

Canadian  
Forces  
College

Collège  
des  
Forces  
Canadiennes



## CONFLICT TERMINATION: UNCERTAINTY TO CLARITY

Maj S.A.M. Tarrant

**JCSP 42**

***Exercise Solo Flight***

**Disclaimer**

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2016.

**PCEMI 42**

***Exercice Solo Flight***

**Avertissement**

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2016.

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
JCSP 42 – PCEMI 42  
2015 – 2016

EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT*

**CONFLICT TERMINATION: UNCERTAINTY TO CLARITY**

Maj S.A.M. Tarrant

*“This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”*

Word Count: 4905

*“La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.”*

Compte de mots: 4905

The military has an up front and leading role during conflict or war. A ‘take charge attitude’ is ingrained in military personnel through courses, professional development and training in which service members participate as their careers progress. Obstacles, however, become apparent when the military is ordered to begin the transition phase from warfighting, where the military is the lead, to a supporting role in stability operations. Military leaders are often left wondering how to contribute in the conflict termination phase and how to optimise the outcomes for the parties involved. According to Canadian Forces Joint Publication, conflict termination is defined as “those specific conditions, which when met, will lead to a cessation of conflict activities.”<sup>1</sup> But what do those ‘specific conditions’ look like and are they understood by all the players involved in the conflict termination phase?

Historically military operational planners have struggled with formulating successful conflict termination strategies. This paper will explore the critical elements that require consideration, forecasting and establishment during the planning phase in order to minimise the chance of resumption of hostilities, and set the stage for a more stable future in any conflict zone.

To begin, a clear definition of the term conflict termination will set the stage for the remainder of the paper. The second element that will be explored is, understanding the fundamentals of the situation. This will require establishing, in advance, clear objectives and end states for laying the groundwork to establish a lasting resolution. Thirdly, it is important to establish the appropriate post-conflict organisation early, comprised of the right players and elements to ensure all voices are being considered. This will be followed by an analysis of current Canadian Forces Joint Publications, while focusing more specifically on the applicability

---

<sup>1</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence. “Conflict Termination.” In B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CFJP 5.0 - The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (OPP), Change 2. Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Branch, April 2008.

of conflict termination throughout the operational planning procedure (OPP). Finally, this paper will emphasise the importance of unity of effort (UoE), detailing what this should look like, and why it is essential for ensuring successful conflict termination. Concluding remarks will summarize the arguments presented above, and ensure recommendations are highlighted, detailing why the end of the conflict is as critical as how it is conducted. As the great Prussian theorist, Carl von Clausewitz declared “ No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war.”<sup>2</sup>

### **What is conflict termination?**

The concept of conflict termination has gained momentum amongst western militaries as they have seen historical examples of the importance of grasping this concept. Militaries of the nineteenth century were established to win wars and to defeat or annihilate the enemy, however not much consideration was placed on post conflict strategy. Terms that will be explored further in this section include the refinement of certain key concepts that are critical to conflict termination, the idea of seizing a moment, as well as exploring the various ways conflicts can end. Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, an English soldier, military historian and theorist stated “the object of war is a better state of peace – even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace that you devise.”<sup>3</sup>

The necessity to better define the term conflict termination has grown in importance as conflicts have evolved from conventional to irregular type warfare. As conflicts come to an end, whether on good or bad terms, another phase commences and planning must reflect the post conflict reality. The term conflict termination is generally used to describe the termination of the

---

<sup>2</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*. New York: Everyman’s Library, 1993.

<sup>3</sup> B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, New York, Penguin Group, 1991

armed conflict. Mr. Christopher Tuck, a professor in Defence Studies at the King's College in London, expands the definition to say that "it also refers to how armed conflicts are brought to an end and focuses on the point that marks the transition from armed conflict to a cessation of armed hostilities".<sup>4</sup> Few critics will argue that western militaries do indeed understand the concept of conflict termination, and have practiced it in the past. Recent conflicts demonstrate, however, that they have difficulties applying it fruitfully.

There are two key principles that are normally discussed when planning the end of a conflict. They are conflict termination and conflict resolution. While both of these concepts have military involvement, they differ greatly from one to the other in their degree of participation. Conflict resolution is a lengthy process heavily reliant on diplomacy and focused primarily as a civil matter. Military support may be required during the conflict resolution phase however in this situation; the role of the military would be secondary to civil cooperation. On the other hand, conflict termination is defined as "the formal end of fighting but not necessarily the end of the conflict itself"<sup>5</sup>. It refers to how armed conflicts are brought to an end, emphasising the point at which a transition takes place, from armed conflict to a full cessation of hostilities. Despite the fact that military operations may be considered as being completed, the conflict itself may continue to manifest by other means. This will ultimately shift the military focus from warfighting to peace and stability operations, as seen in Kosovo, as well as more recently in Afghanistan. This paper will focus primarily on conflict termination, and the establishment of clear transition criteria to make the shift from warfighting to stabilisation operations more smoothly.

---

<sup>4</sup> Christopher Tuck, "Conflict Termination in Iraq" The RUSI Journal, 10 June 2008.

<sup>5</sup> Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, New York, Random House Inc, 1998.

National Bestselling author, Malcolm Gladwell explains how little things can make a big difference in his novel *The Tipping Point*. His idea of the tipping point is defined as “that magic moment when an idea, trend, or social behavior crosses a threshold, tips and spreads like wildfire”.<sup>6</sup> Mr. Feargal Cochrane, author of the novel *Ending Wars* refers to this idea as the emergence of a ‘ripe moment’ and the importance of taking advantage of opportunities in order to bring war to an end.<sup>7</sup> Regardless of what the term is called, the idea of seizing an opportunity at which events take a crucial turn in order to optimise the final outcome is a fundamental concept. When this theory is applied to warfare, it can help recognise opportunity for transition measures to take effect. Not all conflicts experience a tipping point, or ripe moment, and many may be missed or recognised too late. However with effective and thorough planning, the ability to recognise and take advantage of a certain moment or shift in the conflict can greatly aid in the transition to the stabilisation phase.

Wars are normally started by rational actors in pursuit of their perceived interests and objectives, and can be ended when the perception shifts to the belief that violence is unsustainable and is unlikely to lead to their desired goals.<sup>8</sup> There are numerous ways for conflicts to end. Ending modern warfare is directly linked to the ways in which the violence was conducted. Nevertheless, each conflict has its own unique history and political dynamics which frame the end in different lenses. A study by the RAND Corporation, conducted by Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki titled “How Insurgencies End” provides four types of simplistic conflict outcomes.<sup>9</sup> The first one being a Government Loss, where by the insurgency wins. This

---

<sup>6</sup> Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point: How Little Things can make a Big Difference*. Boston: Back Bay Books / Little, Brown, 2002.

<sup>7</sup> Feargal Cochrane, *Ending Wars*. Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 2008. p.37

<sup>8</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*. New York: Everyman’s Library, 1993.

<sup>9</sup> Ben Connable, Martin C. Libicki, United States. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Rand Corporation, National Defense Research Institute (U.S.). *How Insurgencies End*. Vol. MG-965. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010.

can occur in numerous ways to include government overthrow, successful annexation of territory, or recognition of rights, or dramatic political success. The second, Government Victory, can be achieved through legitimate political channels, or by destroying the insurgent cadre. The third is mixed, through either stalemate or a negotiated settlement. The final type of outcome is inconclusive or ongoing, where the failure to address the root causes of the conflict allows them to hibernate and re-emerge years later. Regardless of how the conflict ends, a plan must be put in place in order to support the terms of the cessation of hostilities. This plan will inevitably reflect the conditions upon which the hostilities cease and should be tailored to respond to the outcome.

In order to lay the foundation for further discussion, critical concepts were defined and discussed. The term conflict termination and how it applies to modern warfare was further clarified. As well, the distinction between conflict termination and conflict resolution was further discussed. The ability to take advantage of a defining opportunity known also as a ‘tipping point’ or ‘ripe moment’ can be quite beneficial in planning efforts. Finally, a quick overview of some of the ways conflict can end and how to adjust to the various outcomes wrapped up this section.

### **Understanding the fundamentals and situational changes**

If you are going to ‘get in’ then you need to know what you want to accomplish on ‘your way out’. The first key element of conflict termination for military planners to consider is to understand the fundamentals of the situation. The sources of the specific conflict linked to the nature of trying to explain why the conflict has emerged, how it is being conducted and who all the actors involved are. History has shown that it is nearly impossible to find a single, simple

cause to explain the violent struggles in the world and often the root causes are a complicated mess of economic, social and intertwined political systems.

Mr. Bruce B.G. Clarke is a former U.S. Army officer who is widely published on military and national security affairs. He proposes a model that allows the categorization of where one is in the development of a conflict in his article titled "Conflict Termination: A Rational Model".<sup>10</sup> In order to do this, clear identification of the sources or objectives which form the basis of the conflict must be understood. They generally fit into two categories, success-oriented objectives and conflict-oriented objectives. Success-oriented objectives are normally linked to an increase of power, well-being, or punishing the opponent. Conflict-oriented objectives on the other hand seek an increased level of national dynamism, national honour, or enhanced national profile, irrespective of the outcome. A clear understanding of these objectives will assist planners in determining options for the proper termination strategy.

Planners must start thinking of termination before fighting begins. Lt Col Cavaleri, a retired American Armoured officer and historian concurs with this belief. He produced a study which examines nine critical factors that should be addressed during the planning of stabilisation operations. The fourth of the nine factors is Situational Understanding. According to Lt Col Cavaleri, when this factor is accurately developed and applied appropriately, it will have a significantly positive impact on the environment.<sup>11</sup> Often the root causes of a conflict can be extremely complicated. This makes it difficult for an outsider or third party to fully understand the dynamics at play. This can be further exasperated by history, religion, societal, and political views. Also, planners' personal biases play a significant role in the ability to completely

---

<sup>10</sup> Bruce G Clarke, "Conflict Termination: A Rational Model." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 16, no. 1 (1993).

<sup>11</sup> LtCol David P Cavaleri, *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005.



comprehend the situation. Although it can be extremely difficult to fully grasp where the struggles lay for two opposing parties, attempting to understand will only increase the chances of success. Planning conflict termination in a silo is destined for disaster and there is no such thing as a cookie-cutter format to be applied to all situations. Planners must be able to comprehend the underlying sources of the dispute, the root causes, as well as determine what the objectives of the conflict are in order to define the post-conflict situation.

Lengthy conflicts generally see numerous situational changes as they evolve. As stated above, an adequate understanding of the situation is crucial for success. Intelligence professionals have a critical role to play in attempting to anticipate or predict a shift in the environment. Having adequate intelligence and signaling resources, and incorporating these elements into the planning cycle allow for greater flexibility. When it comes to conflict termination, it is essential to analyse all the factors affecting the current environment in order to reduce the prolongation or flare up of additional conflicts. Although sometimes quite difficult, seeking opportunities, for example, when the intelligence indicates that the enemy is ready for termination, and ensuring that the opportunity is seized, will result in a much more desirable outcome.

Begin preparations early, understand the root causes and adapt the plan to the changes as they arise. These ideas are key to successful conflict termination planning. By implementing these measures military planners will have a higher chance of fulfilling their desired end state, post conflict.

### **Clear political direction and guidance**

One of the most common Clausewitzian quotes is “war is the continuation of policy by other means”<sup>12</sup> Other theorist such as Sun Tzu and Jomini agree that the decision to initiate war is political and must be made by political leaders. Clear political direction, guidance and vision are indispensable to successful planning for conflict termination.

Mr. Bruce B.G. Clarke contends that the key to his proposed model requires the development of three critical pieces of guidance. The first one is a clear political statement; second the establishment of clear political objectives, and the third a set of military objectives that will provide the achievement of the first two.<sup>13</sup> Obtaining these three critical pieces of guidance can be the most challenging aspect of developing successful criteria for conflict termination.

The first principle, a clear political statement, must be provided at the onset of any conflict and well understood by all the planners. Political leaders need to ensure that all parties active in the conflict are aware of what the desired situation or the post-conflict reality should be. A clear vision must be issued from the top down in order to ensure that the stabilisation phase is set up for success. When there is a lack of this first principle, it trickles down and has adverse effects on the entire transition and implementation of this phase. It is unfortunate, but past conflicts have demonstrated a lack of direction and guidance on what the political end state should be. The Vietnam War is an example of a failure to establish a defined end state. Throughout the conflict, the American strategy evolved from advising, to counter-insurgency, to conventional warfare, and finally, to pacification, but these changes were never fully understood

---

<sup>12</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*. New York: Everyman’s Library, 1993.

<sup>13</sup> Bruce G Clarke, "Conflict Termination: A Rational Model." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 16, no. 1 (1993).

at the operational level.<sup>14</sup> National objectives were not clearly defined nor articulated to the operational commanders which led to decision making without an understanding of the political vision. This ultimately led to the failure to linking tactical successes to the overall strategic objective.

The second principle is derived from the political vision, and that is the establishment of political goals that reflect the current environment. The political goals must be clear, realistic and achievable in order to ensure that they can become reality. These goals can differ from agency to agency however they must be in line and synchronized with the overall vision.

Lastly, determining the military objectives that align with the political goals and vision is essential for military planners to create an effective plan. The link must be done all the way back up to the top in order to ensure the transition runs smoothly. It is imperative to remain flexible, due to the complexities in today's environment, and to be able to adapt to changing visions and goals. Military planners must remain up to date and relevant in order to ensure the plan is as accurate as possible, dependant on the outcome of the conflict, as well as, the ever-changing environment. Operation Desert Storm kicked off with a massive air campaign prepping the battlefield for the ground attack. President Bush articulated the following political objectives: "Immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad."<sup>15</sup> The example of the Persian Gulf can be considered a success in terms of understanding the situation. Gen Schwarzkopf understood the political goals and was able to link them to direct military action on the ground.

---

<sup>14</sup> William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success." *Parameters* 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003).

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress", Washington: Government Printing office, April 1992. P. 19.

The military mission in Desert Storm was well articulated at the highest level which trickled down and ultimately produced positive results.

Fred Ikle pointed out in his book *Every War Must End* that governments often lose sight of their own best interests as well as how wars should end, because starting and fighting a war is such a gigantic undertaking in itself.<sup>16</sup> Obtaining clear political vision can often be a challenge in today's contemporary environment. The American government proved that they had learned the lesson of the lack of political direction in Vietnam by giving very precise orders during the Persian Gulf War. Looking at these two examples, history has confirmed that translating political guidance into concrete military termination objectives is vital.<sup>17</sup>

### **Establishing a conflict termination team early with the right elements**

In the article "Operational Planning and Conflict Termination" Major John R. Boulé, an American assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy, makes the argument that each commander should have a standing interagency team to act as the operations transitional planning cell. This cell would be comprised of members with various backgrounds and expertise, well versed in the application of military, diplomatic, and national power. By drawing on a wide complement of talent, the commander is able to reach beyond conceptual ideas to achieve a desired operational outcome. The main purpose of establishing this cell would be to assist in achieving strategic and political objectives which may not be clear to the commander

---

<sup>16</sup> Fred Ikle, *Every War Must End*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1971, chap 1.

<sup>17</sup> William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success." *Parameters* 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003).

who is focussed on combat. Tasks assigned would include assisting in determining the fundamentals of the situation by contributing to defining the transition conditions.<sup>18</sup>

Although the idea of establishing a transition planning cell is a good idea, the complications arise when the conflict goes on for years and years. The replacement of individuals working in this cell would likely take place numerous times over the length of a conflict. This will in turn affect the productivity and effectiveness and cost dispersions on the utility of such a cell. The other issue is that normally the commander prosecuting the conflict is the individual who is the most 'read-in' on the situation. Attempting to link the commanders current fight with the termination of said fight would be a challenge. Individuals tackle problems based on their knowledge and expertise. A transition planning cell working side-by-side with the conflict command leadership could prove to be a challenge, based on the operational tempo of the conflict. However, if this integration is realised, it could significantly improve situational awareness. Mr. William Flavin's concurs with this concept and the last element of his keys for successful conflict termination is establishing the appropriate post conflict organisation.<sup>19</sup> An example where this failed is in Panama 1989, during Operation JUST CAUSE, which saw all the planning and preparation for the termination left to the J5, policy and plans, section. From the beginning, the section was prohibited by security measures from liaising with external agencies, and did not have the influence to gain the commander's attention. This ultimately led them to plan in isolation considering military issues only based on their limited amount of knowledge. This is an example where the key criteria for successful termination were not met and the plan that was ultimately put in place fell apart.

---

<sup>18</sup> John R Boulé, "Operational Planning and Conflict Termination." *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 29 (Autumn/Winter 2001-2002).

<sup>19</sup> William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success." *Parameters* 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003).

Although quite challenging and dependent on the situation, the establishment of appropriate post-conflict organization early can be extremely constructive in successful planning. Ensuring all players are involved early, and throughout, will allow the flow of information and freedom of expression to ensure all agencies are being heard. This will ultimately lead to a more cohesive and effective conflict termination plan.

### **Integration of Conflict Termination within the Operational Planning Process**

Military doctrine is the backbone of routine military operations and provides a common approach to problem solving. The Canadian doctrine on Operational Planning provides military members with an extensive checklist of items to consider or analyse further based on the situation. The responsibilities associated with each stage are not always clear, and therefore it is imperative that this process be coordinated between the operational and strategic levels. Broken down into five stages, initiation, orientation, courses of action (COA) development, plan development and plan review, the following paragraph will detail which critical conflict termination factor should be considered at each stage and why.

Operations planning may be initiated at varying levels in response to either political or military events.<sup>20</sup> Stage 1, initiation serves as a critical element in the establishment of the remainder of the OPP cycle. Gathering planning tools, conducting initial assessments and identifying threats are all important factors of this stage. However, the critical piece is the Commander's Initial Guidance; it is here that the roots to successful conflict termination begin to take hold. The final product of stage 1 is the issuance of the Warning Order. Understandably, the commander's attention is focused on the rapid response of a force due to the criticality of the

---

<sup>20</sup> Canadian Forces Joint Publication 5.0, April 2008, p 4-2

situation. The focus of attention is placed on the current situation at hand and thoughts on the wrap up or conclusion of the conflict are often neglected. However, the Warning Order containing a few key directives to get the lower level and planners thinking about the end of the conflict can prove to be quite beneficial in the long run.

The Stage 2 of Orientation draws the attention of the planning staff towards the requirements of the new operation at hand. Key activities during this stage comprise of conducting mission analysis, reviewing the situation and developing a mission statement. During the mission analysis phase, important questions to consider are when; determining the timeline of the operation and when the transition from warfighting to stabilization could possibly occur. Second is why; defining the purpose of each force in the conduct of the termination and the underlying reasons for the type of force selected. Third is what; what will be required in order to draw things to a close and transition back to the pre-conflict situation. Obtaining answers to these critical questions during the mission analysis phase will increase the flow of information. Transition Conditions are mentioned as part of Stage 2 in helping determine the end state. Defining the set of desired conditions at the conclusion of a campaign, an operation, or their stages or phases at the operational level to converse, reduce or exit from the operation.<sup>21</sup> Conducting a proper and throughout mission analysis provides a solid foundation for the operation but also for a more constructive transition.

During the development of COA in Stage 3, planners build off the Commanders planning guidance which was issued in Stage 2. Conflict Termination begins to take shape much more concretely during the analysis portion of this stage. Planners will provide answers to questions and ask themselves the all-important 'so what?' to new factors or derived deductions. Planners

---

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid* p 4-6

should produce a comprehensive range of options taking into consideration all the factors all while ensuring the COA remain valid. The test of FACCES (Feasibility, Acceptability, Completeness, Compliance, Exclusivity, and Suitability) should be applied to ensure the viability of each COA. The analysis of the political, economic and diplomatic environment will produce military objectives linked to the desired post-conflict landscape. COAs must be planned and established using the desired end state as the main planning factor, failing this will cause great concern and additional work in the long run.

Stage 4, plan development will conclude with the issuance of the approved Operations Order. During this stage, the plan is consolidated, and any issues or shortfalls are remedied all while considering the possible development of branch or sequel plans. Dependent on the operational situation, a sequel plan; which is a subsequent operation that flows from the successful execution of the current operation, could be considered. A conflict termination plan could be developed as a sequel plan taking all the factors and deductions into consideration from the previous planning cycle. This would allow the plan to be made in conjunction with the warfighting operation and reflect more closely the desired end state.

The final stage of the OPP is stage 5, the plan review. This element is critical in ensuring the plan remains viable. The evaluation of the plan may be conducted in a variety of ways but the most important factor is to ensure that the plan remains relevant based on the changing situation. This will in turn push planners to review the conflict termination criteria and ensure that with the evolution of the operation that the termination factors remain applicable.

Overall, the focus of the OPP largely rests on the problem or situation at hand. It can be very challenging and difficult for planners and commanders to see beyond the first bound or the



first problem. However, thorough planning and consideration for conflict termination at all stages of OPP will ensure the proper foundation is established with a greater chance at a stable future.

### **Focus on Unity of Effort (UoE)**

“All efforts are pointed towards the central purpose of the effort- to achieve a clearly defined political objective”<sup>22</sup> Determining what the post-conflict situation should look like, in advance is the underlying foundation for UoE. Additionally, maximum flexibility by all the actors is essential in order to establish a conceptual plan to provide the framework or outline which can easily be adapted depended on the outcome of the situation. Lay the groundwork to ensure a smoother transition with less effort and work in the end. A Synchronization technique is one that brings all elements of national power together to establish the most effective way to tackle a problem. Key to successful synchronization is to ensure that the actions and decisions undertaken are mutually supportive and occur ensuring a UoE.<sup>23</sup>

Synchronization or UoE can be looked at differently depending on the agency. First off it is critical that the international community be synched in terms of what is required and deemed necessary for the successful transition. Next the political/governmental level and other governmental departments (OGD) must be willing to put forth the effort in establishing the criteria for success, working with the agencies and guiding them on what is required. Next the multinational or coalition forces must all be aware of the transition from warfighting to stability operations and be able to link tactical decisions to the strategic direction. Finally, the non-governmental organisations (NGO) must be taken into consideration as their role becomes

---

<sup>22</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*. New York: Everyman's Library, 1993.

<sup>23</sup> Bruce G Clarke, "Conflict Termination: A Rational Model." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 16, no. 1 (1993).

increasing important during the stability phase. All these players must be working towards a central purpose, together.

Detailing who is responsible for what and ensuring harmonisation throughout is essential. The efforts placed towards the stabilisation of Japan from 1945 to 1949 saw international UoE within the American government as well as the military forces stationed in Japan. General MacArthur who was appointed as the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP), in charge of the conflict termination measures had numerous advantages placed before him. He had detailed planning conducted earlier as well as the full support from the Japanese government to implement his plan. These elements along with a commonly understood end state and objectives allowed for the successful reform programs to take root.<sup>24</sup>

One of the critical elements to ensuring this harmonisation is to lay everything out before hand and clearly identify the decisive points for each agency. If a logical sequence is not adhered to, the consequences could hinder or delay the termination plan. For example, during the stability phase, military forces should be providing security and stability operations in order to enable economic and diplomatic discussions to take place. There are many players involved in the conflict termination phase and each one must be taken into consideration when planning. Their various objectives, end states and personal agendas must all feed into and compliment the over termination plan in order to avoid failure.<sup>25</sup> Synchronization is important but so is harmonizing the civil with military effort; establishing 'lanes of operations' who does what when and how in order to reduce the possible duplication of effort.

## **Conclusion**

---

<sup>24</sup> William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success." *Parameters* 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003).

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

There is a common saying “that a plan doesn’t survive first contact”. Although in almost all cases this is true, the important element is to have a solid foundation in order to be able to make adjustments easier as the changes occur. This paper analysed the keys to success and offered recommendations for improving military planning for conflict termination at the operational level. By first setting the stage and defining what the term conflict termination was helped lay the foundation for the remainder of the paper. The next step was discussing the importance of understanding the situation in order to ensure planners take key elements into consideration. Secondly, ensuring clear political guidance is provided in order to be able to translate political objectives into military objectives. A look at recommendations for a conflict termination team, who should be involved and at what level as well as who should take the lead during this phase of planning. Fourthly, the Canadian Joint Operations Doctrine was discussed with recommendations and ideas on where to link conflict termination into the OPP cycle. And finally but most importantly, the critical concept the UoE, where all players, agencies and nations are working together to ensure a synchronised and harmonized approach to work towards a successful conflict termination strategy is required.

The military role during conflict termination is vital however, perhaps not well understood despite all the historical examples of successes and failures. Military planners are confronted with various challenges when planning for conflict termination. Some of the challenges stem from economic, political, diplomatic and humanitarian considerations, however many come from internal to the military itself. Conflict termination is about ensuring planners have the proper strategy for success. Methodology, tools, and keys to success have been established after years of conflict termination; military planners just need abide by them be sure

to consider all elements in order to achieve a satisfactory level of achievement and a more stable future.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Boulé, John R. II. "Operational Planning and Conflict Termination." *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 29 (Autumn/Winter 2001-2002).
- Canada. Department of National Defence. "Conflict Termination." In *B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CFJP 5.0 - The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (OPP), Change 2*. Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Branch, April 2008.
- Caraccilo, Dominic J. *Beyond Guns and Steel: A War Termination Strategy*. Santa Barbara, Calif: Praeger Security International, 2011.
- Cavaleri, LtCol David P. *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005.
- Cimbala, Stephen J. *Through a Glass Darkly: Looking at Conflict Prevention, Management, and Termination*. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2001.
- Cimbala, Stephen J. and Keith A. Dunn. *Conflict Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion, and War*. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1987.
- Clarke, Bruce G. "Conflict Termination: A Rational Model." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 16, no. 1 (1993).
- Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. New York: Everyman's Library, 1993.
- Cochrane, Feargal. *Ending Wars*. Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 2008.
- Connable, Ben, Martin C. Libicki, United States. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Rand Corporation, National Defense Research Institute (U.S.), and Inc Books24x7. *How Insurgencies End*. Vol. MG-965. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010.
- Flavin, William. "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success." *Parameters* 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003).
- Gladwell, Malcolm. *The Tipping Point: How Little Things can make a Big Difference*. Boston: Back Bay Books / Little, Brown, 2002.
- Hoglund, Kristine. *Peace Negotiations in the Shadow of Violence*. Leiden, Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008.
- Holbrooke, Richard. *To End a War*, New York, Random House Inc, 1998.
- Ikle, Fred. *Every War Must End*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1971.

Liddell Hart, B.H., *Strategy*, New York, Penguin Group, 1991

Pillar, Paul R. *Negotiating Peace : War Termination as a Bargaining Process*. Princeton New Jersey, Princetown University Press, 1983.

Soucy, Robert R. II, Kevin A. Shwedo, and John S. Haven II. "War Termination and Joint Planning." *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 8 (Summer 1995).

Tuck, Christopher. "Conflict Termination in Iraq" *The RUSI Journal*, 10 June 2008.

Taylor, A. J. P. *How Wars End*. London: Hamilton, 1985.

U.S. Department of Defense, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress", Washington: Government Printing office, April 1992. P. 19.

Wallensteen, Peter. *Understanding Conflict Resolution*. London: SAGE Publications, 2012.