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IS CANADA A NATION OF WARRIORS OR PEACEKEEPERS? HOW TO REFOCUS ON UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS

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ABSTRACT

The 100th anniversary commemorating the Battle of Vimy Ridge serves as an ideal opportunity to revisit the Vimy myth: the notion that Canada's nation was built on that muddy hill of France. An equally nostalgic and romantic theory that identifies Canada as a nation of altruistic peacekeepers emanates from what is called the peacekeeping myth. It is this latter Canadian identity that Prime Minister Trudeau indirectly referred to in his recent announcement of the Canadian Armed Forces' return to United Nations (UN) missions. This study argues that if a refocus on UN missions is imminent, then Canada can make a greater difference on the international scene by forging a unique expertise to be brought to peace operations training programs, but that this should not be at the expense of maintaining combat capable armed forces.

An exploration of both the Vimy and peacekeeping myths sets the stage to better understand certain Canadian public expectations from its military. This study also provides an overview of the current situation vis-à-vis Canada's allies and their current involvement with the UN. It analyzes some of the new factors surrounding the expanded spectrum of operations in which peacekeepers are now expected to navigate, as well as the challenges that come with this recent reality. Finally, this study shows that the Canadian Armed Forces' possible involvement in the peace operations training domain, while putting an emphasis on the agenda for women, peace and security, would provide an opportunity for Canada to develop a unique niche within the current UN framework and as such, allow the country to slowly rebuild an international reputation within the peace operations realm.

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

Nations are made by doing great things together.

– Ernest Renan

The 100th anniversary commemorating the Battle of Vimy reminds us of Canada's past military exploits and provides us with an opportunity to revisit the Vimy myth, this idea of a nation being born at the price of blood on the battlefields of France. Some counter the argument of Canada as a nation of warriors with the peacekeeping myth, according to which the country's proud heritage is one of altruistic peacekeeping involvement throughout the years. Over the last fifty years, politicians have used these two narratives to spark a sentiment of nationalistic pride and justify choices of military engagements abroad.

With the rise of Daesh in the Middle East, instability and horrors being committed in Syria, Russia invading Crimea and numerous humanitarian crises unfolding in Africa, there is no shortage of opportunities for militaries across the world to intervene and try to bring some peace and security to war-torn countries and regions. As the world witnessed the increase of nationalism and the popularity of far-right parties, Canada elected a Liberal, Justin Trudeau, whose electoral platform focused on human rights, diplomatic relations and inclusion. Not long after his election, Trudeau announced the repatriation of Canada's fighter jets then deployed in the Middle East Stabilization Force in Iraq and Syria, thus putting an end to Canada's last combat-focussed mission. He also indicated that Canada would be returning to peace operations shortly, estimating at 600 the number of troops to be deployed under a United Nations (UN) mandate to be confirmed later.

This shift in focus did bring to the forefront a certain amount of speculation from military and UN experts as to what role the Canadian military should play to remain

relevant among allies. This study will argue that if a refocus on UN missions is imminent, then Canada can make a greater difference on the international scene by forging a unique expertise to be brought to peace operations training programs, but that this should not be at the expense of maintaining combat capable armed forces.

Historians and military experts have been debating for decades whether Canada should be perceived as a nation of warriors or peacekeepers, with the truth most likely lying somewhere in the middle. The duality between the Canadian foundation myth referred to as the Vimy myth and Lester Pearson's strong peacekeeping heritage has been a reality for Canada and is still evident today. In Ottawa, the peacekeeping monument, also known as *Reconciliation*¹, was erected a short walk away from *The Response*², the National War Memorial. Canadians who walk past these monuments recognize the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in both roles, but are probably oblivious to the irony of both war and peace memorials sharing the same area. Chapter 2 will explore the warriors and peacekeepers schools of thought by extracting key events, factors and achievements that have shaped today's Canadian Armed Forces and the Canadian population's expectations vis-à-vis its military.

As the Canadian government has recently announced a shift towards UN Peace Operations, an analysis of the current situation surrounding such a commitment will be conducted in Chapter 3. Flaws, failures and limitations of the UN have been brought to light since the mid-1990s missions in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. These three countries evoke issues such as unprepared troops, peacekeepers' unjustified violence and sex abuse scandals, and the UN's inability to stop a genocide. These failures have shaken

¹Government of Canada, "Canadian Heritage," last modified 7 June 2016, <http://canada.pch.gc.ca/>.

²Government of Canada, "Veterans Affairs Canada," last modified 8 April 2017, <http://www.veterans.gc.ca/>.

the very foundation of the UN as the main organization entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security. The once realistic UN trinity of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force³ was no longer a suitable tool in a world of growing intra-state conflicts. Canada, much like its closest allies, has significantly reduced the number of troops committed to UN missions, despite the rising requirement for blue berets, currently deployed in 16 UN-led peace operations.⁴ The Liberal government, realizing the complexities of modern UN-led missions and the uncertainties surfacing with President Trump's election, have withheld any detailed announcement on the CAF's imminent involvement in peace operations.

Finally, the delay in making such an announcement has allowed speculation, discussions and reflections on what Canada's focus should be to make an impact while maintaining the same level of limited military resources. Chapter 4 will therefore evaluate prospects for Canada's renewed involvement in peace operations. One key area eluded to by both our Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence on numerous occasions is training. Canada was once a leader in UN peace operations training, and the CAF have maintained throughout the years a reputation of credible mentors and trainers in expeditionary operations. Another hot topic within the UN is the agenda for Women, Peace and Security as demonstrated by the adoption of seven related UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) between 2000 and 2013.⁵ If Canada could encompass the essence of those resolutions with its commitment to training, then the impact would be multiplied, and Canada could regain a niche within the UN framework. Evidently, such aspirations will be complex, frustrating at times and progress will materialize slowly. A

³"United Nations," accessed 15 February 2017, <http://www.un.org/>.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

defined scope of mission and realistic expectations should be developed, and appropriate resources should be provided. This would safeguard Canada's impact and furtherance of international peace and security through a specialized UN niche. However, with Canada's North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) domestic responsibilities, as well as its involvement in several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led expeditionary missions, the biggest challenge for the Liberal government will be to strike the right balance between its desire for visible Canadian blue berets and Canada's commitment to military allies.

As Canada is on the edge of re-committing troops to peace operations, and the Vimy commemoration events are being wrapped up, it is pertinent to analyse the nation's two core foundation myths to understand the Canadian public's expectations from its military and to look at how this middle power can make a difference in the world.

CHAPTER 2 - CANADA'S IDENTITY: A NATION OF WARRIORS OR PEACEKEEPERS?

Canada's history has been shifting phases of imperial dependency an inner disunity. It is a country ever divided and ambivalent about war. Warrior Nation, choreboy of empire, fireproof house, peacekeeper. But never solely Warrior Nation.

– Ian McKay and Jamie Swift, *Warrior Nation*

Introduction

When looking at statistics such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the actual size of its military, there really are not any particular statistic that would place Canada on the map as a powerful and respected nation. It is the world's 10th economy⁶ and despite its membership in the Group of Seven (G7)⁷ and its involvement in NATO, Canada has the 58th military⁸ in size in the world. Canada never held a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC), and as of 2010, it lost its bid for a non-permanent seat for the first time since the creation of the UN⁹.

Notwithstanding less than impressive statistics and the recent rejection for a temporary seat at the UNSC, the last decades of Reputation Institute surveys have shown Canada regularly ranked as the most reputable country in the world.¹⁰ In their 2016 survey to 16,000 people from G7 countries, US News and World Report ranked Canada as the 11th most powerful country in the world. Their criteria to evaluate a country's power used the following description: "a leader, economically influential, politically

⁶Knoema, "World GDP Ranking 2016," accessed 11 February 2017, <http://knoema.fr/nwnfkne/world-gdp-ranking-2016-data-and-charts-forecast>.

⁷Government of Canada, "Canada and the G7," accessed 6 February 2017, <http://www.international.gc.ca/g7/index.aspx?lang=eng>.

⁸Nation Master, "Armed Forces Personnel: Countries Compared," accessed 11 Feb 2017, <http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Military/Armed-forces-personnel>.

⁹John Ibbitson and Joanna Slater, "Security Council Rejection a Deep Embarrassment for Harper," *The Globe and Mail*, 12 October 2010.

¹⁰Reputation Institute, "Who is #1 in 2016?" accessed 15 March 2017, <https://www.reputationinstitute.com/research/Country-RepTrak>.

influential, strong international alliances, strong military.”¹¹ They also ranked Canada as the second-best country in the world,¹² with criteria based on quality of life, entrepreneurship, citizenship and power as described above. This survey aside, Canada consistently ranks high in categories such as most respected or best reputation. Canada’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bill Graham, once wrote that despite some shortcomings, “Canada is seen abroad as a highly successful society,”¹³ a reality that has shaped its foreign policy for decades. This speaks to the Canadian “exceptionalism”: Canada’s unique attributes and values which make it an extremely well-respected country with high credibility on the global stage.¹⁴ Since hard statistics do not provide answers, it is interesting to dig deeper into what brought such credibility to Canada. The former Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT – now Global Affairs Canada or GAC) published in 2011 a list of Canadian values that included:

respect for the environment; commitment to democracy; a desire to encourage fairness in developing societies (fair labour, business, legal and governance arrangements); a recognition of the importance of tolerance and a desire to promote that to others; and a strong attachment to the idea of an engaged civil society both at home and abroad.¹⁵

Domestically, there is undoubtedly a unique dimension of multiculturalism and the perception that Canadians are nice and welcoming to foreigners which contribute greatly to Canada’s reputation. On the international scene, when focusing on the military sphere, the first topic studied encompasses the everlasting dichotomy between Canada’s

¹¹US News, “Power Rankings,” accessed 12 March 2017, <http://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/power-full-list#>.

¹²Ibid.

¹³The Honourable Bill Graham, “A Dialogue on Canadian Foreign Policy,” *Peace Research* 35, no. 2 (2003): 13.

¹⁴Denis Stairs, “Myths, Morals, and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy,” *International Journal* lviii, no. 2 (2003): 241.

¹⁵Steve Lee, “Canadian Values in Canadian Foreign Policy,” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 10, no. 1 (2002): 1.

identity as a nation of warriors or peacekeepers. On one side, the Vimy myth stipulates that Canada's military identity was forged at Vimy Ridge exactly one hundred years ago. In 1917, Canadian soldiers worked together to conquer a crucial ridge that none of their powerful allies such as the United Kingdom or France were able to capture. On the other side, UN enthusiasts such as Walter Dorn argue that Canada's international reputation was built on peacekeeping operations and Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson's peace-focused heritage. Both theories will be explored in this chapter in order to outline their truths and limitations.

The Vimy Myth

Canada's war-fighting abilities have been recognized in Vimy, certainly, but also through numerous combat missions since the late 1990s starting with the air strikes in Kosovo. Realists,¹⁶ historians and pro-defence lobbyists such as Jack Granatstein, David Bercuson, Barry Cooper and General Rick Hillier believe that Canada's national identity was mainly built on the Canadian military exploits in Vimy. The Conservatives used this narrative in the early 2000s to revive Canadians' pride in their military heritage, referred to as the *Vimy Effect*.¹⁷ When Canada's representative, separate from Great Britain, was invited to sign the Treaty of Versailles at the end of the Great War, one could argue that successful military engagements were key to bringing credit to Canada on the international stage, a recognition that led to the nation's self-affirmation.^{18,19} Fifty years

¹⁶Mount Holyoke College, "Political Realism," accessed 2 April 2017, <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pol116/realism.htm>. Realism in international relations can be defined as "an approach to the study and practice of international politics. It emphasizes the role of the nation-state and makes a broad assumption that all nation-states are motivated by national interests, or, at best, national interests disguised as moral concerns." It refers to what is as opposed to what's ought to be.

¹⁷Noah Richler, *De La Fleur Au Fusil: Le Canada s'En Va-T-En Guerre* (Montréal, Québec: Leméac, 2013), 54-55, 72.

¹⁸The Canadian Encyclopedia, "Treaty of Versailles," accessed 18 January 2017, <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/treaty-of-versailles/>.

later at the unveiling of the memorial in France, it was ironically Prime Minister Lester Pearson, already a symbol of Canada's new peacekeeping image, who coined Vimy as the birth of the Canadian nation.²⁰ The actions of brave young Canadian men on a muddy hill an ocean away from home were significant and certainly praiseworthy, but the impact of the four-day battle seems to have taken unrealistic proportions as the years went by. The First World War was not the first time Canadians fought under their own identity to gain international recognition for their actions. In fact, during the Boer War, Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier insisted that the initial 1,000 Canadian men sent to Africa to fight with the British would wear their own unique Canadian uniforms.²¹ The British later praised Canada's volunteers for their "bravery, dash and courage."²²

In 2007, former Prime Minister Stephen Harper went as far as describing Vimy as "no place on Earth that makes us feel more Canadian"²³, sparking controversy among skeptics, but inspiring millions of Canadians to be proud of their heritage. Much ink has been spilled over the reason why the Battle of Vimy took such epic proportions for Canadians. Some say it stems from the fact that Canada did not go through an independence war, and as such looks up to the Vimy exploits as events that unified a nation.²⁴ Ian McKay and Jamie Swift argue that the Vimy myth and the concept of a warrior nation create a narrative in which "horrible emotions of war are deployed for

¹⁹Norman Hillmer, *Empire to Umpire : Canada and the World to the 1990s*, ed. J. L. Granatstein (Mississauga, Ontario: Copp Clark Longman, 1994), 350.

²⁰Robert Everett-Green, "Vimy Ridge: Birthplace of a Nation – Or of a Canadian myth?" *The Globe and Mail*, 5 April 2017.

²¹The Canadian Encyclopedia, "Canada and the South African War," accessed 17 April 2017, <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/south-african-war/>.

²²Robert Everett-Green, "Vimy Ridge: Birthplace of a Nation – Or of a Canadian myth?" *The Globe and Mail*, 5 April 2017.

²³Harper, Stephen (speech, Battle of Vimy 90th Anniversary, Vimy, France, 9 April 2007).

²⁴Robert Everett-Green, "Vimy Ridge: Birthplace of a Nation – Or of a Canadian myth?" *The Globe and Mail*, 5 April 2017.

political gain, in the hopes of gaining a patriotic sense of shared purpose.”²⁵ Nic Clarke took a more pragmatic approach and compared the Vimy myth to a “colossus...[with] feet of clay”²⁶, describing the exploits in Vimy as impressive, but infused with nationalistic parochialism that has blinded Canadians from any sense of realism and critical analysis of the actual battle. Yet, there is still a romantic sense of national individuality surrounding Vimy that ignites Canadians’ pride for their military’s contribution on the world scene. If the actual birth of a nation in a four-day battle on foreign soil is debatable, Canada’s military’s unique contribution in different conflicts abroad in the hundred years that followed is quite real and does support the thesis that Canada is, among other things, a nation of warriors.

During the Second World War, Canada contributed almost 10% of its population to the war effort. Canadian sailors, air personnel, and soldiers fought in the Battle of Atlantic, the strategic bombing campaign, and ultimately as part as the combined forces in Normandy.²⁷ They also led forces in Scheldt, then under German domination. Canada’s military actions in liberating the Netherlands resulted in enduring gratitude from the Dutch, still visible today during the yearly Canadian Tulip Festival featuring thousands of Dutch-donated flowers.²⁸

Any country hoping to maintain that credibility needs strong, involved and proven Armed Forces. Canadian militarists, who are mostly Vimy myth theorists as well, therefore advocate for the CAF to be well funded, trained to the highest standard, and

²⁵Ian McKay and Jamie Swift, *Warrior Nation* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2012), xi.

²⁶Active History Canada, "Feet of Clay? Canada’s Vimy Ridge," last modified 4 April 2017, <http://activehistory.ca/2017/04/feet-of-clay-canadas-vimy-ridge/>.

²⁷Veterans Affairs Canada, "Second World War (1939 – 1945)," last modified 28 February 2017, <http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/second-world-war>.

²⁸"Canadian Tulip Festival," accessed 23 March 2017, <http://www.tulipfestival.ca/>.

consistently employed as a combat military in operations abroad. Failure to do so, according to them, would put Canada's safety at risk and significantly reduce its credibility and political power among world partners.²⁹ In 2004, Jack Granatstein stated that although Canada was still part of key organizations such as the G7 or NATO, it "had ceased to matter internationally." He associated that demise to the over idealistic views of UN enthusiastic politicians who led Canada's military to become one of negotiation and idle peacekeeping operations.³⁰ Despite some resources shortfalls, and after emerging from the decade of darkness³¹ with disappointing peacekeeping operations, the Canadian Armed Forces rolled up their sleeves and entered a new phase of combat operations in Afghanistan, Libya, and more recently Iraq and Syria.

The War in Afghanistan

In 2001, Canada's biggest ally was shocked by the 9/11 terrorist attack. An era of the "war against terror" started with Americans expecting Canadians to fight terrorist insurgents by their side. With 24 Canadians losing their life on that infamous day, a shift towards coalition-led combat operations in Afghanistan started for Canada in the beginning of the twenty-first century. This allowed Canada to emerge as a credible and relied-upon world actor in counter-insurgency operations.³² An indication of Canada's recognition as a military leader was the appointment of Canadian Armed Forces top officers in key coalition forces positions. As a matter of fact, in 2004, Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier was appointed as commander of the NATO-led International Security

²⁹J. L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: Harper Flamingo Canada, 2004), 3-6.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 2.

³¹"Liberals Accuse Hillier of Being 'a Prop for the Conservative Party,'" *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 February 2007. The term "decade of darkness" was introduced by Lieutenant-General Al DeQuetteville, but popularized later by General Rick Hillier to underline the lack of funding and resources of the Canadian Armed Forces at the end of the 1990s.

³²"Canada's Exit Will Hurt Afghan Mission: Expert," *The Canadian Press*, 12 August 2009.

Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, leading 5,500 troops from 33 different countries.³³

During ISAF's Afghanistan campaign, Canada led the stabilization efforts in the Kandahar region, referred to by some as the most dangerous one in Afghanistan. The number of coalition casualties occurred in Kandahar province during Operation Enduring Freedom places it as the second most dangerous region in the country.³⁴ Canada's footprint within the coalition was the third biggest behind the United States and the United Kingdom, and accordingly, the CAF accumulated the third largest number of casualties among the coalition.³⁵ During the Afghanistan decade (2002-2011), Canada was recognized internationally for its professional military forces and their ability to lead a coalition joint task force, despite only having the world's 58th largest military.³⁶

This period seems to support the Vimy myth and notion of Canada as a warrior nation. Canadians were standing tall and fighting side-by-side with world powers boasting a rich military history, with the objective of fostering peace and security in the Middle East. Despite Canada's small defence budget and limited number of soldiers, the CAF pulled through. In their mission focussed on weakening the Taliban and bringing stability to Afghanistan, Canadians were described by allies as "showing the way with new, intelligent counter-insurgency strategies."³⁷ It is very difficult to tangibly measure

³³"Canadian General Takes Command of NATO-Led International Security Force in Afghanistan." *Canadian Armed Forces News Release*, 9 February 2004.

³⁴ICasualties, "Operation Enduring Freedom - Fatalities by Province," accessed 15 April 2017, <http://icasualties.org/OEF/ByProvince.aspx>. Operation Enduring Freedom is the name given by the US government to the war in Afghanistan, that essentially lasted from October 2001 to December 2014.

³⁵ICasualties, "Operation Enduring Freedom - Coalition Deaths by Nationality," accessed 20 April 2017, <http://icasualties.org/OEF/Nationality.aspx?hndQry=US>.

³⁶Nation Master, "Armed Forces Personnel: Countries Compared," accessed 11 February 2017, <http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Military/Armed-forces-personnel>.

³⁷Pamela Wallin, "Winning the Afghan War the Canadian Way," *The National Post*, 13 August 2014.

the impact that the Afghanistan years had on Canada's reputation and credibility, but a number of events confirming the Vimy myth quickly followed.

Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier's appointment as the first and only Canadian ISAF Commander in 2004 was certainly a tremendous achievement for Canada, but it was not too surprising, given that Canada was the third troop-contributing nation to the Afghanistan campaign at the time.³⁸ Seven years later, Canada would get another of its generals appointed in a senior coalition leadership role.

The Libya Air Campaign

In 2011, as the Arab Spring was unravelling in Northern Africa, a coalition was formed to enforce UNSC Resolution 1973 in Libya.³⁹ The coalition's lead nations were the United States, France and the UK.⁴⁰ First under US command, the coalition was then transferred to Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) under the NATO umbrella.⁴¹ A theatre commander needed to be chosen, and the consensus led to Lieutenant-General Charlie Bouchard to be designated as the Commander of the Joint Task Force.

At the time, Bouchard, a Canadian helicopter pilot, was stationed in Naples at the Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters.⁴² Although Canada's contribution to OUP's maritime and air components was slim in comparison to the coalition lead nations mentioned above, it was recognized that a Canadian general had enough credibility and respect from all coalition nations to lead such a complex operation. Furthermore, at a

³⁸"Canada's Exit Will Hurt Afghan Mission: Expert," *The Canadian Press*, 12 August 2009.

³⁹United Nations, "UNSCR 1973," accessed 13 February 2017, <https://www.un.org>.

⁴⁰The Guardian, "NATO Operations in Libya: Data Journalism Breaks Down which Country does what," accessed 2 April, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/may/22/nato-libya-data-journalism-operations-country#data>.

⁴¹North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO and Libya," accessed 16 April 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_71652.htm#.

⁴²Christopher S. Chivvis and Karl P. Mueller, "Strategic and Political Overview of the Intervention," in *Precision and Purpose - Air Power in the Libyan Civil War* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2015), pp. 26-27.

NATO meeting in 2011, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates singled out Canadians, along with Danes and Belgians for their contribution to the coalition efforts. In his words, “these countries have, with their constrained resources, found ways to do the training, buy the equipment and field the platforms necessary to make a credible military contribution.”⁴³ As numbers speak louder than words, early mission statistics indicate that Canada had 6.5 per cent of the military troops deployed compared to its US ally, and yet was able to achieve 18.3 per cent of the number of US air sorties on the first month and a half of the air campaign.⁴⁴ Nor was this the only coalition campaign in which Canada was involved.

Middle-East Stabilization Force (MESF) in Iraq and Syria

Only a few years after OUP, a new coalition was being stood up in response to the horrors perpetrated by a group referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).⁴⁵ Canada indeed solidified its international military presence as a new NATO-led coalition was formed to deter and defeat Daesh in 2015. The CAF quickly deployed Special Forces, six CF-18 fighter jets, two CP140 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) patrol aircraft, one CC150 tanker and supporting units to conduct combat

⁴³Russ Campbell, “US Secretary Gates: Canada’s Punching above its Weight,” accessed 3 February 2017, <http://www.russ-campbell.net/2011/06/us-secretary-gates-canadas-punching.html>.

⁴⁴The Guardian, “NATO Operations in Libya: Data Journalism Breaks Down which Country does what,” accessed 2 April, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/may/22/nato-libya-data-journalism-operations-country#data>.<https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/may/22/nato-libya-data-journalism-operations-country#data>. Figures reflecting the number or military personnel deployed include the maritime component. In Canada’s case, there was one ship deployed.

⁴⁵Nicola Oakley and Suchandrika Chakrabarti, “What does Daesh Mean? ISIS ‘Threatens to Cut Out the Tongues’ of Anyone using this Word,” *The Mirror*, 14 April 2017. The organization is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and now as Daesh, which is an acronym for the Arabic translation of ISIL. Daesh also has a negative connotation, as it is similar to Arabic word Daes “one who crushes something underfoot” and Dahes, “one who sows discord”.

operations in Iraq and Syria.⁴⁶ Once again, Canada was described as “punching above weight”⁴⁷ by US Commander despite its relatively small numerical contribution.

That reputation was shaken when the Canadian CF-18 jets were pulled from the MESF anti-Daesh campaign, an announcement that coincided with a Daesh-claimed terrorist attack at the Bataclan in Paris which resulted in 120 deaths.⁴⁸ Kinetic air assets would see a short deployment, because as soon as the Liberals were elected in the fall of 2015, the end of Canada’s contribution to the combat mission was announced. As its allies were strengthening their stance against Daesh, Canada was leaving the fight. The decision was made to maintain other capabilities in the theatre of operations such as the air-to-air refuelling and ISR aircraft to contribute to the coalition’s effort. Additional troops would also be deployed to augment the unit mentoring Kurdish troops in the North of Iraq. Nevertheless, the CAF had removed the capability to achieve kinetic air effects against Daesh and could no longer be considered akin to close allies such as the US, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and even Sweden who all had a fighter force deployed in the Middle East.⁴⁹

Shortly thereafter, US President Barack Obama conveyed his disapproval not publicly voicing it, but by shunning Canada from the subsequent MESF coalition meeting.⁵⁰ This was a reminder that a country cannot aspire to be part of decisions and negotiations if it is not willing to commit and fight alongside allies. The US reaction

⁴⁶Lieutenant-General (ret) Lloyd Campbell, “Op Impact: Canada and the Battle Against Middle East Terrorism,” *Airforce Magazine*, Volume 39, Issue 2 (2015).

⁴⁷Matthew Fisher, “Canada Punching above its Weight in Fight against ISIL Forces, U.S. Military Commander Says,” *National Post*, 17 April 2015.

⁴⁸“Les Attaques Terroristes À Paris Ont Fait Au Moins 120 Morts,” *Radio-Canada*, 13 November 2015.

⁴⁹Florence Gaub, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: Reviewing Operation Unified Protector,” *Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College*, 7.

⁵⁰Katharine Starr, “Canada Not Invited to Anti-ISIS Coalition Meeting in Paris,” *CBC News*, 19 January 2016.

indicates that a mere presence is not enough to be recognized as relevant on the world scene. Canada's powerful allies expect the CAF to participate in combat operations. Failure to do so relegates them to the rank of spectators almost, but certainly not credible contributors to relevant military efforts.⁵¹ A year later, the election of the new US President would bring its share of surprises and would serve as an indicator of a rising expectation from South of the border that Canada needs to "pull its weight" militarily in NATO.

President Trump Holding NATO Partners Accountable and the Start of a New Era

President-elect Trump focused part of his electoral campaign on NATO partners' enduring reluctance to meet the required 2 per cent of GDP commitment to military budgets. During his inaugural speech, he claimed that the United States has "subsidized the armies of other countries[...]; defended other nations' borders[...]; and spent trillions of dollars overseas."⁵² Throughout the first weeks of his presidency, he criticized NATO, and its members' unwillingness to achieve the defence budget goals, concentrating most of his denunciation towards Germany.⁵³ That was yet another reminder that countries must maintain their commitment to alliances, as support from the biggest player is not to be taken for granted.

The appointment of Canadian Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier and Lieutenant-General Charlie Bouchard to key positions as commanders of large coalitions at the operational level secured Canada's reputation as a credible leader for combat missions.

⁵¹J. L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: Harper Flamingo Canada, 2004), 8.

⁵²Donald Trump (speech, U.S. President Inaugural Address, Washington D.C., United States, 20 January 2017.)

⁵³"Germany Says Boosting Defense Spending, Demands Clear U.S. Agenda," *World News*, 18 January 2017.

Building on the legacy from Vimy Ridge, Canada's military was at the forefront of fighting alongside allies, this time against terrorist groups. After departing from such a position after the removal of the fighters in the fall of 2015, Canada was shunned from coalition meetings. Furthermore, although it was intangible, it became just a little less relevant in today's world. A sentiment of déjà vu led Liberal critics to worry about a return to a period similar to the 1990s decade of darkness for the CAF. As significant military engagements and combat missions diminish, the trend has usually been a decrease in Canada's defence budget. Coincidentally, in their proposed budget in the spring of 2017, the Liberals announced that \$8.4 billion would be removed from next year's defence budget, deferred and vaguely redistributed over the next twenty years.⁵⁴

As then Minister of Foreign Affairs John Manley said in 2001, "You can't just sit at the G8 table and then, when the bill comes, go to the washroom. If you want to play a role in the world, even as a small member of the G8, there's a cost to doing that."⁵⁵ Further to strictly referring to defence budgets, his statement underlines the importance of Canada's commitment to ensure that it maintains a resourced military, ready to protect its territory, but also to fight alongside its allies when required, if Canadians want to maintain a certain level of influence in the world. This is not to say that Canada should blindly follow what its allies are asking or doing. There are a number of occasions when Canada did not follow suit, and was right to do so. Canada's refusal to deploy troops as part of the US-led coalition in Iraq in the Second Gulf War, support of the Kyoto Treaty,

⁵⁴Murray Brewster, "Billions in Defence Equipment Purchases Postponed Until 2030s in Liberal Budget," *CBC News*, 22 March 2017.

⁵⁵Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How we Lost our Place in the World* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2003), 1.

as well as its commitments to the International Criminal Court (ICC) are examples that brought credit to Canada in the end, despite being contrary to the US approach.⁵⁶

To summarize, Canada has proven on numerous occasions, starting at Vimy Ridge one hundred years ago, and more recently in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq, that it can “punch above its weight” militarily. However, to uphold that international reputation, the government must strive to maintain a combat-capable military that is resourced enough to stand alongside large military powers and still make a difference. As a counter-argument to Canada being recognized for its small but mighty military with warrior-like achievements, Canada has also been known as a leader in UN peacekeeping operations since 1956 and Lester Pearson’s subsequent awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize the following year.

A Nation of Peacekeepers

From the Suez Crisis in the Pearson era to the much mediatized Rwanda mission led by Canada’s very own Major-General Roméo Dallaire, it is undeniable that Canada has a rich peacekeeping history. Mirroring the Vimy myth, there is another theory of Canada’s identity known as the peacekeeping myth. Eric Wagner defines it as “the idea that the Canadian Forces (CF) have historically made peacekeeping its primary mission, and that this peacekeeping has been motivated largely by altruism and humanitarianism.”⁵⁷

Granatstein concedes that there was indeed some truth in Canada’s soldiers being viewed in the 1950s and 1960s as inspiring peacekeepers making significant

⁵⁶Ibid., 193.

⁵⁷Eric Wagner, "The Peaceable Kingdom? the National Myth of Canadian Peacekeeping and the Cold War," Canadian Military Journal (December 21, 2006).

contributions in preventing small conflicts abroad.⁵⁸ However, he condemns the fact that as Canadians got enamoured with the concept of peacekeeping, they forgot what the core business of a military was: to “be ready to fight wars.”⁵⁹ It is logical though, that with international peacekeeping missions and military intervention on Canadian soil during the October 1970 and the Oka crises, the second part of the 20th century has shaped the way Canadians perceive the role of their armed forces at home and abroad to one of constabulary uniformed refereeing force.⁶⁰

Since the Boer War, Canadians have always demonstrated throughout their military engagements a commitment to the international “greater good” of which the UN has been the guardian for almost 75 years now.⁶¹ Despite some UN flaws, inefficiencies of the administration and the Canadian peacekeepers controversy in Somalia and Bosnia, Walter Dorn argues that Canadians have always been proud of their blue beret heritage.⁶² It is therefore only natural that the Prime Minister would now wish to refocus on peace operations to rebuild Canada’s international reputation as a leader in UN missions.

The narrative of Canada as a nation of peacekeepers is punctuated with the post-Second World War optimism and the birth of a dream for a better world that resonated with Canadians. It provided them with General MacArthur’s hopeful notion that war is not a state that needs to be accepted, but it is rather in everyone’s control to shape

⁵⁸J. L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: Harper Flamingo Canada, 2004), 14.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁶⁰Christian Leuprecht and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Defense Policy “Walmart Style”," *Armed Forces & Society* 41, no. 3 (2015), 553.

⁶¹J. L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: Harper Flamingo Canada, 2004), 203.

⁶²Walter A. Dorn, "Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?" *Canadian Foreign Policy* 12, no. 3 (2005), 27.

circumstances that would lead to conflict escalation.⁶³ This concept that then became a national pride, inspired Canadians and unified a nation of otherwise very different individuals. Although critics of the UN have raised some questions about its apparent inefficiencies in the recent years,⁶⁴ it is irrefutable that Canada has built a rich peacekeeping heritage in the second half of the 20th century.

For his leadership in resolving the Suez Canal crisis, Lester B. Pearson is frequently referred to as the father of modern UN Peacekeeping.⁶⁵ From 1957, the year when he received his Nobel Peace Prize, until 1992, Canada was often contributing the most troops to UN-led peacekeeping operations, sending approximately 125,000 troops over the course of nearly four decades.^{66,67} At its peak, Canada's contribution even reached 3,300 peacekeeping soldiers deployed at once.⁶⁸ As a contrast, in 2017, Canada had 32 military and 90 police personnel deployed, out of a total of nearly 100,000 UN troops, ranking 67th out of 123 contributing nations.⁶⁹

Liberals often argue that peacekeeping is close to Canadians' hearts,⁷⁰ and surveys tend to support their claim. In 2003, a study was conducted by GPC International called "Listening to Canadians." The results showed that 90 per cent of Canadians chose

⁶³Noah Richler, *De La Fleur Au Fusil: Le Canada s'En Va-T-En Guerre* (Montréal, Québec: Leméac, 2013), p.59-60.

⁶⁴"Tensions between western governments, which see the UN as bloated and inefficient, and developing countries, which regard it as undemocratic and dominated by the rich, have rippled across the organisation as ballooning costs drive the push for reform." Chris McGreal, "70 Years and Half a Trillion Dollars Later: What has the UN Achieved?" *The Guardian*, 7 September 07 2015.

⁶⁵Andrew Cohen, *Lester B. Pearson* (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2008), 114-116. Pearson was the Secretary of State for External Affairs (i.e., foreign minister) at the time and would later become Prime Minister in the 1960s.

⁶⁶Michael Byers, "After Afghanistan: Canada's Return to UN Peacekeeping," *Canadian Military Journal* 13, no. 1 (2012), 33;

⁶⁷Lane Anker, "Peacekeeping and Public Opinion," *Canadian Military Journal* 6, no. 2 (2005), 25.

⁶⁸Peace Operations Working Group, "Canada and the UN Peacekeeping," accessed 20 December 2016, <http://www.peacebuild.ca/documents/CanadaUNPKOE.pdf>.

⁶⁹"United Nations," accessed 2 May 2017, <http://www.un.org/>.

⁷⁰Lane Anker, "Peacekeeping and Public Opinion," *Canadian Military Journal* 6, no. 2 (2005), 23.

“promoting world peace” as Canada’s most important foreign policy objective.⁷¹

Contribution to international peace and security has been part of Canada’s foreign policy as a third priority behind the defence of its territory and or Canadians abroad. Canada has indeed chosen to participate in international intervention when they were either UN-led or UN-endorsed. The study also revealed that when looking at what Canada’s top priorities, 81 per cent of respondents indicated that “participating in peacekeeping operations” should be the top one.⁷²

As governments changed alternatively between Tories and Liberals in the last few decades, the defence strategy focus has generally oscillated between more offensive missions under conservative leadership; and peace operations when the Liberals have been in power. The exception to the rule was certainly the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, which started during Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s third and last mandate. It is simplistic to associate the pendulum of military engagements to those two foundation theories as many other reasons guide the type of military operations chosen by the government. However, it can be interesting to isolate this effect for further analysis, as there is a general tendency of governments to align military responses or at least post-conflict focus on either combat operations or peace operations. The best recent proof is when Liberals, as it was expected, based part of their 2015 electoral platform on ending the combat mission in Iraq and refocus on peacekeeping operations in Africa.^{73,74}

⁷¹Communication Canada, “Public Opinion Research in the Government of Canada,” last modified 19 November 2003, <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/PF1-1-2003E.pdf>.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Liberal Party of Canada, “Strategic Priorities,” accessed 15 March 2017, <https://www.liberal.ca/realchange/strategic-priorities>.

⁷⁴Liberal Party of Canada, “2015 Election Platform, Commitment Category: Canada and the World,” accessed 15 March 2017, <https://www.liberal.ca/commitment-category/canada-and-the-world/>.

For its 150 years of existence, Canada has been under Liberal control 58% of the time.⁷⁵ It is not enough of a lead to conclude that Liberal views are more in line with the majority of Canadians. However, even in 2015, Angus Reid's survey on Canadians' opinion on what the military priorities should be, 74% of the respondents answered that the focus should be on peacekeeping versus combat preparedness.⁷⁶ This proves that throughout the years, a majority of Canadians consider peacekeeping as the top priority for Canada's military involvement abroad. The one thing that might not be clear to most survey respondents is that nowadays the delineation between peace and combat operations is far from being clear, and that one cannot enter in a UN-mission unprepared for war.⁷⁷ In other words, one cannot possibly get involved in peace operations without preparing for the most violent type of conflict, as missions evolve over different levels of intensity throughout a spectrum of operations.⁷⁸ As such, even if Canada is to refocus on peace operations, it must not be at the detriment of its combat capability.

Conclusion

In the end, both the Peacekeeping and Vimy myths have value and have contributed to shaping Canada's identity as a military player in the international field. Richler claims that Canada's predominant belief for its military "has always been one of

⁷⁵Parliament of Canada, "How Canadians Govern Themselves," accessed 6 February 2017, http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/senatoreugeneforse/book/prime_ministers-e.html.

⁷⁶Angus Reid Institute, "Election 2015: Canadians Profess Decline in International Reputation in Last Decade by Margin of 2:1," accessed 10 February 2017, <http://angusreid.org/election-2015-foreign-policy/>.

⁷⁷Matthew Fischer, "Canadian Forces Bracing for Hazardous UN Peacekeeping Mission in Africa — and Potential Budget cuts," *National Post*, 22 March 2016.

⁷⁸Walter Dorn and Joshua Libben, *Unprepared for Peace The Decline of Canadian Peacekeeping Training (and what to do about it)*, Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2016), 18. Canadian missions across the Spectrum of Conflict will be developed further in the next chapter.

caring and rescue.”⁷⁹ Whether that gets achieved by a soldier with a tan helmet in Afghanistan, a green toque during the Quebec ice storm or a blue beret in Africa is beside the point. At their core, Canadians want to make a difference, to contribute to the world being a better place. If they were fortunate enough to grow up in a peaceful country away from constant turmoil and terror, then they feel like they are responsible for making a worldly contribution. However, given recent challenges in the 21st century security and defence environment, the question arises as to whether or not the UN is obsolete, or at least mistrusted enough by major world players that it is no longer the go-to easy button to lead peace operations. The next chapter will explore today’s situation relative to peace operations and the UN’s ability to restore durable peace and security to any region.

⁷⁹Noah Richler, *What we Talk about when we Talk about War* (Fredericton, N.B: Goose Lane Editions, 2012), 323.

CHAPTER 3 - UN'S LIMITATIONS AND HOW THE FACE OF PEACE OPERATIONS HAS CHANGED

The world is changing and UN peace operations must change with it if they are to remain an indispensable and effective tool in promoting international peace and security.

– Ban Ki-Moon, United Nations Secretary General

Introduction

As the Cold War was drawing to an end by the end of the 1980s, major world powers started to demonstrate their will to collaborate on the international scene. Dennis Jett describes the few years that followed as the “golden era” of peacekeeping, during which the demand for UN troops was growing across the globe, from Central America to Southern Africa, all the way to South Asia.⁸⁰ However, this period can hardly be described as “golden,” as the reality is much more gloom.

When horror stories from peacekeeper actions in Bosnia and Somalia started to circulate, news of the death of eighteen American soldiers in Somalia with the images of one soldier being dragged in the streets of Mogadishu surfaced in the media.⁸¹ At the same time, information about the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 started to reach nations across the world, and the UN momentum seemed to come to a halt. The close succession of these significant failures, first with a hit to peacekeepers’ credibility and then with the UN’s inability to stop a genocide, significantly affected the global perception towards the UN and peacekeeping operations.⁸² Since the mid-1990s, Canada’s declining troop contribution to UN missions (from over 3000 in 1993 to now approximately 120 in

⁸⁰Dennis C. Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 4.

⁸¹NPR Staff, "What A Downed Black Hawk in Somalia Taught America," *All Things Considered*, 5 October 2013.

⁸²Dennis C. Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 5.

2017⁸³) seems to support the weakening level of trust from major world powers who, at some point in time, saw the UN as the main leader of international peace operations.

Now twenty-three years after the end of this short-lived “golden era” of peacekeeping, has the UN adapted to new realities? Has the international community regained its trust in the UN as a leader in peace operations? This chapter will explore three topics surrounding the current state of the UN, and what it means for Canada. First, it will examine whether or not the UN is now obsolete. It is acknowledged that large organizational reforms take time, resources and energy, but has the UN now caught up to today’s conflict realities? Now that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has indicated his intention to deploy Canadian troops to UN operations, has the UN framework evolved enough to enable Canadian commanders and soldiers to successfully accomplish their assigned peace mission goals?

Secondly, the Permanent Five UNSCR countries and the G7 nations’ troop and monetary contributions to the UN will be examined to determine whether or not they have actually given up on the UN as a credible lead agency for peace operations. The face of peacekeepers has changed significantly during the last two decades as new countries started to provide troops which make up the bulk of blue beret numbers. This phenomenon has brought a number of challenges that Canada will need to consider when renewing its engagement in peace operations in the near future.

Finally, Prime Minister Trudeau’s announcements and actions since the start of his mandate in 2015 will be analysed to observe the impact of Canada’s reputation among allies as well as some short-term consequences for the CAF. As Canada’s military is still awaiting formal orders to deploy under one or several specific UN missions, the

⁸³“United Nations”, accessed 15 February 2017, <http://www.un.org/>.

international community is eager to see Canada once again take a leading role and share the burden of restoring peace in unstable states. France, particularly, would welcome Canada's help in dealing with Islamic extremists in Mali.⁸⁴

Is the UN Now Obsolete?

As Seaman wrote though, the UN is still "the only organisation capable of legitimizing interventions, despite the challenges it faces in the international system".⁸⁵ It therefore could be argued that the United Nations is still relevant today and remains essential to provide legitimacy for any expeditionary military operations in the eyes of the international community.⁸⁶ Furthermore, with the growing enthusiasm for global governance, there is no better placed organization to help coordinate efforts towards human rights, good governance and democratization.⁸⁷ However, peacekeepers responsibilities are now well beyond those defined at the UN's inception, and the shift towards intra-state conflicts have changed the complexity of peace operations. Also, the recent involvement of numerous additional nations with questionable motives, dedication and resources and the UN organizational flaws and inability to adapt when facing rapid violence escalation have been brought to the forefront and continue to raise eyebrows within the international community. When evaluating the complexities of today's conflicts, has the UN organization frame adapted enough to address today's complex international environment, or is the UN now *passé*?

⁸⁴"Canada Should not Promise on Peacekeeping and Fail to Deliver," *The Star*, 31 March 31 2017.

⁸⁵Kate Seaman, *Un-Tied Nations: The United Nations, Peacekeeping and Global Governance*, (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate Pub. Limited, 2014), 149.

⁸⁶Jeni Whalan, *How Peace Operations Work: Power, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness* (Oxford, UK: Oxford Press, 2013), 1.

⁸⁷Ramesh Thakur, "The United Nations in Global Governance: Rebalancing Organized Multilateralism for Current and Future Challenges," *United Nations Initiatives*, 6 October 2011.

The Trinity of Peacekeeping and Flexibility within the Mandate

As previous UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali once said:

“peacekeeping stands out, as one of the Organization’s most original and ambitious undertakings in its effort to control and promote peace.”⁸⁸ When the process of peacekeeping was formalized by the UN more than sixty years ago, it included a few unique fundamental principles: “consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.”⁸⁹ These three guiding principles were specifically established for what is considered to be the first *peacekeeping* operation: United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956.⁹⁰ This was the same operation which resulted in the Nobel peace prize for Lester B. Pearson. It is instructive to examine each of these principles in turn.

Consent of the Parties. This criterion was much more relevant in the pre-Cold War era during which conflicts were usually between states. In today’s world, nations are not typically at war against each other, but violence has occurred between non-state actors, insurgents, and nations themselves surrounding issues such as ethnicity, religion, resources or territory.⁹¹ It is therefore very rare nowadays that consent for a UN intervention, even tacit, is given by all parties involved.

Impartiality. The UN describes impartiality as crucial to maintaining good relations with all parties involved, but not to be confused with neutrality or inactivity.⁹² Impartiality during peacekeeping operations can be compared to the role of a referee, for

⁸⁸United Nations and United Nations Dept of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping*, 3rd ed. (New York: United Nations, Dept. of Public Information, 1996), 9.

⁸⁹"United Nations", accessed 21 February 2017, <http://www.un.org/>.

⁹⁰Andrzej Sitkowski, *UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 2.

⁹¹Donald C.H. Daniel et al., *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 71.

⁹²"United Nations", accessed 21 February 2017, <http://www.un.org/>.

example. For countries that were once imperial nations, the appearance of impartiality can be affected by their colonial past. As such, Canada is often an ideal nation to lead a UN mission, as indicated by Canada's selection as the lead in the UNEF mission.⁹³

Minimal Use of Force. The UN states that peacekeeping missions are not enforcement operations.⁹⁴ As such, force was first intended to be used only in self-defence situations. After the lessons from Rwanda and the inclusion of the responsibility to protect, the minimal use of force thereafter encompassed actions in defence of the mandate. Force, regardless of the context, must be applied proportionally to what the situation warrants, and must always be used as a last resort in UN peacekeeping missions.⁹⁵

One problem, as pointed out by Sitkowski, is that those three principles designed initially for UNEF specifically were then translated into UN policy and applied blindly for the following fifty years.⁹⁶ As Major-General Romeo Dallaire pleaded to the Security Council during the genocide in Rwanda, UN doctrine needed to be reviewed, to include flexible enough rules of engagement to allow for the protection of civilians. In 2005, the UN General Assembly voted unanimously to approve the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P).⁹⁷ Despite its challenges, R2P does address in principles the main issue of the UN missions of the 1990s: "weak mandate and limited rules of engagement from the

⁹³The United Nations Association in Canada, *The Canadian Contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping* (Ottawa, Canada, 2000), 6.

⁹⁴"United Nations", accessed 21 February 2017, <http://www.un.org/>.

⁹⁵"Ibid.

⁹⁶Andrzej Sitkowski, *UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 2.

⁹⁷Gareth Evans, "The Solution: From 'The Right to Intervene' to 'The Responsibility to Protect.'" Chap. 2 in *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All*, edited by Gareth Evans, 31-54, 272-277 (endnotes), (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 31.

UN Security Council.”⁹⁸The protection of civilians is now at the forefront of UN missions, and Defence Minister Sajjan has reassured the Canadian public that it is a top priority for Canada as it contemplates a UN deployment. When talking to the media in the fall of 2016, he said: “When Canada goes in, yes, we will be fulfilling that mandate of protection of civilians and proactively acting in that manner. And we expect other nations to do the same thing.”⁹⁹ This statement does raise the question of whether or not the other nations will wholeheartedly embrace the R2P principles and protect civilians when confronted with difficult situations. Recent history has demonstrated quite the opposite, and this topic will be explored further in the next section as statistics from troops-contributing nations are analysed. As a minimum, though, the expansion of the UN rules of engagement to include the use of force to protect the mandate has solved the problem identified by Major-General Romeo Dallaire. The means to intervene are hence available to peacekeepers, but the framework has not quite caught up. If a change in the rules of engagement was encouraging, almost all other aspects of the UN remain unchanged.

United Nations Security Council and Veto Powers

One of the main critics of the UN has been its bureaucracy, as well as the problems associated with the veto power¹⁰⁰ of the Great Powers, also referred to as the Permanent Five nations (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States.)¹⁰¹ Support from all five nations is required for the approval of any intervention, and as Dennis Jett summarized: “That support will be governed by the interests of the

⁹⁸Lee Berthiaume, "Countries must Ensure their Peacekeepers Protect Civilians," *The Canadian Press*, 11 September 2016.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Kate Seaman, *Un-Tied Nations : The United Nations, Peacekeeping and Global Governance* (Farnham, Surrey, England : Ashgate Pub. Limited, 2014), 21.

¹⁰¹"United Nations," accessed 15 February 2017, <http://www.un.org/>.

Great Powers, which will not be materially affected by every conflict.”¹⁰² Veto powers can be used to protect alliances, and hinder any UN intervention, as observed is the case of Syria, where Russia has repeatedly applied its veto to block any deployment of UN troops to the region.¹⁰³ France has suggested in the past that vetoes should be suspended in cases with extreme violence such as genocide or mass atrocities.¹⁰⁴ Russia often defended the veto power, listing benefits such as more balanced solutions¹⁰⁵ or a protection for “the security council’s integrity by preventing it from being used as a vehicle for toppling governments.”¹⁰⁶

Throughout the years, vetoes have stopped resolutions from being adopted and slowed down UN processes, sometimes to a grinding halt.¹⁰⁷ Efram Isely describes this issue as one significantly affecting the “extent to which the United Nations has the capacity to restore or keep the peace in the changing world environment.”¹⁰⁸ More than seventy years after its creation, few countries would agree that the council is an accurate representation of today’s international balance of power.¹⁰⁹ Since 1993, various countries have brought forward the need for reform of the UNSC, whether for its composition or

¹⁰² Dennis C. Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 45.

¹⁰³ Richard Roth and David Shortell, "US Slams Russian Veto of UN Resolution on Syria Chemical Weapons Use," *CNN*, 28 February 2017. As of the end of February 2017, Russia had put 7 vetoes to block a UNSC Resolution in Syria.

¹⁰⁴ United Nations, Sixty-Eighth General Assembly Meeting, *Minutes of the Plenary*, 7 November 2013.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ "Russian Vetoes are Putting UN Security Council’s Legitimacy at Risk, Says US," *The Guardian*, 23 September 2015.

¹⁰⁷ "Vetoed! What's Wrong with the UN Security Council – And How It Could Do Better", *The Guardian*, 23 September 2015.

¹⁰⁸ Efram R. Isely, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the 21st Century* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010), vii.

¹⁰⁹ "Vetoed! What's Wrong with the UN Security Council – And How It Could Do Better", *The Guardian*, 23 September 2015.

for the distribution of veto powers.¹¹⁰ Although a reform would be vital to securing the organization's legitimacy, there is almost no chance that any agreement would be reached.¹¹¹ As such, it is reasonable to assume that status quo with regards to the veto power of the Permanent Five nations will remain for the foreseeable future. Further to the actual UNSC challenges, there is the undeniable fact that today's peace operations are more complex than ever before.¹¹²

Broad Spectrum of Operations and Lack of Common Doctrine

Since the end of Cold War, true peacekeeping missions tend to be very rare. To UN critics, the notion of peacekeeping has indeed become almost obsolete.¹¹³ UN peace soldiers are sent to theatre in a complex environment where the line is very thin between peace missions and full-spectrum operations including combat missions. That change happened very quickly. In 1998, out of the sixteen ongoing peace operations, ten were under traditional peacekeeping mandates, with tasks such as the monitoring of boundaries and cease-fire agreements.¹¹⁴ The remaining six missions were in countries where a peace agreement had yet to be reached, and as such, their mandates that included tasks such as creation of conditions conducive to peace.¹¹⁵ Ten years later, fifteen out of the seventeen

¹¹⁰Global Policy Forum, "Security Council Reform," accessed 15 March 2017, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-reform.html>.

¹¹¹Kate Seaman, *Un-Tied Nations : The United Nations, Peacekeeping and Global Governance* (Farnham, Surrey, England : Ashgate Pub. Limited, 2014), 149.

¹¹²Efram R. Isely, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the 21st Century* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010), 14.

¹¹³Brett Popplewell, "Last of a Dying Breed: The Canadian Peacekeeper," *National Post*, 11 December 2010.

¹¹⁴Efram R. Isely, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the 21st Century* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010), 14.

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*

UN missions which started or got modified since 1998 were under multidimensional mandates.¹¹⁶

Given the complexity and human security factors involved, UN missions tend to be very long. In fact, Gérard Araud, a former permanent representative of France to the UN once wrote: “Most operations have been long term. This is a fundamental trend that is unlikely to be reversed in the short term.”¹¹⁷ Journalist and foreign correspondent Matthew Fisher emphasized this point in reporting that no UN operations “come with an exit strategy.”¹¹⁸ Nowadays, the escalation of tensions under intra-state conflicts involves non-state actors with no desire to comply with the UN demands. As such, it could be argued that UN soldiers are often powerless in resolving complex conflicts in unstable regions. France has insisted to the UN that transition and exit strategies be made a priority for new and existing peace operations.¹¹⁹

When looking at today’s complexity of peace operations, the Canadian UN Peacekeeping booklet has captured the essence of the changes:

While peacekeeping was initially developed to deal with conflicts between two countries, today conflicts are a complex mix: their roots may be essentially internal, but they are complicated by cross-border involvement, either by states or by economic interests and other non-state actors (such as guerilla or rebel groups).¹²⁰

Even though it is recognized internationally that the spectrum of conflict in today’s environment warrants different types of peace operations, the UN waited until 2008 to

¹¹⁶Ibid. Multidimensional mandates include political, security, social and humanitarian objectives.

¹¹⁷United Nations, *Letter dated 3 February 2010 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations to the Secretary-General* (New York: United Nations, 2010.)

¹¹⁸Matthew Fisher, “Why an African Mission Could be More Dangerous than Afghanistan,” *National Post*, 29 August 2016.

¹¹⁹United Nations, *Letter dated 3 February 2010 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations to the Secretary-General* (New York: United Nations, 2010.)

¹²⁰The United Nations Association in Canada, *The Canadian Contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping* (Ottawa, Canada, 2000), 6.

amend its “principles and guidelines” to include definitions of various peace operations such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement.¹²¹ However, the focus of the document is still mainly peacekeeping and it fails to define where the other types of peace operations belong on the spectrum of conflict. Moreover, although mentioned on the UN websites and in some publications, the UN Charter still does not actually define and frame the different types of peace operations. A Canadian student at Fort Leavenworth, LCol Colin Magee, accurately described this situation as the perpetual development of UN “non-doctrine.”¹²² As the UN fell short of providing a solid framework for peace operations, different countries amended their own doctrine to reflect the realities of today’s conflicts.

The international community generally agrees on a common depiction of the spectrum of conflicts. This is borne out in Figure 3.1 below, which illustrates how different operations are more appropriate to reflect the variable security environment.

¹²¹*United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines* (New York, 2008.)

¹²²Colin G. Magee and U S Army Command and General Staff College, “Apples and Oranges: A Comparison of Operational Level Peace Operations Doctrine of Canada,” United States, and United Kingdom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,2005), 14.




Figure 3.1 -- The Spectrum of Operations

Source: Meharg, *Measuring what Matters in Peace Operations and Crisis Management*

Although he recognizes, as per Figure 3.1, that peace enforcement operations can occur simultaneously with peacekeeping ones, Canadian UN expert Walter Dorn does warn us about the importance of clearly defining a clear mandate for each mission. This is essential so as to not confuse peacekeepers and the Canadian public: “the distinction between these two activities should be made clear. Peace enforcement requires a much closer public and international scrutiny than peacekeeping.”¹²³ CAF joint doctrine does recognize the same five main activities grouped under the term peace support operations (PSOs): conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building.¹²⁴ The Australian Peace Operations Manual offers a similar representation of

¹²³Walter A. Dorn, "Peacekeeping then, Now and Always," *Canadian Military Journal*, Volume 6, Number 4 (Winter 2005-2006), 106.

¹²⁴Department of National Defence. CFJP 01, B-GJ-005-000-FP-001, *Capstone Canadian Military Doctrine* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2001), 5-6. Peace support operations (PSOs) is the specific term used in Canadian doctrine to refer to what is internationally called peace operations.

the peace operations continuum. Their model, similar to the spectrum of conflict illustration at Figure 3.1, assumes a very sequential use of diplomacy and military actions applied to ensure conflicts evolve positively with time towards lasting peace and is depicted at Figure 3.2.




Figure 3.2 -- The Continuum of Peace Operations

Source: Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre, Operations Series: Peace Operations (Canberra, Australia: Defence Publishing Service, 2004), pp. 1-5.

Other models included in different countries' military doctrine such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada include the spectrum of conflict and depict where different types of peace operations belong in a less sequential way. Figure 3.3 below depicts a US interpretation of the different types of modern peace operations in reference to the level of consent of the parties, as well as complexities of the conflict.




Figure 3.3 -- Peace Operations on the Spectrum of Conflicts

Source: Durch, *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*

Although slightly different, all models illustrate conflict as an evolving concept, guided by different factors such as complexity, consent, hostility, effort and time. Modern peace operations are complex in nature; as such, the Trinity of peacekeeping guiding principles can no longer be assumed as always achievable.¹²⁵

The UN Charter recognizes different types of peace operations, but still focussed on peacekeeping missions. Chapter VII of the Charter covers “actions with respect to

¹²⁵The United Nations Association in Canada, *The Canadian Contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping* (Ottawa, Canada, 2000), 8.

threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”¹²⁶ and guides participating nations through the use of force in support of the mandate to prevent aggravation of conflicts and unstable situations. The UN Charter remains vague, and nations continue to make their own assumptions regarding the use of force during peace operations. Matthew Waxman studied the legal aspect of resort to force under UN mandates to determine the consequences of such flexible application of guiding principles. He concluded that the lack of common doctrinal understanding creates a UN policy void which allows participating nations to “promote their ideological or policy agendas.”¹²⁷ There certainly would be value in a UN Charter reform to help clarify the use of force under Chapter VII; however, for now, there does not seem to be enough international appetite to start such an endeavour.¹²⁸ As such, troops engaged in today’s peace operations are still expected to regularly make judgment calls under stressful situations. Moreover, the void in operational level UN doctrine allows for different troop-contributing nations to act under their own accord, and therefore renders coordination, homogeneity and synergy very difficult under UN-led peace operations.¹²⁹

Summary of UN Recent Changes and Enduring Flaws

To summarize successful changes within the UN framework, as well as gaps that hinder the organization’s ability to better respond to today’s conflict environment, the main issues demonstrated in this section were:

¹²⁶“United Nations”, accessed 15 March 2017, <http://www.un.org/>.

¹²⁷Matthew C. Waxman, "Regulating Resort to Force: Form and Substance of the UN Charter Regime," *European Journal of International Law* 24, no. 1 (1 February 2013), 154.

¹²⁸Chris McGreal, "70 Years and Half a Trillion Dollars Later: What has the UN Achieved?" *The Guardian*, 7 September 2015.

¹²⁹Colin G. Magee and U S Army Command and General Staff College, “Apples and Oranges: A Comparison of Operational Level Peace Operations Doctrine of Canada,” United States, and United Kingdom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2005), 14.

- *Successful Change: Rules of Engagement.* The limitation of using force as self-defence only, as was the case for the 1990s mission in Rwanda, has been addressed so that rules of engagement on UN missions now allow the use of force to protect the mandate. This change has therefore given the means and freedom of manoeuvre for peacekeepers to intervene, stop atrocities and protect civilians.
- *Gap: the UNSC and Veto Power.* The UN's veto system and non-representative composition are still a reality today, and will remain unchanged for the foreseeable future. These limitations lead to stalemate, and the international community is unable to legally intervene in some conflict-torn regions.
- *Gap: Broad Mandates.* Intra-state conflicts have led to complex peace missions that spread very wide within the spectrum of operations. Peacekeeping as it was initially designed is almost obsolete, and peace enforcement missions are more current. With no transition or exit strategy, as well as complex multidimensional mandates, reaching peace is almost impossible, hence it is difficult to qualify any UN operation as a success nowadays.
- *Gap: Lack of Common UN Operational Doctrine.* The lack of UN Operational doctrine means that every country develops its own peace operations doctrine (or doesn't follow any doctrine), rendering any prospect of homogeneity and synergy among troop-contributing nations almost bleak.

The UN has remained the overarching organization that oversees and legitimizes most military interventions, and such is still relevant. However, although there was some progress achieved with the expansion of the rules of engagement, there are still numerous gaps that remain to be addressed, or at least mitigated for the UN to be called effective and efficient. UN flaws revealed in the early 1990s, and since amplified by a complex climate of intra-state conflicts have shaken Canada and its allies' enthusiasm for peace operations.¹³⁰ This lack of trust for the UN to lead a successful operation is still evident when looking at statistics. The next section will explore the possibility that major nations

¹³⁰ Dennis C. Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 12.

have now given up on the UN, and that the damage done in the 1990s is nowhere close to being swept under the rug.

Major World Powers and the UN Today

The end of the Cold War brought new hope among the Permanent Five UN members to collaborate in the pursuit of international peace and security through the UN.¹³¹ At their peak in the 20th century, UN peace operations employed over 78,000¹³² peacekeepers in 1993. However, the harsh realities of trying to bring stability to intrastate conflict-torn nations with limited rules of engagement soon resurfaced and led the major powers to be more selective in their approach towards peacekeeping. By 1999, as a reflection of their hesitation to rely on the UN as the sole leader of peace operations, the number of UN peacekeepers had dropped to 12,000.¹³³ Furthermore, since 2000, only one permanent member country has featured in the top 20 troop-contributing nations: China.¹³⁴

The recent decades have shown a steady growth since 2002 in terms of numbers of peace operations across the globe, an increase in the numbers of troops required to support them, as well as a growing interest from additional countries to contribute money and troops to UN operations.¹³⁵ Indeed, as of 2016, there were 125 countries contributing more than 100,000 troops (military and police) to UN-led peace operations.¹³⁶ However, when looking at the countries that provide these UN troops, most major world powers are

¹³¹Rachel E. Utley, *Major Powers and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention* (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 1.

¹³²Ibid.

¹³³"United Nations", accessed 15 February 2017, <http://www.un.org/>.

¹³⁴Rachel E. Utley, *Major Powers and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention* (Burlington, VT: Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2006), 1.

¹³⁵Daniel C.F. Donald et al., *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects* (Washington, D.C.: Washington, Georgetown University Press, 2008), 1.

¹³⁶"United Nations", accessed 15 March 2017, <http://www.un.org/>.

conspicuous by their absence among the top contributing nations, and Canada is among them. Walter Dorn goes as far as saying that:

Our current position as 33rd contributor is a disgrace to our peacekeeping tradition. To ignore the UN's calls for help is to do a disservice to the world organization at a time when the demand for UN peacekeeping is surging and the operations are finally becoming more robust.¹³⁷

As of 2017, when comparing the total number of police and military personnel deployed by countries, China ranked 12th, France 32nd, the United Kingdom 51st, Canada 66th, Russia 67th, and the United States 73rd.¹³⁸ This does not necessarily demonstrate a complete disinterest by powerful states for involvement in peace operations, but rather a realization that perhaps there are other types of coalition or organization capable of leading peace operations. The 21st century certainly did see numerous coalition-led operations mandated by UNSC Resolutions such as interventions in Iraq during the First Gulf War and Libya during the Gadhafi regime.

To help analyse trends in financial and troop contributions by major powers, it is instructive to look at some statistics. The 2017 approved budget for the UN is \$US 7.87 billion,¹³⁹ which represents just below 0.5% of the estimated total world military expenditures, estimated at \$US 1,676 billion in 2015 by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.¹⁴⁰ Total percentage of financial contributions by member nations is decided every three years by the UNSC and ranges from 0.001% to as high as 29% some years. Contributions are chosen in relation to each country's economic wealth, place on

¹³⁷Walter A. Dorn, "Peacekeeping then, Now and Always," *Canadian Military Journal*, Volume 6, Number 4 (Winter 2005-2006), 105.

¹³⁸"United Nations", accessed 15 February 2017, <http://www.un.org/>.

¹³⁹Ibid.

¹⁴⁰"Stockholm International Peace Research Institute," accessed 20 February 2017, <https://www.sipri.org/research/>.

the council as well as numerous other factors that help categorize countries according to classes. As expected, G7 countries, as well as the five permanent members were among the top financial contributors of the UN in 2016, as demonstrated in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 – 2016 Financial Contributions to Total UN Budget

Country	Rank	% of Total UN Budget
United States*	1	28.57
China	2	10.29
Japan*	3	9.68
Germany*	4	6.39
France*	5	6.31
United Kingdom*	6	5.80
Russia	7	4.01
Italy*	8	3.75
Canada*	9	2.92

Source: <http://www.un.org/>. Permanent UNSC members are in red, and G7 countries have an asterix.

As a comparison, financial contributions from 1992 were compiled and added to Table 3.2 to demonstrate that financial contribution to the UN by the main world powers after the Cold War were very consistent throughout the years, except for China. Indeed, China did not become a major financial contributor to the UN until 2001, year at which its contribution reached 1%.¹⁴¹

Table 3.2 – 1992 and 2016 Financial Contributions to Total UN Budget

Country	1992		2016	
	Rank	% of Total UN Budget	Rank	% of Total UN Budget
United States*	1	25.00	1	28.57
China	?	0.77	2	10.29
Japan*	2	12.45	3	9.68
Germany*	4	8.93	4	6.39

¹⁴¹Congressional Research Study, “United Nations Regular Budget Contributions: Members Compared,” accessed 1 March 2017, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30605.pdf>.

France*	5	6.00	5	6.31
United Kingdom*	6	5.02	6	5.80
Russia	3	9.41	7	4.01
Italy*	7	4.29	8	3.75
Canada*	8	3.11	9	2.92

Sources: “United Nations”, <http://www.un.org/> and “United Nations Regular Budget Contributions: Members Compared,” <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30605.pdf>. Permanent UNSC members are in red, and G7 countries have an asterix.

Table 3.2 does not reflect any decreasing trend in interest levels by Western nations towards the UN. However, this consistency in financial contribution levels can be explained by the simple fact that those percentages are imposed by the UNSC, with each country having very limited influence on their own mandated percentage. Evaluating troop contributions throughout the years would be a better indicator of the nations’ confidence in the UN and its mandated operations.

When looking into troop-contributing statistics throughout the year, what is first obvious is that the composition of the UN peacekeeping force changed dramatically. As of 2017, the top troop-contributing countries are Ethiopia, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.¹⁴² In 1994 though, countries like France, Canada and Germany still figured in the top ten troop-contributing nations.¹⁴³ Modern team composition does bring its share of challenges for today’s UN mission leaders, as some countries’ work ethic and dedication to the protection of civilians are less than optimal. There were recent reports in South Sudan of peacekeepers standing idle, and even hiding when civilians were brutally

¹⁴²“United Nations,” accessed 25 April 2017, <http://www.un.org/>.

¹⁴³Ibid.

attacked.¹⁴⁴ A UN investigation that was completed to look into the circumstances blamed command and control challenges, with criticism being directed mainly at countries such as Ethiopia, China and Nepal.¹⁴⁵ Similar incidents have occurred in the last year in Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where peacekeepers failed to intervene in the protection of civilians, despite having the appropriate rules of engagement that allowed them the use of force in those situations.¹⁴⁶ As Lee Berthiaume summarized this issue, if the main limitation of the 1990s was restrictive rules of engagement, “the problem now is with individual member states.”¹⁴⁷

For Canada, the difference between the 2194 soldiers deployed on UN operations at its 1994 peak and the meagre 32 now deployed in 2017 is an indicator of the declining interest of the Canadian government to send military personnel to UN-led missions. For the United States, the trend over the last twenty-three years has been relatively consistent, with a very minimal troop contribution, especially when compared to the size of their total military force. The United States’ general lack of enthusiasm towards the UN confirmed by their reluctance to contribute troops towards UN-led missions is not a new concept, but this sentiment was certainly reinforced after the Somalia events, and the appetite in Congress to deploy troops under UN mandate has since remained derisory.¹⁴⁸

Although current troops deployed to UN missions from major western powers are at an all-time low, it cannot be concluded that the major world powers have in fact given

¹⁴⁴Lee Berthiaume, "Countries must Ensure their Peacekeepers Protect Civilians," *The Canadian Press*, 11 September 2016.

¹⁴⁵"UN Peacekeepers Refused to Help as Aid Workers Were Raped in South Sudan," *The Guardian*, 6 October 2016.

¹⁴⁶Lee Berthiaume, "Countries must Ensure their Peacekeepers Protect Civilians," *The Canadian Press*, 11 September 2016.

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸"United Nations," accessed 15 February 2017, <http://www.un.org/>. The United States currently has a total of 72 police and military personnel deployed on UN-led peace operations, with a ranking of 73rd out of 125 countries.

up on the UN. They are still financing the vast majority of operations and continue to control most of the decision-making through the UNSC. The reality is that today's challenges stem from the differences in attitude and lack of professionalism from the eclectic mix of troop-contributing nations.¹⁴⁹ Prime Minister Trudeau's indicated number of 600 potential military members deployed is significant for the CAF. However, it represents a very small troop contribution to peace operations currently underway throughout the world. It would represent approximately 0.7 per cent of military troops deployed on UN-led peace operations.¹⁵⁰ Such a level of participation would also be in line with Canadian allies' current involvement in UN-led peace operations and, as such, could be argued as a logical decision for the current government. What will make a difference for the international community's views towards Canada's role will be the promptness of commitment, which has already proven to be lacking, as well as the actual chosen niche or command assignment.¹⁵¹ The next section will explore the recent government announcements on Canada's imminent implication in UN-led operations.

Liberals' Rushed Announcement and the Requirement to Think Things Through

During his electoral campaign as well as since the beginning of his mandate, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has advocated for Canada's return to peace operations. In his own words, he advertised to the world that "Canada is back!" One month after his election, he released his mandate letter to the new Minister of National Defence, Harjit Sajjan. One of the tasks assigned was to "Work with the Minister of Foreign Affairs to

¹⁴⁹Lee Berthiaume, "Countries must Ensure their Peacekeepers Protect Civilians," *The Canadian Press*, 11 September 2016.

¹⁵⁰"United Nations", accessed 15 March 2017, <http://www.un.org/>.

¹⁵¹"Canada should Not Promise on Peacekeeping and Fail to Deliver," *The Star*, 31 March 2017.

renew Canada's commitment to United Nations peace operations."¹⁵² Although the removal of the CF-18 jets in Iraq was confirmed shortly after the announcement by the new Prime Minister in the fall of 2015, it was not the case for any formal troop commitment to a UN peace operation. By March 2017, Canada, despite asking the UN to hold off the decision on who would be the next leader of MINUSMA, the UN stabilization mission in Mali, was not ready to commit any troops to a specific UN mission. Prime Minister Trudeau expressed his strong belief that Canada should not be rushed into making any decision with regards to commitments to UN peace operations.¹⁵³

In an article from August 2016, Chris Roberts had indicated, ominously, perhaps, that, in his opinion, Canada was wrongfully making announcements on contributions to UN-led peace operations in Africa prior to knowing its strategy.¹⁵⁴ He argued that the danger resided in Canada using Africa to enhance its international reputation and once acclaimed moral identity, as opposed to first assessing how Canada can contribute to making a lasting impact towards peace and security in Africa.¹⁵⁵ Out of the nine UN-led missions in the African continent, two specific ones have been noted by the press as probable options for Canada's involvement: UNAMIR in Mali and MINUSCA in Central African Republic.¹⁵⁶ Although the UN has indicated the requirement for developed countries to assist as enablers to such missions, Canada has yet to zero into what could be its unique contribution. The complexities of current peace operations in Africa are to this

¹⁵²Office of the Prime Minister, *Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2015).

¹⁵³Bruce Champion-Smith, "Canada Won't be Rushed into Military Peace Mission, Trudeau Says," *The Star*, 25 March 25 2017.

¹⁵⁴Chris W. J. Roberts, "Peace Operations in Africa: Is Canada Making Decisions before Knowing its Strategy?" *Open Canada*, 26 August 2016.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶James Cohen, "Peacekeeping of the Future: Thinking through Canada's Options in Africa," *Open Canada*, 12 April 2016.

day still being considered by the government to ensure that the CAF's men and women are not placed in situations analogous to Somalia or Rwanda. Risks regarding potential troop casualties, involvement of child soldiers and the presence of well-established terrorist groups are still being considered to ensure an accurate weighing of options, but no conclusions have been revealed to the public yet. Since 2013, peacekeeping troops suffered more than 70 deaths in Mali, making UNAMIR one of the deadliest UN missions.¹⁵⁷

In the beginning of March 2017, the CAF released a joint doctrine note on child soldiers to provide strategic guidance on possible child soldiers encounters in future operations.¹⁵⁸ This timely release serves as a reminder that CAF troops deployed to UN-led operations in Africa will most likely be confronted to psychological effects resulting from conflict complexities such as child soldiers, or even atrocities committed by terrorist organizations. Peace operations, once considered by most Canadians as peaceful refereeing interventions such as UNFICYP in Cyprus are no longer the norm, but constitute more an exception nowadays. Canada has yet to complete a thorough analysis of its intentions in the complex African region theatre of operations, as noted by Chris Roberts.¹⁵⁹ Keeping in mind the notable issues raised the last time the CAF deployed *en masse* to Africa in the early 1990s combined with the very complex regional realities of the continent, the Liberal government is still not ready to formally commit any troops to UN operations.

¹⁵⁷“Security in Mali Worrying, UN Peacekeeping Mission Says,” *Gulf News Africa*, 19 March 2017.

¹⁵⁸Stephen Chase, “Military prepares for possible clashes with child soldiers on future missions,” *The Globe and Mail*, 3 March 2017.

¹⁵⁹Chris W. J. Roberts, “Peace Operations in Africa: Is Canada Making Decisions before Knowing its Strategy?” *Open Canada*, 26 August 2016.

Although Canada does not require United States' approval to deploy its military troops, Prime Minister Trudeau's administration wanted to get a better sense of newly elected President Trump's foreign policy prior to making any formal announcement regarding the probable deployment of troops in support of UN-led peace operations.¹⁶⁰ That justified the delay even further by a few months in Canada releasing of the intent, but as the decision still lingers, questions are being asked overtly by the opposition.

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's initial enthusiasm for Canada's return to what he first described as peacekeeping operations seems to have now caught up with the reality of today's conflict complexity. Given Canada's past in Somalia and Rwanda, it became evident that a thorough analysis must be completed prior to committing actual troops to a UN mission. More than a year after his announcement of Canada's imminent deployment of 600 troops in support of UN peace operations, the confirmation of the actual mission and timelines have yet to be announced officially. The meticulousness of the government in this situation may have created angst within the CAF and the UN, but it will pay dividends for troops expected to fulfill the assigned mandate. Moreover, President Trump's recent election and his voicing of concern with regards to Canada and other allies' failure to meet the NATO-recommended 2% of GDP budget on defence spending have contributed to the delaying of the Government of Canada's announcement towards its future UN contribution. In March 2017, the lead of MINUSMA, thought to be eyed by Canada, was officially assigned to Belgian Major General Jean-Paul Deconinck,¹⁶¹ rendering Canada's future involvement in UN peace operations even more uncertain.

Conclusion

¹⁶⁰Robert Fife and Stephen Chase, "Ottawa Weighs Risks of Child Soldiers in Mali," *The Globe and Mail*, 6 March 2017.

¹⁶¹"United Nations", accessed 15 February 2017, <http://www.un.org/>.

This chapter demonstrated that although the UN as an organization is still very relevant to today's international challenges, there are still numerous gaps which hinder its effectiveness and efficiency. The amendment of the rules of engagement to include the use of force for the defence of the mandate was a welcome change that addressed concerns observed in Rwanda. However, obstacles related to veto powers are still affecting the UNSC's ability to intervene under the Responsibility to Protect umbrella, even when mass atrocities are being committed, are still a reality. Moreover, with the broad spectrum of modern operations, and multidimensional mandates, peacekeeping missions should no longer be considered as its core mandate. The current UN Charter still fails to provide a clear framework to ensure enough resources, freedom of action and UNSC responsiveness to consistently achieve mission success. As such, current statistics surrounding UN-led peace operations reveal a certain hesitation from major world powers to commit troops to what could be doomed missions. The growing number of intra-state conflicts has led to more complex peace operations, which depending on the level of force required to achieve the mission's end state and although endorsed by a UNSCR, were usually led by other coalition such as NATO. Hence, the number of troops committed to UN-led peace operations only represents a portion of military personnel deployed worldwide in support of UN-mandated but coalition-led peace operations.

As Canada's closest allies now each contribute a very small number of blue helmets, and the initial assessment of the Government of Canada was of 600 troops, it is unlikely that Canada will regain its top spot as a troop-contribution nation as observed in the early 1990s. Given Canada's past successes, failures and lessons from its participation to peace operations, as well as considering the announced intention from Prime Minister

Trudeau at the start of his mandate, Chapter 3 will explore the possible future of Canada's involvement in UN peace operations.

CHAPTER 4 – THE FUTURE OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS FOR CANADA: TRAINING, WOMEN AND STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE.

It follows that Canadians should pick their opportunities with great care, and with an eye to determining whether the circumstances are ripe, so that the contribution they make is not cosmetic, but real, taking into account the limited resources they are prepared to deploy.

– Denis Stairs, *Myths, Morals and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy*

Introduction

Canada's involvement in UN peace operations in the last half of the 20th century has brought it substantial credit. However, the 1990s revealed UN flaws and inefficiencies, and Canada's peacekeepers attracted media attention for the wrong reasons. The years that followed are sometimes referred to as the "decade of darkness" for the Canadian military. It brought budget cuts, force reduction, dismantlement of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, as well as a significant decrease in Canada's troop contribution to UN-led missions that has not yet been reversed, even twenty years later.

Although there has not been any detailed announcement of Canada's strategy in its renewed involvement in peace operations, there is one key word that often arises from Prime Minister Trudeau or Defence Minister Hajjan's speeches on this topic: training. With the Pearson Centre, formerly known as the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Canada was once a leader in peacekeeping training, education and research. Canadian expertise and advice even contributed to the successful creation of Germany's own international civilian peace operations training centre called ZIF.¹⁶² However, in 2013, after federal government funding dried up, the closure of the Pearson Centre was announced. When combining this training centre

¹⁶²Mike Blanchfield, "Liberals should Reopen Revitalized Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre: Report," *The Canadian Press*, 24 April 2016.

closure with Canada's reduced participation in UN-led operations since the mid-1990s the result is a significant but not insurmountable current gap in Canada's military personnel expertise in peace operations. Furthermore, with today's troop-contributing nations' varied levels of military professionalism and depth of UN expertise, there definitely is an area for improvement in peacekeeping standards where Canada could make a difference. By re-establishing a UN-focussed training establishment in Canada and assisting in delivering UN training abroad, Canada could redevelop a niche and positively affect a number of UN operations concurrently.

Another UN area in which Canada could make a difference was mentioned as a recommendation in the 2016 Senate's Report on UN Deployment: Canada's inclusion of women in all aspects of peace operations to expedite the implementation of UN Resolution 1325 on women peace and security.¹⁶³ Despite pleas from Secretary-General Ki-moon to enhance women's participation to peace efforts, women still represent (as of December 2015) only a meagre 3.2 per cent of military troops deployed as part as UN peace operations.¹⁶⁴

Finally, with Canada's current commitment to NORAD for domestic and continental defence, as well as NATO for expeditionary operations and support to allies, how can an increase in UN involvement not affect an already strained and underfunded military? The two areas mentioned above of training and women, peace and security could be an ingenious way for the CAF to make a difference with minimum resources. In the current context, with President Trump's election and recent emphasis on NATO

¹⁶³The Honourable Daniel Lang, "UN Deployment: Prioritizing Commitments at Home and Abroad," *Senate Canada*, 1 November 2016, 4.

¹⁶⁴United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security* (New York: United Nations Security Council, 2016.)

members' defence contribution, this chapter will explore the importance of striking the right balance with Canada's contribution to its military alliances and multilateral-organization commitments.

Peace Operations Training – Combined Training at Home and Abroad

There are numerous reasons why contributing to peace operations oriented training can be a smart investment for the CAF. First, when hoping for a positive outcome to a complex peace operation, it is key to train CAF military personnel to gain UN-specific knowledge and experience prior to deployment. Secondly, having an institution where all peace actors interact together in preparation for a mission allows civilians, military and police personnel to collaborate and develop a much required synergy for UN operations that could benefit more than military organizations. Finally, focussing on PSO training (in Canada and in Africa) could provide Canada with a niche area within the UN framework and help re-acquire an international reputation in an area where much effort is needed.

The Need for UN Pre-Deployment Training

Between 1994 and 2013, the Pearson Centre has provided peace operations training and education to more than 18,000 people including civilian, police and military personnel, from 150 different countries.¹⁶⁵ In 1995, Canada additionally created the Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres to foster collaboration between the world's emerging training institution with common core mandate.¹⁶⁶ It was transferred to India in 2005 to ensure a continuity of operations as Canada had distanced itself from UN-led peace operations. In 1996, a Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) was also open in

¹⁶⁵Frances Willick, "Pearson Centre Closing," *The Chronicle Herald*, 5 October 2013.

¹⁶⁶"International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres," accessed 20 April 2017, <http://www.iaptc.org>.

Kingston to train Canadian and foreign military personnel in preparation for PSO. However, since the Afghanistan years in the mid-2000s, this training establishment has focussed more on coalition-led operations, and no longer teaches any PSO-centred courses. The number of courses, lectures and discussions provided by the Royal Military College of Canada to officers at various stages of their career was also significantly reduced in the last decade, to a level comparable to the pre-Somalia years in 1992.¹⁶⁷

Indeed, the CAF reoriented its efforts from PSO to combat support during Operation ATHENA Phase II from 2006 to 2011 and as such has reshaped pre-deployment training towards COIN techniques and NATO coalition-led full spectrum operations.¹⁶⁸ This transition, which made perfect sense at the time, has now left the CAF in a similar situation to the one that was identified in the Somalia Inquiry report as problematic. One of the major themes from the observations was the lack of appropriate preparation for the mission, described as “[falling] far short of what was required.”¹⁶⁹ That statement included more than pre-deployment training but the report did highlight some specific shortcomings on this topic:

There was no formalized or standardized training system for peace operations, despite almost 40 years of intensive Canadian participation in international peace operations. No comprehensive training policy, based on changing requirements, had been developed, and there was an absence of doctrine, standards, and performance evaluation mechanisms respecting the training of units deploying on peace operations.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷Walter Dorn and Joshua Libben, *Unprepared for Peace The Decline of Canadian Peacekeeping Training (and what to do about it)*, Ottawa, Ontario : Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2016), 7-8.

¹⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 18-19.

¹⁶⁹Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair* (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 1997), Executive Summary, ES-1.

¹⁷⁰*Ibid.*, Volume 2, 558 and 560.

Efforts were deployed in the mid-1990s to develop PSO-focussed training for Canadians and international partners. If the CAF is to be ready to fulfill the intention of the Liberal government on a renewed commitment to peace operations, it is imperative that such training be available. According to Walter Dorn, this pre-deployment training must include negotiation and conflict management skills, as well as de-escalation tactics to adequately prepare peacekeepers for the reality that they will face during a UN-led mission and hope for success and viable peace.¹⁷¹

If Canada's reputation as a world model for peacekeeping specifically has now faded, it is not the case for its military members' reputation as professional and respected trainers across the globe. Missions that include a training mandate such as Operation ATTENTION in Afghanistan, Operation IMPACT in Iraq and more recently Operation UNIFIER in Ukraine¹⁷² are some examples in which Canada's officers and senior Non-Commissioned Members (NCMs) are relied upon to provide valuable military training and mentorship to numerous foreign armed groups. As such, the CAF would be in a strong position to reinvest efforts in training at home and abroad for peace operations. With the enhanced participation of nations with weak, new or small militaries as per UN statistics outlined in Chapter 2, the level of training and preparation of troops from contributing nations is not ideal.

The 2013 Final Report on Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment (TNA) revealed that 19 per cent of military personnel, 30 per cent of police and 46 per cent of eligible civilians do not receive any pre-deployment training before participating

¹⁷¹Walter Dorn and Joshua Libben, *Unprepared for Peace The Decline of Canadian Peacekeeping Training (and what to do about it)*, Ottawa, Ontario : Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2016), 33.

¹⁷²Department of National Defence, "The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces," accessed 22 April 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/>.

in a UN mission.¹⁷³ Notwithstanding the level of peacekeeper participation in pre-deployment training is the quality of the education received. The same TNA report highlighted some issues with the standardization of training. Of those trained, 16 per cent indicated in the survey that they did not receive the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTM), which was designed by the UN for the specific purpose of training uniformity. This educational package was meant to teach a basic knowledge on the UN as an institution, its mandate, principles of peacekeeping, etc. Using 2016 UN statistics, this means that only 64 per cent of deployed personnel have received the basic UN core training, leaving over 40,000 personnel deployed in the field without any type of standardized basic UN pre-deployment package. To add to this shortfall, statistics from the 2013 report indicate that, on average, 29 per cent of deployed personnel did not participate in any mission-specific training. In essence, they were sent to the affected region with no prior formal training on what was expected of them during the operation, what the local reality was and received no cultural awareness of the local population or any fellow peacekeeping nations with which frictions could arise.¹⁷⁴

In short, there is a significant gap in training that Canada could help address to enhance the level of preparation and professionalism of UN uniformed personnel being sent on peace operations. Canada's involvement would be positively regarded and welcome as the CAF has the right reputation and credibility to provide mentorship at home and abroad since its military members have been consistently deployed in training operations during this last decade. Evidently, prior to sending military personnel overseas

¹⁷³Training: A Strategic Investment in UN Peacekeeping, *Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment, Final Report* (New York: United Nations, 2013), 27.

¹⁷⁴Ibid.

on a training mandate, there is a requirement for Canada to refocus on a PSO curriculum at the various training institutions.

Not Just any Training: The Benefits of Combining Training for Military, Police and Civilian Personnel

Further to having peacekeeping specific training to prepare members for UN peace operations, there is incommensurable value in allowing military and civilians to train together. Canada recognized the value of establishing such a consolidated peacekeeping training centre that would train civilians, military and police personnel together in order to prepare them for complex modern peace operations. In fact, in 1996, the Pearson Centre was the first peacekeeping training centre in the world to offer the opportunity for such combined training.¹⁷⁵

In his recommendation for future investment in PSO training, Dorn underlines the importance of rebuilding what he refers to as the “peacekeeping partnership.”¹⁷⁶ In the 21st century when consent of the parties is rarely the case, the role of blue beret soldiers is rarely one of simple armed referees. As per the UN website, today’s peacekeepers are called upon to “facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law.”¹⁷⁷ As per this extensive list of responsibilities, it would be impossible for soldiers alone to achieve their UN mission’s goals in isolation of police and civilian authorities. That simple fact is also reflected with the 25 per cent of the total UN personnel being either

¹⁷⁵Walter Dorn and Joshua Libben, *Unprepared for Peace The Decline of Canadian Peacekeeping Training (and what to do about it)*, Ottawa, Ontario: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2016), 25.

¹⁷⁶Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁷⁷“United Nations,” accessed February/15, 2017, <http://www.un.org/>.

police, civilian and volunteers, a high proportion which has been constant since at least 2005.¹⁷⁸ If the CAF has strengths such as discipline, ability to operate under stress and command and control efficiency, police, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other civilian personnel can bring their share of knowledge on human security, policy and cultural awareness.¹⁷⁹ As such, if an institution similar to the Pearson Centre was opened or if the Pearson Centre reopened, all actors of the larger peace community would benefit from training together prior to deploying. There lies the reasoning behind the reopening of a peacekeeping training centre that would facilitate such exchanges.

Around the time that the Pearson Centre was created, similar institutions were also established in Africa, and today they are in need of continued international support.¹⁸⁰ At a moment when the number of peacekeepers deployed internationally is close to its peak since the UN's creation,¹⁸¹ there are many training roles that Canada could fill in Africa at those training institutes, as the Liberal announcements have tended to gravitate around this region of the world.

Training Institutes in Africa: How Canada Could Help

There are currently five peacekeeping training organizations in Africa which claim to be the centres of excellence.¹⁸² Some were created with the help of Canadian funding, and the CAF sends a few officers sporadically to act as guest speakers or trainers at those centres. The first one to be created in 1996 was the Southern African

¹⁷⁸Ibid.

¹⁷⁹Walter Dorn and Joshua Libben, *Unprepared for Peace The Decline of Canadian Peacekeeping Training (and what to do about it)*, Ottawa, Ontario : Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2016), 11.

¹⁸⁰ "International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres," accessed 20 April, 2017, <http://www.iaptc.org>.

¹⁸¹"United Nations," accessed 28 April 2017, <http://www.un.org/>. There are currently close to 98,000 peacekeepers (military, police and civilian personnel) deployed on UN-led peace operations.

¹⁸²Donald C.H. Daniel et al., *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 104.

Development Community (SADC) Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare, Zimbabwe. It received extensive support from the Danish Government until policies from the Zimbabwe government led to funding withdrawal, and eventually to a slow decline in its efficiency and mandate fulfillment.¹⁸³ Germany stepped up in 2011 and provided support in three areas described as key to success by the SADC: institutional capability development, curriculum development and actual organization and running of PSO-oriented courses, as well as investments in infrastructure support, equipment. The SADC does recognize that support from countries like Germany is instrumental to enhance the quality of the training delivered in Zimbabwe, and that much additional assistance is required.¹⁸⁴

Other countries' Defence Staff College in Kenya or Nigeria's National War College play host to Peace Support Training Centres which provide training, but also research. Kenya's International Peace Support Training Centre (IPTC) started in 2001 as an institution would train Kenyan military forces only. As of 2017, the centre trains military, police and civilian personnel from across the globe, with Canada being one of the five main financial contributors.¹⁸⁵ The latest centre to be opened is the Peacekeeping School in Bamako, Mali, became operational in 2007.¹⁸⁶ Canada is not one of the financial contributors to this training centre.

¹⁸³Ibid.

¹⁸⁴SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, "Peace and Security: Cornerstone of SADC Integration Agenda," *The Peace Trainer*, 1 January 2014, 14.

¹⁸⁵The International Peace Support Training Centre, accessed 18 April 2017, <http://www.ipstc.org/about-us.aspx>.

¹⁸⁶"École de maintien de la paix," accessed 20 April 2017, <http://www.empbamako.org/#>.

The largest peace and security institution in Africa is certainly the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana,¹⁸⁷ which offers peace operations and mission-specific training, as well as master's degrees and PhDs. Because the centre is not self-sufficient in terms of funding and trainers, it relies heavily on partners across the world for its operations.¹⁸⁸ If Canada could once pride itself in being one of the helping founders by providing \$3 million for the creation of the centre in 2004,¹⁸⁹ this is no longer the case, as it is not even listed among the 16 contributors to its operations in KAIPTC's last report.¹⁹⁰ There are many ways by which Canada could make a difference on the world scene with regards to peace operations, and investing military resources in the KAIPTC could be one of them. To make even greater an impact with the small number of military troops earmarked by the Liberals on for UN-involvement, Canada's renewed implication in peace operations should focus on another area that requires much involvement from the international community: women, peace and security.

Women, Peace and Security

In the year 2000, UNSC Resolution 1325 recognized the unique contributions that women bring to peace processes and urged the international community to grow the involvement of women in all aspects of global peace and security initiatives.¹⁹¹ In 2009, the UN announced targets of 10 per cent women among military peacekeepers, and 20

¹⁸⁷Donald C.H. Daniel et al., *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 107.

¹⁸⁸"The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre," accessed 13 April 2017, <http://www.kaiptc.org>.

¹⁸⁹David Kilgour, "Canada's Peacekeeping Role: Then and Now", *University of Alberta International Week 2004*, "Picking Up the Peaces," 26 January 2004.

¹⁹⁰Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, *2015 Annual Peace and Security Report* (Accra, Ghana, 2015), 36.

¹⁹¹"United Nations", accessed 13 April 2017, <http://www.un.org/>.

per cent among UN police units, to be reached by 2014.¹⁹² Unfortunately, seventeen years later, there is still a lot of work to be done to even come close to reaching the initial UN objectives. The latest statistics indicated a ratio of 3 per cent female military peacekeepers and 10 per cent police female personnel, with no indication of an increasing trend.¹⁹³ Within the CAF, women represent 15 per cent of active military personnel,¹⁹⁴ but the latest report from 2014 indicated that only 13.4 per cent of all deployed CAF personnel to PSOs are female.¹⁹⁵

How the Canadian Armed Forces Can Contribute

Through a targeted recruiting strategy and an inspiring narrative of Canada's commitment to send gender-sensitive task forces on expeditionary operations, the CAF could certainly lead the way in sending more women to peace operations. However, when the Chief of Defence Staff, General Vance, was asked how he thinks the CAF can help advance the women, peace and security agenda with regards to UN missions, his initial reaction was to point to training and mentorship. In his own words, he suggested the following action plan for the CAF:

We can provide extensive training and support to the contingents of the troop-contributing nations in United Nations missions. We can suggest new ideas on ways to conduct activities in peacekeeping missions in order to prevent and eliminate the times when things go wrong. We can also provide mentorship. It is possible for us to be on the ground, with the United Nations contingents, to reduce incidents of sexual misconduct to zero. That can be done.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹²Sabrina Karim, and Kyle Beardsley, "Female Peacekeepers and Gender Balancing: Token Gestures or Informed Policymaking," *International Interactions* 39, no. 4 (2013): 466.

¹⁹³United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security* (New York: United Nations Security Council, 2016.)

¹⁹⁴North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *2015 Summary of the National Reports of NATO Members and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspective*, (2017), 53.

¹⁹⁵Global Affairs Canada, *2013-2014 Progress Report – Canada's Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security*.

¹⁹⁶House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, 19 April 2016.

If Canada were to take on a leadership role in UN training, with a focus on women, peace and security, CAF personnel could influence, at a small scale at first, the future of peace operations towards UNSC Resolution 1325's intent. All African PSO training centres refer to the unique role of women on their website, so it would be logical that they should be receptive to Canada's ideas and potential strategy to address current shortfalls related to the lack of women being currently involved in peace processes. As an example, the SADC has an entire portion of its website dedicated to gender-related issues, and does list as one of its objectives to strive towards "eliminating gender inequalities and marginalisation of women".¹⁹⁷ The KAIPTC website has a link to the Women Peace and Security Institute as one of the main sections.¹⁹⁸ The Mali Peacekeeping School Alioune Blondin Beye offer at least one course specifically related to UNSC 1325 named "Gender in PSO."¹⁹⁹

The SADC recognizes the benefits of female involvement in all aspects of peace operations. Of note, they recognize that, although the female/male ratio in UN missions is currently very low, women's impact is still positive and notable: "Their presence among the peacekeepers seems to give a human face to armed forces and is much more assuring to vulnerable groups like the women and children [who] are more likely to openly share their ordeals with women than men."²⁰⁰ They also acknowledge that women presence among male counterparts during peace operations reduces the occurrences of abuses such

¹⁹⁷"Southern African Development Community," accessed 20 April 2017, <http://www.sadc.int>.

¹⁹⁸"The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre," accessed 13 April 2017, <http://www.kaiptc.org>.

¹⁹⁹"Mali Peacekeeping School Alioune Blondin Beye," accessed 7 April 2017, <http://www.apsta-africa.org>.

²⁰⁰SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, "Peace and Security: Cornerstone of SADC Integration Agenda," *The Peace Trainer*, 1 January 2014, 6.

as rape. After the Bosnia scandals and unacceptable behaviours from today's peacekeepers, there is an urgent requirement to rebalance the forces. As a matter of fact, an investigation conducted by the Associated Press found 2,000 allegations sexual crimes being committed by blue helmets from various countries within the last twelve years of UN missions.²⁰¹

After the adoption of UNSC 1325, The House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development evaluated Canada in relation to the women, peace and security agenda in order to make recommendations to shape Canada's role in the implementation of this initiative. One of their recommendations was that Canada should collaborate with the UN to "improve the pre-deployment and in-mission training provided to UN peacekeepers on women, peace and security."²⁰² This committee's conclusions do support the idea of combining an involvement in UN training with a furtherance of the agenda of women, peace and security.

To summarize, CAF personnel are in the right position to contribute positively as trainers, course developers and mentors for future military, police and civilian peacekeepers at home and abroad. Ensuring a focus on women in peace and security process would help advance the Canada and the UN's agenda with regards to UNSC Resolution 1325 and as such kill two birds with one stone. With the training institutions' challenges to garner international support, a few qualified CAF officers and NCMs deployed strategically to one of more of the five peacekeeping centres of excellence in Africa would be welcome. They would have the opportunity to influence generations of

²⁰¹Paisley Dodds, "AP Exclusive: UN Child Sex Ring Left Victims but no Arrests," *Associated Press*, 12 April 2017.

²⁰²The House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, *An Opportunity for Global Leadership: Canada and the Women Peace and Security Agenda* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2016.)

troops from UN-contributing nations and ensure a certain level of training quality and consistency. Deploying CAF personnel for this purpose would be in line with the current government's intent to re-engage in UN PSOs, as well as contribute to the training of peacekeepers at home and abroad. Prime Minister Trudeau's mandate letter to his Defence Minister indeed clearly stated this intent in one of the assigned objectives:

Leading an international effort to improve and expand the training of military and civilian personnel deployed on peace operations, while insisting that any peacekeepers involved in misconduct be held accountable by their own country and the United Nations.²⁰³

There will be significant challenges ahead if Canada is to invest resources into UN-focussed training capabilities abroad, and it would be ill-advised to consider sending a training contingent as an easy button to press for the government. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the operational landscape has changed since Canada was last involved heavily in UN peacekeeping missions, and as such. Walter Dorn sums it up well: "Modern PSOs have challenging mandates and operate in dangerous environments, under the operational control of a United Nations that has significantly evolved."²⁰⁴ A peacekeeping soldier once said:

Peacekeeping training entails much more than unarmed combat exercises, marksmanship, and obstacle courses; on the ground, the most important talent may be walking in the shoes of the native population.... The quality you need most in United Nations peacekeeping is empathy.²⁰⁵

²⁰³Office of the Prime Minister, *Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2015).

²⁰⁴Walter Dorn and Joshua Libben, *Unprepared for Peace The Decline of Canadian Peacekeeping Training (and what to do about it)*, Ottawa, Ontario: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2016), 34.

²⁰⁵Barbara Benton, *Soldiers for Peace: Fifty Years of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: Facts On File, 1996), 85.

As such, Chris Roberts denotes that Canada must first study Africa's socio-economic, cultural and security challenges to be in a situation to shape the impact it could have investing efforts in UN training.²⁰⁶

If you combine the new realities of an enlarged spectrum of operations with the heterogeneous composition of UN missions, the potential for failure is quite high. With regards to the women, peace and security agenda, it is difficult to imagine how progress could be made quickly in peace operations, as the top five troop-contributing nations as of 2015 had between one and seven per cent of total women within their Armed Forces.²⁰⁷

To summarize, for Canada to make an impact within the UN by getting involved in peace operations training despite challenges listed above, there must first be a well-defined concept of operations along with appropriate resources need to be dedicated to render the mission a success. In a country like Canada, the public rarely sees the requirement for a well-trained, well-equipped military, which has led to consistent defence budget restrictions and the requirement for expeditionary task forces that provide Canada the "biggest bang for its bucks." However, with Canada's commitment to NORAD, NATO and in today's world climate, money and troop investments towards the UN will have to be well-balanced.

Striking the Right Balance:

Even though the Cold War has been over for almost three decades, it is undeniable that tensions between Russia and NATO nations are rising again. For Canada,

²⁰⁶Chris W. J. Roberts, "Peace Operations in Africa: Is Canada Making Decisions before Knowing its Strategy?" *Open Canada*, 26 August 2016.

²⁰⁷UN Women, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325* (New York: United Nations, 2015), 259.

this means that the CAF's presence in NATO-led missions is key to show support and honour its commitment to allies. Since the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and its strengthening under the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) establishment in 2002, both parties have contributed to the rising tensions. In 2008, NATO condemned Russia's military interventions in Georgia led to an almost year-long hiatus on the NRC.²⁰⁸ In 2014, all collaboration under the NRC was suspended again after the Russian invasion of Crimea in Ukraine. Finally, in 2016 at the Warsaw NATO Summit, Allied countries reiterated their concerns with Russia's actions and policies that led to destabilization in different places of the world.²⁰⁹

The primary role of the CAF is and will remain the defence of Canada, along with North America. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau did confirm such a claim in his mandate letter to Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan by asking him to:

ensure that the Canadian Armed Forces are equipped and prepared, if called upon, to protect Canadian sovereignty, defend North America, provide disaster relief, conduct search and rescue, support United Nations peace operations, and contribute to the security of our allies and to allied and coalition operations abroad.²¹⁰

To protect Canada's territorial sovereignty, NORAD commitments will remain a no-fail mission²¹¹ that cannot be compromised for the benefit of international peace interventions. Moreover, with the current world climate and the tensions rising between Russia and NATO, it is crucial that Canada remains committed to its NATO allies in the upcoming years to maintain its political and military status as defined by the Prime

²⁰⁸North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Relations with Russia," accessed 21 April 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm.

²⁰⁹Ibid.

²¹⁰Office of the Prime Minister, *Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2015).

²¹¹Department of National Defence. A-GA-007-000/AF-008, *Air Force Vectors* (Ottawa: Director General Air Force Development, 2014), 9.

Minister.²¹² If Canada is to reinvest efforts and troops towards UN missions, it would therefore not be wise to achieve that goal at the detriment of its contribution to NATO. Canadians, who have mostly remained immune from domestic major conflict, terrorism and war for most of their existence, seldom see the requirement for a combat-capable military. Still today, they embrace the nostalgic concept of blue beret peacekeepers acting as referees between consenting state actors.²¹³

Canada's government must then strike the right balance between NORAD, NATO and UN commitments through an imaginative juggling of scarce military resources. The Canadian public, despite consistently having a foreign policy which prioritizes the defence of Canada and North America, value peacekeeping as the top priority. It could be extrapolated that Canadians assume that the United States will protect them and therefore do not need to invest anymore in their defence budget. Such is the curse of Canada as a middle power neighbouring the World Super Power and military giant that are the US: limited defence budgets with no fewer commitments to alliances and organizations.

President Trump has yet to specifically condemn Canada's defence contribution short of the NATO-mandated 2 per cent of GDP, as his primary target was Germany. However, his inaugural speech did hint to Canada's falling short of "pulling their weight" and relying too much on the United States to fill gaps left by Canada's small defence budget.²¹⁴ Prime Minister Trudeau re-iterated his intent to maintain Canada's defence budget at approximately 1% of its GDP in his proposed 2017 budget, as well as publicly

²¹²Office of the Prime Minister, *Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2015).

²¹³J. L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: Harper Flamingo Canada, 2004), 1.

²¹⁴Donald Trump (speech, U.S. President Inaugural Address, Washington D.C., United States, 20 January 2017.)

in the news. In fact, when asked about Canada's plan to reach the 2 per cent mark at a news conference in Toronto in March 2017, Prime Minister Trudeau side-stepped the question and reiterated Canada's ability to step up for important missions and "punch well above its weight."²¹⁵ Foreign Minister Freeland also expressed the importance of weighing factors other than the defence budget when assessing the CAF's contributions on the world stage. According to her, military capabilities, responsiveness, and presence among allies in key areas of the world should be considered.²¹⁶

Since the closing of Operation ATTENTION in Afghanistan in 2014, the CAF has indeed been deployed to (or confirmed its commitment to) key expeditionary operations as per Table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1 – Canadian Armed Forces Participation in Selected Recent International Military Operations

CAF Mission Name	Country	International Context	Timeframe	Number of CAF Personnel Deployed
Various	Afghanistan	US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and NATO's International Security Assistance Force	2001-2014	3000 (at peak)
Operation MOBILE	Libya	NATO-led Operation Unified Protector	March 2011-October 2011	655 (at peak)
Operation IMPACT	Iraq/Syria	Contribution to the Middle East Stabilization Force	August 2014-Ongoing	Approx. 830
Operation UNIFIER	Ukraine	Operates under the Multinational Joint Commission	April 2015-Ongoing	Approx. 200
Operation REASSURANCE	Romania, Lithuania, and Latvia	Part of NATO assurance and deterrence measures in Central and Eastern Europe	2017	Up to 455

Source: The Honourable Daniel Lang, "UN Deployment: Prioritizing Commitments at Home and Abroad," Senate Canada (November 01, 2016).

²¹⁵Lorne Cook, "Trudeau Holds Firm on Defence Spending Amid New U.S. Pressure on NATO Allies," *The Star*, 31 March 31 2017.

²¹⁶Ibid.

Although in small number, Canada's military personnel are deployed side-by-side with the US and other allies where it matters, and that seems to be acknowledged by the US. In fact, although harping on NATO allies for larger financial defence commitments has been a priority for President Trump since his election, he seems to have spent more time and energy criticizing Canada's commercial trade practices for dairy, energy and lumber than for its failure to meet the 2 per cent standard defence commitment. Canadian journalist Alexander Panetta referred to his criticism on trade as his "most virulent diatribe against Canada to date,"²¹⁷ an indication that trade issues with Canada are more of a concern than its small defence budget. In other words, although he cannot acknowledge it in clear terms, Trump does seem to respect Canada's military contribution, even if it is below the NATO target.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that there are several aspects of the UN that would benefit from Canada's involvement, but two in particular would allow Canada to punch above its weight in the current context. Training should remain to be one of Canada's military personnel expertise; as it is an aspect of peace operations in which Canada can become a leader again and have a global impact on future UN missions with minimal resources. Furthermore, when adding the women, peace and security dimension to this training and by deploying gender-sensitive task forces on future PSOs, Canada could contribute to the progression towards objectives associated with UNSC Resolution 1325 and UNSC Resolutions that followed.

²¹⁷Alexander Panetta, "Trump Lance Sa Plus Virulente Diatribe Contre Le Canada," *La Presse*, 20 April 2017.

With such a strategy, there should be hope to inspire Canadians and other UN troop-contributing nations to leverage women in all aspects of peace processes. With Canada's commitments to the NORAD mandate and current NATO missions, the CAF are already stretched. The attention of Canada's biggest ally seems to be towards NATO missions at the moment, as reflected by the Liberals' delay in announcing Canada's plan for its renewed dedication to UN-led PSOs. As such, if Canada must reinvest efforts towards peace operations, it cannot be at the detriment of Canada's combat capability. More than ever, the government will need to balance its commitment to the myriad of expeditionary underway to avoid over-tasking military personnel.

CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION

To stress one's own love of peace is always the close concern of those who have instigated war. But he who wants peace should speak of war. He should speak of the past one [...] and, above all, he should speak of the coming one.

– Walter Benjamin, *Peace Commodity*

The question as to whether or not Canada is a nation of peacekeepers or warriors will fuel debates among academics and politicians for decades to come. History has shown that the Canadian military can excel in both roles and has dependably demonstrated support to expeditionary operations by being present beside allies in numerous combat and peace missions for the last century. There is, however, a lasting nostalgia that has remained palpable for the past altruistic interventions of Canada's peacekeepers, even 60 years after Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize for orchestrating the first multinational UN peacekeeping mission in the Suez.²¹⁸

Public opinion has consistently demonstrated support to peacekeeping as one of the primary tenants that should appear on the government's foreign policy. Although proud of its military troops when engaged in difficult combat operations such as during the Afghanistan campaign, the Canadian public persists in seeing the Canadian Armed Forces as mediators, guardians of the peace, or even “peacekeeping social workers,”²¹⁹ as Jack Granatstein wrote. As a reflection of that sentiment, Canada's defence budget has fallen short of the NATO 2 per cent of GDP standard, and features among the lowest in comparison to its allies.

²¹⁸Nobel Prizes and Laureates, “Lester Bowles Pearson: Facts,” accessed 24 March 2017, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1957/pearson-facts.html.

²¹⁹J. L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: Harper Flamingo Canada, 2004), 204.

The United Nations' number of deployed troops has reached its highest level within the last few years, with over 100,000 peacekeepers deployed to a myriad of missions. Canada, who was once the leading troop-contributing nation, currently has 32 deployed military personnel on UN peace operations, an all-time low for the country.²²⁰ Canada's closest allies as well as most of the Permanent Five countries, are the largest contributors to the UN's funding, but now supply troops in a very limited amount. Uniformed personnel from countries with weak militaries and little to no UN legacy or expertise now constitute the bulk of the blue berets deployed throughout the world. UN flaws, inefficiencies and its intervention scope limitations have surfaced in the 1990s, and continue to be a topic of discussion among the international community, who often questions the UN's ability to achieve durable peace with variable attitudes and objectives from its contributing nations.

Despite challenges and pushback from critics, the Liberal government of Justin Trudeau announced at the start of its mandate Canada's imminent return to UN operations, qualifying this moment as Canada being "back."²²¹ The speech referred to Canada's heritage as a respected mediator and world leader for peace operations. What the newly elected Prime Minister failed to anticipate or fully grasp was the completely different realities of today's peace operations and intra-state context which renders complex any UN intervention. His hasty announcement of a 600-troop deployment under a UN mandate has yet to materialize into anything concrete, which has led military experts to speculate on a possible mandate.

²²⁰"United Nations," accessed 15 February 2017, <http://www.un.org/>.

²²¹Jim Bronskill, "'We're Back,' Justin Trudeau Says in Message to Canada's Allies abroad," *The Canadian Press*, 20 October 2015.

This study has demonstrated that if Canada must return to peace operations, then it should be focussed on a niche that can lead to international recognition, but that it cannot be at the expense of a combat capability. There are a few factors that have remained constant in Canada's projection of military power abroad: a legitimate mandate, low cost, a big impact, and minimized risk to troops. A focus on UN training programs in which Canada could make an impact has been mentioned on a few occasions by Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan and Canada's top Officer, General Jonathan Vance. Canada has indeed acquired the required credibility and expertise to make an impact once again in the peace operations training field. The Pearson Centre, now closed but once internationally renowned, trained over 18,000 military, police and civilian personnel from Canada and abroad,²²² and CAF personnel has been and continues to be employed as mentors in expeditionary operations.²²³ By once again taking a leading role in peace operations research and UN troops pre-deployment training, Canada could contribute to the overall standardization and level of mission preparation for modern peacekeepers.

There are numerous peace training and education gaps already identified by the UN and African communities that the Canadian Armed Forces could help alleviate. The particular agenda of Women, Peace and Security, encompassed within a training mandate, could bring Canada to the forefront of this hot topic in which the UN has failed to demonstrate much progress in recent years. Canada's 15 per cent ratio of women in the military,²²⁴ compared to the UN's meagre 3 per cent²²⁵, could help steer the much needed

²²²"Canada Needs a New UN Peacekeeping Training Centre," *The Star*, 25 April 2016.

²²³The Honourable Daniel Lang, "UN Deployment: Prioritizing Commitments at Home and Abroad," *Senate Canada*, 1 November 2016.

²²⁴North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *2015 Summary of the National Reports of NATO Members and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspective*, (2017), 53.

²²⁵United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security* (New York: United Nations Security Council, 2016.)

wind of change which has been the UN Secretary General's plea to the international community for a decade. With the modern kaleidoscope of peacekeepers from 124 different countries demonstrating various levels of professionalism, preparation and commitment to the mission, it would be ill-advised to think of any training mission as an easy one. Today's expanded UN mandate that includes the Responsibility to Protect, and large spectrum of operations have brought a level of complexity to peace operations that the CAF cannot elude. A solid operational definition and realistic expectations should therefore be set prior to any Canadian troop being sent overseas.

Notwithstanding President Donald Trump's election and with the CAF's current involvement in domestic NORAD operations and several coalition missions, the Liberal government must strike the right balance to achieve, yet again, the ultimate goal of Canada's international recognition as a country who "punches above its weight" with its military. With only 600 troops potentially deployed on future UN missions, it is doubtful that Canada will regain its once acclaimed reputation as the world's most renowned peacekeeping nation. Comparably, the retraction of Canada's fighters in Iraq brought an end to any current combat mission, leaving the interventionists pessimistic as to the CAF's ability to fight alongside allied military titans in the near future. This government's policy of spreading uniformed personnel thin between numerous domestic and expeditionary operations under diverse mandates, while not providing appropriate funding to support and equip them, is far too familiar. Once again, the weight remains on the shoulders of the men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces to rise up to the challenge, do "more with less," and garner the respect of the international community. Let us hope at least they can count on the Canadian public's support to achieve just that.

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