

Canadian  
Forces  
College

Collège  
des  
Forces  
Canadiennes



## THE GUATEMALAN ARMED FORCES' ROLE IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

Maj P. de León Franco

**JCSP 42**

***Exercise Solo Flight***

### **Disclaimer**

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2016.

**PCEMI 42**

***Exercice Solo Flight***

### **Avertissement**

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2016.

EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT*

**THE GUATEMALAN ARMED FORCES' ROLE IN HUMANITARIAN  
ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF**

Maj P. de León Franco

*“This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”*

Word Count: 3297

*“La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.”*

Compte de mots: 3297

## Introduction

After the signing of the 1996 Peace Accords, the Guatemalan Armed Forces (GAF), initiated a transformation process that took it from a war-time force to a more professional one with a broader constitutional mandate. The Peace Accords, and subsequent constitutional reforms, established that the GAF were to focus on protecting the sovereignty of the nation, territorial integrity and honour of the nation. In addition, the broader scope of the GAF's revised mandate calls for it to provide assistance to civilian law enforcement, and other humanitarian agencies, in case of national disaster or public calamity.<sup>1</sup>

Given the fact that the GAF's current capabilities are overrun by transnational threats such as drug trafficking, illegal immigration and organised crime, there are very few available assets to deal specifically with humanitarian tasks.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, there still significant law enforcement vacuums in much of the Guatemalan rural countryside.<sup>3</sup> This limits the GAF's sense capabilities (in particular, surveillance capabilities such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, or UAVs),<sup>4</sup> and the government's for that matter, which translates into much longer response times for delivering humanitarian relief in case of natural disaster or public calamity.

Therefore, this paper will sustain a persuasive, logical argument whereby the Guatemalan Ministry of National Defence's 2016 Strategic Plan shall be analysed in terms of the GAF's mandate to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). It will provide insight into the GAF's current role in natural disaster relief by providing examples of specific interventions through the analysis of two particular case studies: the 2012 San Marcos

---

<sup>1</sup> Guatemala Ministry of National Defence. *Plan Estrategico del Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2016*. (Directorate of Defence Policy: 2015). p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 6.

<sup>4</sup> National Defence Canada. *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine*. B-GA-400-000/FP-000. (Air Force Training and Doctrine Division: 2012) p. 35.

earthquake and the 2015 El Cambray landslide. The discussion of these two case studies will seek to highlight both the shortcomings and the strengths of the GAF's capabilities. These two case studies will illustrate how the lack of contact with local civilian authorities have hindered the GAF's sense capabilities. It will also assess the possibility of further developing the GAF's sense capabilities and strengthening Military Reserves, specifically the civil defence units, by fostering their capabilities through CIMIC actions. The latter of the case studies will establish how strong inter-institutional coordination has enabled the GAF to successfully contribute in supporting civilian institutions in HADR-related tasks.

Besides providing examples of the GAF's interventions in HADR tasks, this paper will also consider the use of the civil defence units as a means of involving the local, civilian population and authorities in disaster prevention and relief, thus enabling the GAF to acquire additional capabilities in spite of having limited resources and assets.

### **The Guatemalan Armed Forces' Institutional Commitment to Relief Assistance**

The GAF's current constitutional mandate has a broad scope. On one hand, it is centred upon national defence, territorial integrity and support to civilian law enforcement. On the other, the mandate states that the GAF are to provide assistance in case of national emergency or public calamity.<sup>5</sup> This implies the need for capabilities that will allow the GAF to be in a permanent state of readiness. In order to achieve this, the GAF plan to train its reserves so that they can provide humanitarian assistance in case of crisis, as opposed to using units from its standing force as has been the norm.<sup>6</sup> This shift in policy implies the need for the GAF to train and equip its reserves in order to maintain them at a functional level of readiness. The expected end-result

---

<sup>5</sup> Guatemala Ministry of National Defence. *Plan Estrategico del Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2016*. (Directorate of Defence Policy: 2015). p. 5.

<sup>6</sup> Guatemala Ministry of National Defence. *Plan Estrategico del Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2016*. (Directorate of Defence Policy: 2015). p. 5.

is the mitigation and reduction of human suffering and loss of property in cases of disaster or calamity.<sup>7</sup>

Additionally, the National Security Policy calls for the use of national assets in the reduction of vulnerabilities related specifically to natural disasters, or those caused by man. Likewise, the National Defence Policy calls for the bolstering of Military Reserves and the development of Civil Defence. The aim is to provide deterrence to transnational threats, while maintaining a functional level of readiness.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, this clearly reflects a political and institutional commitment toward using the GAF's capabilities toward HADR-related tasks.

Stemming from its constitutional mandate and the National Defence and Security Policies, the GAF have developed its current Institutional Framework which serves as guidelines for the tasks to be carried out. This framework defines Mission Areas as the broad tasks to be executed as per the mandate and national policies.

In particular, Mission Area no. 4 pertains to the GAF's contribution to the National System for Attention to Natural Disasters. It states that “The GAF will put its command and control structure at the disposal of this system in order to efficiently coordinate logistics and relief actions so that response times are reduced.”<sup>9</sup> The desired end-state is to maintain 100% levels of readiness through close coordination with the Humanitarian and Rescue Unit (UHR, in Spanish) so that humanitarian assistance and rescue efforts are available across the entire country.<sup>10</sup>

Furthermore, the strategic plan calls for the following actions to be carried out in order to achieve functional readiness:

---

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* p. 10.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* p. 21.

<sup>10</sup> Guatemala Ministry of National Defence. *Plan Estratégico del Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2016*. (Directorate of Defence Policy: 2015). p. 32.

- Evaluate the physical conditions of installations and their maintenance;
- Provide means and special equipment to rescue and humanitarian aid units;
- Carry out repairs to military installations dedicated to relief efforts; and
- Establish strategic partnerships in order to exchange expertise in the areas of science and technology.<sup>11</sup>

Moreover, the plan further indicates the preparation of Civil Defence in order to support the UHR and Military Reserves in relief efforts through the bolstering of operational capabilities.<sup>12</sup> What the plan does not state is how these operational capabilities are meant to be provided to the Civil Defence units. This indicates a clear gap that needs to be addressed in order for the plan to become fully functional. Nevertheless, close engagement with rural communities is essential in order to reduce the current gaps in the GAF's sense capabilities and thus constitutes a major step toward trust-building CIMIC actions.

### **Overcoming Institutional Limitations**

The downsizing of the GAF as a result of the Peace Accords saw its reduction in three main areas: size of force, budget allotment and ability maintain a persistent presence.<sup>13</sup> With a revamped constitutional mandate, it became abundantly clear that the GAF would not be able to effectively carry out its newly mandated tasks. This mandatory downsizing brought its total force to 15,500<sup>14</sup> which is approximately 60% less than its 1990s levels.<sup>15</sup> In addition, the GAF's

---

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* p. 39-40.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* p. 41.

<sup>13</sup> O'neil, Shannon K. *Guatemala's Enduring Security Problem*. The Atlantic. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/the-guatemalan-governments-enduring-security-problem/245217/>. Last Modified 16 September, 2011.

<sup>14</sup> Global Firepower. *Guatemala Military Strength*. [http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country\\_id=guatemala](http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=guatemala)

<sup>15</sup> O'neil, Shannon K. *Guatemala's Enduring Security Problem*. The Atlantic. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/the-guatemalan-governments-enduring-security-problem/245217/>. Last Modified 16 September, 2011.

military expenditures stand at 0.4% of GDP.<sup>16</sup> To provide specific context, neighbouring El Salvador dedicates 0.6% of its GDP to military expenditures,<sup>17</sup> while Honduras dedicates 1.5% of its GDP.<sup>18</sup> The fact that both El Salvador and Honduras are considerably smaller economies than Guatemala puts the GAF's meagre military expenditures into further perspective. As a result of these first two issues, the GAF's lack of presence throughout the Guatemalan rural countryside has not only opened the door for Transnational Criminal Groups (TCOs) to operate freely,<sup>19</sup> but it has also limited the GAF's sense criminal activities and perform intelligence analysis.

When considering the previous points, it is clear that the GAF do not have the adequate capabilities to carry out both security and humanitarian tasks relying only on its standing force. Limited manpower, financial resources and sense capabilities all represent delayed response times upon natural disaster or public calamity circumstances. That is why the Ministry of National Defence has established the need to bolster its Military Reserves and develop its Civil Defence. However, these two, particular tasks also require further financial and material resources.

As part of the GAF's Strategic Plan a Strengths Weaknesses Opportunity and Threats (SWOT) analysis was performed. It highlighted the that the GAF's has limited financial assets, diminished operational capabilities and a reliance on foreign aid. Consequently, the GAF's ability to modernize its capabilities, is one of its biggest weaknesses at the moment.<sup>20</sup> While it is

---

<sup>16</sup> Nation Master. *Guatemala*. <http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/profiles/Guatemala/Military>

<sup>17</sup> Nation Master. *El Salvador*. <http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/profiles/El-Salvador/Military> Last Modified 16 September. 2011.

<sup>18</sup> Nation Master. *Honduras*. <http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/profiles/Honduras/Military> Last Modified 16 September. 2011.

<sup>19</sup> InsightCrime.org. *Ungoverned Spaces in the Americas, Part I*. Southern Pulse. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/ungoverned-spaces-in-the-americas-part-i> Last Modified 14 July, 2011.

<sup>20</sup> Guatemala Ministry of National Defence. *Plan Estrategico del Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2016*. (Directorate of Defence Policy: 2015). p.20

evident that the GAF cannot improve its capabilities totally on its own, the current institutional framework allows for harnessing international cooperation from allies.

The GAF in receipt of aid from its two biggest allies: The United States (US) and Canada. The bulk of this aid has been destined to improving the GAF's Standing Force's capabilities. In particular, the US has provided assistance in training and equipping task forces located in the mountainous region of San Marcos. These task forces now able to conduct effective counter drug trafficking, smuggling and control the flow of illegal immigrants. Since 2012, this endeavour has provided a law enforcement presence, albeit by the military, in areas where there has been a void.<sup>21</sup>

This particular type of cooperation is highly significant in light of the still-present arms embargo on Guatemala. The said embargo dates back to the early 1980s, and therefore, poses a series of limitations for allies regarding the type of military aid they can provide to the GAF. Therefore, military aid is limited to training, equipment, refurbishing of installations, and other logistical support that does not imply weapons or munitions. Despite temporary waivers in 1983, the ban is still current and significantly limiting.<sup>22</sup>

The GAF's other main ally, Canada, has provided support and aid through its Military Training and Cooperation Program. Since joining this endeavour in 2008, the GAF have taken part in Canada's efforts to strengthen Central American armed forces. This endeavour has been focused on two main areas: developing the GAF's capabilities to contribute in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and HADR tasks. Moreover, through joint cooperation, Canada has provided training at Guatemala's Regional Peace Operations Training Centre (CREOMPAZ, in Spanish).

---

<sup>21</sup> Ramsey, Geoffrey. *Guatemala to Create US-Backed Anti Drug Task Force*. Insight Crime. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/guatemala-to-create-us-backed-anti-drug-task-force> Last Modified 05 April, 2012.

<sup>22</sup> Parry, Robert. *Reagan and Guatemala's Death Files*. Consortium News. <https://consortiumnews.com/2011/11/03/reagan-and-guatemalas-death-files/> Last Modified, 03 November, 2011.



This training has mainly focused on developing PKO and Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) capabilities. In addition to providing training, Canada has also provided assistance in the purchase of equipment used in HADR training.<sup>23</sup>

### **The GAF's HADR capabilities put to the test**

In November 2012, a 7.4 magnitude earthquake rocked the northwestern San Marcos region of Guatemala.<sup>24</sup> The event left a trail of destruction and loss of human life that put response capabilities of civilian law enforcement agencies to the test. Due to the severity of the damage to infrastructure, many of the local villages were cut off from main roads. This led to many people requesting for help by phoning local radio stations and posting information on social media.<sup>25</sup> Alarming, it took well over 24 hours for first responders to arrive on the scene.

In the wake of the disaster, the National Coordinator for the Reduction of Disasters (CONRED, in Spanish), took the lead in the recovery effort. And even as international aid and assistance began to pour in, local authorities were tasked to the assisting of victims on the ground. Moreover, the standing force deployed over 2,000 soldiers from nearby units to help first responders in the search for victims.<sup>26</sup> As Col Ernest L. Sutton points out: “Although our armed forces have been involved in humanitarian assistance efforts many times in the past, these operations have rarely been part of an integrated strategic effort.”<sup>27</sup> Sutton’s remarks were made in reference to the US Army, but the same can be said for the GAF. For the first time is the

---

<sup>23</sup> National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. *The Canadian Armed Forces' Engagement in the Americas*. <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=the-canadian-armed-forces-engagement-in-the-americas/hie8w7sf> Last Modified 10 October, 2014.

<sup>24</sup> The Guardian. *Guatemala Earthquake Kills Dozens*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/07/guatemala-quake-kills-15> Last Modified 07 November, 2012.

<sup>25</sup> The Guardian. *Guatemala Earthquake Kills Dozens*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/07/guatemala-quake-kills-15> Last Modified 07 November, 2012.

<sup>26</sup> BBC News. *Guatemala Earthquake: Search for San Marcos Missing*. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20256454> Last Modified 8 November, 2012.

<sup>27</sup> Sutton, Ernest L. *The New Role of Humanitarian Assistance in National Military Strategy: How to Make it Work*. (US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks:1992.) p. 1.

GAF's history, a coordinated effort with local civilian authorities was carried out in the wake of a natural disaster within the framework of an integrated strategic effort.

In a traditional sense, CIMIC actions are seen as activities in support of military objectives. So, cooperation with civilian authorities is limited to liaising with civilian actors in order to create security and stability through the different tasks that the military performs.<sup>28</sup> However, the modern operational environment demands that CIMIC actions go beyond mission support and focus more on humanitarian assistance. If anything, the modern operational environment calls for military to support local authorities and humanitarian workers since there are instances in where only military can carry out specific tasks that may be beyond the scope of regular civilian actors.<sup>29</sup> Specifically, the availability of strong military reserves would have eased the burden on the standing force and allowed for further reinforcements once relief efforts were underway. Ultimately, units from the standing force would have been deployed in this case anyway, but they would have withdrawn much sooner upon the arrival of reserves and/or civil defence. Therefore, reserves would have become an extension of civilian law enforcement and easily fallen under a civilian command and control structure.

The San Marcos earthquake, demonstrated a very specific point: the gap in sense capabilities that the GAF have within local communities. During the war, the GAF maintained close presence within local communities which provided much needed sense capabilities in order to react to insurgents' movements. The following quote clearly illustrates this point.

In the countryside, the military maintained strict control of internal security by relying on the military commissioner system and the Civil Defence Patrols (PACs) to maintain control and guarantee the security of the population. Military commissioners managed the affairs of their respective departments, supervised civil defence patrols and worked in

---

<sup>28</sup> Rietjens, Sebastian J.H. and Bollen, Myriame T.I.B. *Managing Civil-Military Cooperation. A 24/7 Joint Effort for Stability*. (Ashgate Publishing, Burlington, Vermont: 2008.) p. 36.

<sup>29</sup> Rietjens, Sebastian J.H. and Bollen, Myriame T.I.B. *Managing Civil-Military Cooperation. A 24/7 Joint Effort for Stability*. (Ashgate Publishing, Burlington, Vermont: 2008.) p. 42.

close contact with the intelligence division (G-2), also run by the Army. The military maintained its influence in internal security and intelligence because after the transition it remained the only institution with the resources and trained personnel capable of protecting the citizens of Guatemala. The civilian police was inefficient in carrying out the mission of internal security.<sup>30</sup>

The direct link between civilian and military authorities ended with the change in the GAF's constitutional mandate following the 1996 Peace Accords. Since then, civilian law enforcement has been trying to cope with both internal security and intelligence gathering. Nevertheless, civilian police have limited capabilities which are not well-suited to this task.

As former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy points out, it is important to put people first when discussing security.<sup>31</sup> However, this point is not just limited to focusing on people's needs, but also on understanding the role that communities can play in order to help protect themselves. Considering that traditional CIMIC actions are an extension of military tasks, a structure similar to that of the Civil Defence Patrols (PACs, in Spanish), and military commissioners would have greatly enhanced the GAF's sense capabilities during the San Marcos earthquake and would have made humanitarian assistance flow much quicker than it did. The end of the PAC-military commissioner structure has hindered the GAF's sense capabilities by cutting off its means of gathering intelligence in rural communities. Since civilian law enforcement has been unable to fill this gap, revisiting the previous structure may provide much needed sense capabilities to disaster and humanitarian relief agencies in order to mitigate the impact of disasters on civilian population. In addition to surveillance capabilities, strong reserves and civil defence would allow the GAF to comply its constitutional mandate of both supporting HADR tasks and national defence.

---

<sup>30</sup> Berrios, Carlos G. *Civil-Military Relations and Democratization in Guatemala*. Thesis. (Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, California: 1998.) p. 67-68.

<sup>31</sup> Axworthy, Lloyd. *Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First*. Global Governance; Jan-Mar, 2001. p. 19.

## El Cambray: A New Test

Three years later on October 1<sup>st</sup>, 2015, a massive landslide buried the community known as “El Cambray”, located in the outskirts of Guatemala City. The community is located at the bottom of a ravine where access proved to be difficult as rescue workers had to descend approximately 12 meters in order to reach the roofs of homes.<sup>32</sup>

The fact that this disaster took place in an urban area did not facilitate relief efforts. It did test, however, CONRED and other relief agencies’ response capabilities. In contrast to the San Marcos earthquake, aid flowed almost immediately as first responders did not have to contend with blocked roads and debris. Yet, none of the relief agencies involved, CONRED, volunteer fire department, civilian police and humanitarian workers had the capabilities to recover people out from under the rubble. The only institution that had the capabilities, in the form of heavy engineering equipment, trained personnel and logistics was the GAF.

This exemplifies a case in which the military steps in to fill a gap in civilian capabilities.<sup>33</sup> While civilian agencies were able to procure heavy machinery to dig out victims and survivors, the GAF were the only institution with the readiness to deploy at a moment’s notice. This implies that civil-military relations are usually born out of necessity and not as a permanent bridge of communication and cooperation.<sup>34</sup> And while that may be true, the Guatemalan disaster relief network recognises the need to keep permanent communication and coordination with the GAF. However, the GAF are not asked to step in unless their capabilities are truly needed.

---

<sup>32</sup> The Guardian. *Guatemala Landslide: Under the Mud, Dead Families Found Huddled Together*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/06/guatemala-landslide-under-the-mud-dead-families-found-huddled-together> Last Modified 6 October, 2015.

<sup>33</sup> Gourlay, Catriona. *Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Cooperation in Humanitarian Interventions*. Disarmament Forum. Peacekeeping: Evolution or Extinction. (Brussels: 2000.) p. 34.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* p. 35.

Compared to the CIMIC actions of the GAF during war time, current CIMIC actions acknowledge that civilian authorities have a higher rank in the command and control structure of relief efforts. This is an important point since the military relies heavily on clear, hierarchical structures.<sup>35</sup> To a certain extent, the GAF are now subordinate to civilian control over HADR. As in the case of the San Marcos earthquake and El Cambray, CONRED is the institution in charge of leading all recovery efforts.

Another key element to underscore is the potential for competition among civilian and military institutions. Therefore, a clear understanding of the military's role is essential. Therefore, "The military conduct of civilian tasks is therefore designed to be a stop-gap measure only and should be handed over to civilian agencies as soon as possible."<sup>36</sup> The events at El Cambray prove this to be the case. Notwithstanding, this case also proves that in Guatemala, there need not be any competition among agencies. The GAF's constitutional mandate clearly states that its main task is national security. Nevertheless, it may provide humanitarian assistance in case of natural disaster or public calamity. Therefore, the GAF's involvement is meant to be in support of civilian institutions and only temporary so long as the situation requires the GAF's specific capabilities. Once the search and rescue efforts were called off 13 days later, the GAF withdrew from the area.<sup>37</sup> It should be noted that the existence of a strong Civil Defence unit would have rendered the need for the GAF's presence vital only at the onset of the disaster. Upon the availability of Civil Defence and/or Military Reserves, then the GAF's standing force

---

<sup>35</sup> Gourlay, Catriona. *Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Cooperation in Humanitarian Interventions*. Disarmament Forum. Peacekeeping: Evolution or Extinction. (Brussels: 2000.) p. 36.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.* p. 37.

<sup>37</sup> Mullen, Jethro and Ramos, Annie. *Search for Victims of Guatemala Landslide Called Off with Dozens still Missing*. CNN News. <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/13/americas/guatemala-landslide/> Last Modified 14 October, 2015.

would have been able to withdraw much sooner and thus leave civilian agencies fully in charge of the recovery effort.

The San Marcos earthquakes illustrated one dimension of CIMIC actions, close relation to local communities, whereas the El Cambray landslide evidenced another key CIMIC element, coordination with civilian institutions. In the case of El Cambray, the GAF got a passing mark, but in the case of the San Marcos earthquakes, the GAF fell short of the mark. Both cases, however, point out the need for improved CIMIC actions would have maximise the GAF's capabilities had there been reserve or civil defence forces available. Since the standing force has limited manpower, reserves and/or civil defence could be activated only when needed. The presence of reserves would allow additional manpower to be deployed within a couple of days of the events in support of civilian relief agencies.

## **Conclusion**

Considering that the San Marcos earthquake and El Cambray landslide were completely separate events the years apart, both events required the direct participation of the GAF in humanitarian relief assistance. The GAF's constitutional mandate is clear with regard to this matter; the GAF must provide humanitarian aid and support in case of natural disaster or public calamity.

While the GAF amply supported civilian relief agencies in both cases, the San Marcos earthquake demonstrated how limited sense capabilities led to delayed response times. This lack of sense capabilities stems from the elimination of the PAC-military commissioner structure in favour of a civilian law enforcement-led system. However, civilian law enforcement has proven to be ineffective in this role, thus leading to glaring gaps in the GAF's sense capabilities in rural communities. This issue could well be addressed by the use of UAVs in order to provide

surveillance capabilities and allow response units on the ground a better assessment of the current situation.

The El Cambray landslide proved that improved coordination in relief efforts and response times allowed aid to flow quickly. Yet, civilian agencies' lack critical capabilities that only the GAF could deploy without delay. Therefore, the GAF's involvement in the recovery efforts at El Cambray respected the clear command and control structure whereby civilian authorities held operational command. This case proved that the GAF's involvement was much more successful since its CIMIC actions with civilian institutions have been aligned toward inter-institutional coordination and support.

It is thus clear that the GAF's CIMIC actions are more aligned to coordination and cooperation with civilian agencies, but do not engage local communities. The use of surveillance technology rural communities, such as UAV's, would not only improve sense capabilities in remote areas, but would also aid civilian agencies' response times and facilitate recovery efforts in case of disaster. Also, a return to a strong Civil Defence and Military Reserve system would be beneficial in fully both engaging civilian and military authorities, and building upon existing capabilities.

## Bibliography

- Axworthy, Lloyd. *Human security and global governance: Putting people first Global Governance*; Volume 7, Number 1, 2001.
- Berrios, Carlos G. *Civil-Military Relations and Democratization in Guatemala*. Thesis. (Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, California: 1998.)
- Canadian Joint Operations Command. *Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations*. (Ottawa: 2014.)
- CQ Researcher. *European Migration Crisis*. CQ Press: Volume 25, No. 28. July, 2015. 649-672.
- Gourlay, Catriona. *Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Cooperation in Humanitarian Interventions*. Disarmament Forum. *Peacekeeping: Evolution or Extinction*, (Brussels: 2000.)
- Guatemala Ministry of National Defence. *Plan Estrategico del Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2016*. Directorate of Defence Policy. (Guatemala: 2015.)
- Guatemala Ministry of National Defence. *Plan Operativo Annual 2016*. Directorate of Defence Policy. December, 2015.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-29. *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*. (Washington: 2014.)
- National Defence Canada. *CFJP 3-2 Domestic Operations*. Canadian Forces Joint Publication. B-GJ-005-302-FP-001. (Ottawa: 2011.)
- National Defence Canada. *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War*. (Ottawa: 1991.)
- Roman, Cosmina-Oana. *CIMIC – Concepts, Principles and Functions*. Review of the Air Force Academy. Volume 30, Number 3, (Brasov: 2015.)
- Rietjens, Sebastian J.H. and Bollen, Myriame T.I.B. *Managing Civil-Military Cooperation. A 24/7 Joint Effort for Stability*. (Ashgate Publishing, Burlington, Vermont: 2008.)
- Stefan, Cristina. *Civil Affairs as sources of Military Public Law*. Administrative and Maintenance Services Direction. (Bucharest: 2010)



Turk, Volker. *International Protection*. International Journal of Refugee Law. Volume 2 4, Number 1. (London: 2011.)

Global Firepower. *Guatemala Military Strength*. [http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country\\_id=guatemala](http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=guatemala)

InsightCrime.org. *Ungoverned Spaces in the Americas, Part I*. Southern Pulse. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/ungoverned-spaces-in-the-americas-part-i> Last Modified 14 July, 2011.

National Defence Canada. Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine. B-GA-400-000/FP-000. (Air Force Training and Doctrine Division: 2012)

National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. *The Canadian Armed Forces' Engagement in the Americas*. <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=the-canadian-armed-forces-engagement-in-the-americas/hie8w7sf> Last Modified 10 October, 2014.

Nation Master. *Guatemala*. <http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/profiles/Guatemala/Military>

Nation Master. *El Salvador*. <http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/profiles/El-Salvador/Military>

Nation Master. *Honduras*. <http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/profiles/Honduras/Military>

O'neil, Shannon K. *Guatemala's Enduring Security Problem*. The Atlantic. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/the-guatemalan-governments-enduring-security-problem/245217/>. Last Modified 16 September, 2011.

Parry, Robert. *Reagan and Guatemala's Death Files*. Consortium News. <https://consortiumnews.com/2011/11/03/reagan-and-guatemalas-death-files/> Last Modified, 03 November, 2011.

Ramsey, Geoffrey. *Guatemala to Create US-Backed Anti Drug Task Force*. Insight Crime. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/guatemala-to-create-us-backed-anti-drug-task-force> Last Modified 05 April, 2012.