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AIM

1. The aim of this paper is to recommend the adoption by the Infantry Corps of the development of indigenous security forces (DISF) as one of its main tasks to meet the needs of the future security environment. While the infantry has been involved in this tactical task as part of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the past and in current operations such as Op UNIFIER, this should be institutionalized as one of the main tasks of the infantry, alongside holding ground and the other eight that are currently identified.¹

INTRODUCTION

2. Infantry support to DISF has been a key element to deployed operations for decades. During operations in Afghanistan, this included partnering Canadian Battle Groups with Afghan National Army units, deploying Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) and the establishment of Op ATTENTION, our contribution to the NATO Training Mission, centred in Kabul. The Army currently deploys a task force, based on infantry battalions, in support of Op UNIFIER as well, while other operations involving Special Operations Forces are doing the same elsewhere. The "Evolving Security Environment"² described in *Advancing With Purpose* and recent trends by the Government of Canada (GoC) to seek strategic impact without deploying large numbers of Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel suggest that these tasks will be a constant for the foreseeable future.

¹ Canada, Department of National Defence, *B-GL-321-005/FP-001 Battle Group in Operations*, (Ottawa: Land Force Doctrine and Training System, 2012), 3A2-1.

² Canada, Department of National Defence, *Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy* 3rd Edition, (Ottawa: Chief of the Army Staff, 2014), 5-6.

3. Institutionalization of the tactical task of developing indigenous forces provides benefits to the Infantry Corps in several ways. Involving elements of this task in normal unit training and battle task standards will increase readiness of the force to respond to Government direction by reducing Theatre Mission Specific Training (TMST). It also has the added benefit of enhancing unit abilities to operate across the spectrum, by increasing the collective cultural intelligence. Finally, and most important, the institutionalization of this task for the infantry would not require significant changes or additions to current battle task standards. Much of what an infantry battalion already does can be directly associated with this task; institutionalization would ensure that it remains in the forefront of our thoughts during planning and execution of training.

DISCUSSION

Terminology

4. The actual term of development of indigenous security forces is of importance itself. While clearly a tactical task subordinate to the stability activity SSR, its scope goes beyond the Military Training and Cooperation Programme (MTCP) currently in place, but stops well short of the Foreign Internal Defense concept espoused by the United States Military in Joint Publication 3-22.³ In fact, it is the conventional military component to the concept of "Training, Mentoring and Transfer of Responsibility to Indigenous Military and, in the Short Term, Other Security Forces Such as Police and Border Guards."⁴ This task generally requires a collaborative effort from other agencies, non-conventional forces and international partners. DISF can be an

³ United States, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

⁴ Canada, Department of National Defence, *B-GL-322-001/FP-001 Stability Activities and Tasks* (Ottawa: Land Force Doctrine and Training System, 2012), 5-3-3.

integral element of the concept discussed above, or it could simply be an additional contribution to any operation.

Current Employment

5. At this time, there is no specific line of task in the Managed Readiness Plan for land forces to be employed in the role of DISF. Nonetheless, the task has been a near constant in some form for years. This has led to continuous requirements to force-generate elements specifically for these tasks, which tend to be significant in terms of contribution by senior Non-Commissioned Members (NCM) and officers. While not always the case, these forces are often generated with an infantry battalion as the baseline organization. This is not the only option, but the advantages are evident:

- a. Infantry Battalions can provide force protection and general duties tasks, in addition to mentoring roles;
- b. Infantry Battalions are generally organized in a manner to efficiently become modular and scalable Battle Groups (BG), accepting attachments that would be required for specific trades and specialties;
- c. The Infantry Corps provides the largest quantity of Regular Force units available to the Army; and
- d. Infantry Battalions have the integral capacity to conduct the majority of TMST required for tasks of this nature, with the exception of cultural, legal and medical specialists.

Benefits

6. The advantages of adding the task of DISF to the list of main tasks of the infantry goes beyond the fact that it is currently a popular task and that infantry battalions are generally well structured to be a force generator. Adopting this task would further enhance the Infantry Corps' alignment with the current Army Operating Framework along all four lines of effort.⁵ In particular, it subscribes to our ability to prepare and modernize the force, by fully understanding and preparing for Adaptive Dispersed Operations (ADO).

7. Indeed, while much discussion has been generated about network-centric operations since the concept of ADO was released in *Land Operations 2021*, the actual concept of dispersion is also critical. Steps, both technological and procedural, have been made over the last decade (and will continue into the future) to address the concepts of land forces dispersed in time and space. However, ADO also sees land forces dispersed in purpose.⁶ This is where the adoption of the task of development of indigenous forces allows the infantry to be prepared for the operating environment of the future. By institutionalizing the task, we will ensure that infantry battalions are always prepared to be employed simultaneously in a variety of tasks, from offensive operations to defensive, from force protection to DISF.

8. In this future environment, infantry sub-units from the same unit could be working in the same area of operations with considerably different tasks; one sub-unit could be conducting offensive operations, while another conducts force protection and security tasks, while yet another is fully involved in DISF. In addition, if still organized as an integral sub-unit, they could interchange tasks as the situation changes. In the context of a peace-support operation, some sub-units could be tasked with traditional tasks such as framework patrolling, while others could be

⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy* 3rd Edition, 27.

⁶ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Land Operations 2021 - Adaptive Dispersed Operations: The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow* (Kingston: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2007), 20.

conducting DISF in support of peacekeepers from other nations, as could be imagined with a partnered approach in Africa with forces being contributed by the African Union. This would be an excellent example of a Canadian contribution to the US African Command's concept of the Global Security Contingency Fund⁷, in which units such as the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) are conducting similar tasks.

9. In addition to this flexibility on operations, institutionalizing DISF could also contribute to alleviating leadership and force generation challenges associated with our current model for these types of tasks. To the greatest extent possible, integral sub-sub-units, sub-units and units would be employable in the variety of mentoring and security tasks required, potentially mitigating current force employment that sees the vast majority of a unit's leadership deployed, while a significant amount of the unit remains in Canada with little command and control. In fact, in some cases the "rear guard" to these deployments such as Op UNIFIER is actually larger than the deployed element. This larger footprint on operations does not need to be seen in a negative light. The capabilities and quality of support to the task of DISF would be greatly enhanced by the fact that all members have been trained for the task.

10. The integration of DISF as a main task of the infantry would also provide potential benefits to the Infantry Corps in the execution of other tasks. Increasing cultural awareness of infantry soldiers through professional development and training will be a force multiplier for all operations conducted. This is not true solely for operations either. This cultural awareness that could be harvested would reap rewards when infanteers are on individual and collective taskings to support training and courses.

⁷Charles Hooper, "Going Farther by Going Together: Building Partner Capacity in Africa," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 67 (2012), 11.

11. This cultural intelligence would be achieved through scalable professional development (PD) at the unit level. Units (or higher headquarters) could identify potential areas of interest where DISF is likely to occur and develop their PD programs accordingly. Officers and senior NCMs could focus on the understanding of the culture and history of the area of interest, while junior ranks could focus on developing an understanding of the structure, organization, equipment and weapons of potential partnered forces. The entire unit could put emphasis on some basic language skills related the area of interest. Of course, potential future deployment may not align with the area of interest studied by the unit. While ideal, this is not critical. The simple fact that infantry units focus on these issues will be a force multiplier for any deployment, whether in a different area or with different tasks.

12. Yet another potential benefit would be the opportunity for Regular Force units to increase their cooperation and participation with affiliated Reserve Force regiments. While regimental affiliations have improved significantly over the past several years, increasing partnership would be beneficial to all. Many Reserve Force regiments would benefit significantly from the planning capability, access to resources and expertise available within Regular Force units. Planning and execution of exercises in which Regular Force units mentor, assist and provide resources (equipment and personnel) would enhance Reserve Force training. It would provide Regular Force units with an understanding of the requirement to support, without overtaking, the development and execution of training objectives of their partnered unit. In this manner, Regular Force units would be able to train for their new key task, while at the same time enabling Reserve Force units in their own training and development.

Battle Task Standards

13. One of the most important steps in institutionalizing DISF would be the creation and modification of collective and individual battle task standards (BTS) specific to the infantry. In most cases, the BTS required already exist, but are not specific to the infantry. In addition, some of these BTS would need to be mandatory, regardless of whether a specific mission has been identified, while others would require modification to the task standard and/or necessary criteria. Of course, the simple creation and modification of BTS will not necessarily create the cultural change in infantry units recommended. They will, however ensure that DISF is a constant consideration in unit training plans.

14. Current BTS that are common to the Army or the Infantry that are applicable to DISF are the following⁸:

- a. A04601004E – Maintain Situational Awareness;
- b. A04601186E – Coordinate Integral CSS;
- c. A06701001E – Execute OPP;
- d. A06702044S – Manage CIVPOP/Non-Combatants/DP;
- e. I44673069E – Execute Cordon and Search;
- f. I44601062E – Establish and Operate a CP; and
- g. K44674068S – Execute Convoy Escort.

15. These BTS would generally require modifications to task standards and necessary criteria to ensure training with respect to DISF. Some, such as coordinating integral CSS, would require modification to reflect the requirement of the infantry sub-unit or unit to support CSS of partnered forces. All of these BTS would be mandatory training requirements for infantry regardless of readiness state, either at the sub-unit or unit level.

⁸ Canada, Department of National Defence, *B-GL-383-002/PT-002 Battle Task Standards*, (Ottawa: Army Publishing Office, 2016), Chapters 1 and 6.

16. In addition to the BTS above, the infantry would have to create a BTS (Plan and Execute Development of Indigenous Security Forces) that could adopt some of the elements of the following BTS, which are normally attributed to formed Battle Groups and CIMIC. These include the following⁹:

- a. B06703366S – Plan and Execute Combat Operations Within a Multi-Agency Environment;
- b. B06703367S – Plan and Execute Stability Operations;
- c. B06703368S – Plan and Execute Operations in Support of Civilian Authorities;
- d. C03601358E – Liaise With Civilian Actors; and
- e. C03601357E – Coordinate Military Support to Civilian Actors.

17. By combining some of the task standards and necessary criteria from these BTS, the new BTS would complement the annual training required of infantry sub-units and units to be able to accomplish DISF. Preparing for this BTS annually would also facilitate the execution of the above BTS if the infantry battalion is required to form a Battle Group.

18. These recommended modifications to infantry BTS would be supplemented by some existing individual BTS that already exist. These include¹⁰:

- a. Apply LOAC and CF Code of Conduct;
- b. Apply Cultural and Language Awareness;
- c. Recognize Armoured Fighting Vehicles and Aircraft;
- d. Clear Non-Service Weapons;
- e. Negotiate and Investigate; and
- f. Information Security.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Chapters 6 and 13. Note that Chapter 13 is in draft form.

¹⁰ Canada, Department of National Defence, *B-GL-383-003/FP-001 Individual Battle Task Standards for Land Operations*, (Ottawa: Army Publishing Office, 2010).

19. Modification of individual BTS to reflect the main task of DISF for the infantry would not be essential, especially given the fact that they are currently common to all Army personnel. However, similar to the modifications recommended with collective BTS, the individual BTS could reinforce the task of DISF in annual refresher training. Infantry could enforce a higher standard in which these individual BTS would be required annually for all infantry employed within infantry units, regardless of rank or potential deployment. In the case of Applying Cultural and Language Awareness, this would require identifying an area of interest and conducting training, even if a deployment is not imminent. In the case of task to Negotiate and Investigate, this would be mandatory for all ranks and could be integrated into collective training for DISF. Regardless, a greater emphasis on these individual BTS would further enhance the infantry corps' ability to rapidly enable DISF when required.

CONCLUSION

20. Recent history and probable future developments in the operating environment suggest that DISF is a task that will remain prevalent for the Canadian Armed Forces. It is not exclusive to the Infantry Corps, yet the task will likely remain very infantry-specific. The addition of DISF to the main tasks of the infantry would ensure appropriate planning and effort goes to this task within infantry units. This would see benefits in terms of force readiness and generation, but also would provide opportunities for improvements in collective cultural intelligence, support to training and courses, focused PD and reinforced regimental affiliations. Of course, these benefits come at the cost of adding tasks to the Infantry Corps that already has a large variety of core training to accomplish. However, much of this training could be accomplished by modifying and supplementing collective and individual BTS that are already a component of infantry unit training. While not a zero-sum proposition, the benefits of the recommended changes in training

outweigh the disadvantages of these additions and modifications to training requirements. They could potentially enable better support to DISF in the future and simultaneously improve the focus and efficiency of infantry training and employment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

21. In addition to the recommendation of adopting DISF as a main task of the Infantry Corps, some related concepts would have to be investigated in the future. Further study of modifications to BTS would be required. Doctrinal elaboration of the stability task of development of indigenous security forces, beyond what is currently written in *B-GL-322-010/FP-001 – Stability Activities and Tasks*, would be ideal. Finally, some minor modifications to infantry unit organizations may be desirable, however given ongoing studies into the future structure of the infantry and the scope of research required this was not covered in this paper. At a minimum, the Infantry Corps should continue to consider DISF in training and PD, as it will continue to play a key role in future force generation and employment, regardless of whether it is officially recognized as a main task of the Infantry Corps.

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