

Canadian  
Forces  
College

Collège  
des  
Forces  
Canadiennes



## FROM WAGING WAR TO LAUNCHING DOVES: COLOMBIA'S LONG MARCH TO PEACE

Maj J.G.F. Dionne

**JCSP 43**

**Master of Defence Studies**

### **Disclaimer**

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2017.

**PCEMI 43**

**Maîtrise en études de la  
défense**

### **Avertissement**

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2017.

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
JCSP 43 – PCEMI 43  
2016 - 2017

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE

**FROM WAGING WAR TO LAUNCHING DOVES: COLOMBIA'S LONG  
MARCH TO PEACE**

Maj J.G.F. Dionne

*“This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”*

Word Count: 18282

*“La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.”*

Compte de mots: 18282

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT..... iii

INTRODUCTION ..... 1

CHAPTER 1 –WALKING INTO THE UNKNOWN.....6

    INTRODUCTION .....6

    BREAKING THE STALEMATE .....9

        Betancur Versus the Military .....10

        The FARC.....13

        Paramilitary Groups .....15

    A MISSED OPPORTUNITY .....16

        Government Ambitions Versus Guerrilla Perceptions .....18

        Political Break Through.....19

    SOME NEEDED HELP .....22

    CONCLUSION.....25

CHAPTER 2 –NO END IN SIGHT .....28

    INTRODUCTION .....28

    THE WAR ON DRUGS AND BEYOND.....31

        Repeating the Mistakes of the Past.....32

        Peace Through Diplomacy.....33

        The Paramilitaries and the FARC .....35

    STANDING BY THE EDGE .....36

A Sign of Hope .....	37
The Military and Their Old Ways.....	38
Committed to What Extent .....	40
RELIABLE PARTNERS.....	42
Learning From the Past.....	43
The Quest for Territorial Sovereignty.....	45
CONCLUSION.....	47
CHAPTER 3 –THE MOMENT OF TRUTH .....	50
INTRODUCTION .....	50
ENDGAME.....	54
Losing Ground .....	56
WHY FIGHT .....	59
Survival by Other Means Than Armed Struggle .....	61
Some Remaining Hurdles .....	63
WHEN FRIENDS HELP .....	64
Guarantors and Accompaniers .....	65
Indirect Involvement.....	68
CONCLUSION.....	70
PEACE AT LAST.....	72
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	76

## ABSTRACT

In 2012, after two years of secret negotiations with the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC), Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos announced to the world that his administration was making a significant shift in policy from his predecessor and would attempt to seek a negotiated peace with the oldest guerrilla movement in Latin America. This study seeks to determine why the previous peace attempts initiated by the Colombian government with the FARC failed and why the latest round of negotiations is likely to succeed. The study will examine the peace negotiations during the Betancur, Pastrana and Santos administrations. Through an analysis of the “stalemate theory”, “ripeness theory” and “third party intervention” it will be determined why previous negotiations failed and how they help to support the positive outcome of the ongoing peace process.

## FROM WAGING WAR TO LAUNCHING DOVES: COLOMBIA'S LONG MARCH TO PEACE

### INTRODUCTION

The protracted conflict in Colombia has been identified as being one of the longest cases of a civil war, not only in Latin America, but globally. Despite the rejection by Colombian citizens to the initial terms of a negotiated peace with the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Ejército Nacional*<sup>1</sup> (FARC) the efforts to attain peace deployed by President Juan Manuel Santos were recognized by the Norwegian Noble Committee and awarded the prestigious Nobel Peace Prize for 2016.<sup>2</sup> Santos was rewarded by the committee as he “brought the bloody conflict significantly closer to a peaceful solution, and that much of the groundwork has been laid for both the verifiable disarmament of the FARC guerrillas and a historic process of national fraternity and reconciliation.”<sup>3</sup> Santos’ efforts were acknowledged as he was able to accomplish something that many before him had attempted but failed to achieve, a negotiated peace with the FARC. Through his efforts he enabled Colombia to take a giant leap towards what could be the end of a violent conflict that has been raging for more than half a century.

Colombia underwent three distinct periods where its presidents devoted considerable efforts to end the conflict that threatened its national security. By reaching

---

<sup>1</sup> Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

<sup>2</sup> After the rejection by a narrow margin of the initial peace terms following the Colombia referendum of October 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2016, the Santos administration and the FARC leaders signed a revised peace deal that was approved by both the Colombian Senate and House of Representatives on November 30<sup>th</sup>, 2016. The terms of the current peace deal have been respected by both parties.

<sup>3</sup> The Nobel Peace Prize for 2016, last consulted 04 April 2017, [https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/peace/laureates/2016/press.html](https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2016/press.html)

out to the FARC they strove to ratify a lasting negotiated peace accord. The first two peace attempts ended abruptly in failure and were followed by an intensification of violence in the already protracted conflict. While key elements necessary for success were absent in the earlier attempts to persuade the FARC to lay down their weapons, the latest attempt for peace currently ongoing in Colombia has shown great potential for achieving a complete disarmament of the rebels.

Throughout this essay, it will be argued that this third round of peace negotiations with the FARC has been successful as the conflict had demonstrated conditions that were absent in previous negotiation attempts, notably: 1) the presence of a military stalemate was achieved as the opposing parties failed to see military victory as a possible outcome; 2) the conflict and its main actors reached a level of ripeness and maturity favorable to a negotiated peace settlement; and, 3) non-biased third party intervention was present and this support enabled a more favorable environment at the negotiating table. In support of this thesis a comparative analysis will look at three separate episodes of peace through the lens of an analytical framework based on three distinct comparative criteria: William I. Zartman “Stalemate” criterion; the Dean G. Pruitt’s “Ripeness” criterion and, the criterion of third party intervention.

The stalemate criterion as described by Zartman is essential to a lasting peace agreement. He argues that without a military stalemate, the possibility of a negotiated settlement is significantly reduced as the opposing parties will not be prone to negotiations if they believe to be winning the battle. According to Zartman, a stalemate is reached when both parties are no longer in a position to maintain the fighting due to the

cost of war. This theory is relevant when analysing a conflict where a government is struggling to ensure the security of its population.<sup>4</sup>

When addressing the ripeness criterion of a conflict, Pruitt focuses on the motivation of both parties to agree to a peace agreement. To ensure the motivation of both parties are maintained, he stresses the need to establish trust and the development of common negotiating agenda. Finally, the negotiating parties need to accept compromises, focus on cooperation and demonstrate their willingness to respect the process leading to a ratified peace agreement.<sup>5</sup>

The third party intervention criterion is not based on one theory in particular. For the purpose of this study, elements of the analytical framework used by Nazih Richani and Fonkem Achankeng will be developed. The argument made by Richani that focussed on the importance of having third parties involved in the peace negotiations<sup>6</sup> and Achankeng's focus in the mediation role played by third parties in a protracted conflict will be studied.<sup>7</sup> Both approaches help in understanding the involvement of the third parties in the various peace negotiations in Colombia over the last 40 years.

In the first chapter, the peace process initiated by Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) will be covered. The main elements that caused the failure of this first attempt at peace will be exposed. It will also be shown that Betancur initiated a peace process under the false assumption that a military stalemate existed leading his administration to make concessions that enabled the FARC to gain military strength. The chapter will also

---

<sup>4</sup> William I Zartman, *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995, 335

<sup>5</sup> Dean G Pruitt, "Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks." *International Negotiation* 2, no. 2 (1997), 239

<sup>6</sup> Nazih Richani, "Third Parties, War Systems' Inertia, and Conflict Termination: The Doomed Peace Process in Colombia, 1998-2002." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 25, no. 2 (2005),76

<sup>7</sup> Fonkem Achankeng I, "'Mutual Hurting Stalemates', 'Ripe Moments' and Third-Party Intervention: Implications for the 'Southern Cameroons' Restoration of Statehood' Conflict." *The Round Table* 101, no. 1 (2012), 66



discuss the FARC's attempt to become part of the mainstream Colombian political system as an alternative to their armed struggle.

The second chapter will analyze the Andres Pastrana peace initiative (1998-2002) that was instigated after a controversial concession by his administration to the powerful guerrillas. This second failed attempt was characterized by the intervention of the United States through the approval of Plan Colombia. The impact of a biased intervention by third parties will be discussed. This period also witnessed an increase in violence as the FARC got further entrenched in the drug trade and fought the paramilitaries to maintain their financial means of supporting their ability to wage war. The impact of this violence will be examined through the framework.

The peace process initiated by Juan Manuel Santos (2012 to present) will constitute the third and final chapter of this study and it will be used to demonstrate why this effort possesses the elements that will almost certainly establish a lasting peace agreement. It will determine how Santos encountered success by leveraging the lessons learned from previous peace negotiations with the FARC. The benefits of an unbiased third party intervention will be discussed as will its contribution to keeping both parties at the negotiating table even when they faced roadblocks.

The study will consider how the different episodes of negotiations between the Colombian governments and the FARC evolved over the last three decades and how the first two efforts compare to the latest round in terms of establishing the conditions necessary for a successful outcome. It will be established that the latest peace process possesses the elements required to put an end to the longest conflict in Latin America while the previous two did not. It will also be demonstrated, however, that each of the

previous peace negotiations contributed to the establishment of the required conditions, primarily through lessons learned, and that awareness of these lessons enabled the current administration to make significant progress over the past five years.

Although a negotiated peace with the FARC will not solve all of Colombia's violence and internal security issues it will certainly remove one of the most persistent and violent actors from the conflict. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of the FARC rank and file could also be used as a template or foundation for a similar agreement with the other major guerrilla movement, the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional*<sup>8</sup> (ELN) who espouse similar motives to those of the FARC. Over the past fifty years a number of guerrilla movements have highlighted the inequalities faced by Colombian peasants and workers and leveraged their claims of systemic inequality to justify their armed struggle.<sup>9</sup> As it will be shown through this study the peace efforts of the Colombian governments and the FARC, undertaken over a period of more than 40 years, combined to set the stage for the successes enjoyed by the current peace process. Persistence has bought hope to this troubled nation.

---

<sup>8</sup> National Liberation Army

<sup>9</sup> Offstein, Norman. "An historical review and analysis of Colombian guerrilla movements: FARC, ELN and EPL." *Desarrollo y Sociedad* 52, no. 1 (2003), 109

## CHAPTER 1 –WALKING INTO THE UNKNOWN

### INTRODUCTION

In this first chapter, it will be claimed that the first attempt at reaching a negotiated peace with the FARC ended as a failure. This peace process was initiated under false assumptions and unfavorable conditions for the government that contributed to an escalation of violence. It will be demonstrated that some lessons learned emerged and were applied to some extent by future presidents in their efforts to terminate the conflict.

At the height of the Cold War armed Marxist-Leninist insurgents had proliferated throughout Latin America creating political and social unrest within affected states. With the help of the Soviet Union, the by then well established Fidel Castro and his *guerilleros* were in a position to ideologically influence, financially sustain and provide militarily support to insurgent groups in the region. This significantly strengthened the insurgents and made some governments officials believe, particularly within their security forces, that negotiating with such groups as a “waste of time because there is no middle ground”<sup>10</sup> as it was believed they had no desire to compromise. It was under this particular security atmosphere that Belisario Betancur ascended to the presidency of Colombia in 1982 with the intent of reaching a peace settlement with the insurgent groups in Colombian. In his opinion, the conflict which had raged for twenty years had reached a stalemate.

---

<sup>10</sup> Guy Guliotta. "The Guerilla Tamer." *New Republic*, no. 1 (2011), 8

The president previous to Betancur, Julio Cesar Turbay, had instigated a persistent military campaign for the previous four years under a targeted security law.<sup>11</sup> This hardline stance against the guerrillas reinforced the military's negative perception of the potential for a negotiated peace to end the conflict. Throughout presidency, Turbay had refused to concede to any of the guerrillas demands, most notably for the release of hundreds of political prisoners along with an unconditional amnesty for their crimes.<sup>12</sup> Turbay demonstrated some leniency for the guerrillas towards the end of his mandate, perhaps to create better security circumstances for his successor<sup>13</sup>.

Betancur took a completely different approach towards the security situation in his country by trying to better address the sources of the conflict and by initiating a new round of peace talks. According to Ricardo Vargas, Betancur's attitude was "a radical departure from that of his predecessor for he recognized that guerrilla violence was the product of real social conditions and he also understood the relationship between those conditions and many of the demands of the insurgents"<sup>14</sup>. Despite this new approach, the violence in Colombia rose dramatically with the growth of the highly profitable market for illicit crops. Fuelled by the drug trade, the war economy of Colombia saw the guerrilla forces engaging in a higher level of violence in order to protect their new source of revenue.<sup>15</sup> Elected on an campaign promise centered on "democratic opening and to

---

<sup>11</sup> Fernando A. Chinchilla, "Paix Soutenable. Rapports De Force Et Affaiblissement des Extrémistes en Angola, en Colombie, au Salvador et au Mozambique de 1989 à 1999." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2008, 7

<sup>12</sup> Colin Harding, *Colombia: New Beginning?, Gabriel Garcia Márquez and Others Face Brutal Government Repression*. Vol. 11. London, England: SAGE Publications, 1982, 26

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 26

<sup>14</sup> Ricardo Vargas, "*The FARC, the War, and the Crisis of the State (Translated by NACLA)*". Vol. 31. Hopewell, Pa: North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), 1998, 24

<sup>15</sup> Jim Rochlin, "Plan Colombia and the Revolution in Military Affairs: The Demise of the FARC." *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (2011), 717

seek peace”<sup>16</sup> with the intent of bringing an end to violence, Belisario Betancur had only four years to establish a sustainable negotiated peace. Betancur had expressed his desire to discuss a peaceful resolution to the country’s ongoing cycle of violence through a political dialogue rather than using military means.<sup>17</sup> Criticized for a lack of depth, the peace initiative proposed by Betancur was designed around three main axes: creation of a National Plan of Reconciliation (PNR) to reconcile the causes of the violence (poverty and social exclusion); creation of a commission of mediators constituted of members from all sectors of society; and, the immediate and unconditional amnesty to the guerrillas that cease to fight.<sup>18</sup>

This chapter will demonstrate why the peace process initiated under the Betancur administration was unsuccessful as it did not possess the required conditions to ensure a lasting negotiated peace agreement with the FARC. The factors that contributed to this first significant at peace will be examined. To establish that this effort failed, the chapter will be broken into three sections.

The first section will establish that a military stalemate had not achieved as the parties involved still desired to dominate their opponent militarily. The second section will discuss the unfavorable political environment and the lack of “ripeness” in the conflict. For the first two sections, the position of the government and the FARC will be analysed. The third section will expose the negative effects caused by the absence of involvement of a third party to aid in facilitating the dialog. Notwithstanding the fact that

---

<sup>16</sup> Steven S. Dudley, *Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia*. New York: Routledge, 2004, 17

<sup>17</sup> Catherine C LeGrand, "The Colombian Crisis in Historical Perspective." *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Latino-Américaines et Caraïbes* 28, no. 55/56 (2003), "ProQuest Dissertations Publishing", 12

<sup>18</sup> Fernando A. Chinchilla, "Paix Soutenable. Rapports De Force Et Affaiblissement Des Extrémistes En Angola, En Colombie, Au Salvador Et Au Mozambique De 1989 à 1999." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2008, 177

Betancur was not able to achieve lasting peace, the efforts that he undertook did set the stage for future peace attempts as it was demonstrated that a dialog could be opened with the guerrillas. His efforts led to the eventual disarmament and demobilization of the M-19 and other guerrilla organizations at the end of the decade and the lessons learned set the stage for the peace initiative initiated by Santos<sup>19</sup>.

## **BREAKING THE STALEMATE**

When Betancur was inaugurated his assessment was that the Colombian guerrilla groups would not be able to seize power. His expectation was that the army had sufficient strength to contain the revolutionary movements operating within the country. He believed that the last two decades of fighting had created nothing but a stalemate and no defined winner could be identified.<sup>20</sup> The elements analysed in this section will demonstrate that Betancur's beliefs were not accurate as there was no presence of a military stalemate. For the first two years of his mandate Betancur shaped several ceasefire agreements, temporary for the most part, and initiated secret talks with the guerrilla leaders through trusted agents to promote the basis of his plan.<sup>21</sup> His efforts culminated on November 1<sup>st</sup> 1984 when several guerrilla agents and the government began a formal National Dialogue aimed to end the political violence through reform. At the time, speculations were that some of the guerrilla groups had accepted the offer because they had come to the realization that they could not defeat militarily the

---

<sup>19</sup> Supra, 49

<sup>20</sup> Guy Guliotta. "The Guerilla Tamer." *New Republic*, no. 1 (2011), 8

<sup>21</sup> Steven S. Dudley, *Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia*. New York: Routledge, 2004, 33

government.<sup>22</sup> This was not the fact as the FARC quickly leveraged the concessions made by the government and gained considerable strength, hence dissipating any appearance of a military stalemate and resulted with the guerrillas being in a position of strength at the negotiation table.

### Betancur Versus the Military

Betancur wasted no time with the declaration of an Amnesty Law hoping to seduce over 500 guerrillas into accepting amnesty within the first few days.<sup>23</sup> He also issued amnesty for 1,500 imprisoned guerrillas<sup>24</sup> in November 1982 and granted them a political status demonstrating a significant shift in strategy from that employed by his predecessor. This would be one of the corner stone of the Uribe Accords<sup>25</sup> signed on 28 March 1984 that enabled the ceasefire and initiated peace talks with the FARC.<sup>26</sup> The *Ejército Popular de Liberación (ELP)*<sup>27</sup> and the *Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19)*<sup>28</sup> joined the talks shortly after. The ELN, at the time the second most important guerrilla group, refused to take part to the peace process.

---

<sup>22</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, *Colombia's Bold Gamble for Peace*. No. RAND/P-7055. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 1985, 13

<sup>23</sup> Fernando A. Chinchilla, "Paix Soutenable. Rapports De Force Et Affaiblissement Des Extrémistes En Angola, En Colombie, Au Salvador Et Au Mozambique De 1989 à 1999." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2008, 175

<sup>24</sup> Guy Guliotta. "The Guerilla Tamer." *New Republic*, no. 1 (2011), 8

<sup>25</sup> The Uribe Accord was an initial agreement that addressed the establishment of a bilateral ceasefire and Colombian government committing to modernize political institutions, strengthen education, health, housing and labour policy and initiate the reconciliation process.

<sup>26</sup> Garry Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency*. Halifax; New York; London; Winnipeg: Fernwood, 2011, 26

<sup>27</sup> Popular Liberation Army

<sup>28</sup> 19<sup>th</sup> of April Movement

One of the flaws of the Uribe Accords is that it did not call for the guerillas to disarm or dismantle their military structures.<sup>29</sup> Some detractors of this particular process were critical of Betancur's efforts, labelling them as mere "tactics of peace" and misleading to the population as the war was still ongoing in some of the most remote parts of the country such as Putumayo and Antioqui.<sup>30</sup> Betancur was also perceived as "a political maverick who never enjoyed the support of the country's elite or the military"<sup>31</sup>. The Amnesty Law was a contentious issue within his government and can be seen as a contributing factor to the failure of this initiative as it created friction with the armed forces. As the position of Minister of Defence grew in influence and power under the Turbey presidency the army showed little enthusiasm towards the ceasefire and the Amnesty Law.<sup>32</sup> One of the major decisions taken by Betancur in the initial stages of the peace negotiations was to raise the state of siege put in place by his predecessor. This significant decision made by the new President deprived the military of an omnipresent role in the peace process.<sup>33</sup>

Turbay had conveyed unprecedented powers to the military to battle the guerrilla groups and the military leadership were convinced they could win the war. The Colombian army felt betrayed with the announcement of the amnesty.<sup>34</sup> The Defence Minister of the time, General Fernando Landazabal, was particularly frustrated. Over the

---

<sup>29</sup> Lawrence Boudon, "Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 28, no. 2 (1996), 282

<sup>30</sup> James Francis Rochlin, James Francis. *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, 101

<sup>31</sup> Lawrence Boudon, "Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 28, no. 2 (1996), 282

<sup>32</sup> Colin Harding, *Colombia: New Beginning?: Gabriel Garcia Márquez and Others Face Brutal Government Repression*. Vol. 11. London, England: SAGE Publications, 1982, 26

<sup>33</sup> Catherine C LeGrand, "The Colombian Crisis in Historical Perspective." *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Latino-Américaines et Caraïbes* 28, no. 55/56 (2003), "ProQuest Dissertations Publishing", 12

<sup>34</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, *Colombia's Bold Gamble for Peace*. No. RAND/P-7055. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 1985, 33



previous four years the country's security forces had killed and captured several hundred guerrilla fighters. This divergence in viewpoints between the President and his Defence Minister reinforced the negative perceptions towards the peace initiative by some members of the political elite that still believed the guerrillas could be defeated militarily.

Throughout that period, however, the Colombian military was seen as relatively weak from the FARC's perspective and was frequently accused by the latter of committing atrocities not only towards the guerrilla groups but also towards the population who were caught in the crossfire.<sup>35</sup> Betancur established a presidential commission to look into the issue of human rights abuses in his country. As the peace process was initiated the delimitation between legitimate military action and abuse of power was brought to the forefront by observers of the conflict.<sup>36</sup> The military opposed the addition of human rights abuse to the discussion and the top brass still strongly believed they could defeat the FARC from a military perspective further demonstrating that a stalemate had not been achieved.<sup>37</sup> The human rights dimension was perceived by the military as limiting the effectiveness of their operations against the insurgents.<sup>38</sup> The divergent interpretations on the tactical situation of the conflict by the Colombian military and Betancur were evident.

From the start Betancur's efforts appeared doomed as numerous senior officials were critical of what they considered to be the President putting the government in a weak position and capitulating to the guerrilla's demands. When the peace process was

---

<sup>35</sup> James Francis Rochlin, James Francis. *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, 101

<sup>36</sup> Catherine C LeGrand, "The Colombian Crisis in Historical Perspective." *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Latino-Américaines et Caraïbes* 28, no. 55/56 (2003), "ProQuest Dissertations Publishing", 12

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, 12

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, 12

launched government officials had no idea as to the strength or size of the main guerrilla groups and there was confusion as to why they accepted the ceasefire in the first place or even why they were willing to pursue their fight in any political contest.<sup>39</sup> The FARC did eventually accept the Government's gesture for peace even though they had wished for the establishment of a Grand National Dialog (GND) and the inclusion of a greater portion of the population in the process.<sup>40</sup>

### The FARC

Due to the constant pressure applied by the armed forces since the late 1970's, the FARC military strength had been assessed as weak.<sup>41</sup> The start of their venture into the drug trade also occurred during that period offering the FARC the opportunity to extend some of its territorial influence. This also provided greater financial autonomy and was viewed as a significant opportunity for potential growth by the FARC leadership. As Betancur initiated the talks the links between the FARC and the drug trade raised concerns with the Colombian security circles.<sup>42</sup> This new financial autonomy gained by the FARC was a key factor that helped them gain the advantage over the Colombian security forces and enabled them to gain the military advantage.

The lack of eagerness demonstrated by the military towards the peace process intensified when the FARC adopted a few changes at the offset of their Seventh Conference of May 1982. Not only did they rebrand as *Fuerzas Armadas*

---

<sup>39</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, *Colombia's Bold Gamble for Peace*. No. RAND/P-7055. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 1985, 11

<sup>40</sup> Mauricio Romero, "Entrepreneurs of Violence, Failed Peace Process, and Changing use of Force in Colombia, 1982–2003." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 9

<sup>41</sup> James Francis Rochlin, James Francis. *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, 99

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 100

*Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo*<sup>43</sup> but, most importantly, they shifted their military strategy to adopt an offensive posture seeking confrontation with the Colombian security forces. During that same period they also aimed to increase their number of troops and expand their influence to other regions of the country.<sup>44</sup> Even if they had demonstrated openness to negotiate a peace settlement the FARC leadership was showing signs they were getting ready for the next phase of their offensive. If they felt caught in a stalemate with the country's security forces they were busy establishing the means to break it.

The posturing from the FARC was a calculated manipulation of the peace process to better strategically position themselves. Although they were cooperating and appeared predisposed to negotiate peace they made significant organizational moves to enhance their chances of obtaining a military victory over the government forces. This inclination towards war was an indication that the FARC still believed in their ability to defeat the government and contributed to the failure of the peace process.<sup>45</sup> With growth of their effective strength and by seeking to expand their presence, notably to the some of the major urban centers such as Bogota, the FARC demonstrated their intent to increase their fighting forces. The first two years of the Betancur's presidency saw an increase in violence and kidnappings. This was interpreted as a sign that the FARC wanted to show they could still fight and gain a position of strength to increase their negotiating powers.<sup>46</sup> These manoeuvres led to an eventual rupture of the discussions and a return to war.

---

<sup>43</sup> Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia –People's Army

<sup>44</sup> Garry Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency*. Halifax; New York; London; Winnipeg: Fernwood, 2011, 25

<sup>45</sup> Fernando A. Chinchilla, "Paix Soutenable. Rapports De Force Et Affaiblissement Des Extrémistes En Angola, En Colombie, Au Salvador Et Au Mozambique De 1989 à 1999." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2008, 100

<sup>46</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, *Colombia's Bold Gamble for Peace*. No. RAND/P-7055. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 1985, 8

In order to achieve their expansion objectives the FARC had to secure a stable source of revenue. The proliferation of drug trafficking, particularly the upsurge of the cocaine production and increasing global markets, ensured the financial means for the transformation of the FARC into a bigger fighting force.<sup>47</sup> As the peace talks were ongoing, the FARC took the necessary steps to ensure the growth of their military power.<sup>48</sup> The FARC's venture into the drug trade also weakened the chances of achieving a negotiated peace and further demonstrated that the conflict was far from getting into a stalemate.

### Paramilitary Groups

One interesting trend at the start of the Betancur presidency was the emergence of many paramilitary groups. Paramilitary groups were Colombian citizen's vigilantes taking the law into their own to retaliate against the guerrillas. The creation of such groups rapidly expanded beyond the guerrilla-drug lord power struggle to include ranchers and peasants whose desire was simply to retaliate against the FARC's tax on cocaine production.<sup>49</sup> The rise of these groups was a direct consequence of the power struggle between the guerrillas and the drug lords.<sup>50</sup> The emergence of the paramilitaries further complicated Betancur's peace efforts.<sup>51</sup> The retribution inflicted by the

---

<sup>47</sup> Catherine C LeGrand, "The Colombian Crisis in Historical Perspective." *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Latino-Américaines et Caraïbes* 28, no. 55/56 (2003), 173

<sup>48</sup> Jim Rochlin, "Plan Colombia and the Revolution in Military Affairs: The Demise of the FARC." *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (2011), 720

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid*, 10

<sup>50</sup> Catherine C LeGrand, "The Colombian Crisis in Historical Perspective." *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Latino-Américaines et Caraïbes* 28, no. 55/56 (2003), "ProQuest Dissertations Publishing", 10

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid*, 11

paramilitaries on guerrilla sympathisers not only contributed to the violence on innocent civilians it further divided the country adding pressure on the peace process.

Discord within the government, most notably the frustrated army, and the actions of the FARC seizing the opportunity to rearm, regroup and expand their influence throughout Colombia were clear indications that each stakeholder believed that an armed victory could be achieved over their adversary. The incursion of the FARC into the drug trade also brought an unwanted actor in this explosive mixture and only made matters more complicated for Betancur and his peace process and became a factor contributing to its failure. The paramilitaries contributed to fuel the violence and further militarise the conflict, further demonstrating the absence of a stalemate. The increasing militarization and violence showed that perhaps the conflict had not achieved the level of maturity that Belisario Betancur had believed. Colombia did not appear ready for peace.

### **A MISSED OPPORTUNITY**

One of the peculiarities of the Betancour peace process was the approach. He pursued a broad agenda centered on the three axes previously mentioned but without providing any specifics.<sup>52</sup> Request for amnesty had been a significant demand of the FARC in the early 1980's. Although amnesty was offered by Betancur through the Uribe Accords only 400<sup>53</sup> guerrilla fighters of all groups accepted the offer within the first three

---

<sup>52</sup> Virginia M. Bouvier, *Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War*. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2009, 73

<sup>53</sup> James Francis Rochlin, James Francis. *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, 101

months, far less than the six to seven thousand that were anticipated by Betancur.<sup>54</sup> With the FARC focused on the growth of its combatant force two years prior to the signature of the Uribe Accords it was clear that the organization had doubts about the entire process. The failure of the amnesty offer to attract as many guerrilla fighters as expected was an early indication that the guerrillas, particularly the FARC, had not reached ripeness as an organization as they chose to maintain their armed struggle versus laying down their weapons.

Some officials within the Betancur government voiced their hopes that the amnesty would cause a rupture within the ranks of the guerrillas. From their point of view this division within these organisations could have contributed to a reduction in the fighting.<sup>55</sup> This was also seen as a means for the government to gain public support in the event the peace talks with the guerrillas would breakdown. If the guerrillas reverted to violence this would legitimize a new government offensive. From the inception of the process the army had demonstrated hostility towards a negotiated peace and their views were supported by the traditional politicians and business elites of the country.<sup>56</sup> With government officials anticipating negative results from the beginning and the hostility demonstrated from other elites of Colombian society towards the Amnesty Law showed a further lack of ripeness towards the prospect of the guerrillas reintegrating Colombian society. This resulted in weakening the support Betancur needed to bring the peace process to fruition.

---

<sup>54</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, *Colombia's Bold Gamble for Peace*. No. RAND/P-7055. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 1985, 7

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid*, 6

<sup>56</sup> Jenny Pearce, *Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth*, (London, 1990), 175

When Betancur made his announcement that he would seek peace with the guerrilla organizations he advised that the negotiations would be managed by civilian authorities. As indicated earlier, the reduced role of the armed forces and with Betancur not requesting the disarmament of amnestied guerrillas created frustrations within the ranks of the army. These frustrations were exacerbated by the National Police being given a bigger role in ensuring public safety.<sup>57</sup> The lack of maturity demonstrated by the army's leadership as they felt relegated to a secondary role demonstrates a further lack of ripeness in the process. The military was reluctant to cede the greater autonomy they were granted under Turbay in 1978. This discord between agents of the state made cooperation difficult and further jeopardized the survivability of any gains delivered by an eventual peace accord.<sup>58</sup>

#### Government Ambitions Versus Guerrilla Perceptions

The lack of unity within the government contributed to the FARC remaining sceptical towards the government and their offensive for peace with Berancur at the forefront. Without disarming, the FARC accepted the government's initiative of peace but demonstrated caution throughout. As the months went by the FARC maintained their criticism of the government's lack of resolve in addressing the socioeconomic issues that fueled the conflict.<sup>59</sup> By not tackling this key FARC consideration the government

---

<sup>57</sup> Rex A. Hudson and Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. *Colombia: A Country Study*. 5th ed. Vol. 550-26. Washington, D.C: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2010, 340

<sup>58</sup> Mauricio Romero, "Entrepreneurs of Violence, Failed Peace Process, and Changing use of Force in Colombia, 1982–2003." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 9

<sup>59</sup> James Francis Rochlin, James Francis. *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, 101

officials demonstrated they were not ready to bring to the forefront one of the root causes underpinning the country's almost constant state of warfare since the 1960's.

The vocabulary used was another demonstration of the lack of maturity among opposing forces. The Colombian government was calling the process "peace" but the rebels were considering this effort as "merely ceasefire".<sup>60</sup> By giving a different definition to what they were trying to achieve showed that both parties were not necessarily on the same wave length. The different perceptions of the process were seen as an indication of a further lack of ripeness from all stakeholders. Some guerrilla leaders were looking at this as only a change in tactics from the government and "a temporary suspension of hostilities"<sup>61</sup>. The FARC seemed to believe some positive outputs could emerge from the peace initiative proposed by Betancur and they seized the opportunity to leverage some of its disarmed and demobilized members to bring their agenda into the national political forum. Entering politics demonstrated strategic thinking by the FARC leadership and some maturity as an organization as it provided them the prospect of finding a political alternative to their armed struggle.

### Political Break Through

In 1984 the FARC created a political unit, *Unión Patriótica* (UP), a leftist political party composed of former guerrilla fighters who disarmed and wished to continue their fight through other means.<sup>62</sup> This was a significant step for the

---

<sup>60</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, *Colombia's Bold Gamble for Peace*. No. RAND/P-7055. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 1985, 9

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, 10

<sup>62</sup> James Francis Rochlin, James Francis. *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, 102



organization as it leveraged the ceasefire with the government and transported its armed struggle into the country's political arena.<sup>63</sup> Coincidentally the UP made its political debut in 1985 as the negotiations with President Betancur were hitting a deadlock.

To the surprise of observers the UP won 14 seats in the Colombian Congress.<sup>64</sup> Some paramilitary groups, notably those that experienced economic prosperity when they entered the narco-trafficking business, started targeted assassinations of UP leaders. The assassination of the UP members in itself is a factor that identifies the lack of ripeness in the Colombian conflict by denying the FARC an attempt at reaching a political alternative to the injustices they had been fighting the government's legitimacy. Claims of the FARC that the right-wing paramilitary groups were heavily associated with the military brought another dimension to this issue.

As the FARC were sustaining military losses to the paramilitaries and the government forces, they still adhered to the peace process by maintaining their dual strategy of political and military objectives. The FARC also started to launch violent retaliation against the paramilitaries that attacked vulnerable UP militants in remote areas of the country.<sup>65</sup> This lack of maturity from the FARC leaders demonstrated they were not necessarily ready to accept the sacrifices required to promote their political agenda after years of imposing their violence in parts of Colombia. The emergence of local self-defence groups in response to this renewed violence shows further evidence of the lack of ripeness within the Colombian population.

---

<sup>63</sup> Jim Rochlin, "Plan Colombia and the Revolution in Military Affairs: The Demise of the FARC." *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (2011), 717

<sup>64</sup> James Francis Rochlin, James Francis. *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, 101

<sup>65</sup> Lawrence Boudon, "Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 28, no. 2 (1996), 282

It is clear that, even though Betancur was in favor of the FARC entering politics, his views were not necessarily ubiquitous. The association of the security forces and some right-wing paramilitary organisations demonstrates a lack of ripeness in both the conflict and the peace process itself.<sup>66</sup> As the fighting and the violence had been ongoing for close to twenty years this was a sign of political exclusion of a non-traditional player and that the elite of the country were not ready to see the guerrillas bring their fight into a more legitimate playing field.

Ricardo Rocha-Garcia noted that the emergence of the paramilitaries created by rich rural elite further complicated the dynamics of the peace talks and was a contributing factor to the failed peace process.<sup>67</sup> The Colombian government authority was absent in regions of the country dominated by the guerrillas and drug traffickers. The amnesty offered by Betancur to the guerrillas was perceived by the self-defence groups as treason of the government. They were concerned it would create a source of political instability and a new cycle of violence would emerge as drug traffickers were seen as their primary threat. With this faction of the population demonstrating their inability to confer the monopoly of violence to the government forces showed an absence of maturity in the rural areas. All this occurred simultaneously while the Betancur administration was pushing for a democratization of some of its institutions, such as by holding elections in rural municipalities, in an attempt to start addressing political and social reforms demanded by the FARC.<sup>68</sup>

---

<sup>66</sup> James Francis Rochlin, James Francis. *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, 102

<sup>67</sup> Ricardo Rocha-Garcia "Drug trafficking and its impact on Colombia: an economic overview." *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 28, no. 55-56 (2003), 281

<sup>68</sup> Fernando A. Chinchilla, "Paix Soutenable. Rapports De Force Et Affaiblissement Des Extrémistes En Angola, En Colombie, Au Salvador Et Au Mozambique De 1989 à 1999." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2008, 100

Although the efforts of Betancur to bring an end to the violence in his country were worthy, the three-year respite with the FARC had effects that prolonged the conflict. Through the creation of the UP the FARC attempted to gain recognition as a legitimate political player in Colombia. At the same time they took advantage of the truce to gain strength as they increased its size and expanded their presence throughout the country.<sup>69</sup> The opportunism demonstrated by the FARC is an example of the lack of maturity of the guerrilla group and it could be argued that they were not ready to agree to a sustainable peace agreement. The emergence of self-defence groups did nothing to contribute to the proper conditions for peace and further demonstrated that a portion of the population were not ready for peace. As Colombia was on its own to find a way to achieve peace the lack of maturity of the stakeholder organizations contributed strongly to the failure of the Betancur peace process.

### **SOME NEEDED HELP**

While little documentation on foreign or international organizations involvement in the peace talks launched by Belisario Betancur could be found, analysing third party intervention remains relevant in determining the failure of this first major peace initiative. Even if at the time the Colombian conflict had been raging since the mid-1960's, the impact it had on the region was marginal and it had not gained much attention from Washington or other international agents. This failure to have any international oversight of the peace process was to be a lesson learned for subsequent attempts.

---

<sup>69</sup> Rex A. Hudson and Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. *Colombia: A Country Study*. 5th ed. Vol. 550-26. Washington, D.C: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2010, 327

An impartial verification commission could have monitored the integration of FARC members in the UP and seen to their security.<sup>70</sup> Such a commission, staffed by an international partner could have increased the potential for success. The absence of a trusted third party became a lesson the FARC remembered. The first real significant foreign assistance to a Colombian peace process occurred in the early 1990's when it became a demand of the guerrillas, including the FARC and the ELN, as they united under the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinator (CGSB).<sup>71</sup> All this with the hopes that foreign assistance would reduce the violence towards the guerrillas and their sympathisers entering the political world and decrease the mistrust of the population towards a non-military solution to the violence.<sup>72</sup> Oversight of the negotiations would have contributed to the evolution of the process and the participation of international partners could have been beneficial to help finance this endeavor as well. During those years Colombia was lacking the financial resources to fully support such a process.<sup>73</sup> With reduced economic means and no international support this process had little chance of succeeding. The lack of funding was an obstacle Betancur underestimated in order to ensure the agreed terms of the Uribe Accords could be implemented.

The Cuban revolution had been an inspiration to the FARC during its inception. To initially counter the spread of communism, the United States trained Colombian

---

<sup>70</sup> Andrei Gomez-Suarez, Jonathan Newman, "Safeguarding Political Guarantees in the Colombian Peace Process: Have Santos and FARC Learnt the Lessons from the Past?" *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 5 (2013), 824

<sup>71</sup> Lawrence Boudon, "Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 28, no. 2 (1996), 283

<sup>72</sup> Andrei Gomez-Suarez, Jonathan Newman, "Safeguarding Political Guarantees in the Colombian Peace Process: Have Santos and FARC Learnt the Lessons from the Past?" *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 5 (2013), 826

<sup>73</sup> Fernando A. Chinchilla, "Paix Soutenable. Rapports De Force Et Affaiblissement Des Extrémistes En Angola, En Colombie, Au Salvador Et Au Mozambique De 1989 à 1999." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2008, 181

security forces personnel, as it did with other Latin American countries, at the School of the Americas. In the early 1980's this United States army training helped to better promote the Americans national security doctrine as evidenced by Turbay and his aggressive stance against the FARC.<sup>74</sup> Interestingly, the United States had demonstrated very little interest in the peace talks initiated by Belisario Betancur. Considering the fact that Colombia was in the midst of an economic crisis financial support from the Americans could have potentially sustained the effort.<sup>75</sup> In her assessment of the peace processes that took place in Colombia, Virginia Bouvier highlights that no members of the international community were present. No nation took any steps to accompany the Colombian government and the guerrillas on their journey to facilitate this complex business of peace talks.<sup>76</sup> This is a clear indication of the benefits of neutral third party intervention to maintain peace negotiations alive and could have prevented its failure by keeping both parties at the negotiation table when they faced an impasse.

The involvement in the drug trade by the FARC reduced significantly their reliance on external support to maintain their armed struggle. On the other hand, the ELN still had a requirement to be financed in the early 1980's by countries such as the Soviet Union and China in order to maintain and eventually increase their fighting power.<sup>77</sup> The influence of the foreign powers in Colombia was not solely focused on ideological and political support as the financing of the guerrilla groups further accentuated their military

---

<sup>74</sup> James Francis Rochlin, James Francis. *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, 98

<sup>75</sup> Guy Guliotta. "The Guerilla Tamer." *New Republic*, no. 1 (2011), 10

<sup>76</sup> Virginia M. Bouvier, *Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War*. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2009, 77

<sup>77</sup> James Francis Rochlin, James Francis. *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, 100

power and their ability to destabilize the country.<sup>78</sup> The sentiment demonstrated by a faction of the rural elites in the early initial stages of the peace talks was that the government was caving to Moscow. In the early 1980's Moscow was still seen by some members of the Colombian political and economic elite as the commander of the Colombian guerrilla movements.<sup>79</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The peace process initiated by Betancur came to a sudden halt and had a dramatic end when a commando of the M-19 assaulted the Justice Palace in Bogota in November 1985. As such, this first major attempt by a Colombian President to reach a peaceful negotiated solution ended in failure. Not only were the guerrillas and the political establishment not ready for peace but a faction of the population also turned towards violence. Elected on the promise of peace Belisario Betancur pitched his peace process agenda based on the premise that the conflict plaguing his country was in a stalemate.

The first significant contribution to the failure of the peace process resided in the perceptions of the major stakeholders. Government officials, especially the army, and the FARC believed that a military victory over their opponent could be achieved. While the army was relegated to a secondary role and showed its frustrations with the process the FARC took the opportunity to grow as an organization and increase their influence throughout the country militarily and politically. Their venture in the drug trade enabled them to finance this growth which created friction with the rich landowners and drug-

---

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, 100

<sup>79</sup> Mauricio Romero, "Entrepreneurs of Violence, Failed Peace Process, and Changing use of Force in Colombia, 1982–2003." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 13

traffickers who saw their livelihood was threatened. The resultant emergence of paramilitary groups brought a new wave of violence to the conflict and reduced the possibility of a military stalemate.

The acts of violence directed towards the members of the UP were a clear sign that a portion of the Colombian population was not ready to see the FARC and the guerrillas bring their struggle into the country's political arena. The Amnesty Law implemented in the first year of the Betancur administration was not well received and it created friction with his Defence Minister primarily because it did not call for a disarmament of the guerrillas who stood to profit from this opportunity. This lack of unity was a demonstration of immaturity within the political elite in Colombia. Adding to these factors the FARC and the government's different perspectives on the peace talks and ceasefire were also indications of a lack of ripeness in the conflict that led to the failure of the peace process.

The absence of a third party to broker the negotiations put Belisario Betancour and his peace process in a more precarious situation than necessary. The presence of a neutral party to facilitate the process could have been a force multiplier in supporting the dialogue. The only of foreign interventions in Colombia at the time were the USSR's financing the FARC and the United States provision of training to the Colombian security forces. These interventions only contributed to the maintenance of the state of violence leading to the failure of this attempt for peace.

The ambitious peace process that was initiated by Belisario Betancur was not a total loss. Although the FARC walked out and the ELN demonstrated no intentions of seeking a peaceful resolution to their issues it paved the way to the disarmament and

demobilization of the M-19 which evolved into a political party during the presidency of Virgilio Barco in the late 1980's and four other small groups during the presidency of Cesar Gaviria.<sup>80</sup> Although the ceasefire and the attempt by Betancur's administration to reach peace with the FARC were unsuccessful it did open a dialog with the insurgents.<sup>81</sup> This first significant attempt at a rapprochement by a Colombian government would be the stepping stone to subsequent accords and the demobilization of smaller guerrilla groups such as the *Ejército Popular de Liberación* (EPL), the *Partido de los Trabajadores* (PRT), the *Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame* (MAQL), the faction of the ELN know as the *Corriente Renovación Socialista* (CRS) and finally the M-19 who had suffered a significant blow following their attack on the Palace of Justice. Some, such as Fernando Chinchilla, who argued that although it was a failure, the peace process launched by Betancur not only created the conditions leading to the demobilization of the smaller guerrilla groups it also culminated with the adoption of a new constitution in 1991.<sup>82</sup> Betancur's successor, Virgilio Barco, recognized the La Uribe Accords and subsequently launched the Policy for normalization and rehabilitation (PNR) in September 1986 shortly after taking office.

---

<sup>80</sup> Rex A. Hudson and Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. *Colombia: A Country Study*. 5th ed. Vol. 550-26. Washington, D.C: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2010, 259

<sup>81</sup> Fernando A. Chinchilla, "Paix Soutenable. Rapports De Force Et Affaiblissement Des Extrémistes En Angola, En Colombie, Au Salvador Et Au Mozambique De 1989 à 1999." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2008, 31

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, 35



## CHAPTER 2 –NO END IN SIGHT

### INTRODUCTION

In this chapter it will be argued that the peace negotiation period analysed had the similar fate as the peace process initiated by Betancur and failed. As it occurred in the past, this peace process was initiated with unfavorable conditions for the government and contributed the prolonging of the conflict. It will be demonstrated that some lessons learned from the previous negotiation were applied but were not sufficient to guarantee its success and further contributed to its failure. Some elements that derived from this initiative were to create some of the conditions required for the favorable outcome of the peace initiative studied in chapter 3.

With the end of the Cold War came a considerable adjustment in global geopolitics. The political ideology influence quest of Western democracies and the Soviet Union was to be replaced by the hegemony of the United States. With this new international system, still being defined, Marxist and communist movements found themselves without influential international connections. This had a considerable effect on their ability to garner the support they needed to achieve their military and political objectives.<sup>83</sup>

The inability of the Soviet Union to finance its traditional allies created a shift throughout Latin America where guerrilla movements were either defeated, as in the case of Nicaragua, or peace settlements were reached, as with El Salvador and Guatemala. The absence of support also had effects in Colombia as the ELP and the M-19 laid down their

---

<sup>83</sup> Roy Licklider. *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End*. 1st ed. New York: New York University Press, 1993; 1995, 58

weapons after a negotiated peace, initiated while Virgilio Barco was in power, and concluded by the Cesar Gaviria administration. The return to civilian life by these guerrilla groups was seen as progress towards an end to violence by the Colombian political leaders. Reaching partial peace that did not include the most powerful guerrilla groups, such as the FARC and the ELN, was seen as ineffective by the general population.<sup>84</sup>

Unlike the smaller and less potent guerrilla groups the FARC started to secure its financial autonomy by entering the world of drug trafficking which gave it the means to be less dependent on external support from either Moscow or Havana. As detailed in Chapter 1 this also caused a rise in violence as drug lords launched a vicious turf war with the FARC through the establishment of paramilitary groups. The FARC's new business enterprise of drug trafficking also gained the attention of the United States as part of their war on drugs. By 1994 the US had contributed more than \$26 million (USD) to help the Colombian government eradicate illegal crops.<sup>85</sup>

In addition to the attention from the United States and their war on drugs the conditions in Colombia under which Andres Pastrana revived the peace process were far from ideal. A political scandal had brought the peace process initiated by Ernesto Samper to a sudden halt when the allegations that the Cali Cartel financed his presidential campaign were revealed to be true.<sup>86</sup> Pastrana subsequently initiated talks with the FARC leaders but excluded the ELN and the paramilitaries. Furthermore, the talks with the FARC were initiated without the establishment of a ceasefire. Much like Belisario

---

<sup>84</sup> Eric Lair, *La Colombie Entre Guerre Et Paix.* " *Politique Étrangère* 66, no. 1 (2001), 118

<sup>85</sup> Russell Crandall, *Driven by Drugs: U.S. Policy Toward Colombia.* Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, 1

<sup>86</sup> Cynthia J. Arnson, Arnson, ed. *Comparative peace processes in Latin America.* Stanford University Press, 1999, 4

Betancur, Andres Pastrana's attempt to find a peaceful resolution also started by making a considerable concession to the FARC, a controversial 42 000-square kilometer demilitarized zone<sup>87</sup> in Colombia's South-East to be known as *el despeje*.<sup>88</sup>

This chapter will demonstrate that the peace process under Andres Pastrana presidency was unsuccessful as the conditions for negotiations were not sufficiently favorable to guarantee a lasting negotiated peace agreement with the FARC. The factors that led to the failure of this peace initiative will be examined. To establish that this effort was a failure the chapter will be broken into three sections.

The first section will demonstrate that a military stalemate was not achieved as the FARC was in a stronger military position than the Colombian security forces. The second section will discuss the lack of ripeness in the conflict and the inability of President Pastrana's government to agree to a ceasefire with the guerrillas. The third section will reveal the negative impact of a biased third party intervention on this attempt to bring an end to violence in Colombia.

In further similarity to Betancur's peace initiative Pastrana launched his initiative while the security situation was nowhere near a military stalemate. As a consequence the FARC agreed to sit at the negotiation table only after a major concession by the government. While third party intervention was present and more significant than in the past peace efforts, it was tainted by the biased intervention of the United States. The peace process initiated by Andres Pastrana was ultimately unsuccessful. It did however, through the implementation of Plan Colombia, initiate a retooling of the Colombian

---

<sup>87</sup> The Colombian government cede control of a demilitarized to the FARC. The Colombian security forces were not authorized to enter the demilitarized zone, thus providing the FARC a safe haven in an area of the country it controlled and could plan their activities in safety.

<sup>88</sup> Eric Lair, *La Colombie Entre Guerre Et Paix.* " *Politique Étrangère* 66, no. 1 (2001), 119

security forces that enabled Pastrana's successor to negotiate the demobilisation of the right-wing paramilitary groups thus removing a violent actor from this long raging conflict. These positive gains were also to set some of the conditions present for the subsequent peace initiative to be studied in Chapter 3.

## **THE WAR ON DRUGS AND BEYOND**

The failed attempt by the FARC to bring their struggle into Colombia's political system resulted in an intensification of violence. The aggregate acts of violence by the increasingly powerful paramilitary organizations strengthened FARC's resolve to pursue their armed struggle towards the state.<sup>89</sup> Not only was the internal security continuing to deteriorate but Colombia was also becoming the main focus of the United States war on drugs. It was estimated that approximately 90 percent of the world's cocaine was produced on Colombia's territory.<sup>90</sup> Colombia was in dire straits.

As was discussed in Chapter 1, Betancur's controversial concessions benefited the FARC who were able to avoid a military stalemate. Despite this and ignoring his critics Pastrana pushed his "diplomacy for peace"<sup>91</sup> initiative with the FARC in an attempt to resolve the domestic conflict and make his nation more attractive to foreign investors. This section will examine how both the FARC and the government tried to avoid a military stalemate with the FARC using the demilitarized zone to maintain its position of power and the government implementing a strategy to increase the capabilities of its

---

<sup>89</sup> Chris Lee, "The FARC and the Colombian Left: Time for a Political Solution?" *Latin American Perspectives* 39, no. 1 (2012), 29

<sup>90</sup> Russell Crandall, *Driven by Drugs: U.S. Policy Toward Colombia*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, 2

<sup>91</sup> Stephan J. Randall, "The continuing pull of the polar star: Colombian foreign policy in the post-cold war era." In *Latin American Foreign Policies*, pp. 139-157. Palgrave Macmillan US, 2011, 146

security forces. Finally, this chapter will consider the impact of the military escalation that occurred throughout this peace initiative.

### Repeating the Mistakes of the Past

Many observers identified that Pastrana was taking a huge risk with the demilitarized zone which provided the FARC with the perfect opportunity to capitalize on this territorial concession with a recruitment campaign to increase the size and strength of its fighting force.<sup>92</sup> The creation of the demilitarized zone also called for the withdrawal of the Colombian military from the area. The FARC thus entered into what became known as the *Caguan process* in much the same position they enjoyed at the negotiation table with Betancur: in a favorable military position and with a considerable concession from the government.<sup>93</sup> By using this approach Pastrana was trying to achieve what William Zartman described as a “soft stalemate”<sup>94</sup>.

The demilitarized zone remained FARC controlled until the early months of 2002 when Pastrana broke off the peace talks and ordered the army to regain control of the area.<sup>95</sup> During that period, the FARC took full advantage of the absence of security forces and, through an aggressive recruiting campaign, increased its ranks from an estimated

---

<sup>92</sup> Breanne Hataway, "The FARC's Drug Trafficking as Political Crime: Determining the Success of Colombia's Peace Talks." *North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation* 41, no. 1 (2015), 168

<sup>93</sup> Matt Ince, Ince, Matt. "Defeating Colombia's Oldest Insurgency: Prospects for Peace and Reconciliation with the Farc." *RUSI Journal* 158, no. 1 (2013), 24

<sup>94</sup> William I. Zartman, *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995, 296

<sup>95</sup> Saab, Bilal Y. and Alexandra W. Taylor. "Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32, no. 6 (2009), 460

12,000<sup>96</sup> before the peace talks were initiated to approximately 20,000 fighters.<sup>97</sup> This benefited the FARC considerably as they escalated their acts of violence towards Colombian security forces and intensified their narco-trafficking activities. The offensive posture of the FARC, to gain a military advantage over the Colombian security forces, was interpreted by William Zartman as an attempt to avoid a “decisive stalemate”<sup>98</sup> and continue their armed struggle. In this instance, Pastrana failed to learn from the Betancur peace initiative and weakened his negotiating posture towards the FARC by making a concession, in this instance a portion of territory, in an attempt to reconfigure the Colombian conflict thus permitting them to gain substantial military strength.

### Peace Through Diplomacy

While it appears that Colombia felt the urgency to solve their internal conflict by any means necessary, the core issues that led to violence still needed to be addressed. Andres Pastrana assessed that the conditions were favorable for negotiations and he simultaneously launched *Plan Colombia* in December 1998. This ambitious initiative was aimed at addressing the numerous issues affecting his country through restoration of the rule of law, enhancement of the democratic institutions, consideration for displaced citizens affected by the internal conflict and eradication of illicit drug plantations.<sup>99</sup> Criticized from the start as being too broad-based, Pastrana’s peace agenda did not envision the further militarization of the conflict with the guerillas or the intensification

---

<sup>96</sup> Cynthia J. Arnson Arnson, C.J., Chicola, P., Delahunt, W.D., Egeland, J., Gilman, B.A., Hollis, C.C., Moreno, L.A., Ramírez-Ocampo, A. and Suárez, A.R., 2000. *The Peace Process in Colombia and US Policy* (No. 246). Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 4

<sup>97</sup> Matt Ince, "Filling the FARC-Shaped Void: Potential Insecurity in Post-Conflict Colombia." *The RUSI Journal* 158, no. 5 (2013), 27

<sup>98</sup> William I. Zartman, "The unfinished agenda: negotiating internal conflicts." *Stopping the killing: How civil wars end* (1993), 27

<sup>99</sup> Pierre Vayssiere, *Les revolutions d’Amerique latine*, Paris, Ed. du Seuil, 1991, 347

of work on the fumigation of illicit crops.<sup>100</sup> As it will be described in the third section of this chapter, the bulk of the United States financial assistance under Plan Colombia was directed to “help stabilize the Bogota government and prop up its floundering armed forces”<sup>101</sup>. This strengthening of the Colombia security forces was an attempt to give the Government the upper hand militarily and achieve at least a stalemate with the FARC.

When this new round of peace talks was initiated Colombia was viewed internationally as a weak state. It did not possess a monopoly on the use of force and it faced significant challenges in protecting its citizens from both guerrilla groups and the members of paramilitary organizations.<sup>102</sup> The increased involvement of the United States through the implementation of Plan Colombia strengthened the Colombian army and the other security forces and coloured their response to the armed actors of the internal conflict. The 2001 Andean Initiative, that also targeted neighboring Andean countries, aimed to provide additional aid for counter-narcotics activities as well as provide further resources and training to bolster the capabilities of the Colombian military in their fight against the FARC. All of these initiatives were primarily oriented towards providing Colombia with the military means to engage in a “decisive escalation”<sup>103</sup> with the FARC and the paramilitary units in the hopes of achieving a stalemate or dominant position.

---

<sup>100</sup> Stephan J. Randall, "The continuing pull of the polar star: Colombian foreign policy in the post-cold war era." In *Latin American Foreign Policies*, pp. 139-157. Palgrave Macmillan US, 2011, 147

<sup>101</sup> Breanne Hataway, "The FARC's Drug Trafficking as Political Crime: Determining the Success of Colombia's Peace Talks." *North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation* 41, no. 1 (2015), 168

<sup>102</sup> Catherine C. LeGrand, "The Colombian Crisis in Historical Perspective." *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Latino-Américaines Et Caraïbes* 28, no. 55/56 (2003), "ProQuest Dissertations Publishing", 1

<sup>103</sup> William I. Zartman, "The unfinished agenda: negotiating internal conflicts." *Stopping the killing: How civil wars end* (1993), 27

### The Paramilitaries and the FARC

Before Pastrana took office the paramilitaries had evolved from roaming squads to well organized armed bodies. They unified under a national umbrella in 1997 and were referred from that moment, as the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC).<sup>104</sup> The AUC benefited from the distracting effects of both the FARC's and the government's attempts to avoid reaching a military stalemate allowing them to expand their drug trafficking activities.

The AUC entered a commercial war with the FARC over the control of the primary resources for cocaine production and plantation sites that were situated outside of the demilitarized zone. This push from the AUC not only challenged the financial autonomy of the FARC but also their political power within the remote rural areas. Seeking protection, peasants and farmers were left without a choice, they had to pick a side.<sup>105</sup> In the absence of protection from the government citizens caught in the crossfire joined the ranks of the FARC in considerable numbers. The effects of this were to bolster the ranks of the FARC; help secure their financial autonomy, and avoid a stalemate with the government's security forces.

Yet again this round of peace talks took a similar turn to those talks undertaken by Belisario Betancur as all parties involved strove to avoid even the appearance of a stalemate. While the FARC were taking advantage of the security provided by the demilitarized zone to gain military strength and Andres Pastrana turned to the United States to help finance his ambitious Plan Colombia, the AUC got further involved in the

---

<sup>104</sup> Leslie Gill, "War and Peace in Colombia." *Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice* 52, no. 2 (2008), 135

<sup>105</sup> Pierre Vayssiere, *Les revolutions d'Amerique latine*, Paris, Ed. du Seuil, 1991, 348

<sup>105</sup> William I. Zartman, *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995, 345



drug trade and maintained their attacks on the FARC and other guerrilla groups further ensuring the conflict would not enter a stalemate. As well, the ferociousness of the violence that the AUC inflicted in the country side, killing and torturing civilians they claimed were guerrilla sympathizers, created more destabilizing fear and deterioration of public safety thus contributing to the failure of the peace process. The escalation in military capabilities and violence were demonstrative of the lack of ripeness in Colombia's political conflict.

### **STANDING BY THE EDGE**

After more than 30 years of fighting the economic pressures of the war might have suggested that the conditions favourable for a peace settlement were on the horizon. Despite the combat fatigue of both the guerrillas and the government security forces the atmosphere surrounding the 1998 peace initiative proposed by Andres Pastrana tended to say otherwise. Not only were both sides still taking aggressive measures to get the military edge, but the divisive positions on what needed to be negotiated to achieve a lasting peace agreement remained a considerable factor.<sup>106</sup> With both the FARC and the government posturing for a position of strength showed that neither were ready for peace. This illustration revealed how both parties were not at a point of ripeness to seriously engage in peace negotiations.

---

<sup>106</sup> Cynthia J. Arnson Arnson, C.J., Chicola, P., Delahunt, W.D., Egeland, J., Gilman, B.A., Hollis, C.C., Moreno, L.A., Ramírez-Ocampo, A. and Suárez, A.R., 2000. *The Peace Process in Colombia and US Policy* (No. 246). Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 5

### A Sign of Hope

In the early days of Andres Pastrana's presidency there were signs of maturity within the Colombian population. As Cathrine LeGrand suggested in her study of the history of the conflict, public opinion was supportive of this new peace initiative. Considering that previous administrations had reached peace agreements with the smaller guerrilla groups, the mood amongst the population seemed to support a negotiated settlement with the FARC. Colombian citizens were fatigued and impatient after over thirty years of violence and appeared supportive of the government's efforts to bring an end to violence. This could have been perceived as a sign of maturity from the population in general but LeGrand concluded that an attempt to negotiate peace without a ceasefire rapidly diminished the optimism they demonstrated in 1998 and the anger of the population grew.<sup>107</sup> By the start of 2002, the majority favored a strong offensive by the government forces against the FARC.<sup>108</sup> This demand showed that the citizens of Colombia believed the insurgency could be defeated and further demonstrated the lack of ripeness in the conflict. This further reinforced the perception from within the Pastrana administration that fighting the insurgency as purely a domestic issue although created a significant governance issues.

One of the key factors identified by Lawrence Bourdon as an essential element of any Colombian peace process was the need for a strong central state. The provision of the demilitarized zone to the FARC also created what he referred to as a "para-statal

---

<sup>107</sup> Catherine C. LeGrand, "The Colombian Crisis in Historical Perspective." *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Latino-Américaines Et Caraïbes* 28, no. 55/56 (2003), "ProQuest Dissertations Publishing", 1

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid*, 1

organisation”<sup>109</sup> as it gave the guerrillas political authority within that specific zone of the country. With the FARC strong and growing stronger, however, the government initiated the peace process with an enemy in a position of strength.<sup>110</sup> This demonstrated a clear lack of maturity in the conflict as the government did not understand the strength of their enemy. Far from being in a dominant position of power, it had ceded control of a significant portion of its territory to the FARC. According to Alfredo Rangel Suárez, a security advisor under the Gaviria administration, this combined with FARC’s refusal to accept a verifications commission within the demilitarized zone contributed to create frustration within the security forces and was identified as one of the key factors leading to the failure of the Pastrana peace talks.<sup>111</sup> The FARC’s refusal of the verifications commission also showed an unwillingness to fully commit to the peace process, demonstrating that they were not organizationally dedicated and lacked ripeness in the quest for peace.

### The Military and Their Old Ways

The military exhibited a similar attitude to what they displayed in past peace negotiations. As during the Betancur peace initiative, they demonstrated reluctance to accept and support the concession made by Pastrana to the FARC. Their frustration resided once again with their not being offered a central role in the negotiations. Several military leaders also resigned as a sign of protest in the first few months of the Pastrana

---

<sup>109</sup> Laurence Boudon, "Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 28, no. 2 (1996), 295

<sup>110</sup> Stephan J. Randall, "The continuing pull of the polar star: Colombian foreign policy in the post-cold war era." In *Latin American Foreign Policies*, pp. 139-157. Palgrave Macmillan US, 2011, 147

<sup>111</sup> Alfredo Rangel Suárez, "The Military and the Peace Process in Colombia." *The Peace Process in Colombia and US Policy* (No. 246). Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 50

peace talks.<sup>112</sup> This crisis displayed a lack of maturity within the military establishment. Nonetheless, the military was later praised for their positive impact on the ceasefire agreement that occurred over 1999/2000 Christmas holiday season that showed to the FARC that Pastrana and his administration were taking serious measure to favor the peace talks.<sup>113</sup> These contradictory actions by the military indicated that favorable negotiation conditions for a peaceful resolution of the Colombian protracted conflict had yet to reach that required ripe moment.<sup>114</sup> Additionally, the allegations towards the military, which was accused of supporting the AUC and their activities,<sup>115</sup> demonstrated a lack of ripeness towards the achievement of a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

The tactics employed by the Colombian security forces contributed to enhance the lack of trust of the guerrillas and eventually contributed to the termination of the peace process. As they were during the mid-1980's, the Colombian military and police were again accused of committing human rights abuses in the line of duty.<sup>116</sup> While they were on the decline, human rights abuses by the Colombian security forces were still attracting unfavourable attention from the international community and tarnishing the image of the government also seen as weakened and losing legitimacy over its territory.<sup>117</sup> This was principally due to the evidence tying the security forces to the AUC which was being accused of committing the majority of atrocities committed against the civilian

---

<sup>112</sup> Ibid, 49

<sup>113</sup> Ana Y. Ayala, "Sustainable Peace in Colombia: Case Study of the Pastrana and Uribe Administrations." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2012, 41

<sup>114</sup> William I. Zartman, "The unfinished agenda: negotiating internal conflicts." *Stopping the killing: How civil wars end* (1993), 27

<sup>115</sup> June S. Beittel, June S. Buitel, "Peace Talks in Colombia." *Current Politics and Economics of South and Central America* 6, no. 2 (2013), 190

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, 191

<sup>117</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, *Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground*. New York: Random House, 2005, 51

population.<sup>118</sup> These ties between the army and the AUC highlighted by the allegations of human rights abuses were demonstrations of the Colombian security forces lack of maturity toward the peace process and contributed to the failure. These allegations contributed to the reinforcement of the FARC's attitude and perhaps strengthened their perceived lack of faith in the government officials desire to end the violence. Once again, as seen during the Betancur peace initiative, the army's lack of ripeness undermined the government's efforts to negotiations and demonstrated a lack of unity that contributed to the failure of the peace process.

#### Committed to What Extent

The FARC typically displayed a mixed attitude towards the peace process. A certain degree of ripeness was demonstrated early as they were open to talk peace with Pastana.<sup>119</sup> This ripeness dissipated once it was proven they were using the protection offered by the demilitarized zone to launch attacks on government security forces, to maintain their drug trafficking activities, and, more importantly, to expand their ranks.<sup>120</sup> Furthermore, the FARC military activities included the hijacking of an Aires airline flight and the kidnapping of Senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem Turbay during the same event.<sup>121</sup> These activities, aimed at terrorizing the population, were reported by the press as a lack

---

<sup>118</sup> Caryn C. Hollis, "U.S. Department of Defence." *The Peace Process in Colombia and US Policy* (No. 246). Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 41

<sup>119</sup> Nazih Richani, "Third Parties, War Systems' Inertia, and Conflict Termination: The Doomed Peace Process in Colombia, 1998-2002." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 25, no. 2 (2005), 80

<sup>120</sup> Ana Y. Ayala, "Sustainable Peace in Colombia: Case Study of the Pastrana and Uribe Administrations." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2012, 42

<sup>121</sup> June S. Buitel, "Peace Talks in Colombia." *Current Politics and Economics of South and Central America* 6, no. 2 (2013), 183

of seriousness by the FARC towards a peaceful resolution to the conflict.<sup>122</sup> A similar action of provocation was undertaken by the ELN a few years later when they hijacked an Avianca Colombian Airline flight.<sup>123</sup> The ELN, who had voiced an interest in initiating peace talks with the Pastrana administration, demonstrated that they too had not reached a level of maturity favorable to ending their armed struggle. For both the ELN and the FARC, kidnappings became a source of revenue and a way to target high profile Colombian figures. These activities added to their long list of human rights abuses and they were heavily criticized by the international community.

On 23 Feb 2002, two days after the FARC hijacked the Aires flight, they kidnapped Ingrid Betancourt, a candidate for the succession to Andres Pastrana and an outspoken critic of the FARC.<sup>124</sup> After benefiting from a considerable concession from the government and several periodic ceasefires, the FARC's actions did not suggest that they were striving to achieve peace or that the guerrilla organization was ripe for a cessation of hostilities. Similar to many of the actions of the government, the activities of the FARC demonstrated a lack of ripeness throughout this peace initiative.

The lack of maturity in the Colombian conflict partially resided in the limited political reform achieved over the years. The militarily incapacitated M-19 and ELP who were convinced over the years to negotiate peace that eventually lead to their disarmament and demobilization.<sup>125</sup> However, the government and FARC's declining

---

<sup>122</sup> Juan Fernando, New York Time, *Colombian Rebels Hijack a Plane and Kidnap a Senator*, last accessed 02 February 2017

<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/21/world/colombian-rebels-hijack-a-plane-and-kidnap-a-senator.html>,

<sup>123</sup> Terror on flight 9463, The Guardian, last accessed 05 February 2017  
<https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/1999/apr/28/features11.g23>

<sup>124</sup> Colombian Rebels Kidnap Politicians, BBC News, last accessed 06 February 2017,  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1838455.stm>

<sup>125</sup> Laurence Boudon, "Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 28, no. 2 (1996), 295

efforts to demonstrate ripeness through their actions maintaining the state of war led to the failure of this peace process.

Andres Pastrana ended the dialogue in early 2002 as he was no longer able to maintain the interest of the FARC in the process. Nor was he able to establish a consistent dialogue with the ELN or the AUC. Unlike the previous attempts though, the failure of these peace negotiations was influenced by third-party involvement, a factor seen by the FARC as very unwelcome.<sup>126</sup> Through the implementation of Plan Colombia, the United States funded initiatives that they believed could enable political and social reform aimed at strengthening Colombia's government and bringing an end to the internal turmoil. By pushing this plan forward the issue of the military stalemate was addressed but it failed to mitigate the immaturity the government and the FARC displayed when sitting at the negotiation table. External assistance was required to bring the negotiations to the next level and keep the discussions alive.

## **RELIABLE PARTNERS**

While Andres Pastrana campaigned on the promise of initiating a new dialogue with the FARC the genesis of the peace talks revival in Colombia was not solely prompted by politicians. In this case, third party influence convinced the government to reach out to the FARC and the ELN. This marked a significant evolution from previous peace processes where third party involvement typically supported a party over another. Contrary to talks during the Betancur period, the Pastrana peace talks saw the

---

<sup>126</sup> Ana Y. Ayala, "Sustainable Peace in Colombia: Case Study of the Pastrana and Uribe Administrations." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2012, 42

involvement of both neutral and biased actors.<sup>127</sup> The last section of this chapter will focus on the involvement of the United Nations and the United States in this failed peace process by demonstrating that the impact of biased interventions was a negative factor that led to the termination of the negotiations.

### Learning From the Past

The pressure brought by the American government to escalate efforts in support of the war on drugs was first felt in Colombia during the Cesar Gaviria era with the hunt for the notorious Pablo Escobar. The United State's focus on the war on drugs occurred at the same time as FARC's escalation of violence that strengthened their power and influence throughout the country. As these events were taking place the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) supported a Colombian network of influential figures<sup>128</sup> that included local United Nations officials. This working group initiated discussions with the FARC and presidential candidates as early as 1997. One of the leading topics of their agenda was to initiate discussions with Colombian and United States officials to seek how to help the FARC break out of political isolation.<sup>129</sup>

The FARC and the recently elected Pastrana administration together to initiate a dialogue early in their mandate. Some observers such as Nazih Richani noted that the FARC and the government were not fully committed to peace for domestic purposes but rather for external factors such as responding to regional and international pressure and to

---

<sup>127</sup> Nazih Richani, "Third Parties, War Systems' Inertia, and Conflict Termination: The Doomed Peace Process in Colombia, 1998-2002." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 25, no. 2 (2005), 79

<sup>128</sup> This working group included figures such former Conservative Minister Alvaro Leyva, UNDP consultant James Lemoyne, Journalist Maria Elvira Bonilla and a Costa Rican lawyer, Jorge Urbina. Richani,80

<sup>129</sup> Nazih Richani, "Third Parties, War Systems' Inertia, and Conflict Termination: The Doomed Peace Process in Colombia, 1998-2002." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 25, no. 2 (2005), 79



improve the political-military situation they faced.<sup>130</sup> At the same time both parties were trying to avoid a military stalemate that demonstrated they had not reached a level of ripeness favorable to a peace dialogue. For these reasons the attempt for peace failed but the involvement of a neutral third party demonstrated it could play a role in bringing opposing parties to the negotiation table, an evolution compared to the Betancur initiative. Although neither party had demonstrated that they were ready for peace the UNDP showed it could *jump-start* peace negotiations. Unfortunately, it was not in a position to mediate the divergent agenda items of the opposing parties who demonstrated mixed interests and got further entrenched in the war system that prevailed in Colombia.<sup>131</sup>

Alongside the UN-led initiative, but prior to reaching out to the United States for help, Colombia had initially turned to its immediate neighbours and European countries early in 2001 to seek support for this latest peace effort.<sup>132</sup> In his attempt at seeking regional support Pastrana originally reached out to Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez. Castro preferred to take a “back-seat” approach in the procedures this time as opposed to his traditional position of supporting the FARC. Chavez, who got elected a year into Pastrana’s term, indicated he would provide assistance if called upon in an attempt to reduce the influence of the United States in the region.<sup>133</sup> As Venezuela was going through its own political crisis, Colombian officials sought out a more stable partner.<sup>134</sup>

---

<sup>130</sup> Ibid, 81

<sup>131</sup> Ibid, 83

<sup>132</sup> Stephan J. Randall, “The continuing pull of the polar star: Colombian foreign policy in the post-Cold War era” in *Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism*. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 147

<sup>133</sup> Judith Gentleman, Dante B. Fascell North-South Center (Fla.), and Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute. *The Regional Security Crisis in the Andes: Patterns of State Response* 200, 16

<sup>134</sup> June S. Buitel, "Peace Talks in Colombia." *Current Politics and Economics of South and Central America* 6, no. 2 (2013), 194

With the government and the FARC demonstrating little interest in pursuing the dialogue, and the former insisting that all discussions occur inside the demilitarized zone demonstrating a lack of confidence towards the government.<sup>135</sup> The security situation in Colombia was becoming increasingly difficult. This was to lead Colombia to look further North for support. The ties with the United States rapidly dominated the government's efforts to find a solution to the conflict. The relationship between the Pastrana and Clinton administrations supported work aimed at finding ways to support Plan Colombia but failed to seek how it could involve the United States in supporting the peace dialogue.

### The Quest for Territorial Sovereignty

The United State's increased interest in Colombia occurred in the early 1990's with the US pressing the Colombian authorities to increase their counter-narcotics operations.<sup>136</sup> When Plan Colombia was unveiled, however, it brought the country's struggle to the international stage.<sup>137</sup> It also unleashed a wave of criticism from the international community and created frictions with some members of the Andean community as Plan Colombia was seen by these stakeholders as focusing too much on military assistance raising fears of a further militarization of the conflict.<sup>138</sup> The American involvement contributed to the FARC's entrenchment as they pursued ways to ensure their survivability in the event of kinetic equipment and hardware to enhance their

---

<sup>135</sup> Ana Y. Ayala "Sustainable Peace in Colombia: Case Study of the Pastrana and Uribe Administrations. "ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2012, 42

<sup>136</sup> Francisco Leal Buitrago, "Armed actors in the Colombian conflict" in *Armed Actors: Organised Violence and State Failure in Latin America*. 1st ed. New York; London: Zed Books, 2004; 2008, 95

<sup>137</sup> Stephan J. Randall, "The continuing pull of the polar star: Colombian foreign policy in the post-Cold War era" in *Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism*. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 140

<sup>138</sup> Julia E. Sweig, Julia E. Sweig, *What Kind of War for Colombia?*, Foreign Affairs 2002, September/October (2002), 124

command and control and intelligence gathering capabilities the plan initiated a new wave of militarization of the conflict.<sup>139</sup> The intentions of the United State's funding was to help Colombia re-establish its legitimacy to govern with the ultimate aim of resolving its domestic situation.<sup>140</sup> Some observers perceived this new position of the United States as a demonstration of their opposition to Pastrana's concessions to the FARC.<sup>141</sup> As such, the American involvement was widely perceived as biased and focused on their national security interests.

Events that occurred on the international scene also had a significant impact on the evolution of the Colombian conflict. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9-11), created a significant shift in Andres Pastrana's successor's approach towards the FARC and other belligerents in Colombia as, shortly after those events, the remaining Colombian guerrilla movements were added to the list of terrorist organizations.<sup>142</sup> Although the focus of the George W. Bush administration then was the war on terror oriented towards fighting the Taliban, their pledge to support the Colombian through Plan Colombia remained steadfast. The listing of Colombia's guerillas as terrorists, however, muddied the waters.

In contrast to the Betancur period, third party involvement played a much greater role in the Pastrana peace process. Neutral intervention by UNDP with the contribution of a limited group of the Colombian elites helped to kick-start the talk and bring the

---

<sup>139</sup> Harold A. Trinkunas, "Rivalry, Trade, and Restraint on the Colombia-Venezuela Border" in *American Crossings: Border Politics in the Western Hemisphere*. Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015, 120

<sup>140</sup> Julia E. Sweig, Julia E. Sweig, *What Kind of War for Colombia?*, Foreign Affairs 2002, September/October (2002), 124

<sup>141</sup> Nazih Richani, "Third Parties, War Systems' Inertia, and Conflict Termination: The Doomed Peace Process in Colombia, 1998-2002." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 25, no. 2 (2005), 85

<sup>142</sup> Stephan J. Randall, "The continuing pull of the polar star: Colombian foreign policy in the post-Cold War era" in *Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism*. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 149

government and the FARC to the negotiation table. On the other hand, the bias intervention of the United States was perceived as favoring the Colombian government through their financing of Plan Colombia. While the third party intervention had demonstrable impacts they were limited and not sufficient to maintain the dialogue in the face of the lack of ripeness across the full spectrum of Colombian participants.

## CONCLUSION

This attempt at peace in Colombia failed because both sides were, as William Zartman described it, on a “life cycle that imposed their own dynamics in competition, as it were, with the requirement of negotiation”<sup>143</sup> The seeds of this second significant peace process with the FARC were planted as Andres Pastrana was still on the presidential campaign trail. Although the initial indications were at first promising negotiations came to a halt after the FARC’s *coup d’éclats* kidnapping of two high-profile politicians. This peace process lasted for the majority of Pastrana’s mandate but failed to bring the ELN and the paramilitaries, now unified under the AUC umbrella, to the negotiation table. As it was the case for the Betancur peace initiative, Pastrana walked into peace negotiations with a false perception of stakeholder readiness and facing a lack of unity between his administration and the army. The FARC leveraged this situation to gain concessions and escalated the intensity of the conflict leading to the termination of the peace talks.

The primary contributor to the failure of this peace process was that the FARC, benefitting from a generous demilitarized zone, remained a military force to be reckoned with. As the peace talks were coming to a close, the FARC’s involvement in drug

---

<sup>143</sup> William I. Zartman, *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995, 4

trafficking increased significantly and became closely associated with its military struggle. This amplified their ability to pursue their political objectives through a campaign of violence that included kidnappings of Colombian prominent citizens. Their desire to gain further military strength was intimately tied to the “increase in power of the paramilitary organizations and the massive U.S. military aid”<sup>144</sup> to the Colombian security forces through Plan Colombia. The key actors in the conflict were taking measures to avoid a military stalemate and they remained committed to defeating their opponent on the battlefield.

Faced with a combat-fatigued population Andres Pastrana was under the impression that making a significant concession to the FARC would enable his government and the FARC to establish the grounds to achieve a lasting peace. Unfortunately, it was to be a direct cause of failure to the peace process. As did Betancur, Pastrana quickly realized that the military was reluctant to support significant concessions to the guerrillas and they demonstrated a lack of ripeness through their actions. As no ceasefire was reached prior to initiating the talks the FARC was once again negotiating in a position of force. The FARC remained on the offensive throughout the process showing that the organization was not mature and ready for peace. The lack of ripeness demonstrated by key stakeholders was a direct cause of the failure of this peace process. The links between the military and the AUC further clouded the process and attracted criticism from the international community. The events of 9-11 created a shift on how the Colombian conflict was perceived by the international community, as the guerrilla groups received the label of terrorist organizations.

---

<sup>144</sup> Chris Lee, "The FARC and the Colombian Left: Time for a Political Solution?" *Latin American Perspectives* 39, no. 1 (2012), 30

Third party involvement played a dual role during this peace process and also contributed to its failure. For the first part, the intervention of a neutral party, by the means of the UNDP brought the FARC and the government to the negotiation table and offered hope that the parties could find common grounds. On the other hand, the biased intervention of the United States, aimed at strengthening the Colombian government ability to fight against the FARC, increased the militarization of the conflict. The international community and the Andean countries criticized Plan Colombia as they judged it too heavily oriented towards military assistance and not focused sufficiently on re-establishing the democratic institutions of Colombia thus enabling them to overcome their social and economic challenges. Third party intervention was not sufficient to motivate the FARC and the government to achieve peace and the process was terminated by Pastrana in early 2002.

The financial aid provided by the United States significantly benefitted the Colombian security forces and enabled them to shift to the offensive in the early days of Andres Pastrana's successor. In opposition from his predecessors, he campaigned on an agenda to weaken both the guerrillas and the AUC. Those efforts continued for more than a decade until the peace process instigated by Juan Manuel Santos, when the FARC finally agreed take a more serious approach to negotiations and finally agreed to disarm.

## CHAPTER 3 –THE MOMENT OF TRUTH

### INTRODUCTION

In this chapter it will be argued that the peace negotiation period studied here was considered successful. Unlike its predecessors, this new peace process was initiated with evidence of favorable conditions from the very beginning that enabled a political resolution of the conflict. It will also be demonstrated that lessons learned from the previous negotiations were applied here in order to strengthen the conditions required for a successful and lasting negotiated peace.

Over the last two decades the tactics employed by the guerrilla movements in the use of kidnapping and extortion denied them the support they used to enjoy from the rural population. Their growing immersion in the cultivation and trade of illicit drugs attracted the attention of the United States as that country intensified their war on drugs just before the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Most importantly, the FARC's participation in these illegal activities and their hesitancy to engage in a decisive political dialogue brought into question the credibility of guerrilla movements as they had wandered from their initial purpose.<sup>145</sup>

Since the mid-1960's the FARC operations had gone through a series of evolutions that sought to incapacitate the authority of the government, principally in the rural areas, and ended-up reaching the surroundings of the capital city of Bogota. They were able to achieve this through a combination of both guerrilla and conventional military tactics targeting not only the military but also political and economic targets affecting the civilian population along the way. After going through a readjustment of

---

<sup>145</sup> Norman Offstein, An Historical review and analysis of Colombian Guerilla Movements: FARC, ELN and ELP, 100

their tactics after the end of the Cold War and the increased punitive pressure resulting from the War on Drugs, the FARC faced yet another challenge when the United States embarked on the War on Terror. Labeled as terrorists in the aftermath of the tragic events of 9-11 the FARC found themselves facing a significantly different opponent, as the Colombian security forces had gone through a considerable transformation. Leveraging the assistance of the United States through the implementation of Plan Colombia the Colombian police and the military received counter-insurgency training and new equipment to position them to achieve at least a stalemate in their fight against the FARC.

This new favorable military posture facilitated the implementation of the Democratic Security Doctrine (Defence Policy and Democratic Security) implemented by Andres Pastrana's successor, Alvaro Uribe Velez. Upon taking office in 2002 he established an *all-out* war against the guerillas.<sup>146</sup> This was in stark contrast to the approach of his predecessor who attracted voters with a campaign of peace. For his part Uribe wanted to put an end to the conflict by defeating the FARC militarily. With the adoption of an offensive posture he then moved to attack the legitimacy of FARC. With the substantial financial and military assistance provided by the United States, through the implementation of Plan Colombia, Uribe was well positioned to implement his new policy.

Through his two terms Alvaro Uribe was able to maintain the pressure on the FARC and eliminated some key figures. The killing of the organization's second in command, Raoul Reyes, in 2008 is an example of his "success.". By shifting to the offensive, Colombian security forces inflicted considerable losses on the FARC. Even

---

<sup>146</sup> Nazih Richani, *Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia*. 2nd ed. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2013, 201



with these losses some observers, such as Jim Rochlin, indicated that the series of defeats suffered by the FARC between 2002 and 2010 affected the organization but they still possessed the means to maintain their struggle.<sup>147</sup>

Among other successes realized following the implementation of Democratic Security Doctrine was a peace deal with the AUC. This was reached in 2003 after the enactment of the controversial Justice and Peace Law that offered combatants conditional amnesty. The demobilization of AUC members ended in 2006.<sup>148</sup> A significant contributor to the violence in Colombia had thus been removed from the chessboard. It was under these circumstances that Juan Manuel Santos, a former Defence Minister under Alvaro Uribe during his second term, took office in 2010. Elected on a promise to maintain the security policies of his predecessor he implied during his inauguration speech that peace talks with the FARC were a consideration for his administration.<sup>149</sup> Although he adopted some of the policies of his predecessor it was under his reform agenda, labelled as “Democratic Prosperity,”<sup>150</sup> that he initiated secret talks with the FARC to set the appropriate framework prior to engaging in formal peace talks. This certainly differed from predecessor's approach. The framework the Santos administration and the FARC agreed upon was comprised of six themes: 1. Integrated agricultural development policy; 2. Political participation; 3. End of conflict; 4. Solution to the

---

<sup>147</sup> Jim Rochlin, *Plan Colombia: the demise of the FARC*, 737

<sup>148</sup> June S. Beittel, "Peace Talks in Colombia." *Current Politics and Economics of South and Central America* 6, no. 2 (2013), 10

<sup>149</sup> Text of inaugural speech given on August 7, 2010 by Juan Santos, last consulted 21 February 2017, [http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2010/Agosto/Paginas/20100807\\_27.aspx](http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2010/Agosto/Paginas/20100807_27.aspx)

<sup>150</sup> Text of inaugural speech given on August 7, 2010 by Juan Santos, last consulted 21 February 2017, [http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2010/Agosto/Paginas/20100807\\_27.aspx](http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2010/Agosto/Paginas/20100807_27.aspx)

problem of illicit drugs; 5. victims, and 6. implementation, verification and ratification.<sup>151</sup>

With the secret talks Santos had ensured that both parties agreed on the way ahead before making the announcement public. The prospect for an achievable peace was now on the horizon.

This chapter will demonstrate that the peace process initiated under the Santos administration enjoyed the required conditions to ensure that a lasting negotiated peace agreement could be ratified with the FARC. More precisely, the factors leading to the success of this peace initiative will be discussed in detail. This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section will demonstrate that a military stalemate had been achieved as none of the parties involved were in a position to defeat their opponent by military means. The second section will discuss how the favorable political environment and the evolution of the conflict created “ripeness” evidenced in the interactions between the FARC and the government. For the first two sections the position of the government and the FARC in relation to the two previous attempts will be analyzed demonstrating why they enabled the chances of success of the ongoing peace process. The third section will expose the positive effects created by the implication of unbiased involvement by a third party to aid in facilitating the dialog. Notwithstanding the fact that the peace process initiated by Santos still has a long road ahead before a lasting peace is confirmed, the conditions established since 2012 give a sign of hope that the protracted conflict in Colombia, involving the oldest guerrilla movement in Latin America, can be solved through a political solution. Finally, both sides recognize the benefits of a negotiated peace.

---

<sup>151</sup> International Crisis Group, Colombia: Peace at Last?, Latin America Report, Number 45, September 25, 2012, 34

## ENDGAME

Through the implementation of the Democratic Security Doctrine by Alvaro Uribe Colombian security forces were of sufficient strength to inflict serious losses on the FARC.<sup>152</sup> Not only did the government forces regain control over some of the communities within the demilitarized zone but, perhaps more importantly, they were able to eliminate some of the FARC's most senior and influential leaders.<sup>153</sup> The increased pressure brought to bear by the Colombian army required the FARC to rethink its military strategy and they began avoiding direct military confrontations. Essentially FARC was forced to revert to its initial *modus operandi* of employing only guerrilla tactics.<sup>154</sup> The internal security situation Juan Manuel Santos inherited was due to the success of *Plan Patriota* that he implemented while he was Alvaro Uribe's Defence Minister during Uribe's first term.<sup>155</sup> This section will determine why this peace initiative possess the potential to be successful. It will identify the factors that led to a military stalemate that made both the government and the FARC want to pursue a negotiated peace as a favorable way to end the conflict.

### Entering Into a Deadlock

Although critics on the international scene were alarmed by the large number of displaced Colombian citizens and the increase in accusations of human rights abuses the internal security improved significantly in Colombia in the years leading to Santos's

---

<sup>152</sup> Nazih Richani, *Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia*. 2nd ed. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2013, 201

<sup>153</sup> See *supra* p.43 and *infra* p.49

<sup>154</sup> David Kilcullen, and Greg Mills. "Colombia: A Political Economy of War to an Inclusive Peace." *Prism: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations* 5, no. 3 (2015): 111

<sup>155</sup> June S. Beittel, "Peace Talks in Colombia." *Current Politics and Economics of South and Central America* 6, no. 2 (2013), 5

election.<sup>156</sup> Elected on the promise to maintain pressure on the FARC by implementing an aggressive security policy, the Santos administration was able to inflict considerable losses to the guerrilla organization with the first few months of taking office. Victor Julio Suarez, also known as Mono Jojoy, was eliminated in September 2010 after a successful raid. Approximately a year later the Colombian military eliminated Alfonso Cano who had succeeded Manuel Marulanda, the FARC's original founder, after he succumbed to a heart attack in 2008. This was a considerable military setback for the FARC and their senior leadership was significantly affected by the loss of these key figures. The Colombian government and the military were heading towards a stalemate with the FARC by demonstrating that they could fight them effectively but not decisively.

A succession of military victories demonstrated that government forces were gaining ground on the FARC. These victories created the conditions that were to lead to a military stalemate putting the opposing forces in a position where achieving a complete destruction of the opponent became very difficult if not impossible to achieve. This was in contrast to the "fluctuating stalemate" Colombia had witnessed over the past decades.<sup>157</sup> Faced with increasingly powerful government forces, the new FARC Commander in Chief, Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri, referred to as Timochenko, started to release hostages to the government in order to facilitate initiation of the political dialogue.<sup>158</sup> For the first time in the conflict, FARC senior leaders demonstrated the organization was struggling to overcome the Colombian military and revealed the first

---

<sup>156</sup> Victoria Bruce, Karin Hayes, and Jorge Enrique Botero. *Hostage Nation: Colombia's Guerrilla Army and the Failed War on Drugs*. Knopf, 2010, 234

<sup>157</sup> Nazih Richani, "Third Parties, War Systems' Inertia, and Conflict Termination: The Doomed Peace Process in Colombia, 1998-2002." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 25, no. 2 (2005), 97

<sup>158</sup> June S. Beittel, "Peace Talks in Colombia." *Current Politics and Economics of South and Central America* 6, no. 2 (2013), 6

signs of a stalemate. The FARC's leadership may have realized that achieving their aims through violence was an objective they could no longer achieve. The gains by the Colombian military were a major factor that pushed the FARC leadership to consider a political solution and an end to their armed struggle. Unlike his predecessors, Santos and his administration were able to capitalize on the presence of this military stalemate and push hard for a negotiated peace.

### Losing Ground

In early 2012 government forces were estimating the FARC's strength to be as low as 8,000 soldiers<sup>159</sup>, less than half of the estimated 20,000<sup>160</sup> under arms ten years earlier. On the other hand, the Colombian security forces had doubled their strength to approximately 450,000 troops.<sup>161</sup> This coupled with the void left after the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of the AUC after peace negotiations with the Uribe administration resulted in the FARC being able to expand their influence into remote areas of the country. In order to financially sustain their armed struggle<sup>162</sup> they became increasingly active in illicit activities such as illegal mining, cattle rustling and extortion. Forced to avoid direct confrontations with government forces they focused on guerrilla tactics and the sabotage of critical infrastructure such the electricity distribution systems. They also impacted Colombia's economic prosperity with attacks on oil

---

<sup>159</sup> June S. Beittel, "Peace Talks in Colombia." *Current Politics and Economics of South and Central America* 6, no. 2 (2013), 6

<sup>160</sup> Find reference from chapter 2

<sup>161</sup> Nazih Richani, *Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia*. 2nd ed. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2013, 206

<sup>162</sup> See *Supra* p.42+3

pipelines.<sup>163</sup> Despite seeing its military strength diminished after a persistent and effective offensive by government security forces, the FARC still had the means and the will to disrupt the government and have an impact on security in Colombia. Outside of the conflict both sides were demonstrating openness and willingness to engage seriously in finding a negotiated settlement. This appeared to indicate that they might have entered into what William Zartman described as a “hurting stalemate.”<sup>164</sup> It was also around this time that total war stopped being a viable option for both parties.

Leading figures of previous peace attempts, such as Belisario Betancur, believed the FARC and their security forces had entered the “hurting stalemate” stage of their conflict. The examination of the previous peace process highlighter there had not been any military stalemate. The Santos administration’s peace initiative remains the first time the Colombian security forces were seen as being in a stronger military position than the FARC therefore putting the government in a favorable negotiating position.<sup>165</sup> The FARC, however, had demonstrated through its history that it was able to quickly adjust to new circumstances and regain the military upper-hand.<sup>166</sup> None the less, for the first time in more than fifty years, Colombian government officials realized that a military defeat alone would not end the conflict and the FARC realized that an armed struggle alone could enable them to survive but not achieve their key objective of social justice for the less fortunate. The “Democratic Prosperity” and the institutional reforms<sup>167</sup> were also

---

<sup>163</sup> June S. Beittel, "Peace Talks in Colombia." *Current Politics and Economics of South and Central America* 6, no. 2 (2013), 6

<sup>164</sup> William I. Zartman, *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995, 296

<sup>165</sup> International Crisis Group, Colombia: Peace at Last?, Latin America Report, Number 45, September 25, 2012, 2

<sup>166</sup> Kyle Johnson, Michael Jonsson. "Colombia: Ending the Forever War?." *Survival* 55, no. 1 (2013), 73

<sup>167</sup> *Infra* p.53

aimed at addressing the FARC core requests that were given little considerations in previous peace negotiations studied.

Another actor of violence in Colombia also came to the realization that military victory was no longer a viable means of achieving their objectives. On February 8, 2017, it was announced in Quito, Ecuador that the Colombian government and the ELN had begun formal peace negotiations.<sup>168</sup> The entry of the ELN in a separate peace process was a telling demonstration that a “hurting stalemate” prevailed in Colombia. Moreover, the Colombian security forces were potentially now in a position to assert the government’s credibility throughout the country and regain the confidence of its rural citizens.

The entrance of the ELN in a peace process created the prospect of a power void in remote areas of the county that could benefit organized crime. As both the FARC and ELN were involved in illegal activities, the conditions were emerging wherein criminal organizations, *bandas criminales*<sup>169</sup> referred to as BACRIMs, could take advantage of the situation created by a departure of guerilla forces.<sup>170</sup> According to Matt Ince BACRIMs would represent a “source of insecurity for Colombia.”<sup>171</sup> The severity of this new threat remained to be seen and it was unclear as to how it could affect the military stalemate or the demobilization of the guerrillas.

After more than a decade of financial and military assistance from the United States the Colombian security forces were able to fight the FARC and the ELN on a more even footing. Ten plus years of aggressive counter-insurgency operations had helped

---

<sup>168</sup> Colombia: Peace talks with ELN rebel group begin, Last consulted 5 March 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-38902638>

<sup>169</sup> This how Colombian organized crime organizations have been labelled regardless of size or illicit activities they are involved in.

<sup>170</sup> Ince, Matt. "Filling the FARC-shaped void: Potential insecurity in post-conflict Colombia." *The RUSI Journal* 158, no. 5 (2013), 29

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid*, 29

level the playing field and pushed the key participants into finding means other than war to achieve their objectives. The conditions present in 2012 suggest that the Colombian conflict had achieved a favorable level of maturity and the conditions for peace had finally been established after years of fighting and a number of unsuccessful attempts at reaching peace. At last the painful lessons of the past would be leveraged to end this protracted conflict.

## **WHY FIGHT**

When Santos implemented his Democratic Prosperity policy, he not only initiated a policy shift his administration also recognized the existence of the Colombian internal conflict. This became even more apparent when the Colombian Congress ratified the Law of Victims in 2011 and Land Restitution in 2012. With the implementation of these two laws Santos acknowledged the legitimacy of some of the priorities identified by the FARC in previous negotiation attempts.<sup>172</sup> Without making any concessions to the FARC and by implementing meaningful legislation that addressed some of the core issues of the conflict as the secret talks were ongoing the Colombian government demonstrated admirable maturity.

A constitutional amendment in 2005 created a significant evolution in Colombian politics allowing presidents to hold office for two successive presidential terms.<sup>173</sup> This development in the Colombian political system showed emerging maturity within the elite of the country and enabled continuity in this latest round of negotiations. Alvaro

---

<sup>172</sup> Bill Rolston, Sofia Ospina, "Picturing Peace: Murals and Memory in Colombia." *Race & Class* 58, no. 3 (2017), 26

<sup>173</sup> Carey, John M. "The reelection debate in Latin America." *Latin American Politics and Society* 45, no. 1 (2003): 119-133, 81



Uribe was the first to profit from this change in Colombia enabling him to maintain the pressure he applied on the FARC since taking office. Like Uribe, Santos was elected for a second term and thus was given the opportunity to continue to pursue his peace agenda and keep the negotiations alive. The Santos administration's initiatives to consolidate the security gains of the last decade and continue with social reforms extended the legitimacy of the central government in the remote areas of the country. This evolution of the Colombian political systems is another demonstration of the ripeness that enabled continuity in the government's initiatives and prevented an interruption in the peace talks due to a transition in government.

In contrast to the peace processes studied in the previous chapters, Santo's peace initiative put greater emphasis on the integration of the guerrillas into the country's political process.<sup>174</sup> Setting the conditions to favor and facilitate the FARC's participation in politics enabled the Colombian government to remove a factor that legitimized the guerrillas armed struggle. Over the previous two decades the FARC had drifted away from its original purpose when they entered into narco-trafficking activities and leveraged the government concessions in previous peace attempts to strengthen themselves militarily.<sup>175</sup> Since 2012 FARC has demonstrated that it has reached a greater level of maturity than it had in the past by maintaining a ceasefire even if the government forces maintained the offensive. It also demonstrated maturity with its willingness to work with the Santos administration in finding a way to integrate itself in Colombian

---

<sup>174</sup> Norman Offstein, An Historical review and analysis of Colombian Guerilla Movements: FARC, ELN and ELP, 109

<sup>175</sup> Kilcullen, David and Greg Mills. "Colombia: A Political Economy of War to an Inclusive Peace." *Prism: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations* 5, no. 3 (2015), 111

politics.<sup>176</sup> In stark contrast to previous peace efforts the FARC agreed to sit at the negotiating table despite not having the initiative or having publicly agreed in advance to the discussion topics. This was strong evidence of ripeness within their organization's leadership.

The agenda items proposed by the government were however, discussed during secret negotiations to ensure both parties would be amenable to the focus of discussions. The need to develop a specific peace agenda was a major lesson learned from the previous peace attempts.<sup>177</sup> Aware that a very limited time was available to bring the process to a successful conclusion Santos and his administration did not want to waste their efforts on adjusting the negotiation's agenda. The fact that both parties agreed on the agenda items to be discussed prior to launching the formal process can be viewed as a sign of ripeness in the conflict as they mutually demonstrated a positive attitude towards attaining peace. They had actually begun to work together.

#### Survival by Other Means Than Armed Struggle

Interestingly, the FARC agreed to participate in the peace talks without requesting any initial concessions from the government. Contrary to the Betancur and Pastrana initiatives that were initiated after the promulgation of a general Amnesty Law and the establishment of demilitarized zone respectively, the FARC made no such claims when Santos reached out to float the idea of secret talks. By sitting at the negotiating table for

---

<sup>176</sup> Kyle Johnson, Michael Jonsson. "Colombia: Ending the Forever War?." *Survival* 55, no. 1 (2013), 68

<sup>177</sup> Olga L. González, "Colombie : Les Dialogues De Paix De La Dernière Chance ?" *Mouvements* n 76, no. 4 (2013), 85

the peace talks without trying to destabilize a level playing field FARC demonstrated that it had reached a level of ripeness favorable to the conduct of peace negotiations.

An event demonstrating the level of maturity now present with the FARC leadership and their willingness to put an end to their armed struggle occurred at the height of the secret talks. Alfonso Cano, the FARC commander-in-chief was eliminated on November 4, 2011. Despite this the FARC maintained their participation at the preliminary talks without engaging in any acts of retribution.<sup>178</sup> The willingness of the guerrillas to keep the negotiations alive amid a significant loss in their leadership was a demonstration of the degree of ripeness that the conflict had reached.

Another noteworthy difference in this new peace initiative was the FARC's willingness to engage in the peace process outside of the country, something they had steadfastly refused to consider during the Betancur and Pastrana peace talks. As Santos and his secret talks in Cuba were gaining momentum, the FARC senior leaders agreed to several rounds of discussions with the government negotiators that were hosted in Cuba and Norway. The willingness of the FARC to abandon a previously key negotiation requirement suggests both organizational maturity and seriousness in their intent. This attitude allowed for the development of a viable negotiation framework that was to set the stage for the talks that occurred in Oslo.<sup>179</sup> The fact that both parties agreed on the topics that were to be discussed during formal negotiations demonstrates the ripeness not only of both organizations but also of the conflict itself.

---

<sup>178</sup> Andrei Gomez-Suarez and Jonathan Newman. "Safeguarding Political Guarantees in the Colombian Peace Process: Have Santos and FARC Learnt the Lessons from the Past?" *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 5 (2013), 819

<sup>179</sup> International Crisis Group, Colombia: Peace at Last?, Latin America Report, Number 45, September 25, 2012, 34

### Some Remaining Hurdles

Although significant progress has been made not all Colombians are supporting the Santos peace initiative. The military, for example, has shown little enthusiasm in the proceedings for fear of seeing their budgets shrink once a peace deal is signed and the FARC have completed the DDR process.<sup>180</sup> The concerns of the military could be premature due the unknown impact of the void that will likely be created once the DDR of the guerrillas is completed. Truces between the FARC and ELN have also been reported as a contributing factor to the reduction of violence in the country.<sup>181</sup> This end to a long-standing guerrilla rivalry can be seen as a sign of maturity and one of the stepping stones to a lasting peace. Nonetheless, the attitude of the military has not changed and it will remain of importance throughout the proceedings and beyond.

The land reforms pushed by the Santos administration have also brought criticism from rich landowners and cattle ranchers who perceive that their livelihood will be affected by a signed peace agreement.<sup>182</sup> This perception demonstrated a lack of maturity towards the unknown once the DDR process is progressing. After an initial peace accord was ratified in Havana on September, 24, 2016 the former president led the plebiscite “No” campaign that led to the rejection of the accord by the Colombian population on October 2<sup>nd</sup> of the same year.<sup>183</sup> The rejection of the accord was by a thin margin of 50.2% against and 49.8% supporting the accord but with only 27% participation from

---

<sup>180</sup> Olga L. González, "Colombie : Les Dialogues De Paix De La Dernière Chance ?" *Mouvements* n 76, no. 4 (2013), 85

<sup>181</sup> June S. Beittel, "Peace Talks in Colombia." *Current Politics and Economics of South and Central America* 6, no. 2 (2013), 10

<sup>182</sup> Rettberg, Angelika. "Peace is better business, and business makes better peace: The role of the private sector in Colombian peace processes." (2013), 14

<sup>183</sup> Brodzinsky, Sibylla. "Colombia's Second Chance for Peace." *The World Today* 72, no. 6 (2016), 1.

eligible voters.<sup>184</sup> These results can be perceived as a lack of maturity that remains towards the uncertainty of peace. This does not undermine the considerable efforts from both parties as they strove to negotiate new terms for a peace deal. All these significant progresses achieved since the election of Juan Manuel Santos were reinforced by members of the international community who took a supporting role in helping the government and the FARC in taking the steps towards finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

### **WHEN FRIENDS HELP**

Different to the circumstances encountered in the peace processes analysed in the previous chapters the peace initiative undertaken by Juan Manuel Santos benefited from greater cooperation and assistance from the international community. While usually considered as being beneficial to the process third party interventions do not guarantee a successful conclusion to a peace process. As described by Patrick Regan, “we know surprisingly little about the conditions under which, and the types of interventions that are most likely to be successful.”<sup>185</sup> Notwithstanding, Santos still pursued support from the international community as he began his exploratory talks in 2010. Since then it was observed that third party involvement played an essential role during the exploratory phase.<sup>186</sup> As was the case in the Pastrana peace talks the Santos initiative benefited from two different types of third party involvement: Official roles by the means of guarantors

---

<sup>184</sup> Colombia’s FARC rebels – 5- years of conflict, last consulted 02 March 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36606568>

<sup>185</sup> Patrick R. Regan, "Conditions of successful third-party intervention in intrastate conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 2 (1996), 337

<sup>186</sup> Vicenç Fisas Armengol, "The principles of mediation and the role of third parties in peace processes." *Norwegian peacebuilding resource center. Report* (2013), 3

and accompaniers and indirect international organization involvement by the United Nations. As stipulated in Article 9 of the Havana Accord no third party is either appointed as an official mediator nor has any level of authority over the negotiations.<sup>187</sup> By securing third party intervention through the guarantors and accompaniers Santos ensured a balanced approach to his peace process and showed that he had learned from previous efforts by avoiding biased interventions.<sup>188</sup>

### Guarantors and Accompaniers

Early in Santos' quest to secure third party involvement in his exploratory talks Cuba and Norway pledged their support in the dialog process.<sup>189</sup> Those two nations were identified as the guarantors but with no specific roles as was detailed in article 9 of the Havana Accord.<sup>190</sup> Breanne Hataway identifies the initial secrecy of the talks as a potential explanation for this lack of precision and it engendered some confusion as to what role these two nations would play.<sup>191</sup> Historically the purpose of the guarantors is to ensure that both parties adhere to the agreed terms and help reduce the tensions between

---

<sup>187</sup> Acuerdo General para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera (Havana Accord), last consulted 02 March 2017, <http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/AcuerdoTerminacionConflicto.pdf>

<sup>188</sup> Canan Gündüz, and Kristian Herbolzheimer. "Standing united for peace: The EU in coordinated third-party support to peace processes." *Initiative for Peacebuilding, IfP Mediation Cluster, International Alert and Conciliation Resources, Brussels, December* (2010), 24

<sup>189</sup> Vicenç Fisas Armengol "The principles of mediation and the role of third parties in peace processes." *Norwegian peacebuilding resource center. Report* (2013), 3

<sup>190</sup> Colombia's Farc rebels - 50 years of conflict, Last consulted 02 March 2017, <http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/AcuerdoTerminacionConflicto.pdf>

<sup>191</sup> Breanne Hataway, "The FARC's Drug Trafficking as Political Crime: Determining the Success of Colombia's Peace Talks." *North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation* 41, no. 1 (2015), 179

opposing parties.<sup>192</sup> These two nations played a significant role in ensuring the safe passage of FARC mediators when they traveled to Cuba and Norway.<sup>193</sup>

After both parties had agreed on the six points framework of the negotiations, the peace talks moved from Havana to Oslo with all parties agreeing that discussions should proceed quickly in order to maintain momentum.<sup>194</sup> One of the key obstacles that remained was the FARC's deep distrust of the government's representatives. Because of this they were reluctant to make concessions in order to reach a settlement, the FARC initially requested that both Norwegian and Cuban representatives be given a limited role in the first stages of negotiations thus limiting their influence. This decision by the FARC surprised some observers as they benefited from international actors, such as the European Union, during the Pastrana peace talks as they supported some FARC agenda themes such as municipal electoral reform.<sup>195</sup> Nonetheless Cuba and Norway have been praised as being key contributor to the success of the early proceedings.<sup>196</sup> Even if they seemed reluctant at first, the FARC accepted the presence of the guarantor nations and maintained their presence at the negotiation table as Norway and Cuba offered an unbiased support contrary to the United States involvement during the Pastrana peace initiative.

---

<sup>192</sup> Vicenç Fisas Armengol "The principles of mediation and the role of third parties in peace processes." *Norwegian peacebuilding resource center. Report* (2013), 7

<sup>193</sup> Breanne Hataway, "The FARC's Drug Trafficking as Political Crime: Determining the Success of Colombia's Peace Talks." *North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation* 41, no. 1 (2015), 180

<sup>194</sup> Kyle Johnson, Michael Jonsson. "Colombia: Ending the Forever War?." *Survival* 55, no. 1 (2013), 74

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid*, 75

<sup>196</sup> Michael Jonsson, Elliot Brennan, and Christopher O'Hara. "Financing War or Facilitating Peace? The Impact of Rebel Drug Trafficking on Peace Negotiations in Colombia and Myanmar." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 39, no. 6 (2016), 551

As the peace talks evolved the two guarantors proved to be beneficial to both the FARC and the Colombian government. Observers such as Kristian Herbolzheimer noted that over the actual negotiation period Cuba and Norway were able to offer “logistics, capacity-building, trust-building and problem-solving during crises in the peace negotiations.”<sup>197</sup> Such observations demonstrate the importance of third party involvement in keeping both parties at the table. The involvement of the Guarantors is supported by other regional partners.

The other official role played by a third party is the one of accompanier nation. Venezuela and Chile were attributed such roles. For the former, this consists of a significant evolution due to the multiple and recurring tensions with Colombia that affected their relationship over the previous decade. Accused of being a FARC supporter by the United States and by Alvaro Uribe,<sup>198</sup> Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez was a key facilitator in convincing the FARC to take part in the secret talks held in early 2010.<sup>199</sup> Chile was selected for this role due to their solid reputation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in Latin America and for their continued involvement in international assistance.<sup>200</sup> Chile was also partly chosen in order to ensure a balance in regional political biases, notably buffering those of Cuba and Venezuela. Both parties agreed on the presence of a UN mission in Colombia with contributions from the

---

<sup>197</sup> Kristian Herbolzheimer, "Innovations in the Colombian peace process." *NOREF: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre* (2016), 8

<sup>198</sup> Harold A. Trinkunas, “Rivalry, Trade, and Restraint on the Colombia-Venezuela Border” in *American Crossings: Border Politics in the Western Hemisphere*. Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015, 118

<sup>199</sup> June S. Beittel, "Peace Talks in Colombia." *Current Politics and Economics of South and Central America* 6, no. 2 (2013), 6

<sup>200</sup> Breanne Hataway, "The FARC's Drug Trafficking as Political Crime: Determining the Success of Colombia's Peace Talks." *North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation* 41, no. 1 (2015), 182



Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) countries.<sup>201</sup> This agreement constituted a positive sign that the peace process was progressing well and both parties understood that a political solution to the conflict was at the horizon.

### Indirect Involvement

Although the Colombian government and FARC agreed to the presence of a potential UN peacekeeping mission on Colombian soil, the UN is not sitting at the negotiating table in Havana. The input of the international organization is made through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who at times provide assistance in facilitating the negotiations.<sup>202</sup> Similar to their actions during the Pastrana peace initiative the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was active in the early stages of the dialog enabling the Colombian people's voice to be heard at the negotiating table. It did so by sending reports to the negotiation teams after conducting forums in several communities.<sup>203</sup> This enabled the government and FARC negotiation teams to better understand the population's perspective of the peace process.<sup>204</sup> The presence of the UNDP is a positive sign as they bring consistency and raise awareness of the concerns of Colombia's citizens.

The re-election of Santos for a second-term enabled his administration to continue the negotiations with the FARC. Despite slow progress Santos did not request the

---

<sup>201</sup> Kristian Herbolzheimer, "Innovations in the Colombian peace process." *NOREF: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre* (2016), 8

<sup>202</sup> Breanne Hataway, "The FARC's Drug Trafficking as Political Crime: Determining the Success of Colombia's Peace Talks." *North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation* 41, no. 1 (2015), 182

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid*, 183

<sup>204</sup> COMUNICADO CONJUNTO. LA HABANA, 21 DE MARZO 2013  
last consulted 28 February 2017, <https://perma.cc/SR7J-BYYG>

involvement of the United States in the peace process until early February 2015.<sup>205</sup> Until that specific request the assistance of the Americans was centered on counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency initiatives that favoured the Colombian security forces in their fight against the FARC. The appointment of an American special envoy did not have a significant impact during the negotiations and the peace process maintained its air of independence. The ability to avoid biased intervention was a significant improvement from the previous peace efforts. Unlike the external influences of the Betancur and Pastrana peace initiatives, Santos benefited from guarantors and accompaniers nations steered clear to influence the course of the negotiations and limited their interventions to facilitate the continuation of the dialog. This avoided to taint the course of the negotiations and it enabled both parties to maintain a greater level of trust.

Throughout this latest round of peace negotiations, president Juan Manuel Santos showed that he had learned from previous peace initiatives and leveraged their hard-earned lessons. Early in the process he engaged in secret negotiations on neutral territory and agreed with the FARC on agenda items before making it public that official negotiations would be taking place. He sought the support of guarantors and accompaniers nations beneficial to the relationship and confidence building required to keep both parties at the negotiation table when they faced potential road blocks. He supported the involvement of NGOs under the umbrella of the UNDP who ensured that the people's voice was heard throughout the peace process.

---

<sup>205</sup> What Does the New U.S. Special Envoy Mean for Colombia's Peace Process?, last consulted 15 March 2017, <https://www.wola.org/analysis/what-does-the-new-us-special-envoy-mean-for-colombias-peace-process/>

## CONCLUSION

The security conditions present in Colombia when Juan Manuel Santos got elected were the result of a long sequence of events initiated during previous failed peace negotiation. The implementation of Plan Colombia and the adoption of an offensive posture towards the FARC by Alvaro Uribe degraded the fighting capacity of the guerrillas from dominant to stalemate in less than ten years. This resulted in the demobilization of the AUC and removed a potent agent of violence from the conflict. Benefiting from the military stalemate, the ripeness of the conflict, and the unbiased support of third parties, the Santos peace initiative has now been ongoing for nearly five years. It has demonstrated the potential to culminate in the signing of a lasting peace agreement followed by a successful DDR of the remaining guerrilla groups.

Years of fighting and the financial burden brought by the economics of war pushed both the government and the FARC to realize that achieving a decisive military victory no longer was a feasible objective. By entering a “hurting stalemate” stage the conditions created favorable circumstances for the parties to negotiate. Ending the conflict by other means than war was now the most logical and desirable outcome. The stalemate was the catalyst for the Santos administration and the FARC’s senior leadership to talk peace on a level playing field. The recent involvement of the ELN in peace talks further reinforces the stalemate in the Colombian conflict. It remains to be seen if and how the BACRIMs will exploit this void.

When the Colombian government ratified the Law of Victims and Land Restitution the Santos administration demonstrated ripeness by addressing and legislating relief to two key issues that fueled the FARC’s armed struggle. The government showed

it was ready to take serious steps towards bringing an end to the conflict. As opposed to previous peace negotiation periods the FARC made no significant demands that required humiliating concessions from the government. Here the FARC demonstrated a level of maturity that they had not previously displayed and they entered the peace talks with no significant advantage over the government that would enable them to rearm and recruit and go back on the offensive. Although the agreement received criticism and encountered several roadblocks, the plebiscite of October 2016 being particularly noteworthy in this regard, both parties stayed at the negotiating table and worked at refining the initial accord. Also, unlike previous peace attempts, this one received beneficial and unbiased support from the international community.

From its inception, the peace process initiated by Juan Manuel Santos benefited from the participation of third parties. The supporting nations were not only in a position to facilitate the dialog, their presence helped to keep both parties at the negotiating table in difficult moments. Lessons learned from the past were applied and both parties strove to ensure that third parties remained unbiased partners throughout the entire process. Additional support from international organizations through the UNDP enabled NGOs to bring visibility to the general population's concerns during negotiations and ensured their views were heard. Although at times criticized due to the absence of direct involvement of a great power, the process maintained its independence with the government and the FARC leveraging the presence of the Guarantors and Accompaniers nations to ensure progress in the negotiations. As demonstrated through the study of three Colombian peace processes the Santos peace initiative possessed from the start the required factors

that could lead to a lasting peace agreement. Colombia, South America and the entire world now stand to benefit from this Herculean effort.

## PEACE AT LAST

After more than 50 years of fighting that scarred multiple generations and affected the very social fibre of the country Colombia could finally be on the edge of reaching a lasting peace agreement with the oldest and strongest guerrilla movement in Latin America. If the latest peace negotiations are to reach such a status after a long and bumpy road paved with the efforts of multiple presidents, the death, displacement and substantial financial expenditures, it will be a relief for the entire country. As the conflict evolved over the years, the Colombian population suffered multiple ups and downs and the prospect of peace seemed nothing but an illusion.

Belisario Betancur initiated an ambitious peace process with the FARC in 1982 based on the incorrect assumption that the conflict had reached a military stalemate. Andres Pastrana, for his part, initiated a peace process with the FARC while they possessed a military advantage over the country's security forces. Both presidents initiated peace negotiations from a position of weakness and pursued their peace initiatives following electoral promises. Juan Manuel Santos launched his peace talks with the FARC after the latter had faced considerable military defeats to the Colombian military and lost several key leaders within a year after a series of fruitful military operations. Contrary to Betancur and Pastrana, Santos inherited a security situation that had entered a "hurting stalemate" and the government was negotiating from a position of strength. Although the FARC demonstrated on more than one occasion they had the capabilities and the means to quickly turn their situation around the Colombian security forces were in much better shape than before as they now had the personnel and equipment to effectively fight the FARC. They were able to chase the FARC out of

several regions and restore the legitimacy of the government. The recent initiation of peace talks between the government and the ELN strongly indicate the presence of a stalemate in the conflict. It remains to be seen if and how the BACRIM's are able to exploit the vacuum that will be created if both the FARC and ELN sign a lasting peace agreement that includes a full DDR of its members. As the false assumptions of military stalemates of the past were direct causes of the peace process failures studied in chapters 1 and 2, the "hurting stalemate" in Colombia demonstrated in chapter 3 should prove to be one of the key factors leading to the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

The level of ripeness present in the conflict when Santos reached out secretly to the FARC was also significantly different than in the past. The simple fact that the peace process was initiated without the government making significant concessions to the FARC is worthy of note. Betancur initiated his peace initiative with an Amnesty Law that did not call for the disarmament of demobilized guerrillas and Pastrana ceded a portion of territory about the size of Switzerland within which the FARC had complete freedom of movement. The FARC subsequently leveraged these opportunities to get stronger militarily and politically in the rural areas. On the other hand, Santos and his administration addressed some of the core demands of the FARC that they believed justified their armed struggle when the Colombian Congress approved the Law of Victims and Land Restitution. These legislations did not directly benefit the FARC but rather the rural population showing that the conflict had entered a new level maturity. The FARC initiating a ceasefire during the Santos peace initiative and not retaliating after the elimination of Mono Joy and Alfonso Cano in the last stages of the secret talks was another indication of the ripeness of the guerillas. The rejection of the initial Havana

peace accord during the October 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2016 Plebiscite delivered the government a mixed message from the Colombian population towards the outcome of the process.

The interference from some and lack of interest from other members of the international community were two factors that led to the failure of the peace talks initiated by Betancur and Pastrana. This was possibly because Betancur was trying to achieve peace during the Cold War as the East and Western blocks were fighting an ideological war while Pastrana was trying to accomplish the same as the United States were distracted by their War on Drugs and the initial stages of the War on Terror. Despite this the financial contributions of the United States improved the security conditions in Colombia which proved helpful in the latest efforts. There was, however, no direct assistance at the negotiating table. Andres Pastrana benefited from the involvement of the UNDP and some notable Colombian citizens but his peace initiative remained tainted by the biased intervention of the United States, notably through their involvement in the implementation of Plan Colombia. Learning from his predecessors, Santos reached out to the international community and sought, at the inception of his secret talks with the FARC, the support of helpful third parties. When the official announcement that his administration was to enter peace negotiations with the FARC was made it was also announced that the peace process was to be supported by Guarantors and Accompaniers nations. With the support of international and regional partners Santos and the FARC maintained negotiations even when hurdles were encountered during the talks. The Betancur and Pastrana peace initiatives that lasted approximately three years before failing. The Santos official peace process has been ongoing for close to five years with an Accord being reached in Havana on September 24, 2016. While it remains yet to be fully



implemented awaiting the completion of the DDR of the FARC members, it remains a first true agreement between the two parties and offers signs of hope for the citizens of Colombia that a lasting peace agreement has finally arrived.

Although the road to a complete DDR process with the FARC will be a lengthy and complex process the latest peace process did, from the beginning, possess the following factors: a military stalemate from which both parties came to the conclusion that a military victory over its opponent was not achievable; a level of ripeness that had yet to be witnessed in the conflict with both parties taking measures to remain at the negotiation table to agree on the terms of a negotiated peace; and finally, the participation of third parties to broker the talks and help the government forces and the FARC built trust and confidence on the long road to sustained peace. History has demonstrated that the security situation in Colombia can deteriorate quickly but the factors currently present give hope and could set the stage to reach similar peace agreements with the ELN. This could enable the Colombian security forces to focus on the BACRIMS and reduce the impact of the power vacuum left by the removal of the rebels. The steps towards the end of the protracted Colombian conflict have been undertaken and time will tell if the factors studied will be the proof of a solid and lasting peace agreement in this particular case.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bullet Proof; Colombia's Peace Process. *The Economist*, May 30, 2015, 2015. 35.
- Colombia Peace Process*. Lanham, United States, Lanham: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc., 2016.
- Colombia Peace Process*. Lanham: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc, 2016.
- "Colombia: FARC-EP Give their Reasons for Demanding Resignations of Officials." *BBC Monitoring Americas - Political*, 2002.
- "Colombia's Peace Process." *The Economist* (1999): 6.
- Colombia's Remarkable Peace Process*. New York: New York Times Company, 2016.
- "Colombie - Referendum Sur La Paix En Colombie: Santos Convaincu De La Victoire Du «oui." *Rfi*, 2016, French.
- La Colombie Et Les FARC: Encore Un Effort*. Vol. 41: Rogers Publishing Ltd, 2016.
- DEFMIN and Retired General Expound on Military's Needs in Fight Against Subversion*, 1988.
- ENGEL on Colombia Peace Process*. Lanham: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc, 2015.
- Engel Remarks at Hearing on Colombia Peace Process*. Lanham: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc, 2015.
- "M. Santos : " Tout Processus De Paix a Ses Ennemis ": Pour Le Président Colombien, l'Exigence De Justice Ne Peut Pas Bloquer Un Accord Avec La Guérilla Des FARC." *Le Monde*, 2014.
- "Not Looking Good; Colombia's Peace Process." *The Economist* 362, no. 8259 (2002).
- "On the Brink; Colombia; Sustaining Colombia's Peace Process." *The Economist* 358, no. 8206 (2001): 3.
- Resurrecting Colombia's Peace Deal*. New York: New York Times Company, 2016.
- Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)*, 2012.
- "Saving Colombia's Peace; Latin America." *The Economist* 421, no. 9010 (2016): 14.

*Statement by National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice on Progress in Colombia's Peace Process.* Lanham: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc, 2016.

*Statement by White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest on the Colombia Peace Process.* Lanham: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc, 2015.

"Still Breathing; Colombia's Peace Process." *The Economist* 361, no. 8243 (2001).

"Truth, Justice and Forgiveness? Colombia's Peace Process." *The Economist* 371, no. 8371 (2004): 36.

"Venezuela Hosts Colombia Peace Talks." *Jane's Country Risk Daily Report* 14, no. 174 (2007).

"War for Ever." *The Economist* 309, no. 7581 (1988): 42.

Achankeng I, Fonkem. "'Mutual Hurting Stalemates', 'Ripe Moments' and Third-Party Intervention: Implications for the 'Southern Cameroons' Restoration of Statehood' Conflict." *The Round Table* 101, no. 1 (2012): 53-69.

Acuerdo General para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera (Havana Accord), last consulted 02 March 2017, <http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/AcuerdoTerminacionConflicto.pdf>

Alther, Gretchen. "Colombian Peace Communities: The Role of NGOs in Supporting Resistance to Violence and Oppression." *Development in Practice* 16, no. 3-4 (2006): 278-291.

Andrew Webb-Vidal, recently in Monteria,north Colombia. "FT.Com Site : Colombia's Peace Talks Near Collapse." *FT.Com* (2005): 1.

Arjona, Ana. "Institutions, Civilian Resistance, and Wartime Social Order: A Process-driven Natural Experiment in the Colombian Civil War." *Latin American Politics and Society* 58, no. 3 (2016): 99-122.

Arnson, Cynthia. *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America* Stanford University Press, 1999.

Arnson, Cynthia J., Phillip Chicola, William D. Delahunt, Jan Egeland, Benjamin A. Gilman, Caryn C. Hollis, Luis Alberto Moreno, Augusto Ramírez-Ocampo, and Alfredo Rangel Suárez. *The Peace Process in Colombia and US Policy* Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2000.

Arnson, Cynthia. *In the Wake of War: Democratization and Internal Armed Conflict in Latin America.* Stanford, Calif; Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012.

- Ayala, Ana Y. "Sustainable Peace in Colombia: Case Study of the Pastrana and Uribe Administrations." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2012.
- Bartoli, Andrea. "Getting it done: Postagreement Negotiation and International Regimes" edited by Bertram I. Spector and I. William Zartman." *Political Science Quarterly* 120, no. 1 (2005): 147-148.
- Beittel, June S. "Peace Talks in Colombia." *Current Politics and Economics of South and Central America* 6, no. 2 (2013): 179.
- Boudon, Lawrence. "Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 28, no. 2 (1996): 279-297.
- Bouvier, Virginia Marie. *Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War*. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2009.
- Breazeale, N. Brooke. "Transforming Colombia's Conflict: A Case for Re-Prioritizing U.S.-Colombia's Militaristic Approach." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2010.
- Brockett, Charles D. "El Salvador -- from Madness to Hope by Belisario Betancur, Reinaldo Figueredo Planchart and Thomas Buergenthal / El Salvador's Decade of Terror by Americas Watch Committee / Archbishop Romero Ten Years on by Julian Filochowski / and Others." *Latin American Research Review* 29, no. 3 (1994): 174-174.
- Brodzinsky, Sibylla. "Colombia's Second Chance for Peace." *The World Today* 72, no. 6 (2016): 1.
- . "Voices: Colombia's Path to Peace." *World Policy Journal* 30, no. 2 (2013): 101.
- Bruce, Victoria, Karin Hayes, and Jorge Enrique Botero. *Hostage Nation: Colombia's Guerrilla Army and the Failed War on Drugs*. Knopf, 2010.
- Buchenau, Jurgen, Rodney Longley, and Thomas M. Leonard. *Encyclopedia of United States-Latin American Relations, Volume 3, Volume 3* CQ Press, 2012.
- Busacca, Justin. "Justice and Reconciliation in Uribe's Colombia: An Opportunity for Peace." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2009.
- Bushnell, David. "Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War/Showing Teeth to the Dragons: State Building by Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Vélez, 2002-2006." *Latin American Politics and Society* 52, no. 4 (2010): 150-153.
- Bustamante-Reyes, Juliana. "Colombia's Path to Peace." *New Zealand International Review* 42, no. 1 (2017): 14-17.

- Carey, John M. "The Reelection Debate in Latin America." *Latin American Politics and Society* 45, no. 1 (2003): 119-133.
- Celis, Leila. "Les Mouvements Sociaux dans ee Contexte de Conflits Armés Causes et Effets de la Défense des Droits Humains (1980–2012)." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2013.
- Chesterman, Simon, Michael Ignatieff, Ramesh Chandra Thakur, United Nations University, and International Peace Academy. *Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005.
- Chinchilla, Fernando A. "Paix Soutenable. Rapports De Force Et Affaiblissement Des Extrémistes En Angola, En Colombie, Au Salvador Et Au Mozambique De 1989 à 1999." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2008.
- Colombia's FARC rebels – 5- years of conflict, last consulted 02 March 2017  
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36606568>
- Colombia: Peace talks with ELN rebel group begin, Last consulted 5 March 2017,  
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-38902638>
- Colombian Rebels Kidnap Politicians, BBC News, last accessed 06 February 2017,  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1838455.stm>
- COMUNICADO CONJUNTO. LA HABANA, 21 DE MARZO 2013, last consulted 28 February 2017, <https://perma.cc/SR7J-BYYG>
- Congressional Research Service. *Colombia's 2014 Elections: Referendum on the Peace Process CRS Report*, 2014.
- Crandall, Russell. *Driven by Drugs: U.S. Policy Toward Colombia*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.
- Cuadros, José Dario Rodriguez. "Le Processus De Paix En Colombie." *Études* no. 11 (2014): 21-32.
- Cueter, Nicolas. "Caught between the War on Drugs and Guerrilla Warfare: Colombia's Road to Peace." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2015.
- Dominguez, Agustin E. "After the Negotiations: How Reconstruction Teams can Build a Stronger Peace in Colombia." *Prism : A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations* 5, no. 4 (2015): 88.
- Donot, Morgan. "Serrano, Yeny. 2012. Nommer Le Conflit Armés Et Ses Acteurs En Colombie. Communication Ou Information Médiatique ? (Paris : L'Harmattan)." *Argumentation Et Analyse Du Discours* no. 10 (2013).

- Dubuis, Étienne. "La Colombie s'Offre Un Accord De Paix Aussi Fragile Que Controversé: AMÉRIQUE LATINE - Les Redoutables Forces Armées Révolutionnaires De Colombie Ont Accepté De Rendre Les Armes Au Terme De Quatre Années De Négociations. Mais Le Gouvernement De Bogota Est Accusé De Lui Avoir Fait Trop De Concessions." *Le Temps*, 2016.
- Dudley, Steven S. *Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia*. New York: Routledge, 2004.
- Dufort, Philippe. "Droit International, Relations Sociales De Propriété Et Processus De Paix En Colombie : Une Réarticulation Politico-Juridique." *Études Internationales* 39, no. 1 (2008): 105-123.
- Echandía Castilla, Camilo. "Colombie : Évolution Du Conflit Armé à Partir De l'Analyse De La Territorialité Et Des Stratégies Des FARC (1990-2011)." *Problèmes d'Amérique Latine* N 83, no. 1 (2012): 101-116.
- Elman, Miriam Fendius. *Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer?*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1997.
- Erika Tatiana Ayala García, Rubén Darío Rodríguez Angarita, and Eduardo Gabriel Osorio Sánchez. "Architecture and Art as Tools to Build and Strengthen the Post-Agreement of Peace in Colombia." *DEARQ: Journal of Architecture* no. 18 (2016): 46-55.
- Forsythe, David P. "United States Policy Toward Enemy Detainees in the "War on Terrorism"." *Human Rights Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (May 2006, 2006): 465-491,554.
- Garcia, Ricardo Rocha. "Drug trafficking and its impact on Colombia: an economic overview." *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 28, no. 55-56 (2003): 277-304.
- Gaudin, Andres. *Colombia's Peace Process Makes Significant Headway: Latin American Data Base/Latin American Institute*, 2013.
- . *. . Rebels, Government Maneuver to Keep Colombia Peace Talks on Track: Latin American Data Base/Latin American Institute*, 2016.
- . *. . Sides in Colombia Peace Talks Agree to Form Truth Commission: Latin American Data Base/Latin American Institute*, 2015.
- Gauhar, Altaf and Belisario Betancur. "President Belisario Betancur." *Third World Quarterly* 5, no. 4 (1983): 765-769.

- Gentleman, Judith, Dante B. Fascell North-South Center (Fla.), and Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute. *The Regional Security Crisis in the Andes: Patterns of State Response* 2001.
- Gill, Lesley. "War and Peace in Colombia." *Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice* 52, no. 2 (2008): 131-150.
- Gomez-Suarez, Andrei and Jonathan Newman. "Safeguarding Political Guarantees in the Colombian Peace Process: Have Santos and FARC Learnt the Lessons from the Past?" *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 5 (2013): 819-837.
- González, Olga L. "Colombie: Les Dialogues De Paix De La Dernière Chance ?" *Mouvements* n 76, no. 4 (2013): 78-89.
- Gugliotta, Guy. "The Guerrilla Tamer: What Duarte can Learn from Betancur." *The New Republic* 192, no. 6 (1985): 8.
- Gündüz, Canan and Kristian Herbolzheimer. "Standing United for Peace: The EU in Coordinated Third-Party Support to Peace Processes." *Initiative for Peacebuilding, IfP Mediation Cluster, International Alert and Conciliation Resources, Brussels, December* (2010).
- Gutierrez, David. "The Coming of Los Buendia: Colombia's Peace Process and the Difficulty that Lies Ahead." *Harvard International Review* 37, no. 3 (2016): 4.
- Gutman, Roy, David Rieff, and Anthony Gary Dworkin. *Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know*. Rev. and expand ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2007.
- Harding, Colin. *Colombia: New Beginning: Gabriel Garcia Márquez and Others Face Brutal Government Repression*. Vol. 11. London, England: SAGE Publications, 1982.
- Hataway, Breanne. "The FARC's Drug Trafficking as Political Crime: Determining the Success of Colombia's Peace Talks." *North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation* 41, no. 1 (2015): 163.
- Higuera Silva, Angelica. "Remember, Remember the 6th and 7th of November: Colombia 1985 Siege of the Palace of Justice." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2010.
- Hoyos, Cristina. "La Paix En Colombie ? Les Possibilités d'une Participation De La Suisse Au Processus De Paix." (2006): 197-204.
- Hudson, Rex A. and Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. *Colombia: A Country Study*. 5th ed. Vol. 550-26. Washington, D.C: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2010

- Human Rights Watch (Organization). *War without Quarter: Colombia and International Humanitarian Law*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998.
- Ince, Matt. "Filling the FARC-Shaped Void: Potential Insecurity in Post-Conflict Colombia." *The RUSI Journal* 158, no. 5 (2013): 26-34.
- Ince, Matt. "Defeating Colombia's Oldest Insurgency: Prospects for Peace and Reconciliation with the Farc." *RUSI Journal* 158, no. 1 (2013): 20-27.
- Jenkins, Brian Michael. *Colombia's Bold Gamble for Peace*. No. RAND/P-7055. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 1985.
- Johnson, Kyle, and Michael Jonsson. "Colombia: Ending the Forever War?." *Survival* 55, no. 1 (2013): 67-86.
- Johnson, Scott C. "The Forgotten Streets: While Ongoing Peace Talks may Finally Put an End to Colombia's Guerrilla Fighting, it Remains to be seen what Will Happen to Buenaventura, the Urban Monster the War Created." *Foreign Policy* no. 209 (2014): 28.
- Jonsson, Michael, Elliot Brennan, and Christopher O'Hara. "Financing War or Facilitating Peace? The Impact of Rebel Drug Trafficking on Peace Negotiations in Colombia and Myanmar." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 39, no. 6 (2016): 542-559.
- Juan Fernando, New York Time, *Colombian Rebels Hijack a Plane and Kidnap a Senator*, last accessed 02 February 2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/21/world/colombian-rebels-hijack-a-plane-and-kidnap-a-senator.html>
- Kaplan, Robert D. *Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground*. New York: Random House, 2005.
- Kilcullen, David and Greg Mills. "Colombia: A Political Economy of War to an Inclusive Peace." *Prism: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations* 5, no. 3 (2015): 106.
- Kirk, Robin. "When the Shooting Stops: How Transitional Justice Turns Knowledge into Acknowledgment." *World Policy Journal* 33, no. 3 (2016): 32-38.
- Lair, Éric. "La Colombie Entre Guerre Et Paix." *Politique Étrangère* 66, no. 1 (2001): 109-121.
- Lazzeri, Pietro. *Le Conflit Armé En Colombie Et La Communauté Internationale*. Torino; Budapest; Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004.



- Lee, Chris. "The FARC and the Colombian Left: Time for a Political Solution?" *Latin American Perspectives* 39, no. 1 (2012): 28-42.
- Leech, Garry M. *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency*. Halifax; New York; London; Winnipeg: Fernwood, 2011
- LeGrand, Catherine C, "The Colombian Crisis in Historical Perspective." *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Latino-Américaines et Caraïbes* 28, no. 55/56 (2003), 165-209 "ProQuest Dissertations Publishing"
- Licklider, Roy. *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End*. 1st ed. New York: New York University Press, 1993; 1995.
- Lobo, Gregory J. "Colombia, from Failing State to a Second Independence: The Politics and the Price." *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 16, no. 4 (2013): 351-366.
- Loveman, Brian. *Addicted to Failure: U.S. Security Policy in Latin America and the Andean Region*. Lanham, Md; Toronto: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006.
- Marcella, Gabriel, Dante B. Fascell North-South Center (Fla.), and Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute. *Plan Colombia: Some Differing Perspectives*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001.
- Marks, Thomas A. "A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe's Colombia (2002–2006) Vs FARC." *Stability Operations in the Western Hemisphere* (2007): 43.
- McPherson, Alan L. *Encyclopedia of U.S. Military Interventions in Latin America*. Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO, 2013.
- Melo, Jairo Baquero. "Regional Challenges to Land Restitution and Peace in Colombia: The Case of the Lower Atrato." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 10, no. 2 (2015): 36-51.
- Munive, J. "Review: Alternatives to War: Colombia's Peace Processes." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 18, no. 1 (2005): 128-129.
- Muslera, Esteban Ramos. "The Process of the Construction of Peace in Colombia, Beyond Negotiation: A Proposal Starting from a Transformative and Participatory Peace." *El Agora USB* 16, no. 2 (2016): 513-532.
- Nagle, Luz Estella. *Plan Colombia: Reality of the Colombian Crisis and Implications for Hemispheric Security*. United States: 2002.

- Newman, Edward and Oliver P. Richmond. *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during Conflict Resolution*. New York; Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006.
- News, VOA. *Colombia Resumes Peace Talks with FARC*. Lanham: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc, 2013.
- Nussio, Enzo. "Learning from Shortcomings: The Demobilisation of Paramilitaries in Colombia." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 6, no. 2 (2011): 88.
- Offstein, Norman. "An historical review and analysis of Colombian guerrilla movements: FARC, ELN and EPL." *Desarrollo y Sociedad* 52, no. 1 (2003): 99-142.
- Pearce, Jenny. *Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth*, (London, 1990).
- Pécaut, Daniel. "La « guerre Prolongée » Des FARC." *Echogéo* (2012; 2008).
- . *Les FARC: Une Guérilla Sans Fins?*. Paris: Lignes de repères, 2008.
- Pérotin-Dumon, Anne. "Colombie, Octobre 2016." (2016).
- Pruitt, Dean G. "Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks." *International Negotiation* 2, no. 2 (1997): 237-250.
- Randall, Stephen J. "The Continuing Pull of the Polar Star: Colombian Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era." In *Latin American Foreign Policies*, 139-157: Springer, 2011.
- Randall, Stephen J. and Jillian Dowding. "Canada, Latin America, Colombia, and the Evolving Policy Agenda." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 14, no. 3 (2008): 29-46.
- Rettberg, Angelika. "Peace is Better Business, and Business Makes Better Peace: The Role of the Private Sector in Colombian Peace Processes." (2013).
- Richani, Nazih. *Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia*. 2nd ed. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2013.
- . "Third Parties, War Systems' Inertia, and Conflict Termination: The Doomed Peace Process in Colombia, 1998-2002." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 25, no. 2 (2005): 75-103.
- . "The Political Economy of Colombia's Protracted Civil War and the Crisis of the War System." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 21, no. 2 (2001): 50-77

- Richmond, Oliver P. and Henry F. Carey. *Subcontracting Peace: The Challenges of the NGO Peacebuilding*. Burlington, Vt; Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2005.
- Riendeau, David. *La Nouvelle Colombie*. Vol. 41. Montréal: Rogers Publishing Limited, 2016.
- Riendeau, David. *La Nouvelle Colombie: Guerre Civile, Cartels De La Drogue... La Colombie a longtemps ete consideree comme un pays a eviter. mais en une eecennie, elle a fait un bond de geant en matiere d'economie et de Securite. et les Investisseurs etrangers y Affluent*. Vol. 41: Rogers Publishing Ltd, 2016.
- Rochlin, James Francis. *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003.
- Rochlin, Jim. "Plan Colombia and the Revolution in Military Affairs: The Demise of the FARC." *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (2011): 715-740.
- Rolston, Bill and Sofi Ospina. "Picturing Peace: Murals and Memory in Colombia." *Race & Class* 58, no. 3 (2017): 23-45.
- Romero, Mauricio. "Entrepreneurs of Violence, Failed Peace Process, and Changing use of Force in Colombia, 1982–2003." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2003.
- Rosenau, James N. and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Center of International Studies. *International Aspects of Civil Strife*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1964.
- Ruiz, Bert. *The Colombian Civil War*. Jefferson, N.C: McFarland, 2001.
- Saab, Bilal Y. and Alexandra W. Taylor. "Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32, no. 6 (2009): 455-475.
- Sanin. "Tempting the Wrath: ``Plan Colombia" in the Colombian Peace Process." *International Negotiation* 6, no. 3 (2001): 417-435.
- Schipani, Andres. "Santos Promises Peace in COlombia." *FT.Com*,2013.
- Schneider, Julia Drey. "A Shift in Policy, a Shift in Peace: Colombian Civil Society Peace Initiatives (1997–2008)." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2009.
- Springer, Natalia Maria, NATO Defence College, and NATO Defence College. Academic Research Branch. *Deactivating War: How Societies Demobilise After Armed Conflict*. Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, 2006.

- Stokes, Doug. *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*. New York; London: Zed Books, 2005; 2004.
- Sweig, Julia E. *What Kind of War for Colombia?*, Foreign Affairs 2002, September/October (2002): 122-141.
- Taillefumier, Vincent and Luis Lema. "La Colombie Et Les FARC Signent l'Armistice: DROIT INTERNATIONAL - Pour Donner Davantage de Poids au Document, La Suisse va y Être Associée. Mais Berne Conteste Être à l'Origine de cette Idée." *Le Temps*, 2016.
- Terror on flight 9463, last accessed 05 February 2017  
<https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/1999/apr/28/features11.g23>
- Text of inaugural speech given on August 7, 2010 by Juan Santos, last consulted 21 February 2017,  
[http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2010/Agosto/Paginas/20100807\\_27.aspx](http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2010/Agosto/Paginas/20100807_27.aspx)
- The Nobel Peace Prize for 2016, last consulted 04 April 2017,  
[https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/peace/laureates/2016/press.html](https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2016/press.html)
- Tokatlian, Juan Gabriel. "The Political Economy of Colombian-U.S. Narcodiplomacy: A Case Study of Colombian Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 1978-1990." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing", 1991.
- Vargas Meza, Ricardo. "*The FARC, the War, and the Crisis of the State (Translated by NACLA)*". Vol. 31. Hopewell, Pa: North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), 1998.
- Vayssière, Pierre. *Les Révolutions d'Amérique Latine*. Vol. 150 Ed. du Seuil, 1991.
- Waisberg, Tatiana. "The Colombia-Ecuador Armed Crisis of March 2008: The Practice of Targeted Killing and Incursions Against Non-State Actors Harbored at Terrorist Safe Havens in a Third Party State." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32, no. 6 (2009): 476-488.
- What Does the New U.S. Special Envoy Mean for Colombia's Peace Process?, last consulted 15 March 2017, <https://www.wola.org/analysis/what-does-the-new-us-special-envoy-mean-for-colombias-peace-process/>
- Whitney, WT. "Who is Responsible for Crisis in Colombian Peace Talks?" *Guardian (Sydney)* no. 1666 (2014): 8.
- Wilpert, Gregory. "Le Président Santos Contraint De Renégocier Avec Les FARC; Pourquoi Les Colombiens Ont Rejeté La Paix." *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 2016, French.

Zackrison, James L. and National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies. *Crisis? what Crisis?: Security Issues in Colombia*. Washington, D.C: National Defense University, 1999.

Zartman, I. William. "The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts." *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End* (1993): 20-36.

Zartman, I. William. *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995.