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SHARED IDEAS, INCOHERENT INTENT: DESTINED FOR FAILURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

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Terrorism came to the forefront of the world's consciousness with the World Trade Centre incident on September 11th, 2001, and consequently the United States launched the Global *War on Terror* (GWOT).[1] This *'War On Terror'* would continue for the next decade, until the term was removed by the Obama administration in 2012.[2] In name the war may have ended, but in context, the war is still being fought in many areas of the world today. What differentiates this *war* from previous wars we think of such as World War I and World War II, is the differentiation between necessity and choice.[3] All can agree that the campaigns of the great World Wars were not only successful in the application of military power, but in the rebuilding of the nation states of Germany and Japan after the conclusion of the war. In the modern day military conflicts of Iraq, Afghanistan and across Africa, the application of military power has been just as decisive, and in many ways more so. The difference lies in the shared vision pertaining to today's missions and clear direction from government on how to achieve its aims.

The wars in Europe and the Pacific during the early to mid-20th Century were wars of necessity, and as such, the whole of the government apparatus was directed towards them and towards setting the conditions within the aggressor states such that those nations would not rise to oppose free nations again. These wars were in all ways a grand success. This does not appear to be the case with the current conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, where Western nations are engaged in what would appear to be wars of choice. This paper will argue that *the conflicts in the Middle East and Africa are destined for failure in the current form they're being fought by*

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[1] President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, United States Capitol, Washington, DC, 20 April 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html

[2] Jay Solomon, "U.S. Drops 'War on Terror' Phrase, Clinton Says," March 31, 2009, *Wall Street Journal*, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123845123690371231#printMode

[3] Alastair Finlan, *Contemporary Military Strategy and the Global War on Terror: US & UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq 2001-2012*, New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013, 2

Canada, and that this is due in large part to the consistent lack of a concrete Whole of

Government (WoG) approach.

   This paper will start with a synopsis of the development of the Comprehensive Approach

(CA), its application in international conflict, and the importance of WoG *coherence* within that

approach. The paper will then move to an overview of the state of terrorism worldwide, followed

by a discussion of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan throughout the early 21st century as the

main argument in support of the thesis. Finally, it will settle on the current conflicts in Iraq and

North Africa, where the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are engaged. Throughout it will show

that despite popular rhetoric to the contrary, there is in actuality little being done to effectively

align efforts to halt increases in terrorist activities on the international stage from a Canadian

WoG perspective, and as a result Canada's involvement in the '*War on Terror'* is likely to

continue for a long time.

   The Comprehensive Approach is a relatively new term in the military lexicon pertaining

to international operations, and has been described in numerous ways. In its simplest form it is

the coordinated effort of a number of agencies to achieve a common goal, usually in the realm of

security. These agencies include governmental departments of foreign affairs, military groups,

international aid agencies, large transnational corporations, and the list goes on. It has been

discussed in terms of the 3D approach (Diplomacy, Development and Defence), and the Whole

of Government approach, and is universally accepted as having originated in the early to mid-

2000's around the time of the commencement of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.[4]

   The driving factor behind the requirement for a CA lies with the complexity of operations

today, and the realization that the operating environments of today have been affected by

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[4] Kim Richard Nossal, "Introduction: Security Operations and the Comprehensive Approach," In *Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach*, edited by Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011, 1-2

globalization, the spread of information via increases in technological advancements, and increased inter-connectedness. Charles A. Pfaff, a US Army Colonel working within the Department of State, and having experience in the Iraqi Theatre of Operations, described the current operating environment as a *chaotic* system. In describing his chaotic system, he elaborates that it is comprised of connected subsystems, and that the "state of any particular subsystem affects the state of the other subsystems. Since the values that describe the subsystems vary in an irregular way, the state of the system itself varies irregularly."[5]

A 2013 article in the *Canadian Military Journal* entitled 'Is Your World Complex? An Overview of Complexity Science and Its Potential for Military Applications', refined this chaotic definition of inter-connected systems under the term Complex Systems. Using real world examples in nature, the author explains that complex systems are composed of an "assemblage of entities interacting according to rules, and exhibiting emergent behaviours through adaptation."[6] He cautions that small events can result in a multitude of larger unknown outcomes, and therefore it is important to have an understanding of the systems being affected and to be prepared when results are not as anticipated. This makes a case for the implementation of a CA to foreign interventions, so that complex situations can be tackled via multiple avenues by different subject matter experts.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began to realize this during its campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, and an understanding began to develop that the problems being faced by militaries in today's day and age could not be faced by militaries

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[5] Charles A. Pfaff, Chaos, Complexity and the Battlefield, *Military Review*, July-August 2000, 84
[6] Stephane Blouin, Is Your World Complex? An Overview of Complexity Science and Its Potential for Military Application, *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol 13 No. 2, Spring 2013, 27

alone.[7] NATO's 2010 *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* affirms this belief, citing that "the lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management."[8]

Derrick Neal and Linton Wells stated that the motivation behind the move towards this CA arose from a desire "for effectiveness in an increasingly complex international environment, and efficiency in an era of declining defense resources."[9] They further elaborated that its application may be via one of four different models from a NATO perspective:[10]

1. An externally driven CA, by an international organization such as the UN or EU, with NATO supporting;

2. An Alliance-wide CA, with a focus on NATO-led military operations and a CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) relationship with other entities;[11]

3. National level activities under individual WoG approaches; or

4. Sub-Alliance activities under a smaller military structure.

Integration into these models seems to be at the forefront of the priorities established by Global Affairs Canada (GAC). GAC claims that as part of their international agenda for 2016-17, the "department will collaborate closely with other federal entities and provincial, territorial, and

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[7] James J. Landon, "CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation", in *Lessons from Bosnia, The IFOR Experience*, edited by Larry Wentz, US Department of Defense, Command and Control Research Program, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1998, 120-121

[8] NATO, *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,* NATO Summit Lisbon, 19-20 Nov 2010, 6

[9] Derrick J. Neal and Linton Wells, eds., *Capability Development in Support of Comprehensive Approaches – Transforming Civil-Military Interactions*, Centre for Technology and National Security Policy, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC: National Defence University, 2011, 2

[10] Ibid., 2-3

[11] *Alliance* – referring to NATO

municipal governments, and engage constructively with a diversity of Canadian and international stakeholders."[12]

Canada's foreign policy on international security outlines several key areas for engagement, including terrorism, non-proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threat reduction, transnational crime, research and outreach, and stabilization and reconstruction.[13] Each of these areas is rife with rhetoric surrounding collaboration with other governmental agencies and international stakeholders. Under the headline of *terrorism* alone, GAC discusses participation in eleven international forums (including NATO), and elaborates on the Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program (CTCBP) which exists to assist "other states with training, funding, equipment, technical and legal assistance so that they can prevent and respond to terrorist activity."[14]

Internally, GAC has made some fundamental changes to its organizational structure, which at first glance would lead one to believe it is focused on coordinated efforts towards a WoG approach to operations. In 2013, the former Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) merged with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) under the new Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD). The purpose was widely accepted as being directed towards a more "coherent foreign policy."[15] However, following extensive criticism that the enveloping of CIDA into DFATD would decrease the capability of CIDA to effectively conduct humanitarian assistance, the Minister for

[12] Global Affairs Canada statement of priorities, last accessed 02 May 16, http://www.international.gc.ca/department-ministere/priorities-priorites.aspx?lang=eng, last accessed 02 May 16
[13] Global Affairs Canada Foreign Policy on International Security and Disarmament, last accessed 02 May 16, http://www.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/security-securite2.aspx?lang=eng,
[14] Global Affairs Canada Foreign Policy on Terrorism, last accessed 02 May 16, http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/terrorism-terrorisme.aspx?lang=eng
[15] Tonda MacCharles, "Federal Budget 2013: Tories Fold CIDA into Foreign Affairs Department", The Star Online, 21 Mar 13, https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/federalbudget/2013/03/21/federal_budget_2013_tories_fold_cida_into_foreign_affairs_department.html

International Development, Julian Fantino, reportedly stated that "the new department will maintain the 'mandate of poverty alleviation and humanitarian support'."[16] As such, not much changed in DFATD over the next two years. The former DFAIT continued on its path of foreign relations and trade, while CIDA maintained its humanitarian assistance and poverty relief mandate.

Under the new liberal government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, once again some changes were made. In November of 2015, DFATD was renamed GAC, ostensibly to "reflect the government's priorities."[17] In short it would seem that the shift towards Global Affairs Canada from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development would signal a more aligned foreign policy, if for no other reason than simplifying the name under a common header would lead one to think that the *stove-piping* of the industries of trade, foreign affairs and development was being eliminated or at least downplayed. However, in depth this does not appear to be the case. One need only look at the Ministerial mandate letters provided to the (still) individual Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Trade and International Development to see that nothing has changed. Of the three letters, it is only the letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MINA) that has any mention of security or collaboration towards international security, meekly stating that the Minister should "ensure a close link between defence policy, foreign policy and national security."[18] Nevertheless, at least one of the two D's under GAC (Diplomacy), is loosely aimed towards a WoG approach to operations.

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[16] Michelle Zilio, "So Long CIDA, DFAIT; Hello DFATD", iPolitics, 27 Jun 13, http://ipolitics.ca/2013/06/27/so-long-cida-dfait-hello-dfatd/

[17] Privy Council Office, "Machinery of Government Changes", 05 Nov 15, http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=docs&doc=mog-ag-eng.htm

[18] Justin Trudeau, "Minister of Foreign Affairs Mandate Letter", Prime Minister's website, last accessed 03 May 16, http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-foreign-affairs-mandate-letter

Of the third D (Defence), Canadian Military Doctrine, outlined in Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01 (CFJP 01) states that military operations, both foreign and domestic, will take place alongside allies and coalition partners, as well as foreign government departments and agencies, local governments, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It stresses the need for "interdepartmental and interagency action in the rapidly emerging concepts of whole of government operations and the comprehensive approach strategy."[19]

The Ministerial mandate letter to the Minister of National Defence (MND) mentions collaboration several times; echoing the letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Prime Minister's direction to the MND regarding "a close link between defence policy, foreign policy and national security," and specifically mentioning working with MINA regarding the current conflict in Iraq and Syria, and to further United Nations peace operations.[20]

As can be seen, there are differing opinions on the importance of WoG operations. International organizations such as NATO are fully invested in the CA to operations as a future means of conflict resolution. Nationally, individual Canadian governmental departments are full of rhetoric surrounding WoG operations, but only two of the three elements of the WoG approach to international operations within a 3D construct, that of Diplomacy and that of Defence, have any sort of higher direction to align towards comprehensive solutions. Nevertheless, having an understanding of the general importance being placed on the WoG approach, either as a separate element from, or an inclusion into a larger CA to international operations, it is now important to understand the current security environment from a Canadian perspective.

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[19] Canada, *CFJP 01 Canadian Military Doctrine*, Department of National Defence, Joint Doctrine Branch, Ottawa, ON: Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, 2011, v
[20] Justin Trudeau, "Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter", Prime Minister's website, last accessed 03 May 16, http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-national-defence-mandate-letter

Published in 2013, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, outlines the terrorist threat, discusses the Government of Canada (GoC) strategy for addressing that threat, and delineates responsibilities towards governmental departments and agencies regarding their role in counter-terrorism.

The terrorist threat has been divided into three main categories: Sunni Islamist Extremism (foreign and domestic), other international terrorist groups, and domestic issue-based terrorism. Under Sunni Islamist Extremism, the Government of Canada specifically identifies Al Qaeda (predominantly Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula - AQAP), and Al Shabaab (AS) as the main elements. These elements pose the most direct threat to Canada and Canadians abroad. Organizations such as Hamas and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) can affect Canadian interests on the international stage, whereas domestic issue-based terrorism usually revolves around home-grown grievances surrounding issues such as animal rights or the environment.[21] In recent years, ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) has also risen to the forefront of Canadian interest from a Sunni Extremist categorization, and Boko Haram (BH) in Nigeria as another international terrorist organization.

Canada's strategy to address terrorism falls into four linear categories: Prevent, Detect, Deny and Respond. To *Prevent* individuals from participating in terrorism, "Canada aims to target and diminish the factors contributing to terrorism by actively engaging with individuals, communities and international partners, and through research to better understand these factors and how to counter them."[22] This is achieved through a broad counter-violent extremism (CVE) campaign. *Detect* is achieved through intelligence assets via collaboration with international

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[21] Canada, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, Government of Canada, 2nd Edition, 2013, 6-9
[22] Ibid., 15

partners to identify common threats.[23] *Deny* is enacted to decrease the capacity of terrorist organizations or persons, and to disrupt their activities.[24] *Respond* is aligned to "provide the capability for immediate coordinated response that will mitigate the damage of an incident, as well as longer term recovery."[25] Respond activities are categorized as either domestic or international, with the Department of Foreign Affairs [GAC] being identified as the lead agency for a Canadian response to an international terrorist activity, supported by other governmental departments, including national security forces.[26]

The identification of AQAP and Al Shabaab as the primary threats to Canada, signal the focus of operations towards the regions of the Middle East and Africa. The 2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada further reaffirms this. Of the 53 terrorist entities listed by Canada in the report, 27 of them reside in the Middle East and Africa, and another 17 exist in Asia, adjacent to the Middle East.[27] The four main terrorist entities in the Middle East and Africa, being AQAP, ISIS, AS and BH, together conducted 893 terrorist attacks in 2013 alone. Additionally, the Taliban, operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, conducted 775 terrorist attacks in that same timeframe.[28] Logically, this is where the national security apparatus has been focused over the past two decades, and continues to remain focused today.

The advent of the 21st century saw Canada enter a war of choice. Canadian military intervention in the Middle East was centered on Afghanistan under Operation APOLLO from 2001-2003, then under Operation ATHENA from 2003-2011 with NATOs International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). With the cessation of combat activities in 2011, the CAF contingent

[23] Ibid., 17
[24] Ibid., 21-27
[25] Ibid., 28
[26] Ibid., 29
[27] Canada, *2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada*, Department of Public Safety, Government of Canada, 2014, 7
[28] Ibid., 9

would be redirected into Operation ATTENTION, the Canadian Contribution to Training Mission – Afghanistan (CCTM-A), a subset of NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A).

ISAF was created in December of 2001, following agreements arising from the Bonn Conference, [29] and the provision of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386.[30] Following a rotational command structure for the first two years, NATO assumed command of the ISAF in August of 2003, and outlined their plan for the expanded mission in Afghanistan in October of that same year via a formal letter to the UN Secretary General.[31] This expansion was authorized via UNSCR 1510 a few days later.[32] NATO's plan would see the envelopment of the German Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Konduz under their mandate, and the further expansion of other provisional reconstruction teams following the Konduz PRT as a test-bed.[33]

By 2006, NATO came to the realization that they were now in the business of state-building. The 2006 Riga Summit stated that "contributing to peace and stability in Afghanistan is NATO's key priority."[34] NATO emphasized the close ties between security and development and called upon all member states to contribute to the effort of state-building in Afghanistan, affirming the requirement for a CA to this effort, and recognizing the importance of the PRTs.[35]

[29] United Nations, *Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions*, United Nations Security Council, 05 Dec 01
[30] United Nations, *Resolution 1386 (2001)*, United Nations Security Council, 20 Dec 01
[31] NATO, Letter from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General, 2 Oct 2003, in United Nations letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 07 Oct 03
[32] United Nations, *Resolution 1510 (2003),* United Nations Security Council, 13 Oct 03
[33] NATO, Letter from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General, 6 Oct 2003, in United Nations letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 07 Oct 03
[34] NATO, *Riga Summit Declaration*, 29 Nov 06, para 5, see
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_37920.htm?selectedLocale=en
[35] Ibid., paras 5-10

With the commencement of CAF large scale combat operations in Southern Afghanistan in 2006, and their envelopment into the newly established Regional Command South (RC(S)) in Kandahar under NATO ISAF, the Canadian government decided to use Afghanistan as a test bed for its own WoG approach to international operations. The intent was a coordinated response "to address the complex and difficult problems of rebuilding war-torn Afghanistan."[36] The mission was slow to start from an effectiveness perspective. However, despite several divisive governmental debates in 2006 and 2008 over Canada's role in the mission, a 2007 independent panel report by former Liberal Deputy Prime Minister John Manley which advocated for increased WoG involvement in Afghanistan moved forward to implementation. The consequences of that report were "a substantial evolution in both the strategic whole-of-government coordination framework in Ottawa and the corresponding mission structure and civilian resourcing in Afghanistan."[37] The deployed civilian and police component increased markedly, and senior civilian leadership positions were established at the embassy in Kabul, at Kandahar Airfield under the auspices of the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK), and director of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT).

The mission of Task Force Kandahar (TFK) would develop slowly, but eventually align towards the categories of *Security* (increasing the capabilities of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)), *Governance* (increasing provincial and local functioning councils), and *Development* (successful rural/urban interface).[38] This would reflect the 3D nature of the Canadian WoG effort. Networking and common intent were stressed as imperatives to success.[39]

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[36] Howard G. Coombs, *Canadian Whole of Government Operations – Opérations canadiennes pangouvernmentales – Kandahar – 09/2010 – 07/2011*, Ottawa, ON: The Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2012, 5
[37] Ibid., 6
[38] Howard G. Coombs, "Perspectives on Canadian Armed Forces Leadership in 21st Century Whole of Government Operations", in *In Harm's Way, The Comprehensive Approach: Perspectives From the Field*, Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2015, 45
[39] Ibid., 47

There were however multiple challenges faced by the WoG coordination effort. Mr. Gavin Buchan, former political director and senior official from DFAIT on the ground in Kandahar for most of 2006-07, claimed that TFK was plagued by significant issues surrounding synchronization of actions. He stated there were a "series of structural obstacles to effective civil military coordination of Canada's efforts in Kandahar."[40] The main obstacles he cited were variances in the reporting chains for military and civilian departments arising from different command philosophies, a complex multi-national command structure in theatre, and the lack of a Canadian civilian in-theatre command structure to interact with Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (JTF-A).[41]

Principally, the different command philosophies arose out of cultural differences between the departments. Whereas the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) readily adopted a *Mission-Command* oriented structure, allowing increased freedom of action at the ground level, DFAIT operated more along the lines of a *Command By Direction* model, implementing explicit instructions with continuous feedback to DFAIT HQ, and CIDA was heavily centralized and operated under a *Command By Plan* model.[42] The result was a severe decrease in flexibility at the ground level, degrading effective coordination of efforts.

Compounding this problem, the DND component operated under a parallel multi-national command structure that would necessitate particular actions at particular times. The military component was duly aligned from nation to nation. This same sort of structure did not exist on

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[40] Gavin Buchan, "Civil-Military Coordination: Canada's Experience in Kandahar, 2005-2009", *in Security Operations in the 21st Century, Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach*, Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski (eds.), School of Policy Studies, Kingston, ON: Queen's University Press, 2011, 101
[41] Ibid., 100-101
[42] Ibid., 99-100

the civilian side, and as a result, development and governance efforts varied widely from contributing nation to contributing nation, resulting in major variances between PRTs.[43]

Finally, there was not an effective overall command organization to coordinate both the efforts of the civilian components of the Canadian governmental response itself, and those efforts aligned with the DND element. The result of this was a reliance on ad-hoc working relationships. While this seemed to function adequately in the early days of the WoG campaign, due in large part to the small numbers of civilians present in relation to the DND contingent, as the numbers of civilians increased following the Manley Report, there was a subsequent degradation in the collaboration capabilities of the varying departments.[44] Furthermore, the civilian element and the military element never did come under a common command hierarchy, mostly due to "discrete departmental accountabilities."[45]

Former diplomat Cedric de Coning, a noted writer in the realms of civil-military cooperation and complexity in international operations, characterizes the inter-departmental complications listed above under the heading of *coherence,* or more realistically in this case, the lack thereof. He defines coherence as "the effort to direct the wide range of activities undertaken in the political, development, governance and security dimensions of international peace and stability operations towards common strategic objectives."[46] He defines several levels of coherence (intra-agency, whole of government, inter-agency, and international-local) and multiple levels of relationships between actors (united, integrated, cooperative, coordinated,

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[43] Ibid., 101
[44] Ibid., 101-105
[45] Ibid., 105
[46] Cedric de Coning and Karsten Friis, "Coherence and Coordination: The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach," *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15, 2011, 253

coexisting, and competing), and he states that the combinations of these two factors may vary over time in a particular situation.[47]

The challenge he notes is that even though policy makers espouse the importance of coherence, it is rarely realized at the operational level. To validate his claim, he cites the 2003 Joint Utstein Study of peacebuilding, which concluded that out of 336 peacebuilding cases studied in the 1990s, "more than 55%...did not show any link to a larger country strategy."[48] The failure he claims is caused by "poor or incomplete policy implementation [or]…inherent contradictions in the mandates, interests and value systems of some of the actors, so that the degree to which these actors can be coherent with each other are limited."[49]

Further to the issues surrounding coherence, the issue of *discrete departmental accountabilities* should have been foreseen by the Canadian WoG actors before they even went to Afghanistan. A year 2000 report by Tom Fitzpatrick of the Treasury Board of Canada (TB), entitled *Horizontal Management: Trends in Governance and Accountability*, describes the different relationships pertaining to governance and accountability.[50] Governance in Canada directs that accountability have a *vertical* component, where "Ministers are individually accountable to Parliament for their own actions and for all aspects of their departments' and agencies' activities."[51] The difficulty in multi-agency or multi-departmental coordination however, exists in the realm of *horizontal* accountability. Fitzpatrick notes that "for these

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[47] Ibid., 257

[48] Ibid., 259-260. Cited study was conducted by Dan Smith, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: the Synthesis Report of the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding,* Oslo, Norway: International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), 2003

[49] Ibid., 260

[50] Tom Fitzpatrick, *Horizontal Management: Trends in Governance and Accountability,* Treasury Board of Canada, Secretariat for CCMD's Action-Research Roundtable on the Management of Horizontal Issues, 2000. On page 6 of the report, *Governance* is defined as *"*the processes and structures through which power and authority are exercised, including the decision making processes, i.e., who participates and how." *Accountability* refers to "the obligation to demonstrate and take responsibility for performance in light of agreed expectations, and answers the question: Who is responsible to whom and for what?"

[51] Ibid., 7

relationships to be effective, there must be a reasonable intersection of mutual interest, and a reasonable alignment between the multiple vertical accountability structures, cultures and values systems, at least in the key immutable areas."[52] This should be achieved through Governmental provision on "the appropriate context in which the decisions can be made as well as the legislative, regulatory, policy and results-based management frameworks that ensure the government can know when and how objectives are met."[53]

In the case of Afghanistan, this did not appear to be what occurred, as a dual-chair model was employed with equal power distribution between the military and civilian elements. Without the realization that vertical accountability was going to remain extant, the proper procedures were not enacted to enable functional horizontal accountability.

However, despite these gloom and doom reports, at the time surrounding the mission in Afghanistan, there was frequent belief that the mission, and the WoG approach to it, was successful.

Within the public service, Ms. Anne Lavender, the Development Advisor (DEVAD) to the TFK Commander (TFK COMD) from October 2010 to June 2011, stated that she went into the mission recognizing that "a WoG effort, including DND, DFAIT, CIDA, RCMP and CSC [Correction Services Canada], was required in order to bring to bear a synchronized Canadian government contribution to the ISAF effort."[54] Her article acknowledges the challenges between military Counter-Insurgency (COIN) and development goals, but she states that from her perspective the "TFK COMD was able to focus all of Canada's military efforts there [Dand and

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[52] Ibid., 11
[53] Ibid., 11
[54] Anne Lavender, "Counterinsurgency: A Development Practitioner's Perspective", in *In Harm's Way, The Comprehensive Approach: Perspectives From the Field*, Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2015, 54

Panjwayi], resulting in significant progress."[55] She concludes by stating that "the COIN purpose and approach with regard to 'local ownership' was in synergy with best development practice [and that]…the Canadian WoG approach was deemed best practice relative to the rest of our NATO partners."[56]

A reinforcing WoG perspective was offered by Assistant Commissioner (retired) Graham Muir of the RCMP. Filling the role of the Canadian Police Commander in Afghanistan in 2010, he claimed that "on a scale of 1 to 10, our [Canada's] comprehensive approach was a good solid 8.5."[57] He discussed working with the Canadian 92nd Military Police Battalion and the Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (P-OMLT), and that in regards to a common vision, they "effectively delivered that in Kandahar with the whole-of-government approach" and that the WoG alignment "speaks well of our…capacity to deliver on solutions at all levels: strategic, operational and tactical."[58]

So, looking back at Afghanistan, how effective was the NATO mission and in particular, Canada's WoG approach to its portion of the mission?

Dr. Daniel Eustace's 2014 doctoral thesis, "State Building as Strategy: An Interrogation of NATO's Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2011," tackles this question; as least regarding the NATO side of the issue. Dr. Eustace analyzes the question of the success of NATO's mission in Afghanistan via a gap analysis aligned to the areas of conceptual gaps, institutional gaps and capability gaps.[59] For a conceptual gap at the strategic level, he posits that NATO failed in its ability to present a coherent external narrative to the general population

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[55] Ibid., 56

[56] Ibid., 58

[57] Graham Muir, "A Mountie's Experience with the Comprehensive Approach", in *In Harm's Way, The Comprehensive Approach: Perspectives From the Field*, Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2015, 107

[58] Ibid., 111

[59] Daniel D. Eustace, "State Building as Strategy: An Interrogation of NATO's Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2011", Doctoral thesis, University College Cork, 2014, 94

on the purpose of the mission, and that they further failed in their understanding of the

environment they were engaging in.[60] For example, the US stance was that the mission in

Afghanistan was critical to national security, but this narrative conflicted with the message being

sent about the intended withdrawal of troops starting in 2011, thereby opening the door for a

resurgence of the Taliban enemy.[61] Regarding the Canadian WoG approach to operations, this

can also be seen as being the case. A 2009 statement by the Prime Minister at the NATO Summit

in Strasbourg, France, highlighted the need for NATO to remain committed to Afghanistan.[62]

This was despite a 2008 report by CBC News that Canada was signaling a 2011 departure from

the mission.[63] As it stood, the departure was formally announced in 2012 for a firm 2014 end

date.[64] This narrative – counter-narrative dilemma undermined the level of dedication to

achieving a long-term solution in Afghanistan.

For a capability gap at the operational level, Dr. Eustace claims that NATO failed to

"design, develop or adopt planning methods that allow for common understanding and coherent

integrated action."[65] The deficiencies arose out of issues related to "a lack of trust, loyalty and

common instrumentality for planning."[66] His examples included difficulties surrounding

operational security and access to information, and a common lexicon pertaining to the planning

methodologies and mission. This is strikingly similar to the Canadian issues alluded to earlier

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[60] Ibid., 97-98

[61] Ibid., 97. Sourced from David M. Abshire and Ryan Brown, "The Missing Endgame for Afghanistan: A Sustainable Post-Bin Laden Strategy," *The Washington Quarterly*, Fall 2011, 59

[62] Canada, "PM joins world leaders in supporting NATO's commitment to Afghanistan", News Release, Government of Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, 4 Apr 09, http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?m=/index&nid=441329

[63] CBC News, "Harper Says 2011 'End-Date' for Afghanistan Mission, *CBC News*, 10 Sep 11, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/harper-says-2011-end-date-for-afghanistan-mission-1.746890

[64] Stephanie Levitz, "Stephen Harper Confirms Canada's Soldiers Will Be Out of Afghanistan by 2014," *National Post*, 21 May 12, http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/stephen-harper-confirms-canadas-combat-role-in-afghanistan-will-end-in-2014

[65] Daniel D. Eustace, "State Building as Strategy: An Interrogation of NATO's Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2011", Doctoral thesis, University College Cork, 2014, 155

[66] Ibid., 158

about differences in the command philosophies of the Canadian WoG elements deployed to Afghanistan, and the challenges of horizontal coherence.

For a tactical capability gap, both NATO and CAF experienced a similar pitfall – a lack of proper cultural awareness. Dr. Eustace argues that akin to what was evident amongst the other NATO nations, the cultural training provided to CAF members was inadequate to facilitate proper interaction with the host nation population, and other agencies working in the region.[67]

Numerous other examples were presented by Dr. Eustace in his doctoral thesis on the inefficiency of the CA, with the conclusion that "the overall condition of Afghanistan did not advance" and that "the country must remain as one of a failing, if not failed state." [68] This was based on key analysis of several outcomes aligned with desired effects and a systematic analysis of the progress over the period of NATO's CA. Further to this, the aforementioned *2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada*, stated that "several militant and terrorist groups will continue to operate in the region [Afghanistan / Pakistan] after the 2014 departure of international forces from Afghanistan. As such, threats will persist against Canada and Canadian interests in the region."[69] Therefore, with the overall mission evaluation being assessed as a failure, how then could Canada's WoG approach to the mission be considered anything other than the same?

So has the GoC adapted its policies and procedures to face the current threats in the Middle East and Africa in order to facilitate greater measures of success?

Canadian governmental operations in these regions today span the full scope of the national counter-terrorism strategy. GAC participation in the Global Counterterrorism Forum

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[67] Ibid., 171-172
[68] Idib., 225
[69] Canada, *2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada*, Department of Public Safety, Government of Canada, 2014, 23

(GCTF) aligns with the realm of *Prevent*, through CVE efforts in the areas of combatting foreign fighters, increased governance, religious education and increased rule of law. From 2013-2015, Canada co-chaired the GCTF Sahel Working Group with Algeria, and invested approximately $1.25 Million dollars in CVE programming in that region.[70] Although there exists a potential role for the CAF in security provision coincident to civilian community outreach programs that counter radicalization, the CAF is not currently involved in the GCTF due to a lack of mandate. This is despite a clear identification by GAC of the importance of these efforts.

Further to this, the CIDA mandate still does not mention its role in security. The *Official Development Assistance Accountability Act*, enacted into legislation on 28 June 2008, serves as the underpinning of the mandate for CIDA, and exists "to ensure that all Canadian official development assistance abroad is provided with a central focus on poverty reduction."[71] Nowhere is there a mention of a WoG focus towards security in CIDA's mandate, and the Act remains the guiding legislation for CIDA despite changes to the structure of GAC.

Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy identifies the primary agents under *Detect* as being the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Canadian Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) and the RCMP, in collaboration with other federal departments and agencies such as DND, GAC, Transport Canada (TC) and the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA).[72] The CAF is currently working alongside the RCMP and CSIS in the realm of both identifying threats to Canada and the role/movement of Canadian foreign fighters. However, due to the security considerations involved in collection efforts, the results of the

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[70] Canada, "Canada Deepens Cooperation With Algeria in Fight Against Terrorism", Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Government of Canada, 15 Sep 13, http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2013/09/15a.aspx?lang=eng
[71] *Official Development Assistance Accountability Act*, Government of Canada, Department of Justice, 2008, 1
[72] Canada, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, Government of Canada, 2nd Edition, 2013, 18

collaboration are not widely published in the open domain, hence the level of effectiveness cannot be measured in this paper.

Deny is largely centered on capacity building efforts under the GAC CTCBP. In its role to assist other nations in developing their security apparatus, GAC states that the CTCBP will be GAC-led, but will be "managed interdepartmentally to ensure a whole-of-government approach."[73] The CAF, using GAC CTCBP funding, has been involved in capacity building in Africa since at least 2011, according to open sources.[74] The improvements in security though have been of a marginal level, if there have been any at all. Since the commencement of CAF participation in the 2011 mission in West Africa, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) took it upon itself to use weapons from the Libyan conflict to attempt to control most of Mali in 2011/12, and BH in Nigeria has risen in status and gained international notoriety for incidents such as the kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014. Both terrorist entities continue to play major roles in the security apparatus of West Africa. The main issues in countering these threats arise from the lack of a firm government mandate pertaining to security in that region, and the continued *poverty-related*, and not *security-related*, mandate of the development arm of GAC [CIDA].

The *Respond* category has more promise, but has also not fielded major results as of yet. Canada's mission in Iraq against ISIS has received much public notice over the past year. On 25 September, 2015, the G7 Foreign Ministers issued a combined statement outlining their commitment towards "a comprehensive approach to fight ISIL and to prevent a humanitarian

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[73] Global Affairs Canada, Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Assistance, last accessed 09 May 16, http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/ctcb-rcat.aspx?lang=eng
[74] David Pugliese, "Canadian Special Operations Forces Complete Exercise Flintlock in Africa," Ottawa Citizen, 07 March 2016, http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-special-operations-forces-complete-exercise-flintlock-in-africa

catastrophe."[75] On 8 February 2016, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau issued a statement on the

proposed plan for combatting ISIS, outlining the three elements of the plan being focused on

Security, *Development* and *Diplomacy*.[76] This is strikingly reminiscent of the goals of TFK in

Afghanistan a decade ago.

Further to this, it would seem that GoC intent is again a revolving target, as the advent of

a new Liberal government in late 2015 resulted in a change of mission parameters for DND with

the withdrawal of CF-18 Hornet fighter aircraft from the mission. This is despite information

published in an article by the National Post only a year prior, in which Jason MacDonald, a

spokesman for Prime Minister Stephen Harper stated that "when we recognize a threat like this

that must be addressed, and that involves Canadian interests, we do our part."[77] That part,

according to Prime Minister Harper included CF-18s. Once again, it would seem that Canada's

contribution is up for debate and heavily influenced by politics; conditions which send confusing

signals to both enemies and allies alike.

David Carment, of the news website OpenSource.org draws clear analogies between the

government's approach to ISIS in Iraq and the approach to Afghanistan of almost 2 decades

previous. He points out that "Canada had no significant internal evaluation of and policy on the

region," and alludes that both the financial contributions associated with the *Development*

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[75] Global Affairs Canada, "G7 Foreign Ministers' Statement, Joint Action to Fight the Terrorist Organisation ISIL/DAESH, New York, 25 September 2014," http://www.international.gc.ca/g7/25b.aspx?lang=eng
[76] Justin Trudeau, Statement by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau: New Approach to Address the Ongoing Crises in Iraq and Syria and the Impact on the Surrounding Region, Ottawa, ON, 09 Feb 16, http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/02/08/talking-points-prime-minister-trudeau-new-approach-address-ongoing-crises-iraq-and
[77] Mark Kennedy, "Harper Announces Plans to Send CF-18s to Bomb ISIS in Iraq," *National Post*, 3 Oct 14, http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/isis-motion-calls-for-air-strikes-no-troops-in-iraq

portion of the plan in Iraq, and the lack of transparent information on the *Diplomatic* portion of the mission, point resolutely towards repeating the mistakes of the mission in Afghanistan.[78]

It would seem that the mistakes of the past are being repeated in the present, visible by the continued lack of a coherent mandate across government departments (as per the Ministerial mandate letters and CIDA's lack of focus on security), improperly aligned functional priorities pertaining to threats in the Middle East and Africa (such as DFATDs sole involvement in the GCTF), and a general lack of governmental policy from the Prime Minister. All roads seem to lead to the conclusion that unless the government can outline clear policy guidance on their wars of choice in the Middle East and Africa, align strategy with that policy and end states, and train the WoG team to act together instead of in separate stove-pipes, then the *conflicts in the Middle East and Africa are destined for failure in the current form they're being fought by Canada.*

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[78] David Carment, "Where's the Diplomatic Element in Canada's Anti-ISIS Strategy," OpenSource.Org, 09 Feb 16, https://www.opencanada.org/features/wheres-diplomatic-element-canadas-anti-isis-strategy/

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