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READY AYE READY? THE FUTURE OF NAVAL LOGISTICS READINESS

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READY AYE READY? THE FUTURE OF NAVAL LOGISTICS READINESS

AIM

1. The intent of this service paper is to provide recommendations for the future assessment and certification of Logistics Readiness as it pertains to Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) ships and submarines in order to improve the level of support to RCN and Joint Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) operations. More specifically, it will conduct an analysis of current policy and identify gaps within the existing Logistics Readiness Inspection (LRI) program. Based on this analysis, recommendations to best address these gaps will be discussed and put forward. This service paper will not address Compliance and Assurance inspections of RCN shore-based units or installations.

INTRODUCTION

2. For the purpose of this paper, Readiness is defined as “a measure of the ability of an element of the CAF to undertake an approved task, consisting of both operational capability and response time. The [tenets] of readiness are Personnel, Materiel, and Training.”¹ The Commander of the RCN issued the current LRI policy within Naval Order (NAVORD) 7045-4 which is co-championed by the Director of Naval Logistics (D Nav Log) and the RCN Comptroller (RCN Compt) on his behalf. The intent of the LRI is to provide Commanding Officers with “an objective, independent assessment of their unit’s logistical readiness, and compliance to logistics policies and procedures.”² The LRI program is segregated into three functional components: Compliance, Assurance, and Readiness and ships are required to complete the inspection process at a minimum of every two years.³ Compliance and Assurance

¹ NAVORD 7045-4, 1-2.

² *Ibid*: 1.

³ *Ibid*: 3.

reviews are defined as pertaining to the “requirements of external regulations posed upon the logistics department”, while Readiness reviews focus on meeting the guidelines prescribed within RCN Readiness doctrine as found within “CFCD 129, CFCD 102, and the Sea Training Guide”⁴.

3. The above definitions lead to some key questions that will fuel the following analysis. Does the current LRI program promote Readiness in support of operations? Is there sufficient guidance provided within the various publications on the key elements of Logistics Readiness? Are Compliance, Assurance, and Readiness equally evaluated within the current LRI construct? These questions must be addressed in order to ensure that policies and inspections are focused on improving support to operations while meeting legal and regulatory requirements.

DISCUSSION

Definitions

4. Given the stated difference of Compliance and Assurance being related to external requirements while Readiness is in keeping with RCN doctrine, one must understand the corresponding relationship between these elements. Compliance sets the conditions for Readiness by ensuring that Logistics Departments meet the standards prescribed by numerous policies and regulations across the full spectrum of support provided within the ship. By confirming that these standards are met, Commanders are assured that their ship is “set up for success” as the management and oversight required to achieve such standing is normally a strong indicator that the Logistics Department is well positioned to support current and future operations.

⁴ *Ibid*: 3. CFCD is an acronym for Canadian Forces Controlled Document.

5. It is important to differentiate that Readiness directly relates to the ability to provide the balanced, responsive, efficient, and mission-tailored logistical support required to achieve combat capable maritime forces and the sustainment of combat effectiveness.⁵ Stages of Readiness are specified based on the type of operations expected of a given ship based on its progression within the Tiered Readiness Program (TRP).⁶ Support to deployed naval force elements and naval force packages must be developed across the full spectrum of operations: from domestic to expeditionary; RCN based, joint, or multinational; at both the operational and tactical levels. This support is rooted in the three principles of Naval Logistics: Primacy of Operations, Flexibility, and the Principle of Economy.⁷

The Current State

6. With an understanding of the relationship and differences between Compliance, Assurance and Readiness, it is possible to analyze the current state of the LRI checklists to determine how effectively these elements are being addressed. The LRI checklist is divided into numerous sections covering the full spectrum of support disciplines: Departmental Leadership, Human Resources and Administration, Public Funds, Non-Public Property, Supply, Contracting, Food Services, Transport and Electro-Mechanical Engineering (TEME), Technical Assistance, and Ammunition.⁸ It is not the intent of this paper to provide a determination of whether a particular checklist item is Compliance and Assurance or Readiness based, however a summary and general assessment of each area is provided as follows:

Leadership – The smallest section, this checklist focuses on Compliance and Assurance in evaluating the Head of Department and their Chief with respect to the preparedness of

⁵ NLP-4.00, i.

⁶ CFCD 129.

⁷ NLP-4.00, 1.

⁸ LRI Checklist dated 5 May 15. This checklist is used for the analysis throughout this paper.

the department for the inspection itself and ensuring that a self-audit was completed for the years where an inspection was not required. No points concerning Readiness are contained within this section.

Human Resources / Administration: This section is divided into the following sub-sections: general administration, personnel administration and personal readiness, pay, and central registry operations. On the whole, this section evaluates the control and oversight within the ship in meeting various regulations at the RCN and pan CAF levels. The sub-section concerning the annual personal readiness verification is the only Readiness focused area within this section.

Public Funds: The section is split into two sub-sections: cash, working capital fund and security, and financial management. It is entirely focused on Compliance and Assurance largely in meeting national level Department of National Defence (DND) policies, Readiness is not addressed.

Non-Public Property: This section is divided into the following sub-sections: cash, bank reconciliation and security, transactions and administration, messes and employees, exchange operations, and public grants and properties. The checklist items appearing within this section ensure Compliance with regulations primarily found within the RCN's Naval Non-Public Property Manual, Readiness is not addressed.

Supply: This section addresses the following elements: administration, warehousing / general stores, provisions, and system administration. While the majority of the checklist items promote Compliance with the national level Supply Administration Manual, the

verification of these mandated functions such as stocktaking, write-offs, and warehouse operations directly impact materiel Readiness in support of operations.

Contracting: This section is split into contracting process, irregularities, and payment cards. It verifies Compliance with national level contracting policy found within the Procurement Administration Manual and other regulations, Readiness is not addressed.

Food Services: This section contains the following sub-sections: administration, ration control, standards and procedures, facilities and equipment, and hygiene, sanitation, and safety. These items are primarily focused on Compliance with regulations found in the national level Food Service Manual and other RCN level directives, Readiness is not addressed.

TEME: This section is focused on evaluating the ship's ability to maintain equipment in accordance with national standards as prescribed within the Land Maintenance System. As with the Supply section, there is an inherent promotion of materiel Readiness gained through the proper maintenance of equipment in accordance with these standards. The final two sub-sections ensure Compliance with national level mobile support (transport) policies.

Technical Assistance: This section verifies Compliance with both RCN and national level policies concerning the technical inspection and return of materiel and evaluates the effectiveness and oversight of the technical inspection program onboard. Again, this section provides an underlying support to materiel Readiness.

Ammunition: This section is focused on management of ammunition onboard and promotes compliance with national level regulations. In doing so, materiel Readiness is further supported.

7. In summary, the current checklist is largely Compliance and Assurance based, with some sections directly or indirectly promoting personnel or materiel Readiness.

The Gap

8. In promoting Readiness it is important to understand the unique nature of the delivery of support within the maritime environment. The vast majority of the current Compliance and Assurance based LRI checklist items are the same for any static unit within the CAF. Basic supply, pay, or contracting functions exist throughout the Army and Air Force as well and similar Compliance and Assurance inspections are completed within those organizations. The differing factor for a ship is that it is mobile in nature, self-sufficient and self-sustaining, making it capable of operating globally with little to no advance warning. While this provides the government with a useful tool in promoting national interests, it also presents specific support challenges to the Naval Logistics community and underlines the importance of operational Readiness.

9. Operational Readiness within the RCN is managed by the Director of Naval Force Readiness (DNFR).⁹ The promotion of Readiness is driven across the Personnel, Materiel and Collective Training streams in order to positively influence future operational effects. The respective publications¹⁰ detail the expectations within each stream and for each department

⁹ CFCD 129, ii.

¹⁰ CFCD 102, CFCD 129, STG(C).

onboard with the goal of building a cohesive team within the ship that is “ready” to support the Commanding Officer in any given operation.

10. A review of the relevant publications quickly confirms the identified shortfall in the assessment of Logistics Readiness. The Sea Training Guide (STG) defines the Readiness requirements of the Logistics Department within Chapter 13. This chapter is two pages long and includes specific direction on a general lecture which is to be given as the ship progresses through the initial steps of the TRP. While a review of the Sea Training Group webpage details some additional elements, such as the training of the ship’s Contamination Control Organization (CCO), these documents are entirely insufficient in detailing the Readiness requirements of the Logistics Department in support of a given ship’s operations. CFCD 129 notes the link between Engineering and Logistics considerations in achieving materiel Readiness but does not offer anything further on the subject. CFCD 102 simply contains Combat Readiness Requirements (CRRs) associated with CCO training with no specific points related to the Logistics Department except the aforementioned general lecture.

11. The Sea Training Group is responsible to evaluate a given ship’s Readiness in accordance with the TRP.¹¹ This evaluation is forwarded to the respective Fleet Commander who authorizes a specific Readiness state.¹² As such, in assessing Logistical Readiness, it would seem logical that the Sea Training Group would have a large part to play. However, no formal standardized checklist or guidance currently exists in order to promote their involvement. Despite this fact, under the direction of the respective Formation N4, Logistics Officers on both coasts sail in support of the Sea Training Group and participate in Readiness certification programs to varying

¹¹ STG mission statement as per their DWAN webpage.

¹² CFCD 129, para 107.6.

degrees. The result is a non-standardized and somewhat ad hoc approach that relies heavily on the expertise and initiative of the Logistics Officer participating. In order to mitigate this as much as possible, Fleet Logistics Officers on each coast have historically created, adapted and shared Sea Training Checklists within the Naval Logistics community.¹³ Fleet Logistics Officers are immediately responsible to the Fleet Commander for the Logistics Readiness of the Fleet.¹⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. Given the current Compliance and Assurance focus, more must be done to promote, assess and certify Logistics Readiness. It should be noted however, that the current level of Compliance and Assurance review must be maintained in order to meet regulatory requirements. Therefore, any effort in promoting Readiness is envisioned as being over and above the existing status quo.

13. The Logistics Readiness program must be a two-pronged approach. The LRI checklist in its current form represents the first prong, while a standardized assessment at sea by Sea Training in accordance with the various states of Readiness within the TRP represents the second. In order to formalize and communicate this approach two options exist. The current NAVORD 7045-4 could be re-written to detail the new program in its entirety or the Logistics Readiness program could be detailed within CFCD 129 and the NAVORD could simply describe the Compliance and Assurance checklist process. As CFCD 129 represents the source of all RCN Readiness doctrine, this option is preferred. In either event, the LRI should revert to being called the Logistics Compliance Inspection in order to avoid confusion with the Sea Training Readiness Checklist.

¹³ Historic evidence based on interviews with current and past Fleet Logistics Officers from both coasts.

¹⁴ CFP F4 Log mission statement as found on their DWAN webpage and as per their Terms of Reference.

14. The STG Chapter 13 must be rewritten to provide sound guidance on the promotion, assessment, and certification of Logistics Readiness. This must be based in the doctrine found within NLP 4.00 and other relevant policies. Operational Readiness across the full spectrum for High Readiness (HR) ships must be discussed including working within joint and multi-national environments and their related support structures which include the Forward Logistics Site (FLS), Joint Task Force Supply Component (JTFSC), and the larger support structures detailed within the Allied Logistics Publication (ALP) 4.1.

15. Sea Training Readiness Checklists must be standardized and formalized in policy within the Sea Training Group. These checklists are to be based on the current versions on each coast. Checklists must assess the ability of the ship to support the operations expected within each stage of the TRP and therefore each state of Readiness should have its own checklist. For HR ships set to deploy, there should be a section assessing the FLS during the Mission Work-ups phase in order to assess the complete naval force package and not just the Logistics Department within the ship.

16. Support to Sea Training programs on each coast must be standardized in order to ensure that Logistics Officers of an appropriate level of expertise and experience are mentoring and assessing the Readiness of our ships at sea. This may or may not require a full time Logistics Officer within Sea Training Pacific and Atlantic staffs.

17. All of the above recommendations should be coordinated by D Nav Log in their role as the RCN strategic level N4. It is understood that D Nav Log is not in control of all of the given references (CFCDs, STG); therefore they would be required to work with DNFR and the Sea Training Group to influence the recommended changes.

CONCLUSION

18. This service paper has analyzed current policy and identified gaps within the RCN's LRI program. The analysis defined the relationship between Compliance, Assurance, and Readiness and provided an assessment stipulating the extent to which each is addressed within the program's current format. The identified shortfall in the evaluation of Readiness was confirmed by a review of RCN Readiness doctrine and an exploration of the level of support to Sea Training activities on both east and west coasts. Based on this analysis, recommendations to best address these gaps were discussed in order to improve the level of support to RCN and Joint CAF operations.

19. Given that primacy of operations is the first principle of naval logistics, the importance of logistical Readiness cannot be understated. The challenge of providing operational support across the full spectrum of operations both domestically and across the globe requires a Logistics team that is tested and verified as "ready" to support the Commander in achieving operational effect. While the current program provides a solid Compliance and Assurance based foundation, it must adapt in order to promote those aspects of Readiness that are key to future success.

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