada to further its interests. Finally, the chapter will present for consideration options that would allow Canada to expand its defence diplomacy program along with the advantages and disadvantages of each option.

An International Failure

When Canada volunteered to lead the UN mission to Zaire in 1996, there was significant pressure on the United Nations to respond to the growing humanitarian crisis. This pressure was all the more acute as the genocide in Rwanda had occurred in the very recent past.⁹⁸ The mission was to provide aid and protection to the Hutu refugees that were fleeing Rwanda.⁹⁹ This proved to be a challenge for which Canada was ill prepared. Shortly after the mission was terminated, a steering review committee determined that the Canadian Armed Forces failed to anticipate the military and diplomatic challenges that were faced by Operation ASSURANCE.¹⁰⁰ While it was clear that the mission had not been properly resourced, the root causes of the disappointing outcome was a lack of understanding of the tribal complexities of the region, a lack of situational awareness of

⁹⁸ Walter Soderlund, and Donald Briggs, *Humanitarian Crisis and Intervention: Reassessing the Impact of Mass Media*, (Virginia : Kumarian Press), 2008.

⁹⁹ <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=1&CdnOpId=1> (accessed 24 April 2017)

¹⁰⁰ Peter Kasurak, *A National Force: The Evolution of Canada's Army, 1950-2000*, (Vancouver: UBC Press), 2013.

the rapidly changing situation, and insufficient understanding regarding the capacity of local players. In his recommendation to terminate the mission, it was evident that LGen Maurice Baril recognized these shortcomings, all of which that could have been alleviated had Canada had in place a more robust defence diplomacy posture in the region in the years leading up to the crisis.¹⁰¹ For example, the CDA network's primary task is to provide the situational awareness, regional understanding and decision making advice that was unavailable to the government of Canada and the CAF at the time. Programs such as the MTCP could have provided Zaire and the surrounding region with the knowledge and capacity to more properly respond. The MTCP is also a source of information regarding the capabilities and capacities as those running the training activities are postured to directly observe these characteristics. While the mission was terminated before any serious international embarrassment occurred, it did not go unnoticed by local actors in the region.¹⁰² The lessons identified from the subsequent study of Op ASSURANCE serve as an important reminder of how insufficient defence diplomacy can lead to an international failure.

Defence Diplomacy Success - OSH Network

The Canadian forces, in collaboration with Global Affairs Canada, are currently in the process of establishing a network of operational support hubs (OSHS) around the world. Current locations include Germany, Kuwait and the Caribbean.¹⁰³ Several additional OSHs are planned in the coming years. By providing a permanent support

¹⁰¹ Michael, Hennessy "Operation 'Assurance': Planning a Multi-National Force for Rwanda/Zaire", *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no.1 (Spring, 2001)

¹⁰² Simon Massey, "Operation Assurance: The Greatest Intervention that Never Happened", *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 15 February, 1998.

¹⁰³ Department of Defence Operational Support Hub website: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-support/os-hubs.page> (accessed 04 April 2017)

presence in the regions in which they are established, OSHs enable the rapid deployment of CAF operations. The time saved in not having to deploy support mechanisms along with deployed task forces greatly reduces the response time of the task force, something that is particularly critical during disaster relief operations.

The establishment of these support hubs requires close coordination and relationships, fostered in part through defence diplomacy, with the host nations. The OSHs require the support and assistance of host nations as they often provide access to the infrastructure and space needed. Close relationships with the host nation's security and defence forces are also vital as they provide security for the hub locations.¹⁰⁴ In each case, the locations are selected based on a number of factors as determined by GAC. One of those factors is the relationship between the CAF and the host nation military forces. Hence, countries with which the CAF has long established close relationships are preferred.¹⁰⁵

Endeavours such as this are one of the many benefits realized by the relationships and common understanding that can be fostered through defence diplomacy. Unfortunately, the number of countries with which the CAF has extensive, deep-rooted relationships is declining.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ My own experience supports this. I was responsible for the several aspects of the planning and initial set-up of the OSH in the Caribbean. The CAF mil-mil relationship with the host nation armed forces, while a significant asset, required constant cultivation on both my part and the part of my colleagues. This involved an investment in time and resources.

¹⁰⁵ I was privy to some of these conversations at the strategic level.

¹⁰⁶ Mike Jefferies, "The Future of Foreign Military Training", *Strategic Studies Working Group* (Toronto: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute), 2013.

Achievement of Strategic Priorities and Objectives

In terms of achieving Canada's strategic priorities, the benefit of a robust defence diplomacy apparatus has been established. Consider first the MND mandate to increase support to UN operations. Arguably, one of the ways in which the CAF could develop the interoperability needed to achieve this priority is through the re-establishment of frequent participation in UNPSO ops. Familiarity gained through common experiences goes a long way to building relationships. Given the current state of Canada's participation in UNPSOs, however, building this type of close relationship would take time if this were the sole mechanism of enhancement. The number of Canadian soldiers deployed on UN operations has fallen from approximately 3,300 in 1992 to 35 in 2015.¹⁰⁷ Of note, Canada recently announced that up to 600 CAF members will in the near future be deployed on a UNPSO; however, timelines and details have not been forthcoming (as of May 2017). Building up these numbers will require time, and building trust and familiarity with a large number of nations will not occur over a single operation. In addition to time, Canada would have to increase the number of operations in which it participates. Engagements and military assistance can have tangential political and diplomatic benefits as well. When speaking about Canada's current mission to the Ukraine, Ukrainian Col Alexey Krasiuk said "Canada being here matters not only from a military point of view but from a political point of view."¹⁰⁸

The MTCP offers another potential mechanism through which increased investment would directly contribute to this strategic priority and would complement this

¹⁰⁷ Murray Brewster, "Does Canada Still Contribute to Peacekeeping in the World?", *The Globe and Mail*, 29 September 2015.

¹⁰⁸ Skyba, A, "Harper's World: Canada's New Role on the Global Stage", *The Globe and Mail*, 05 January, 2017: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harpers-world-the-past-and-future-of-canadas-foreignpolicy/article26542719/> (accessed 12 April 2017)

effort. Increasing the investment in the MTCP would greatly augment the positive effects outlined by CRS while providing more depth. Increasing the number of training opportunities, and the number of individual participants, while simultaneously increasing participation in UNPSOs could shorten the timelines in which meaningful gains could be achieved. There are some who advocate for training activities such as the MTCP to support Canada's foreign policy objectives. As the retired lieutenant-general Mike Jeffries, has suggested: "Canada should consider military training assistance as more than just another tool in the diplomacy bag. Rather it should see it as a fundamental part of Canada's foreign policy"¹⁰⁹

The benefits achieved by increasing support to UNPSOs and the associated training programs could be leveraged to enhance another key government priority: the re-establishment of Canada's leadership abroad in conflict prevention, mediation and post conflict reconstruction. As Canada does not have the resources to conduct these activities unilaterally, the ability to achieve these benefits requires influence within multilateral organizations. Building such influence depends in part on Canada's credibility. Meaningful participation in UNPSOs builds such credibility. Thailand's support to Australia as it led the mission in East Timor demonstrates how support from other nations can be a tremendous enabler of future success. Increasing investment in the MTCP and participation in UNPSOs would certainly go a long way towards enabling this kind of outcome.

Increasing both the financial and personnel resources of the Canadian Defence Attaché network would also enable the CAF to more meaningfully pursue these priorities

¹⁰⁹ Mike Jeffries, "The Future of Foreign Military Training", *Strategic Studies Working Group* (Toronto: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute), 2013.

while at the same time improve the decision making advice provided to the Government and the Department of National Defence. More resources would mean greater depth of relationships, a more robust diplomatic network, and increased mutual understanding. Such an environment would lead to more informed, and possibly timelier, decision making advice to the strategic level.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, given how involved the CDA network is in the MTCP, an increase in engagement would benefit this program as well. More in depth engagement would better position the CDAs to identify capability deficiencies and identify opportunities for training requirements that could be provided by the MTCP. In addition, with more personnel available, the CDAs would more readily be able to provide the administration and logistical support currently provided to the MTCP without impacting other key activities.

There are a number of ways to enhance Canada's defence diplomacy program. One option would be to maintain the current resource levels of the program while reducing the number of countries involved. This would allow a redirecting of resources to enable more in depth engagement with select nations, an approach referred to in this work as "niche defence diplomacy." The second option would be a modest budget increase to the defence diplomacy program. This could be done either by increasing the overall resourcing level as a whole, or by increasing the funding to specific activities targeting specific partner countries without changing the resource commitments to the remainder. Alternatively, DND could make defence diplomacy a top priority and resource it accordingly.

¹¹⁰ Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Defence Policy and Diplomacy*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada), November 2013, <http://www.crs-csex.forces.gc.ca/reports-rapports/2013/213p0976.aspx> (accessed 08 Nov 2016)

“Niche” Defence Diplomacy

In this option, the current resourcing levels provided to defence diplomacy activities would remain the same, but the number of nations targeted by the program would be reduced significantly. The countries selected would be those with which the government has identified interests. A redirection of resources toward a smaller cadre of countries would facilitate an increase in engagement and training activities. Niche diplomacy also involves a scaling back on foreign policy commitments to regions of the globe that are not closely tied to Canada’s national self-interest.¹¹¹ The focusing on a smaller number of smaller nations, with concrete investment over time, is an idea supported by Mike Jefferies.¹¹²

This option would not require additional resources. Rather, resources would simply be redirected as deemed appropriate. Given the resource pressures experienced by the Department of National Defence owing to its status as Canada’s largest discretionary expenditure, this aspect makes this an attractive option. Redirecting resources to CDAs that are accredited to nations within which Canada has significant interests would allow for more in depth engagement, increased cultural awareness, stronger relationships, and better understanding of foreign nations’ capacities and deficiencies. This would enhance the CDAs’ ability to provide decision making advice to the strategic level. As a redirection of resources would also apply to the MTCP, the efforts of the CDA network could then be leveraged to assist in delivery of MTCP training that is more robust, more targeted and therefore more likely to deliver concrete

¹¹¹ Fen Hampson and Roland Paris, *Rethinking Canada’s International Priorities*, (Ottawa : University of Ottawa), 2010.

¹¹² Mike Jefferies, “The Future of Foreign Military Training”, *Strategic Studies Working Group* (Toronto: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute), 2013.

benefits to the recipient nations. This combined effort would have a positive influence on the GES strategic priorities of fostering relationships with allies and partners, and in strengthening the capacity of partner nations defence apparatus to deal with crises. Finally, Canada could develop significant influence among its partners as a result of increased activity. This influence could be leveraged to gain more influence within international institutions such as the UN. As such, these efforts could complement other efforts undertaken by the Canadian government.

There are a number of drawbacks to the niche defence diplomacy model. There is a risk that countries that lose Canadian support will respond negatively, for example. There would be new gaps in situational awareness within regions in which Canada is no longer engaged. A lack of situational awareness would reduce the ability of the CDAs to provide decision making advice in certain cases, negatively impacting Canada's ability to provide effective, timely assistance. The absence of ties with regional countries in a situation like this would further compound this problem as support, and the facilitation of operations it enables, would be diminished or possibly non-existent. The potential shortfalls of this were demonstrated by the Op ASSURANCE example.

Countries that lose MTCP support might also suffer. The effectiveness of the affected partners' defence forces could suffer, as might their ability to deal with security crises. This in turn could result in a loss of security and stability within certain global regions. Fortunately, such an impact would likely be small. No states that receive training and capacity building assistance rely on Canada exclusively. Thus any loss associated with Canada redirecting its efforts elsewhere would likely be offset by other contributing countries.

Perhaps the most significant disadvantage of the niche defence diplomacy model is the potential political fallout and its negative impact on the Canadian government's global priorities and efforts. Countries that would no longer benefit from CDA engagement and training efforts would likely be more hesitant to support Ottawa's broader global agenda.

More Resources for Defence Diplomacy

In this option, the CAF would redirect more resources, primarily in the form of money and personnel, towards its defence diplomacy efforts. As a basis for discussion, it is suggested that the increase bring total expenditure of the program to the same level spent by Australia: approximately \$200 million. While this is slightly more than a twofold increase, it would still represent less than 1% of Canada's defence budget.

The increase in resources could be distributed in one of two ways. It could be evenly dispersed throughout all aspects of the defence diplomacy program. This approach would result in the same dilution of resources currently experienced due to the large numbers of countries in which Canada is currently engaged. While increasing the resources would certainly be helpful, the benefits that could be achieved would likely not be maximized. Alternatively, one could maintain the current funding levels in certain areas, while allocating the additional resources to specific areas, and countries, of particular interest to Canada. This would be similar to the "niche defence diplomacy" approach, but without cutting off support to countries where Canada's interests are minimal.

The latter approach allows Canada to increase resources and focus on regions

where it has extensive interests. As in the niche defence diplomacy approach, an increase in funding to the CDAs responsible for the regions of interest would see tremendous benefit in the depth of engagement and mutual understanding that would result. The increase in funding to the MTCP activities in the regions of interest would realize benefits in the same manner as in the niche model.

There are also advantages over the niche defence diplomacy model. By not eliminating funding to any countries completely, Canada would maintain its current level of situational awareness. It would also avoid the potential challenges associated with the niche model in the event that a crisis requiring Canada to intervene presents itself. Additionally, Canada could realize increased influence with the states that benefit from the increased focus, while mitigating the loss of influence experienced in the niche model. The most significant advantage to this approach is that it greatly mitigates the potential political ramifications of the niche model. While clearly under this model some countries would benefit more than others, the discourse in this case would be more readily managed by the political level.

The challenges presented by this option are significant. While it would still represent less than 1% of spending overall, doubling the money made available to defence diplomacy would be a significant pressure in the current environment. Consider that in early 2017, the Department of National Defence was forced to find \$190 million in savings by restricting all non-essential travel and non-mission related training activities. The measures were taken in addition to earlier cost-saving measures in 2016-17 that saw the parking of a large number of support vehicles and naval vessels.¹¹³ In light of such

¹¹³ Lee Berthiaume, "DND Curbs Travel, non-mission training to save money for missions", *The Canadian Press*, 20 March 2017.

resource limitations, an additional \$100 million allocated to defence diplomacy activities that may not generate immediately evident results would be difficult to support at the strategic level. However, as the founder of the Global Canada Initiative, Robert Greenhill, argues, the cost of not investing appropriate resources towards these efforts may be equally high. If Canada announces it will invest in defence diplomacy activities and does not resource them properly, “we risk wasting much of the goodwill we have remaining.”¹¹⁴

Finally, the CDA and MTCP programs would require a large increase in personnel in order to deliver the effects made possible by the additional funding. The Department of National Defence currently has a significant personnel shortage, both in the regular and reserve forces. Difficulties in retaining and recruiting are compounding this problem and indicate that the personnel shortage is unlikely to be reversed in the near term.¹¹⁵ These personnel pressures are impacting high priority military capabilities and missions making it unlikely that personnel would be made available to boost the CAF’s defence diplomacy program.

Large Increase to Defence Diplomacy

The last proposal for increasing the defence diplomacy resources would involve a substantial increase in all aspects of Canada’s defence diplomacy program both in terms of money and personnel. While the ideas presented in this section may seem at first to be

¹¹⁴ Robert Greenhill, “Canada is Not Back When it Comes to Global Aid - It’s Far Back”, *The Global and Mail Special Edition*, 12 January 2017.

¹¹⁵ Lee Berthiaume, “Canadian Military Facing Shortfall of Personnel”, *The Ottawa Citizen*, December 15 2014: <http://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/canadian-military-facing-shortfall-of-personnel> (accessed 10 April 2017) ; Lee Berthiaume, “Canadian Military Losing Soldiers at increasing rate as headcount drops to level not seen in years”, *Postmedia News*, January 27, 2016: <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-military-losing-soldiers-at-increasing-rate-headcount-drops-to-level-not-seen-in-years> (accessed 10 April 2017)

unrealistic, they are intended to illustrate that a balance must be achieved. While it may be desirable to increase resources, there is a limit to what can be allocated. As such, even in the light of any increase, the CAF should temper its expectations accordingly. A large increase would have to be accompanied by a much higher priority on the achievement of the effects defence diplomacy is intended to pursue. As the intent would be to make relatively rapid, concrete gains in terms of effectiveness of the program, the level of increase would have to be commensurate with a substantial overall increase in defence spending as a whole.

The advantages of such an investment could potentially be quite significant. The increase in global engagement the CAF would be able to undertake would rapidly enhance the relationships and mutual understanding with every region within which it engages. This would likely allow Canada to make inroads in terms of support and influence with other nations in global institutions. In some cases, a stronger emphasis on relationships could create opportunities for leadership that currently do not exist for Canada. This would result in a meaningful attempt to pursue the government of Canada's priority in leadership abroad.

On a similar note, a large increase in the resources allocated to the MTCP would see it make large concrete increases to the numbers of training programs it conducts and the number of personnel that participate in each one. The effect of this would be to rapidly improve the capacity and professionalism of foreign militaries involved in the program while making visible contributions to the stability and security of Canada's partners and allies. This would be a tangible benefit to Canada's priority of international stability. The increased emphasis on training efforts would noticeably enhance

interoperability between Canada and all participant nations, enabling operations abroad and further enhancing Canada's credibility on the world stage.

The disadvantages and challenges of such an approach are equally significant. The level of funding needed would be, from the Canadian perspective, staggering. Indeed, such an increase in defence spending would likely be unrealistic for Canada in all but the most drastic of security circumstances. Moreover, money alone is not the key to rectifying personnel shortages. Trained personnel take time to recruit, train and develop to the level of knowledge and expertise that would be needed to conduct activities on this scale. The increase in personnel that would be required would only be possible in the event that the overall defence establishment, that is the total number of authorized military positions, were to increase. This would require virtually unprecedented (in a time of relative peace) political will. Defence diplomacy on this scale would also require oversight in order to ensure that it is appropriately managed and continues to deliver its intended results. This careful management is likely beyond the CAF's current capacity.

The political appetite for such an increase in defence diplomacy would be difficult to cultivate. While the CRS review stated that the MTCP program was indeed value for the money, and the CAF has been credible and effective in providing foreign military training, "Determining the overall effectiveness of these programs is less clear."¹¹⁶ As Jeffries puts it, "While success in imparting military skills to foreign military leaders and soldiers may improve their performance, it does not guarantee achievement of the national strategic objectives"¹¹⁷ The makes "selling" any such increase to defence

¹¹⁶ Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Defence Policy and Diplomacy*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada), November 2013

¹¹⁷ Mike Jefferies, "The Future of Foreign Military Training", *Strategic Studies Working Group* (Toronto: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute), 2013.

diplomacy activities difficult.

CONCLUSION

Defence diplomacy in the Canadian context refers to “the focused and tailored engagement undertaken by the defence team with partner countries and organizations around the world in order to build and maintain cooperative relationships.” As such, it can make a direct contribution towards all three of priorities in the CFDS. In particular, the activities conducted by the Military Training and Cooperation Program support the CAF’s ability “to contribute to stability and security abroad.” Defence diplomacy can be exploited to assist in the revitalization of cooperation and engagement with partners abroad, the re-energizing of Canadian leadership on international issues and within multinational institutions, increased Canadian support to United Nations Peace Support Operations, and involvement in activities related to mediation, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. It has a role in protecting the sovereignty of Canada, the defence of North America, increasing support to United Nations peacekeeping operations and contributing to the security and stability of Canada’s allies and any allied or coalition operation in which the CAF participates.

This paper has argued that an expansion of the CAF’s defence diplomacy program would have a positive impact on the Government of Canada’s ability to foster and enhance relationships with allies and partners, strengthen the capacity of partner countries’ defence and security institutions to prevent and manage crises, and significantly improve the ability of the Government of Canada to make informed, timely decisions regarding defence and security matters abroad. The positive impact would be disproportionate to the resource investments necessary. Moreover, these effects could be leveraged to enhance the Government’s articulated diplomatic priorities. Finally,

providing the CAF with more robust defence diplomacy capabilities would enhance the military's contribution to Canada's defence priorities of increasing support to UNPSOs, protecting Canadian sovereignty, and contributing to the security of Canadian allies through allied and coalition operations.

This paper began with an analysis and review of Canada's current defence diplomacy program, with an emphasis on Canada's Global Engagement Strategy and the findings of a review of the DPD conducted by CRS. Each of the seven objectives outlined by the GES link directly to the national strategic priorities outlined by the Government of Canada. The defence diplomacy activities conducted by the CAF – specifically the Canadian Defence Attaché network, the military personnel exchanges conducted with foreign nations, and the Military Training and Cooperation Program – are intended to advance these objectives.

The CDA network builds and enhances relationships with Canada's allies and partners. CDAs direct involvement with foreign nations makes them the primary source of decision making advice for both the strategic and the national strategic levels. CDAs also provide inroads to Canadian industries, and thus opportunities to promote Canadian prosperity. CRS audit findings demonstrate that the CDA network is under resourced and it is becoming increasingly difficult to meet its mandate. The result of both these aspects is that the CDA network is not able to achieve the depth of engagement needed to foster deep, long lasting mutual beneficial relations with Canada's allies and partners.

Similarly, Canada has overextended in its commitment to the MTCP. The main goal of the MTCP is to enhance peace support interoperability among Canada's partners. At the macro level, the CRS audit found that the program is relevant, the training

provided is of an excellent quality and that they goals of the program are in line with the strategic level priorities. However, as the \$18 million dollars allocated to the program is diffused among 62 countries, the overall success of the MTCP program has been limited.

Australia's defence diplomacy program is indicative of what Canada's could be. The Australian equivalent of Canada's MTCP, the Defence Cooperation Program, has four times the budget of its Canadian peer. With just 28 registered partners, Australia is able to conduct much extensive, in depth training and engagement. The benefits of such investment and concentration were evident during Australia's leadership role in the East-Timor crisis of 1999. Australia has built deep rooted relationships that produce influence and contributions to regional peace and security that Canada cannot claim.

The CAF should give serious consideration to increasing its resource allocation to defence diplomacy activities. Relatively modest investments can result in significantly beneficial outcomes. Canada depends on allies and partners in order to defend its borders provide prosperity to its citizens and exercise leadership and influence in meeting the global challenges of today. Alliances are developed through time and fostered through relationships, interoperability and mutual support. Defence diplomacy has the potential to offer great assistance in these areas and as such is a tool that is currently being underutilized by both the Canadian Armed Forces and the Government of Canada. Increasing the priority on the activities of defence diplomacy and providing an appropriate level of resourcing would allow the CAF to achieve far reaching outcomes that would have a tremendous benefit to Canada as it seeks to exercise influence on the world stage. While such an increase would require additional resources, both in terms of money and personnel, the returns make the investment worthwhile. As Canada bids for a

seat on the UN Security Council, defence diplomacy can help. As the CAF is tasked with conducting operations abroad, the ability to house forces, and to use allies' territory as an operating base, is vital to mission success. Defence diplomacy will continue to play a critical role in establishing the conditions that allow this to happen, but only if it is given priority. If it is not, there is a real risk of another "bungle in the jungle." And that wouldn't be good for anyone.

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