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ROAD TO NOWHERE: THE 2016 CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW AND POLICY STATEMENT

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Exercise *Solo Flight*

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INTRODUCTION

John Kingdon developed an internationally recognised theory to analyse policy making. Entitled the *multiple streams model*, it suggests that if the problem stream, policy stream, and politics stream open simultaneously, then there is a great opportunity for policy change.[1] Using Kingdon's model as a point of departure for analysis, this paper will question whether there is any need to conduct a new Canadian Defence Policy Review (DPR) and subsequent major policy release. According to Kingdon's model, there is. First, the problem stream is open. The Canadian Forces (CF) are currently faced with significant personnel shortages and procurement delays.[2] Second, the policy stream is open. The current Liberal government argues that the 2008 *Canadian First Defence Review* policy statement is out of date and failed.[3] Third, the political stream is open. The 2015 federal election resulting in a change of government makes the stream open and ready to proceed with policy change.[4] While Kingdon's model is often used for policy analysis, this paper suggests it is less useful in analysing Canadian defence policy.

Justin Trudeau's Liberal Party announced during their election campaign in mid-2015 that, "We will begin an open and transparent review process to create a new Defence White Paper that will replace Harper's failed *Canada First Defence Strategy*."[5] Accordingly, on 6th April 2016, the new Liberal government announced the DPR that will direct a new defence policy statement for release in 2017. Unlike previous policy reviews and releases, the 2016 DPR has stated it will be open and transparent, with a focus on multiple defence policy areas

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[1] John Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995), 117.

[2] David McDonough, "Mind the 'Gaps' in Canadian Defence Policy, Event After the Budget 2015," Last modified 23 April 2015, https://www.opencanada.org/features/mind-the-gaps-in-canadian-defence-policy-even-after-budget-2015/.

[3] Liberal Party of Canada, "Real Change - A new plan to strengthen the economy and create jobs with navy investment," Last accessed 28 April 2016, https://www.liberal.ca/files/2015/09/A-new-plan-to-strengthen-the-economy-and-create-jobs-with-navy-investment.pdf.

[4] Brian Tomlin, Norman Hillmer, and Fen Hampson, *Canada's International Policies* (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2008), 23.

[5] Liberal Party of Canada, "Real Change: A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class," Last accessed 28 April 2016, https://www.liberal.ca/realchange/.

that include: situating Defence in the broader Government of Canada priorities; providing guidance on the desired orientation of the military; prioritizing procurement; and communicating Canada's defence and security priorities to its public, allies and other stakeholders.[6]

This paper will methodically utilize historical evidence on defence policy and assume unchanging strategic priorities to conclude that the DPR and subsequent policy release will provide little change to the *status quo*. This position will be reinforced by examining the current Minister of National Defence's (MND) *non-activist* approach, his limited political influence, and minimal relative power in the Cabinet. The paper will firstly conduct a historical review of the six major Canadian defence policy documents dated between 1964 and 2008. It will demonstrate that a majority of directed changes within these documents failed to close the commitment-capability gap in each case and that the budget was the true determinant of defence policy and spending.[7] Secondly, the paper will examine Canada's strategic priorities and highlight that there is little reason that these will adjust and drive change to the CF multi-purpose and combat-capable force. Finally, the paper will compare two *activist* MND with the current MND to illustrate how the former were able to implement policy change as a result of their personalities, political influence and relative power in the Cabinet.

So what is the *status quo*? The *status quo* is best summarized by Peter Gizewski in his interpretation of the 1994 *Defence White Paper* as "… a defence policy aimed at protecting and promoting Canadian interests and values through the use of a balanced, multi-purpose

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[6] The Defence Policy Review will consult with the public, academics, Canadian Forces personnel, Parliamentary committees, and Canada's closest partners and allies; Government of Canada, "Defence Policy Review – Terms of Reference," Last modified 6 April 2016, http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/terms-of-reference.asp.

[7] The commitment capability gap is best described in the 1987 Defence White Paper – *Challenge and Commitment* as the Canadian Forces "Not being able to meet those commitments fully and effectively" and is defined by Douglas Bland as the armed forces inability to meet commitments [referring to domestic and international operations] fully and effectively; Department of National Defence, *Defence White Paper – Challenge and Commitment* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1987), 34.

and combat-capable CF." [8] The *status quo* also sees the CF performing three roles based around its two strategic imperatives (defence of Canada and the defence of North America) and one strategic choice (contribution to international peace and security).[9] It is also an environment where defence policy White Papers and statements are ad hoc and non-committal, and defence capabilities and commitments are instead made through federal budget releases, questions in the Houses of Parliament and speeches.[10] Finally, the *status quo* is a CF that has been under pressure since the end of World War Two due to significant operational commitments and limited capabilities—commonly referred to as the commitment-capability gap.[11]

CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY (1964—2008)

Unlike the United States of America (U.S.) or Australia, the Government of Canada does not have a tradition of releasing regular defence policy White Papers or comprehensive policy statements.[12] Since 1964, there have only been four defence White Papers and two major policy statements, and these have traditionally been released shortly after a government has assumed power.[13] Unfortunately, historical evidence indicates that defence policy White

[8] Peter Gizewski, "Canada's Defence Policy: Is Change Really Needed?," *The General Sir William Otter Papers*, no. 1 (2005): 1.

[9] Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, *The Defence Policies of Nations – A Comparative Study* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994), 71-75.

[10] Bernd Horn, *The Canadian Way of War* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006), 366; Robert M. Hartfiel, "Planning without guidance: Canadian defence policy and planning, 1993-2004," *Canadian Public Administration* 53, no. 3 (September 2010): 325.

[11] Rob Byers, "Security and Defence: Commitment and capabilities," *The Adelphi Papers 26*, no. 214 (Winter 1986): 10-11.

[12] The United States of America releases a Quadrennial Defense Review, on a set four-year cycle. Whilst the Quadrennial Defense Review is not named a 'White Paper,' its purpose is the same. "A white paper provides information on what the government is doing or intends to do on a policy matter"; Audrey Doerr, "The Role of Coloured Papers: Information, Debate or Advocacy?," *Annual Conference of the Institute of Public Administration of Canada*, (September 1981): 1.

[13] Since 1964 there had been other policy documentations released which have implications for the Department of National Defence (For example the 2004 National Security Policy and the 2013 Statement on Canada's Artic Foreign Policy). The paper categorizes the 2005 *International Policy Statement for Defence* and the 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy* as major defence policy statements.

Papers and major policy statements have not closed the commitment-capability gap; they contain no funding commitments; and they become obsolete shortly after their release.[14]

In March 1964, the Pearson Liberal government released the *White Paper on Defence,* which was to become notorious within the Department of National Defence (DND) for the force re-structuring known as unification. Unlike previous White Papers, this document would clearly articulate Canada's defence policy through the lens of domestic and international security.[15] This theme would remain in subsequent White Papers and major policy statements. This was one of the few defence policies that had some implementation success—albeit only for the force structure change—but there were still areas that failed to gain momentum. The unification bill process took three years to finally pass, and once implemented, it was intended to apparently provide savings of up to twenty-five percent in operating costs. These would be reinvested into capital and modernization programmes; however, this goal was never achieved, and procurement of new equipment was cancelled.[16] Compounding this was the fact that the commitment-capability gap began increasing due to rising inflation levels, which drove personnel reductions without a commensurate reduction in commitments.[17] Hunt and Haycock state, "The strategic plan failed because it contradicted Canada's alliance policies, was too expensive … [and] no role for the designated force

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[14] *Ibid*. 324-325.

[15] The three major objectives are: "… preserve the peace by supporting collective defence measures to deter military aggression; to support Canadian foreign policy including that arising out of aggression; to support Canadian foreign policy including that arising out of participation in international organizations; and to provide for the protection and surveillance of our territory, our airspace and our coastal waters." Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964), 1.

[16] *Ibid*, 19; Barry Hunt and R.G. Haylock, *Canada's Defence – Perspectives in Policy in the Twentieth Century* (Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993), 213; Douglas L. Bland, *Canada's National Defence - Volume 1 Defence Policy* (Kingston: Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data, 1997), 62; Desmond Morton, *Understanding Canadian Defence* (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2003), 183.

[17] Between 1964-8 personnel were reduced from 120,000 to 100,000. During this period the NATO mission commitment remained unchanged; however, the Canadian Forces deployed 1150 personnel to Cyprus (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) on a continual basis from 1964; John M. Treddenick, "The Defence Budget," in *Canada's International Security Policy*, ed. David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1995), 420.

[referring to the mobilization force station in Canada] ever materialized."[18] Although the 1964 *White Paper on Defence* had some short-term success in force restructure, it did not come to full fruition, and the commitment-capability gap began expanding with reductions in personnel and increased operational commitments. As Bland states, "all semblance of a coordinated policy joining strategy and structure disappeared."[19]

Not until 1971, under the Pierre Trudeau Liberal government, was the *Defence in the 1970s* White Paper released. The aim of this White Paper was to refocus Canadian defence imperatives from collective defence in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the defence of Canada.[20] Even before the White Paper was released, many of the steps listed in the document, such as reducing defence expenditures and personnel numbers and downsizing in Europe, had already commenced.[21] One of the issues with the refocus of imperatives was that the CF were to become more geographically dispersed within Canada and overseas in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations.[22] This resulted in the commitment-capability gap continuing to be tested. The White Paper would appear to have been a major step backward for the CF; however, statements in the document were eventually reversed. The most notable reversals were a refocus back towards the NATO alliance and an

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[18] Barry Hunt and R.G. Haylock, *Canada's Defence – Perspectives in Policy in the Twentieth Century* (Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993), 212.

[19] Douglas L. Bland, *Canada's National Defence - Volume 1 Defence Policy* (Kingston: Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data, 1997), 63.

[20] Department of National Defence, *Defence in the 1970s* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), 15; Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence*. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964), 1.

[21] *Ibid*, 24-28; The 1971 White Paper directed that the Canadian permanent force in Europe be reduced from 10,000 to 5,000 personnel; Rob Byers, "Security and Defence: Commitment and capabilities," *The Adelphi Papers* 26, no. 214 (Winter 1986), 10.

[22] Over the period 1973-1978 the Canadian Forces deployed the following United Nations operations: Middle East- United Nations Emergency Force (October 1973-July 1979), Vietnam- International Commission for Control and Supervision (1973-1974), Middle East. United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (1974-2006), Lebanon. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. (March-October 1978). This was in addition to standing United Nations commitments (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) and NATO commitments; Canwest News Service, "Canadian military missions since the end of the Second World War," Last modified 11 April 2006, http://www.canada.com/topics/news/features/story.html?id=%2059117cd3-3be7-4fa8-b11a-86a13bf0b701.

increase in the defence budget towards the mid- to late 1970s.[23] The budget increase was a move to close the commitment-capability gap through procurement modernization projects, but this did not materialize due to the long lead times in project delivery and the end of the Cold War in 1991. It would be another 15 years before another Defence White Paper was released.

In 1984 the new Brian Mulroney Progressive Conservative government promised action on reducing the commitment-capability gap of the CF and in 1987 released their White Paper *Challenge and Commitment—A Defence Policy for Canada.* This paper first set out to protect Canadian territorial waters through a naval modernization programme—including the procurement of nuclear powered submarines—through its "three ocean strategy."[24] Second, the paper called for a consolidation of Canada's NATO commitments to southern Germany.[25] Third, increased surveillance of Canadian territory would be accomplished through airfield upgrades, increased quantities of long-range patrol aircraft and space based technology.[26] Finally, the Reserves would have a greater role to play in Canadian Defence.[27] Overall, the government's aim was to close the commitment-capability gap through increased defence expenditure; however, international circumstances prevented this from occurring.

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[23] The refocus towards NATO occurred through a modest modernization and capital procurement programme involving procurement of main battle tanks, long-range patrol aircraft, anti-submarine aircraft, Canadian Patrol Frigate (Phase 1) and new fighters. Additionally, in 1982 the Trudeau government allowed the US to test cruise missiles on Canadian soil. The issue was that these projects have long lead times (up to 15 years), hence the ability to close the commitment-capability gap was too late. Fortunately, the end of Cold War occurred in 1991; Norrin M. Ripsman, "Big Eyes and Empty Pockets: The Two Phases of the Conservative Defence Policy," in *Diplomatic Departures – The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-1993*, ed. Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 104; The *Defence in the 1970s* White Paper was specific in that "defence expenditures will continue to be curtailed, as reflected in continued manpower cutbacks and constraints on equipment acquisition …" this did not occur. The reality was by the end of 1977-78 the capital component of the defence budget was increased 20%. Additionally, in 1978 the Trudeau Government committed to the NATO 3% real growth target. This was in response to growing inflation and a growing capability gap; Department of National Defence, *Defence in the 1970s* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), 15; Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence*. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964), 42; Rob Byers, "The Economics of Defence," in *Canada's Defence Defence – Perspectives in Policy in the Twentieth Century*, ed. B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock (Toronto: Clopp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1993), 260-261.

[24] Department of National Defence. *Defence White Paper – Challenge and Commitment* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1987), 51.

[25] *Ibid*, 62.

[26] *Ibid*, 60.

[27] *Ibid*, 64.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 no longer justified a defence policy based on strategic deterrence and credible continental defence.[28] What initially set out to be a significant increase in CF capability actually resulted in a defence policy that would not survive more than a couple of years before becoming obsolete.

The release of the *1994 Defence White Paper* under the new Jean Chrétien Liberal Government was to be a considerable change for the CF. The focus would be on collective security linked firmly to the United Nations, with reduced attention to collective defence.[29] This would be achieved through a reduction in capability and the establishment of a multi-purpose and combat-capable force. Personnel reductions were significant, with a target of 12,000. The preceding five budgets resulted in defence expenditures being reduced by 30 percent to $9 billion per year.[30] With forces being withdrawn from Europe, it made sense for the capability requirement to be commensurately reduced; however, contrary to statements in the *1994 Defence White Paper* to "do less", the Chrétien government decided to increase its operational commitments.[31]

Between 1989 and 2001, Canada participated in 42 new operations in countries including Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, East Timor, Ethiopia and Eritrea.[32] These Liberal

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[28] This included the cancelling of nuclear submarines, reduction in personnel from 87,000 to 83,500, cancellation of 250 main battle tanks, delay in acquisition of more than 200 armoured vehicles, cancellation of six long-range patrol aircraft, reduction in the conversation of CF-5 fighter aircraft, cancellation of the unmanned airborne surveillance and target acquisition program, cancellation of the Polar 8 ice-breaker ship, reductions in the upgrade of seven Challenger aircraft; Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, *The Defence Policies of Nations – A Comparative Study* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994), 69-70.

[29] Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994), 17-18,

[30] All monetary values are in 1999 dollars; Douglas Bland, *Canada without Armed Forces?* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 126; Canada, Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994).

[31] *Ibid*, 14.

[32] Based on the author's personal experience, it must be highlighted that international operational deployments place a significant burden on personnel, equipment and support capabilities. The resources to conduct pre-deployment training, force project into and out of theatre, and to sustain the force is significant. Consequently, people must avoid thinking of a deployment in the raw numbers of personnel serving overseas. The commitment of personnel and supplies dedicated to ensuring Canadian Forces are safe and sustained is not insignificant; Canwest News Service, "Canadian military missions since the end of the Second World War,"

government operations culminated with a major deployment to Afghanistan shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The end result was not a reduction in the commitment-capability gap, but rather increased commitments, concurrent with defence budget cuts. The challenge was that these operational commitments were funded out of the defence budget.[33] Consequently, money was diverted from capital projects, resulting in less funds being available to procure new equipment and modernize the force.[34] This period was known by many in the CF as the "decade of darkness"; however, at the turn of the century the federal deficit was finally eliminated, and the defence budget climbed to approximately $13 billion.[35] This would be a short-lived opportunity to address some of the capability gaps.

In 2005, the Paul Martin Liberal government released *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World.* This statement was akin to a Defence White Paper; however, its most notable difference was that it was both a defence and foreign statement with a whole-of-government approach to security. This statement was heavily influenced by the new security environment following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and operational commitments in Afghanistan. It was also timely, as Senate criticism was growing over the expanding commitment-capability gap and operational burden on personnel.[36] Prior to the release of the policy statement, the 2005 federal budget announced a $13 billion increase in defence spending over five years to close the capability gap.[37] This increase was also detailed in the policy statement which was directed mostly towards the land

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Last modified 11 April 2006, http://www.canada.com/topics/news/features/story.html?id=%2059117cd3-3be7-4fa8-b11a-86a13bf0b701.

[33] Philippe Lagassé and Paul Robinson, *Reviving Realism in the Canadian Defence Debate* (Kingston: Queen's University Press, 2008), 34.

[34] *Ibid*.

[35] Martin Shadwick, "Defence and the 2015 Election," *Canadian Military Journal 16*, no. 1 (November, 2015): 70, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol16/no1/index-eng.asp; Philippe Lagassé and Paul Robinson, *Reviving Realism in the Canadian Defence Debate* (Kingston: Queen's University Press, 2008), 35.

[36] In 2004 the Canadian Forces was required to take an 'operation pause and reduced its international operation commitments from 4,000 personnel to 1,600 personnel across 17 missions; House of Commons, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence - Issue 25 – Evidence,* Monday, 27 June 2005. http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/381/defe/25eva-e.htm?language=e.

[37] This was announced as the largest defence spending increase in 20 years. Department of Finance, *The Budget Plan 2005*: (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2005), 221.

and air environments. Additionally, a new headquarters restructure was announced. Known as "transformation", it would see the CF headquarters become more consolidated and more operationally focused.

Overall, this defence policy statement and the 1987 White Paper were the only policy documents that described meaningful attempts to reduce the commitment-capability gap. The main reasons for this approach in 2005 were that the national mood was focused on support for the CF in Afghanistan, but more importantly, the government financial woes during the "decade of darkness" had been resolved, allowing for more money to be invested.[38] Notwithstanding, in 2016 there are still many capability gaps that are still not closed from the 2005 policy statement, due to the global economic crisis.[39]

The change of government in early 2006 and pressure from the media resulted in the Stephen Harper Conservative government releasing a new defence policy statement in 2008.[40] The *Canada First Defence Strategy* largely adhered to the themes of the 2005 policy statement, but it differed by providing a "shopping list" of capabilities whilst promising to increase defence spending over 20 years from, "approximately $18 billion in 2008-09 to $30 billion in 2027-28."[41] Of all the Defence White Papers and major policy statements, this document stood out by having the longest expenditure forecast; however, like all other policy White Papers and statements, it too became dated shortly after its release. This was a result of the 2008-09 global economic crisis, when Canada recorded its first fiscal deficit after 12

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[38] "The Government of Canada posted a budgetary surplus of $1.6 billion in 2004-05, marking the first time in Canada's history that the federal government has been in surplus for eight consecutive years. As a result, the federal debt was $499.9 billion at the end of 2004-05, down $63.0 billion from its peak of $562.9 billion in 1996-97, resulting in interest savings of over $3 billion annually"; Department of Finance. *Canada's Fiscal Progress – Chapter 3*. Last modified 19 September 2008, http://www.fin.gc.ca/ec2005/ec/ecc3-eng.asp.

[39] Capability gaps that remained exposed post the 2005 *International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* include: upgrading the Aurora maritime patrol aircraft fleet, replacing the Buffalo and Hercules search and rescue aircraft, acquiring unmanned aerial vehicles to support domestic and international operations, procure ships to support land operations and sustain naval task group operations worldwide, and the replacement of frigates and destroyers.

[40] George MacDonald, "Canada First Defence Strategy: Beyond its 'best before' date," Last accessed 26 April 2016, http://vanguardcanada.com/canada-first-defence-strategy-beyond-its-best-before-date.

[41] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 2008), 12.

years of surplus.[42] The end result was defence budget reductions and delays in major acquisitions, with the Navy being most affected.

Upon close review of the Defence White Papers and major defence policy statements since 1964, it can be concluded that none were successful in reducing the commitment-capability gap. Even though major force structure reviews were announced, and to most extent implemented, there were still extensive operational commitments that respective governments tasked the CF to fulfil.[43] This was most notable during the mid 1970s and 1990s-early 2000s, when personnel were continuously deployed with inadequate equipment and logistics support due to capital and modernization programmes being delayed or cancelled.[44] Additionally, equipment "shopping lists" were only partially honoured, and acquisitions were delayed or cancelled, depending on the economic or geopolitical environment.

So where do stakeholders turn to understand Canadian defence policy and gain guidance on modernization and capital project expenditure?[45] The author's suggestion is to examine the annual federal budget.[46] What the Defence White Papers and major defence policy statements fail to detail is the cost associated with capital and modernization projects.[47] Instead, they provide a brief statement of expected defence reductions or increases; however, these statements have generally not been honoured, mainly due to changes in the economic or geopolitical strategic situation. The key point is that it is not these

[42] Trading Economies, "Canada Government Budget 1949-2016," Last accessed 25 April 2016, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/canada/government-budget.

[43] The major force structure reviews include Unification (1964), the downsizing of the Canadian Forces to a multi-purpose combat capable force (1994), and Transformation (2005).

[44] House of Commons, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Wounded, Canada's Military and the Legacy of Neglect - An Interim Report by the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, September 2005, 3.

[45] Stakeholders include: Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces, other government departments, the United Nations, allies and partners, defence industry, strategic think tanks, veteran advocate non-government organizations, and academic institutions.

[46] John M. Treddenick, "The Defence Budget," in *Canada's International Security Policy*, ed. David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1995), 413.

[47] This is very different to the Australian Government's 2016 Defence White Paper. In this White Paper all capital projects were fully costed; Department of Defence *2016 Defence White Paper* (Canberra: Defence Publishing Services, 2016), 180.

White Papers and major policy statements that determine the commitment-capability gap—it is the federal budget. As John Treddenick states, "Most important, the defence budget represents the government's plan of action with respect to the execution of its intended defence policy."[48] This is also reinforced in a study of Canadian Cabinet decision-making that states, "Budgets in Canada have become much more than mere statements of the coming year's expenditure plan. Increasingly, the budget speech is seen as the government's most important declaration of its fundamental policy priorities."[49] Ultimately, the defence White Papers and major policy statements provide nothing more than an update of the current strategic environment, a justification of force structure changes, an overview of areas that require modernizing, and a reconfirmation of Canada's two strategic imperatives and one strategic choice. They may however be a useful exercise in civil-military relations or public education more broadly, but that question is beyond the scope of this paper.

CANADA'S TWO STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES AND ONE STRATEGIC CHOICE

Located in North America and surrounded by three oceans, Canada is the world's second largest country. The world's only military superpower—the U.S.—borders Canada to the south. Canada is extremely fortunate, given its abundance of natural resources and its lack of credible military threats.[50] Economically, Canada's gross domestic product (GDP) is the 11th largest in the world, and 77% of its trade is with the U.S.[51] Consequently, Canada is

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[48] John M. Treddenick, "The Defence Budget," in *Canada's International Security Policy*, ed. David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1995), 413.

[49] Mark Schacter and Phillip Haid, *Cabinet Decision Making in Canada: Lessons and Practices*, Institute On Governance, April 1999, Last accessed 27 April 2016, http://iog.ca/publications/cabinet-decision-making-in-canada-lessons-and-practices/.

[50] Stratfor, "Canada's Geographic Challenge," Last accessed 16 April 2016, https://www.stratfor.com/video/canadas-geographic-challenge.

[51] Government of Canada, "Trade with the United States of America correct as at 2015 and data for Gross Domestic Product correct as at 2014: Report - Trade Data Online," Last accessed 13 April 2016, https://www.ic.gc.ca/app/scr/tdst/tdo/crtr.html?naArea=9999&searchType=All&productType=HS6&reportType=TE&timePeriod=5%7CComplete+Years&currency=CDN&toFromCountry=CDN&countryList=DET&grouped=GROUPED&runReport=true; The World Bank, "GDP at market prices (current US$)", Last accessed 13 April 2016

highly dependent upon the U.S., which is within its sphere of interest. Traditionally, Canada's geostrategic set of circumstances are driven by two strategic imperatives and one strategic choice in support of its national interests. These imperatives and choice are likely to remain fixed and hence not drive any major defence policy change.

Canada's first strategic imperative is the defence of Canada.[52] Roy Rempel notes that, first and foremost, Canada's strategic interests are "… those interests associated with the continuation of the Canadian state, the society that it protects, and Canadian way of life."[53] With the exception of the 1994 *Defence White Paper*, the defence of Canada has been emphasised in all Defence White Papers and major policy statements since 1947.[54] The military defence of Canada implies preventing attack from state and non-state actors; however, there are other important domestic roles that the CF support in the defence of Canada. These domestic roles include support in times of natural disasters, during major international events within Canada, and as part of search and rescue operations.[55] Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic has also remained an important defence policy requirement, due to the region's remoteness and increased foreign offshore activity.[56]

In March 2016, the current MND, Harjit Sajjan, informed the Standing Committee of National Defence that it is highly likely that the defence of Canada will remain the priority

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http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2014+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc.

[52] Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment 2013-2040* (Ottawa: Chief Force Development, 2014) xi.

[53] Roy Rempel, *Dreamland: How Canada's pretend foreign policy has undermined sovereignty* (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 158.

[54] Craig Stone, and Binyam Solomon, "Canadian Defence Policy and Spending," *Defence and Peace Economics* 16, no. 3 (June 2005): 151.

[55] Recent notable operations include: Operation LENTUS-2013—response to major flooding in Southern Alberta; Operation FORGE-2011—assistance in the emergency evacuation of more than 3,000 residents threatened by forest fires; and Operation PODIUM-2010—support to the Vancouver Olympic and Paralympic Games; Department of National Defence. "Canadian Forces – Past Domestic Operations," Last accessed 14 April 2016, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations/past-list.page#details-panel-1427053926518-1.

[56] Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. *Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad*. (Ottawa: Canadian Communications Group, 2010) 6.

for the government.[57] Additionally, a publication review entitled *Canadian Forces Future Security Environment 2013-40* does not indicate any significant threats that challenge the CF in its defence of Canada.[58] The cyber threat is growing yet the DND has already taken measures announced in both the 2015 and 2016 federal budgets to strengthen capabilities in this area.[59]

Geographically, Canada is fortunate because it has very limited exposure to conventional peer, or near-peer military threats on its territory.[60] Additionally, Canada has the U.S. to its south, who would always honour its North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) and NATO commitments to the defence of Canada. Consequently, the main threats to the defence of Canada are internal. So there is little reason to believe that Canada will change the military *status quo*. As previously highlighted, Canada has sufficient military capability to support domestic requests and to prevent a threat from inside Canada impacting the U.S.' security.

Canada's second strategic imperative is the defence of North America. It has its beginning in 1940 with the Ogdensburg Agreement and the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD).[61] During this agreement Canadian Prime Minister

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[57] House of Commons, Standing Committee of National Defence, *Briefing by the Minister of National Defence on his Mandate Letter*, Tuesday, 8 March 2016. http://www.parl.gc.ca/Committees/en/NDDN/StudyActivity?studyActivityId=8815357

[58] Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment 2013-2040* (Ottawa: Chief Force Development, 2014), xi-xiv.

[59] Department of Finance, "2015 Budget - Chapter 4.3: Protecting Canadians," Last modified 21 April 2015, http://www.budget.gc.ca/2015/docs/plan/ch4-3-eng.html; Department of Finance, "2016 Budget - Chapter 5 - An Inclusive and Fair Canada," Last modified 22 March 2016, http://www.budget.gc.ca/2016/docs/plan/ch5-en.html.

[60] A peer, or near-peer, actor is defined as a "State or collection of states with the power to effectively challenge a countries interests." A threat is defined as an actor that has both capability and intent. A review of the Government of Canada official document "The Future Security Environment 2013-2040" indicates that there are no threats to Canada. Russia is the only county, besides the U.S., that has the capability to mount, force project and sustain protracted operations outside its regional; however, they have not intent to do this against Canada and hence is pose no threat; Austin Long, *Deterrence from Cold War to Long War – Lessons from six decades of RAND Research* (San Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), 6; Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment 2013-2040* (Ottawa: Chief Force Development, 2014), xi-xiv; T. Szayna *et al*, *The Emergence of Peer Competitors: A Framework for Analysis* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001), 7.

[61] R.B. Byers, "Security and defence: Commitment and capabilities," *The Adelphi Papers 26*, no. 214 (Winter 1986): 7.

Mackenzie King confirmed to American President Franklin Roosevelt for the first time that there will be no threat to the U.S. that comes from Canada.[62] Subsequently, all Canadian Defence White Papers and major defence policy statements since 1947 have emphasised Canada's responsibility to work with the U.S. in support of the defence of North America. This requirement is essential for Canada's prosperity, if for no other reasons than military and economic security concerns. The defence of North America is primarily executed through NORAD, and Canada's contribution to it is considerable. Canada has multiple permanent joint surveillance assets located across the north of the country—commonly known as the Northern Warning System (NWS)—as well as combat and maritime platforms allowing it to respond to both military and civilian threats on short notice. Additionally, cooperation mechanisms such as the PJBD and the Defence Production Sharing Arrangements (DPSA) are important in ensuring close Canada-U.S. military defence ties.[63]

Even though there have been tensions with the U.S. over security-related issues in the defence of North America, these have not impacted the strategic imperative. The most notable incidents were the stationing of U.S. nuclear missiles on Canadian soil in 1961 and the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962, when the John Diefenbaker Progressive Conservative Party government decided not to immediately place its forces on a state of high alert.[64] Additionally, in 2005 the Martin Liberal government made a conscious decision not to participate in a ballistic missile defence programme. Given that these tensions did not jeopardize Canada-U.S. long-term relations, it is unlikely that a political incident from within Canada is going to impact this second strategic imperative.[65] Canada continues to support the

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[62] Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s* (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2008), 142-143.

[63] Michael Hart, *From Pride to Influence – Towards a New Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: UBC Press, 2008), 135.

[64] Derek Burney and Fen Osler Hampson, *Brave New Canada – Meeting the Challenge of a Changing World* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2014), 20.

[65] The only conceivable scenario that may jeopardize U.S / Canada relations would be a major terrorist attack on the U.S. that originated in Canada. This scenario could potentially have dire consequences for the Canadian economy; however, analysis of this scenario is beyond the scope of this paper.

NORAD mission and has always ensured that major policy statements emphasize the importance of contributing to the defence of North America. Importantly, the NORAD mission expiration date was removed from the binational accord in 2006.[66]

There is little reason to believe that the DPR will make any changes to the second strategic imperative and the *status quo*. For 60 years the NORAD mission has been the centrepiece of North American defence. During Prime Minister Trudeau's visit to Washington, D.C. in March 2016, the importance of the continental defence of North America was also re-emphasised with discussions around the upgrading of the NORAD NWS.[67] Also the Trudeau government's position on replacing the CF-18 fighter aircraft provides no reason to believe any change to the *status quo* will occur. The MND's mandate letter clearly states that he is to, "launch an open and transparent competition to replace the CF-18 fighter aircraft, focusing on options that 'match' Canada's defence needs."[68] The important point in this statement is that replacement will "match" defence needs and not exceed or reduce them. Therefore, based on all of these observations, the defence of North America is highly likely to remain a strategic imperative, and no change to the *status quo* will occur.

The contribution to international peace and security is a strategic choice that Canada has exercised since 1899 with its deployment of troops to South Africa. More recently, this choice can be linked back to the Gray Lecture speech delivered in 1947 by former Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, who stated that one of Canada's national interests is the "

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[66] Joseph Jockel, and Joel J. Sokolsky. "NORAD Does Not Need Saving," *International Journal* 70, no. 2 (June 2015): 189.

[67] Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau, "Fact sheet: Canada – United States: Neighbours, Partners, Allies," Last modified 10 March 2016, http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/03/10/fact-sheet-canada-united-states-neighbours-partners-allies.

[68] Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau, "Minister national defence mandate letter," Last accessed 22 March 2016, http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-national-defence-mandate-letter#sthash.dJ5O2Ete.dpuf.

… willingness to accept international responsibilities."[69] The contribution to international peace and security has been outlined, in one form or another, in all Defence White Papers and major policy statements since 1964.[70]

Since the end of the Second World War, this strategic choice has been executed through the deployment of CF on numerous occasions. A majority of the deployments have been in support of United Nations peacekeeping and NATO operations, with regional security and humanitarian crisis operations occurring to a lesser extent.[71] Throughout the Cold War period, CF deployments were split between NATO operations in Europe and United Nations peacekeeping operations, mostly under Liberal governments. Not until after the Cold War were international peace and security operational commitments expanded. Once again, a majority of these operations occurred under the Liberal government (1993-2006) and were in support of the United Nations. After 2006, under the Harper Conservative government, United Nations operational deployments began to recede significantly, with a growing focus on supporting NATO-led operations.[72]

There is little reason to believe that the DPR will make any change to the strategic choice and the *status quo*. In the Throne Speech, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has already

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[69] At the time of the speech Louis St. Laurent was the Canadian Foreign Minister; R.A. MacKay *Canadian Foreign Policy - 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents* (Toronto: McClelland and Steward, 1970), 388.

[70] The strategic choice has been described in all Defence White Papers and major policy statements since 1964 as: 1964-to support Canadian foreign policy including that arising out of our participation in international organizations; 1971-the performance of international peacekeeping roles as we may at time to time assume; 1987-Peacekeeping; 1994-Contribution to international security; 2005-contributing to a safer and more secure world; 2008-Contributing to international peace and security-projecting leadership abroad.

[71] Walter Dorn, "Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?" Last accessed 26 April 2016, http://walterdorn.net/32-canadian-peacekeeping-proud-tradition-strong-future. There are numerous security missions that the Canadian Forces have contributed towards but they are mainly in partnership with the United States and focused on fighting illicit trafficking by transnational organized crime in the Caribbean basin and the eastern Pacific Ocean. The Canadian Forces also deployed as part of the Multinational Observer Forces (MFO) in the Sinai. Deployments in response to humanitarian aid and disaster relief are varied but include Haiti, 2004 Boxing Day Indian Ocean Tsunami and the Philippines in 2013; Department of National Defence, "Canadian Forces Operations," Last accessed 26 April 2016, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations/past.page.

[72] Under the Stephen Harper Conservative Government, Canadian Forces withdrew from the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. They committed to the UN endorsed, NATO led, operation in Libya (2011) and deployed soldiers to Eastern Europe in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Most recently the Harper government deployed Special Forces and combat aircraft to Iraq in support of operations against the Islamic State.

stated that the Government is, "committed to United Nations peacekeeping operations and the fight against terrorism." Interestingly, when the MND's mandate letter and Liberal party's campaign documentation are examined, the commitment to the United Nations remains a strategic choice.[73] The Liberal party's campaign messaging from 2015 emphasised that the Liberal party is committed to "supporting international peace and security operations … on a case-by-case basis."[74] This position is reconfirmed in Minister Sajjan's mandate letter when it details that contributions to the United Nations will be on a "case-by-case basis" consisting of mostly specialist capabilities.[75] Consequently, the current Liberal government will likely exercise its strategic choice in a discretionary manner, as previous governments have done so often in the past.[76] This will most likely see the CF maintaining its balanced, multi-purpose, combat-capable force in meeting the requirements of its strategic choice.

Since 1994 the CF have continued to demonstrate outstanding adaptability by deploying overseas in support of Canada's national interests amidst capability shortfalls. Consequently, based on these observations, there is no reason to suggest any major change arising out of the DPR. Increased pressure could, however, be placed on the CF specialist capabilities in order to achieve commitments made by the Liberal Government Prime Minister and MND.

ACTIVIST MINISTERS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

[73] Governor General of Canada, "Making real change happen: speech from the throne to open the first session of the forty-second Parliament of Canada," Last modified 4 December 2015, http://www.speech.gc.ca/en/content/making-real-change-happen.

[74] Liberal Party of Canada, "Real Change - A new plan to strengthen the economy and create jobs with navy investment," Last accessed 28 April 2016, https://www.liberal.ca/files/2015/09/A-new-plan-to-strengthen-the-economy-and-create-jobs-with-navy-investment.pdf.

[75] These specialists include: mobile medical teams, engineering support, aircraft to transport supplies, missions commanders, staff officers and headquarter units; Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau, "Minister national defence mandate letter," Last accessed 22 March 2016, http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-national-defence-mandate-letter#sthash.dJ5O2Ete.dpuf.

[76] For example, in 2003 the Jean Chrétien Liberal government exercised its strategic choice and choose not to support the United States with the deployment of forces on Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The MND is the link between the government and the military, and as a result, has considerable responsibility in the performance of their duties. Douglas Bland categorises three types of Canadian MND: *caretakers* who carefully balance military and political priorities and ultimately keep a middle ground; *supporters* who have strong links to the military and a good understanding of the institution; and *activists* who come in with an agenda and implement policy change.[77] Brian Tomlin supports Bland's position and notes that an entrepreneur is an essential requirement to create and implement policy change.[78] He states that an entrepreneur must have the following characteristics: " … a claim to a hearing, either because of their expertise on an issue or leadership of organized groups; political connections or negotiation skills and the savvy to use them effectively; and a persistence and tenacity."[79] Bland's and Tomlin's statements take us some way toward understanding *activist* ministers; however, to further enhance their analysis, consideration should be made in accounting for the MND's influence and relative power amongst individuals in the Cabinet.[80]

Former MND Paul Hellyer and Douglas Young are excellent examples of *activist* ministers who also had considerable influence in the Cabinet due to their political experience and character. Additionally, they had relative power in the Cabinet as a result of the profile of defence at the time of policy change. In contrast, the incumbent Minister Sajjan does not yet exhibit the aforementioned characteristics, nor does he have relative power in the Cabinet due to the current low profile of defence. Consequently, his ability to implement defence policy change will likely be inhibited.

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[77] Douglas Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada* (Kingston: Ronald Frye and Company, 1987), 94-95.

[78] Brian Tomlin, Norman Hillmer, and Fen Hampson, *Canada's International Policies - Agenda, Alternatives and Politics* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2008), 26.

[79] *Ibid*.

[80] For example, the former Minister of National Defence Peter McKay had considerable influence in the Cabinet due to his political standing and experience (he was the leader of the Progressive Conservative Party from May to December 2003); however, in 2008 he had very little relative power in Cabinet. This was due to the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces being a low priority for the Harper Conservative Government due to the economic crisis. It would not have mattered how much influence he had he would not have been able to push through capability changes through the Cabinet.

Paul Hellyer's ability to lead unification of the CF in an effort to enhance civilian control over the military and attempt to create internal savings was a major undertaking. J.L. Granatstein comments that Hellyer was "tough and shrewd, often even sly, he paid no attention to the fearful and the doubters as he relentlessly pressed ahead [referring to unification]."[81] Hellyer was fortunate in that he had 15 years of political experience prior to assuming the position of MND and as a result, had considerable connections within the party.[82] Importantly, he had the support of the Prime Minister and most of the senior Cabinet colleagues to see his policy changes through.[83] Hellyer entered the ministry with a clear agenda to get the military out of its comfort zone by making it more efficient.[84] He was so passionate about creating change in the CF, in fact, that he wrote the first draft of the White Paper himself.[85] He also demonstrated significant tenacity throughout the White Paper review and implementation process. His relative power in the Cabinet was established as a result of the attention Defence was receiving after the *Royal Commission on Government Organization*.[86] In April 1967, three years after the White Paper's release, the unification bill was passed. Ultimately, Hellyer's short-term success in partially changing the *status quo* within the CF came down to his *activist* approach as well as his influence and relative power in the Cabinet.[87] It would be over 30 years before another example of an *activist* MND would come into the spotlight.

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[81] J.L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: Phyllis Bruce Books, 2004), 76.

[82] Brian Tomlin, Norman Hillmer, and Fen Hampson, *Canada's International Policies - Agenda, Alternatives and Politics* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2008), 132.

[83] *Ibid*, 81.

[84] Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s* (Toronto: Nelson, 2008), 241-242.

[85] Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes - My fight to unify Canada's Armed Forces* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990), 34.

[86] The Royal Commission on Government Organization (1962-1963) identified significant bureaucratic inefficiencies with defence; Brian Tomlin, Norman Hillmer, and Fen Hampson, *Canada's International Policies - Agenda, Alternatives and Politics* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2008), 104-105.

[87] Hellyer's shortfall in the unification process was that he did not establish unity, support, or consensus within the Canadian Forces. Paul Hellyer still managed to get the unification bill passed into legislation; however, his short-term gains were reversed over the following decades especially the regards to service environment identity and customs/traditions.

Douglas Young's efforts over the period October 1996 to June 1997 to implement policy change through the reform of the military justice system and officer professional development is an example of an *activist* MND who was able to achieve change without undertaking the White Paper process.[88] Young entered the ministry with seven-and-a-half years' political experience and had served as a minister on five separate occasions.[89] Granatstein comments that, "Young was the cabinet troubleshooter, the man who had shaken up the Transport and Human Resources ministries."[90] He was appointed as the MND at a time when the CF were still in the headlines as a result of the 1993 Somalia incident, which was creating a huge political issue for the Liberal Government.[91] This issue and his political influence set the conditions for him to establish relative power within the Cabinet. Young entered the position with the agenda to fix the CF.[92] He immediately removed the Chief of Defence Staff, General Joseph Boyle, and shortly thereafter directed that the *Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia* cease their hearings. Young was determined to resolve his perceived issues within the CF and created a special advisory group to investigate the military justice system as well as initiating a review to provide recommendations on what needed to be fixed within the institution.[93] His actions set the conditions for policy change within the institution as a result of the combination of an activist approach and his political influence and relative power in the Cabinet.[94] Importantly, Young was actually a more successful *activist* minister then Hellyer because his changes have been

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[88] Parliament of Canada – PARLINFO, "Young The Hon. M. Douglas, P.C., Q.C., B.A., LL.B," Last accessed 17 April 2016, http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/ParlInfo/files/Parliamentarian.aspx?Item=05851560-5cf7-4b18-a4ac-1ac13d36e939&Language=E.

[89] Young's other minister appointments prior to occupying the Minister of National Defence position included: Minister of Veterans Affairs, Minister of Employment and Immigration, Minister of Labour, Minister of Human Resources Development and Minister of Transport, *Ibid.*

[90] J.L. Granatstein, "A diary of the defence review, 1997" *International Journal 52*, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 525.

[91] For more information, see David Jay Bercuson's book: *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1996).

[92] *Ibid*.

[93] David J. Bercuson, "Up from the Ashes: The Re-Professionalization of the Canadian Forces after the Somalia Affair," *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 3 (2009): 36.

[94] *Ibid*.

much more sustainable within the CF. Minister Sajjan, however, does not appear at this early stage to have an *activist* approach, political influence and relative power in the Cabinet to create significant policy change.

Initial observations indicate that Minister Sajjan has entered his position in Defence without a specific agenda for change. A review of the Minister's first House of Commons speech and his first meeting within the Standing Committee of National Defence has shown thus far that he has not articulated any agenda for change within the CF.[95] Consequently, based on his experience within the military, Minister Sajjan is akin to Bland's definition of a *supporter* of Defence as opposed to an *activist*.

Influence and subsequently power within Cabinet is explained by Bruce Doern as, "… the capacity to have one's way vis-à-vis other persons, ideas and priorities."[96] As previously noted, Hellyer and Young demonstrated strong influence as a result of their political experience having served in Parliament and ministerial roles prior to their appointment as MND.[97] In contrast, Minister Sajjan entered politics in December 2014 as the Liberal candidate for South Vancouver and was elected into Parliament in October 2015. In relation to many of his peers in Cabinet, Minister Sajjan is also politically inexperienced and has no

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[95] House of Commons, "Parliament of Canada – PARLINFO, House of Commons Debates Volume 42nd Parliament Session 1," Last accessed 17 April 2016, http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=42&Ses=1&DocId=8067275#Int-8763056; House of Commons, Standing Committee of National Defence, *Briefing by the Minister of National Defence on his Mandate Letter*, Tuesday, 8 March 2016. http://www.parl.gc.ca/Committees/en/NDDN/StudyActivity?studyActivityId=8815357.

[96] G. Bruce Doern, Allan M. Maslove and Michael J. Prince, *Public Budgeting in Canada – Politics, Economies and Management* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991), 46; Garcia-Retamero *et al* provide an excellent description of power as: "Power by definition is a relative concept, similar to status because the power of actor "A" can only be assessed in relation to the remaining actors in the environment. It is perhaps easiest to think of power as a resource that is used to influence the behavior of others." Rocio Garcia-Retamero, Stephanie Müller, and David L. Rousseau, "The Impact of Value Similarity and Power on the Perception of Threat," *Political Psychology* 33, no. 2 (2012): 180.

[97] Paul Hellyer had served as Assistant to the Minister of National prior to being appointed as Minister of National Defence; Parliament of Canada – PARLINFO, "Hellyer, The Hon. Paul Theodore, P.C., B.A., F.R.S.A," Last accessed 29 April 2016, http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/ParlInfo/files/Parliamentarian.aspx?Item=6ffdccf5-fe20-4be5-b99d-1593863458ac&Language=E&Section=ALL; Douglas Young had served as Minister of Employment and Immigration, Minister of Labour, Minister of Human Resources Development, and Minister of Transport; Parliament of Canada – PARLINFO, Young The Hon. M. Douglas, P.C., Q.C., B.A., LL.B, Last accessed 17 April 2016, http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/ParlInfo/files/Parliamentarian.aspx?Item=05851560-5cf7-4b18-a4ac-1ac13d36e939&Language=E.

presidential or vice-presidential roles within the six Cabinet Committees he resides.[98] Consequently, even with his military experience, his political influence in the Cabinet is considered minimal and hence his ability to drive change will be challenging in the short term. Compounding this shortfall of political influence is the low profile of Defence within the Cabinet.

Unlike in 1964 and 1996 when there was pressure on the government to resolve significant issues within Defence; this situation does not currently exist. The CF are continuing to achieve results for the government, and the post 2015 election polls suggest that Defence was not a significant driver for change as opposed to the economy and jobs. Additionally, the media have only been focusing on the new mission in Iraq, federal budget and the DPR.[99] This indicates that there is no crisis within Defence demanding the Cabinet attention that would raise Minister Sajjan's relative power amongst his colleagues. Consequently, based on Minister Sajjan's *supporter* approach, his minimal political influence and lack of relative power in the Cabinet, it is unlikely that there will be change to the CF *status quo* resulting from the DPR and subsequent policy release.

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[98] The committees include: (1) Agenda, Results and Communications, (2) Defence Procurement (Ad Hoc), (3) Canada in the World and Public Security, (4) Canada in the World and Public Security: Sub-Committee on Canada-United States Relations, (5) Intelligence and Emergency Management, and (6) Agenda and Results; Parliament of Canada – PARLINFO - SAJJAN, "The Hon. Harjit Singh, P.C," Last accessed 22 March 2016, http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/ParlInfo/Files/Parliamentarian.aspx?Item=f37d5cb2-a1ad-4ec9-a7de-ca265da02938&Language=E&Section=ALL; Amongst the 30 cabinet ministers (minus the Prime Minister) 18 have no political experience. Within Minister Harjit Sajjan's committees, the most politically experienced ministers include: Stéphane Dion (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Ralph Goodale (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), Scott Brison (President of the Treasury Board), and Chrystia Freeland (Minister of International Trade); Parliament of Canada, "Current Ministry (Cabinet)," Last accessed 27 April 2016, http://www.parl.gc.ca/parliamentarians/en/ministries.

[99] Supporting this assessment is an analysis of questions asked of Minister Sajjan in the House of Commons over the period 3 December 2015 to 22 April 2016. The Minister has been asked to respond on average to less than two questions during question time. A vast majority of the questions have been in reference to the mission in Iraq and funding to the Canadian Forces. This is an indication of the low-profile Defence current has within Parliament; Parliament of Canada, "Parliamentary Business – 42nd Parliament, 1st Session," Last accessed 27 April 2016, http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications; Lorne Bozinoff, The Forum Poll public opinion poll taken after the 2015 election indicates that the main issues concerning Canadian were a change in government, jobs and ethics in government, The Forum Poll, "Post-Election Poll: Voter wanted change," Last modified 23 October 2015, http://poll.forumresearch.com/post/2417/big-vote-movers-niqab-balanced-budget-infrastructure-investment/.

CONCLUSION

This paper has shown that, based on historical evidence, unchanging strategic imperatives (defence of Canada and the defence of North America) and choice (contribution to international peace and security), and a current *non-activist* MND with minimal relative power in the Cabinet that the DPR and subsequent defence policy statement will have minimal impact on changing the *status quo*. A methodical analysis of Defence White Papers and major policy statements since 1964 has shown that the CF commitment-capability gap has not been reduced. Instead, this analysis suggests that the annual federal budget drives the policy for determining expenditures associated with capital and modernization programmes. The paper then examined the two strategic imperatives and one strategic choice and concludes these are unlikely to change. Consequently, based on this assessment, the *status quo* of a multi-purpose and combat-capable force is most likely to remain unchanged. Finally, the paper examined two former *activist* MND and compared them with the current MND. This comparison showed that the current MND has not entered his position with a specific agenda for change, with minimal political influence, and limited relative power in the Cabinet. Consequently, it concludes that the current MND will be unlikely to drive change to the *status quo* in the short term.

So then why dedicate valuable resources and time in conducting a comprehensive DPR and subsequent policy release? In reality, these policies provide little more than an update on the strategic environment, on possible force structure changes, reconfirmation of the strategic imperatives and choice, and an overview of potential modernization options. The DND and CF has still managed to procure equipment and to deploy on operations without periodical DPRs and major policy releases. Perhaps a better solution is for the government to just “do stuff” in replacement of a significant policy review and statement release?

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