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> *History also teaches how to laugh at the solemnities of the origin. The lofty origin is no more than a metaphysical extension which arises from the belief that things are most precious and essential at the moment of birth.*
>
> – Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History"

In 1947, The Canadian government became involved with the Palestine question: a complex problem that emerged when the United Kingdom withdrew from Palestine and requested that a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations be called to consider the issue.[1] Shortly thereafter, the General Assembly created the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)–consisting of 11 members including Canada–"to investigate and report on the future of Palestine after the termination of the British Mandate."[2] The UNSCOP presented two plans. The majority proposed partitioning Palestine into Arab and Jewish states within an economic union (with Jerusalem under a separate international regime responsible to the UN), while the minority recommended a federal union of the two entities with Jerusalem as the federal capital.[3] Despite British warnings that neither of these plans could be implemented without the support of both the Arab and Jewish populations, Canada voted with the General Assembly in favour of the majority plan. Shortly thereafter, a civil war began in the

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[1] Robert Alexander MacKay, *Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents*, ed. Robert Alexander MacKay, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 134.

[2] United Nations Archives and Records Management Section, *Summary of AG-057 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) (1947)*, (New York: UN, 1949), 1.

[3] MacKay, *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 134.

contested territory, which later resulted in the ethnic cleansing of Palestine (also known as the Nakba). This analysis examines how public policy frameworks can be used to analyse historical evidence, and what factors influenced the Canadian government's institutional policy toward the Israel/Palestine question. No single explanatory factor or variable shaped the formulation of Canadian foreign policy toward Palestine and the then newly created State of Israel. Positivist methodological frameworks do not adequately explain how the Government of Canada dealt with a problem as complex in nature as the Israel/Palestine question, as they are predicated on linear-based scientific, rationalist models designed to deal with simple technical problems. Post-positivist models, such as those espoused by Raul Perez Lejano, Horst W.J. Rittel, Jacques Derrida, Charles W. Mills, and Michel Foucault will be used to destabilize linear frameworks and narratives, demonstrating that they privilege specific discourses over others, and as a result, exclude key historical events–like the Nakba–from analysis. This essay decentres the Canadian Department of External Affairs (DEA) as the institutional focal point of analysis to demonstrate that discourses of institutional and domestic racism, emanating from multiple sources, interacted with the formulation and implementation of the Government of Canada's foreign policy toward Israel and Palestine. In evaluating Canada's response to the Israel/Palestine problem, this essay provides a brief historical summary of the contradictory policy initiatives that emerged in the region during the British mandate; a critical assessment of positivist approaches used to analyse Canadian foreign policy toward Israel and Palestine; and, the employment of post-positivist approaches to deconstruct narratives which either idealize Canada's role in this conflict or narrowly focus on the discourse of *realpolitik*.

From the First World War until 1947, the UK held Palestine as a mandate under the auspices of the League of Nations.[4] However, the British Government failed to administer this territory adequately as it made conflicting promises to Arabs and Jews concerning the future of the area–namely the McMahon promises and the Balfour Declaration.[5] In 1915, in an attempt to gain Arab support for the war against Turkey, Sir Henry McMahon, British high commissioner to Egypt, promised Sharif Husain of Mecca, that: "Great Britain [was] prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca."[6] The Balfour Declaration contradicted this pledge. In November 1917, in order to win favour amongst Zionists in Britain and the United States, British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour wrote a letter to Lord Walter Rothschild, declaring that British policy aimed at "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."[7] This document is of significant importance as it explicitly associates British governmental support to the Zionist movement. After discussions in the British Cabinet, and consultation with Zionist leaders, Balfour wrote: "I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet."[8] As a result, British mandatory authorities had the impossible task of trying to reconcile two opposed national movements: the Arabs of Palestine and Syria, who claimed the territory by right of possession and McMahon's promise,

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[4] MacKay, *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 134.

[5] David Jay Bercuson, *Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 4, 5.

[6] *Ibid*., 4. It is clarified by the author that this included Palestine.

[7] *Ibid.*, 5; Arthur James Balfour, *Arthur James Balfour to Lord Walter Rothschild, Second Baron Rothschild, 2 November, 1917*, Letter, Accessed 19 April, 2016, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/the%20balfour%20declaration.aspx.

and the Zionists, who claimed Palestine by historical right and Balfour's pledge.[9] From that point forward, Jewish groups and lobbyists in Britain, Canada and the United States referenced the Balfour Declaration as a written agreement that the British Government had committed to the Zionist cause of securing a homeland for the Jewish diaspora in Palestine.

Some scholars have analysed the Canadian government's institutional policy toward Palestine and Israel within positivist frameworks. Yves Engler, in his text *The Black Book of Canadian Foreign Policy*, uses a simplistic, agency-based model to explain Canada's decision-making process. "Ottawa mandarins" he argues, "supported Israel as a possible western outpost in the heart of the Middle East."[10] In an attempt to debunk the characterization of Canada being an *honest broker*, Engler constructs a linear narrative by attributing Zionist sympathies, *possibly* held by senior bureaucrats and government leaders like Lester Bowles Pearson (the under-secretary of state) and Supreme Court Justice Ivan C. Rand (Canada's representative to UNSCOP), to the Government of Canada's official policy to support the Partition Plan at the UN and the eventual creation of the State of Israel.[11] This is problematic as there is insufficient evidence to support the claim that Zionism directly influenced the government's official policy toward Palestine–that so-called *mandarins* always supported the idea of the State of Israel. In 1943, A.J. Freiman, the President of the Zionist Federation, urged Prime Minister William Lyon MacKenzie King to put pressure on the British Government to reverse its 1939 White Paper

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[8] *Ibid*.

[9] Bercuson, *Canada and the Birth of Israel*, 6.

[10] Yves Engler, *The Black Book of Canadian Foreign Policy*, (Vancouver: RED Publishing, 2009), 57; Stephen Brooks, "The Policy Analysis Profession in Canada," *Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art*, ed. Laurent Dobuzinskis, David H. Laycock, and Michael Howlett, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 33. Brooks describes how Ottawa mandarins wielded significant influence on

decision to halt Jewish immigration to Palestine.[12] Elizabeth P. MacCallum, a Middle East expert and DEA policy advisor to the Prime Minister, "rejected all of Freiman's arguments."[13] Moreover, after reading her report, Hume Wrong, associate under-secretary of state for external affairs and MacCallum's immediate supervisor, concluded that: "I would myself be loath to see any strong advocacy by the Canadian government of a particular solution to the Palestine problem. No matter what may be done about the White Paper, Palestine will remain, for a long time, a troubled area."[14] Therefore, Engler's argument that senior officials in Ottawa were overwhelmingly pro-Zionist is historically inaccurate. Furthermore, his methodological approach is flawed, as it conceptualises the power to create policy as emanating almost exclusively from government agents (whom he erroneously generalises as being sympathetic to the Zionist movement).

Using positivist frameworks to conduct historical analysis of issues as complex as the Israel/Palestine question is problematic from onset, as they are inherently designed to resolve simple problems. As design theorists and systems analysts Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber argue: "[t]he difficulties attached to rationality are tenacious . . . the classical paradigm of science and engineering–the paradigm that has underlain modern professionalism–is not

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policy following the Second World War. However, this is not substantial evidence to support the claim that these individuals were completely sympathetic to the Zionist movement in Canada.

[11] Engler, *The Black Book of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 54 - 57.

[12] Bercuson, *Canada and the Birth of Israel*, 22.

[13] *Ibid*., 23; Richard Newport, "The Outsider: Elizabeth P. MacCallum, the Canadian Department of External Affairs, and the Palestine Mandate to 1947," PhD Dissertation, Carleton University, 2014, ii, 1. Newport highlights MacCallum's expertise in his dissertation: "From 1925 to 1935, as a research analyst and author for the Foreign Policy Association . . . she gained international recognition for her scholarship on the problems and challenges confronting the Middle East, and Palestine in particular."

[14] Bercuson, *Canada and the Birth of Israel*, 26.

applicable to the problems of open societal systems."[15] In order to explain complex societal issues, and create linear narratives, these frameworks exclude information, facts and ambiguities from discussion. Take for example, Escott Reid and Michael Hart, both of whom have constructed rationalist narratives about Canadian foreign policy of the 1940s and 1950s, using a simplistic model that romanticises one historical era over another. Writing in the late 1960s looking toward the future, Reid claims that: "the next ten years could become a *golden decade* in Canadian foreign policy comparable to the great decade of 1941 to 1951 [emphasis added]."[16] Similarly, in his analysis of Pearson as foreign minister, Hart states that: "[h]e saw Canada's role as an 'honest broker' or 'helpful fixer' as responding . . . to the idealistic streak in Canadians' character . . . who had brought Canada what is now nostalgically referred to Canada's 'golden age'."[17] Accounts like these are constructed by highlighting the stark contrast between Canada's negative approach to the League of Nations and its considerable involvement with the UN.[18] From a methodological perspective, this coherent rational narrative about Canadian policy can only emerge by *othering* the preceding administration, and by excluding ambiguous and possibly negative outcomes from Pearson's actions. As a result, Pearson and Louis St. Laurent are linked with this *golden age* of diplomacy, at the expense of King being "depicted less favourably."[19] According to Rittel and Webber, this conclusion is flawed because complex problems, like the

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[15] Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," *Policy Sciences* 4, no. 2 (1973): 160.

[16] Escott Reid, "Canada Foreign Policy, 1967-1977 A Second Golden Decade," *International Journal*, 22 (1966): 171.

[17] Michael Hart, *From Pride to Influence: Towards a New Canadian Foreign Policy*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 84 – 85. Although Hart acknowledges that this concept of a *golden age* of diplomacy exists, he does not refute it.

[18] Hector Mackenzie, "Knight Errant, Cold Warrior or Cautious Ally? Canada on the United Nations Security Council, 1948–1949," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 7, no. 4 (2009): 453.

[19] *Ibid*., 454.

Israel/Palestine question, "are inherently different from the problems that scientists . . . and engineers deal with" and therefore require different methodological approaches.[20]

Some post-positivist theories are also ineffective at explaining the Israel/Palestine problem. In his *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, Jean-François Lyotard argues that: "scientific knowledge does not represent the totality of knowledge," despite the fact that it attempts to legitimate itself "to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject."[21] Rejecting this modernist construct, Lyotard expands upon Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of *language games*, claiming that: "various categories of utterance can be defined in terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which they can be put in exactly the same way, as the game of chess is defined by a set of rules."[22] Although Lyotard's approach is useful for countering positivist frameworks, it is flawed as it privileges language over all other factors, such as institutional power. Within his critique of modernity, these and other discourses do not exist, only language games wherein truth is established within a particular language system.[23]

This leads to simplistic conceptualisations of complex issues. As policy theorist Raul Perez Lejano points out, "[when] taking a cue from Lyotard, all policy discussions [are] nothing other than language games . . . policy-making must then be simply a competition over the best

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[20] Rittel and Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory,"160.

[21] Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, Vol. 10, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 7, 23.

[22] *Ibid*., 10.

[23] Raul Perez Lejano, "Postpositivism and the Policy Process," *Routledge Handbook of Public Policy*, ed. Eduardo Araral, Scott Fritzen, Michael Howlett, M. Ramesh, and Xun Wu, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 100.

discourse."[24] When analysing the Israel/Palestine problem within this framework, the "more influential, better resourced interest group wins the policy battle."[25] Within the context of understanding how the Canadian government arrived at its decision to support partition, one could then argue that when compared with the Arab lobby in Canada, the Zionist lobby directly influenced policy because of its size and influence. For example, Middle East historian Eliezer Tauber argues that: "[b]ecause Arab lobbying in Canada was no match for Zionist lobbying, its influence on Canadian policy making was nil."[26] Although this observation is accurate, Tauber attributes it as the only relevant discourse that influenced Canadian policy. After quoting former Canadian delegate to the UN, George Ignatieff as stating that Canadian delegates "were clearly more responsive . . . to Jewish pressure and influence than they were to Arabs," Tauber concludes that "not only did the Canadian government ignore the Arab standpoint and support the Palestine partition plan, but the Canadian delegates to the United Nations were actually among the partition's main initiators."[27] His conclusion is problematic as it relies on the premise that because the Zionist lobby constructed a more convincing narrative, it therefore directly influenced policy. This discourse alone did not shape Canada's decision to a multifaceted issue like the Israel/Palestine question. In fact, as David Bercuson argues, in the mid 1940s: "the Zionist lobby in Canada had completely failed to achieve its aims; Canadian policy had not been influenced," to the degree desired.[28] Thus, this particular methodological approach, espoused by

[24] *Ibid*., 104.
[25] *Ibid*.
[26] Eliezer Tauber, "The Palestine Question in the 1940s and the Emergence of the Arab Lobby in Canada," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 40, no. 4 (2010): 537.
[27] *Ibid*.
[28] Bercuson, *Canada and the Birth of Israel*, 33.

Lyotard of narrowly focusing on language over all other discourses and factors, can result in a simplistic evaluation of complex problems.

Post-structuralist theory is a useful tool to uncover what is absent from these historical narratives. Derrida characterizes this concept of the *other* as an attempt to privilege presence over absence, thus creating these rational linear-based narratives. "The formal essence of the signified is *presence,*" he argues, "and the privilege of its proximity to the logos. . . is the privilege of presence."[29] Derrida demonstrates that this idea of the *other* is never to be found in its full being, that half of it is always *not there*.[30] Furthermore, he claims that binary opposites are not completely autonomous from one another as the structure of a sign is determined by the *trace* of that other which is absent or excluded.[31] This concept of the *trace* is effective at deconstructing historical narratives on Canadian foreign policy, predicated on the assumption that a shift in direction occurred from King to St. Laurent (via Pearson in the DEA), which ushered in a *golden age* of Canadian diplomacy. Kim Richard Nossal, for example, argues that Canada embraced liberal internationalism under the leadership of Pearson in the late 1940s, because, among other things, of its "involvement with, and support for *international institutions*" like the UN.[32] Similarly, Zachariah Kay, in his *The Diplomacy of Prudence: Canada and Israel, 1948 – 1958*, characterizes the decade from 1947 to 1957 as "[t]he Emergence of Liberal

[29] Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 88.

[30] *Ibid*., 15.

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] Kim Richard Nossal, "The Liberal Past in Conservative Present: Internationalism in the Harper Era," *Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Claire Turenne Sjolander and Heather Ann Smith, (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2013), 23.

Internationalism."[33] Claiming that Canada adopted a "cautious approach to international relations," Kay romanticises the discourse of internationalism by describing it in stark contrast to the preceding era dominated by the supposed "self-effacing and British-orientated William Lyon Mackenzie King."[34] Both of these scholars attempt to construct linear historical narratives by engaging in the methodological practice of conceptualising King and St. Laurent's foreign policies as being separate from and in opposition to one another. In order to achieve this, they exclude certain discourses and information from analysis – namely the impact that King's policy decisions had on those of the St. Laurent government. For instance, King directed senior bureaucrats in the DEA and Canadian representatives at the UN to keep in step with the policies favoured by the US and UK, Canada's oldest and closest allies.[35] There is no evidence to suggest that his successor reversed this decision. In fact, as one historian argues: "[i]n spite of a general belief that the advent of St. Laurent and Pearson heralded a transformation in attitudes and actions, King's successors did not depart significantly from those instructions."[36] This is evident when analysing Canada's actions at the diplomatic level. In 1947, the British and American governments took opposite sides in the conflict between the Arabs and Jews–the American officials pressuring Britain to allow Jewish refugees into Palestine.[37] Throughout the controversy, like its predecessor, the St. Laurent government acted cautiously, uncertain how to respond when its traditional allies disagreed, anxious to align its policies and actions with

[33] Zachariah Kay, *Diplomacy of Prudence: Canada and Israel, 1948-1958*, (Montreal:McGill-Queen's Press, 1996), xiii, 4.
[34] *Ibid*.
[35] Mackenzie, "Knight Errant," 469.
[36] *Ibid*., 458.
[37] *Ibid*., 458 – 459.

theirs.[38] Therefore, despite the fact that Nossal and Kay have excluded this information from their narratives, traces of King's policy direction are resonant within his successor's administration. Furthermore, by constructing this false dichotomy between the two administrations, Nossal and Kay perpetuate the myth that Canada deliberately strove to emerge as a middle power – with little evidence to support this. John Wendell Holmes – former under-secretary of state and Canadian diplomat posted to the UN during this era–dismisses suggestions that Canada strove to become a "moderate, mediating middle-power [as] there was little, if any, talk about a role at all."[39] He further diminishes this argument by adding that the idea of Canada acting as a "linch-pin . . . between the [US and UK] was popular with after-dinner speakers, but . . . had little real significance. The tone of Canadian memoranda on the UN was often too peremptory to suggest that of a compromiser."[40] Thus, Derrida's use of *trace* is an effective analytical tool as it destabilises linear narratives revealing what information and concepts have been both excluded and constructed by the author. With this in mind, positivist frameworks are not effective at analysing complex issues like the Israel/Palestine question, as they fail provide an accurate "account of what goes on in government and society at large."[41]

In his *Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy*, Bercuson evaluates Canada's role in dealing with the Israel/Palestine question. Although he provides substantial evidence to support his argument that pro-Zionist Jewish lobbyists did not explicitly influence Canadian foreign policy in the Middle East, his approach is problematic as it privileges

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[38] *Ibid*., 461.

[39] Mackenzie, "Knight Errant," 454; John Wendell Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order,1943-1957*, Vol. 2, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1982), 41.

[40] Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace*, 41.

[41] Lejano, "Postpositivism," 101.

the diplomatic discourse of *realpolitik* for critical analysis over all other factors. For example, he claims that: "Canada was far more concerned about the impact of the Palestinian question on British-American relations than it was about the fate of Jews or Arabs."[42] By conceptualising power as emanating exclusively from the senior levels of the DEA–whose officials apparently were driven only by diplomatic concerns–Bercuson relies on a structuralist analytical approach. Structuralism, as a methodological framework, is flawed as it constructs meaning by privileging presence over absence, thereby excluding other factors from analysis. As Derrida demonstrates: "the concept of a centered structure is in fact the concept of a play based on a fundamental ground, a play constituted on the basis of a fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude."[43] Bercuson concludes, for instance, that the Canadian government based its decision to support the Partition Plan on what it clearly perceived to be the national interest: "Canada supported what the British or the Americans supported whether or not Canadian policy-makers thought they were right or wrong."[44] He conceptualises this discourse of *realpolitik* as the origin of the Government of Canada's foreign policy toward Israel and Palestine.

Bercuson applies this structuralist approach to his analysis of domestic racism in Canada. He demonstrates that anti-Semitism grew after Zionists attacked British forces in Palestine, by citing how, in 1946, several major newspapers, such as: the *Toronto Telegram* and the *Windsor Star*, expressed opposition to the Zionist movement.[45] Bercuson's assessment of domestic Canadian racism is accurate. For much of its history, Canada maintained its status as a white

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[42] Bercuson, *Canada and the Birth of Israel*, ix.

[43] Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 353.

[44] *Ibid*.

[45] *Ibid*., 45.

settler-colony by enforcing a preference for white, British-origin Protestants in its immigration intake.[46] Irving Abella and Harold Troper clearly demonstrate that the prevailing attitude of Canadian elected and immigration officials towards Jewish refugees in the period from 1933 to 1948 was that "none is too many."[47] "Following British and American immigrants," they argue, "preference was given northern and then central Europeans. At the bottom were Jews, Orientals and blacks."[48] However, Bercuson's methodological approach is problematic as he conceptualises this particular discourse as originating from and remaining within the domestic sphere, without attributing it to the state, or government officials. For example, he argues that although King "appeared to favour opening Canada's doors wider" to Jewish immigrants, "he was unwilling to force the issue against the antagonism of a Quebec that harboured strong anti-semitic [*sic*] prejudices."[49] Thus, within his narrative the people were anti-Semitic, not the government. This approach to analyzing Canadian foreign policy is flawed because government officials had previously enforced racist policies quite publically. In 1939, for example, they refused entry to the SS *St. Louis*, forcing over 900 Jews fleeing Nazi persecution to turn back to Europe, and for many to face imminent death.[50] Although Bercuson discusses domestic anti-Semitism within his narrative, he does not critically analyse how this discourse of racism may have influenced or interacted with the formulation and implementation of Canadian foreign

[46] Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Abigail B. Bakan, "The Racial Contract: Israel/Palestine and Canada," *Social Identities* 14, no. 5 (2008): 647.

[47] Irving Abella and Harold Martin Troper, *None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948*, (University of Toronto Press, 2012), x-xi; Abu-Laban and Bakan, "The Racial Contract," 647.

[48] Abella and Troper, *None Is Too Many*, 5.

[49] Bercuson, *Canada and the Birth of Israel*, 15.

[50] Abu-Laban and Bakan, "The Racial Contract," 647.

policy. This allows him to structure his narrative on the premise that diplomacy is race neutral, that officials acted in the "national interest."

In contrast, Foucault effectively evaluates historiography and positivist approaches to writing history without relying on simplistic analytical tools. Building upon Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics, Foucault discourages historians from attempting "to capture the exact essence of things [in] their purest possibilities . . . because this search assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession."[51] Like other critics of positivism, Foucault does not accept the idea that history is objective. For example, he argues that if historians refuse to "extend [their] faith in metaphysics, if [they] listen to history, [they will] find there is something all together different behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence."[52] Instead of trying to identify the origin or root cause of an issue, Foucault claims that historians should disturb "what was previously considered immobile . . . fragment what was thought unified . . . [and show] the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself."[53] Within this concept of historical analysis, no single discourse or factor can be attributed as the origin of a complex problem like the Israel/Palestine question. Rather, Foucault argues that: "the historical beginning of things is not inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things . . . [i]t is disparity."[54] Conceptualising how different discourses emerge and interact with one another is critically relevant.

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[51] Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rainbow, tr. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherri Simon, (New York: Pantheon,1984), 78.

[52] *Ibid*.

[53] *Ibid*., 82.

[54] *Ibid*., 79.

Foucault views discourses of power as being relational–not fixed or hermetically separate. He argues that a government's use of power – through the implementation of policy – is not solely intended for "the preservation of the state within a general order so much as the preservation of a relation of forces; it is the preservation, maintenance, or development of a *dynamic of forces* [emphasis added]."[55] Instead of trying to locate an overarching meaning in an uninterrupted continuity of historical archives – as Bercuson and others do in their historical narratives – Foucault argues that historians should employ Nietzsche's concept of *entstehung* or emergence: i.e. historical developments are "always produced through a particular stage of forces" instead of flowing from one predominant discourse or origin.[56] Within this framework, emergence delineates the interaction that these forces wage against each other.[57]

By analysing discourses of international diplomacy and domestic racism as being separate from one another, historians and political scientists have constructed narratives either romanticising the *golden age* of diplomacy, or attributing the Government of Canada's foreign policy decisions as being race neutral, structuring their narratives largely around the actions of the DEA. In order to determine what this dynamic of forces is, and understand how they influenced Canada's foreign policy toward Israel/Palestine, the DEA will be decentred as the focal point from which power emanates. Decentering an institution like the DEA problematizes the presumption that the state simply represents the people and acts for the greatest good of the greatest number, or as Bercuson argues, "in the national interest."[58] Decentering the DEA reveals

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[55] Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, ed. Michel Senellart trans. Graham Burchell, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 296.
[56] Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 83.
[57] *Ibid*., 83-84.
[58] Lejano, "Postpositivism,"101.

that the discourse of racism did not emanate exclusively from either domestic or governmental spheres during the post-World War Two era. Instead, as philosopher Charles W. Mills proposes, systemic racism is embedded in the fabric of western society, not just within specific demographics or government departments.[59] He theorizes the entrenchment of white supremacy, identifying this as an "unnamed political system that has made the modern world what it is today."[60] Mills proposes the theory of the *racial contract*: a way to conceptually bridge mainstream political ethics and philosophy (with its emphasis on social contract theory) and that of more critical work which explicitly takes up themes such as history, conquest, slavery, colonialism, imperialism, apartheid, and reparations.[61] He applies a post-positivist approach to the basic definition of race itself, which coincides with Foucault's concept of power. For Mills, "*[w]hiteness is not really a color at all, but a set of power relations*."[62] The point of his theory is to explain and expose the inequities of specific policies by deconstructing "the theories and moral justifications offered in defence of them . . . Thus . . . enabling us to understand the polity's actual history and how these values and concepts have functioned to rationalize oppression, so as to reform them."[63]

A discourse of institutional racism (at the multinational level) interacted with the formulation and implementation of Canadian foreign policy. As the Government of Canada formulated policy in an attempt to contribute to the resolution of the Israel/Palestine issue, its officials engaged and participated directly with the UN. Ivan C. Rand, Canada's representative

[59] Charles W. Mills, "White Time: The Chronic Injustice of Ideal Theory," *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race* 11, no. 01 (2014): 28, 29; Abu-Laban and Bakan, "The Racial Contract," 638.
[60] *Ibid*., 638.
[61] *Ibid*., 640.
[62] *Ibid*., 641; Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract*, (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1997), 127.

to the UNSCOP, worked with other countries' representatives in order to formulate "a plan of partition with provisions for economic unity and constitutional guarantees."[64] By 27 August 1947, seven members of the Committee, including Canada, voted in favour of the Partition Plan.[65] Although Bercuson and Kay have analysed this from a functionalist perspective, focusing mainly on the discourse of diplomacy and international relations, a discourse of institutional racism also emerged as force. Using Mills' methodological approach, political scientists Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Abigail B. Bakan argue that the racialization of categories commonly considered to be race neutral, such as: citizenship, religion and democracy, must be explicitly recognized as part of the continued exercise and reproduction of state power.[66] They evaluate these categories as being part of the continued imperialism and ideological privileging of a constructed and hegemonic whiteness.[67] With this in mind, the UN, like its predecessor, should not be conceptualized as being race neutral. Although there is no evidence to suggest that representatives at the UN, like Ivan Rand, were overtly racist, Mills demonstrates that racialized contractual relations have become embedded in the hegemonic liberal capitalist project of Western ruling elites.[68] As Abu-Laban and Bakan demonstrate, the UN, like its predecessor: "reflected the historic global contract in so far as the countries that were members were heavily from the West, and many parts of the developing world were still under foreign rule."[69] Thus, this discourse of institutional racism destabilises the notion that government officials constructed

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[63] Mills, *The Racial Contract*, 5-6; Abu-Laban and Bakan, "The Racial Contract," 641.
[64] United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly (A/364), New York: UN, 3 September 1947.
[65] *Ibid.*
[66] Abu-Laban and Bakan, "The Racial Contract," 638.
[67] *Ibid.*, 638.
[68] *Ibid.*, 641.

Canada's foreign policy toward Israel and Palestine based solely on the national interest within a race neutral environment. From a post-positivist perspective, policy is not simply designed in a central location and diffused outward; rather, it undergoes transformation and redesign as new policy actors take on the institutional norm and make use of it.[70] In this particular case, a discourse of racism contributed the institutional norm of the UN and its decision making process.

Bercuson is correct in his assessment that Zionism did not directly influence Canadian policy makers in their decision to support the Partition Plan. However, he limits his analysis to evaluating Zionism in relation to how it failed to influence government officials. Decentering the DEA allows Zionism to be analysed in conjunction with these Western discourses of domestic and institutional racism. As previously discussed, Canada originally labelled both Jews and Arabs as non-white, undesirable immigrants.[71] Abu-Laban and Bakan attribute this policy of prohibiting the entry of the non-white immigrants to: "the historic project of modeling Canada after Britain politically, economically, culturally, socially, and demographically as a white settler colony."[72] Based on Mills' premise that race is a construct, and not something that is fixed and fundamentally immobile, Abu-Laban and Bakan demonstrate that although the Jewish diaspora in North America were originally viewed as being *less than white*, this pattern should not be conceptualised as being static. "In liberal democracies, from the post-World War Two period through to the present," they argue "a notable and dramatic transition in the socio-economic and

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[69] *Ibid*., 648.
[70] Lejano, "Postpositivism," 106.
[71] Abu-Laban and Abigail B. Bakan, "The Racial Contract," 645; Baha Abu-Laban, "Arab-Canadians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Arab Studies Quarterly* (1988): 110.
[72] Abu-Laban and Bakan, "The Racial Contract," 645.

racial positioning of Jewish citizens developed."[73] This is partly due to the interaction of the Zionist discourse with that of Western racism. Nineteenth-century European Zionists shared similar characteristics with other nationalist movements of the time, except they did not possess a land of their own.[74] Over the span of time, through the assertion of Zionism, the non-white Jewish victims of anti-Semitism asserted a bridge from non-whiteness to whiteness, by identifying with the Western racist discourses of global hegemony, Orientalism and colonialism.[75] Take for instance the language used by some Zionists to describe the Arabic inhabitants of Palestine. In August 1943, the *Montreal Star* published this comment from a rabbi: "Arabs are by nature a lazy people. They have dried up the land in Palestine and turned it into a desert. Therefore England should give this land to the Jews. They can make it flourish as it used to in Roman times."[76] Similarly, prominent Zionist playwright, Theodor Herzl, described Palestinians as "dirty Arabs", and the space in which they inhabited as "blackened Arab villages whose inhabitants looked like brigands."[77] Over time, Zionism – as a nationalist discourse and conservative ideological response to European anti-Semitism – developed and identified with the Western colonial discourse of imperialist expansion.[78]

Deconstructing the notion that the discourse of *realpolitik* alone influenced Canada's response to the Israel/Palestine question, or that this era represents a *golden age* in Canadian diplomatic history, also allows for a better assessment of the actual consequences that resulted

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[73] Abu-Laban and Bakan, "The Racial Contract," 643.
[74] Walid Khalidi, "Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine." *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 18, no. 1 (1988): 7.
[75] Abu-Laban and Bakan, "The Racial Contract," 646.
[76] Baha Abu-Laban, "Arab-Canadians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," 110.
[77] Abu-Laban and Bakan, "The Racial Contract," 646.
[78] *Ibid*., 644.

from the implementation of the Partition Plan–a policy the Canadian delegates helped design. Positivist analytical models, such as those adopted by Bercuson and Kay are limiting as they exclude any real analysis of these consequences. For instance, these scholars have not provided an in-depth analysis of the ethnic cleansing of Palestine in relation to the Government of Canada's decision to support the Partition Plan at the UN. This is methodologically problematic, because as one expert on race points out: "[w]hen history takes place, it does so in actual spaces. Among aggrieved groups, history also takes places away, leaving some people . . . displaced, disinherited, [and] dispossessed."[79] This is certainly the case with respect to the Israel/Palestine question. On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly passed Resolution 181(2) partitioning Palestine into two separate states.[80] The vast majority of the Jewish public accepted this plan, while most Palestinians, Arab leaders and Arab governments rejected it.[81] According to historian Illan Pappe, sections of the Israeli military conducted a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing to ensure that land, previously held by indigenous Palestinians, could be declared open to permanent Jewish-only settlement.[82] As a result, during the Nakba, approximately 800,000 Palestinians were uprooted from their homes, 531 Palestinian villages destroyed, and 11 Palestinian urban neighbourhoods emptied of their inhabitants.[83] Although some historians like Bercuson, have included a chapter on Canada's response to the Palestinian refugee issue, the Nakba is not critically analysed or discussed, despite the fact that Canadian government officials

[79] George Lipsitz, *How Racism Takes Place*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011), 20; Charles W. Mills, "White Time: The Chronic Injustice of Ideal Theory," *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race* 11, no. 01 (2014): 29.

[80] United Nations Archives and Records Management Section, *Summary of AG-057 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) (1947)*, (New York: UN, 1949), 1.

[81] Benny Morris, *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 75.

at the time reacted to it. For instance, General A.G.L. McNaughton acknowledged this violence during his statement to the Security Council in 1948, when he recommended suspending the Partition Plan: "[i]t is now proposed that this effort should be suspended, at least temporarily," he argued as "Palestine will become a scene of ever increasing violence and disorder . . . a bitter civil war seems likely to break out."[84] Moreover, Pearson admonished those who attributed the violent acts of the Nakba to the UN's decision, by stating in the General Assembly: "[l]et those who charge that this decision was the cause of all the bloodshed and destruction . . . in the last twelve months ask themselves whether there would have been peace and order . . . if a unitary state had been forced."[85] Although this does not prove that Canada's role in crafting and supporting the Partition Plan directly led to the Nakba, it does highlight the fact that policy makers were well aware of the violence, and were willing to publically defend their decision to support the Partition Plan. From a methodological perspective, analysing the Nakba in relation to Canadian foreign policy problematizes those historical narratives narrowly focused on either government institutions or romanticized notions of Canadian political and diplomatic history.

Positivist-based approaches to historical analysis do not adequately explain how the Canadian government dealt with the complex and multifaceted Israel/Palestine question. This is due to fact that they are predicated on linear-based scientific, rationalist models designed to deal with simple issues. No single explanatory factor, such as *realpolitik* or racism, shaped the

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[82] Abu-Laban and Bakan, "The Racial Contract," 648.

[83] Ilan Pappe, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007*), 21.

[84] A.G.L. McNaughton, Speech, United Nations Security Council, New York, 24 March 1948. *Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents*. ed. Robert Alexander MacKay, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 141.

[85] LB. Pearson, Speech, United Nations General Assembly, New York, 22 November

Government of Canada's foreign policy in the Middle East. Post-structuralist models, such as those adopted by Derrida, Foucault and Mills, are effective at destabilizing linear frameworks and narratives, demonstrating how they privilege specific discourses over others, and as a result, exclude key historical events – like the Nakba – from analysis. By decentring the Canadian DEA as the institutional focal point of analysis, this essay demonstrates that discourses of institutional and domestic racism interacted with the formulation and implementation of the Government of Canada's foreign policy toward Israel and Palestine. With this in mind, when analysing the government's formulation and implementation of institutional policy toward Israel and Palestine: "[t]here is no ground for neutrality."[86] Despite the fact that Canadian officials did not deliberately implement this policy with the aim of causing the ethnic cleansing of Palestine, the Government of Canada is still complicit in "the dispossession of the Palestinian people . . . [as] Canada not only voted in favour of the Partition Plan, despite Britain's abstention, but played a central role in developing this option."[87]

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1948, *Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents*, ed. Robert Alexander MacKay, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 143.

[86] Abu-Laban and Bakan, "The Racial Contract," 652.

[87] *Ibid*., 652-653.

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