National Defence / Défense nationale

Canadian Forces College

Collège des Forces Canadiennes

NO SEXUALIZED JOKES, NO WINKS, NO NODS: ELIMINATION OF HARMFUL SEXUAL BEHAVIOUR THROUGH CULTURE CHANGE IN THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

Maj S.J. Gillis

JCSP 42	PCEMI 42
Exercise *Solo Flight*	**Exercice *Solo Flight***

Canada

NO SEXUALIZED JOKES, NO WINKS, NO NODS: ELIMINATION OF HARMFUL SEXUAL BEHAVIOUR THROUGH CULTURE CHANGE IN THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

Maj S.J. Gillis

NO SEXUALIZED JOKES, NO WINKS, NO NODS: ELIMINATION OF HARMFUL SEXUAL BEHAVIOUR THROUGH CULTURE CHANGE IN THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

INTRODUCTION

Like most other militaries around the world, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has traditionally been an all-male dominion.[1] Unfortunately, the integration of women into militaries has highlighted issues related to sexual misconduct, harassment and rape. During his change of command ceremony, the incoming Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), General Jonathan Vance said "It [harmful sexual behavior] is a threat to morale. It is a threat to operational readiness and a threat to this institution".[2] General Vance took command and quickly released the order to initiate Operation *Honour* within thirty days but studies show that "easy quick fix solutions" are unlikely to prevent sexual assault[3] and therefore a more fulsome and comprehensive approach is required for the CAF to permanently change harmful sexual behaviours.

The authors of "The Shadow Organization" claim that every organization is really made up of two organizations[4]. The first organization is the visible one comprising policies and procedures; they describe this as the tip of the ice berg. The second or "shadow" organization is the organization that lies beneath the surface and is made up of day-to-day behaviours, habits,

---

[1] Lana Obradovic, "Be All She Can Be: Gender Integration in NATO Military Forces", (dissertation, The City University of New York, 2010), 1.

[2] General Jonathan Vance, 17 July 2015, Change of Command Address. Quoted by CBC. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/gen-jonathan-vance-becomes-chief-of-defence-staff-vows-to-tackle-harassment-1.3156520.

[3] Megan Schmid, "Combating a Different Enemy: Proposals to Change the Culture of Sexual Assault in the Military", *Villanova Law Review*, Vol 5, 2010, 478.

[4] Robert Allen, Colin Park, and Saul Pilnick, "The Shadow Organization", *Management Accounting* (pre-1986), 55, 7, January 1974, 11.

and human interactions.[5] This is an important concept if one agrees that organizational cultures are normative systems in that "the most effective way for an organization to change human behavior is by changing the culture".[6] Perhaps if the CAF focuses on the social interactions at all levels and environments, the culture within the massive shadow organization will shift over time creating a social environment where sexualized behavior is eliminated and not accepted.

The normative system concept is based on three premises; the most important of which to the way forward discussed in this paper is that "people are capable of designing and shaping the cultures of which they are part rather than merely being shaped by them".[7] This premise can be leveraged along with institutional-driven changes to affect long-term change.

This paper will argue that the CAF can change harmful sexualized behavior by addressing its day-to-day culture. While the CAF has taken immediate action relying on a top-down leadership approach with Operation *Honour*, this paper will argue that a combination of bottom-up leadership, policy change and targeted training will have a long-lasting effect on the culture of the CAF and therefore presents the best opportunity for permanent behavioural change.

The paper will begin by discussing the current situation regarding sexual misconduct within the CAF. The paper will discuss the conflicting role that masculinity plays in both the problem and the solution. The paper will then discuss the theory of cultural change advocated by Geert Hofstede as a basis for developing the CAF's response and way ahead. This paper will also discuss the role of the bystander in making permanent changes to behaviour. Throughout the

---

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] Stan Silverzweig and Robert Allen, 'Changing the Corporate Culture", *Sloan Management Review*, Spring 1976. 33.

[7] *Ibid.*

paper, specific complimentary mechanisms available to the CAF in a multi-pronged approach to cultural change will be presented.

BACKGROUND

Stories of sexual assault, harassment, and misconduct are not new to the CAF but the most recent public concern is being driven in part by continued public coverage of stories of sexual misconduct within other institutions such as university campuses and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) among others. On May 16, 2014 Noemi Mercier and Alec Castonguay released an investigative article for Maclean's magazine, which highlighted the dismal state of sexual assault, sexual harassment and sexual violence in the CAF. The article pulled no punches, describing a sexualized culture within the CAF and an organization seemingly unwilling to act.

With impressive expediency, the CDS ordered an independent investigation into the state of affairs related to sexual misconduct in the CAF; this would become known as the Deschamps Report named after the team lead Marie Deschamps, a former Supreme Court of Canada justice. The External Review Authority (ERA) was asked to make recommendations concerning:

> adequacy of definitions in defence administrative orders; adequacy of policies, procedures and programs related to sexual misconduct / harassment; resources dedicated to sexual misconduct / harassment programs; extent of CAF members reporting incidents and related issues; and any other matters the ERA considered relevant.[8]

The ERA was limited in its scope and ordered to refrain from reviewing many matters related to the CAF's military justice system including decisions at summary trials, court marshals or by military judges. Additionally, the ERA could not review any "decisions made in the

---

[8] Marie Deschamps, *External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces*, 27 March, 2015, 4.

discretion to investigate complaints, lay charges, proceed with charges or prosecute charges".[9] This limitation, while reasonable when considering the potential scope and dangerous outcomes, limited the investigators from analyzing a key factor in how the CAF responds to cases of sexual misconduct that are reported.

The 87 page report was the result of many months of interviews, focus groups, and town halls with over 700 individuals across the country at many CAF locations. The report may have had more validity if the members had been selected randomly rather than volunteering or being "voluntold" as reported in the report.[10] Regardless, the report is comprehensive and gives a strong impression that there is a serious cultural problem within the CAF and robust broad action is required if the CAF is to remain a professional institution in the eyes of Canadians.

It's A Wicked Problem

Rittel and Webber describe wicked problems using ten criteria.[11] While all are applicable to the current state of affairs in the CAF regarding sexual misconduct, some are more troublesome than others. Firstly, the problem of sexual misconduct is very difficult to define. The Deschamps report discusses a plethora of issues but the causal factors are more infinite than just a training or cultural problem. External pressures and influences such as misogynistic views in society are at play. The requirement for a military force to apply controlled lethal violence may require attributes in individuals that are counter-intuitive to solving this masculine-driven challenge that can manifest itself as sexual misconduct; this makes defining the problem and the solution difficult.

---

[9] *Ibid.*
[10] *Ibid.*, 6.
[11] Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning", *Policy Sciences*, 4, (1973), 155-169.

Perhaps the most important element of a wicked problem in the case of sexual misconduct in the CAF is that the CAF has no right to be wrong. As organizations such as the CAF, RCMP and universities struggle with elusive solutions, it only takes one or two independent instances of sexual misconduct to bring down the institution's legitimacy regardless of any successful initiatives or change. The CAF must remain cognizant of this key element and continue to press forward despite likely setbacks. Program developers must design change initiatives such that they will withstand leadership changes but be flexible enough such that they can overcome long-term challenges.

Operation *Honour*

The CAF's initial response to the Deschamps report came from the CDS, General Lawson, on 16 June 2015 when he told Peter Mansbridge during a televised interview that "we're biologically wired in a certain way and there will be those who believe it is a reasonable thing to press themselves and their desires on others."[12] Reacting to public outcry, it took the government of the day only a month to replace General Lawson with General Johnathan Vance who within another month launched Operation *Honour* on 14 August 2015.

Operation *Honour*, the CAF's official response to the Deschamps report, is typical of a military operation order. It provides the commander's intent and drills down execution phases to follow in the fullness of time. While much of the immediate weight is transferred to subordinate commanders, the order does describe future activities, some in detail, to take place as the CAF develops a more fulsome and informed plan.

---

[12] General Tom Lawson, televised interview with Peter Mansbridge, 16 June 2015. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/military-sexual-misconduct-due-to-biological-wiring-gen-tom-lawson-tells-cbc-news-1.3115993

Key elements of Operation *Honour* include all CAF commanders' implementation of CDS direction, the opening of the Sexual Misconduct Response Centre (Interim) (SMRC(I)), application of strict discipline as related to inappropriate sexual behavior, revision of CAF policies, and long-term vigilance with regards to eliminating inappropriate sexual behavior.[13]

Operation *Honour* was desperately needed in order for the CAF to give confidence back to Canadians that the CAF is taking the issue of sexual violence within its ranks seriously. Now the hard part begins with long-term implementation and sustained success. As discussed in the introduction, the intent of this paper is not to analyze Operation *Honour* as its initiatives are ongoing but this paper will attempt to tease out issues related specifically to changing the "norms of conduct in the CAF that appear to fall below what would be tolerated in most workplaces".[14]

Legitimacy

Duty With Honour explains that for the profession of arms, or the CAF, to maintain legitimacy within Canada it must "embody the same values and beliefs as the society it defends". [15] This basic interpretation of legitimacy can be misleading when we have Members of Parliament responsible for the Status of Women in Canada exclaiming that sexism is "deeply rooted and pervasive" in Canadian society.[16] It is important that CAF members understand the importance of espousing aspirational national values and beliefs. This unfortunate dichotomy is an important issue as the ERA found "many officers were quick to excuse sexual incidents in the CAF on the basis that this kind of conduct is a reflection of Canadian society".[17] It is important

---

[13] CDS Operation Order, Operation HONOUR, 14 August 2015.
[14] Deschamps report, 21.
[15] Department of National Defence, *Duty With Honour* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2009), 31.
[16] John Paul Tasker, "Conservative MP Michelle Rempel Says She Faced Sexism, Unwanted Touching", CBC News, 18 April 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/michelle-rempel-sexual-harassment-1.3541189
[17] Deschamps report, 18.

that any CAF cultural change reflect this aspirational perspective on Canadian values and these aspirational values are clearly communicated and entrenched in the CAF ethics program.

Strategy

Harmful sexual behavioral problems are not exclusive to the CAF. It seems that almost weekly a new case of sexual misconduct is reported on national news, but institutional responses to many cases have been victim-focused. An excellent example of a victim-centric or post-misconduct based policy is the Draft Sexual Violence Policy developed by Carlton University; while this policy should be cutting-edge, it is largely focused on what actions will be taken after assaults occur but does very little to outline a plan for prevention.[18] Perhaps this is a reflection of lack of stakeholder involvement in policy development. Its first guiding "principle" in fact is that the university will be "survivor focused";[19] this will do little for preventing sexual assaults on campus. The CAF will only be successful in maintaining its legitimacy if it invites stakeholders to the table and takes aim at the root causes of harmful sexual behavior using a prevention-focused strategy.

Root Causes

The preponderance of research seems to indicate that sexual violence is often more about power than sexual desire; furthermore, much evidence indicates that micro-cultures such as the military culture can be an environment that increases the risk of harmful sexual behavior. The Deschamps report indicates that the "norms of conduct in the CAF appear to fall below what would be tolerated in most workplaces".[20] Importantly, the report also goes on to state that

---

[18] Draft Sexual Violence Policy, Carlton University, 15 March 2016.
[19] *Ibid.*, 3.
[20] Deschamps report, 21.

military members "do not simply work for the CAF, but work, socialize and often live within institutional and social structures established by the military".[21] This is an important consideration as a prevention-focused plan is developed; this close socialization can be leveraged in making permanent behavioural change.

Many studies have shown that military cultures around the world are replete with aggression of many forms towards women such as "misogynistic jokes, denigrating glances and sexual harassment."[22] A major and often cited study was conducted by Madeline Morris in 1996, which compared rape cases in the US military to the same in civil society. She found that while rates of normal crimes were significantly lower in the military, the delta with sexual assaults were not nearly as significant, indicating that acts of sexual assaults are abnormally high within the military.[23] Morris concludes that military gender and sexual norms may be causal factors contributing to this differential.[24] She also points out that heightened incidences of rapes are associated to other male-dominated groups such as motorcycle gangs, fraternities, and sport teams.[25] Not surprisingly, Morris' study found that incidences of rape were higher in groups where the normative gender and sexual attitudes were more conducive to rape;[26] a reasonable person can extrapolate this to mean that incidences of lower-level harmful sexual behavior would also be higher in groups where harmful sexual behavior such as sexual jokes or teasing is accepted within the group culture. It is reasonable to assume the CAF does not want to be grouped with motorcycle gangs within the discussion of harmful sexual behaviour so how can it

---

[21] *Ibid.*, 40.
[22] Sabine Koeszegi, Eva Zedlacher and Rene Hudribusch, "The War Against the Female Soldier? The Effects of Masculine Culture on Workplace Aggression", *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol 40(2), 2014, 227.
[23] Leoran Rosen, Kathryn Knudson and Peggy Fancher, "Cohesion and the Culture of Hypermasculinity in US Army Units", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol 29, No 3, Spring 2003, 326.
[24] Madeline Morris, "By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture", *Duke Law Journal 45*, (1996), 761.
[25] *Ibid.*, 698.
[26] *Ibid.*, 706.

drive change? Most feminists argue that the correlation is connected to the masculine nature of militaries.[27]

Significant evidence suggests that masculine socialization is a risk factor for harmful sexual behavior.[28] In her paper "Rape, War, and The Socialization of Masculinity", Zurbriggen outlines a number of dimensions of masculinity and their relevancy to war and sexual assault, many of which are important traits of successful or dominant military personnel. She refers to toughness and aggression as being a strongly correlated dimension between military and rape perpetrators;[29] it is this toughness and aggression that includes the acceptance of violence, which has been shown to be valued traits in militaries.[30] Restricted emotions are another dimension of high correlation between war and rape; it implies that men socialized within masculine groups are taught to suppress their emotions with the only accepted emotion being anger.[31] These dimensions, along with others strongly correlated between rape and war, form the basis for the widely held belief that militaries are overly masculine and therefore are more likely to commit and accept acts of harmful sexual behavior. The connection between masculinity and militarism is well articulated by David Morgan as:

> Of all the sites where masculinities are constructed, reproduced, and deployed, those associated with war and the military are some of the most direct. Despite far-reaching political, social, and technological changes, the warrior still seems to be a key symbol of masculinity. In statues, heroic paintings, comic books, and popular films the gendered connotations are inescapable. The stance, the facial expressions, and the weapons clearly connote aggression, courage, a capacity for violence, and, sometimes, a willingness for sacrifice. The uniform absorbs

---

[27] Eileen Zurbriggen, "Rape, War and The Socialization of Masculinity: Why Our Refusal to Give Up War Ensures That Rape Cannot Be Eradicated", *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 34, 2010, 538-549.

[28] Ashley Jennifer Bickerton, "'Good Soldiers', 'Bad Apples' and the 'Boys' Club': Media Representations of Military Sex Scandals and Militarized Masculinities", (P.h.D dissertation, University of Ottawa, 2015), 27.

[29] *Zurbriggen*, Rape, War, 541.

[30] *Ibid*., 542.

[31] *Ibid*,. 541.

individualities into a generalized and timeless masculinity while also connoting a control of emotion and a subordination to a larger rationality.[32]

Even an individual not associated with the military could draw the likeness to a military environment as described above. In Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping, Sandra Whitworth suggests the military purposefully trains recruits to be more masculine through constant harassment and promotion of elitist attitudes while valuing absolute obedience, courage, physical strength, discipline, and avoidance of emotions such as fear, sadness, uncertainty and guilt.[33] These too are all key indicators of masculine culture.

It is clear from this short discussion above that masculinity is a key dimension of militaries. It is also clear that some masculine dimensions are highly correlated with harmful sexual behavior. If the CAF is going to be successful in eliminating harmful sexual behavior, it will need to have an open discussion about how masculinity will be capitalized on where needed to maintain the warrior spirit and how it will control or minimize some masculine dimensions that make harmful sexual behavior acceptable within the CAF. This culture change will be critical to the success and legitimacy of the CAF moving forward.

CULTURE CHANGE

Collective Programming

Before one can focus on changing culture within an organization, one must first understand culture. Within the context of organizational behavior, culture can be simply defined as the sum of beliefs that shape norms of behavior and dictates the ways things get done in an

---

[32] David Morgan, Theatre of War: Combat, the Military, and Masculinities", in *Theorizing Masculinities*, ed. Harry Brod and Micheal Kaufman (London: Sage, 1994), 165.
[33] Sandra Whitworth, *Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 160-162.

organization.[34] Culture has also been defined as a set of behaviors that are generally supported within the group.[35] Geert Hofstede describes culture as "the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another".[36] The CAF certainly does its share of collective programming. CAF members are socialized into the CAF culture through a variety of mechanisms including training, professional development, employment, and other such experiences.[37] As Sandra Whitworth puts it "it [boot camp] is a tightly choreographed process aimed at breaking down the individuality of the recruits and replacing it with a commitment to, and a dependence on, total institution of which they are now part".[38] This total institution is described as such by Whitworth because "the military world has its own unique set of norms of behavior and dress, its own judicial system, and its own right and responsibilities".[39] While this exclusiveness or insulation from society can be seen as a negative, it may be this very exclusiveness that the CAF can leverage to change behavioural norms and over time, the culture within the CAF.

Now that it has been established that the CAF has its own distinct culture and it has the potential to be somewhat de-linked from society at times due to the 'total institution' concept, we must evaluate what must be changed within the CAF culture to ensure behaviours reflect the aspirational Canadian values where all persons in contact with those in uniform are safe from harmful sexual behaviour of any kind. It will be important to have frank discussion with regards

---

[34] Dimitrios Belias, and Athanasios Koustelios, "The Impact of Leadership and Change Management Strategy on Organiational Culture," *European Scientific Journal*, vol 10 no. 7 (March 2014): 453.
[35] Silversweig, *Changing the Corporate Culture*, 33.
[36] Geert Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations*, (London: McGraw-Hill Book company, 1991), 5.
[37] Department of National Defence, *Cultural Intelligence and Leadership*, (Winnipeg: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2008), 43.
[38] Whitworth, Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping, 155.
[39] *Ibid.*, 156.

to the masculine versus feminine organizational attributes and what attributes the CAF should be programming into new recruits and also into currently serving military members.

Hofstede offers a model where strategy, structure, control and culture all interact with each other and have two-way relationships.[40] This model implies that any of the four elements can be affected or changed by adjusting other elements. This supports the determination that a multi-pronged approach is required to change the culture within the CAF. Control mechanisms such as policies and processes can influence by regulating behaviour of CAF members. Control mechanisms may include acceptable codes of conduct and requisite discipline or administrative systems to enforce these policies.[41] For example, adjustments could be made to the CAF harassment program to make it easier and quicker to respond. The latest Conservative Government tabled a new Bill (Bill C-71)[42] that would have given victims' rights to military members similar to those provided by Canadian Victim Bill of Rights introduced in April 2014. Unfortunately, the changing of governments left this new Bill unfinished after only its First Reading in the House of Commons. This Bill, if the new Government picks it up,[43] should increase the likelihood that victims will come forward thus creating consequences for perpetrators and perhaps preventing future harmful sexual behavior. If potential perpetrators see a likely potential outcome as a conviction rather than silence, perhaps they will think twice before committing acts of harmful sexual behaviour. There are many other policies that can be explored and even borrowed from non-military communities that can be implemented to support cultural change.

---

[40] Geert Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences*, (London: Sage Publications, 2001), 409.
[41] *Ibid.*, 408.
[42] Bill C-71, Victims Rights in the Military Justice System Act,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISInfo/BillDetails.aspx?billId=8045337&Language=E&Mode=1&View=8.
[43] Victor Choi, "Why Trudeau Should Commit to Passing This Victims' Right Bill, *Huffington Post*, 11 October, 2015.
http://www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISInfo/BillDetails.aspx?billId=8045337&Language=E&Mode=1&View=8.

Structure of the organization such as reporting relationships, reporting mechanisms, working environment adjustment are all examples of how structural change can impact organizational culture. Although the CAF has already implemented change in this area with the establishment of the SMRC(I), there is room for improvement. Jessica Ladd of Callisto presents a fantastic system concept in her Ted Talk "The Reporting System That Sexual Assault Survivors Want"[44] The concept is an on-line tool that enables easy time-stamped reporting of harmful sexual behaviour even if a victim isn't ready to report the incident to authorities. The system stores the information until such time the victim would like to take action or until the system receives a second allegation against the same perpetrator. The system can identify the matched perpetrator and take action with the victims knowing they are not alone. This has excellent potential to prevent repeat offenders and create permanent change in the military environment. The work and social environment can also be changed by eliminating low-level harmful sexual behaviour such as derogatory comments and sexualized language. These are just small examples of changes that can be made to improve the current situation.

Strategy may be the easiest of all elements to change or adjust. Strategy can impact culture by driving the organization in a specific direction. Strategy in line with a desired cultural change can have profound effect on culture. The CDS has shown he is interested in driving change and evidence suggests the CAF is continuing to review and implement options to improve the situation.

In addition to his theory that culture is influenced by strategy, structure and control, Hofstede argues that culture is the product of four elements, which he articulates using his Onion

---

[44] Jessica Ladd, "The Reporting System That Sexual Assault Survivors Want", *Ted Talk*, February 2016. https://www.ted.com/talks/jessica_ladd_the_reporting_system_that_sexual_assault_survivors_want.

Diagram.[45] At the core of the circular diagram are values. Rituals, heroes, and symbols together

make the outer rings he summarizes as practices.[46] If one works with the assumption that CAF

values will not change because they represent Canadian aspirational values then one must

consider altering the other three variables in order to affect cultural change in the CAF.

Symbols

The CAF culture is replete with symbols everywhere. Within the military context

symbols include unit designations and patches, uniforms, ceremonial objects and objects as

simple as a Regimental Sergeant Major's pace stick. Within Hofstede's model of cultural

manifestations, symbols are the most easily changed aspect of culture and therefore are the least

influential of the elements of culture.[47] This paper will not address the manipulation of symbols

as its impact is seen as minor with respect to changing sexualized behaviours. In the fullness of

program implementation however, symbols of a sexualize nature which may exist in less formal

social environments such as messes must be considered and addressed.

Heroes

According to Hofstede, heroes are persons who possess characteristics which are highly

prized in a culture.[48] NCOs act as heroes in the military culture. They are the most

knowledgeable, they have significance influence on the daily activities of the individuals under

their influence and they have proven their worth through advancement or recognition from the

organization. This cohort of leaders was found to be a significant problem area in Deschamps'

---

[45] Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences*, 11.
[46] *Ibid,*, 8.
[47] Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations*, 7.
[48] *Ibid.*, 8.

Report and must be addressed immediately with training and monitoring;[49] they can become strong agents of positive change but right now they may be the biggest hurtle to success.

Formal leaders with authority such as senior NCOs are not the only leaders in the CAF. Former CDS Rick Hillier identifies unofficial leaders as having significant influence within the institution.[50] Unofficial leaders emerge and have significant influence when there is a group perception that the group has differing objectives than the organization,[51] which is an important consideration when resistance may be expected while the CAF pushes to change behaviours and culture. Sometimes the unofficial leaders are obvious while others are more difficult to spot from a distance; identifying these players will be key to having success at the lowest levels of the CAF.

Heroes can easily identifiable if observed by an informed eye. The heroes the CAF is looking for will have three primary identifiers according to Steve Benton and Melissa Giovagnoli; they get involved, they know their stuff, and they influence others.[52] It is important to note that these leaders may be very influential within small or large groups but they may not have a leadership role by virtue of their rank within the CAF and this may be a challenging cultural barrier to overcome when it comes time to embrace and use these unofficial leaders in a more formal manner through identification, training and recognition.

These heroes, if properly identified, trained, and rewarded will form the basis for environmental change within the CAF. This has several advantages over mass training efforts.

---

[49] Deschamps Report, 17.
[50] Rick Hillier, *Leadership: 50 Points of Wisdom For Today's Leader*, (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2010), 141.
[51] Patrick O'Connor, *The New Management of Engineering*, (Stevenage: Lulu Inc: 2004), 35.
[52] Steve Benton and Melissa Giovagnoli, *The wisdom Network*, (AMACOM 2006), adapted by "Find the Unofficial Leaders Within Your Workforce", managebetter.biz, http://www.managebetter.biz/Main/Articles/Find_the_unofficial_leaders_within_your_workforce__24985.aspx

Firstly, training fewer members at intense levels will be more cost effective then training the

masses. Secondly, these heroes will influence others both within and outside of the work

environment due to previously identified social patterns in the CAF, which has a higher potential

for real and lasting change. Thirdly, these heroes will be present in the workplace at all levels

and therefore will be able to influence behaviours even when the official or higher ranking

leaders are not watching. This strong form of active bystander intervention[53] can have significant

ripple effects through the organization.

Rituals

Rituals are activities that are essential within a culture. Rituals within the military context

may be seen in respect for the chain of command, accepted ways of completing tasks or social

innuendos within how military personnel interact with each other within their unit

environment.[54] If positive rituals are reinforced by the heroes in a social or work network then

more impressionable members within that social cohort are more likely to accept and act within

these defined acceptable norms of conduct.

Strong culture is not necessarily a bad organizational trait. Even in an organization like

the CAF where doctrine, standard operating procedures, action-on drills, regulations and policies

abound, there are many situations facing military members where they have to think on their feet

and work their way through a situation with many variables. It is culture that guides members of

an organization in times of ambiguity. As Peters and Waterman wrote when referencing an

organization with a strong culture: "people way down the line know what they are supposed to

---

[53] Helene LeBlanc, " A Study on Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace", Report of the Standing Committee on the Status of Women, 41st Parliament, Second Session, February 2014. 110.

[54] Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations*), 8.

do in most situations because the handful of guiding values is crystal clear".[55] The CAF relies on its strong culture of discipline and places immense responsibility in the hands of very young soldiers, aviators and sailors. One only has to look back at September 1, 1990 during the Oka Crisis where Private Patrick Cloutier stood face to face with Ojibwa warrior Brad Larocque. The 19 year old soldier stood with a stoic stare as the warrior, holding a loaded weapon, asked the private if he was afraid while he explained the feeling when a bullet travels through the body, all while reporters' cameras recorded the confrontation.[56] This confrontation and the soldier's restraint would become the shining example of the CAFs professionalism in the dangerous situation. One could argue it was the Army's culture that gave young Private Cloutier the restraint to not react to the tense situation. The young soldier knew he stood alone but with his comrades and unit closely behind him ready to help if needed. The actions of Private Cloutier were a small example of how culture can positively influence decisions and actions of CAF personnel.

Based on a case study of differing organizational cultures, Hofstede identified six dimensions of perceived practices that set organizations apart from each other and had significant impacts on their cultures along with subsequent behaviours. Without discussing all six in detail, it is worth noting two key dimensions that are applicable to the discussion of culture within the CAF. The first dimension differentiates an organization by how it balances its concern for people compared to its concern for completing the job. In an employee-oriented organization, people feel their personal problems are taken into account, which the organization takes a responsibility for employee welfare and that important decisions are taken by committee.

---

[55] *Ibid.*, 179.

[56] Jennifer Wells, "A Warrior, a Soldier and a photographer – Remembering the Oka Crisis", *The Star*, 22 August 2015. https://www.thestar.com/news/insight/2015/08/22/a-warrior-a-soldier-and-a-photographer-remembering-the-oka-crisis.html.

Conversely, people in job-oriented organizations feel a strong pressure to complete the job, they feel the organization is interested in their job-related outcomes over their personal well-being, and important decisions are made by individuals without consultation.[57] The dimension implies that the two perspectives are opposed and therefore cannot exist in the same organization. The applicability to the CAF is important considering the primary focus of the CAF is to complete the mission but members are consistently told the organization cares about its people. A military organization must put the mission first but how then does the organization care for its people is an important question when considering the problem of sexual violence. Victims will not report incidences if they don't believe the system will take care of them. This presents an important communication challenge for any plan moving forward.

The second dimension important to the operation of the CAF relates to where the employees derive their identity. A parochial organization is one in which the employees draw their identity from the organization vice a professional organization where employees draw their identity from their job. The distinction is important in the discussion of culture within the CAF where the ERA reported issues both at work and outside the workplace due to the tendency for military members to socialize together, especially important on deployments, in barrack environments or in training environments where the distinction between work and personal life is blurred. This evidence suggests members of the CAF have a tendency to be more parochial in nature. The CAF can leverage this tendency to its advantage knowing that changes at work may eventually lead to behavioural changes outside of work, a goal that must be achieved for any lasting change to occur.

---

[57] Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations*, 190.

Bystanders

In her Ph.D. dissertation, Jane Palmer describes Routine Activities Theory, which posits that "for a 'direct contact predatory crime' to occur, a willing offender and a suitable victim must converge in a place conducive to the crime…without the intervention of a capable guardian".[58] Palmer's paper raises the issue of bystander intervention and possibly even specialized training as a potential future success story in rape prevention on college campuses. While the challenges may not be identical, it is reasonable to assume that this same theory could be applied in preventing the entire spectrum of harmful sexual behaviour within the CAF. If we combine this theory with Hofstede's hero theory and properly targeted training, it is feasible the CAF could drive significant day-to-day cultural change. Heroes, acting as trained bystanders, would be able to recognize harmful behaviour, and have the social status to interrupt the behaviour both at work and outside of work. Of course heroes won't be everywhere at all times but this may present the best opportunity to permanently change the underlying social behaviours that contribute to an environment that accepts, or worse, promotes harmful sexual behaviours.

Is Change Really Possible?

Pundits argue that behaviour cannot be changed by changing the organizational culture.[59] This may be valid in some organizations but this paper suggests the opposite, culture can be changed through behaviour modification. Additionally, studies have shown that prevention training in sexual violence was not retained beyond six weeks.[60] Longer-term training programs

---

[58] Jane Palmer, "Peers as Bystanders in Preventing and Responding to Dating Violence and Sexual Violence on College Campus", (PhD dissertation, American University, 2013), 12.

[59] Belias, The Impact of Leadership, 458.

[60] Moira Carmody, "Preventing Adult Sexual Violence Through Education", *Current Issues in Criminal Justice*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 348.

however, have shown success in preventing harmful sexual behaviour;[61] this must be considered in CAF's training plan.

As Ashley Bickerton writes, there is popular belief that harmful sexual behaviour is a result of a few "bad apples".[62] While there are outliers in every group of people that could be referred to as bad apples, it is difficult to ignore the overwhelming research that points to the negative relationship between militarism and masculinity and its effect of creating sexualized cultures within military organizations, which lends support to the argument that careful culture change can have a lasting effect on harmful sexualized behaviour.

MAKING THE CHANGE

To completely eradicate sexual misconduct within the CAF is a massive multi-year challenge using a vast multi-pronged approach. As 1st Lieutenant Chad Christian writes, we must fight sexual misconduct using the same tactics we use to fight insurgencies; Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations.[63] COIN operations is a term military personnel can understand and they identify it with multifaceted hard fighting against a difficult, motivated and resistant enemy. The long game for eliminating harmful sexual behaviour from the CAF will require help from outside agencies and experts, all working towards a single goal just like COIN operations. As with COIN operations, the long-term strategy will require much more than just focusing on behaviours at the tactical level. At this point however, the CAF must move forward with a plan that is flexible enough to adapt to new conditions, successes and failures, and new strategies, all within a diverse society that wrestles with similar challenges.

---

[61] *Ibid.*, 349.
[62] Bickerton, "'Good Soldiers', 'Bad Apples', 9, 221.
[63] Chad Christian, "Countering the Insurgency Within our Ranks", *Military Review*, November-December 2013. 67.

CONCLUSION

This discussion focused on some strategies the CAF can use to create an environment that is intolerant of harmful sexual behaviour. While immediately changing every CAF members' behavior inside and outside of work may be too lofty of a goal, the CAF does have powerful tools to make a significant change in the environment within which every CAF member works.

Studies show close links between masculinity, violence and harmful sexual behaviour. Sexualized language, jokes and innuendo help create a culture and environment that is conducive to misogynistic behaviour. This behaviour forms the root barrier to eliminating harmful sexual behaviour within the CAF. Given the need for a military to maintain a warrior spirit so it can apply lethal violence when required, It is important that the CAF openly searches for the right balance of masculinity within its organization. This balance and follow-on collective programming of all military members will be the key to future success.

The combination of Hofstede's model of culture change, and bystander theory offer hope to the CAF. Behavioural change is possible; long-term cultural change will ensure the CAF permanently improves the environment that is conducive to harmful sexual behaviour while recognizing that wicked problems are never fully solved and long-term continued efforts will be required.

Policy changes must compliment on-going cultural shifts. Victim rights and new creative reporting options can form the cornerstone to improving reporting and conviction rates, while revised harassment policies can contribute successfully to eliminating lower-level harmful sexual behaviour.

Pundits will argue that there are no problems, just bad apples. Research is clear, male dominated organizations such as sports teams, gangs and militaries all over the world share common issues. Environments that accept sexualized practices are prone to experiencing increasingly serious forms of harmful sexualized behaviour and violence. The CAF must focus on long-term behavioural and cultural change; no sexualized jokes, no winks, no nods; if it expects to maintain its legitimate place as a professional organization in Canadian society.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, Robert, Colin Park, and Saul Pilnick, "The Shadow Organization", *Management Accounting* (pre-1986), 55, 7, (January 1974).

Allred, Keith. "Peacekeepers and Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces Fuel the Demand for Trafficked Women and New Hope for Stopping It". *Armed forces & Society*. Vol 33, No 1, (October 2006).

Bickerton, Ashley Jennifer, "'Good Soldiers', 'Bad Apples' and the 'Boys' Club': Media Representations of Military Sex Scandals and Militarized Masculinities", (P.h.D dissertation, University of Ottawa, 2015).

Belias, Dimitrios and Athanasios Koustelios, "The Impact of Leadership and Change Management Strategy on Organiational Culture," *European Scientific Journal*, Vol 10, No. 7, (March 2014).

Benton, Steve and Melissa Giovagnoli, The wisdom Network, (AMACOM 2006), adapted by "Find the Unofficial Leaders Within Your Workforce", managebetter.biz, http://www.managebetter.biz/Main/Articles/Find_the_unofficial_leaders_within_your_w orkforce__24985.aspx.

Bill C-71, Victims Rights in the Military Justice System Act, http://www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISInfo/BillDetails.aspx?billId=8045337&Language=E&Mode =1&View=8.

Brubaker, Sarah Jane. "Sexual Assault Prevalence, Reporting and Policies: Comparing College and University Campuses and Military Service Academies". *Security Journal 22*, No 1, (February 2009).

Canada. Department of National Defence. *Duty With Honour*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2009.

Carmody, Moira, "Preventing Adult Sexual Violence Through Education", Current Issues in Criminal Justice, Vol. 18, No. 2.

CDS Operation Order, Operation *Honour*, 14 August 2015.

Choi, Victor, "Why Trudeau Should Commit to Passing This Victims' Right Bill, *Huffington Post*, 11 October, 2015. http://www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISInfo/BillDetails.aspx?billId=8045337&Language=E&Mode =1&View=8.

Christian, Chad, "Countering the Insurgency Within our Ranks", Military Review, November-December 2013.

Department of National Defence, Cultural Intelligence and Leadership, Canadian Defence Academy Press.

Deschamps, Marie, *External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces*, 27 March, 2015.

Draft Sexual Violence Policy, Carlton University, 15 March 2016.

Hillier, Rick, *Leadership: 50 Points of Wisdom For Today's Leader*, Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2010).

Hofstede, Geert, *Cultures and Organizations*, London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1991.

Hofstede, Geert, *Culture's Consequences*, London: Sage Publications, 2001.

Hoyle, Lindsay, "Command Responsibility – A Legal Obligation to Deter Sexual Violence in the Military". *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 37*, No 2, (Spring 2014).

Koeszegi, Sabine, Eva Zedlacher and Rene Hudribusch, "The War Against the Female Soldier? The Effects of Masculine Culture on Workplace Aggression", Armed Forces and Society, Vol 40(2), (2014).

Ladd, Jessica, "The Reporting System That Sexual Assault Survivors Want", Ted Talk, (February 2016). https://www.ted.com/talks/jessica_ladd_the_reporting_system_that_sexual_assault_survivors_want.

Lawson, Tom, Televised interview with Peter Mansbridge, 16 June 2015. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/military-sexual-misconduct-due-to-biological-wiring-gen-tom-lawson-tells-cbc-news-1.3115993

LeBlanc, Helene, " A Study on Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace", Report of the Standing Committee on the Status of Women, 41st Parliament, Second Session, (February 2014).

Mercier, Noemi and Alec Castonguay, "Our Military's Disgrace". *Maclean's*. Vol 127, Issue 17, (May 2014).

Morgan, David, Theatre of War: Combat, the Military, and Masculinities", in Theorizing Masculinities, ed. Harry Brod and Micheal Kaufman (London: sage, 1994).

Morris, Madeline, "By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture", Duke Law Journal 45, (1996).

Obradovic, Lana , "Be All She Can Be: Gender Integration in NATO Military Forces", Dissertation, The City University of New York, 2010.

O'Connor, Patrick, *The New Management of Engineering*, Stevenage: Lulu Inc: 2004.

Ontario Provincial Government. "It's Never Okay: An Action Plan to Stop Sexual Violence and Harassment. March 2015.

Palmer, Jane, "Peers as Bystanders in Preventing and Responding to Dating Violence and Sexual Violence on College Campus", (PhD dissertation, American University, 2013).

Razack, Sherene. Dark Threats & White Knights. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004.

Rittel, Horst and Melvin Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning", Policy Sciences, 4, (1973).

Rosen, Leoran, Kathryn Knudson and Peggy Fancher, "Cohesion and the Culture of Hypermasculinity in US Army Units", Armed Forces & Society, Vol 29, No 3, Spring 2003.

Schmid, Megan, "Combating a Different Enemy: Proposals to Change the Culture of Sexual Assault in the Military", *Villanova Law Review*, Vol 5, 2010.

Senator King to Top Military Officials: Change Military Culture on Sexual Assault. Lenham: *Federal Information & News Dispatch Inc*. 2013. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1365225139?pq-origsite=summon

Skaburskis, Andrejs. "The Origins of Wicked Problems". *Planning Theory & Practice*, Vol 9, No 2, 277-280, (June 2008).

Silverzweig, Stan and Allen, Robert, "Changing the Corporate Culture", *Sloan Management Review*, (Spring 1976).

Switzer, Stephanie. "Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault in the Military". Psy.D. Dissertation, University of Hartford, 2007.

Tasker, John Paul, "Conservative MP Michelle Rempel Says She Faced Sexism, Unwanted Touching", CBC News, 18 April 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/michelle-rempel-sexual-harassment-1.3541189.

Vance, General Jonathan. 17 July 2015, Change of Command Address. Quoted by CBC. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/gen-jonathan-vance-becomes-chief-of-defence-staff-vows-to-tackle-harassment-1.3156520.

Waterhouse, Jennifer and Dianne Lewis. "Communicating Culture Change". Public Management Review, Vol 6, No 3, (February 2007). http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1471903042000256538.

Weitz, Rose. "Vulnerable Warriors: Military Women, Military Culture, and Fear of Rape". *Gender Issues 32*, No 3, (September 2015).

Wells, Jennifer, "A Warrior, a Soldier and a photographer – Remembering the Oka Crisis", *The Star*, 22 August 2015. https://www.thestar.com/news/insight/2015/08/22/a-warrior-a-soldier-and-a-photographer-remembering-the-oka-crisis.html.

Whitworth, Sandra, *Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.

Wilson, Peter. "Defining Military Culture". The Journal of Military History 72, (January 2008).

Zurbriggen, Eileen, "Rape, War and The Socialization of Masculinity: Why Our Refusal to Give Up War Ensures That Rape Cannot Be Eradicated", *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 34, 2010.