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## ELECTED BUT NOT EFFECTIVE: UNDERSTANDING THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN HAITI

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**JCSP 42**

**Master of Defence Studies**

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**PCEMI 42**

**Maîtrise en études de la  
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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
JCSP 42 – PCEMI 42  
2015 – 2016

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE

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## **Abstract**

Thirty years ago, the International Community went into Haiti with a solution to its destabilizing predicament without even knowing what the exact problem was. Three decades of trying to enforce free and fair elections in hopes that a democratic government can save Haiti from its disparaging future has proven futile. The United Nations is still in Haiti to this day and the state is no further along in terms of its insufferable human security and ineffective governance. Haiti prides itself on being the first independent state in the Americas, yet it is currently the state most dependent on others. This paper argues that human security goals require prioritization over democratic governance in Haiti.

In order to better understand democracy, this paper commences with an analysis of the theories of democracy and how democracy is viewed and practiced around the world. Subsequently, this paper deciphers the enigma that is Haiti's social, economic and political insecurity. It is only through a better understanding of the issues plaguing Haiti that the international community can practically aid the state in developing into a stable land that can subsist on its own. The last chapter provides recommendations of how Haiti can improve its internal security situation in order for the state to eventually be better positioned to practice democracy.

Democracy is a process, not an end state. Haiti requires a stable society before democracy can function effectively. Without ameliorating the social, economic and political stability of the state first, democracy will continue to be a struggle within Haiti.

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*Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.*

- Winston Churchill, speech before the House of Commons on 11 November 1947

## **CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION**

Despite over 200 years of independence, the Caribbean state of Haiti has struggled to find any long term stability and current trends do not illustrate any positive changes to its situation. The United States (UN) and the international community have been trying to foster a democratic society in Haiti for over 30 years in hopes of it resulting in a more stable political, economic and social environment. Unfortunately, their efforts have only been by means of selecting freely chosen governments through democratic elections. Notwithstanding all the efforts, Haiti still continues to struggle with effectively implementing democracy. There have been free and fair elections over the decades, but they are contentious and contested despite the continued presence of the international community during the processes.<sup>1</sup> These free and fair elections have yet to result in any effective improvements in the state or the quality of life of its people.

Cultural, structural and political impediments have costly and difficult effects on democratic consolidation in Haiti. The international community is also responsible for forcing free and fair elections before the emergence of stability, security and the acceptance of democratic norms and a liberal political culture in Haiti. After 30 years of constant international intervention with little long-lasting benefit, it is time to reassess the future of democracy in Haiti

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<sup>1</sup> E. Mobekk, "Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti," *Democratization* 8 no.3, 183; and Frank Jack Daniel, "Haiti postpones Sunday's presidential election as violence erupts," last updated 23 January 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-election-postponed-idUSKCN0V02HF>. Election violence is a continual issue in Haiti, with the latest round of elections in January 2016 being delayed due to violence and claims of fraud as reported by many most major news agencies including Reuters.

in order to determine exactly what is required in order to lift Haiti from its current standing. Some form of democracy may play a significant role in stabilizing the failed state but it must be integrated into the environment through more effective means than just an electoral process. Haiti requires a more legitimate solution that appeals to its people in order to ensure that the resultant state of affairs becomes a permanent part of its culture.

Only 600 miles southeast of Florida and situated on the Western most third of the island of Hispaniola, Haiti is one of the most populated countries in the Caribbean with close to ten and a half million people.<sup>2</sup> Yet despite its size and close proximity to Canada and the United States of America (US), both of which have continually donated significant amounts of aid to Haiti over the last half century, Haiti continues to be a failed state that has yet to form any democratic structure. Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index 2015 ranks Haiti as the 11<sup>th</sup> most fragile state in the world.<sup>3</sup> One of the Haitian government's greatest failings is its inability to address the human security issues in the state. The majority of Haitians do not possess the fundamental human freedoms of living in a safe and secure environment. Since human security is defined in terms of an individual's freedom from harm<sup>4</sup>, Haiti's fragile state world ranking is evidence that there are currently more pressing issues for the Haitian government than administering the next round of elections.

Haiti prides itself on being the first independent state in the Americas, yet it is currently the state most dependent on others. Haiti may never become a consolidated democracy in a Western contemporary context unless it first becomes a less fragile society. Instead of forcing

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<sup>2</sup> Thomas E. Weil, *Area Handbook for Haiti* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 5.

<sup>3</sup> Fund for Peace, "Fragile States Index 2015," accessed 20 April 2016, <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015>. The main criteria determining the rank of a state are refugee issues, human flight, inadequate development, poverty and economic decline, credibility of the state, government funded social services, human rights and rule of law or security.

<sup>4</sup> Edward Newman, "Critical Human Security Studies," *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 1 (2010): 78.

democracy on Haiti, the international community needs to allow Haiti to become independently able to function in a safe and secure environment. Emphasis needs to be placed on addressing the human security issues that are destabilizing the state before more effort is spent on democratizing the government. In order to achieve economic, security and social stability it may require an outside organization such as the United States (UN) to take greater control of government affairs or a Haitian head of state to rule for longer than a democratically acceptable period of time so that culture of stability is created before a culture of democracy. The international community has historically been fixated on the length of a term in office as an indication of democracy. That is a myopic misuse of democracy and in the case of Haiti only leads to added bureaucracy instead of increased stability. Haiti needs to concentrate on supporting the right head of state that is making positive change towards a safe and secure environment first and then the political process can evolve into ensuring each president has an equitable amount of time in office.

Haiti is known for its politically volatile history and current run of devastating natural disasters. For such reasons there is an abundance of literature and research regarding Haiti. This allowed for the use of many single source books and journals when writing this paper. In addition, there is a myriad of academic articles outlining the various theories on democracy allowing for a broad understanding of contrasting views of democracy. Key democratic theorists analyzed in this paper include Robert Dahl and Larry Diamond who are liberal democrats attesting that democracy must be accompanied by the freedom of the individual, Stephen D'Arcy who adds that any credible liberal democracy must have a transparent government and Samuel Huntington who opposes the views of the others claiming that democracy is only free and fair elections. Analysis for this paper was conducted by means of a case study of various conflicting definitions of democracy around the world, concentrating on liberal democracy and illiberal



democracy and how these democratic processes are reflected in Haiti's current environment. The resultant findings are presented in a final recommendation that Haiti adopts an illiberal democratic governance structure until the state can establish a more stable environment for its citizens.

This paper will analyze the democratic struggles Haiti has experienced over the last 30 years and try to draw conclusions as to why the state has such difficulty adopting democracy and whether Haiti even requires democracy before it can establish a safe and secure environment. The first section of this paper will establish an understanding of democratic definitions, theories and trends in order to better appreciate the reasoning behind the final conclusions. This will be followed by a chapter analyzing how democracy is practiced around the world, paying particular attention to the growing influence of the Western world on developing states and the pressure Haiti is under due to the high ideals of the international community. Subsequently, there will be an examination of how different countries and cultures perceive democracy, including a review of some successful non-democratic states that are still able to provide stability and good governance. Chapter four will address the failure of democracy in Haiti starting with a short review of Haiti's political history and the key reasons for its current destabilization. Further analysis of Haiti's current political situation, its political and electoral processes, and foreign policy issues will prove that forcing the establishment of a democratic government is futile in a state such as Haiti that cannot self-govern as of yet. Chapter five will attempt to provide recommendations on what is to be done in order for Haiti to be able to adopt and sustain democracy in the distant future. It will outline that the key to democracy is Haitian stability, good governance and order and that will require cultural change for democracy to truly be

effective. This paper will argue that human security goals require prioritization over democratic governance in Haiti.

*Judged against the exacting standards set by democratic ideals, real democracy as we know it is almost sure to be quite far from fully democratic.*

- Robert Dahl, Democratic Theorist, “The Past and the Future of Democracy”

## **CHAPTER TWO - DEFINING DEMOCRACY**

Democracy’s roots can be traced back over two millennia. Most notably as early as ancient Greece in the eighth century citizens realized the value in collectivity and the public accountability of rulers.<sup>5</sup> In the past century democracy has grown exponentially with human rights advances inevitably resulting in people having more influence on the management of the state. The true distinction between a democratic and non-democratic government notwithstanding, there are approximately 86 democratic states in the world containing more than half of the world’s population.<sup>6</sup> Democracy is still not universally accepted though. Nor is there a theoretical consensus on its definition. Yet, when used accurately, it has proven an effective means for appealing to more people in society by making them shareholders instead of subjugated followers.

Although democratic societies can sometimes be hampered by having too many interested parties, the final decisions agreed upon are more decisive and inventive due to the varying points of view being taken into consideration instead of homogenous group think.<sup>7</sup> In order for democracy to be most effective, however, there must be some level of homogeneity in the participants as is proven by the successful spread of democracy in predominantly

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<sup>5</sup> Bruce S. Thornton, *Democracy’s Dangers and Discontents: The Tyranny of the Majority from the Greeks to Obama* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2014), 2.

<sup>6</sup> Robert A. Dahl, “The Past and the Future of Democracy,” *Centre for the Study Political Change* 5 (1999): 6, [http://www.circap.org/uploads/1/8/1/6/18163511/occ\\_5.pdf](http://www.circap.org/uploads/1/8/1/6/18163511/occ_5.pdf).

<sup>7</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), 546.

homogenous societies, whether it be ideological or cultural.<sup>8</sup> Unfortunately, despite its noted value, democracy is not the be all and end all. It has not fully been integrated into countries like Haiti for a variety of reasons far more contentious than a lack of general agreement on its definition. What is lacking in countries that are struggling with democracy is their government's ability to ensure that their citizens have access to safety and security, economic prosperity, and social welfare instead of only focusing on controlling the power of their government officials.<sup>9</sup> With this said, agreeing on a definition of democracy without all of its derivatives would go a long way in helping new states understand and implement the practice.

### **Definitions of democracy**

Although more or less common knowledge, it is worthwhile to review the fact that the word democracy comes from the Greek words *demos* ('people') and *kratos* ('rule') and literally means that the people will rule.<sup>10</sup> Theorists such as Huntington oversimplify democracy's definition as only free and fair elections.<sup>11</sup> This has been one of the greatest failings in the Western intervention of Haiti. Supporting democratic elections worldwide has been a current theme in Western countries, often used as a "solution" to the instability in troubled states. Ironically, there is an abundance of references from theorists and scholars around the world such as Dahl, Diamond, and D'Arcy amongst others stating that democracy is much more than just free and fair elections. Before and since Che Guevara dedicated his life to trying to discount American attempts to 'democratize' the South with his oft quoted insistence that "democracy cannot

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<sup>8</sup> Robert A. Dahl, "The Past and the Future of Democracy," *Centre for the Study Political Change* 5 (1999): 7, [http://www.circap.org/uploads/1/8/1/6/18163511/occ\\_5.pdf](http://www.circap.org/uploads/1/8/1/6/18163511/occ_5.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), 546.

<sup>10</sup> Robert A. Dahl, "Democracy," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, accessed 4 February 16, <http://global.britannica.com/topic/democracy>.

<sup>11</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 9-10.

consist solely of elections that are nearly always fictitious and managed by rich landowners and professional politicians,” the West has realized that democracy cannot exist without freedom.<sup>12</sup>

Elections are only a fraction of democracy, albeit an easily measurable fraction. This is perhaps why foreign governments concentrate on elections as criteria for success when trying to implement democracy in non-democratic states. Democracy theorist Robert Dahl, while further agreeing that there is no unanimous definition of the term, purports that democracy is ideally a system of political equals where every citizen has the right to participate in and effect government decision making, the choice to vote at an agreed upon age, and access to opposing policies and opinions.<sup>13</sup> This is a fairly common definition of democracy that completely disregards Huntington’s more limited approach.

Gallie has coined the term ‘contested concepts’ to offer an explanation as to why there are debates over the ‘official’ definition of theories such as democracy. “There are disputes...which are perfectly genuine: which, although not resolvable by argument of any kind, are nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence.”<sup>14</sup> Essentially, in contested concepts everyone is correct in their definition if it is based on sound arguments. For democracy specifically, however, he advises that instead of insisting on one distinct definition there is scope to combine various definitions in order to have a more all-encompassing meaning.<sup>15</sup> The risk is that democracy becomes too inclusive of a definition much like the current theoretical debates over the definition of security. There is something to be said for

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<sup>12</sup> Che Guevara (speech), “Economics Cannot Be Separated from Politics,” Ministerial Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, Punta del Este, Uruguay 8 August 1961.

<sup>13</sup> Robert A. Dahl, “The Past and the Future of Democracy,” *Centre for the Study Political Change* 5 (1999): 10-11, [http://www.circap.org/uploads/1/8/1/6/18163511/occ\\_5.pdf](http://www.circap.org/uploads/1/8/1/6/18163511/occ_5.pdf).

<sup>14</sup> W.B. Gallie, “Contested Concepts,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series* 66 (1955-1956): 169.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*, 168.

simplicity; especially as the West continues to sell its brand of liberal democracy to states that have yet to experience it. Otherwise, there is great potential that democracy will not be applied in the true spirit of the word.

The unknown future of a consensus on the official definition of democracy has not appeared to halt its proliferation around the world. Many countries are choosing democracy for its economic advantages as it opens doors to wealthy Western organizations and corporations. Democracy's worldwide appeal might help to explain some of the dichotomies in countries whose constitutions call for democracy but whose governments bastardize the political practice to suit their own needs. These government officials use democratic terminology to legitimize their office while condoning non-democratic treatment of their citizens.<sup>16</sup> This circumstance has resulted in the mockery of the election process in many destabilized states where the will of the people is useless since they are told how to vote instead of encouraged to freely choose based on personal preferences. This is most evident in the 'free and fair' elections that occur in various countries where people are intimidated into voting for various parties or are restricted from participating all together.<sup>17</sup> Ethiopia is a stunning case study of just such political injustice. Ethiopia's last elections in 2015 saw its ruling party winning 100% of the seats in its government because only those in its party and the six other supporting parties and their supporters were allowed to vote.<sup>18</sup> Those elections were only free a fair for a percentage of the population; therefore, they completely undermined the primary tenets of democracy as detailed by Dahl. There can be no democracy without a non-corrupt government offering monetary value for free

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<sup>16</sup> Robert A. Dahl, "The Past and the Future of Democracy," *Centre for the Study Political Change*, 5 (1999): 7, ([http://www.circap.org/uploads/1/8/1/6/18163511/occ\\_5.pdf](http://www.circap.org/uploads/1/8/1/6/18163511/occ_5.pdf)).

<sup>17</sup> Stephen D'Arcy, *Languages of the Unheard: Why Military Protest is Good for Democracy* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2013), 23.

<sup>18</sup> Leonardo Arriola and Terrence Lyons, "Ethiopia: The 100% Elections," *Journal of Democracy* 27 no. 1 (January 2016):76.

and fair elections with no restriction on participation, free media, independent judiciary, civil society, a social welfare network including access to education and reasonable health care, and transparent government spending. In other words, democracy requires freedom and equality for all citizens.

If every citizen has a right to voice their opinions about government decisions, the government has to have a policy of openness so as to facilitate access to the public. If those in positions of power have failed to reveal their actions in front of their peers and the common citizen they are circumventing democracy.<sup>19</sup> This practice of ‘piecemeal’ democracy, when a government chooses which aspects of democracy it wishes to follow and which it wishes to ignore, lends fuel to antidemocratic ideologists and most likely explains the reason why there is still a large portion of the world that does not practice this political process. Democracy may never be embraced worldwide, but its popularity will continue to grow based on how it has been expanding globally thus far. With powerful hegemons in every region of the earth flourishing in fully democratic societies, its appeal is undoubtedly universal; even if its definition is not.

## **Liberalism**

Western definitions of democracy often have the concept of freedom embedded within and thus are considered liberal democracies. This leads to a misconception that democracy and freedom (or liberty) are synonymous. This is not the case though. Freedom as defined by John Stuart Mill is when one has freedom of opinion on all subjects, freedom of expression and publication, freedom of tastes and pursuits, and freedom to choose with whom one wishes to

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<sup>19</sup> Stephen D’Arcy, *Languages of the Unheard: Why Military Protest is Good for Democracy* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2013), 70.

associate so long as there is no harm done to others.<sup>20</sup> As Mill purports, “no society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified.”<sup>21</sup> This definition of freedom is the basis for the political doctrine entitled liberalism. Liberalism is a philosophy that concerns the state and its non-intrusive relationship with the individual and the individual’s relationship with society.<sup>22</sup> Liberal societies are communities where the individual’s needs are of highest import. Democracies can be considered nothing more than collectives making decisions without regard to the needs of each individual citizen. Although the lines are often blurred in the West, the distinction does explain why an absolute definition of democracy is difficult to determine.

### **Democratic Theories**

Theorists such as Dahl and Diamond agree that freedom is essential to a democratic society; others such as Huntington purport that democracy and liberalism are two separate concepts that do not necessarily have to be complementary. As was illustrated through Gallie’s contested concepts, both camps are potentially correct. Democracy’s elusive definition is based on the fact that it has been around for two and a half millennia, resulting in it meaning “different things to different people at different times and places.”<sup>23</sup> This is similar to most major religions that have evolved over time to become an ever increasing collection of sects in order to conform to the society in which they are practiced. Further analysis of Dahl’s Western liberalism mentality illustrates that democracy allows for people to fulfill their intrinsic need to control their

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<sup>20</sup> John S. Mill, *On Liberty* (London: Harvard College Library, 1869), 26.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, 27.

<sup>22</sup> Will Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 1.

<sup>23</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 3.



lives including how they live, where they live, who they live with and how they conduct their daily activities based on their beliefs and practices.<sup>24</sup> Diamond supports Dahl's claims placing great emphasis on the requirement for a free and fair society. He asserts that democracies have to be able to solve their own problems while meeting the public's expectations to provide a free, just and fair society, for more than just superficial elections, in order to promote economic growth, equality, and rule of law.<sup>25</sup>

Others, such as Huntington, acknowledge that this basic need for control is valid, but it does not assist in defining democracy due to its lack of measurability; thus, only free, fair and conclusive elections can really define democracy.<sup>26</sup> Basing a definition of such a powerful political process solely on the effectiveness of elections seems somewhat impractical as there cannot be free and fair elections without a free and fair society in which to have them. Yet, the question of what is considered free and fair and who is the judge of such a ruling will continually impinge on democracy's ability to be universally accepted as defined by Western societies. Therefore, periodic elections where everyone has the ability to vote is a simplistic way of characterizing Western proclivity for democracy.

To further confuse the matter, defining democracy has, like the aforementioned religions, many sub-sets with followers who praise their form of democracy as the ultimate approach. One view is autonomous democracy where anti-capitalistic, deliberative participation of all of society in government decisions is deemed to give the most freedom to citizens.<sup>27</sup> This practice should,

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<sup>24</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 52.

<sup>25</sup> Larry Diamond, "The Democratic Rollback : The Resurgence of the Predatory State," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2008, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2008-03-02/democratic-rollback>.

<sup>26</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 9-10.

<sup>27</sup> Stephen D'Arcy, *Languages of the Unheard: Why Military Protest is Good for Democracy* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2013), 5.

in essence, allow any member of society to debate any issues facing its government and have a say as to the final decision. This would give a lot of power to the public, but only if the public has the freedom to speak freely. Freedoms based in a constitution or other sets of rights are linked to liberal democracy. Although freedoms granted to citizens are not only attributed to liberal democracy, they are the basis that sets it apart from illiberal democracies that do not necessarily have a constitution or given rights; thus, liberal democracy concentrates on the liberal side of democracy more than democratic itself.<sup>28</sup> The differences in these more popular forms of democracy are slight, but like mainstream religions, the differences are enough to cause great debate and sideline any chance of general consensus on the practice of democracy.

Between these two more popular forms of democracy there still lays the debate between Dahl supporters and Huntington supporters as to whether democracy is about freedom or if it is about politics, namely voting. This difference is significant because it aids in explaining why Haiti is a democratic state that does not technically practice democracy despite it having elections on a moderately regular basis. If one uses Francis Fukuyama's theory of the existence of two types of states, patrimonial and modern, Haiti is a patrimonial state where politics are at the discretion of the leader and their chosen few with the public merely following obediently; whereas a modern state does allow citizens to vie for positions of power based purely on merit, education, or aptitude without the benefit of being related to the ruler.<sup>29</sup> In other words, a modern state provides a control mechanism for the corruption that often plagues Haiti. Therefore, Huntington's definition of democracy as only the political process of free and fair elections is

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<sup>28</sup> Timothy Ferris, *The Science of Liberty: Democracy, Reasons, and the Laws of Nature* (New York: Harper Collins, 2010), 20.

<sup>29</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), 10.

moot if there is no underlying requirement for the definition to include a reference to a free and fair society.

Fareed Zakaria further adds to Huntington's claims through his assertion that democracy in today's society does not always require liberty, and is therefore an illiberal democracy, although the West would prefer that liberty remain an essential element:

For people in the West, democracy means "liberal democracy": a political system marked not only by free and fair elections but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property. But this bundle of freedoms – what might be termed "constitutional liberalism" – has nothing intrinsically to do with democracy and the two have not always gone together, even in the West. After all, Adolf Hitler became chancellor of Germany via free elections. Over the last half-century in the West, democracy and liberty have merged. But today the two strands of liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western political fabric, are coming apart across the globe. Democracy is flourishing; liberty is not.<sup>30</sup>

What Zakaria might be referring to is what Stepan and Linz call a "authoritarian-democratic hybrid" system found in many states where the head of state fears losing their legitimacy if they do not support certain aspects of democracy such as free and fair elections, while trying to maintain authoritarian control over the population and dissenters in order to have continued support of their people and the International Community.<sup>31</sup> Bell generalizes this phenomenon of selectively choosing certain aspects of Western liberal democratic practices over others as illiberal democracy.<sup>32</sup> One could argue that Haiti has fallen within this system of illiberal democratic governance over the last 30 years. As each president comes into power in Haiti they seem reluctant to give up their seats at the end of their term and there does not appear to be great

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<sup>30</sup> Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Liberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), 17.

<sup>31</sup> Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz, "Democratization Theory and the Arab Spring," *Journal of Democracy* 24 no. 2 (April 2013): 20.

<sup>32</sup> Daniel A. Bell and Kanishka Jayasuriya, "Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework," in *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1995), 9.

advancements in the almost non-existent human security in the state. This can be attributed to the fact that many failed states like Haiti have weak governments that are missing the balance of the three essential institutions of “the state, rule of law, and procedural accountability.”<sup>33</sup>

Table 2.1 Democracy Theorist Comparison

<b>Democracy Criteria</b>	Human Rights		✓	✓	✓	✓
	Basic Freedoms			✓	✓	✓
	Formal Legal Equality			✓	✓	✓
	Government-funded Social Services		✓	✓	✓	✓
	Rule of Law		✓	✓	✓	✓
	Independent Judiciary		✓	✓	✓	✓
	Transparent Governance	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Free and Fair Elections	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Huntington	Stepan & Linz	Dahl	Diamond	D’Arcy	
<b>Democratic Theorist</b>						

When these democratic theories are compared against one another, one can visualize how similar yet drastically different these theories are (see Table 1). Each theory is perfectly justifiable and based on very sound evidence. The difficulty comes in having to constantly decide which theory applies to which political situation. Without an international governing body, who gets to decide which theory is the most applicable to world politics? Which organization selects the definition that is the most useful in the case of Haiti? When does the Haitian government get to convey its preference based on what it would determine to best fulfil the needs of the Haitian peoples?

<sup>33</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), 25.

These are questions that need to be answered before democracy can be adequately accepted into the Haitian society.

No matter which school of thought one subscribes to, democracy is an effective means to achieve a society where each citizen feels as though they can contribute to both their own and their state's betterment. This gives democracy quite an advantage over other political systems. Although, while the term is being scrutinized one must ask themselves why one half of the world is so convinced that democracy is the sole solution to state governance while the other half of the world continues on without it; and very successfully in some cases? None-the-less, democracy in the Western, liberal sense of the word has been proven to result in happier people in more peaceful and prosperous states who all have an ability to provide a wealth of input into government decisions.<sup>34</sup> While democracy may not be the only political process that could aid, it is clearly evident that a truly democratic environment that includes civil liberties along with freely elected officials would be one way to stabilize and strengthen Haiti while facilitating its diplomatic relations with fellow Western states. It is now a matter of determining how to develop a culture of democracy in Haiti that will last longer than the election build up.

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<sup>34</sup> Timothy Ferris, *The Science of Liberty: Democracy, Reasons, and the Laws of Nature* (New York: Harper Collins, 2010), 33. Ferris concludes that "it is no longer necessary to rely upon moral and ethical grounds to argue, say, that the United States senate would do better if it contained more women and minorities. The scientific data suggest that a more diverse Senate would be a more intelligent and aware Senate."

The tyranny of a prince in an oligarchy is not so dangerous to the public welfare as the apathy of a citizen in a democracy.

- Charles de Montesquieu, Lawyer and Political Philosopher

### **CHAPTER THREE: DEMOCRACY AND THE WORLD**

Western democracies of the past century have a robust culture that encompasses the democratic principles of well-established middle classes, sound social welfare and strong education policies.<sup>35</sup> Democracy's greatest growth began in the 1970s, however, and continued well into the 1980s when several dozen states adopted various forms of the practice.<sup>36</sup> The spread of democracy can be attributed to many countries experiencing economic growth during that timeframe. This growth resulted in improved social welfare and institutions such as "education, freedom of inquiry and communication, property rights, the rule of law, political participation, [and] respect for the rights of opposition" that expanded middle class societies that were expecting an elevated standard of living.<sup>37</sup> More so than economic prosperity, the changes in human security and human rights over the last 50 years have had a huge impact on the West's determination to spread democracy throughout the world. From suffrage to equity to the rights of the child, citizens are putting more demands on their governments as they realize that they should be given these inalienable rights. With the globalization through internet access, leaders of failed and failing states are being subjected to a liberalization process whether or not they have fully bought in to leading a democratic society.

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<sup>35</sup> Natan Sharansky and Ron Dermer, *The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 26.

<sup>36</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 114.

<sup>37</sup> Robert A. Dahl, "The Past and the Future of Democracy," *Centre for the Study Political Change*, 5 (1999): 8, ([http://www.circap.org/uploads/1/8/1/6/18163511/occ\\_5.pdf](http://www.circap.org/uploads/1/8/1/6/18163511/occ_5.pdf)).

When the USSR collapsed in the late 1980s, the spread of democracy boomed. The West, led by the USA, saw this as proof that democracy was in fact better than communism, which further excited a furor to democratize the rest of the world. Unfortunately, this determination to see universal liberal democracy was overpowering to some states who feared a return to the Western imperialism of the past; instead of embracing democracy, many states such as Russia, China and many in the Middle East repelled democracy and still do to this day.<sup>38</sup> As Stepan and Linz assert, recent world events do not necessarily mean the “end of history and the reign of full democracy.”<sup>39</sup> This still seems to be a hard concept for the West to come to terms with. The influence of democracy on non-democratic states continues, even when it is proven to have more of an adverse than liberating effect on a state.

There is a great misconception that democracy is without fault as are the states that practice it. In Western states where liberal democracy has replaced religion and human rights are the back bone of society, the hypocrisy of these states is not lost on others who are criticized for their lack of social justice. For most of these states, they have only recently become truly democratic in the liberal sense themselves. Quite a few of these countries such as the USA are still deliberating the legalities of gay marriage, transgender washrooms, and homosexuals in the military. Even the Vatican City State that continuously petitions for the rights and freedoms every citizen in the world does not allow women to serve as priests. Furthermore, Canada is one of many states that has laws that will allow the government to use the military to control the population in extreme cases; effectively taking away the rights and freedoms of its people in the

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<sup>38</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 183.

<sup>39</sup> Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz, “Democratization theory and the Arab Spring,” *Journal of Democracy* 24 no. 2 (April 2013): 21.

name of national security. Thus, these states are criticizing non-democratic countries in spite of their own lack of ‘true’ democracy.

### **International Proliferation of Democracy**

The UN further adds to the Western democratic irony by its insistence for states to adopt democracy over the last few decades. Although not all members of the UN Permanent Five are democracies, the dominant Western colonizing states in positions of influence, such as those on the Security Council, undoubtedly biases the UN in terms of the benefits from liberalism and democracy. The dichotomy in large organizations such as the UN insisting that other states establish democratic societies is that these organizations, although liberal in their practices and mandates, are not governed democratically or by purely democratic states.<sup>40</sup> None-the-less, although the UN is not a world governing body, it is still ‘obeyed’ by the majority of states as thus. In addition, it is the voice of many states together agreeing that democracy should be the new international norm. As the globalized world morphs politically from individual empires to international alliances and organizations, the pressure on smaller states to democratize is more pronounced because the international community is forcing the issue as opposed to just one or two world powers.<sup>41</sup>

In addition, the bureaucracy that continually plagues any decisions made by the UN collective of democratic and non-democratic states must skewer their understanding of the concept of democracy. If the UN and other international organizations do not have a clear understanding of what is required for democracy, how then can they credibly demand democratic

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<sup>40</sup> Robert A. Dahl, “The Past and the Future of Democracy,” *Centre for the Study Political Change* 5 (1999): 16, ([http://www.circap.org/uploads/1/8/1/6/18163511/occ\\_5.pdf](http://www.circap.org/uploads/1/8/1/6/18163511/occ_5.pdf)).

<sup>41</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 53.



governments from failed or failing states such as Haiti? Quite often the international community confuses liberalism with democracy as well; such as in the case of Haiti where the state requires immediate liberalization, yet the international community concentrates on the process of elections in hopes of ameliorating a supposed democratic dearth. This misunderstanding results in countries like Haiti being mistreated with the wrong political medicine for the wrong social ailment.

Adding to the democratic pressures of the international community on smaller states is the world hegemon: the US. Not only have the increased wealth of the middle-class and the boom of technology made the freedom of the individual more accessible to almost every state in the world, but the political and cultural reach of the US has greatly influenced cultures around the world.<sup>42</sup> With every new McDonalds or Starbucks or blockbuster Hollywood movie that appears outside of the US, the spread of the American dream of liberty and democracy seeps into the essence of almost every state it touches. In fact, under the George W. Bush presidency the proliferation of global democracy and universal freedom was the core of his foreign policy and a leitmotif that reoccurred throughout his tenure.<sup>43</sup> Whether through outward political action or more subtle cultural infiltration through large American companies, the US has undoubtedly had a massive influence on the spread of democracy throughout the world over the last three decades.

### **Democracy in the Caribbean**

Thirty years ago the majority of the developing countries in the Caribbean and South America were under extreme hardships with authoritarian governments and

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<sup>42</sup> Amy Chua, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 123.

<sup>43</sup> Public Broadcasting System, "Experts Discuss Global Democracy," last modified 4 July 2007, [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics-july-dec07-democracy\\_07-04/](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics-july-dec07-democracy_07-04/).

deteriorating economies. Thus, the liberal and democratic reach of the US did not have to go that far to try to influence the future of desperate Latin American states. With the American dream right next door, many Latin American countries aspired to have the freedoms and political influence that they saw enjoyed by their American neighbours. Confusing democracy with liberalization many states adopted democracy through mass protest against the military dictatorships or authoritarian rule that oppressed the population.<sup>44</sup> Democracy and liberalization is only slowly improving in Latin America though. Democracy especially is not yet fully incorporated into the Latin American culture, which is evident in the extremely powerful presidential positions and the corruption rampant throughout civil and political affairs as seen currently in Haiti and Brazil amongst other states.<sup>45</sup> While countries such as Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic continue to experience positive growth in both social and economic standards, they all still have a journey ahead of them before they can be called truly democratic states.<sup>46</sup> This is not surprising, however, as democracy is still relatively new in Latin America and it is only natural that it will take a few generations before democracy and liberalism becomes a norm.

### **Cultural Interpretations of Democracy**

Normative changes towards a democratic society in non-democratic countries will naturally differ from state to state and culture to culture based on the comprehension of, and in some cases requirement for, democracy. If the definition of democracy is disputed amongst Western scholars raised in liberal democratic societies, how can one expect

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<sup>44</sup> Gustavo Emmerich, *Democracy Building in Latin America and the Caribbean: Can the European Union Contribute?* (Mexico City: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2009), 6.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*, 5.

<sup>46</sup> Steven Radelet, "The Rise of the World's Poorest Countries," *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 4 (October 2015): 6.

states for which democracy is a new concept to embrace it and incorporate it into their cultural norms to the same Western standards? Every state does not need to be a purely democratic state. It can be argued that although the Western world believes that the freedoms associated with liberal democracy are essential for many African and Middle Eastern states, these states do not want democracy and would not be capable of adopting the practice due to their ingrained religious and cultural characteristics.<sup>47</sup> One characteristic in particular that differentiates many of these countries from Western countries is their historically contentious ethnic diversity that pits religious or tribal peoples against one another. Another is a prevalent nomadic lifestyle. The centuries of multi-civilization in these states makes adopting new practices such as democracy very challenging; much more so than the single civilization societies more common to the West.<sup>48</sup> Many of these ethnic groups have centuries of hatred or prejudice to overcome before they can consciously choose someone who is not one of their “people” to unbiasedly rule their state.

The dearth of democracy in multi-civilized states is further challenged by the conflicts that often arise while one civilization tries to be the hegemon in the state. Democracy cannot be successful unless all parties recognize the other parties as fellow citizens; there can be competitive animosity but it must be understood that the other party is not a combative enemy.<sup>49</sup> The historical hatred that often exists between divergent cultures in the same state makes democratically peaceful co-existence extremely difficult. In addition to the continuous legacy of

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<sup>47</sup> Natan Sharansky and Ron Dermer, *The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 23.

<sup>48</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 131.

<sup>49</sup> Mark Kingwell, *Unruly Voices: Essays on Democracy, Civility and the Human Imagistate* (Canada: Biblioasis, 2012), 126.

cultural strife, without the will to adopt democracy by either the people or the political elite there is little chance that the International Community can effect these political changes through sheer determination alone. This is especially true of countries that try to undergo significant cultural changes in order to allow democracy to flourish. While attempting to adjust to democracy some states have stepped away from their own cultural identity to adopt one that is foreign and unattainable in many cases; resulting in ineffectual democratic governments.<sup>50</sup> Trying to be what one never was is difficult to sustain and this is especially true of states who attempt to change the customs of fundamentally different peoples at the same time.

The International Community has struggled with the reality that despite all of the incentives such as inclusion into economic treaties or multinational organizations, some countries are not likely to convert to democracy in its true sense, if at all. In particular, countries that are more prone to inter- and intra-state conflict are less likely to become mature democracies unless they are built on a homogenous society.<sup>51</sup> Logically, democracies are based on agreeing to compromise and allowing the majority of all the people's voice to determine future decisions. This is difficult to do if one party is not willing to concede to the other no matter how much time and money the International Community commits to the situation. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the European Union still has a military mission in place in the state despite the Dayton Peace Accord signing in 1996 and the billions of dollars that the International Community has spent on developing a peaceful society let alone a democratic government in the

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<sup>50</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 306.

<sup>51</sup> Mohammed Ayoob, "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective," in *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 135.

state.<sup>52</sup> Until Bosnia-Herzegovina resolves its centuries-long ethnic tensions, democracy and liberalization will always be unrealized plans. Although the West perceives democracy as the greatest tool for improving human security and strengthening the state, the misunderstanding of multi-civilized states leads to a tendency to become fixated on the installation of democracy instead of on the means required to ensure its survivability.

Another Western misconception is that emancipation is the key to liberalization that in turn becomes democratization. What is overlooked, however, is that sometimes freeing people does not make them free. A state where every group suddenly has a right to self-determination without the aid of time or education to assist in assimilating the new changes can often lead to deleterious chaos in failed or failing states.<sup>53</sup> Forcing democracy in such situations can cause greater harm still. Demagogues such as Robert Mugabe from Zimbabwe, Slobodan Milosevic from Serbia, and Rwandan Hutu leaders during the genocidal era used their newly emancipated freedoms to incite hatred and violence against the majority ‘others’ instead of fostering a new society of peaceful coexistence.<sup>54</sup> The determination of the West to spread democracy to ensure ‘world order’ over the past 30 years has not been a successful venture in less fortunate countries such as Haiti who are not only impoverished but mired in oft times violent internal conflict that no amount of new freedoms of association, religion or language have resolved. The progression from freedom to democracy might be taken as a given in the West, but freedom is only effective if governments can uphold them and honour them through their policies and political practices.

### **Non-Democratic Political Structures that Provide Good Governance**

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<sup>52</sup> Jean-Germain Gros, *State Failure, Underdevelopment, and Foreign Intervention in Haiti* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 1.

<sup>53</sup> Mohammed Ayoob, “Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective,” in *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 127.

<sup>54</sup> Amy Chua, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 187.

Honouring rights and freedoms are core aspects of liberal democracy that have been proven to assist in providing stability and good governance in a state. Therefore, it is understandable that liberal democracy is often equated with strong and prosperous governments. There are other non-democratic countries in the world, however, such as China, Kuwait, and Taiwan that maintain good social order and thriving economies despite the lack of some freedoms and rights for their citizens. Other countries such as Cuba have experienced a marked increase in quality of life for all citizens under communism than it had before the Castro regimes due to medical, education and infrastructure improvements directly related to the communist government policies.<sup>55</sup> In fact, one advantage that autocratic or authoritarian governments often have over democratic ones is the ability to make a decision in the best interest of their people without having to honour any past decisions or affiliations.<sup>56</sup> Although the lack of full rights and freedoms does seem a high price to pay to the West, the associated stability that might otherwise not exist in some of these non-democratic states explains why many citizens are happy to accept a more controlling government in exchange for a better quality of life.

Recent history also reveals cases where the introduction of democracy to non-democratic states has severely worsened the quality of life for the population. In countries such as those in the former Yugoslavia under Marshall Tito's rule and even in Indonesia where Suharto maintained order, the populations were far more tolerant of one another than what has resulted since democracy was introduced.<sup>57</sup> The same could be said for the emancipation of the Kurds in Iraq and the Chechens from Russia in terms of a noticeable decrease in security and quality of

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<sup>55</sup> Irshad Manji, *Risking Utopia: On the Edge of a New Democracy* (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1997), 47.

<sup>56</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), 544.

<sup>57</sup> Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Liberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), 18.

life upon gaining freedom.<sup>58</sup> In addition, peoples governed by autocratic rulers often benefit from their strong convictions to protect what ‘belongs’ to them and quell internal conflict and uprisings. This was evident during the Lebanese Civil War from 1975 to 1990 when the emancipated Lebanese peoples suffered during the conflict while their oppressed neighbours in Syria lived in a stable and secure environment.<sup>59</sup> Thus, it is clearly evident that societies can achieve stability and security in both democratic and non-democratic environments, and continue to do so despite the spread of democracy around the world.

For the most part, however, countries are finding that becoming a democracy is more advantageous and respectable from the perspective of the mostly democratized International Community. As an example, democracies are more easily accepted into powerful international organizations such as the European Union. In addition, the majority of the world’s wealthiest states are also democracies. This includes emerging world powers that are now thriving democracies despite spending considerable time as non-democratic states. Countries such as Germany and Japan were dominant non-democratic countries during the Great Wars yet they now are textbook examples of prosperous democratic societies; especially Germany, a state that was the furthest thing from a democracy for decades and purposefully waged war against democratic states.<sup>60</sup> Who could imagine that 70 years later Germany would be one of the top ten

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<sup>58</sup> Mohammed Ayoob, “Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective,” in *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 126.

<sup>59</sup> Mohammed Ayoob, “Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective,” in *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 126.

<sup>60</sup> Natan Sharansky and Ron Dermer, *The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 24.

democracies in the world?<sup>61</sup> The transition for these and many other countries was not idyllic and took a significant amount of time and interest from outside organizations. They did, however, have the advantage of already possessing established democratic institutions such as respect for education and industrialization that made the democratization process easier.<sup>62</sup> Not all countries have the same fortuitous starting point for their transitions into democracy, which can explain why some never seem to become truly democratic states.

Countries such as Haiti that do not have these already established practices still have a chance to become democratic states if that is what they truly desire though. It is already apparent that Haiti has a people that wish to be free from oppression and desire the social welfare that can ensure their human security needs are met. Haiti has leaders who preach democracy even if they are not completely aware of how to practice it. It also has the constitution and political policies in place to transition into a democratic state.

According to Sharansky and Dermer, this is more than adequate in order for Haiti to become a democratic state one day:

The formula that triggered a democratic revolution in the Soviet Union had three components: People inside who yearned to be free, leaders outside who believed they could be, and policies that linked the free world's relations with the USSR to the Soviet regime's treatment of its own people. Whether this same formula is applied to a great power like China or a weak despotism like Zimbabwe, a secular totalitarian regime like North Korea or a religious tyranny like Iran makes no difference. It will work anywhere around the globe.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Global Democracy Ranking, "Democracy Ranking 2015," accessed 20 April 16, <http://democracyranking.org/wordpress/rank/democracy-ranking-2015/>. Germany is currently ranked 7<sup>th</sup> in the world.

<sup>62</sup> John T. Fishel and A. Saenz, "Lessons Learned from Haiti: Capacity Building for Peacekeeping," in *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case for Democracy*, ed. John T. Fishel and Andes Saenz (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), 29.

<sup>63</sup> Natan Sharansky and Ron Dermer, *The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 269.



In the case of Haiti, this formula is missing a resolution to the contentious cultural divide and a realistic timeframe, but precedence has been set by many other states to illustrate that it could work. The goal is to ensure that through the Western desire to see the proliferation of democracy to Haiti and other states, the International Community does not lose sight of the reasons for the spread of democratization. There is no hurry in instituting democracy in the form of free and fair elections as soon as possible. Democracy in Haiti can take as long as required in order to ensure that it is truly a reflection of the will of the people built on an already established safe and secure environment.

*The country's economy is showing signs of fatigue, with public and private investment on a drastic decline, growth waning and inflation increasing, resulting in reduction in social spending, a drop in income-generating activities, increased vulnerability to external shocks, and higher exposure to humanitarian crises, against the backdrop of decreasing international funding. Three consecutive years of drought have resulted in poor harvests, plunging 1.5 million Haitians into severe food insecurity, and further testing the resilience of the Haitian people.*

- Sandra Honoré, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti at the UN Headquarters in New York, 19 March 2016

## **CHAPTER FOUR: THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY IN HAITI**

The issues plaguing Haiti today are a separate all-encompassing study and it often appears impossible to pinpoint the solution that could alleviate its omnipresent struggles. Yet the international community often turns to democracy as the key to solving its problems. It has been established that democracy is the way of the majority of the world, and most certainly the majority of the international hegemons. It is also understood that true democracy has many different levels of adherence around the world. There is no question that democracy would be good for Haiti as it would benefit any state with a population that seeks freedoms and social justice. Whether pure democracy is indeed the solution to Haitian political and social instability is yet to be established though.

The history of democracy in Haiti is a short and tragic tale. Although Haiti was the first independent Caribbean state in 1804, the true struggle for democracy and more specifically an end to the terrorizing military regimes did not begin until the 1980s.<sup>64</sup> Haiti's political history has always been an ethnic power struggle between the mulattoes who came from wealthier, European ancestry entitling them to run the government, own land and control the economy and

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<sup>64</sup> E. Mobekk, "Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti," *Democratization* 8 no.3, 173.

the majority black population who ruled the army.<sup>65</sup> In the two hundred years of independence Haiti has been subjected to some of the most violent internal conflict and strife imaginable. This is due in part to the fact that the ruler of the state was always in the most precarious position of power. Of the 24 Haitian rulers, three previous heads of state were killed and fourteen others fled the state as a result of violent coups and revolts from the people.<sup>66</sup> After nothing but dictators and military rulers, it seemed a political phenomenon when the Roman Catholic priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide won a democratically run election by 67 percent majority in order to become the first ‘freely’ elected president of Haiti in 1990.<sup>67</sup> Unfortunately, after only eight months Aristide was forced to flee office like many of his political predecessors. Democracy in Haiti had to wait for the International Community to once again interfere.

The initial failure of democracy in Haiti was understandable. The concept was thrust upon the people only a short time after surviving over 30 years of despotic terrorism with the Duvalier regimes. In addition, Aristide was determined to make his mark as the first democratically elected president, but in so doing he neglected the all-powerful army, the mulatto elite and foreign investment, which were all historically critical elements of Haitian politics.<sup>68</sup> Aristide resorted to the same mistakes as his predecessors and unfortunately most of his successors in terms of keeping tight control over the management of the state. Not sharing power with the other governmental organizations and outside influences that would best serve the

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<sup>65</sup> Elizabeth Abbot, *Haiti: The Duvaliers and Their Legacy*, (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1988), 26.

<sup>66</sup> Elizabeth Abbot, *Haiti: The Duvaliers and Their Legacy*, (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1988), 25.

<sup>67</sup> John T. Fishel and A. Saenz, “Lessons Learned from Haiti: Capacity Building for Peacekeeping,” In *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case for Democracy*, Edited by John T. Fishel and Andes Saenz, (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), 11.

<sup>68</sup> E. Mobekk, “Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti,” *Democratization* 8, no.3 (2001): 173.

people is a misconstrued concept of democracy.<sup>69</sup> This does not mean that Haiti requires consociational democracy where the president of one party needs to have a vice president from another party in order for there to be political fairness. What it is implying is that it is only through inclusivity that democracy will work, and if those organizations that are to be included are broken then they need to be repaired and incorporated into the plan before democracy can be successful in any society; especially in Haiti.

### **The Start of the Downfall**

The constant desire for power amongst Haitian heads of state is a social phenomenon. With consequences more dire than just man's innate desire to control, Haitian leaders have continuously allowed their position of power to become more important than the needs of the people. Even post-Duvalier era presidents have become victim to "acute presidentitis", otherwise known as the desire to prolong tenures past the constitutionally mandated date.<sup>70</sup> Haiti's current position as the poorest state in the Americas is a direct result of power hungry heads of state spending more energy on trying to maintain power than on trying to help the people. Even the most recently elected president, Michel Martelly, left the office on the last possible day leaving an interim president in charge after elections continue to be delayed due to the usual claims of fraud. This is why to date it has been socially acceptable in Haiti to replace political actors through assassination and violent intimidation or removal despite it being counter to democratic

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<sup>69</sup> John T. Fishel and A. Saenz, "Lessons Learned from Haiti: Capacity Building for Peacekeeping," in *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case for Democracy*, ed. John T. Fishel and Andes Saenz (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), 28.

<sup>70</sup> Jean-Germain Gros, *State Failure, Underdevelopment, and Foreign Intervention in Haiti* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 99.

practices.<sup>71</sup> That is sometimes the only way to get them out of office. If the heads of state themselves cannot firmly abide by the democratic rules they were chosen to uphold, how can the rest of the state be held accountable for not adhering to democracy?

To date Haiti has never had a democratic government. It has had free and fair elections under the watchful eye of the UN, but that was the extent of the democracy involved; and even those elections were contested and fraught with controversy. This is why United States Security Council Resolution 940, reinstating the freely elected Aristide in 1994, was not necessarily a democratic success since Aristide's return did not result in any palpable changes to the deplorable human security issues or the internal or external cooperation amongst the government.<sup>72</sup> Martelly was to be Haiti's crowning democratic success, and perhaps he could have been more influential in these regards if it was not for the effects of the devastating earthquake and hurricane that he dealt with during his tenure. With Martelly's democratically elected successor still unknown at this time as the presidential elections of 2014 continue to lag, the future of liberal democracy in Haiti appears increasingly less likely to occur within the near future.

### **History of Haitian Instability**

The unknown future of Haitian democracy is not surprising, however, considering the volatility of Haiti's past. Haiti's separation from France was the first catalyst in its downfall from being the Pearl of the Antilles, as it was called, to one of the least liberal and democratic countries in the Americas. The irony is that Haiti should be the exact opposite since it gained

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<sup>71</sup> John T. Fishel and A. Saenz, "Lessons Learned from Haiti: Capacity Building for Peacekeeping," in *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case for Democracy*, ed. John T. Fishel and Andes Saenz (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), 9.

<sup>72</sup> E. Mobekk, "Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti," *Democratization* 8, no. 3 (2001): 175.

independence from France just after the French revolution and as social equality was increasing in popularity.<sup>73</sup> At this time the French masters who inhabited Haiti feared that their slaves and workers would revolt against them in much the same way the revolutionary working class revolted in France and resolved to govern the black Haitians with extreme discipline and lack of access to education in order to keep the Haitians in their places.<sup>74</sup> This is in essence where the animosity between the black and white (now mulatto) Haitians originated. Black Haitians were treated so deplorably that the experience is passed down from generation to generation so that the atrocities are never forgotten or forgiven.

Effectively, slavery has played a key role in forming Haitian identity today. Slavery was not particular to Haiti alone during the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, but Haitian slave owners were particularly barbaric. Similar to many Caribbean states of the era, black Haitians were owned as labourers and mulattos were often allowed education and relative freedom. For those Haitians kept in captivity, French slave owners followed actual formulations that determined that it was more economical to buy a new slave every four to seven years than to take care of their cadre of slaves and so black Haitians were worked or beaten to death with little regard to their welfare.<sup>75</sup> This injustice led to the Haitian revolution and ultimately to independence.

Independence came at a great cost, however, since it was the first state to win independence in the Americas in an actual battle against its European oppressors. Once Haiti became its own state, freed slaves and took back land from the French inhabitants, the rest of the

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<sup>73</sup> John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti 1994-1997* (Westport: Praeger, 1998), 5.

<sup>74</sup> John T. Fishel and A. Saenz, "Lessons Learned from Haiti: Capacity Building for Peacekeeping," in *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case for Democracy*, ed. John T. Fishel and Andes Saenz (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), 9.

<sup>75</sup> Elizabeth Abbot, *Haiti: The Duvaliers and Their Legacy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1988), 11.

world shunned it and barred it from international commerce.<sup>76</sup> Truthfully, the freed Haitians were in no position to manage their economy even if they were given a chance with the majority of Haitians being illiterate and unaccustomed to world affairs. This left the few educated mulattoes to control the civil service and the economy “on behalf” of the black Haitians.<sup>77</sup> This slight from the International Community and resultant seizure of power by the mulatto Haitians had a destructive impact on all Haitian people that still exists to this day.

The racial forge that ultimately initiated Haiti’s economic woes worsened in 1808 with the divide of the state into a mulatto South led by a highly educated Petion in France and a black North ruled by self-taught Christophe.<sup>78</sup> Between Petion’s overly liberal policies and Christophe’s overly despotic barbarism, the two rulers managed to destroy Haiti’s economic potential and the spirit of the people when the state most needed prosperity and unity:

The rival regime in the south was headed by Alexandre Petion, a mulatto, who served with the title of president from 1808 to 1818. Educated in France, Petion had a certain admiration for democratic ideals and allowed the people to enjoy unprecedented liberty of action. He confiscated the large French plantations and parceled out small plots of land to soldiers and officers. Petion’s generosity, however motivated, changed the entire agricultural base of the society. No longer willing to cultivate coffee, indigo and sugar, most of the people in the south grew garden crops for their own use. Although profits from export crops declined, the common man, secure on his small plot, probably considered himself better off than ever before. In terms of national prosperity, however, the results were calamitous. Customs and tax revenues declined; paper money without backing was issued; and new foreign loans were obtained at excessive interest rates. Nevertheless, the people in the south enjoyed freedom, while the people in Christophe’s kingdom [up north] lived as serfs.<sup>79</sup>

Although both intelligent men, neither ruler appreciated the value of the other’s governance enough to consider adjusting their ways in order to ensure both financial and social stability for

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<sup>76</sup> *Ibid*, 18.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid*, 25.

<sup>78</sup> Elizabeth Abbot, *Haiti: The Duvaliers and Their Legacy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1988), 21.

<sup>79</sup> Thomas E. Weil, *Area Handbook for Haiti* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 31.

their people. There have been periods in Haiti's past where the state was able to overcome its debt ridden misery, even if the people were socially repressed. Two hundred years later, however, the Haitian government has still has yet to find a solution to this dilemma, even with the renewed aid of the International Community.

After a century of struggle, the invasion of the US in the first part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to assist Haiti with political turmoil resulted in improved financial prosperity for Haiti. With the Americans aiding in Haiti's leveling of foreign debt, the increase in commodity prices during the mid-1900s and the Caribbean increasingly becoming a vacation destination for most North Americans (especially to Haiti with its distinct French culture), the state was able to enjoy some relative financial comfort.<sup>80</sup> In addition, the Americans required adequate living conditions while they were in Haiti, thus they provided many infrastructure improvements to roads, air fields, communication facilities and hospitals.<sup>81</sup> Unfortunately, a century of inadequate agricultural expertise resulted in the resurgence of agricultural exports leaving the land barren, with many of its once luscious forests being cleared for over-farming without the foresight to properly cultivate the lands.<sup>82</sup> This characteristically poor management of natural resources multiplied by the continued political turmoil, over population, and lack of social welfare once the Americans left in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century has given rise to a state that is one of the most dependent independent states in the world.

### **Haiti's Political Past**

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<sup>80</sup> Jean-Germain Gros, *State Failure, Underdevelopment, and Foreign Intervention in Haiti* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 98-99.

<sup>81</sup> Elizabeth Abbot, *Haiti: The Duvaliers and Their Legacy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1988), 47.

<sup>82</sup> Thomas E. Weil, *Area Handbook for Haiti* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 5.



Haiti has always prided itself on its long-lived independence. The politics associated with independently running a state has been a fundamental aspect of life for Haitians as well. The state barely survived military coups and dissolved governments until the Haitian public and international community were finally able to force the creation of a democratic framework. Since 1987, Haiti has been a democratic republic with a constitution that clearly details Haiti's elected bicameral parliament with an upper and lower house, an elected president as the head of state, a prime minister with staff, a cabinet, a supreme court and elected mayors.<sup>83</sup> Unfortunately, its democratic history is just as volatile and disappointing as its previous 200 years of ineffective government.

Interim governments abounded from 1987 until Aristide was elected in 1990. His short stay in office was followed by other short stays by other presidents necessitating the continual physical intervention of the UN and international community since 1993 to ensure elections are run freely and fairly, in addition to all of the other social and infrastructure assistance that Haiti requires. A significant reason for the electoral nightmares is due to the inadequate use of the constitutionally mandated Permanent Electoral Council that is supposed to be (but unsurprisingly is not) transparent and independent of the executive.<sup>84</sup> The inability for Haiti to have uncontentious and timely elections can be directly attributed to a misunderstanding of democracy on the part of the Haitians and the rest of the West though. Haitians often remind the international community that when they were fighting for democracy in the mid-1980s their definition of democracy was not just fair elections. Haitians want 'participatory democracy' in the sense that the population has an influence on the political, social, and economic issues

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<sup>83</sup> Global Security, "Haitian Politics," last modified 29 March 2016, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/haiti/politics.htm>.

<sup>84</sup> Ricardo Seitenfus, "The Nature of Haitian Politics and International Challenges," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 6, no.3 (2011): 87.

affecting the state.<sup>85</sup> The West has concentrated on putting the ‘right person’ in charge of the state, while the state is concentrating on everybody ruling it together regardless of who is in charge since those in power have historically become power hungry.

### **Duvalier Regimes**

Another reason why elections do not naturally equate to democracy for Haitians is the fact that they have had elections in the past that were such fraudulent and contentious farces that even the most naive realized they were purely symbolic. During the reign of the president Francois ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier ballots were counted by the army he controlled leaving him winning a two-thirds majority chosen by an illiterate electorate that could not read the names on the paper; and his son and successor Jean-Claude won by 2,391,916 votes for and none against.<sup>86</sup> The reign of the Duvaliers was the furthest thing from a liberal democracy, especially when Papa Doc was president. He won the hearts of the people originally by being a black Haitian that realized his aspirations, but he became so evil in his quest for power that he resorted to violence and torture in order to ‘control’ the population.<sup>87</sup> Between the two Duvaliers, hundreds of millions of dollars were embezzled, tens of thousands of Haitians went missing either through murder or exile, thousands were tortured into compliance in the presidential quarters, and millions more were scared into following the self-declared ‘presidents for life’.<sup>88</sup> In a fear society such as that of the Duvalier era ending in 1986, there are no liberal democratic rights such as human dignity, independent judiciary, rule of law, freedom of publication and political

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<sup>85</sup> E. Mobekk, “Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti,” *Democratization* 8, no. 3 (2001): 179.

<sup>86</sup> Alex Von Tunzelmann, *Red Heat: Conspiracy, Murder and the Cold War in the Caribbean* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 2011), 91 and 372.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>88</sup> Elizabeth Abbot, *Haiti: The Duvaliers and Their Legacy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1988), 6 and 333.

opposition parties.<sup>89</sup> After surviving such brutality, Haitians were looking for freedom, not free and fair elections. Thirty years later they are still looking for the same thing: corruption, crime and human security need to be addressed before elections can even be considered.

### **The Impact of Corruption**

Corruption is perhaps Haiti's biggest obstacle in its quest for democracy. Ranked as one of the world's 10 most corrupt states, Haitians have good reason to constantly mistrust their politicians and legal systems.<sup>90</sup> The corruption stems in part from historical legacies and in part from megalomania. Historically, politics was the purview of the more affluent mulattos and with time they consolidated their power by sharing it solely with relatives and close friends; and if they could not be trusted the power resided in only the ruler.<sup>91</sup> This oligarchy somewhat abated after the Duvaliers left the office, but many Haitians are still weary of the government. All elections from municipal to federal are highly contentious with often violent protests and claims of fraud despite the involvement of the international community in the running of the election. There is little faith from Haitians that their best interests are being taken into consideration and they have reason to be skeptical. Social welfare deficiencies are not being resolved and the crime rate is debilitating for the state in terms of tourism or commerce, specifically in regards to robbery and aggravated assault; although it is difficult to get accurate statistics due to poor

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<sup>89</sup> Natan Sharansky and Ron Dermer, *The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 197.

<sup>90</sup> Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2015," accessed 20 April 2016, [http://www.transparency.org/state/#HTI\\_DataResearch](http://www.transparency.org/state/#HTI_DataResearch). According to Transparency International Haiti ranks as the 158<sup>th</sup> most corrupt state out of 168 countries.

<sup>91</sup> John T. Fishel and A. Saenz, "Lessons Learned from Haiti: Capacity Building for Peacekeeping," in *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case for Democracy*, ed. John T. Fishel and Andes Saenz (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), 9.

reporting from the Haitian National Police (HNP).<sup>92</sup> The government claims that there are not enough trained police officers to patrol the areas in most dire need, yet ex-President Martelly used the HNP to safeguard many of his close associates including those that did not even hold positions in office.<sup>93</sup> This apparent abuse of power is not conducive to transparency in government.

The legal and constabulary systems still function with corrupt favouritism and graft as well. Haitian laws are supposed to be transparent according to the constitution, but law enforcement is rarely applied or enforced.<sup>94</sup> Even with the renewed efforts to revitalize the HNP criminals are evading capture and once captured they are avoiding prosecution. In addition, gangs in the capital of Port-au-Prince are often associated with high ranking political entities. Such is the case in one gang led by former prisoner Gabriel Jean-Baptiste who is reputed to be linked to the previous Martelly government and another gang controlled by a former deputy.<sup>95</sup> These criminal associations with political or legal entities further limit the powers of the HNP to fulfil their mandated roles. The UN continues to monitor and train the HNP but the population does not take them as seriously as they do the UN military and police forces due to the legacy of police corruption. The HNP and the Haitian Department of Justice will have to improve considerably by producing lower crime rates and higher prosecution numbers in order for the UN

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<sup>92</sup> United States Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security/Overseas Security Advisory Council, "Haiti 2016 Crime and Safety Report," last modified 3 January 2016, <https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=19193>.

<sup>93</sup> Kim Ives and Thomas Peralte, "Haiti: Carnival Tragedy — U.S., France and Canada Are Accessories to the Crime Wave and Gang Wars," *Global Research*, 26 February 2015. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/haiti-carnival-tragedy-u-s-france-and-canada-are-accessories-to-the-crime-wave-and-gang-wars/5433750>. This interesting article did not give much evidence to the fact that the US, France and Canada are verified accessories to the currently problems with crime in Haiti other than the fact that these countries supported the Martelly government which did not adequately control crime.

<sup>94</sup> U.S. Department of State, "2014 Investment Climate Statement – Haiti," last modified June 2014, <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/228815.htm>.

<sup>95</sup> Kim Ives and Thomas Peralte, "Haiti: Carnival Tragedy — U.S., France and Canada Are Accessories to the Crime Wave and Gang Wars," *Global Research*, 26 February 2015, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/haiti-carnival-tragedy-u-s-france-and-canada-are-accessories-to-the-crime-wave-and-gang-wars/5433750>.

and the Haitian citizens to trust in their professionalism. Based on previous trends and the financial crisis that is gripping the state, corruption in the Haitian legal system may last for years to come.

## Crime

Although official statistics are scarce, the national and transnational crime rates in Haiti are amongst the highest in the Caribbean due to the uncontrollable corruption and brutal economy. The majority of Western governments advise strongly against unnecessary travel to the state due to the critically high crime rates. The Government of Canada in particular stresses extreme vigilance while in the state due to the inordinately high cases of “murders, kidnappings, armed robbery, burglary and carjacking” at all hours of the day, which is in part a result of many gang leaders and criminals escaping from a prison in the vicinity of Port-au-Prince in 2014.<sup>96</sup> Further compromising the Haitian government’s ability to control corruption is the transnational crime that is pervasive throughout the state.

Haiti is a long established transshipment point for drug trafficking and the porous borders, ineffective HNP and low employment rate make this destabilizing source of income attractive to gangs and government officials alike.<sup>97</sup> With a gross national income of \$842 USD (compared to Canada’s at \$51,630 USD) and aside from remittances, drug trafficking is the only other reliable source of income for Haitians.<sup>98</sup> The vicious circle of needing crime to assist with one’s quality of life while the very same criminal offences contribute to the deplorable living conditions in the

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<sup>96</sup> Government of Canada, “Travel: Haiti,” last modified 28 April 2016, <https://travel.gc.ca/destistates/haiti>.

<sup>97</sup> Stewart Patrick, *Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford Press, 2011), 146.

<sup>98</sup> The World Bank, “Data: Haiti,” accessed 29 April 2016, [http://data.worldbank.org/state/haiti#cp\\_fin](http://data.worldbank.org/state/haiti#cp_fin) and “Data: Canada,” accessed 29 April 2016, <http://data.worldbank.org/state/canada>.

state leaves Haiti in a conundrum that the UN has been unable to solve over the last 20 years. Haitians need an alternative to crime that is more profitable and sustainable in order to save their society from irreparable ruin.

## **Human Security**

The population of Haiti is just over 10.5 million people and 58.5% of them live below the poverty line compared to 13.8% of 35.5 million Canadians.<sup>99</sup> The number of poor people in Haiti is staggering and is a leading contributor to Haiti's lengthy road to democracy. The lack of jobs available for Haitians is in large part a result of the reluctance of the many companies to establish commerce in such a volatile state with little infrastructure, electricity or suitable roads to assist with business. Certainly the earthquake in January 2010 further worsened the dilapidated infrastructure expanding the current miserable commercial conditions. Unenforced building code standards sealed the fate of the state that day, however, leaving a damaged state that will take decades to repair once enough money is made available.<sup>100</sup> This leaves millions of disenchanting, unemployed people sitting around in the dirt and rubble of Port-au-Prince, with little to call their own other than family members to feed. In order to create more jobs in Haiti, the government has to concentrate on economic growth. Unfortunately, institutions that can promote economic growth are very difficult to create in extreme poverty and political uncertainty.<sup>101</sup> Once again Haiti finds itself with a seemingly unsolvable enigma.

## **Undereducated Populace**

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<sup>99</sup> The World Bank, "Data: Haiti," accessed 29 April 2016, [http://data.worldbank.org/state/haiti#cp\\_fin](http://data.worldbank.org/state/haiti#cp_fin) and "Data: Canada," accessed 29 April 2016, <http://data.worldbank.org/state/canada>.

<sup>100</sup> Jean-Germain Gros, *State Failure, Underdevelopment, and Foreign Intervention in Haiti* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 1.

<sup>101</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), 545.

Another complication is that even if there were more jobs available, Haitians have such little access to education that it would be difficult to find people capable of working in the labour force. Even with Haiti's Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training increasing their involvement with Haitian schools, the education statistics have not improved to levels adequate enough to allow for a competent workforce, let alone professional vocations. Since the emphasis on education began in 2011, education has improved but the literacy rate of the population is still only 48% with the average person only attending a total of five years of school.<sup>102</sup> Enrollment also remains low, 80% of teachers are not qualified and only 15% of the primary schools in Haiti are publicly funded; the rest are supported by non-governmental organizations, non-profits and church groups.<sup>103</sup>

With the majority of schools being funded by organizations other than the government, access to education is not a given for the majority of Haitians. Their salaries alone are not even enough to pay for one year of schooling for one child in most cases, let alone feeding their families. After five years of focusing on issue the state is still at impossibly low levels of literacy and education. These statistics are so drastically low that it will be quite a while before noticeable changes to education are visible and only if more government money is invested in it. With so many other vitally pressing government issues including elections, the future of Haitian education is in a precarious state.

### **Limited Social Welfare**

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<sup>102</sup> United States Development Program, "Human Development Index 2015," accessed 20 April 2016, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/HTI>.

<sup>103</sup> USAID, "Haiti Education Fact Sheet," January 2016, accessed 29 April 2016, <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1862/Education%20Fact%20Sheet%20FINAL%20%20January%202016%20-2%20page.pdf>.

In fact, education is only one of the many social welfare issues that are seriously depleting Haiti's future prospects for peace and stability. Waste management, road repair, medical facilities, water management and fire and police services amongst many other municipally or federally funded agencies in the majority of democratic states are almost non-existent in Haiti. This is mostly due to the fact that government taxes, including property and income taxes, are not a civic obligation in Haiti. The Duvaliers cemented this cultural phenomenon with their overuse of foreign aid instead of taxing Haitians during their reign in order to gather favour with the Haitian elite and limit their accountability.<sup>104</sup> As the elite were the only ones with enough of an income or any property to tax, the Duvaliers did not have worry about providing them social services since they were not paying for them. Most of the elite can afford to have their social needs fulfilled in the USA or Canada or can pay for private companies in Haiti. It is the other 95% of Haitians who suffer from the lack of government support for basic needs and are left in dire straits depending on the international community and aid organizations for day to day subsistence.

Although foreign policy objectives in Haiti are difficult to determine, one can be assured that foreign aid plays a major role in current and future government planning. The Duvalier regimes established Haiti as a state dependent on foreign aid for its very existence. Its failed status as a state and deplorable living conditions for its citizens has further cemented Haiti as a risk with for outside investors. The lack of adequate education leaves the state with little prospects for commercial successes from within. These realities have left Haiti an increasingly dependent state. As much as the international community has vowed to teach Haitians how to fish instead of providing enough fish to sustain the 10.5 million residents, the past 50 years has

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<sup>104</sup> Jean-Germain Gros, *State Failure, Underdevelopment, and Foreign Intervention in Haiti* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 104.



proven that the longer the international community assists the Haitian government in obtaining absolute independence, the less likely it is to achieve it:

A strong case can be made that contemporary failed states are not being rebuilt; instead, their worse effects are being managed, and not always with success. Skeptics would go further: Humanitarian intervention, far from ushering in sustainable states, perpetuates dependency and poverty.<sup>105</sup>

Haiti appears to be torn between wanting its own independence and wanting to maintain its current semi-stable (through foreign aid) lifestyle. What would happen to the generations of Haitians who have always relied on outside agencies for health, education, engineering, security and the other myriad of social services that are provided by various organizations in the international community? Much like the 20-year-old child that lives in the basement rent-free; why would they move out on their own if their parents are always there to take care of them and what awaits them outside of the house could potentially be worse?

### **Foreign Relations**

This culture of dependency is stunting the much needed growth of the Haitian economy. The gamble of decreasing foreign aid and building their own economic independence to echo their constitutional desires of self-governance seemed too risky to the past several Haitian governments. Otherwise, foreign aid, in which the Government of Canada alone has given Haiti over \$1.6 billion CDN since 2006<sup>106</sup>, should be resulting in more dramatic improvements not only in Haitian quality of life but in its Haitian foreign relations prospects. Haitian foreign relations are somewhat of a misnomer as it is basically accepting as much foreign aid as possible

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<sup>105</sup> Jean-Germain Gros, *State Failure, Underdevelopment, and Foreign Intervention in Haiti* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 2.

<sup>106</sup> Government of Canada, "Minister Paradis Announces Renewed Engagement in Haiti," last modified 12 June 2015, <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=987539>.

while still trying to persuade other states that it is mature enough to have its own sovereignty. Haiti has always been a black sheep in the Caribbean from its groundbreaking independence in the early 1800s to its French culture, creole language, voodoo practices and embarrassingly low capacity for self-sufficiency and that has often left the state preferring regional isolation as opposed to being heavily engaged in regional associations.<sup>107</sup> Unfortunately for Haiti, after over 50 years of international aid and 20 years of near constant UN presence, the world is getting weary of providing so much money and not seeing any noticeable advancements. This is especially true of regional states that have the most to lose from a national security perspective in terms of influxes of refugees and transnational drugs if Haiti does not manage to elevate itself from a failed to at least a failing state with potential in the near future.

The situation in Haiti is closely monitored by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) due to its proximity and large diaspora in Canada, the USA and other regional countries in the Caribbean. The countries in these organizations are also some of the highest contributors in aid. In terms of elections, 75% of election financing is from the international community, yet 20 years on Haiti cannot have an election without the presence of the UN further augmenting the costs.<sup>108</sup> The OAS and CARICOM also have observers who are dispatched to monitor the elections. Although these organizations are regionally collocated with Haiti, the cultural differences between the historically British commonwealth countries and Haiti's French roots leaves a great linguistic and cultural divide that often makes the Haitians resentful to have no choice but to take advice from people who do

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<sup>107</sup> Nigel Quinney, "Culture Counts: A Diplomatic Perspective on Culture and Regional Conflict Management," in *Rewiring Regional Security in a Fragmented World*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 97.

<sup>108</sup> Ricardo Seitenfus, "The Nature of Haitian Politics and International Challenges," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 6, no.3 (2011):87.

not fully understand them.<sup>109</sup> Assistance is seen as meddling and perhaps sometimes they were. With the amount of time and money these regional organizations were contributing to the election process in Haiti, however, the Haitian government and people should at least be prepared to have close oversight of their slightest movement. Especially after 20 years of status quo.

The effort of the international community to aid Haiti in this definite time of need is commendable, even if the efforts have not resulted in noticeable improvements. Although the UN has been the predominant international organization involved in Haiti over the past couple of decades, there are a few countries in particular that have been highly influential in the state, most notably the US. The US has a history with colonization and intervention in the Caribbean. By the late 1800s into the first decade of the 1900s, the US had already occupied or acquired Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, and Nicaragua and had customs receivership in the Dominican Republic.<sup>110</sup> Haiti seemed the next logical step, and the ousting of the 14<sup>th</sup> Haitian head of state before his term ended gave the Americans all the reason they needed to intervene in the state.<sup>111</sup> The efforts of the Americans from the beginning of their occupation in 1915 worked very well at first. They fixed the infrastructure in the state to facilitate their own lines of communication and brought much needed social welfare such as medical facilities.

Unfortunately, the Americans did not treat the Haitians as equals, exhibiting racism, being verbally and physically abusive, and denying the Haitians equivalent education and training, until eventually their continued presence harkened back to previous years of oppression

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<sup>109</sup> *Ibid*, 88.

<sup>110</sup> Elizabeth Abbot, *Haiti: The Duvaliers and Their Legacy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1988), 34.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid*, 25.

and eliciting a massive Haitian black-pride movement.<sup>112</sup> By 1934, the Americans could no longer justify occupying a state that did not want them there. The departure of the Americans left Haiti slightly better off than when they arrived with renewed infrastructure and an improved economy. Without the training and education of how to maintain these new advances, however, the state slowly reverted to its pre-occupation ways.

After the Americans left, years of dictators and despotic rule forced hundreds of thousands of Haitians to flee the state. Haiti had effectively gone from a foreign repressive occupation to a domestic repressive rule. Throughout the following decades of turmoil thousands of Haitians immigrated to Canada and as a result the Canadian Government continues to have a large influence in Haiti. Canadians of Haitian decent are one of the largest non-European Canadian ethnic groups at approximately 137,995 people.<sup>113</sup> This significant diaspora have had great influence over the strategic decision-making of the federal government over the last 30 years.<sup>114</sup> Due in part to pressure from Haitian-Canadians, Canada has participated in the majority of UN initiatives in Haiti for almost 30 years by providing police, military and civilian experts in varying capacities.

Canada has spent so much time and effort on Haiti that it is now part of the foreign policy outlook until 2020. The Government of Canada will concentrate on promoting many of the same priorities in the Mission des States Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti's (or MINUSTAH, which

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<sup>112</sup> John T. Fishel and A. Saenz, "Lessons Learned from Haiti: Capacity Building for Peacekeeping," in *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case for Democracy*, ed. John T. Fishel and Andes Saenz (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), 10.

<sup>113</sup> Statistics Canada, "2011 National Household Survey: Data tables," last modified 7 January 2016, <http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-pd/dt-td/Rp-eng.cfm?LANG=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=0&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=0&GC=0&GID=0&GK=0&GRP=1&PID=105396&PRID=0&PTYPE=105277&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=0&Temporal=2013&THEME=95&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=>.

<sup>114</sup> John T. Fishel and A. Saenz, "Lessons Learned from Haiti: Capacity Building for Peacekeeping," in *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case for Democracy*, ed. John T. Fishel and Andes Saenz (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), 56.

is French for the United States Stabilization Mission in Haiti) mandate including sustainable economic growth and a democratic government.<sup>115</sup> The Haitian diaspora continues to pressure the Government of Canada in terms of tough immigration laws for relatives, but for the most part Canada's continued economic support of Haiti coupled with the civilian, military and police forces that continue to serve under MINUSTAH have appeased Haitian-Canadians and the international community alike.

The legacy of Canada's participation in UN missions in Haiti began with the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) that was approved in 1993 but did not commence in earnest until 1994. UN Security Council Resolution 940 authorized a multinational force to use any necessary force under Chapter VII to oust the military leadership that had taken over the state in a coup d'état, professionalize the Haitian Army, establish a national police force and establish a safe and secure environment in Haiti.<sup>116</sup> This three year mission was just the beginning of a parade of missions established with almost identical mandates that would become increasingly robust as the length of the mission progressed. Despite a gap of a few years between 2000 and 2004, the UN has consistently been in the state trying to professionalize the HNP, electoral process and judiciary, and provide peace and stability to the volatile state.

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<sup>115</sup> Government of Canada, "Minister Paradis Announces Renewed Engagement in Haiti," last modified 12 June 2015, <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=987539>.

<sup>116</sup> E. Mobekk, "Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti," *Democratization* 8, no.3 (2001): 174.

Table 4.1 UN Missions in Haiti: 1993-2016

<b>Mission</b>	<b>Mandate</b>	<b>Dates</b>
International Civilian Police Mission in Haiti	Professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP) forces	February 1993 to November 2000
UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)	Promotion of a stable environment under a democratic government, professionalization of the Haitian Armed Forces, sustainment of separate police force, and establishment of a society based on free and fair elections	September 1993 to June 1996
UN Support Mission in Haiti (MANUH in French)	Professionalization of the HNP, establishment and training of an effective national police force, promotion of institution-building, national reconstruction and economic stability	June 1996 to July 1997
United States Transition Mission In Haiti (UNTMIH)	Professionalization of the HNP, training of HNP in crowd control, rapid reaction and Palace security	August to November 1997
UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH in French)	Professionalization of the HNP, assistance of supervisors and training specialized police units	December 1997 to March 2000
International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH in French)	Increasing the promotion of human rights and strengthening the credibility of the HNP and the judiciary	March 2000 to November 2000
Multinational Interim Force	Establishment of a safe and secure environment, distribution of relief to those in need, assistance to HNP and Haitian Coast Guard in maintenance of law and order and human rights	February 2004 to June 2004
UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH in French)	Establishment of a safe and secure environment; provision of support to the political and electoral process; assistance with the strengthening of institutions, law enforcement and rule-of-law; protection of human rights; and reconstruction of infrastructure.	June 2004 to present

\*Information from UN Website <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml>, accessed 29 April 2016.

From the commencement of the first mission in 1993 until today, the UN mandate for Haiti still calls for the professionalization of the HNP. The UN has had a continual presence in Haiti for over 20 years and has yet to aid in professionalizing a national policing capability. Controlling corruption in the HNP is difficult as well as instilling a code of conduct that incorporates appreciation of civil rights in a society where civil rights are still developing.<sup>117</sup> Other challenges to professionalizing the HNP include a lack of adequate facilities and resources, cultural tendencies to use vigilantism for retribution, and lack of public education in the role of the police.<sup>118</sup> In the last five years, however, the HNP grew in strength from 3,300 officers in 2010 to more than 12,000 officers in the spring of 2015; with a goal of reaching 15,000 officers by the end of 2016.<sup>119</sup> Hopefully the HNP will continue to grow in numbers and credibility until, because with Haiti no longer possessing military forces, the HNP is the only way the government will be able to enforce law and order once UN forces leave the state.

Presently, the Canadian contribution to Haiti involves a full range of federal employees in MINUSTAH. The Military Chief of Staff of MINUSTAH is a Canadian Armed Forces officer who serves along with four other CAF military staff officers, the civilian Chief of Staff is often a Canadian and the Deputy Chief of Police for MINUSTAH is a Canadian police officer serving with over 90 other Canadian police officers. MINUSTAH itself was a rather large UN mission that has decreased in size over the years. MINUSTAH's initial strength was 6,700 military, 1,622 police, 548 international civilians, and approximately 1000 local civilians.<sup>120</sup> As of 29 February

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<sup>117</sup> John T. Fishel and A. Saenz, "Lessons Learned from Haiti: Capacity Building for Peacekeeping," in *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case for Democracy*, ed. John T. Fishel and Andes Saenz (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), 14.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid*, 23.

<sup>119</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Diplomacy in Action – Haiti," accessed 30 March 2016, <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/regions/westernhemisphere/219169.htm>.

<sup>120</sup> United Nations, "MINUSTAH," accessed 29 April 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/facts.shtml>.

2016, there remains 2,368 military, 2,382 police, 304 international civilians, and 941 local civilians.<sup>121</sup> It has less personnel undertaking one of the largest UN mandates in the history of the state. One could posit that it is due to the progress of Haiti towards a safe and secure environment. Realistically, however, after 20 years of trying to professionalize the HNP, rebuild political and judicial institutions and reconstruct the crumbling infrastructure, MINUSTAH could face serious challenges with such a small sized force.<sup>122</sup>

It is understandable that the UN is trying to slowly extricate itself from the troubled state since UN missions are so extraordinarily expensive. Haiti costs over \$700 million USD per year alone, which is far beyond Haiti's annual budget.<sup>123</sup> Haiti would never be able to afford the services they are being provided for free. Is this continued intervention still the solution though? If the goal is for Haiti to have a self-sufficient government with credible institutions and a stable social and economic environment, when does the UN leave Haiti to its own devices?

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<sup>121</sup> United Nations, "MINUSTAH," accessed 29 April 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/facts.shtml>.

<sup>122</sup> Namie Di Razza, *L'ONU en Haïti Depuis 2004: Ambitions et déconvenues des opérations de paix multidimensionnelles* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2010), 18.

<sup>123</sup> Jean-Germain Gros, *State Failure, Underdevelopment, and Foreign Intervention in Haiti* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 1.



*It's always best to start at the beginning.*

- Glinda, the Good Witch, *The Wizard of Oz*

## CHAPTER FIVE: THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN HAITI

Practicing democracy is an effective way to maintain stability in a state. The state needs to be prepared to benefit from democracy though or the electoral process ends up as an expensive ritual instead of an effective tool. In the case of Haiti, the first step towards democracy should be establishing a safe and secure environment. After the state improves its internal security issues, it can focus on making democracy a norm by addressing the systemic problems that are perpetuating the social, political and economic unrest. As Fukuyama states:

Political order is not just about constraining abusive governments. It is more often about getting governments to actually do the things expected of them, like providing citizen security, protecting property rights, making available education and public health services, and building the infrastructure that is necessary for private economic activity to occur.<sup>124</sup>

Haiti is presently facing a significant human security crisis that is negatively impacting its economic and political future. In order to consolidate its democratic processes, the Haitian people have to experience quantifiable improvements to their living conditions. Over the last 25 years of elections, Haitians have not noticed any change prompting them to believe that a democratically chosen government is of advantageous.<sup>125</sup> The opinion amongst the population is that the Haitian government lacks legitimacy; and this is echoed by the international community. The process of democratization requires political legitimacy though.<sup>126</sup> A legitimate state should

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<sup>124</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), 54.

<sup>125</sup> E. Mobekk, "Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti," *Democratization* 8, no. 3 (2001): 180.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid*, 181.

be able to prove that it can control its territory and maintain an internationally acceptable level of human rights and social welfare.<sup>127</sup> Unfortunately Haiti can do none of the above.

### **A Change in Cultural Beliefs and Practices**

In order to democracy to become a norm in Haiti, the population requires a better understanding of the practice. With understanding comes acceptance; with acceptance, sound practice. Haitians need to be more aware of the intricacies involved in democracy and willing to support the government in its political adaptation.<sup>128</sup> In order for democracy to become a way of life in Haiti, Haitians have to change their attitudes towards it and accept it as a new belief and part of their culture.<sup>129</sup> Changes to these effects take time, especially considering Haiti's challenges with corruption and social and political violence. Author Irshad Manjii refers to this cultural adaptation in poor states such as Haiti as adopting Western norms of progress and likens it to women trying to succeed in predominantly male organizations yet never being fully accepted.<sup>130</sup> Without the population trusting in the principles of democracy, however, Haiti will have less chance of ever solidifying the political process.

Haitians have had little reason in the past to trust their various levels of government. Wide scale corruption at the municipal level has resulted in Haitians being the least likely state in the Caribbean to trust their regional governments and most likely to be in favour of a centralized

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<sup>127</sup> Edward Newman, "Critical Human Security Studies," *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 1 (2010): 77-94. Edward Newman is a professor of International Security at the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds and an associate at the Center for Peace and Human Security, Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris.

<sup>128</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 51.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>130</sup> Irshad Manji, *Risking Utopia: On the Edge of a New Democracy* (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1997), 49 and 51. Ms. Manjii is an author and an educator at New York University.

state government controlling municipal governments.<sup>131</sup> The lack of governmental control over political, criminal and social violence by municipal institutions also erodes the trust of the Haitian population. In order to start gaining the trust of citizens, each level of government in Haiti is required to place more efforts on strengthening institutions and ensuring the rule of law in order to better control violence and crime.<sup>132</sup> Once corruption and crime appear under control, Haitians may start to place more faith in the ability of the government to protect their rights. Once faith is established, changes to government policies, such as further developing democracy, will be easier for Haitians to accept and eventually embrace.

### **Democracy Education and Training**

Along with trusting their governments to protect them, Haitians also require government support in educating society about democracy. The Haitian education system can barely supply adequate education to those fortunate enough to afford school, yet further demands should be placed on it to educate the population on exactly what democracy entails and how best it can work for them. As President Roosevelt stated to American citizens in 1938, “democracy cannot succeed unless those who express their choice are prepared to choose wisely. The real safeguard of democracy, therefore, is education.”<sup>133</sup> Education supports an enhanced understanding of

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<sup>131</sup> Daniel Montalvo. “Decentralize or Centralize? Challenges for Reform of the State and Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean,” In *Challenges to Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from the Americas Barometer 2006-2007*, edited by Mitchell A. Seligson (Nashville: Vanderbilt University, 2008): 98 and 110. Montalvo further explains on page 259 that “the problem of corruption in [in Latin American] municipalities is very serious, particularly in Haiti and also in Bolivia, Mexico, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Panama where percentages of people who have had to pay bribes are higher than the regional average.”

<sup>132</sup> Namie Di Razza, *L'ONU en Haïti Depuis 2004: Ambitions et déconvenues des opérations de paix multidimensionnelles* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2010), 94. Fishel and Saenz make similar recommendations in regards to HNP corruption. John T. Fishel and A. Saenz, “Lessons Learned from Haiti: Capacity Building for Peacekeeping,” in *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case for Democracy*, ed. John T. Fishel and Andes Saenz (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), 23.

<sup>133</sup> Preston Smith, “Quality Public Education + Dialogue = Democracy,” *Huffington Post*, 25 June 2014, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/preston-smith-/quality-public-education-\\_b\\_5527806.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/preston-smith-/quality-public-education-_b_5527806.html).

complex issues associated with public policy in regards to party platforms. An education in democracy does not only entail having knowledge about the political parties running for office though. Haitians also require basic understanding of democratic principles and the advantage of democracy over other forms of governance. During Aristide's first elections in 1994, only 15% of the population participated and those that did were confused by the second round of elections due to no previous knowledge of the democratic process.<sup>134</sup> Such a low turnout did not properly represent all Haitians. Although subsequent elections have had more participation, Haitians require further education in other stabilizing aspects of democracy in addition to free and fair elections such as rule of law and good governance. With a more complete appreciation of democracy, Haitians can make an informed choice and have confidence that the people they choose to represent them in government will be acting on their behalf.

### **Political Process Changes**

Not only does the Haitian population require training in democracy, but Haitian government officials could also benefit from more education and training on the specificities of democracy. In doing so the government of Haiti could overhaul its rather convoluted voting policies. Haiti is in a continuous voting process as dictated by the constitution requiring yearly votes at the parliamentary level, coupled with periodic municipal and presidential voting as well.<sup>135</sup> One would think that all of this practice would make Haitians more adept at democracy. On the contrary, the continuous processes of electoral violence and the money spent on ensuring the elections are free and fair eventually leads to voter fatigue.

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<sup>134</sup> E. Mobekk, "Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti," *Democratization* 8, no. 3 (2001): 176.

<sup>135</sup> Ricardo Seitenfus, "The Nature of Haitian Politics and International Challenges," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 6, no.3 (2011): 88.

## Controlling Corruption

The future of democracy in Haiti also relies on anti-corruption training. Corruption needs to be eradicated by institutionalizing anti-corruption from the top down, starting with government and police forces. Corruption increases the amount of violent crime which in turn negatively affects the economy. With increased crime, money that could be used for social services such as education is instead spent on security as is the case in many indebted Caribbean states.<sup>136</sup> Furthermore, the extreme rates of crime results in high demand, college educated Haitians immigrating to other countries where the standard of living is better.<sup>137</sup> The Haitian government is attempting to counter the rampant corruption. An anti-money laundering law came into effect in 2013 and in 2014 the Haitian government passed an anti-corruption law raising legislation to international standards.<sup>138</sup> These new laws are a step in the right direction. How well these laws are upheld remains to be seen. Strict adherence to these laws is necessary, however, if Haiti has any hope of facilitating democracy throughout the state by controlling corruption.

## Job Creation

The unemployment rate in Haiti contributes greatly to the instability in the state as many disenfranchised citizens with no social welfare on which to rely have crime as a ready source of income. Creating local tenders and competitors for national projects instead of granting them to international companies is one way that Haiti can employ more Haitians in the state. The

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<sup>136</sup> John W. Graham, "Regional Security and Conflict Management in the Americas: Terrorism from Without, Drugs and Conventional Thugs from Within," In *Rewiring Regional Security in a Fragmented World*, edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 491.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>138</sup> U.S. Department of State, "2014 Investment Climate Statement – Haiti," last updated June 2014, <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/228815.htm>.

government of Haiti can also improve its investment climate. The challenge is that investment in Haiti has not improved significantly enough over the past few years as firms consider Haiti a difficult market to navigate. There was slight economic growth in 2013 in fields such as agriculture, manufacturing and tourism.<sup>139</sup> However, World Bank's "Economy Rankings 2015" report ranks Haiti as the 182<sup>nd</sup> most difficult place to start or operate a business out of 189 states; dropping from 177<sup>th</sup> place in 2014.<sup>140</sup> The inability of local Haitian businesses to expand is further impinging economic growth as well. Lack of internal capital and no effective securities market results in local companies employing family members instead of creating jobs and providing very little monetary advantage to their local municipalities.<sup>141</sup> As international donations start to dwindle and the MINUSTAH continues to downsize, Haitians need somewhere legitimate to work in order to stimulate the Haitian economy and decrease the national crime rate.

### **Income and Property Tax**

The collection of income and property taxes would also assist Haiti in providing some much needed infrastructure repairs and social welfare programmes. Haiti has tax laws; however, they are not universally applied.<sup>142</sup> Tax collection could only include to a small portion of Haiti's population though since the low GDI results in an average salary of \$2 USD per day for most Haitians. The meagre daily salary is too low to obtain any substantial benefit. Despite the low salary, high percentages of Haitians would pay taxes to the municipality in order to obtain social

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<sup>139</sup> Ibid.

<sup>140</sup> World Bank Group Doing Business, "Economy Rankings 2015", accessed 29 April 2016, <http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings>.

<sup>141</sup> Jean-Germain Gros, *State Failure, Underdevelopment, and Foreign Intervention in Haiti* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 6. Amy Chua also supports Gros's findings in; Amy Chua, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 9.

<sup>142</sup> U.S. Department of State, "2014 Investment Climate Statement – Haiti," last modified June 2014, <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/228815.htm>.

welfare services.<sup>143</sup> Taxes could have a significant effect on the ability of a municipality to provide support to its citizens. Adequate social services are integral to ensuring the rights and freedoms of a democratic population. If the economy can improve enough to provide better paying jobs, taxing Haitian citizens will help stabilize the insecure state. More stability will bring in more investment, which will result in more jobs demanding higher education. The current cycle in which Haiti exists could cease being vicious and start being prosperous.

### **The Future of Democracy in Haiti**

The future of democracy in Haiti is a complex one. There are many interdependent factors that await resolution before Haiti can become a democratic state both in name and in practice. In addition, the presence of the UN is both a beneficial and a limiting factor. The UN has undoubtedly supported Haiti in maintaining order and developing the initial stages of democracy over the many decades. Without the UN, Haiti may not have had the capacity to quell the dissidents that repeatedly threatened to further destabilize the already failing state. In truth, Haiti is still in need of MINUSTAH to improve its legislative and electoral processes, implement social service programmes, uphold human rights, and train the HNP.<sup>144</sup> The challenge, however, is in Haiti avoiding overdependence on the UN.<sup>145</sup> In order to avoid occupation of Haiti by the international community, another potential solution to Haiti's instability but one that is not

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<sup>143</sup> Daniel Montalvo. "Decentralize or Centralize? Challenges for Reform of the State and Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean," In *Challenges to Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from the Americas Barometer 2006-2007*, edited by Mitchell A. Seligson (Nashville: Vanderbilt University, 2008): 109.

<sup>144</sup> Gustavo Emmerich, *Democracy Building in Latin America and the Caribbean: Can the European Union Contribute?* (Mexico City: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2009), 13.

<sup>145</sup> Jean-Germain Gros, *State Failure, Underdevelopment, and Foreign Intervention in Haiti* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 162. Gros provides an example of how the MINUSTAH mandate can be misconstrued: "From its perspective, Haitians were supposed to take the lead in policing, justice, border patrol, and so forth. On the other hand, Haitian officials argued that if these tasks were theirs to perform, what then was the purpose of MINUSTAH?"; and The Economist, "Haitian politics: Business comes first," *The Economist*, 10 March 2012, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2012/03/haitian-politics>.

acceptable due to Haiti's past travails, democracy will have to wait until Haiti is economically, socially and politically able to slowly incorporate it into the very fabric of society.

## **Conclusion**

Thirty years ago, the International Community went into Haiti with a solution to its destabilizing predicament without even knowing what the exact problem was. The international community chose democracy as the solution to Haiti's instability. Three decades of trying to enforce free and fair elections in hopes that a democratic government can save Haiti from its disparaging future has proven futile. The United Nations is still in Haiti to this day and the state is no further along in terms of its insufferable human security and ineffective governance.

A century ago one would have called the imposition of Western democracy on less powerful states colonization or imperialism. A century ago the West forced their beliefs and practices on smaller or less powerful states "for their own good". Today, however, the West realizes that there is a fine line between telling people what one perceives to be better for them and forcing them to conform. In the case of Haiti, democracy does not seem to be their choice anymore. However, the state is conforming to something that it does not fully understand.

In order for democracy to be the answer to Haiti's problems, the political process has to function effectively. Haitian citizens require an environment in which to practice democracy that includes a basic level of knowledge about democracy, changes to the political processes, significantly lower crime and corruption rates, and local industry to increase personal income so that democracy can develop into a new cultural norm.

Democracy has a future in Haiti; just not yet.



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