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## THE ROLE OF THE GUATEMALA ARMED FORCES IN HUMANITARIAN AID AND DISASTER RELIEF WITHIN POST-CONFLICT GUATEMALAN SOCIETY

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**JCSP 42**

**Master of Defence Studies**

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**PCEMI 42**

**Maîtrise en études de la  
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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
JCSP 42 – PCEMI 42  
2015 - 2016

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE

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**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Table of Contents	ii
List of Tables	iii
Abstract	iv
Chapter	
1. Introduction	1
2. The transition of the guatemalan armed forces from war to peace	14
3. NATO and Canadian Forces doctrine in Humanitarian Intervention	29
4. Analysis of NATO and Canadian Forces CIMIC doctrine and Guatemalan Armed Forces CIMIC actions in Humanitarian Intervention	47
5. Conclusion	63
Bibliography	73

**LIST OF TABLES**

Table 3.1 Possible Types of Human Security Threats .....	31
Table 3.2 Traditional versus Human Security .....	33

## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role that the Guatemalan Armed Forces currently play in Guatemalan society. The main focus of this research is based upon the transition the Guatemalan Armed Forces have had from a war-time force to a professional, modern security agency. As such, this new role focuses on human security as opposed to state security. Furthermore, the limitations the Guatemalan military faces calls for practical solutions so that the military may be of assistance to civilian agencies during humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters. The use of Civil-Military Coordination is one way in which the military can engage local populations so that these may take control of their own relief capabilities in addition to the support provided by law enforcement and humanitarian agencies. Nevertheless, Guatemala Armed Forces doctrine is currently a work in progress. Therefore, the process of distilling best practices from an allied partner, such as Canada, or a larger multinational player such as NATO, can prove invaluable to the advancement of this process. Through the study and potential incorporation of Canadian and even NATO doctrine, the Guatemalan Military can develop its own doctrine to suit the country's specific needs. The ultimate product looks to produce a clear, and coherent humanitarian doctrine within Guatemala Defence Policy.

*The pursuit of peace and progress cannot end in a few years in either victory or defeat. The pursuit of peace and progress, with its trials and its errors, its successes and its setbacks, can never be relaxed and never abandoned.*

- Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General, United Nations

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The 36-year internal armed conflict in Guatemala created a significant war-time structure and doctrine in the Guatemalan Armed Forces (GAF). As such, this concept of a war-time force determined its composition, training and philosophy. Consequently, all efforts were focused on defeating the guerrilla insurgents who were mainly located in the western highlands of Guatemala. The continued struggle between the GAF and insurgent factions led to the hardened approach utilised by GAF commanders amid the ongoing struggle.

The 1976 earthquake tested the GAF's capabilities in terms of disaster relief and humanitarian aid. It should be noted that recovery efforts were led by the military in coordination with civilian agencies such as the Red Cross. However, these coordination efforts were not part of an ongoing partnership, but rather it was the result of hastened solutions in the wake of the crisis. In a sense, it was an improvised alliance born out of necessity rather than a carefully devised plan.

With the end of the war and the signing of the 1996 Peace Accords, the need for a hardened, war-time force was over. The Peace Accords called for the redefinition of the GAF's constitutional mandate, among other elements, such as the size of its force. This particular point led to an agreed downsizing of the GAF to force levels that were

congruent to the national reality. Consequently, the GAF were tasked with national defence as its primary focus. This role entailed the protection of national sovereignty and borders, territorial waters, air defence, and cooperation with regional partners along with interdiction tasks.

In contrast, the Canadian Forces (CF), have emerged from a long-standing tradition of domestic peace and contribution to international efforts to bring peace and security to the world. The CF's contributions in World War I and II have forged their legacy while their contributions to the creation of Peacekeeping Operations have made them an international referent. As such, this paper looks to the CF in order to draw insights, lessons, best practices and other relevant elements which have led the CF to become a professional military force intent on providing humanitarian assistance whenever possible. In addition, their active role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), attests to their relevance as a major international player. Furthermore, the CF's exemplary coordination with civilian law enforcement and local communities makes them an ideal candidate to draw comparisons as presented in this paper.

Much like the CF, the GAF need to have close coordination with civilian law enforcement and other civilian agencies. However, the nature of this coordination remains unclear as the emergence of transnational threats such as organised crime, international drug syndicates, and juvenile street gangs, the capabilities of civilian enforcement were overrun to a point where the overhauled National Civilian Police (PNC, in Spanish), was incapable of addressing citizen security, particularly in densely populated areas in the outskirts of Guatemala City. As a result, the PNC's law enforcement capabilities were essentially collapsed due understaffing, underfunding and

underequipping. Subsequent efforts to reequip and re-staff the PNC have met with mixed results.

In order to address the PNC's lack of effectiveness, ad-hoc combined operations were sanctioned in order to give the PNC more robust capabilities, particularly when dealing with especially fierce organised criminal groups such as Mexican drug cartels in the Central American region. The fierce battle among cartels for control over drug shipping routes evidenced the hobbled, PNC's woeful inadequacy. The GAF were tasked with providing perimeter security during raids and busts, and support in high-profile apprehensions of drug lords and kingpins.

Another facet of the GAF's support to civilian law enforcement is the use of the National Defence Navy in maritime interdiction tasks. Essentially, the Navy took on a dual national defence-coast guard role. This duality put the spotlight on the fact that civilian law enforcement, namely the PNC, had no coast guard capabilities. Moreover, air control capabilities fell back into the lap of the GAF's air capabilities. In essence, the PNC's role as a nationwide civilian law enforcement agency was dwarfed amid the scale of the threats bearing down on Guatemala.

Since the GAF need to conduct joint operations (air-land-maritime), in support of civilian law enforcement, relevant elements can be distilled from NATO doctrine particularly pertaining to the coordination which can be conducted with civilian actors, both in a law enforcement and a humanitarian assistance capacity. The elements distilled from this analysis may provide further insights that the GAF may consider for inclusion in their own doctrine.



Nevertheless, the drug trade continues to be a significant problem throughout Mexico and Central America. In addition, to the drug trade, the phenomenon of human trafficking in the form of illegal immigration carried out by organised crime syndicates and backed by powerful cartels, adds to the pressure put upon the PNC and the GAF. Furthermore, domestic threats such as extortion, kidnapping and petty street crime have put a considerable strain on the PNC's capabilities to the point where the GAF needed to roll out their citizen security squadrons in order to support the PNC's law enforcement tasks by providing tougher units to combat street gangs and organised criminal groups. Even with expanded resource allocation to the Ministry of the Interior, both in terms of financial resources and manpower, homeland security continues to be an elusive goal for Guatemalan authorities.

On top of the previous points, the potential threat of international terrorism is ever-present in Central America since illegal immigration enables would-be terrorists to enter the United States undetected. There have been instances of suspected terrorists passing through Central America with the intent to enter the United States. It remains unclear if, in fact, actual terrorists have made their way into the United States via Mexico or Central America. If so, this considerable risk for the regional security of North America comes to the forefront of national defence concerns for the United States and Canada. In any event, the mere suspicion of potential terrorists passing through porous borders throughout Mexico, Belize and Guatemala pose a significant enough risk to warrant decisive action on the part of the countries involved.

However, threats to national security in Guatemala don't limit themselves to cartels, syndicates and gangs; there is the constant menace of natural disasters. These

include: earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, landslides and volcanic eruptions. The prevalence of these disasters puts the onus on the GAF, with regard to supporting humanitarian relief and recovery efforts, amid these national emergencies. Two recent cases underscore such menaces: the 2014 San Marcos earthquake and the 2015 El Cambray landslide. One, the San Marcos earthquake, rocked the western portion of Guatemala, while the El Cambray landslide ravaged an urban dwelling at the foot of a sizeable cliff.

In response to the GAF's constitutional mandate that warrants it to protect the nation, the GAF have used their regular, standing force in order to support humanitarian relief efforts, and even reconstruction. While these tasks typically fall on civilian agencies, these, such as the PNC, have proven to lack the needed capabilities in order to deal with the aftermath of disasters, such as deploying rapid-response units. The GAF's Humanitarian and Rescue Unit (UHR, in Spanish) has shown to be well-adept at providing assistance and support in times of dire need, yet ultimately yielding to civilian agencies.

Given Guatemala's current security environment, focused specifically on organised crime and other security concerns, the GAF's role in Guatemala's public security business has shifted dramatically over the course of the last 20 years. Since their establishment, the GAF's *raison d'être* is focused on providing a stable security environment for Guatemalan society as a whole. The GAF's role has shifted from a combat-exclusive philosophy to a Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) approach supporting civilian relief agencies and law enforcement. As such, the thesis proposed in this paper can be summed up in one statement: *the evolution of the GAF's constitutional*

*mandate and defence policy demand the development of capabilities that will embrace their outlined role and give them enough tools to better support civilian-led recovery and relief efforts during national emergencies and crises.* As indicated by this statement, regardless of how good policy and doctrine may be, the lack of proper tools and capabilities, the GAF will be, ultimately, ineffective in supporting civilian law enforcement and humanitarian agencies in the wake of natural disaster and public distress.

In order to support the thesis, this paper aims to hone in on these matters through a series of research questions.

- How did the reduction of force following the Peace Accords negatively impact the GAF's overall capabilities to conduct HADR tasks?
- Is the GAF's current constitutional mandate conducive to performing HADR tasks effectively?
- Is the GAF's current doctrine appropriate to address HADR tasks efficiently given their role in supporting civilian agencies?
- What additional capabilities do the GAF need in order to effectively carry out HADR tasks as per its constitutional mandate and defence policy?
- What best practices can be distilled from allied nations' doctrine, such as Canadian CIMIC doctrine, in order to overcome gaps identified in the GAF's defence policy?
- Should the GAF even participate in HADR efforts in support of civilian disaster relief and humanitarian agencies in the first place? If so, in what capacity should the GAF participate?

The questions previously indicated aim to set the tone for the content set forth in this paper. These questions seek to address the thesis presented in this paper as well as providing a guide for the development of the argument contained throughout this essay.

Consequently, this paper intends to argue the need for the GAF to improve their capabilities for HADR tasks by reallocating assets from non-national defence tasks and promoting the development of civilian capabilities determined to address humanitarian and relief efforts. Also, local communities can be empowered to take charge of relief efforts in the immediate aftermath of a critical event through the implementation of CIMIC actions. The harnessing of local communities' potential, and thereby furthering the GAF's presence and sense capabilities will be addressed in this paper. As will be discussed, this can be done through partnerships with local civilian authorities that seek to promote community organisation and training in order to maintain a minimum degree of readiness. This will allow local communities to enhance the GAF's capabilities and eventually work together with law enforcement and humanitarian agencies in assisting victims.

As a corollary to the previous point, the main argument of this paper looks to establish the need for making immediate recovery efforts less dependent on the GAF's capabilities by building capacities in local communities. This capacity-building process looks to take the pressure off the GAF's biggest asset: the regular force. By aiding local communities in building their own rapid deployment capabilities, current gaps may be overcome in terms of coverage and response time. In addition, an initiative of this nature represents a critical first step toward building up civilian capabilities that do not currently exist. Ultimately, these capabilities will make disaster management less reliant on

military forces, thus leaving military forces to play a supporting role in disaster recovery and relief efforts.

Also, this paper aims to address the set of research questions, and prove its thesis, by means of a mixed qualitative/quantitative methodology. In essence, this approach seeks to utilise up-to-date, academic works produced by renowned experts and relevant literature while incorporating available statistical data from official sources. This approach looks to distill best practices from both CF and NATO doctrine which could produce inputs for further updates of the GAF defence policy. This mixed methodology looks to present inputs that will allow for a persuasive and convincing argument thus enabling the drafting of a logical and feasible proposition aimed at addressing the issues outlined in this paper.

One important drawback is that statistical information is scant in Guatemala, and tends to be unreliable at times. This paper has taken into account these drawbacks and seeks to utilise, both reliable and credible, sources when citing specific numbers on any given topic. Moreover, care has been taken to fact check any claims made by the author, and any other academic source cited in this paper. In essence, this paper has relied on secondary data emanating from official government data and that produced by think tanks, NGOs and universities, while also relying on content produced by relevant academics and researchers in the field of political science, international affairs, military, economics, law and human rights. These disciplines have contributed the conceptual framework by which this paper intends to develop its thesis.

In addition, Canadian Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) doctrine has been closely studied and analysed in order to distill relevant concepts, ideas and guidelines which could be incorporated in the GAF's defence policy as a means of producing a benchmark for future revisions to the GAF's defence policy, focusing specifically on HADR tasks. This benchmark does not intend to scrutinise any potential gaps in current policy, but rather, it intends to provide insights as a part of the feedback process which seeks to improve upon current efforts and products. While Canadian CIMIC is by no means perfect, it is the product of a military which has had greater experience in these matters all over the world, thus producing a greater amount of expertise and lessons learned. It is by extracting these lessons learned that this paper aims to obtain insights and provide additional fodder for future editions of the GAF's defence policy. In this regard, this paper is an exercise in harmonising two different approaches on the same subject.

Another key element within the methodological considerations of this paper is the use of NATO CIMIC doctrine. This doctrine will be used as a reference in order to establish common practices in this field. Considering that GAF defence policy and Canadian CIMIC doctrine are two separate elements produced by individual nations, NATO CIMIC doctrine is especially relevant since it encompasses the efforts of a multinational coalition that is focused on developing interoperability among member nations. While Guatemala is not a member nation of NATO, Guatemala does contribute troops to UN peacekeeping operations throughout the world. Moreover, Guatemala has close cooperation with regional partners, such as the United States, Mexico, El Salvador and Honduras in regional security efforts and initiatives. Hence, Guatemala has an increasing role in multinational operations. It is this reason why a doctrine, such as

NATO CIMIC, would greatly enhance current GAF defence policy into a more polished product that is in synch with the interoperability required for large-scale, multinational operations, whether in a combat scenario or a humanitarian context. Even though the GAF does not currently play a role in NATO, it is important to underscore the fact that the two biggest regional partners for Guatemala, the United States and Canada are not only NATO members, but also play a significant role in NATO coalition operations, particularly in the field of humanitarian aid and disaster relief. Since it has been established that Guatemala has close cooperation with these two nations, it only makes sense to draw from NATO CIMIC doctrine in order to provide theoretical support to the analysis conducted in this paper.

As an additional note to the research methodology for this paper, the author seeks to draw from personal experience while participating in UN peacekeeping missions, CIMIC activities conducted in Guatemala, both by the GAF and in conjunction with regional partners, and, most importantly, first-hand experience, at the operational level, during the El Cambray disaster. As a recently promoted Lieutenant Colonel in the GAF, this experience at the operational level has become a pivotal element in framing GAF defence policy within a real-life context. Therefore, these personal insights seek to enrich the theory and content put forth in this paper. The author's 20-year tenure in the GAF has been highlighted by stints at the National Defence Staff Headquarters as an operational level staff officer, but also at the tactical level in security-related tasks as a junior officer. Furthermore, deployments to Africa as a part of Guatemala's contingent supporting the UN MONUSCO Mission have proven to be valuable in gaining a clear perspective of

how multinational operations require careful and close engagement of local populations in order to boost the effectiveness of military operations.

It is also worth highlighting that this paper does have its own, inherent limitations. These limitations are mainly due to gaps in available data, mainly in the form of statistical data that can aid the analyses put forth. Furthermore, the data that is available could also be outdated, or incomplete. Efforts have been made in order to avoid the use of incomplete, or unreliable, data in order to eliminate any misinterpretations or misconceptions.

Despite these limitations, this paper's scope aims to reach beyond traditional avenues and seeks to broaden the horizon for the GAF in order to continue fostering closer relations between local communities and the GAF in order to move past the war-time philosophy the GAF implemented during the internal armed conflict, and gain a stronger foothold in local communities whereby the population can play a larger and more significant role in making their communities safer and more prepared.

As such, this paper's structure looks to examine several aspects in greater detail in order to support the thesis and answer the research questions. Firstly, an examination into the historical background of the GAF is needed in order to establish where the GAF is coming from and emerging into this more evolved role. That being said, this historical background is specifically focused on the 36-year internal conflict. This particular point in the GAF's history, and in a much broader sense Guatemalan history, is especially relevant to the present paper since it sets the foundation for the building blocks with which the GAF have had to work with in the years following the Peace Accords.

Therefore, this chapter is not an exercise in providing a detailed, historical account of the



conflict as such, but rather, an insight into the reasons behind the force structure the GAF has utilised when conducting HADR tasks. Moreover, it also serves as the starting point for the GAF's defence policy and it establishes the need for further developing and refining the philosophy driving the policy's implementation.

The second chapter of this paper looks to address NATO and Canadian CIMIC doctrine in further detail distilling particular elements that are applicable to the GAF's current security environment and defence policy. Since Canada is a NATO-member nation, its CIMIC doctrine contains elements which can be analysed and considered as a benchmark, while NATO doctrine allows for an ample, large-scale, multinational approach to HADR tasks. Consequently, the third chapter delves into an analysis of Canadian and NATO CIMIC doctrine thus distilling elements which could be incorporated into the GAF's current policy. This exercise intends to take these distilled elements and magnify them within the GAF's context and reality. The end result looks to provide refined elements that could become fodder for future revisions and editions of the GAF's defence policy.

The third chapter of this essay looks to address the thesis and research questions by looking at the elements that could be distilled from both NATO and CF CIMIC doctrine and incorporated into the GAF's own defence policy. The study of the GAF's participation in the El Cambray disaster will serve as a case study in order to underscore the doctrine guiding the GAF's participations and establish which of the distilled elements from CF and NATO CIMIC doctrine could be implemented in overcoming current gaps and building the GAF's own doctrine for humanitarian intervention.

Finally, the conclusion seeks to bring all of the aforementioned elements together and round out the thesis stated in this paper. Also, this section encompasses the answers to the research questions that have guided the drafting of this paper. Additionally, this section looks to become a springboard for future research and study into this field particularly since the GAF's essence has moved from the defence of the nation in the face of threats posed by insurgency, but to the defence of the nation in the face of threats posed by ever-increasing disasters, both natural and man-made. At its core, the GAF's mandate is keen on enhancing the GAF's traditional role and expanding its relevance in support of Guatemalan society.

So, the first section of this paper will provide a historical context which will paint a clearer picture of the GAF's starting point and the reasons motivating their transition from a war-time force to a professional, peace-time military.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE TRANSITION OF THE GUATEMALAN ARMED FORCES FROM WAR TO PEACE

#### THE GUATEMALAN ARMY AS A WAR-TIME FORCE

Revolutions, or insurgencies at the very least, tend to be fuelled by ideology. On the surface, many of the revolutionary endeavours in Latin America during the 20<sup>th</sup> century had a very public left-wing ideology. Yet, the heart of the matter reveals other economic and political motives driving dissidents' struggles. In Guatemala's particular case, land ownership, or lack thereof, was at the forefront of the guerrilla insurgency's revolutionary campaign.<sup>1</sup> Initially, unrest and discontent arose from vast sectors of Guatemalan peasants who felt disenfranchised by a government that catered to the interest of multinational corporations such as the United Fruit Company.<sup>2</sup>

As University of California's Beatriz Manz points out in her book, *Paradise in Ashes*, this disproportionate possession of land led to uneven distribution of wealth which, in turn, led to increasing levels of poverty among farmers and peasants.<sup>3</sup> Thus, a small fraction of available farmland was available to the majority of peasants for subsistence farming. This only exacerbated the condition of poverty in which a sizeable chunk of the Guatemalan population lived in, but specifically those dwellers of rural

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<sup>1</sup> David Pierce, "Causes for the Guatemalan Civil War as seen in *Paradise in Ashes* by Beatriz Manz," *Inquiries Journal*. 10 (2009): 1, accessed 28 December 2016, <http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/7/causes-for-the-guatemalan-civil-war-as-seen-in-paradise-in-ashes-by-beatriz-manz>

<sup>2</sup> Pierce, *Paradise in Ashes*, 1.

<sup>3</sup> Beatriz Manz, and Aryeh Neier, "Paradise in Ashes - A Guatemalan Journey of Courage, Terror, and Hope," (New York: University of California, 2004): 96.

areas.<sup>4</sup> This inequitable distribution of land was the main force that led the Jacobo Arbenz regime to issue the infamous Decree 900 which abolished the private property of idle farming lands held by barons and corporations in favour of dispossessed peasants and farmers. Estimates of land distribution indicated 90% of farmers were landless in the early 1950s.<sup>5</sup> Similar estimates accounted for 2% of landlord holding 70% of Guatemala's useable farm lands.<sup>6</sup> Among these powerful barons was the United Fruit Company.

The ensuing details of what has become known as Operation PB Success in which a CIA-led coup overthrew the Arbenz regime exemplify the degree of the discontent among the general Guatemalan population. And while most of the land expropriated by the dispositions of the Decree 900 was restituted to its original owners,<sup>7</sup> the seed for turmoil had already been planted. Its worth noting that the details pertaining to this episode of Guatemalan history exceed the scope of this paper, but do account for additional inputs into the origins of the 36-year armed conflict.

Once the Decree 900 was repealed by the government following the overthrow of the Arbenz regime, the more than 100,000 farmers that had been benefitted by this decree<sup>8</sup> found themselves once again dispossessed and disenfranchised. While it may seem easy to place the blame of the Arbenz regime for agitating the masses with false promises of seemingly free land, the fact remains that this incident only served to augment existing contradictions within Guatemalan society. One thing to bear in mind

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<sup>4</sup> Manz and Neier, *Paradise in Ashes*, 212.

<sup>5</sup> Walter La Feber, "America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1996. 8th ed. *America in Crisis*," (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1997): 152, 157-159,

<sup>6</sup> Walter La feber, *Cold War*, 157.

<sup>7</sup> Walter La feber, *Cold War*, 158.

<sup>8</sup> Walter La feber, *Cold War*, 159.

that is Guatemala was emerging from the Ubico dictatorship (1930-1944), and so the repression observed during this period left an indelible mark in the psyche of younger generations of this time.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, poverty, lack of land, inequality, and corruption, among other elements, fuelled the uprising by the Guatemalan population.<sup>10</sup>

As unrest grew, other revolutions in Latin America, mainly the Cuban Revolution of 1959, spread left-wing, Marxist-Leninist ideology throughout the continent.<sup>11</sup> And while the Arbenz regime preceded the Cuban Revolution, the Cuban Revolution lent itself to providing logistical support and ideological backing to the would-be guerrillas in Guatemala during the 1960s.<sup>12</sup> In that regard, Cuba's aid to Guatemalan insurgents, and by extension the rest of the Central American nations' insurgencies, was critical to advancing the communist agenda in Latin America. Central America was largely seen as gateway for communism to gain a foothold in the region and progressively topple largely pro-American dictators.<sup>13</sup>

Now, it is not fair to say that Cuba was responsible for fuelling the ideology of insurgents in Guatemala, but the clear Marxist-Leninist inclinations of each revolutionary group were clear. Consequently, ensuing violent offensives by guerrillas were met with corresponding reactions from the Guatemalan military. The degree of penetration by Communism in Guatemala is still a matter of debate. Nevertheless, the effects of insurgents' efforts to take control of the state resulted in the genesis of the 36-year civil

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<sup>9</sup> Manz and Neier, *Paradise in Ashes*, 224.

<sup>10</sup> Manz and Neier, *Paradise in Ashes*, 224.

<sup>11</sup> Joseph A. Rausch, *The Significance of Nationalism for the Spread of Communism to Vietnam and Cuba*. (Blacksburg, Virginia: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2011), 55.

<sup>12</sup> Peter Rutland "What was Communism?" *Russian History*, 37 (2010): 427-429.

<sup>13</sup> William T. Stone "Communism in Latin America." *Editorial Research Reports CQ Press*, 1 (1954): 161. <http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1954030200>.

war that led to hundreds of thousands displaced, tens of thousands missing, thousands more dead and still-lingering consequences in the aftermath of the war.<sup>14</sup>

Aside from the political motivations of revolutionary groups determined to take control of the Guatemalan State, their actions prompted the military governments of the time to employ the GAF in defence of national sovereignty. Naturally, this meant a drastic shift for military and police forces, who were dedicated almost exclusively to law enforcement, into a war-time force capable of conducting complex military operations in inhospitable jungle and mountain settings against a seemingly invisible foe entrenched within local, rural communities.<sup>15</sup>

One example of the GAF's need to reinvent itself in the midst of the war in order to adequately respond to the enemy's advances was the creation of the Kaibil Special Forces in the early 1970s. As Time Magazine contributor Tim Padgett wrote in a 2011 article: "They [Kaibiles] were the principal instruments of the Guatemalan military government's 'scorched earth' campaign of the 1980s against leftist guerrillas and communities suspected of backing them."<sup>16</sup> This depiction illustrates the extremes to which Guatemalan military governments went to in order to destroy the momentum guerrilla forces had achieved throughout the war, especially in the rural countryside of the Guatemalan Western Highlands.

Ultimately, the GAF was able to destroy the insurgency's momentum and avoid a military defeat which would have led to a revolution akin to that of the Sandinistas in

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<sup>14</sup> William T. Stone, *Communism in Latin America*, 161.

<sup>15</sup> "Guatemala Country Profile," Insightcrime.org, last modified February 28, 2016, <http://www.insightcrime.org/guatemala-organized-crime-news/guatemala>

<sup>16</sup> Tim Padgett, "Guatemala's Kaibiles: A Notorious Commando Unit Wrapped Up in Central America's Drug War," *Time*, July 11, 2014, accessed November 10, 2016, <http://world.time.com/2011/07/14/guatemalas-kaibil-terror-from-dictators-to-drug-cartels/>

Nicaragua. This ultimate military victory by the GAF brought about a decline in hostilities from the mid-1980s onward, leading up to the definitive ceasefire signed on December 4<sup>th</sup>, 1996, and the eventual Peace Accords on December 29<sup>th</sup> of that year.<sup>17</sup> While the entire peace process is certainly worth having a closer look, it exceeds the scope of this paper. So, it's worth noting that the culmination of this process eventually produced the texts containing the results of the process itself. In it, the full demobilisation of guerrilla forces was ordered while a mandatory downsizing of the GAF was indicated.<sup>18</sup> It only seemed logical at the time that the need for a strong military force would be redundant during peace time. Such logic also dictated the need for a strong, civilian police force that could efficiently carry out law enforcement activities. This led to the overhauling of the then-National Police in favour of the National Civilian Police, or PNC.<sup>19</sup>

## **THE NATIONAL CIVILIAN POLICE**

With the overhaul of the PNC and its newly renovated mandate dedicated to law enforcement, the GAF was essentially relegated to national defense tasks. These tasks include border protection, territorial sovereignty, defence of national waters, among others. The closure of several bases deemed unnecessary were a reactionary measure in order to cut funding from the Defence Ministry's coffers. Consequently, these national defence tasks were to be carried out by a smaller force dedicated exclusively to this end.

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<sup>17</sup> "Guatemala. MINUGUA-Background," United Nations, last modified: January 6, 2003, accessed November 10, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/minuguabackgr.html>

<sup>18</sup> Michael Sanchez, "1996 Guatemalan Peace Accord: Preceding History and Recent Developments," *Ethics of Development in a Global Environment*. (California: Stanford University, 1996), 121.

<sup>19</sup> "Report Puts Guatemala National Police under Microscope," Patrick Corcoran, last modified, March 26, 2014. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/report-puts-guatemala-national-police-under-the-microscope>

Moreover, the military would only be mobilised upon a credible threat to national security.<sup>20</sup> As per article 249 of the Guatemalan Constitution, “the military shall cooperate in times of emergency or public calamity”.<sup>21</sup> In essence, articles 244 and 249 of the Constitution encompass the GAF’s mandated a much more limited scope of its actions. However, both articles are rather ambiguous in the sense that they do not go into greater detail about what the GAF’s role actually should be as a peace time force. While it is abundantly clear that they have been tasked with protecting independence, national sovereignty, and the honour of the nation, the text states that the GAF are also tasked with the keeping of peace and national security. These last two points, as ambiguous as they are, provide the clout the GAF have needed in order to incur in homeland security tasks that would have otherwise been under the sole custody of the PNC. Furthermore, the keeping of peace has been redefined within a context that is not limited to just war, but to a broader context in which transnational threats, such a drug trafficking, have become credible menaces to national security and peace.

At the time the Peace Accords were signed, the GAF lacked a clear, defence policy under which to operate. Yet, the constitutional mandate was deemed clear enough to guide the GAF’s actions regarding national defence and assistance to public distress regardless of the fact there was no defence policy in place. Nevertheless, the GAF’s role would be limited to national defence as such, and aiding civilian agencies and law enforcement in case of emergency.

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<sup>20</sup> “Guatemala Political Constitution,” National Congress Guatemala, 1986, [https://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/sp/gtm/sp\\_gtm-int-text-const.pdf](https://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/sp/gtm/sp_gtm-int-text-const.pdf)

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.



In the years following the Peace Accords, the PNC has proven to be ineffective, at best.<sup>22</sup> In essence, increases in budget allocations have risen steadily alongside murder rates in Guatemala. The PNC has received a median budget allocation increase of roughly 15% annually since 2000. This translates to 20 billion Quetzales (some USD 2.5b), over a period from 2000 to 2011.<sup>23</sup> A recent ranking by the online business magazine *Business Insider*, ranked Guatemala City as the 25<sup>th</sup> most dangerous city in the world citing a homicide rate of 47.17 murder per 100,000 residents.<sup>24</sup> While that figure alone is startling enough, the aforementioned magazine ran another ranking of the most violent countries in the world referencing a study conducted by the risk consultancy firm Verisk Maplecroft in which the firm's Criminality Index considers elements such as drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, among other activities that could potentially lead to violence. The firm's calculations produce an Index ranging from 10 (very low level of violence) to 0 (very high level of violence). Guatemala was the runner-up in this index with a score of 0.72<sup>25</sup> It is worth noting that 1<sup>st</sup> place in this ranking went to Afghanistan with a score of 0.71.<sup>26</sup>

So, the ineffectiveness of civilian law enforcement, namely the PNC, has put Guatemalan society, as a whole, under enormous amounts of distress and strife. Yet, the

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<sup>22</sup> "Report Puts Guatemala National Police under Microscope," Patrick Corcoran, las modified, March 26, 2014. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/report-puts-guatemala-national-police-under-the-microscope>

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> "50 Most Violent Cities in the World," Business Insider, last modified January 26, 2016. <http://www.businessinsider.com/most-violent-cities-in-the-world-2016-1/#50-obreg-n-mexico-had-2829-homicides-per-100000-residents-1>

<sup>25</sup> "13 Most Dangerous Countries in the World," Business Insider, last modified, December 1, 2016. [http://www.businessinsider.com/verisk-maplecroft-criminality-index-2016-worst-countries-2016-11?utm\\_content=bufferdf9b6&utm\\_medium=social&utm\\_source=facebook.com&utm\\_campaign=buffer%2F/#13-nigeria-237-africas-largest-economy-has-made-big-strides-in-recent-years-but-with-the-prevalence-of-the-terrorist-group-boko-haram-and-insurgents-like-the-niger-delta-avengers-the-threat-of-violence-in-nigeria-remains-extreme-1](http://www.businessinsider.com/verisk-maplecroft-criminality-index-2016-worst-countries-2016-11?utm_content=bufferdf9b6&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer%2F/#13-nigeria-237-africas-largest-economy-has-made-big-strides-in-recent-years-but-with-the-prevalence-of-the-terrorist-group-boko-haram-and-insurgents-like-the-niger-delta-avengers-the-threat-of-violence-in-nigeria-remains-extreme-1)

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

blame should not be placed square of the PNC's shoulders; the PNC counts roughly 30,000 officers nation-wide. This translates to about 194 officers per 100,000 residents. In comparison, the UN recommends that a country's police force should be comprised of 222 officers per 100,000 residents.<sup>27</sup> Undoubtedly, it is safe to argue that the PNC is understaffed despite the law enforcement crisis facing Guatemala. Notwithstanding, the PNC has had financial backing. Clearly though, it appears that financial backing alone has been inadequate in order to deal with the dimension of Guatemala's crime issues.

Furthermore, official government figures don't fare much better. A report published by the Guatemalan National Security Council placed violent deaths at an average of 420 per month for the period comprising 2012-2015.<sup>28</sup> This figure is actually down since the monthly average for the period comprising 2008 to 2011 is stated to be at 509.<sup>29</sup> The cited information relies on official information provided by the PNC. And while there is an inherent element of underreporting in this official government data, it does prove to be quite insightful into the severity of Guatemala's crime rate.

In light of the daunting task facing the PNC, current Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales stated: "we have conducted evaluations and it has worked, but the PNC's performance, on its own, has not been enough; at this time, we need to redesign our strategy".<sup>30</sup> This statement from President Morales underscores the fact that traditional law enforcement has been inadequate in dealing with Guatemala's crime issues. In 2006,

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<sup>27</sup> "Report Puts Guatemala National Police under Microscope," Patrick Corcoran, last modified, March 26, 2014. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/report-puts-guatemala-national-police-under-the-microscope>

<sup>28</sup> Secretaría Técnica del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional, "Reporte Estadístico 2016," (Guatemala City: Dirección de Evaluación y Monitoreo, 2016), 5.

<sup>29</sup> Secretaría Técnica del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional, *Reporte Estadístico 2016*, 6.

<sup>30</sup> "La PNC no es 'suficientemente fuerte' para brindar protección a la población," Paolina Albani, *Diario Digital*, last modified July 4, 2016, <http://diariodigital.gt/2016/07/la-pnc-no-suficientemente-fuerte-brindar-proteccion-la-poblacion/>

the GAF created the so-called “Citizen Security Battalions” in order to support the PNC in public safety tasks. The Otto Perez Molina administration had set a deadline for the eventual withdrawal of these battalions, initiating their phasing out in the second half of 2016. Nevertheless, the Morales Administration deemed this to be counterproductive as the PNC “...is not yet at full strength”.<sup>31</sup>

This particular fact has been taken into full account in the Ministry of National Defence’s Strategic Plan. The 2016 version of the Strategic Plan clearly highlights the legal basis the GAF has in order to support law enforcement agencies in public safety issues as indicated by article 1 of Decree 40-2000.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, this plan fully integrates the contents of article 249 of the Constitution in which the GAF is mandated to support and cooperate in cases of national emergency and public calamity.<sup>33</sup> In line with this philosophy, the GAF commissioned nine new citizen security battalions in 2015 in order to support police operations throughout the country.<sup>34</sup>

The strategy of integrating military forces into regular law enforcement duties is a widespread practice in Mexico and Central America. Since declaring its war on drugs, Mexico has employed military forces to conduct law enforcement tasks, while Honduras and El Salvador have also implemented similar strategies.<sup>35</sup> And Op-Ed piece in the New

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ministry of National Defence, *Guatemala National Defence Policy* (Guatemala City: Department Political Affairs, 2016), 8.

<sup>33</sup> Ministry of National Defence, *Guatemala National Defence Policy*, 8.

<sup>34</sup> “Ejército crea nueve escuadrones de Seguridad Ciudadana,” Prens Libre, last modified February 5, 2015, [http://www.prens Libre.com/noticias/justicia/Ejercito-escuadrones-seguridad-Guatemala-violencia-inseguridad\\_0\\_1298270290.html](http://www.prens Libre.com/noticias/justicia/Ejercito-escuadrones-seguridad-Guatemala-violencia-inseguridad_0_1298270290.html)

<sup>35</sup> “A Decade of Failure in the War on Drugs.” José Luis Pardo Veiras, *The New York Times*, last modified October 9, 2016, [http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/opinion/a-decade-of-failure-in-the-war-on-drugs.html?ref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FMexican%20Drug%20Trafficking&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=stream&module=stream\\_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=3&pgtype=collection&\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/opinion/a-decade-of-failure-in-the-war-on-drugs.html?ref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FMexican%20Drug%20Trafficking&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=3&pgtype=collection&_r=0)

York Times in October of 2016 issued harsh criticism to the regional security policy which utilises the military in order to combat crime. This piece illustrates how Mexico's War on Drugs has actually escalated the levels of violence to heights far exceeding those prior to the launch of this campaign.<sup>36</sup> In that regard, Guatemala has faced a similar fate in its struggle against its own demons.

### **THE SHIFT FROM STATE SECURITY TO HUMAN SECURITY**

Notwithstanding the shortcomings of this regional security strategy, crime is not the only pressing concern on public safety. The prevalence of natural disasters and man-made threats have also put additional stress on the already beleaguered GAF. Natural disasters, in particular, represent the biggest burden on the GAF's standing force outside of their combat-related tasks and law enforcement contributions. Therefore, the GAF's role evolved into one of human security, as opposed to the traditional war-time, counterinsurgency function it once held. In the words of Canadian statesman Lloyd Axworthy: "security traditionally has focused on the state because its fundamental purpose is to protect its citizens".<sup>37</sup> This quote is the epitome of the GAF's war-time role. Yet, its evolution beyond that role has been slow; it has taken roughly 20 years to reach the point where it is focused more on human security, rather than being state-centred.

The need to shift from this state-centred approach to a more people-centred approach is true of war-torn nations emerging from violent conflict; and Guatemala is no exception.<sup>38</sup> To further quote Mr Axworthy:

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Lloyd Axworthy, "Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First," *Global Governance* 7 (2001): 19.

<sup>38</sup> Axworthy, Human Security, 19.

Human security today puts people first and recognizes that their safety is integral to the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. The security of states is essential, but not sufficient, to fully ensure the well-being of the world's peoples.<sup>39</sup>

As a matter of fact, this particular approach is perfectly valid to the GAF's modern philosophy since Guatemala, as a state, is not only devoted to the security of its own citizens, but it is also committed to regional peace and stability within Central America, and, in a much broader sense, the American continent. Additionally, the promotion of human security requires militaries, and by extension governments, to work more closely with non-government actors.<sup>40</sup> This partnership, in addition to partnerships with the private sector, have become more important than ever. As such, this approach has been born more out of necessity than strategy. Nevertheless, the intent is to develop a holistic approach in the pursuit of ensuring people's safety. Beyond this, the involvement of other actors outside government and the military also guarantees that the military, in particular, will gradually become less prominent in public safety tasks thereby affording civilian agencies and law enforcement greater participation in protecting their own citizens.

Another key element to this discussion is the intervention by the GAF during humanitarian crises. This intervention has clearly underscored the GAF's revamped philosophy aimed at human security. The GAF's constitutional mandate remains clear. Yet, their incursion into several different areas underscores the need for the GAF to reinvent themselves in order to remain relevant in Guatemalan society. Furthermore, the GAF continue to broaden their scope into areas such as rural development, resource management, environmental protection, and more hardcore endeavours, such as

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<sup>39</sup> Axworthy, Human Security, 20.

<sup>40</sup> Axworthy, Human Security, 22.

combating contraband and smuggling, illegal immigration and combatting cross-border crime syndicates.<sup>41</sup>

For all the strides the GAF have made in order to reposition themselves in the Guatemalan, post-conflict psyche, their tarnished image as a result of alleged human rights violations has created unnecessary resistance.<sup>42</sup> This resistance is unlike the kind seen in war-time, but comes in the form of the general population becoming wary of the military's actions in traditional civilian domains. Therefore, it has become paramount for the GAF to actively engage in Civil-Military Coordination actions in order to gain popular trust, particular in those communities which were largely affected during the conflict. The implementation of clear, CIMIC-oriented techniques is pivotal for the successful articulation between the GAF and civilian agencies.

## **GUATEMALAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY**

The current Guatemalan National Security Policy has taken on the mission of creating conditions conducive to social development throughout the country. The policy's main objective is centred upon building the ideal conditions under which people can feel free of fear from violence and have the opportunity to fulfill their potential.<sup>43</sup> This objective is driven by relevant, security-related institutions. In light of the military's articulated efforts with other civilian actors, the Pact for Security, Justice and Peace highlights the understanding that society, as a whole, is responsible for constructing strong, democratic institutions that will not only respond to criminal threats, but also be

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<sup>41</sup> Carlos G. Berrios, "Civil-Military Relations and Democratization in Guatemala" (Master's diss., Naval Postgraduate School, 1998), 72.

<sup>42</sup> Berrios, "Civil-Military Relations in Guatemala," 15

<sup>43</sup> Ministry of National Defence, *Guatemala National Defence Policy*, 8.

ready in case of natural disaster.<sup>44</sup> While this pact is mostly centred on strengthening institutions in the justice and security sector, it goes without saying that these very institutions play a key role in safeguarding overall human security.

Current security policy also states its limitations. It is worth noting that the number of limitations the GAF face in carrying out their mandated tasks are far more related to the lack of available resources and derived tasks than to a lack of readiness or training.<sup>45</sup> However, the lack of available resources does impact upon the GAF's tactical readiness, in addition to their deployment capabilities. Beyond that, available capabilities, while subject to logistical constraints, have proven to be sufficient in providing critical response in emergency situations. Of course, it could be argued that there is a constant need for improving upon current capabilities. But, considering financial and materiel constraints, the focus needs to shift toward operational and tactical efficiency in order to guarantee a functional level of readiness.

## **COORDINATION WITH CIVILIAN AGENCIES**

In spite of the GAF's readiness and disposition to be among the first responders in case of public distress, it cannot bear the entire burden of responsibility, nor should it be the agency in charge of disaster relief and/or humanitarian assistance. The point on this subject is taken by the National Coordinator for Disaster Reduction (CONRED, in Spanish). This agency is essentially a hub for all of the agencies, both government and non-government, that are involved in disaster response. This system includes the military, universities, NGOs, environmental protection organisations, local municipalities, and

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<sup>44</sup> Ministry of National Defence, *Guatemala National Defence Policy*, 8.

<sup>45</sup> Ministry of National Defence, *Guatemala National Defence Policy*, 13

even the tourism board, among others.<sup>46</sup> This system clearly establishes the GAF's role as one of the many players involved in providing disaster relief and humanitarian aid. How prominent a role each member plays depends upon its capabilities, resources and specific functions; undoubtedly, some players will be among first responders, such as the military, while others will be second responders such as public road works, and even third responders such as environmental protection organisations or even the academic sector.

Decree 109-96 by the Guatemalan National Congress, article 3, formally recognises CONRED as the lead actor and coordinator in any case of public disaster. Therefore, any, and all recovery and relief efforts are mandated to be civilian-led in nature. Consequently, the military, even if it plays a major role in response, is ultimately subordinated to a civilian, government agency. This entails the need for effective CIMIC techniques and approaches that can provide efficient communication and coordination cases where the military's capabilities would be an asset. Moreover, it is also important to underscore the fact that not all cases of public distress would require military capabilities in order to aid relief efforts. In this regard, one such example is the Eruption of the Pacaya Volcano in 2010. Even though this eruption was not a national disaster, it caused significant damage to towns and villages within the immediate radius of the eruption. Such towns and villages were promptly evacuated by CONRED with the help of the PNC, while NGOs moved in to help provide shelter and assistance to the affected families.<sup>47</sup> In this particular instance, there was no need for the military to deploy since

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<sup>46</sup> "Sistema CONRED," Coordinadora Nacional para la Reducción de Desastres, last modified June 30, 2016, <http://conred.gob.gt/site/Integracion>

<sup>47</sup> "2010: Fuerte erupción del Volcán de Pacaya", Prensa Libre, last modified May 27, 2015, <http://www.prensalibre.com/hemeroteca/2010-fuerte-erupcion-del-volcan-de-pacaya>



local law enforcement authorities had the capability to evacuate victims, while humanitarian aid was prompt from numerous sources.

The previous example makes the case for the military to play a supporting role as opposed to being the major player supported by others. Notwithstanding, the GAF do aim to fill the holes left by the gaps of civilian agencies.<sup>48</sup> This is one aspect that is clearly addressed by the Ministry of Defence's Strategic Planning Guide. And it is for this reason that the Guatemalan Military remains as the most respected and trusted government institution,<sup>49</sup> particularly in light of recent corruption scandals. It is certainly positive that the population, in general, trust the military since local communities are expected to play a pivotal role in subsequent CIMIC actions to be implemented in the near future. Furthermore, this positive public opinion could be used as a springboard toward gaining the trust and confidence of those communities that were severely affected during the war and remain reluctant to work with the GAF.

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<sup>48</sup> Ministry of National Defence, *Guatemala National Defence Policy*, 14.

<sup>49</sup> "El innegable respaldo popular al Ejército de Guatemala." Roberto Dardon, *PanAm Post*, last modified December 22, 2016, <https://es.panampost.com/editor/2016/12/22/el-innegable-respaldo-popular-al-ejercito-de-guatemala/>

## CHAPTER 3

### NATO AND CANADIAN FORCES DOCTRINE IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

#### HUMAN SECURITY

At the heart of the GAF's transformation from a war-time force to a peace-time one lies the theory of Human Security. This conceptual approach has driven the GAF's compliance of its constitutional mandate.<sup>50</sup> In addition, the very essence of human security is what has molded GAF doctrine placing citizen security as the top priority. While regional security is a pressing concern, the GAF is devoted to its population. As such, the GAF has devoted considerable manpower and resources toward HADR tasks, particularly when it is called upon for support in times of crisis.

As was pointed out by Axworthy, human security is about putting people first.<sup>51</sup> However, within the contemporary operational environment it is not enough to just put people first. Much more effort needs to go into ensuring that an apparatus is in place which will allow this people-first approach to be successful.

The United Nations Commission on Human Security (CHS) adeptly points out key factors that underscore the need for a new security paradigm.

First, any human security paradigm needs to consider the interconnections between traditional threats with new, transnational threats. It is not that one supersedes

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<sup>50</sup> Ministry of National Defence, *Guatemala National Defence Policy*, (Guatemala City: Department Political Affairs, 2016), 6.

<sup>51</sup> Lloyd Axworthy, "Human Security and Governance: Putting People First," *Global Governance* 7(2001): 19

the other, but rather, they converge at certain points in order to further compound the already complex security environment.

Second, human security now requires an integrated approach that would enable this issue to be addressed from multiple angles as opposed to a more traditional law enforcement-based approach.<sup>52</sup>

Both points illustrate the need for an approach that can address human security as a multidimensional phenomenon and not as a standalone matter. In this line of thought, HADR tasks become an integral part of any successful human security paradigm. A traditional, law enforcement-based paradigm will only serve to tackle on side of the matter. The remaining sides need to be dealt with simultaneously and within a logical structure that can provide clear guidelines for action. It is here where the GAF play a key role in ensuring citizen security.

As stated, this multidimensional approach is clearly defined by the Commission on Human Security (CHS), as:

...to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threat and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building block of survival, livelihood and dignity.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, *Human Security in Theory and Practice* (New York: Human Security Unit, 2014), 5.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

This definition clearly underscores the need for a multidimensional approach in light of critical and pervasive threats. Undoubtedly, the Central American region is wrought with both critical and pervasive threats, ranging from abject poverty to transnational drug trade. However, traditional approaches have proven to be, ineffective at best, in ensuring adequate human security.

Moreover, the CHS has devised a series of threats that affect human security. The following table lists these types of threats.

**Table 3.1 Possible Types of Human Security Threats**

<b>Type of Security</b>	<b>Examples of Main Threats</b>
Economic Security	Persist poverty, unemployment
Food Security	Hunger, famine
Health Security	Deadly infectious diseases, unsafe food, malnutrition, lack of access to basic health care
Environmental Security	Environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters, pollution
Personal Security	Physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, child labor
Community Security	Inter-ethnic, religious and other identity based tensions
Political Security	Political repression, human rights abuses

Source: United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, *Human Security theory and practice*, 6.

This table illustrates a conceptualisation of the different possible types of main threats that could affect a given type of security. Within the consideration of HADR tasks, virtually any one of these could represent the need for humanitarian assistance and/or disaster relief. Nevertheless, food, health and environmental security stand out as the areas that would pose the greatest need for aid of this sort. In addition, these

dimensions of security represent the “vital core” of what human security truly encompasses.<sup>54</sup>

Thus far, it appears the focus is on reactionary measures that could be taken in the wake of a specific event such as a natural disaster, or a humanitarian crisis, stemming from war or mass migration. However, human security theory is heavy on prevention. In this regard, human security is a prevention-oriented approach since it looks to address the root causes of threats.<sup>55</sup> Consequently, greater attention is placed on essentially preventing risks and threats from developing into crises in the first place. Undoubtedly, Guatemala, and in a broader sense the Central American region, have deep, structural phenomena that have produced the threats undermining the current security environment. Phenomena such as poverty and inequality have been known to create a greater propensity for crime to thrive. And while addressing poverty and the mechanisms by which it could be addressed exceed the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that human security cannot work in an isolated fashion from all the factors that lead to insecurity.<sup>56</sup>

Thus, there are five main features to human security that comprise its approach:

- People-centred;
- Multi-sectoral;
- Comprehensive;
- Context-specific; and

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<sup>54</sup> P.H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, “Why Human Security?”, *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*. Winter/Spring (2006):42

<sup>55</sup> United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, *Human Security in Theory and Practice* (New York: Human Security Unit, 2014), 6

<sup>56</sup> United Nations, *Human Security*, 7

- Prevention-oriented.<sup>57</sup>

It has already been established that human security is prevention-oriented in as much as addressing root causes is possible. It remains clear that broad, structural issues require the implementation of policies and legislation that can minimise their prevalence. In that same line of thought, human security's people-centred approach looks to shift the focus from a predominantly state-centred security paradigm to one where the individual citizen's safety becomes the primary focus of security policies and risk management.<sup>58</sup> Furthermore, states have become increasingly aware of the fact that interstate conflicts are not as prevalent now as they once were. Currently, the emergence of transnational crime syndicates, terrorist organisations, drug cartels, and even cyberterrorists have shifted the focus from one state pitted against another, to a fight against individuals who, often times, do not represent any state at all, but an organisation based on a set of principles, or ideology. The following table puts these differences under the spotlight.

**Table 3.2 Traditional versus Human Security**

<b>Type of Security</b>	<b>Referent Object</b>	<b>Responsibility to Protect</b>	<b>Possible threats</b>
Traditional	The State	The integrity of the State	Interstate War, Nuclear Proliferation, Revolution
Human	The Individual	The Integrity of the Individual	Disease, Poverty, Natural Disaster, Violence, Landmines, Human Rights Abuses

Source: Liotta and Owen, *Human Security*, 38.

As the table above shows, there is a clear paradigm shift when moving from traditional, state-centred security policy toward a people-centred security focus. While

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> P.H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, "Why Human Security?", *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*. Winter/Spring (2006): 38

the threat of interstate conflict is always present, the prevalence of disease, natural disaster among others, are present within every state, to a varying degree. Even developed countries in North America and Europe need to address poverty and human rights abuses, though not to the extent as seen in the developing world. Also, this is not to say that focusing on state security is to be disregarded, but rather, the integrity of the individual should comprise the building blocks upon which broader state and regional security is constructed.

In addition, human security is multi-sectoral since it recognises the fact that any effective security policy needs to integrate all sectors of society. As such, a successful security policy needs to gather as many stakeholders as required in order to have ample representation. In this regard, stakeholders can range from state-sanctioned security agencies, such as military and police, to local, civilian populations who, many times, organise themselves into ad-hoc local community watches, or even civilian militias. Also, the justice sector plays a pivotal role in aiding the risk assessment and management process, in addition to other players, such as humanitarian agencies, international cooperation, academia, non-government organisations, and even the private sector.

Human Security's comprehensive approach requires that its multi-sectoral nature lead to a logical interdependence whereby all sectors, players and stakeholders involved can move forward in a congruent manner leading to the promotion of policies aimed at dealing with and preventing threats.<sup>59</sup> In a broader, regional context, this mindset demands that governments work among themselves in order to develop regional policies that can address risks and threats in an integrated, multinational manner. Moreover, a

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<sup>59</sup> United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, *Human Security in Theory and Practice* (New York: Human Security Unit, 2014), 7

philosophy, such as this, demands a high level of interoperability. One clear example of interoperability within the security environment can be seen in how countries are able to share relevant intelligence amongst themselves in order to track, and ultimately, thwart criminal organisations' plans and activities.

Lastly, the context-specific feature of human security calls for custom solutions across a wide variety of situations and circumstances.<sup>60</sup> This implies that cookie-cutter policies will be rendered ineffective due to the volatile nature of the current security environment in Central America, and the world at large. While it may seem a daunting task producing tailor-made solutions and policies for virtually every kind of threat out there, it is necessary in the business of keeping people safe. So, does that mean that policies need to be rewritten in order to suit every possible threat that could arise? Clearly, no. However, what this does mean is that policy needs to have enough leeway in order to ensure that proper measures can be taken by policy-makers and security professionals so they can have the tools they need in order to bear down on said threats.<sup>61</sup>

One example of how a multidimensional and multinational organisation can be go about dealing with human security, which will be discussed in further detail in the next section, is NATO. The analysis derived from this discussion looks to provide inputs for bringing the concepts and elements of human security into focus through a practical example.

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> P.H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, "Why Human Security?", *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*. Winter/Spring (2006): 46



## NATO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Within the realm of humanitarian and disaster relief, the GAF have made clear strides to develop a comprehensive approach that can encapsulate their constitutional mandate and corresponding call for action. This has led to the development of a doctrine that, while still under construction, has made enough headway to where it has proven to guide the efforts when needed.

In this regard, the GAF find themselves immersed in regional security efforts, as well as, domestic endeavours. At times, it may seem like it is a constant game of catch-up. Yet, the GAF have managed to produce clear guidelines outlining its tasks for the foreseeable future as seen in the most recent edition of their defence policy. Nevertheless, it is the aim of this paper to look at current doctrine from allied nations and organisations that could provide valuable insights into the GAF's current HADR doctrine, and consequently, provide fodder for future reviews and updates.

Since humanitarian intervention has gained widespread attention due to the nature and breadth of disasters in Guatemala in recent years, taking a closer look at NATO's doctrine on this matter provides an opportunity for distilling useful elements that could potentially become incorporated to the GAF's own humanitarian doctrine.

Firstly, NATO's humanitarian intervention raises the issue regarding why the military should become involved in humanitarian relief efforts in the first place. It could be argued that civilian actors could provide a better and more economical response to humanitarian aid and disaster relief.<sup>62</sup> Yet, the military possesses capabilities and

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<sup>62</sup> Maurits Jochems, "NATO's Growing Humanitarian Role", *NATO Review*, Spring (2006), accessed March 1, 2017, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/art4.html>

resources that civilian relief and law enforcement agencies may not possess in a given context or moment. In addition, the military is equipped to provide support in cases when civilian actors become overwhelmed during relief operations, or crisis.<sup>63</sup> That being said, a large, multinational coalition such as NATO does provide clear benefits when supporting a humanitarian crisis. One such example is the use of strategic airlift capabilities. These capabilities can deliver aid and supplies in a prompt and timely manner to areas that could be inaccessible by land.

When considering the scope of NATO's humanitarian intervention, the NATO Logistical Handbook clearly defines three types of humanitarian missions:

- Disaster Relief;
- Refugee/Displaced Person Assistance; and
- Humanitarian Aid.<sup>64</sup>

In essence, disaster relief pertains to coordination efforts carried out in order to take preventive actions that can lead to the mitigation of a natural, or man-made, disaster. This includes stockpiling of food, blankets, supplies and medicine, while carrying out coordination efforts with national and local authorities of member nations in order to maintain constant communication with NATO headquarters.<sup>65</sup> This is a clear example of the multi-sectoral approach discussed earlier in human security theory.

Secondly, assistance to displaced persons and/or refugees has come under close scrutiny in recent years due to the escalation of conflict in Africa and the Middle East.

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, "Chapter 5: Logistical Support for Peace Operations" *NATO Logistical Handbook*, (Geneva: 1997), 506.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

These conflicts have not only caused waves of displaced persons stemming from conflict, but also mass migrations resulting from civilians fleeing violence. Considering that this particular issue has been the focus of multidimensional UN Peacekeeping Operations, NATO member states have had to deal with this specific matter as a consequence of the conflict in Syria, as well as, other Middle-Eastern states and Africa.<sup>66</sup>

The third type of mission, humanitarian aid, basically entails providing assistance bridging the gap between victims and supplies when civilian distribution systems are disrupted or broken down. Consequently, supplies would not only be in short supply, but also high demand. Furthermore, the scale of the emergency would suppose and even greater sense of urgency especially when considering the magnitude of its impact on victims.<sup>67</sup>

The definition of these three mission areas supposes and important consideration: understanding the nature and scope of the disaster in order to find the proper approach in order to deal with the situation appropriately. Furthermore, natural disasters and humanitarian crises demand swift action. It is precisely here where military capabilities can be deployed much more rapidly than civilian ones. One such example is strategic air transport capabilities. Since time is a critical factor in these situations, being able to deploy aid and rescue workers quickly, and effectively, can significantly change the course of the emergency.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Sarah Glazer, "European Migration Crisis" *CQ Researcher*, 25(2015): 651.

<sup>67</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, "Chapter 5: Logistical Support for Peace Operations" *NATO Logistical Handbook*, (Geneva: 1997), 508.

<sup>68</sup> Maurits Jochems, "NATO's Growing Humanitarian Role", *NATO Review*. Spring (2006), accessed March 1, 2017, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/art4.html>

In order to illustrate how NATO's capabilities were put to effective use, the Pakistan earthquake of 2005 can be considered as a prime example. In the immediate aftermath of this disaster, the Pakistani government requested the aid of NATO so that critical shelter material provided by UN High Commissioner for Refugees could be delivered to victims via NATO's air bridge right before the onset of harsh winter conditions.<sup>69</sup> The previous example highlights how a key military capability can be used to provide aid in times of urgent distress especially when civilian agencies lack the required capabilities on short notice.

While military capabilities, such as the air bridge in Pakistan or the use of airlift rescue capabilities during Hurricane Katrina, constitute an invaluable resource particularly when civilian actors become overwhelmed in an emergency, it is civilian leadership that is best suited to lead coordination efforts. In that regard, NATO acknowledges that United Nations, particularly its Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) should take the lead in relief efforts along with the authorities of the affected country. Also, NATO has its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) which works as a disaster response mechanism whereby 20 nations, in addition to the 26 member nations, host an UN OCHA liaison officer who advises NATO on all related matters. This coordination unit works closely with civilian authorities of stricken nations in order to ensure that aid is delivered promptly and efficiently.<sup>70</sup>

Given that military capabilities can be of invaluable support to civilian agencies during a crisis, it is local civilian authorities who should lead recovery efforts. This can

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

be said for multinational coalitions such as NATO, or even the UN for that matter, but also for local militaries. Therefore, the military needs to work together with civilian authorities in order to deliver aid in a timely and coordinated manner. However, this coordination needs to be a continuous process so that when the need arises, appropriate structures are already in place. This can be achieved through CIMIC actions which will be further discussed in the next section.

### **CIMIC ACTIONS FOCUSED ON HADR TASKS**

Within the realm of traditional military operations Civil-Military Coordination implies that the military and population work together in order to mutually support each other in times of peace, war or crisis. In essence, CIMIC is meant to be a force multiplier that will contribute significantly to the positive outcome of a mission.<sup>71</sup> This coordination is to be carried out between military commanders and civilian authorities in a dimension of collaboration and support.

Consequently, CIMIC actions should ideally follow a logical and congruent framework. Since the GAF is still very much under reconstruction following the end of the War, doctrine from allied nations has been essential in directing the GAF's efforts toward building their own HADR framework and doctrine. One allied nation whose CIMIC doctrine could be distilled in order to extract key elements is Canadian Civil-Military Cooperation since Canada is a renowned world leader in humanitarian intervention.<sup>72</sup> Given the international recognition achieved by Canadian CIMIC doctrine

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<sup>71</sup> National Defence Canada, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1999), 1-1.

<sup>72</sup> Fergus Watt, "Doing Good and Doing Well: Canada and the Responsibility to Protect – A Civil Society Perspective," (paper presented at the Canada, Humanitarian Intervention and the 'Responsibility to Protect' Seminar, UC Berkeley Campus, November 13, 2009).

on humanitarian intervention, the GAF could very well take advantage of close ties to Canada and adapt this doctrine by means of an exercise where ideas, experiences and lessons learned can be exchanged so that relevant items can be distilled and potentially incorporated to the GAF's own doctrine.

At the core of this doctrine, three, vital objectives need to be discussed in further detail:

- The promotion of prosperity and employment;
- The promotion of global peace as the key to protecting Canadian security; and
- The projection of Canadian values and culture is important to Canadian success in the world.<sup>73</sup>

Considering that these three objectives represent a clear, Canadian approach to CIMIC operations domestically, and abroad, these could be potentially become pillars for a Guatemala-specific humanitarian doctrine. In that sense, the first of the objectives mentioned above, the promotion of prosperity and employment is a critical component for a society to thrive. It may seem that this objective has more to do with economic policy rather than security; however, it should be noted that a strong security environment is highly conducive to favourable economic conditions, and thereby development.

The second objective, promotion of global peace can certainly be adapted to suit Guatemala's immediate needs. Guatemala is currently ransacked by transnational drug trade and organised crime syndicates. Since these groups operate cross-border, there is a

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<sup>73</sup> National Defence Canada, *Civil-Military Cooperation*, 1-3

clear need for the promotion of global, if not, regional security in Central America. Likewise, the projection of values and culture also represents an opportunity for building on, and expanding, presence both regionally and globally. This objective can lead to a harmonisation of regional values and create a culture of collaboration and aid among regional players in the achievement of common aims.

In light of these three, broad policy objectives, the main objective of CIMIC boils down to achieving the required coordination among military and civilian actors in order to heighten the chances of mission success.<sup>74</sup> This is certainly true in the case of natural disasters and/or humanitarian crises. Consequently, “CIMIC, when conducted in an impartial, neutral and independent manner in the eyes of national authorities and the local population, is a force multiplier.”<sup>75</sup> Thus, CIMIC seeks to combine efforts in a way that all actors can work together toward a common cause. Beyond that, the sum of all forces creates an even larger force that would otherwise be impossible to replicate. In addition, the complementation of all actors’ capabilities would become conducive toward overcoming as many gaps as possible.

Based on Canadian CIMIC doctrine, a series of political-humanitarian objectives are pursued through the cooperation of factional leaders, police and civilian authorities. In order to achieve these goals, there is a clear need to overcome the resistance to change. These can be summed up as follows:

- Establish the primacy of the rule of law and an impartial judicial system;
- Integrate social justice and tolerance into citizens’ everyday lives;

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<sup>74</sup> National Defence Canada, *Civil-Military Cooperation*, 1-4

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

- Integrate the right to life and fair trial into citizens' daily lives;
- Establish law and order as a means of achieving sustainable peace;
- Foster the respect for human rights in all political, religious civil and military environments;
- Strengthen the culture of freedom (political, religious, thought, expression); and
- Maintain the availability of public services such as health care, educations, public transportation, and so forth.<sup>76</sup>

The previous objectives underscore the need for an integrated approach in dealing with CIMIC interventions in humanitarian endeavours. Consequently, this approach demands the full participation of all actors in society whereby conditions created can be conducive to maintaining a high level of readiness amid the threats posed by disasters. In a broader sense, these objectives look toward creating a culture of disaster and conflict prevention so that many of the threats faced today can be significantly minimised.

By adopting these objectives, the GAF, and Guatemala as a nation, can reassess the intended outcomes and tailor them to Guatemala's specific needs. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that Guatemalan society possesses similar needs to those of Canadian society since sustainable peace and development, along with the rule of law and respect for human rights, are cornerstones for development and equality. Those nations that fail to guarantee these basic conditions are subject to harsh consequences. Furthermore, the price that is paid due to the lack of preparation and coordination is immense and can lead to decades of recovery efforts costing countries vast amounts of resources.

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<sup>76</sup> National Defence Canada, *Civil-Military Cooperation*, 1-6



In essence, this discussion intends to spark a benchmarking process whereby the GAF, and Guatemala as a nation, can look to the work done by Canada and distill the best practices and most successful accomplishments in this area. Undoubtedly, this is not meant to be a cut-and-paste job, but rather an academic and intellectual exercise in which the successes and failures of Canada, as an allied nation and partner, can serve as a guide post for the development and implementation of Guatemala's own humanitarian doctrine. Consequently, the next section will take a closer look at how the current GAF humanitarian doctrine is shaped thus far.

### **GUATEMALAN ARMED FORCES HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE**

The GAF's humanitarian doctrine is still a work in progress, to say the least. The 2016 National Defence Policy and White Paper underscore the need for the GAF to contribute significantly and play a key role in the establishment of a national security apparatus that can, not only provide support in times of need, but also aid in conflict prevention and the minimisation of risk.<sup>77</sup>

However, the GAF's humanitarian doctrine is still in its infancy since the transition of the GAF from a war-time force to a peace-time one focused on human security has been a slow, and often times, painful process. In addition, the resistance to change has proven to be a significant drawback throughout this transition. This is why distilling doctrine from an allied nation, such as Canada, is a worthwhile exercise throughout this process.

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<sup>77</sup> Ministry of National Defence, *Guatemala National Defence Policy*, (Guatemala City: Department Political Affairs, 2016), 15.

It is also worth noting that civil assistance and humanitarian aid is a mission set that has been integrated into the GAF's constitutional mandate. Hence, the GAF's role is not just limited to security and defence, but an expanded one that looks to harness military capabilities and know-how for the benefit of disaster relief and humanitarian aid times of crisis.

This expanded role contemplates the need for incorporating civilian authorities and law enforcement into a larger, systematised national security apparatus in which the military plays a pivotal role, but ultimately, a supporting one. While this does not diminish the military's importance by any means, it does represent a fundamental paradigm shift in traditional GAF mission sets. As such, current defence policy is heavy on combatting transnational threats and organised crime while humanitarian intervention represents a smaller portion of the GAF's focus. This is the result of the prioritisation of the nation's most pressing needs in terms of peace and security. Thus, these mission sets grab the most attention from policy and decisionmakers. As indicated in the policy objectives above, rule of law, respect for human rights, and law and order all represent fundamental security tasks that need to be carried out effectively in order to create conditions conducive to establishing and maintaining an adequate level of readiness amid the threat of natural disasters and humanitarian crises. Moreover, the GAF have been moving toward and increasing emphasis on prevention so that the need for intervention is decreased and the toll of emergencies can be significantly reduced.<sup>78</sup>

The end state of this transition process looks to create a seamless system in which any potential disaster and/or crisis can be met with the best possible response. Also, this

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<sup>78</sup> Ministry of National Defence, *Guatemala National Defence Policy*, 16.

exercise looks develop capabilities to the extent in which civilian authorities can take full command of recovery efforts utilising the military's capabilities to enhance the work carried out by all actors involved.

After having discussed relevant inputs from NATO and CANADIAN CIMIC and humanitarian doctrines, a deliberate analysis is required in order to determined which of the items that have been distilled could be translated into inputs for future updates and reviews of current Guatemalan doctrine and policy.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS OF NATO AND CANADIAN FORCES CIMIC DOCTRINE AND GUATEMALAN ARMED FORCES CIMIC ACTIONS IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

#### GUATEMALAN HADR DOCTRINE

Current Guatemalan HADR doctrine is based upon an expanded interpretation of its constitutional mandate. This expanded role calls for assistance in case of “emergency or public calamity” as indicated by article 249 of the Guatemalan Political Constitution.<sup>79</sup> Therefore, the GAF shall provide its cooperation in times of need in support of civilian-led agencies during disaster response.

The GAF has a specific unit dedicated to disaster response tasks known as the Humanitarian and Rescue Unit (UHR, in Spanish). This unit boasts qualified search and rescue personnel, as well as, officers that liaise with CONRED and other civilian agencies, such as the Red Cross. This unit is renowned for its constant state of readiness as mandated by its role within the CONRED system.

One fine example of this unit’s prowess was its intervention in the 2010 Haiti earthquake. This event put the UHR’s rapid response deployment to a real-life, large-scale test. In less than 12 hours, the unit was assembled and ready to deploy on search and rescue missions in the aftermath of the disaster.<sup>80</sup> Domestically, the UHR was deployed in the wake of the El Cambray landslide in 2015. The unit was on the scene

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<sup>79</sup> Ministry of National Defence, *Guatemala National Defence Strategy* (Guatemala City: Department Political Affairs, 2016): 8.

<sup>80</sup> “Perspectiva Militar” last modified March 23, 2017, <http://perspectivamilitar.blogspot.com/2010/01/uhr-gt-desplegada-hacia-haiti-en-mision.html>

immediately following the disaster as first responders. Once aid began pouring in, the unit gradually moved out as other civilian relief agencies set in, and the PNC took over security tasks.<sup>81</sup> In spite of the UHR being battle-tested, it has a small force of 73 members.<sup>82</sup> By all means, this number of rescue workers is insufficient for nationwide disaster and humanitarian relief tasks. They are best served in cases where there is a lack of first responders.

This point illustrates the shortage of manpower that the GAF currently possess specifically related to HADR tasks. While other units of the GAF are able to support HADR tasks such as the Corps of Engineers who can supply heavy machinery and road reconstruction capabilities, trained professionals dedicated to relief tasks are hard to come by. Therefore, this glaring gap in the GAF's capabilities has motivated the search for alternatives.

The Guatemalan Defence Policy takes into consideration the need for the activation and readiness of reserves. These reserves are meant to be deployed when needed with the UHR as its commanding unit.<sup>83</sup> This initiative intends to maintain a reserve force located throughout the country so that in the event of a crisis, the UHR can be swiftly deployed to the scene in order to command rescue units. Per 2016 figures supplied by Global Fire Power, Guatemala has a standing force of 15,500 units, while an

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<sup>81</sup> CNN Español, "Al Menos 26 Muertos y 600 Desaparecidos tras el Deslizamiento en Guatemala", CNN en Español, October 02, 2015, <http://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2015/10/02/rescatan-a-12-personas-tras-un-deslizamiento-en-guatemala/>

<sup>82</sup> "Dialogo", last modified July 02, 2013, <https://dialogo-americas.com/es/articles/entrenados-para-salvar-otros>

<sup>83</sup> Ministry of National Defence, *Guatemala National Defence Strategy* (Guatemala City: Department Political Affairs, 2016), 8.

active reserve of none.<sup>84</sup> Consequently, this indicates a pressing concern for the GAF's leadership as it's already overburdened and taxed standing force would not be able to cope with a massive-scale disaster such as the 1976 earthquake that totalled most of the country.

By the same token, Global Fire Power has identified roughly 5 million eligible citizens for military service in Guatemala.<sup>85</sup> This supposes a large pool of potential members that could fill out reserve spots and be activated and mobilised in times of crisis. However, this phase of the Guatemalan National Defence Policy is still very much in its infancy. The actual strategy on how this is planned to be conducted remains to be seen. Therefore, the lack of a clear strategy at this point leaves room for the adaptation of doctrine from an allied nation, such as Canada, in the design and creation of a strategy for the build up of reserves through CIMIC intervention.

However, it is not simply a matter of putting reserves together for the sake of having units ready to be deployed at some point, but rather, it should be part of a greater initiative to develop and integrated HADR doctrine that can address fundamental issues and outline the way in which reserves can be utilised to multiply the GAF's presence throughout the country. One such doctrine that can be studied and distilled in order to obtain best practices for the design and implementation of an effective HADR doctrine is Canadian doctrine on humanitarian intervention.

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<sup>84</sup> "Global Firepower", last modified January 16, 2017, [http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country\\_id=guatemala](http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=guatemala)

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

## CANADIAN PRINCIPLES IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Within the context of domestic operations, the Canadian Forces (CF) are keenly aware of the role they are to play at the request of civilian agencies in times of need. Indeed, command and control of humanitarian intervention lies with civilian agencies. Thus, the role of the CF is a supporting one in which their capabilities can be used in order to multiply efforts of humanitarian workers, or provide some type of coverage where gaps may exist.<sup>86</sup>

The previous point underscores a key issue: defence resource managers must be keenly aware of the capabilities and limitations of materiel and staff when called upon. There may exist the desire to help, yet there may be inherent limitations that could keep the military from providing assistance. For example, budgetary restrictions may pose a significant obstacle. Also, a shortage of manpower or equipment may prevent the CF from carrying out the requested tasks. It's also important to note that all requests for aid must be consistent with the CF's mandate. Furthermore, the use of CF personnel in non-defence tasks must adhere to the written agreement between the CF and the civilian agencies requesting its help. The same goes for equipment as its use for non-defence tasks must be carefully considered.<sup>87</sup>

In essence, humanitarian assistance can be defined as: "...an action taken to save lives, prevent human suffering, and/or mitigate property damage."<sup>88</sup> At the core of this concept lies human security. It is clear that the focus of humanitarian intervention is on

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<sup>86</sup> National Defence Canada, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1999), 4-1.

<sup>87</sup> National Defence Canada, *Domestic Operations* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2011), 5-2

<sup>88</sup> National Defence Canada, *Domestic Operations*, 5-3

saving lives. While mitigating property damage may seem like a secondary task, it is pivotal when it comes to protecting key infrastructure such as roads or communications.

In this regard, there are three categories for humanitarian assistance operations:

- “Emergency civil assistance undertaken in response to natural or human-induced disasters, such as urban search and rescue (USAR);
- Search for missing persons on land and not resulting from an aeronautical or maritime incident (sometimes referred to as ground SAR, or GSAR); and
- Other humanitarian assistance (responses to requests arising from events or situations that are less than the scale of a provincially or locally declared emergency).”<sup>89</sup>

These three categories clearly illustrate the extent in which the CF will intervene in case of a disaster or crisis. As such, it is the emergency itself that will determine the extent in which the CF can intervene as deemed by liaison officers who have contact with civilian authorities in charge of the situation. In addition, only CF personnel essential to the mission shall be deployed and for the length of time needed for civilian agencies to regain control of the situation.<sup>90</sup>

However, there may be emergencies in which immediate response is required and which do not allow for enough time to obtain the necessary clearances from headquarters or commanders. These may include:

- “Rescue and evacuation of individuals in emergency situations, emergency life-saving treatment, the safeguarding of public health;
- Emergency restoration of essential services (including fire-fighting, water, power, communications, transportation, and fuel);
- Emergency clearance of debris, rubble, and dangerous items from public facilities and other areas to permit the rescue or evacuation of people and the restoration of essential services;

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> National Defence Canada, *Domestic Operations*, 5-4



- Detection and monitoring of chemical, biological, and radiological contamination, the control of the spread of contamination and the timely reporting of such incidents;
- Provision of emergency transportation and movement control;
- The safeguarding, collection, and distribution of essential supplies and materiel;
- Preparation of emergency or preliminary damage assessments; and
- Restoration of interim emergency communications.”<sup>91</sup>

The situations mentioned above represent emergencies in which vital infrastructure has been affected while the saving of lives becomes the main concern. As such, these tasks may become overwhelming for first responders, or may require the immediate deployment of equipment. In addition, transport and strategic airlift capabilities may become critically important for the delivery of supplies and aid.

Another key dimension of these operations lies in supporting civilian law enforcement. This is a critical task since the scope of the emergency may overwhelm civilian authorities to the point where law and order may break down. Therefore, the presence of military personnel in order to stabilise the situation and instill a sense of peace and security in the local population.<sup>92</sup>

All the elements discussed underscore the importance of the military in support of civilian agencies in emergency situations. Consequently, the CF are committed to providing assistance, first and foremost, when it is requested. Much like the GAF, the CF have a clear mandate in which they are required to provide emergency assistance through humanitarian intervention. Nevertheless, there are obstacles that need to be overcome in order to achieve this. Canadian principles take this point fully into account by drawing a line at the point where the CF would be unable to provide adequate assistance.

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

Ultimately, these limitations boil down to the extent in which the CF may provide support in terms of time and resources.

## **THE ROLE OF CIMIC IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN CANADIAN FORCES**

The role of CIMIC in humanitarian intervention can be defined, by the CF, as: “the coordination and cooperation, in support of a mission, between the military and civil actors, including the national population and authorities, as well as international, national, governmental, and non-governmental organizations and agencies.”<sup>93</sup> This concept highlights the role of CIMIC as a part of mission support. Furthermore, it underscores CIMIC’s nature as coordination between military and non-military actors. This point is critical as the CF understand the importance of maintaining effective coordination between all actors involved in humanitarian intervention. Consequently, there is a clear need to make effective communication and coordination the focus of CIMIC interventions. The main intent behind CIMIC should be to integrate the military into the entire domain of humanitarian intervention and not isolating it. This is pivotal since there is no, single institution that can have all the necessary capabilities in order to deal with an emergency or humanitarian crisis on its own. The need to establish a coordinated effort implies the need for dedicated professionals to interact with other institutions.

However, it is also important keep in mind the supporting role that the military must play in this type of intervention. Hence, the traditional approach of CIMIC whereby it is used to support the commander’s intent within the mission area has been

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<sup>93</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *CIMIC Capabilities*, (Belgium: Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, 2013), 8.

significantly changed to a role where the military may act only when called upon. Nevertheless, the military may support civilian actors under certain circumstances by facilitating projects and fostering goodwill among local populations.<sup>94</sup>

Since 2000, the CF have developed CIMIC capabilities through the utilisation of a Reserve Force so that they may be trained in civilian skills and jobs.<sup>95</sup> Consequently, the use of reserve forces in this task provides important capabilities that may be drawn upon in support of civilian actors. Furthermore, the CF's rapid deployment capabilities are crucial to supporting civilian actors amid emergency situations.

One example of the CF's CIMIC capabilities in action is its participation in Afghanistan. The CF's CIMIC team was tasked to carry out operations in order to boost trust in the local population so that they would provide information regarding the enemy's movements. To achieve this, activities needed to be conducted in order to build and maintain a relationship of mutual trust. The following types of activities were conducted:

- Holding regular meetings with local authorities (village representatives), as well as, local citizens, teachers and students;
- Conducting small, quick, high impact projects in favour of the community like, road repairs, school supplies or support to important infrastructure;
- Donating school and medical supplies to the applicable institutions;

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *Op. Cit.*, 9

- Distributing a newsletter produced by the CF as means of psychological operations designed to build trust in the community.<sup>96</sup>

The outcomes proved positive as they were a clear contribution to the commander's intent. As force protection was enhanced, relationship-building activities continued. It was clearly evident that the CIMIC team had been successful at a tactical level. At a strategic level, however, coordination proved to be less than efficient. As a result, communication suffered which led to a lack of direction between the CF and Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB).<sup>97</sup>

During this participation, it was felt that CIMIC would do very well at a tactical level. However, its attempts to crossover into the work done by NGOs through the undertaking of projects was questioned. Nevertheless, it was also argued that there was a need for CIMIC operators to take a practical approach since active community participation was key to actually building trust with locals.

Yet, civilian organisations have accused the military of using CIMIC in order to manipulate local communities into trusting them. These organisations have questioned the military's intentions citing ulterior motives. In reality, the intentions of civilian organisations can also be questioned. Ultimately, both military and civilian agencies have common goals. Therefore, there is a pressing concern that both military and civilian actions be harmonised so that neither gets in the way of the other. This can be achieved through careful coordination and planning. Also, it's important to involve civilian organisations working with the military in relationship-building activities. This is

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<sup>96</sup> Graham M. Longhurts, "The Evolution of Canadian Civil -Military Coordination (CIMIC)", *Canadian Military Journal*, Winter (2006/2007): 56.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

essential for both agencies and civilian populations so that they can perceive the military's true intentions by way of these activities.<sup>98</sup>

The previous example outlines how CIMIC intervention can be beneficial if careful coordination is conducted with civilian actors and the local population. The Afghanistan experience was mostly intended at building trust in the local communities of a foreign country. Nevertheless, the key lesson that can be distilled here is that relationship-building activities are crucial anywhere the military chooses to become involved in a non-combat role. As such, CIMIC is a bridge for the military to enter the domain of civilian organisations. While the intent is not to become the main player, the military can certainly play a major role in helping civilian organisations advance relief efforts in case of humanitarian crises. Therefore, the military needs to implement procedures that can support coordination and liaison with all actors, at all times.

Another important lesson that can be distilled from the Afghanistan experience is that CIMIC is an on-going concern. Thus, these actions should not be regarded as temporary, but rather as permanent. The military cannot expect to implement short-term CIMIC actions in order to reap long-term benefits, such as trust from local populations. What this implies is that CIMIC actions need to be on-going through projects and other joint actions conducted with local actors so that whenever the military is called upon to participate, in any capacity, the structure is there for the military to play a major, contributing role and then withdraw when the appropriate times comes. The following section will take a closer look at the GAF's own humanitarian intervention experience

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

through the discussion of the El Cambray Landslide which serves as a case study for this paper.

## **THE GUATEMALAN ARMED FORCES INTERVENTION IN THE EL CAMBRAY DISASTER**

On the evening of October 1<sup>st</sup>, 2015, a community on the outskirts of Guatemala City known as “El Cambray” was the scene of tragic events. An enormous landslide buried more than half the community leaving dozens missing. In the wake of the tragedy, emergency units and first responders scrambled to the scene. First responders included CONRED, the PNC and Fire Department. Other organisations began arriving on the scene shortly thereafter. As evening turned into night, frantic efforts to uncover survivors had proven much more difficult than anticipated due to the amount of dirt and rubble deposited on dwellings and houses. Since the PNC and Fire Department lacked any type of heavy machinery capabilities, the GAF’s Corps of Engineers was called upon to support. The rapid deployment of the Corps of Engineers’ machinery proved to be pivotal in rescuing survivors. This deployment bought CONRED enough time to acquire its own heavy machinery capabilities and continue with the search for further survivors. In addition, the GAF deployed citizen security units and members from the UHR supported by troops from its standing force to support the PNC in providing security and helping search and rescue efforts.<sup>99</sup>

As the recovery effort continued, the GAF’s Corps of Engineers gradually withdrew its bulldozers and backhoes as CONRED began furnishing heavy machinery.

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<sup>99</sup> The Guardian, “Guatemala landslide: under the mud, dead families found huddled together” Last Modified 06 October, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/06/guatemala-landslide-under-the-mud-dead-families-found-huddled-together>

Eventually, the GAF withdrew amid criticism from the Guatemalan people who insisted on their permanence at the site. After 12 days, rescue efforts were called to a halt. By this time, local and international NGOs, churches, and private citizens had provided food, shelter, and clothing to victims. Local municipalities donated installations to serve as shelters, while the PNC and the GAF's Citizen Security Unit continued to safeguard victims and keep looters away from the site. Once the search was officially called off, the Corps of Engineers was left behind to stabilise the terrain and clear the way for a nearby river.<sup>100</sup>

This emergency put Guatemala's disaster response mechanism under a strenuous test. While the San Marcos earthquake of 2014 was a considerable stress test on all organisations involved, the intensity and magnitude of the El Cambray landslide exceeded the previous threshold set in 2014. In addition, the landslide was a time-sensitive disaster since potential survivors who were trapped beneath the rubble had only hours to live. Thus, the first 48 hours were the most crucial. This is where the military can step in and offer a critical capability that civilian agencies may lack at the onset of an emergency.

Another important lesson learned in this emergency was that the Guatemalan emergency response system, headlined by CONRED, was effective in bringing together all actors and putting them into action in a coherent fashion. Evidence of this can be seen in the way the disaster site was divided into four sectors: one was led by the UHR and Corps of Engineers, two were managed by the Volunteer Fire Department, and the other

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<sup>100</sup> Manuel Hernandez and Carlos Alvarez, "Conred suspende tareas de búsqueda en El Cambray 2", last modified October 13, 2015, <http://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/comunitario/suspenden-busqueda-de-victimas-en-el-cambray-2>

by the Municipal Fire Department. This division of labour allowed rescuers to save lives that would have otherwise been lost.<sup>101</sup>

In essence, the actions carried out by first responders was swift and decisive. This led to lives being saved while public confidence in the military soared. Moreover, the response to this emergency was totally led by civilian institutions. In this event, the Secretary-General for CONRED, who chaired the inter-agency group in charge of handling the crisis, reported directly to the President of Guatemala. It remains clear that the response system works and is capable of handling a disaster of considerable magnitude. Additionally, the military played a key role throughout the entire ordeal while being subordinated to the civilian institutions that took charge of this event.

Nevertheless, no matter how good a system may be, there may still be area for improvement that would have to be addressed. The next section will take a closer look at how these shortcomings could be translated into valuable lessons learned.

#### **GAPS IDENTIFIED IN THE RESPONSE TO EL CAMBRAY ACCORDING TO NATO AND CANADIAN FORCES DOCTRINE**

While the job done by first responders and subsequent agencies who participated in the search and rescue efforts at the site of the disaster was remarkable, the same cannot be said for the assistance that evacuees received. Since the entire zone was shut down by CONRED and deemed uninhabitable, many families were forced to leave their homes while rescue efforts were being conducted. Moreover, these families were not allowed to

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid.



return after rescue efforts had been called off due to the persistent risk of another landslide.

First of all, evacuated families had nowhere to go. Many resisted leaving, but were eventually escorted by PNC to make-shift tents erected by one of the GAF's Citizen Security Units and the local Fire Department. Furthermore, evacuated families, who left with only the clothes and their backs, essentially had lost everything. Consequently, a cry for help went out to provide food and clothing for these victims. Food and clothing drives were organised by radio and television stations, churches and charitable organisations. Many of these calls were made through social media.<sup>102</sup> As a result, humanitarian aid began pouring in days after the initial disaster occurred. While the local municipality arranged for a gymnasium to be converted into a shelter, evacuees spent the first few nights huddled in blankets under the make-shift tents.

As aid began to pour in, food and clothing were abundant, but first-aid materials and common medications, such as pain killers, antibiotics, rehydration salts, cough syrup and cold pills were scarce. Government officials thanked the population for their support, but also urged them to stop sending food and clothing and instead help out with medical supplies. Amid the call, some foreign governments stepped in and offered their support by supplying the requested items.<sup>103</sup>

After the crisis was officially over, evacuated families were now left homeless. Since the government had closed off the area, victims were allowed to return to houses

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<sup>102</sup> Nic Wirtz and Elisabeth Malkin, "Hundreds Missing in Guatemala as Landslide Cleanup Begins", last modified October 04, 2015, [https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/world/americas/guatemala-landslide-cleanup-begins-as-hundreds-are-missing.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/world/americas/guatemala-landslide-cleanup-begins-as-hundreds-are-missing.html?_r=0)

<sup>103</sup> The Baja Post, "Mexican Government Sends Humanitarian Aid to Guatemala", last modified October 06, 2015, <http://thebajapost.com/2015/10/06/mexican-government-sends-humanitarian-aid-to-guatemala/>

deemed safe enough to enter only to retrieve personal belongings under the watch of PNC. Some of these families found temporary accommodation with relatives, some in the countryside, while others spent weeks in the improvised shelters set up by the local municipality. Ultimately, a number of families were evicted from the shelter, as the local municipality had determined it could no longer afford to keep the shelter running.<sup>104</sup>

Then-President Alejandro Maldonado announced a plan to build publicly-funded homes for the homeless families on land seized from convicted druglords. The plan was to use the land and build homes to those families who qualified for the hastily-set up programme. With the land in place, the government requested the Corps of Engineers to carry out the construction of these homes. At the time of writing this paper, close to two years after the disaster, the project remains unfinished.<sup>105</sup>

The events that unfolded following the El Cambray landslide proved to be far from effective. The delivery of Humanitarian Aid was botched, and critical medical supplies took weeks to arrive. Homeless families had nowhere to go, while both the local and national governments struggled to help families move on. This underscores the lack of preparation disaster response agencies since their participation did not contemplate the consequences of the disaster on victims and their families.

Moreover, the Guatemalan government got it wrong by tasking the military to conduct a civilian housing project. The rationale behind this decision has not been fully explained. Perhaps it was a matter of the central government cutting corners by asking

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<sup>104</sup> BBC News, “Guatemalan Families Evacuated for Fear of a New Landslide”, last modified October 09, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-34492848>

<sup>105</sup> BBC News, “Guatemala to Build Homes for Mudslide Victims”, October 08, 2015 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-34474193>

the military to do this work instead of hiring out civilian contractors who could do the job much more efficiently. This example underscores the fact that the military is not always the best at doing everything; in a world where resources are scarce, often times it's best to pay more up front than to endure long-term effects with the long-term costs associated. In the end, the botched housing project has been a legacy from one government to another, both of them failing to address the issue effectively.

The entire ordeal that followed the landslide, specifically the disarray of humanitarian aid that came from all corners of society, was evidence that proper CIMIC activities between the military, civilian agencies and local populations can lead to a properly organised effort whereby the right aid can reach the right people at the right time. It is unquestionable that a remarkable outpouring of support came from even the poorest Guatemalans, but using social media to promote a clothing drive that could have easily been part of a larger coordination effort by formal government and non-government agencies. Furthermore, standing plans could have been developed in order to deal with this particular type of emergencies, especially since it hadn't been the first time Guatemala, as a nation, dealt with a situation such as this. CIMIC tasks, such as donations of food, clothing, medical supplies and other humanitarian aid to applicable organisations could have led to a stockpile of aid thus increasing the disaster response mechanism's tactical readiness. It should not be up to the local population to coordinate delivery of humanitarian aid on its own when there could be perfectly functional plans put into place well in advance of any potential emergency.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

Since the GAF's emergence from its war-time role into a peace-time, humanitarian iteration, the need for the GAF to reinvent itself has become evident. This process has posed a considerable challenge particularly in light of its downsizing following the signing of the 1996 Peace Accords. Moreover, the GAF's diminished capabilities implied overburdening leftover personnel by taking on additional tasks related to security and humanitarian aid.

While humanitarian assistance is nothing new to the GAF, the context in which HADR tasks are to be carried out is. This new security environment has morphed from guerrilla to asymmetrical warfare in which imminent threats emerge from all angles. As such, transnational organised crime syndicates, drug cartels, street gangs, extortionists and even petty criminals are all vying for a piece of the action. In this regard, the GAF have needed to support the PNC in law enforcement tasks, in addition to providing national defence and interdiction capabilities.

Yet, the focus of the present paper has been the GAF's role in HADR tasks whereby their role as a military force is to be subordinated to civilian actors in charge of coordinating relief efforts in times of national emergency. Consequently, the GAF have had to abide by their constitutional mandate which states that they must support any, and all, efforts during times of national emergency and disaster. However, the GAF lack a clear humanitarian doctrine by which they can perform their role. It is important to note that this lack of doctrine is not due to a lack of will, but rather to the circumstances that

molded the GAF over the course of the 36-year struggle and the ensuing transformation process following the end of the war.

The lack of doctrine has been largely overcome by the careful observance of the GAF's constitutional mandate in addition to any applicable legislation. While this has sufficed, evidence of the GAF's intervention in the El Cambray landslide disaster of 2015 shows how the GAF have been more than adequate in responding and supporting in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. But, once the emergency was over, not just the GAF, but all institutions involved in the relief process proved ineffective in dealing with the consequences of the disaster. Victims were left largely unattended, with no place to live, and relying on the goodwill of charity in order to begin putting their lives back together. There is no doubt that all institutions, beginning with CONRED, could have done a better job of dealing with victims. Nevertheless, the GAF's role throughout the handling of the disaster proved just how pivotal the military can be in times such as these. Despite a valiant and commendable effort, the GAF were simply stretched too thin; in addition to aiding recovery efforts through the provision of heavy machinery, the GAF also aided the PNC in providing security to the disaster site. Also, the GAF supported CONRED in transporting and delivering humanitarian aid to victims and their families.

The thesis statement of this paper, which reads as follows: the evolution of the GAF's constitutional mandate and defence policy demand the development of capabilities that will embrace their outlined role and give them enough tools to better support civilian-led recovery and relief efforts during national emergencies and crises, evidences the need for the GAF to expand their capabilities in order to become better equipped at handling emergencies such as the El Cambray landslide. This paper has

clearly shown that the GAF are quite capable of providing rapid response to crises through the UHR unit and other relevant units, such as the Corps of Engineers, as seen in the case study presented in this paper. The biggest limitation, however, is not the know-how, but the sheer amount of equipment and personnel needed to engage in HADR tasks. However, this concept does not advocate for an increase in the number of military personnel or increased spending on military equipment, but rather, more engagement with local communities in order to empower civilians to take control of their own security. To that end, the topic of human security was widely discussed. As per Guatemala's Political Constitution, the State is obliged to guarantee the safety and welfare of its citizens. Consequently, the State needs to find the means and the ways to carry out this mandate. That is where, both the GAF and the PNC, play such a critical role in ensuring the adequate implementation of the human security doctrine at all levels.

As discussed, human security is about putting people first. In this sense, putting people first not only refers to being able to protect people from threats, but also to being able to help people protect themselves. Notwithstanding, this paper has established the need for the GAF to increase its capabilities in order to better support recover efforts. This points toward the need to empower local communities so that they may be able to protect themselves. Undoubtedly, empowering local communities so that they can protect themselves is no easy task. However, it is seen as the most feasible way in which the GAF can contribute to increasing their capabilities, while keeping their standing force tasked to other national defence and interdiction tasks.

This paper has taken careful consideration of all available data and literature particularly since there is a lack of consistent data available on the relevant matters

discussed throughout the paper. While NATO and the CF have produced considerable amounts of data on HADR topics, including doctrine, the GAF are struggling to put forth information and data pertaining to all their current mission sets. Furthermore, academic research has also been hard to come by. So, this limitation has proven to be a challenge in the development of this paper.

History has taught the GAF an important lesson: engagement with local population can prove to be a decided advantage in conducting successful operations. While this concept no longer applies to waging a conventional warfare, it is certainly applicable to humanitarian tasks. If anything, the El Cambay disaster proved that close engagement with local communities can help aid reach victims sooner. The delay evidenced in this case is proof that the disconnect between civilians and military can prove costly in terms of unnecessary suffering.

Another key issue discussed in this paper was how to bring the military, and thereby civilian agencies, and local communities closer together so that these may work in tandem. The means to carry out this task has been through Civil-Military Coordination. There is no question that CIMIC activities are as important now as they have ever been. What this implies is that the military must acknowledge the role it plays within local communities and how this role can be harnessed in order to augment the military's sense capabilities, which in turn, would result in a considerable reduction in response times.

This paper also took a closer look into the GAF's CIMIC doctrine. Suffice it to say, this doctrine is scant, at best. Therefore, the gaps that have been identified as a result of this paper need to be addressed so that these can be transformed into positive conditions that can result in a meaningful impact upon the operational readiness of

disaster-response agencies. It is clear that the benefits of this type of engagement would enhance the capabilities of both military and civilian agencies while providing greater involvement with local communities. In this regard, it is also a way of allowing communities to self-protect. In essence, the GAF, and other civilian relief agencies would only have command and control over communities during times of distress. The ultimate goal is to move toward the creation of civil defence units that can be activated when circumstances deem it appropriate.

The fact that the GAF lack a clear humanitarian doctrine has raised the issue of developing one. However, the sources for developing this doctrine require a closer look. While lessons learned are a fundamental tenet of doctrine building, this process often takes a long time and depends on trial and error. Fortunately, there exists the possibility of aid from allied partners, such as Canada, who can lend their own lessons learned and doctrine in order to help the GAF conceptualise their own humanitarian doctrine and how it may be applied to HADR tasks.

In order to aid the conceptualisation of a humanitarian doctrine for the GAF, a study of NATO and CF CIMIC doctrine in humanitarian interventions was conducted. This study was by no means exhaustive, but meant to address specific issues that the GAF can readily consider as a part of a broader benchmarking process. This study also intended to distill clear concepts that are universal to any type of humanitarian task and that could be applicable to the GAF's own reality and circumstances. The overarching theme throughout this entire analysis of both NATO and CF doctrine is putting people first. Thus, human security has become the cross-cutting theme to the GAF's potential humanitarian intervention doctrine.



In the study of CF and NATO CIMIC doctrine, key principles and concepts underscore the tasks to be carried out. These principles and concepts are intended to become guidelines by which the GAF can elaborate upon their constitutional mandate. While said mandate provides the GAF with the legal investiture to act in times of crisis, ultimately, they cannot act unilaterally; the GAF's involvement must be requested by the proper civilian authorities. While this may seem like a simple, bureaucratic procedure, it is a vital part of the role in which the military is intended to play under the new security paradigm that envelopes the Central American region.

This paper has also taken a closer look at the GAF's Defence Policy as articulated within its corresponding role. It was established that this policy is heavy on addressing transnational threats, national security, the protection of territorial sovereignty, the eradication of illegal immigration and fostering interdiction capabilities, but an equally important element is humanitarian assistance. However, the scarcity of resources, in particular equipment and manpower, have proven to be a considerable obstacle that needs to be overcome in order for the GAF to provide appropriate support to civilian agencies. Furthermore, it has also been established that the downsizing of the GAF to less than two thirds of its war-time peak has played a significant role in reducing its operational capabilities.

Perhaps the biggest question answered in this paper pertains to whether the military should even be involved in humanitarian assistance in the first place. The answer to this question was clearly answered in the case study presented in this paper. Indeed, the military possesses capabilities that civilian agencies may lack, or may not have had readily available. In the case of the El Cambray emergency, the GAF's Corps of

Engineers proved to be ready at a moment's notice. Also, the UHR was swiftly deployed, within a matter of hours, straight after first responders arrived on the scene. Given the magnitude of the emergency, the GAF's contributions proved to be pivotal throughout the search and rescue portion of the operation.

Another key consideration to the military's involvement in humanitarian assistance can be seen in the transport capabilities that the GAF provided to civilian relief agencies. While humanitarian aid was in short supply, the outpouring of support from the Guatemalan people posed a logistical problem to relief agencies. This issue was solved by the GAF through the provision of transport trucks that could pick up supplies at designated points and then reach victims in a timely manner. In addition, troops were deployed for the sole purpose of distributing supplies to victims.

Overall, the military's involvement throughout the case study presented in this paper was successful. However, its involvement in the post-emergency process highlights the limits of military involvement. The construction of government-assisted housing proved to be a complicated endeavour that should have been best left to civilian contractors. The unnecessary backlash that the GAF have taken as a result of their inefficiency in this task is an important lesson that must be heeded. Perhaps a broader, CIMIC-based project could have been implemented whereby the GAF retained command and control of the operation, but community involvement would have enhanced the GAF's capabilities and allowed for the empowerment of the local community in its own reconstruction. In a sense, it's a way of letting the community rebuild itself, and its identity, following such catastrophic events.

This reconstruction process underscores the GAF's limitations. Essentially, these limitations are caused by budgetary constraints and a shortage of manpower and equipment. Ideally, resources would be available to help the GAF obtain the necessary elements in order to carry out its mission sets in the best possible way. However, an increase in budget allocation seems out of the question at this time. So, in order for the GAF to overcome the gaps identified in this paper, they need to do more with less. This is why the use of CIMIC actions has been pinpointed as a feasible alternative to expanding the GAF's capabilities without actually increasing the size of its standing force.

By engaging local communities, the GAF are bridging a significant gap: reducing the space between them and civilian populations. The reduction of this space is significant since these spaces are exploited by organised crime syndicates in order to gain a foothold in specific territories. The notable absence of both military and civilian law enforcement has allowed these criminal groups to solidify their position especially in towns and villages along the Mexico-Guatemala border. Since increasing budget allocations, force and equipment to both the GAF and the PNC represent a considerable challenge, CIMIC actions would become conducive to developing strong civil defence capabilities.

The idea of forming civil defence units in local communities is not a new idea. As has been discussed, this idea was implemented in the early 1980s as a means of combatting the insurgent, guerrilla forces. The difference between then, and now, is that there is no armed conflict currently taking place on Guatemalan soil. Moreover, local communities basically had to pick sides during the conflict. This time, the prevailing security environment does not demand taking sides, but rather, peasants in poor farming

communities have no choice but to aid criminal groups since they are completely overwhelmed by the aggression and level of violence these groups impose upon defenseless communities.

It remains clear that security is a significant concern in the Guatemalan rural countryside. Nevertheless, this paper demonstrated how the lack of engagement with local populations has been detrimental to law enforcement presence to a point where the PNC is unable to cope with its own mandate. Considering that the GAF are constitutionally mandated to protect borders, closer engagement with border communities, and authorities on the other side of such borders, would enable for closer cooperation among all actors. This engagement would allow the GAF to aid the PNC in maintaining presence of law and order while aiding border communities to cope with cross-border threats. Therefore, engagement with local populations becomes increasingly important on many fronts. By implementing relevant CIMIC actions, the GAF can transfer know-how and training to local populations instead of arming them, as occurred in the 1980s. By transferring knowledge to local communities, these can become less reliant on the State for assistance. Ultimately, the military will play a very specific role in disaster response since civilian agencies will be empowered and capable of managing humanitarian assistance on their own. Of course, the military may still be called upon to provide specific support, such as the UHR unit, but only when civilians are unable to furnish a specific capability. Till now, the Guatemalan Defence Policy has only outlined its intent to create civil defence units. Thus, this plan is still very much in its infancy. As a result, there is still plenty of room for using CIMIC actions as a means of inching closer toward this end.

At the outset of this paper, it was discussed that the GAF were looking to change their role from a war-time defence force to a modern, professional institution dedicated to the protection of human lives. The GAF's involvement in humanitarian assistance has gone a long way toward improving its standing in the minds of citizens, and society as a whole. By engaging local communities and providing them with their own disaster response capabilities, the GAF can further enhance their standing. While the GAF's main order of business will continue to be national defence, their role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief has proven to be critical in aiding Guatemala's development into a state that truly ensures human security by putting people first.

Consequently, future research can build upon this paper and delve deeper into the actual means by which the GAF can carry out the building and updating of HADR doctrine. As such, future research can expand upon the guidelines provided by the current National Defence Policy in order to develop a coherent strategy paper that can hone in on the actual tasks that the GAF need to conduct in order to produce clear directives by which the GAF can operate in support of civilian law enforcement and humanitarian agencies.

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