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CONVENTION AND BEST PRACTICES: A MODEL FOR DESIGNING A CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY STRUCTURE

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ABSTRACT

As the Government of Canada embarks upon a Defence Policy Review throughout 2016, it is an opportune time to examine what type of structure a Canadian White Paper on Defence should look like, how such a document should be structured. This paper will seek out convention and best practices and incorporate them into a model which is recommended for presenting the Government's new Defence Policy. This paper will only recommend subject matter headings and explore why their inclusion or exclusion is advantageous or disadvantageous to the administration of Defence in Canada.

Chapter 1 provides a review of seven Canadian Defence White Papers and Defence policies statements from 1964 and 2008 in order to identify common trends and themes as well as rarer inclusions and omissions.

Chapter 2 provides a review of the most current policy statements from three of Canada's allies: The United States, The United Kingdom, and Australia. By examining the US' Quadrennial Defence Review 2014, The UK's National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, and Australia's 2016 Defence White Paper, best practices of our allies are recommended for adoption.

Chapter 3 provides an examination of the effect that the defence policy process has on the structure of a defence policy. Understanding the effect of the policy process on the structure of the policy document or instrument demonstrates the link between process and ultimate content of the policy statement.

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INTRODUCTION

At all levels of military leadership, leaders utilize strictly templated formats for delivering information and direction to their subordinates. Orders formats and processes remain a constant, efficient and predictable way to deliver the information that military personnel require in order to accomplish their mission. The highest instrument of strategic direction, the National Defence Policy, is meant to be an original document representing new direction as issued by a Government. Is there a way for the Government to adopt a more predictable and detailed defence policy? It has been eight years since the last Canadian Defence Policy related statement, the Canadian First Defence Strategy, was released. A new government has come to power in Canada and with it, an announcement that a Defence Review will be conducted. Whether called a defence review, strategy statement or Defence White Paper, what is really important is how well it actually articulates the defence priorities and policies of the government. A statement on defence policy in any form serves two purposes: to provide strategic guidance and management to the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) as well as to state the government's intended policy direction. It has been stated that governments prefer to write vague policy statements, that "ambiguity and generality protect a government from charges of hypocrisy and inconsistency." [1] While this is an apt observation of one of the possible political considerations influencing the policy process, ambiguity does not always appear to guide the policy process. In fact, the reality of the nature of defence policy is best stated in the conclusion of Hellyer's 1964 *White Paper on Defence* which seemed to place the following caveat on the entire publication: "the paper is a charter, a guide, not a detailed and final blueprint. The policy

[1] Ferguson, James. "Time for a New White Paper?" *CDA Institute*, (Fall 2015): 47, http://www.cdainstitute.ca/images/on_track/On_Track_Fall_2015_articles/On_Track_20.2_-_Fergusson.pdf

outlined in it is not immutable. It can be altered or adapted to meet requirements of changing circumstances, national and international."[2] A balance is implicit in this statement. How does the Government provide direction while retaining flexibility? Much of what has been written on Canadian defence policy has been published by Dr Douglas L. Bland of Queen's University. This paper will necessarily draw from the extraordinary amount of work that Dr. Bland has contributed to the subject of defence administration in Canada. In explaining the Government's role in defence, Dr Bland states that "the civil authority must at least control policies dealing with national goals, allocation of defence resources and the use of force."[3] Throughout this paper, the term defence policy statement and defence policy instrument are used interchangeably, both terms refer to any statement on defence policy used by the Government, whether it be a defence statement, or a White Paper. This paper will answer the following research question: what content and considerations should be included in the structure of Canada's defence policy instrument in order to ensure that it is an effective governance tool.

Chapter 1 of this paper will examine the past seven defence policy instruments whether they be White Papers or defence statements, from Minister Hellyer's 1964 *White Paper on Defence* to Minister MacKay's 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy* in order to identify formats as well as both similar and unique content. Chapter 2 will provide a brief survey of the defence policy instruments of our allies: The United States, The United Kingdom, and Australia which will add perspective and comparison to the examination of the history of Canada's defence policy statement structure. Taken together, the first two chapters of this paper will examine a brief history of military policy while putting it into an actionable format. Chapter 3 will explore

[2]Government of Canada. *White Paper on Defence*. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964), 30.
[3] Bland, Douglas L. "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society* 26, no. 1 (Fall 1999): 19.

the public policy process and the impact of that process on the structure and content of the policy statement. Ensuring that policy is analytically linked to the goals and realities of other government departments and the breadth of concurrence required for successful implementation will be examined. Outlining the requirement for broad inter-departmental consultation to insure that factors such as fiscal flexibility, foreign factors, and industrial realities (to name only a few), are accurately considered and that defence policy is not formulated in political isolation.

CHAPTER 1- Canadian Defence Policy since 1964

The most useful place to begin deducing what content should be included in a defence policy in order for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces to be effectively led as well as meet the intent of the Government of the day, is with past defence policies. This is not to say that governments would be encouraged to plagiarize the policies of past governments, but as will be shown below, many of the policies continually address the same subject matter. The difference in the following policies often comes down to nuance, rhetoric, detail, and emphasis. More than any other factor, emphasis is the method by which successive Governments have had their Defence Policy stand out from the policies of other governments. Chapter 1 will survey, (in order to establish patterns and emphasize differences), the seven defence policies released between 1964 and 2008. Table 1.1 lists the title of the policy, the government under which it was released, and finally the year it was released (by which for the sake of brevity, will be used throughout this paper to make reference to each policy instrument).

Table 1.1- Past Canadian Defence Policy White Papers and Statements

Title	White Paper on Defence	Defence in the 70's	Defence Update, Challenge and Commitment, A Defence Policy for Canada	Canadian Defence Policy	White Paper on Defence	A World of Pride and Influence in the World	Canada First Defence Strategy
Government	Liberal	Liberal	Progressive Conservative	Liberal	Liberal	Liberal	Conservative
Year	1964	1971	1988-89	1992	1994	2005	2008

The major topical headings found within defence policies are explored below in more depth. Where practical, examples from the various policies will be explored in reverse chronological order, with the premise that the more current the defence policy, the more relevant it remains today. In some cases, where themes are explored, defence policies will be introduced out of sequence, grouped in themes in order to support the findings of this paper.

The Policy Introductions

Introductions found at the beginning of each policy instrument, tend to emphasize key messages. Most interesting however is that major announcements are never found in the introduction, rather, Prime Ministers, Defence Ministers or sometimes both, use it as an opportunity to set the tone of the defence policy. The tone has often reflected major shifts in the defence and security environment. 1964, 1971, and 1988-89 were still very much influenced by the Cold War while 1992 and 1994 reflected the post-Cold War new world order. The 2005 and 2008 policies were both heavily influenced by the post-September 11th terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the author (the Minister or Prime Minister) of the introduction emphasizes what they see as the purpose of the policy instrument.

In setting the tone of the defence policy, Governments have sought to do this by informing and by establishing the context in which the policy was released. The purpose outlined in 1964's intro was to "keep the public informed of the nature of and the reason for the new policy."[4] In 1971, the purpose was expressed as an effort to establish "appropriate size and structure of the Canadian Armed Forces," thus seeking to inform the leadership of the CAF.[5] Following these two policies, beginning with 1988-89, the introductions become more pronounced and even assertive, irrespective of the Government of the day. The 1988-89 message emphasized international stability and alignment with statements such as "Canada is not a neutral nation" and "rejects as naïve or self-serving the arguments of those who promote neutrality or unilateral disarmament."[6] These statements were both comments on the global context as well as the vocal domestic context (namely the peace activism) in which the policy was being released. In 1992 the new world order is the message while in 1994 the new world order and current fiscal situation was at the heart of the message: "responding to a fundamental reordering of international affairs, and the need to confront important economic realities at home…"[7] These were both efforts to set the tone by establishing the context in which the policies were being released.

The last two defence policies return to an informing role. In 2005, the message was restricted to the fact that the defence policy was to guide the Canadian Forces (CF): "…in their operations, and assist the Department of National Defence in the development of a sustainable long-term program" and to provide an "intellectual framework required to guide and shape the

[4] Department of National Defence, *1964 White Paper on Defence*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964), 5.
[5] Department of National Defence, *Defence in the 70s*, (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971).
[6] Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment, A Defence Policy for Canada*,(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1988). 2-3.
[7] Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper on Defence*, (Ottawa: Assistant Deputy Minister Policy, 1994).

Canadian Forces to face the defence and security challenges of the 21st Century."[8] 2008 also stated the message that the defence policy was about a "comprehensive, long term plan that will provide the Canadian Forces with the people, equipment and support they need to carry out their core missions in Canada, North America, and Abroad," and thus was enabling the CAF while at the same time providing guidance.[9]

If the collective introductions for the seven policies were stated in simplistic terms, it serves to provide the "why" of the policy, the Government's justification or motivation for issuing a defence policy while at the same time setting the tone for the remainder of the document.

The Strategic Environment

Following the Minister of National Defence's forward to a defence policy, it has become convention to frame the current strategic environment in which the defence policy will be executed. The framing of the strategic environment serves the purpose of demonstrating to Canadians, the threats and issues that the government sees the CAF being structured and in some cases being deployed in order to address. Since 1964, defence policies' strategic environment outlooks have been divided by the end of the Cold War with those prior to 1992 being focused on the foreign threat represented by the Soviet Union. 1992 summarized the changing strategic environment well by stating that "events, trends and forces currently reshaping the world will present new challenges and generate new risks for Canadian society."[10] There is a significance to being able to accurately observe and state the requirements for emerging security trends. In many respects, the strategic environment

[8] Department of National Defence, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence 2005*, (Ottawa: DND, 2005).
[9]Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, (Ottawa: DND, 2008). 1-2.
[10] Department of National Defence, *Canadian Defence Policy*, (Ottawa: DND, 1992). 4.

will inform other decisions in the defence policy. The boldest example of a defence shift due to the changing strategic situation was the plan in 1988-89 to acquire 10 to 12 nuclear powered submarines.[11] Several pages of the defence policy were dedicated to justifying the strategic requirement for the acquisition of the vessels, as well as assurance that the submarines would not be armed with nuclear weapons.[12] By 1992, the Cold War had ended and the strategic situation had changed. 1994's defence policy dedicated four pages to "the new world order". Proliferation and failed states characterized the Liberal Government's analysis of threats. Tied into this assessment was a strategic justification for the reduction in the defence budget. 1994 stated that "many Western economies are still characterized by relatively high unemployment, volatile currencies and large accumulated national debts."[13] The defence policy's conclusion was thus "under these conditions, the most appropriate response is a flexible, realistic and affordable defence policy…"[14] This use of the strategic environment to justify cuts to the defence budget is the only example in all seven of the defence policy instruments and has not appeared to set a precedence. None the less, there will always be an opportunity for governments to link the adjusting of budget levels to the strategic environment.

The "reshaping" of the World as outlined in 1992's policy, did in fact lead to future declarations of new threats to Canada. 2005 and 2008's policies shifted focus to anti-proliferation efforts and the risk that failing states pose to Canada. Both 2005 and 2008 reflect the same threats to Canada but the strategic environment is addressed differently. Whereas 2008 outlines the threat, 2005 comes closer to committing to a strategy to be engaged in the World, namely to "…concentrate our efforts in areas where Canada can make a difference, the Government has decided to focus on failed

[11] Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment, A Defence Policy for Canada*, (Canada, DND, *1988-89).* 10.
[12] Ibid., 54.
[13] *1994 White Paper on Defence*, Chapter 2.
[14] *Ibid.*

and failing states."[15] Defence policy instruments will continue to frame the strategic environment in which the CAF is expected to operate or to engage in. This practice has not been altered in the past seven policy statements. Where governments can distinguish themselves and make their policies more successful in implementation is through the tying of the strategic environment to probable tasks for the CAF, as well as tying the procurement of equipment to the missions and operations that the CAF could expect to be ordered to carry out.

Bland reminds us that in writing a defence policy, governments must consider both the present force and the force of the future.[16] Governments risk policy failure if they only consider their current strategic environment at the expense of the anticipated future environment, or *vice versa*.

Role of the CAF

Each defence policy establishes the roles of the CAF. As a component of each of the seven policies, articulating the role of the CAF has been the primary focus. Outlining the role of the CAF in a defence policy achieves two distinct objectives. Firstly, the Government of the day has historically used the "Roles" paragraphs to establish its expectations for the CAF, while at the same time deliberately establishing parameters for the CAF in which they are expected to operate. Secondly, the Government is not actually committing its forces to a mission. Instead the document provides a policy that establishes the Force necessary for it to act if it desires or is required to employ the Forces in the future.

When a Canadian Government has outlined its defence policy regarding the roles of the CAF, the roles have always fell into one of five categories. So similar are defined roles of the CAF throughout all seven defence policy instruments that Canadian defence policy has displayed

[15] *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence 2005*. 5.
[16] Bland, Douglas L. "Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom." *Policy Matters* 3, no 3 (February 2002): 32.

remarkable continuity. Future authors of defence policies must pay close consideration to this for two reasons. Firstly, a marked departure from the traditional roles of the CAF would indicate a revolutionary shift away from convention, and would receive significant attention and scrutiny. Secondly, the noted trend is that successive Governments have maintained this continuity while still being able to tailor their policies as they see fit. This has been achieved by placing more emphasis on one, or two of the roles over the others. However, never have any of the roles been completely omitted or abandoned from defence policies. Of the four reoccurring roles outlined below, the first three are more recognizable, while the fourth role captures well an oft utilized description of the role governments describe. The four roles are:

1. The Defence of Canada;
2. Continental Defence;
3. Internationalism (NATO, UN, etc); and
4. Operating along the Spectrum of Operations with a mission of capability centric emphasis.

While the first three are self-explanatory, the fourth requires further explanation. Often Governments have made statements within their defence policies about the role they expect the CAF to carry out. More often than not, it is not simply an explicit statement of *capacity* (which will be addressed later on in this chapter). When a government makes a statement about the CAF operating along the spectrum of operations, it does so either by expressing it in terms of mission centric (the missions that it would expect its forces to conduct) or of ability or of capability centric (the capabilities that it wishes it's forces to have). In the following pages, the role of the CAF in each of the seven defence policies will be summarized utilizing each of the four recurring roles.

The Defence of Canada

Defending Canada has always been the most frequently mentioned role but certainly not the most prominent outlined in a defence strategy. The two exceptions were in 2008 when this role was the title of the defence statement itself (*Canada First Defence Strategy*), and in 1971 when the Government went as far as to state in the opening paragraphs: "Canada will continue to secure as an independent political entity…"[17] One should also not overlook the centrality of the defence of Canada in 1971's policy being heavily influenced by the October Crisis.[18] The trend even with 2008 has been to briefly mention the preservation of sovereignty as a goal to be achieved. Very little effort has been made historically to try and add any qualitative or quantitative measure to the objective of this role with the exception of 1994. 2008's defence policy outlined six "core missions" of the CAF, of which the first four were exclusive to Canada's domestic security including: "conduct of daily domestic (and continental) operations"; "supporting a major international event in Canada (Vancouver Olympics and G8 meetings)"; "respond to a major terrorist attack"; and "support to civilian authorities…"[19] 2008 offered broad, if not vague direction regarding sovereignty with the Minister's declaration that: "…defence of Canada is our first priority. The CF will be reorganized and retooled to tighten their focus on the primary mandate."[20] Further, the following statement regarding the Navy's and Air Force's role were to: "place much greater emphasis on protecting Canada"[21] While the statement lacked depth and definition, the intent of the Government was clear enough.

[17] *Defence in the 70s.* 3.
[18] Bland, Douglas L. *Canada's National Defence Vol 1*. (Kingston, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, 1997), 284.
[19] *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 10.
[20] *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence 2005*
[21] *Ibid*., 19-20.

1994 perhaps provides the best definition for the defence of Canada's sovereignty in the six paragraphs that it dedicates to "Protecting Canadians". The policy statement outlines six standing domestic roles for the CAF and uses quantitative and qualitative measurements such as "regular basis", "control activity within", "routine basis", "within 24 hours", and "sustain… as long as necessary."[22] With the exception of the unique requirements of the Cold War where comments on "strategic deterrence and conventional defence…" (1988-89) were more common[23], sovereignty is not dealt with in great detail despite being a common theme.

Continental Defence

If a Canadian Federal Government were to consult with its key ally, the United States, regarding Canada's defence policy statement, most prominent amongst the concerns would be Canada's commitment to collective continental security in partnership with the United States. Each defence policy has stated that the defence of North America, collective defence, and continental defence, are not only second-only to Canada's sovereignty but key to ensuring Canada's sovereignty. The North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) is frequently mentioned in order to establish Canada's commitment to the partnership. Only two policy statements stand out with respect to content regarding continental defence, 1971 and 1994. 1971 makes the bold statement (perhaps only by today's standards, well removed from the realities of the Cold War) that "Canada's objective is to make… an effective contribution to continued stability by assisting in the surveillance and warning systems, and in the protection of the US' retaliatory capability as necessary."[24]

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[22] *1994 White Paper on Defence*, Chapter 5.
[23] *Challenge and Commitment, A Defence Policy for Canada, 1988-89*, 7.
[24] *Defence in the 70s*. 25.

1994 reaffirms Canada's commitment to working within the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and Canada's commitment of forces to collective security.[25] Both of these statements served the same purpose: they sought to reassure the US that Canada was committed to collective-continental security. This is an example of how a Government can take a routine, but essential aspect of defence policy as continental defence, and emphasize its commitment in order to strategically communicate with, and reassure an ally.

Internationalism

Defence policies always include statements outlining the intentions of the government regarding the employment of the CAF internationally. Along with domestic security and continental defence, some form of internationalism rounds out the list of Canadian defence policies' predictable roles. Absence of a strong acknowledgement that Canada has *some* role in the World would be a very significant policy shift. The important distinction for each policy are the general statements governments have made about what that international role looks like. In the broadest terms, Canadian defence policies' brands of internationalism fall into two prevailing roles: niche participation or facilitator. The first is exemplified by governments seeking a leadership role for Canada in the world while at the same time subtly acknowledging that Canada is not a world leader. Niche participation has been characterized in defence policies by leadership in specific areas. 2008 stated that "international leadership is vital if Canada is to continue to be a credible player on the World stage" but did not state leadership in what areas.[26] 1992 listed a number of areas where Canada could participate globally: "continue to be involved in multilateral peacekeeping operations, regional instability, disaster relief, postwar reconstruction, protection of refugees, supervised fair elections, assisted nations to manage

[25] *1994 White Paper on Defence*, Chapter 5.
[26] *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 9.

transition to independence, and even protect ethnic minorities."[27] 1994 emphasized that the CAF retained an important role in facilitating armed international intervention: "for us now to leave combat roles to others would mean abandoning this commitment to help defend commonly accepted principles of state behaviour."[28]

More frequently however, Canadian defence policy signals an intent to be a facilitator internationally. Even in the context of the Cold War where Canada was absolutely aligned, multiple governments sought to identify the CAF as a means to fulfill the role of facilitator. 1964 sought to maintain "collective measures for maintenance of peace and security as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, including the search for balanced and controlled disarmament."[29] This was to be achieved by support to "Canadian foreign policy including that arising out of our participation in international organizations."[30] 1971 again sought to facilitate disarmament while at the same time promoting the value of deterrence. The Government and the CAF would be partners in "working for arms control and disarmament agreements, and by contributing to the system of stable mutual deterrence."[31] In 1988-89, the government, most likely responding to the changing political situation in the Soviet Union, was even bolder in its role as facilitator by writing that "Canada will continue to work to reduce tensions and to improve East-West relations."[32] Facilitation is a role that fits well with the ideas that most Canadians have of Canada's place in the World. Worth further study would be whether multiple Canadian Defence Polices have influenced this or whether the political leaders have been influenced by a deeply imbedded belief in society that this its inherently Canada's role.

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[27] *Canadian Defence Policy*, 11.
[28] *1994 White Paper on Defence*, Chapter 2.
[29] *1964 White Paper on Defence*, 6.
[30] *Ibid*., 5.
[31] *Defence in the 70s.* 5.
[32] *Challenge and Commitment, A Defence Policy for Canada, 1988-89*, 5.

Role, Spectrum of Operations- Mission vs Capability Centric

While Canadian sovereignty, continental defence, and internationalism are recognized constants in Canadian defence policy, they are not the exclusive subjects utilized by governments for stating the role that they assign to the CAF. Most instruments of defence policy since 1971 have articulated the role of the CAF in terms of operating on a spectrum of operations. This practice can further be broken down in either mission or capability terms. These statements are always found amongst the paragraphs, sections, or chapters of defence policies and statements which describe the role of the CAF. It may be that the more general terms utilized when describing a spectrum of operations offers governments some strategic political space to manoeuvre versus the more definitive role which is usually expressed in the first three commonly stated roles of the CAF. 1971 is an example of the vagueness offered by describing the CAF's role in terms of a spectrum. The 1971 statement on maritime forces manages to mention both mission and capability without committing the CAF to a specific, perhaps accountable role: "Versatility is required because it is not possible to be certain precisely which maritime activities will be required and which will not in the years ahead. It is therefore sensible to design a general purpose capability for Canada's maritime force."[33] 1992 stated that the land forces were to "maintain a general purpose combat capability," without defining exactly what that meant.[34]

1994 utilized both the capability and mission spectrum to describe the role of the CAF. Again, the government did not devote time on specifics but it does illustrate the use of the spectrum theme: "by opting for a constabulary force- that is, one not designed to make a genuine contribution in combat- we would be sending a very clear message about the depth of our

[33] *Defence in the 70s*. 28.
[34] *Canadian Defence Policy*, 1992, 24.

commitment to our allies and our values…"[35] The following caveat was also added in 1994: "A country of Canada's size and means cannot, and should not, attempt to cover the entire military spectrum…" this would manage expectations and would seem to place limits on the previously quoted statement.[36] 1994 also indicated mission centric spectrum of operation roles. A significant and realistic view was taken on Canada's mission capability, with an emphasis on peacekeeping operations that:

> Have evolved from mainly inter-positional and monitoring operations to undertakings that are far more ambitious-and pose far more challenges and risks to our personnel… if the Canadian Forces are to play a role in collective security, they must remain a capable fighting force."[37]

The most interesting use of the mission capability is the government's mention of retaining a mission capability for domestic operations, having been heavily influenced by the then recent events of the Oka Crisis: "…the use of the CF in this role (aide to civil power) has been comparatively infrequent. Nevertheless, the crisis at Oka in 1990 served to remind us that such situations can arise."[38] 2005 continued this trend by focusing on the CAF's role in terms of missions it was expected to carry out, such as military training to foreign forces.[39] Further, the government outlined six specific operations ranging across the spectrum of operations that the CAF had to remain prepared to carry out.[40] In 2008's "six core missions" assigned to the CAF, generalized capability statements were made with an absence of criteria and detail such as "lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period" and "deploy forces in

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[35] *1994 White Paper on Defence*, Chapter 2.
[36] *Ibid*., Chapter 2.
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] *Ibid*., Chapter 4.
[39] *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence 2005*. 27.
[40] *Ibid*., 28.

response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods."[41] These mission and capability centric approaches defining the CAF's roles, must be applied carefully. A defence policy should "clearly articulate the Government's defence policy objectives and the resources allocated to achieve them,"[42] if it intends to effectively administer that defence policy going forward.

The CAF's three common roles are unlikely to be changed by any governments in future defence policies unless they were prepared to explain why such a historical shift has occurred. More than likely, governments will continue to leave their mark on the Canadian defence policy by continuing to use a mission, capability, or combination of the two along the spectrum of operations in order to express their intent for the role of the CAF. How precisely and detailed the policy is will reflect how committed the Government is to having it properly resourced and executed.

Funding

The question of how funding is reflected in defence policy instruments over the past sixty years is characterized by three notable trends, and perhaps a more notable absence. Governments have to varying degrees, attempted to adhere to the three following items: first, governments have sought to publish projected and predictable funding for the CAF based on service priorities; second, policies have outlined governments' priorities and funding over a stated realistic term of outlook; third, funding for defence and changes to that funding, have been expressed in terms of budget share. Absent from all but 2008 (where it is mentioned only in a token manner) is any outlined strategy for military procurement. 2008 states that the government will "continue to improve the way it procures new equipment, fostering greater transparency and engaging

[41] *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 10.
[42] Hartfiel, Robert Michael. "Planning Without Guidance: Canadian Defence Policy and Planning, 1993-2004". *Canadian Public Administration* 53, no. 3 (Sept 2010): 325.

industry earlier in the process."[43] The lack of more detail on the procurement process can either be indicative or symptomatic of the challenges that Canada has had with military procurement.

Projected and Predictable Funding

To varying degrees of success, past defence policies have attempted to outline their projected funding for defence policy in order to make funding predictable which, in turn, allows the services to act on their priorities. 2008 stands out as the policy with the longest projections, 20 years. A bold length of time with the stated aim of making defence funding predictable for the services. "With this funding framework, National Defence will be able for the first time to plan for the future on the basis of stable and predictable funding, which will allow it to strategically allocate resources and build the capabilities…"[44] This approach differs from 2005 which sought to highlight a previous commitment ($13 Billion) to the defence budget which was outlined in the Federal Budget, but not in detail in the defence policy.[45] 1994 provided a different type of budgetary notice: the government's intention to decrease defence spending. 1994 provided defence planners and the CAF a very honest expectation of forthcoming cuts. 1994 was forthright in its decision to cut defence spending:

> The Committee's recommendation concerning the size of the Regular Forces was judged to be inconsistent with the financial parameters within which the Department of National Defence must operate. Cuts to the defence budget deeper than those envisioned by the Committee will be required to meet the Government's deficit reduction targets.[46]

The 1994 policy went further, outlining in detail where cuts were to be expected in the coming years: "…acquisitions will be cut by at least 15 billion dollars over the next 15 years. As a

[43] *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 20.
[44] *Ibid*., 13.
[45] *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence 2005*. 1.
[46] *1994 White Paper on Defence,* Intro.

result, a large number of projects currently in plans will be eliminated, reduced or delayed."[47] 1994 is alone amongst the other defence policies in that it commits to justifying its cuts to the defence policy. The policy stated that "Our prosperity and with it our quality of life is threatened by the steady growth of public sector debt," the Government believed that "the Canadian Forces have already made a large contribution to the national effort to reduce the deficit, the Government believes that additional cuts are both necessary and possible."[48] 1994 also was the first defence policy not to include a statement of priorities or objectives for the CAF.[49] The absence of priorities certainly reinforced the intent of the policy: to find additional fiscal savings.

1992's defence policy was used to signal the first of the post-Cold War budget cuts, announcing a drawdown in the number of Regular Force personnel.[50] Important to the policy process, 1992 also established a list of capital priorities for the expenditure of defence funds. [51] 1971 announced personnel reductions but omitted actual details in the figures. 1971 however, did state that defence funding would follow the model used by other departments, again omitting specific details.[52] 1964 outlined each service's capital investment priorities without disclosing the associated figures. [53]

Realistic Outlook Term

If defence policy is to guide defence planners, it is best done by identifying the period of time for which planners should consider. In order to do this, defence policies should identify the period of time for which the funding guidance will remain valid. This has not been common practice in Canadian defence policies. 2008 identified a short lived twenty year plan which was very ambitious.

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[47] *Ibid*., Chapter 6.
[48] *Ibid.*, Chapter 2.
[49] Bland, *Canada's National Defence Vol 1*. 284.
[50] *Canadian Defence Policy*, 1992, 12.
[51] *Ibid.*, 28.
[52] *Defence in the 70s.* 41-42.
[53] *1964 White Paper on Defence*, 24.

The intent was to forecast major capital acquisitions with a view that past policies were "not predictable and did not sufficiently address the rust-out of key equipment platforms, strain on personnel and other challenges arising from a high operational tempo."[54] This contrasts from the only other effort to define a valid funding period, which in 1988-89 it was declared that a "rolling five-year funding plan will be introduced within a fifteen-year planning framework."[55] Such a model would seem to achieve both the longer-term outlook that provides predictable funding, while the shorter "rolling" term seems to provide for adjustments. The longer planning term would still, in theory, provide longer term planning guidance for the CAF.

Identifying the life term of a defence policy is obvious in its usefulness to defence planners. Political reality often works against this practice, making long term commitments difficult for an elected government. Further, even if a government has the intention of committing itself to a realistic and predictable funding period, the electorate may not be as committed to that government's next term of office.

Budget Share

A practice prior to the landmark de-funding announcements of 1994 had been to adjust defence spending through the expression of funding through percent of budget share. This method of expressing funding emphasis can be used to impact expenditures without overtly providing figures. The impact of this practice can be very significant. In 1992, the funding of capital was increased at the expense of the share going to personnel through an announcement of percentages to be spent on each section of the capital budget[56] There is some degree of political safety in expressing percentages in lieu of figures, but the practice is not only one of political trickery. If the use of budget share is

[54] *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 11.
[55] *Challenge and Commitment, A Defence Policy for Canada, 1988-89*, 62.
[56] *Canadian Defence Policy*, 1992, 14.

connected to an actual policy goal, it can serve as an effective measure of the CAF's or DND's performance in achieving a stated policy. One additional budgetary item has only appeared in 2008's policy but can very much improve the CAFs and DND's ability to plan for the future. In 2008 there is a written commitment by the Government to separately fund the incremental costs of major operations.[57] While this funding has been conducted in the past, committing to do so relieves the pressure on DND and the CAF to retain contingency funds, it offers flexibility in a world where often there is not.

Funding is amongst the major consideration of any defence policy. Without adequate funding, the policy instrument is hollow. Predictable funding based on a realistic term will enable effective and realistic defence planning. Achieving proper budget share while mitigating the financial cost of being prepared to operate in an uncertain world will always serve to enable defence policy. Finally, a defence policy must be able to maintain support of Parliament. Parliament will always maintain a fundamental tool of Parliamentary oversight: the annual review of estimates. [58] Achieving parliamentary confidence through well-reasoned and justifiable funding, can prolong the life of a defence policy.

Multilateralism

Canadian defence policies have always commented on Canada's multilateral defence relationships. Over the past sixty years, emphasis has remained relatively unchanged when discussing cooperation with the United States, the United Nations, and NATO. It may be surprising that some governments which ended up de-emphasizing specific relationships in practice, did not express the intent to do so in their policies (the Harper Government re. the UN, and the Chretien Government re.

[57] *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 13.
[58] Bland. Douglas L. "A Vigilant Parliament: Building Competence for Effective Parliamentary Oversight of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces." *Policy Matters* 5, no. 1, (February 2004): 18.

the United States). Multilateralism as reflected in past defence policies has always been used to express four government intentions: declaration of support for either some, or all of the US, UN, and NATO, to highlight the benefit to Canada of these partnerships, to reflect leadership in a specific area, and to highlight policy shifts.

Declarations of Support

2008's defence statement evenly weighted its support for both the UN and NATO: "…operations will often be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Canada will continue to support and contribute to these key international bodies."[59] 2005 and 1994 both declared continuing support for the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in partnership with the US.[60] 1992 reaffirmed support for NATO, the first policy to be issued in the post-Cold War era.[61] Many of the statements of support are characterized by their brevity and seemingly routine inclusion. One has to look back to 1964 in order to reference a blunt statement of advantage in supporting multilateral partnership as understood by a government: "One cannot be a member of a military alliance and at the same time avoid some share of responsibility for its strategic policies."[62]

Historically, the trend has been for Canadian governments to not identify in their defence policies what implications partnerships might have other than on occasion listing the benefits. 1971 however, provides a critical look at what was perceived to be a failing United Nations and Canada's cautious approach to future UN missions: "…the prospects for effective international peacekeeping, which were viewed with some optimism in 1964, have not developed as had been hoped."[63] The 1971

[59] *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 9.
[60] *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence 2005*. 23. & *1994 White Paper on Defence*, Chapter 2.
[61] *Canadian Defence Policy*, 1992, 3.
[62] *1964 White Paper on Defence*, 13.
[63] *Defence in the 70s.* 1.

policy picked up that criticism later in the document when describing the failure of peacekeeping operations: "The experience has all too often been frustrating and disillusioning. Some operations have been severely hampered by inadequate terms of reference and by a lack of cooperation on the part of those involved."[64] While this critique was not a withdrawal of support for the UN, it does demonstrate the ability for a government to highlight potential reasons why Canada would continually evaluate multilateral cooperation on a case by case basis when not a matter of mutual defence.

Benefit of Multilateralism

That Canada almost always acts in a multilateral context is just accepted and assumed by Canadians. Only on occasion has a Canadian government made the effort to describe the benefits that arise from such partnerships. Collective defence is well understood, however some governments have sought to further explain the benefit of multilateralism in terms of how it promotes Canadian sovereignty and values. In the wake of the September 11th attacks, closer integration of security occurred with the United States. With this came the criticism and hesitation about how far this relationship should be taken. The government of the day responded in its 2005 defence policy with a clear statement about the benefit to Canada of ongoing cooperation: "Canada has benefited immensely from its defence partnership with the United States over the years. Our bilateral cooperation continues to provide us with a degree of security that we could never achieve on our own."[65] The government linked the current threat to Canadian sovereignty: "…most of the new

[64] *Ibid*. 39.
[65] *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence 2005*. 21.

dangers to the United States are no less risks to Canada." "It is clearly in our sovereign interest to continue doing our part in defending the continent with the United States."[66]

In 1988-89, the Government linked the promotion of Canadian values to participation in UN missions by stating that "The use of our armed forces for peacekeeping or truce supervision under United Nations or other international auspices serves our national interest as well as the broader community." Outlining the benefits of multilateral cooperation is a double edged sword for a government. On one hand, outlining the reasons why a government is committed to a particular relationship will justify why resources and personnel are in turn being committed, on the other hand, without properly defining what the government seeks from the relationship, could be seen as blanket support for every operation, program, and position taken by the multilateral partner(s). Further, there is a danger in overextending the CAF or overstating its capabilities: "Policies built on coalitions or that place the (CAF) and the degree to which committed forces will be operationally effective in the circumstances,"[67] could overcommit the CAF and risk embarrassing delays or failures in delivering forces to a coalition, alliance, or UN force. This makes readiness as Bland states: "fundamentally a political matter…"[68]

Tool of Leadership

When Canadian governments seek to highlight their support for multilateral partnerships, it is not only the recognition that Canada's military will usually not work alone, but it is often an opportunity for Canada to achieve at least some recognition of leadership. In 1964 the Government sought to promote the work that the military had done in helping to develop the emerging militaries

[66] Ibid.
[67] Bland, "*Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom*." 31.
[68] *Ibid*.

of newly independent members of the Commonwealth, another multilateral forum in which Canada has sought to participate.[69]

In 1992 the Government highlighted the significant number of peacekeeping missions and a significant numbers of personnel that the CAF had deployed in support of these operations.[70] In 1994 the defence policy took something of a different tone by addressing recent UN failures and committing Canada to participating in UN reforms.[71] Finally, 2005's policy found the Government declaring that Canada would take a leading role in the moving forward of the "Responsibility to Protect" initiative, as well as taking a role in the Multinational High Readiness Brigade for UN operations.[72] The expression of the roles and tasks that the Government intends to highlight under Canadian multilateralism is an important function of the defence policy but it also serves to signal internationally to Canada's allies what Canada's defence intentions are.

Policy Shifts

When Canadian Governments are making significant shifts in their defence policies, they will almost certainly have an impact on their commitment to multilateral partnerships. Keeping in mind the role that defence policies play in informing allies and partners of the Canadian Government's intentions, governments will use defence policies in order to signal a change in course to both domestic and international audiences. In four of the seven past policy statement, Canadian governments have announced shifts in support of multilateral partnerships, and each time it has been about a change in contribution to the NATO force in Europe. The most notable of these was the announcement in 1992 that Canada would cease to maintain bases in Europe and the restructuring of

[69] *1964 White Paper on Defence*, 26.
[70] *Canadian Defence Policy*, 1992, 32.
[71] *1994 White Paper on Defence*, Chapter 6.
[72] *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence 2005*. 24-25.

Canada's military commitment to Europe.[73]

Multilateralism is going to continue to be an essential element of Canadian defence policy. As a component to future defence policies, multilateralism will continue to be a prominent way for the Government of the day to declare support for key alliances and partnerships and to outline for Canadians the benefits of these relationships. Further, using both a defence policy to signal aspiring leadership in a certain role amongst allies and partners, as well as intended policy shifts that effect Canada's role in multilateral operations underline a government's commitment to that position.

Criteria for Engagement

One principle of war is the requirement for military action to retain an element of flexibility. Political consideration will often seek this same principle in public policy, and defence policy should not be assumed to be immune from this reality. Four of the past seven defence policies have outlined what conditions and criteria must be met in order for the CAF to deploy in the conduct of an international operation. This is one of the most important elements to a defence policy as it has the effect of telling military planners, Canadians, and Canada's allies and partners what is important in order to achieve, from the Canadian Government's point of view, successful operational end-states.

Therein lies the political disadvantage. For a government to release a defence policy which clearly lists criteria that should or even must be achieved prior to the deployment of the CAF, leaves the Government of the day open to very close scrutiny by parliament, the press, academia, as well as the interested public. Governments can choose to omit engagement criteria from their policies or they can choose to be selective in how detailed their guidance is. What has been included in past statements provides a useful survey of criteria for future governments to consider.

[73] *Canadian Defence Policy*, 1992, 9.

Engagement Criteria, 1971

In 1971, the Government and the CAF were clearly frustrated by the lack of success in the conduct of UN Peacekeeping missions. In a view that highly differs from the popular view by Canadians that Canada and peacekeeping are intrinsically linked, the Government wrote that "the experience has all too often been frustrating and disillusioning. Some operations have been severely hampered by inadequate terms of reference and by a lack of cooperation on the part of those involved."[74] To that end, the Government added the following criteria for CAF's involvement in Peacekeeping operations to the defence statement:

> If asked to participate in such an operation, a major factor affecting the Government's decision would be the existence of realistic terms of reference. They would have to reflect a consensus by all parties on the purposes which the operation was intended to serve and the manner in which it was to discharge its responsibilities.[75]

While not overly demanding in the form of a criteria, this statement was seeking to ensure that a proper mandate and agreement was in place in order to have the cooperation of both parties to a supervised peace agreement. This criteria seems to be specific to only traditional peacekeeping operations and the supervision of negotiated truces. Since that time, peace support operations have only become more complex as have other international operations.

Engagement Criteria, 1988-89

Even prior to some of the most notable failures in peacekeeping/peace support operations in the early 1990s, the Government of the day had identified some key concerns with the deployment of the CAF in support of these operations. The 1988-89 defence policy stated that "each request for a

[74] *Defence in the 70s.* 39.
[75] *Ibid.,* 40.

Canadian contribution to peacekeeping has to be considered on its own merits."[76] The defence policy was seemingly bold in its demands for certain conditions, though it must be noted that this criteria was only linked to participation in peacekeeping operations. The criteria was as follows:

1. A clear and enforceable mandate;
2. The principal antagonists agree to a ceasefire and to Canada's participation in the operation;
3. It is likely to serve the cause of peace and lead to a political settlement in the long term;
4. Whether the size and international composition of the force are appropriate to the mandate and will not damage Canada's relations with other states;
5. Whether Canada's participation will jeopardize other commitments;
6. Whether there is a single identifiable authority competent to support the operation and influence the disputants;
7. The operation is equitably funded and logistically supported; and
8. The operation is routinely reviewed.

Many of these criterion would be identifiable to those in the profession of diplomacy and arms as previous points of failure in peacekeeping and peace support operations. While this criteria could be applied to all international operations, the concerns more or less seem to be treated as unique to the diversity of the UN.

Engagement Criteria, 1994

In 1994's policy, the Government stated another set of criteria not much different from 1988-89. The Government of the day went even further in stating that the criteria should be evaluated against proposed UN missions and that the criteria did not apply to NATO enforcement and defence operations.[77] The distinction is important. Canada would certainly be signalling a shift in commitment to NATO if the Canadian Government started to attach criteria to its participation in

[76] *Challenge and Commitment, A Defence Policy for Canada, 1988-89,* 24.
[77] *1994 White Paper on Defence,* Chapter 6.

Alliance operations. The 1994 policy stated that the "design of all missions should reflect certain key principles" the criteria for participation in UN operations was as follows[78]:

1. There be a clear and enforceable mandate;
2. There be an identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority;
3. The national composition of the force be appropriate to the mission;
4. There be an effective process of consultation among missions partners;
5. In missions that involve both military and civilian resources, there be a recognized focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibilities, and agreed operating procedures; and
6. Canada's participation be accepted by all parties to the conflict.

It is with the sixth criterion above that one could anticipate the potential problem in applying this criteria to any mission other than a classic peacekeeping mission supervising the truce between two state actors. At the time that the 1994 policy was being written, the World was changing and the nature of conflicts had shifted away from state on state violence. Peace support operations would become increasingly required, and thus the sixth criteria would, if adhered to, ensure that Canada could not be involved in another UN peace support mission which involved most parties other than state players. The sixth criteria represents the danger inherent in stating engagement criteria, in the language of 2005's policy: "The fluid nature of the international security environment makes it difficult to predict the precise threats that we might face even five years from now."[79]

Engagement Criteria, 2005

2005's defence policy statement went further than the previous three policies that have listed engagement criteria. In 2005, the Government went further to extend engagement criteria to all international missions. While there was not an added qualifier that the criteria did not apply to NATO operations in support of mutual defence, there was nothing to suggest that the Government of the day

[78] *Ibid*.
[79] *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence 2005*. 5.

was seeking to place caveats on its NATO membership. The Government stated that "while demand for our military to participate in international operations will undoubtedly remain high, the Government will be selective and strategic when considering such deployments."[80] The criteria was as follows:

1. The mission supports Canada's foreign policy objectives;
2. The mandate is realistic, clear, and enforceable;
3. International political and financial support as well as other resources are sufficient to achieve the desired end;
4. The proposed forces are adequate and appropriate for the mandate;
5. An effective process of consultation between mission partners is in place; there is a clear exit strategy or desired end-state;
6. There is a defined concept of operations, an effective command and control structure and clear rules of engagement; and
7. The mission does not jeopardize other Canadian Forces commitments.

The criteria does not differ in a significant way from the previously listed criteria with the exception of the inclusion of a "defined concept of operations" and "clear rules of engagement", most certainly influenced by the fallout from Canada's mission in Somalia and the resulting public inquiry. In many respects, this criteria represents hard lessons learned for Canada's military as well as Canada's government. The importance of criteria is supported by their origin, taken from a long list of failed missions inspired by well-intentioned foreign policy. The inclusion of deployment criteria may be politically problematic, but in the long run would most certainly avert military, and thus political failure.

Operational Capacity

Prior to the end of the Cold War, Canada maintained high readiness forces in Europe and additional high readiness re-enforcements in Canada, ready to surge into Europe if hostilities were to breakout. With the end of the Cold War and the announcement in 1992 that the CAF was no longer

[80] *Ibid*., 27.

going to maintain forces in Europe, Canadian Governments sought to continue to reassure allies that Canada was going to maintain an expeditionary capable force. By outlining in the defence policy the capacity of the CAF to deploy forces internationally, the Canadian Government informs allies as well confirms for the CAF the expectation placed on them by the Government for the size, type, and sustainability of forces. While a maximum deployed number of 10 000 joint forces was seen as possible *in extremis* in 1994, the constant since 1992, has been a sustained force of between 4000 and 5000 personnel. [81]

2008's policy marked a departure from firm numbers. The policy outlined the type of operations that the CAF was expected to respond to without commenting on the structure or size of force that would be expected to deploy.[82] 2005's policy outlined, by service, the expected force that would be generated and sustained in support of an international mission.[83] Stated deployable force strength in a defence policy can have the perhaps un-intentioned effect of demonstrating the means for the Government to deploy the CAF while not actually wanting to do so. A stated deployable capacity can remove flexibility from the Government and present the Government with additional personnel and equipment issues that it may prefer not to address. Conversely, politically, committing or appearing to commit forces without the capacity to support the commitment, can leave a government vulnerable. Bland points to the 1980s as an era when the Government was vulnerable to political attack because of the "commitment-capability" gap.[84]

Stated capacity has to be realistic in order to ensure political awareness of defence requirements. Bland states that: "Too often military capabilities are described and seen simply as pieces of equipment, platforms used to deliver weapons to targets." "Rather, a capability must be

[81] *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence 2005*. 29.
[82] *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 3.
[83] *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence 2005*. 12-19.
[84] Bland, "*Canada's National Defence Vol 1*" 183.

measured as an inseparable combination of weapons and equipment; trained personnel; adequate supporting equipment and logistics…"[85] This accurate estimate of requirements in order to deploy a capability, avoids surprises for governments and accusation of military "mission creep." Ultimately, outlining Canada's capacity to deploy an expeditionary capability is what can give a defence policy international credibility.

Public Opinion

Inserting into policy what is conceived to be popular public opinion at the time a defence policy is published happens more often than not in Canadian defence policy. This practice is always done in order to justify a policy or policy theme being pursued by a government. In 1971, the Government cautiously reaffirmed its support for US ballistic missile defence and sought to downplay public concern for the threat from US interception of Soviet missiles over Canadian territory.[86] In the preamble of the 1971 policy by the Minister of National Defence, Donald Macdonald, public opinion was sighted by the Minister just prior to announcing that defence expenditures would be cut: "There has been increased skepticism about the traditional roles of the Armed Forces as we move further and further from the last time the Forces were engaged in combat operations." [87]

According to Bland, there is always a question of the defence policy reflecting "how policy can be sold to Canadians."[88] The Government acknowledged the role that public opinion played in ensuring that the forces "enjoy the support that they require."[89] In stating this, the Government boldly outlined in 1988-89 an important consideration for all future governments about the public's opinion

[85] Bland, "*Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom*." 30.
[86] *Defence in the 70s.* 26.
[87] *Ibid.*, Introduction.
[88] Bland, *Canada's National Defence Vol 1*. xiv.
[89] *Challenge and Commitment, A Defence Policy for Canada, 1988-89,* 81.

in regards to the CAF, that "… attitudes of the public toward defence have doubtlessly been affected by concern about, or even distaste for, some of the unpleasant realities of international security."[90] At the same time, this statement sought to inject some *realpolitik* into its own policy by acknowledging that the World does not always reflect the idealistic vision that Canadians may have for it.

1992's policy stated that "Canadians are justifiably proud of the contributions the Canadian Forces have made to international peacekeeping."[91] This coincided with a period of increased commitments to UN operations globally. In 1992, the Government included a section on Official Languages in the defence policy. As it announced its commitment to increase the number of bilingual positions throughout the CAF and civil service, the policy was being justified by stating that the CAF was "…making a major contribution to the unity of the country."[92] While it is unclear whether Canadians in 1992 saw the CAF as an instrument of Canadian unity, the Government certainly saw an opportunity to justify one of its policies through such a broad, inclusive declaration.

1994's policy statement uses multiple instances of language which suggested that public opinion was heavily influencing policies even if in reality the Government was using the notion of public opinion in order to promote support for its defence and foreign policies. 1994's policy stated that "Canadians believe that the rule of law must govern relations between states" and that "Canadians have deemed their own security indivisible from that of their allies." In recognition of the type of UN missions that Canada was currently engaged in at that time, the policy stated that "Canadians have a strong sense of responsibility to alleviate suffering and respond, where their efforts can make a difference."[93] In introducing the Government's international security policy in

[90] *Ibid.*
[91] *Canadian Defence Policy*, 1992, 32.
[92] *Ibid.*, 16.
[93] *1994 White Paper on Defence*, Chapter 2.

1994, the Government begins the chapter by stating that "Canadians are internationalists and not isolationist by nature."[94]

In 2005's defence policy, significant value was seemingly put on the opinion of Canadians towards the type of missions that the Government was already engaged in, namely Afghanistan. The policy stated that "Canadians are proud of the role their military has played in protecting people who cannot protect themselves, in delivering humanitarian assistance to those in desperate need, and in rebuilding shattered communities and societies."[95] The Government declared that the "the suffering that these situations (failed and failing states) create is an affront to Canadian values..."[96]

It is common practice for Governments to cite public opinion in the promotion or defence of their policies. This tactic has been used more often than not in the past seven Canadian defence policy instruments. It is a tactic that can legitimize policy and give it the appearance of being both consultative and popular.

Partisanship

If a national defence policy is going to be a lasting document, enduring in order to be effective, it must be politically palatable for future governments. A full defence review is a lengthy process consuming time and resources that cannot be repeated every time a new government comes to power without placing a significant administrative burden upon DND and the CAF. Only twice in 60 years has overt partisan commentary been added to the body of an instrument of defence policy. The two instances, in 1988-89 and 2008, were remarkably similar. In 1988-89, the Government proclaimed in the defence policy that "after decades of neglect, there is indeed a significant

[94] *Ibid.*, Chapter 6.
[95] *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence 2005.* 2.
[96] *Ibid.*, 5.

commitment-capability gap,"[97] and that "…the Canadian Forces have been sadly neglected" and that "Decades of neglect must be overcome."[98]

2008's policy stated that past governments had "dramatically under-invested in the Canadian Forces, leaving them seriously unprepared to deal effectively with this increasingly complex global environment."[99] The policy stated that the Government's planned investments would "…reverse the damage done by major cuts to the defence budget in the 1990s."[100]

A government's decision to make a defence policy overtly partisan will have to balance its desire to comment on perceived weaknesses of the policies of previous governments with its desire to see its policy survive to provide long term direction to the CAF. An overtly partisan defence policy is all but guaranteed to be rejected by the next government. Bland provides a differing view that "although the context changes and political rhetoric varies, the actual policy that has directed Canadian defence policy is nearly always the same."[101] This survey of the past seven defence policies would support Bland's analysis. It should be added however, that the fact that a new Government might launch a new defence policy and inevitably come to the same policy conclusions as a previous, partisan policy, it will still engage in a resource intensive policy process to remove the messaging of the last government. There is potential that a cycle of partisanship motivated policy duels could leave DND and the CAF without a dependable long term policy strategy.

Global Regional Interest

The trend of Canadian defence policies since the end of the Cold War has been to outline the global regional interests that Canadian defence policy would be applied to. 2008 remains the

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[97] *Challenge and Commitment, A Defence Policy for Canada, 1988-89,* 43.
[98] *Ibid.,* 89.
[99] *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 6.
[100] *Ibid.,* 11.
[101] Bland, *Canada's National Defence Vol 1*. xiv.

exception to this trend, having not defined the Government's areas of regional interest as it pertains to defence policy. Much like other topics in defence policies, stated regional interests offer both advantages and disadvantages to the Government.

Outlining in a defence policy areas where the CAF would be likely to operate can signal to one's defence partners and allies a willingness to participate internationally. 1971's policy offers an intriguing example of this whereby the Trudeau Government attempted shift away from Europe, characterized best by Bland as an "attempt to take defence policy…away from the Cold War, NATO orientation and into a type of Canadian neo-isolationism paradigm."[102]

Stated regions of interest can further offer Canada's foreign policy a substantial tool in achieving and promoting Canada's stated foreign policy goals. Conversely, stating regional interests commits, to an extent, a government to a specific area and will have to follow up with some commitment of resources in order to maintain credibility. Bland points to 1971's policy whereby "increased defence commitments without understanding the implications for doing so," saw CAF numbers reduced in Europe but also geographically distributed while not accounting for the loss of efficiencies.[103]

Stating regional interests will have the effect of orienting the CAF and thus its resources on a specific region. Table 1.2 represents the areas identified as regional interests by successive governments from 1992 to 2005:

[102] Bland, *Canada's National Defence* Vol 1. xii.
[103] Bland. "*Canada's National Defence, Vol I*" 116.

Table 1.2: Stated Global Regional Interests, Canadian Defence Policies

Canadian Defence Policy, 1992	1994 White Paper on Defence	A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence 2005
Asia Pacific Region	Latin America; Middle East; Africa; Central and Eastern Europe; and Asia-Pacific Region.	Africa; Latin America; The Caribbean; and Asia Pacific Region.

Identifying areas of regional interests enables military planners and develops closer relationships with Global Affairs Canada (GAC) in order to achieve the government's intent in identified regions. It remains for a government to not only decide if it wants to identify regions of interest but also to decide what their identification means for the execution of defence policy. Simply having broad statements of multiple regions does not provide the type of direction to the CAF that it would be able to action. What has been missing from each of the above listed defence policies is a statement of goals or objectives the Government wants the CAF to achieve in those regions.

Readiness

During the Cold War, Canada's high readiness forces were based in Continental Europe. Other forces, in Canada, were kept at lower readiness states, awaiting a request for reinforcement of Canada's Europe based forces. Following the end of the Cold War and Canada's decision to close down its European bases, Canada sought to show (NATO in particular), that it was a dependable ally and could deploy forces rapidly if required. The majority of defence policies state to a varying level of detail, what state of readiness the Government expects its forces to remain. Readiness figures provided in the policy statements are never complete for all services. Defence policy statements should reflect the reality that the "timeliness and the readiness of forces are critical factors that rest at

the boundary of soft and hard assets."[104] Readiness will significantly impact the effectiveness of an active defence policy.

In 1992, the defence policy outlined response times for search and rescue as well as Initial Response Units across the country.[105] Domestically, the Government was comfortable assigning expectations for responsiveness, but it was not until 1994 that the Government began to include readiness states for all deployable forces. 1994 details the various components of the services and at what readiness level they were to be held.[106] Readiness preparation and maintenance is a costly undertaking. In practice, readiness states as outlined in a defence policy should reflect what the CAF estimates is possible and what the Government, through DND, agree to fund. 2005's policy statement was detailed in respect to force composition and availability as well as the length of time the force would have to be sustained for, but left out (other than recommitting to NORAD standards) any figure that would indicate a level of general readiness expected.[107]

2008's defence policy statement effectively illustrates the trade-off that must be made between readiness and funding. High Readiness forces represent a government's ability to quickly project influence in the World across the military spectrum of operations. In 2008's defence policy the Government declared (with likely partisan motivation) that "Since the early 1990's, readiness resources have been cut" and that it would "…reverse this trend by allocating enough resources to ensure that CF personnel and their equipment are ready to deploy when and where they are needed".[108] The policy statement did declare that the CAF would "maintain combat-capable units at the right level of readiness", but never did declare what the levels of readiness would be nor what the

[104] Bland, *Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom*. 31.
[105] *Canadian Defence Policy*, 1992, 30.
[106] *1994 White Paper on Defence*, Chapter 6.
[107] *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence 2005*. 30.
[108] *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 18.

allocated readiness funds were.[109] This example best illustrates the balance that future governments will have to struggle with: defining and thus funding stated readiness levels versus accepting forces kept at a lower state of readiness and potentially un-able to respond with the strength and speed to global events as desired by the government.

Industry

The years leading up to 2020 have thus far and more than likely will continue to be, characterized by problematic military procurement. Governments have in many cases not been able to partner with industry in a manner that can deliver the right equipment at the right time and on budget. The overarching theme in defence/industry relations is the potential benefits to Canadian industry in both domestic and foreign markets.

While a call for a sound relationship with industry is almost present in each defence policy statement (2005 excepted), little detail beyond proclamations of partnership is provided. Dr. Craig Stone has widely studied and written about the lack of a stated defence industrial policy in general and has stated that a "lack of a clearly articulated defence industrial policy or strategy by the Government,"[110] has characterised the lack of industry focused content in every defence policy since 1964.

In 2008's defence policy statement, "significant benefits for Canadian industry" were sought and policy was to "enable industry to reach for global excellence and to be better positioned to compete for defence contracts at home and abroad."[111] This was a return to the concerns in 1992 which called "for roughly balanced cross-border defence trade over time and give Canadian firms an opportunity to compete for US defence contracts on the normal commercial basis of price, quality,

[109] *Ibid.,* 9.
[110]Stone, Craig. "Canada Needs a Defence Industrial Policy". *International Journal*, 63, no. 2. (Spring 2008). 355.
[111] *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 4.

and delivery." In the years between those concerns of trade balance and economic opportunity came 1994's announced budget cuts which signalled the intention to move away from research and development in favour of "off the shelf" solutions when viable.[112]

Perhaps, notably, during the last years of the Cold War, the concern about industry and its place in Canada's defence policy in 1988-89, was for more than just cost and value. The Government used the policy to announce that it was accepting recommendations from the Defence Industrial Preparedness Task Force which consisted of representatives of Canadian industry, banking, and universities. The consultation would generate "proposals for strengthening defence industrial preparedness."[113]

Cold War partnership with industry was important in order to sustain the CAF while engaged in the event of the much feared war between NATO forces and the Warsaw Pact states. Subsequent military mobilization would depend upon Canada's ability to successfully mobilize industry as well. This consideration of industrial capacity no longer figures in Canadian Defence Policies. With the urgency of Cold War preparedness having vanished, it should be considered whether less coordination and attention to defence industries in Canada as well as declining budgets have led to some of the procurement system failures being experienced today. As stated by Stone, "recognizing that a policy will not be forthcoming from the government, the most DND can really hope to achieve is a strategy that indicates intentions to industry."[114] Without government commitment however, these intentions do not represent a "safe bet" for Canadian industry.

[112] *1994 White Paper on Defence*, Chapter 7.
[113] *Challenge and Commitment, A Defence Policy for Canada, 1988-89*, 22.
[114] Stone. "Canada Needs a Defence Industrial Policy"

Other Key Areas of Defence Policy

The above twelve topics in Canadian defence policy often vary from government to government. There are ten more topics listed below that have appeared in defence policies over the last fifty years. Often, little information is enclosed which leaves little to analyse in this paper. For other topics, much may be stated but little in the way of theme change occurs. Personnel as a topic is a defence policy constant as successive governments may cut or grow the size of the force or adjust the role of the Reserve Force. Likewise, equipment is a topic that is always present. For the most part, policy concerning these topics have a negligible impact on defence policy unless they were to be omitted and neglected. In other cases, such as the Arctic, policy changes little, and their importance seems to be in their inclusion versus their content. These topics are as follows:

1. The Arctic;
2. Personnel;
3. Equipment;
4. Infrastructure;
5. Policy Implementation;
6. Structure of the CAF (notwithstanding 1964 unification);
7. Arms Control;
8. Mobilization (essentially eliminated from mention since end of the Cold War);
9. Space; and
10. The Environment.

The above topics also merit further study and analysis. Their role in Canadian defence policy will become increasingly more important if a government further develops these topics by adding more detail and emphasis on them in future defence policies. The overwhelming conclusion from this look at past Canadian defence policy instruments is that many questions must be asked and much analysis conducted during the policy process. Performed at its worst policy formulation

reflects what BGen (Ret'd) Dr. James Cox states as "…being built on nothing more than shallow rhetoric, pathological partnership and worst of all, ignorance."[115]

CHAPTER 2- Allied Defence Policy Statements

Designing a Canadian defence policy through the use of the conventions and assessed best practices of past Canadian defence policies and statements limits the breadth of documents that can contribute to the expression of Canada's defence policy. As outlined earlier in this paper there are significant trends continue from one defence policy instrument to another. Further, the structure of future defence policies could benefit from adopting the some of the structure and content of Canada's allies' policies. Due to considerations of time and space, this chapter is an analysis of key areas of their most current policy papers and statements. This chapter will not conduct a historical analysis of the policy instruments of various allies. The defence policies are as follows in Table 2.1:

Table 2.1: Allied Defence Policies and Statements

Title	Quadrennial Defense Review 2014	National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom	2016 Defence White Paper
Country	The United States	The United Kingdom	Australia
Government	Democrat	Conservative	Liberal
Year	2014	2015	2016

Analysis of the above policy statements and White Paper establishes themes across the topics imbedded in the policies. While some of these topics are not absent from past Canadian defence policies, the same degree of emphasis and detail are not always to the same level and thus their contribution to the policy process does not reach its full potential. With the

[115] Cox, James. "Three Questions: The Basis for a New Defence Policy Review." *CDA Institute*, (Autumn 2015). 45.

announcement that Canada is to undertake a Defence Policy Review process that will conclude with a new defence policy instrument in early 2017, ensuring that the right areas of focus and level of detail are utilized throughout the consultation process is key to a successful policy.[116]

Executive Summaries

Most Canadian defence policy statements are unique amongst its allies due to the omission of an executive summary at the beginning of, or released in conjunction with the defence policy instrument. The inclusion of such a summary makes the content of the document more accessible by summarizing the key points in simple format. While this could be interpreted as facilitating academic lethargy, the reality is that summaries are much more likely to be read by more members of both the CAF and the public. This assumption reinforces the ideas presented with shaping public opinion as previously discussed in this paper. Such that a concise summary of a large document is more easily digested by a media eager to convey headlines on the day of a policies release. This practice is not foreign to Canadian reports. 2008's policy statement included a very brief executive summary while most recently, *the Deschamps Report* concluding the *External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces* attached a nine page executive summary to the front of the report.[117] The net effect was a rapid communication of the report's findings and a useable tool for the CAF's chain of command in addressing the issue.

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[116] Government of Canada, "Canada Launches Public Consultations on Defence Policy Review," last accessed 26 April 2016, http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?crtr.sj1D=&crtr.mnthndVl=12&mthd=advSrch&crtr.dpt1D=6670&nid=1047019&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.yrStrtVl=2010&crtr.kw=&crtr.dyStrtVl=20&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVl=2&crtr.page=3&crtr.yrndVl=2016&crtr.dyndVl=31

[117] National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, "External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces," last accessed 26 April 2016, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/caf-community-support-services/external-review-sexual-mh-2015/summary.page

Executive Summaries vary in length and design. The US' Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 2014) utilized a two page "Fact Sheet" in order to communicate the highlights and priorities of the 88 page document.[118] The UK's National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (SDSR 2015) utilizes a fifteen page "Key Facts" document full of simple figures, graphs, and graphics which outlines the key points of the greater 96 page policy document.[119] Finally, Australia's 2016 Defence White Paper (2016 DWP) provides a fifteen page summary providing a paragraph on each chapter to be found in the (perhaps astounding) 191 page White Paper.[120]

Providing an executive summary for those who will access a Canadian defence policy will help the government to brand, communicate and disseminate the key information relevant to its new defence policy. Utilized in the "Key Facts" document of SDSR 2015's summary is a simple visual graphic of how the UK's Joint Force 2025 order of battle would appear.[121] The use of such a diagram within the executive summary of Canadian defence policy would be for most Canadians, including journalists, the first time that they have seen the size and formation of the CAF illustrated, and perhaps better put into the context the defence policy being written.

Detailed Global Regional Analysis

All Canadian defence policies have begun with an examination of the strategic environment. Some of those policy instruments have gone on to state global regions of interest.

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[118] Department of Defense, United States of America. "Quadrennial Defense Review 2014," Last Accessed 26 April 2016, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/20140302_FINAL_QDR_Fact_Sheet_v13_CLEAN.pdf

[119] Ministry of Defence, "SDSR 2015 Key Facts", Last Accessed 26 April 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/494895/SDSR_2015_Booklet_vers_15.pdf

[120] Government of Australia, Department of Defence. "2016 Defence White Paper" Last Accessed 26 April 2016, http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf

[121] *SDSR 2015 Key Facts*, 3-5.

As discussed in Chapter 1, this is always restricted to general regions themselves and omits any commentary on specific countries. The trend amongst our closest allies is to intially highlight regions of interest, but then to go into more detail. All three allied defence policies outline specific partnerships or concerns with countries of interest. QDR 2014 highlights the Asia-Pacific Region but also comments on specific partnerships (Australia, Indonesia, South Korea, and Japan) while also commenting on concerns such as China and North Korea.[122] SDSR 2015 provides seven pages of regional summaries with country specific information to be actioned or considered such as this example from the Middle East Section of the policy: "we will set out our vision of our future relationships with partners in the region in our new Gulf Strategy. In particular, we will build a permanent and more substantial UK military presence…" and its corresponding section on Bahrain: "We have begun work on a new naval base in Bahrain, HMS Juffair, to support Royal Navy deployments in the region, and we will establish a new British Defence Staff in the Middle East."[123]

The 2016 DWP utilizes geographic spheres to highlight Australia's regional interests, beginning with its "own neighbourhood". An example of this specific state commentary is in the eight pages of regional analysis of Australia's specific defence interests with Indonesia: "including a shared maritime border, a commitment to combatting terrorism, promoting peace and stability in our region and working to strengthen the regional security architecture."[124] While it can be argued that Canada goes into that level of detail with the US, (and that it is far removed from other regions), Canada also continues to list global regions of interest without any significant detail in its defence policy statement. This amounts to a blanket statement of engagement across vast territories. With Canada's comparatively small global presence, military

[122] *QDR 2014*, 4-5.
[123] *SDSR 2015*, 55.
[124] *2016 DWP*, 59.

engagements and cooperation by the state in the specific declared regions of interest would better direct the defence policy of Canada. This suggests a much closer relationship between Global Affairs Canada and the Department of National Defence. The nature of SDSR 2015 being both a strategic defence and security review, means that the UK's assertion that: "We will further enhance our position as the world's leading soft power promoting our values and interests globally, with our world-class Diplomatic Service," allowed for a more broad and inclusive whole of government approach in the policy.[125] Considering the size of Canada's global efforts relative to the UK, Canadian inter-departmental cooperation should be more easily reflected in Canada's defence policy.

Priority of Funding by Service

Canadian defence policies on occasion have outlined by military Service what the defence spending priorities are, but more often than not, defence policies announce all procurement projects collectively. QDR 2014 goes further and outlines the Secretary of Defense's direction to the Services for the protection of priority capabilities which are "most closely aligned to the pillars of our updated defense strategy."[126] An example of this approach is the core pillar of *Protecting the Homeland* and thus missile defence, nuclear capability, and cyber capabilities cannot be sacrificed or degraded.[127] This achieves strategic guidance for the Service Chiefs as they allocate funding. Likewise, the Canadian Government could use funding prioritization to give strategic direction to the CAF on what capabilities it needs to preserve.

Australia announced a very significant investment program in the 2016 DWP but it was further outlined in a separate, accompanying document, the *2016 Integrated Investment*

[125] *SDSR 2015*, 9.
[126] *QDR 2014*, 32.
[127] *Ibid.*

Program. The investment program outlines in great detail (over dozens of pages) the Service responsible for each project, the associated cost and the expected timeline.[128] Throughout both the 2016 DWP and the Integrated Investment Program, the Australian Government stresses the use of third party, properly costed future projects. The amount of work present in both documents is impressive and represents close partnership between numerous government departments. When compared to the lack of detail of procurement announcements in Canadian defence policy statements, the difference is startling.

Publishing procurement project details in Canadian defence policies has not been the practice. Neither the Services nor the CAF have been required to or have provided a level of detail that would reassure industry and taxpayers that the projects are fiscally viable. An allied example of this is the future replacement of the UK's nuclear submarine fleet which has become a more contentious political issue.[129] The growing political debate is not unlike that experienced by the former Canadian Conservative Government when it initially announced plans to purchase the F-35 fifth generation fighter.[130] Both of these projects were criticized for their shear cost and amongst other things, the requirement for their capability. The difference however is the level of detail that the respective governments have committed to outlining in their defence policies in order to promote, explain and justify the projects.

It may be assumed by successive Canadian governments that Canadians would not be interested in Service priorities, how they are ranked, and how they are costed. The effective

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[128] Government of Australia, Department of Defence. "2016 Integrated Investment Program". Last Accessed 26 April 2016, http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Docs/2016-Defence-Integrated-Investment-Program.pdf

[129] The Independent. "Trident: What the future holds for the UK's nuclear submarines." Last Accessed 26 April 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/trident-what-the-future-holds-for-the-uks-nuclear-submarines-a6830496.html

[130] The Globe and Mail. "Canada to stay in program of F-35 jet buyers despite pledge to withdraw." Last Accessed 26 April 2016, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-to-stay-in-program-of-f-35-jet-buyers-despite-pledge-to-withdraw/article28897002/

management of defence requires that priorities are assigned and protected by the Government of the day.

Implementation Guidance

The publishing of a defence policy does not in itself end the policy process. The administration of defence, much like other public policies must be led and managed throughout the life of the policy. Very little has been included in past defence policies about the implementation of the policy itself. Direction on implementation in allied defence policies have encompassed both guidance directing cooperation at the departmental level as well the process to be used for reviewing the implementation of the policy. Embedding the process into the defence policy can contribute to transparency in the defence process.

The QDR process in the United States offers the most structured review process, by its very nature it is a mandated review embedded in Federal Law. U.S. Code 118 mandates that the Secretary of Defense every four years will conduct a "comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, modernization plans, posture, infrastructure, budget plan and other elements…" [131] Amongst other objectives, the QDR is meant to be a "mechanism for… (ii) monitoring, assessing, and holding accountable agencies within the Department of Defense for the development of policies and programs that support the national defense strategy."[132]While this paper will not advocate a legislated requirement for the Canadian Government to conduct a Quadrennial style review, there is a requirement for Canadian defence policies to outline a mechanism to monitor and assess the progress of defence policy implementation. This will achieve a predictable and transparent process.

[131] Cornell University Law School. "10 U.S. Code 118- Defense Strategy Review." Last Accessed 25 April 2016. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/118
[132] *Ibid.*

The SDSR 2015 provides a detailed process of post-policy delivery consultations. It outlines the reporting through "impact assessments" that effected government departments (bearing in mind the multi-department policy that is SDSR 2015) as the policy relates to matters of safety, the environment, sustainable development, and equality/diversity.[133] While arguments for the review of these items (or others) could be made, it is the concept of a policy-mandated review process tailored to items important to the Government which could better provide for the administration of Canadian defence policy and transparency in its execution.

In implementing SDSR 2015, the UK Government announced that: "To deliver this strategy we will enhance security structures which will promote our further integrated, whole-of-government approach."[134] It is a realization that departments must work together in order to achieve effective policy outcomes. The ongoing procurement of a replacement fighter jet for the CAF has been a process which is rife of examples of poor departmental cooperation. The Office of the Auditor General of Canada concluded in 2012 that the process was not transparent and that: "Public Works and Government Services Canada did not fully carry out its role as the government's procurement authority. Although it was not engaged by National Defence until late in the decision-making process…"[135] The mandated cooperation between Government departments may seem redundant, however, in light of recent Canadian failings in inter-departmental cooperation, future governments should direct a formal process of cooperation in an implementation section of defence policies.

The 2016 DWP dedicates an entire chapter to outlining implementation of the defence policy. It directs that a bi-annual meetings between the Minister for Defence and the Defence

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[133] *SDSR 2015*, 81.
[134] *Ibid*., 82.
[135]Office of the Auditor General of Canada. "Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons: Replacing Canada's Fighter Jets." Last Accessed 26 April 2016, http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl_oag_201204_02_e.pdf

Committee is held in order to "consider a formal strategic assessment of the alignment between Defence's strategy, capability and resources, together with First Principles Review and cultural reform implementation."[136] An opposing view of this process might be that such consultations don't have to be mandated, that they would be inherent in the process of administration. However, mandating regular assessments adds transparency to the process, and makes good administration a routine task.

Where allies have spilled a significant amount of ink in their defence policies on outlining cooperation and review in the implementation of their policies, Canadian defence statements have been mostly absent of these controls and practices. Addressing implementation in detail completes the policy process and further professionalizes the administration of defence.

Industrial Policy

As discussed in Chapter 1, Canadian defence policy has often mentioned the importance of relationships with industry, but falls well short of having an industrial policy. Australia's approach to government-industry relations represents a different approach. The 2016 DWP was released in conjunction with the 2016 Integrated Investment Program and the 2016 Defence Industry Policy Statement. The three documents together cover the relationship between Industry and the Australian Department of Defence.

The Department of Defence (Australia) noted that "all elements of the Government's Defence investment… are outlined in an Integrated Investment Program…"[137] Complementing the 2016 DWP is the Defence Industry Policy which "acknowledges the fundamental

[136] *2016 DWP*, 186.
[137] Department of Defence. "Defence White Paper." Last Accessed 27 April 2016. http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/

contribution that Australian industry provides to defence capability."[138] The 2016 DWP outlines the establishment of the Defence Innovation Hub, with the role of "respond(ing) to strategic challenges and develop the next generation of game-changing capabilities."[139]

While industry is occasionally mentioned in Canadian Defence Policy, there is never any inclusion of any detail that would resemble a policy towards cultivating closer relations as well as encouraging innovation. In 2015 Canada made a more concerted effort to communicate with industry through the release of the Department of National Defence's Defence Acquisition Guide in order to "provide industry with the information they need to make informed research and development investments decisions based on potential requirements."[140] Canada does have a new *Defence Procurement Strategy* but it has yet to be linked to a Defence Policy, having been created post release of 2008's *Canada First Defence Strategy*.

There are two key reasons why relations between the Government of Canada and the defence industry have not become better aligned: domestic politics and a lack of commitment to greater funding. Notwithstanding the industry-centric policies of the previous Canadian Government, there is always a political de-motivator for closer ties between the Government of the day and the defence industry. The partisan politics surrounding the continued fighter-jet replacement for the Royal Canadian Air Force led to the creation in 2015 of the Independent Review Panel for Defence Acquisition.[141] The defence industry is big business and in the past has been tainted by less than ethical and legal practices such as BAE's admission to participating in a bribery scandal. This rocked the industry in the early years of the last decade, a time that

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[138] *Ibid.*
[139] *2016 DWP*., 112.
[140] Department of National Defence. "Department Acquisition Guide 2015." Last Accessed 27 April 2016, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-defence-acquisition-guide-2015/index.page
[141] Department of National Defence. "Independent Review Panel for Defence Acquisition." Last Accessed 27 April 2016, http://forces.gc.ca/en/business-how-to-do/irpda.page

coincided with the publishing of the 2005 and 2008 defence policy statements in Canada.[142] Thus, there are challenges to overcome in order to actually encourage a greater relationship between the Government and the defence industry.

The lack of commitment to greater funding by the Government of Canada is less than an attractive enticement for the defence industry to participate in closer alignment to defence policy. Australia's monumental efforts to align defence policy with industry is the result of a commitment (stated in 2016 DWP) to increase its funding of defence to two percent of GDP by 2020-2021, representing an investment of $191 billion over ten years.[143] Canada's investment in defence is much more modest, thus it can be argued that there is little reason to tie an industrial policy to its defence policy. The Canadian Government must decide if the economic benefits, including the potential Regional Industrial Benefits are worth embedding a commitment to industry in the next defence policy.

Cyber

Cyber is the one domain that while not absent from Canadian defence policy statements has been only lightly considered. Much has changed since 2008 in the cyber environment, and this is reflected in how Canada's allies have addressed cyber in their own defence policy statements.

QDR 2014 states cyberspace amongst the highest of the President's objectives with a focus on finding new cyber capabilities.[144] QDR 2014 discusses the formation of the Cyber

[142] The Washington Post. "BAE Systems pays $450 million to settle bribery scandal charges." Last Accessed 27 April 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/05/AR2010020503811.html
[143] *2016 DWP*., 9.
[144] *QDR 2014*, 50.

Mission Force to be stood up in 2016 in order to further enable all combatant commanders.[145] The statements regarding cyber make it clear from a policy perspective, there are both international and domestic, offensive and defensive requirements for the Department of Defense to invest in new capabilities.[146]

Cyber is ranked along with terrorism as amongst the UK's highest defence priority.[147] SDSR 2015 very effectively states the case for the importance of cyber consideration: "the range of cyber actors threatening the UK has grown. The threat is increasingly asymmetric and global. Reliable, consistent cyber defence typically requires advanced skills and substantial investment."[148] SDSR 2015 details through significant analysis the level and diversity of the cyber threat that currently exists. The analysis is backed up with the announcement that the UK "will invest £1.9 billion over the next five years in protecting the UK from cyber attack…in 2016 we will publish a second five-year National Cyber Security Strategy, and we will launch a further five-year National Cyber Security Programme."[149]

The 2016 DWP focuses throughout the document on cyberspace, and states that "Cyber attacks are a real and present threat to the ADF's warfighting ability as well as to other government agencies and other sectors of Australia's economy and critical infrastructure."[150] The alignment and cooperation across the Services and Government departments is viewed as a way forward for Australia's defence policy: "…enhanced national cyber security efforts, which

[145] *Ibid*., 55.
[146] *Ibid*., 16.
[147] *SDSR 2015*, 10.
[148] *Ibid*., 19.
[149] *Ibid*.
[150] *2016 DWP*, 16.

include better coordinated cyber security capabilities and working with industry and academia to counter the threat of cyber attack."[151]

The requirement for cyber to be included in Canadian defence policy statements is clear. Canada's allies are making cyber a priority in their defence policies. The level of detail committed in their policies reinforces their intent to being proactive in the cyber domain. Considering that one of the roles of a defence policy is to communicate a state's defence intents to its allies, Canada must ensure that what is being communicated to its allies on Canada's cyber efforts is credible. Canada cannot afford to be viewed as a vulnerable alliance partner in the cyber domain.

Personnel Policies

Most Canadian defence policy statements make comments on personnel, the most common two being the role of the Reserve Force and either strength increases or decreases. From Canada's allies there are examples of personnel issues included in their defence policy instruments with an appropriate amount of detail that the intent and objectives of the Governments can meet.

QDR 2014 discusses the requirement for the rebalancing of the Reserve Force and Active Force in order to achieve the proper ration of forces for the future Joint Force.[152] As the CAF attempts to balance fiscal prudence with desired readiness levels, the Reserve Force in Canada will very likely play a more prominent role in sustaining the operational readiness of the CAF. A Canadian defence policy should address Reserve Force integration into Regular Force Task Forces as well outline the support that is unique to reservists of Canada.

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[151] *Ibid.*, 73.
[152] *QDR 2014*, 31.

The SDSR 2015 announces personnel initiatives that range from employment of reservists, increased diversity in the recruiting pool, and even the study of admitting women into occupational trades currently closed to them (an area where Canada has left its allies behind in its level of inclusiveness).[153] A Canadian defence policy must account for all elements of personnel policy, including policies that impact the unique requirements and sacrifices placed on Canadian military families. The exceptionally detailed 2016 DWP spares little detail in outlining personnel concerns. Detailed breakdowns of re-allocation of personnel is provided, serving to prioritize professional areas as well as to highlight growing initiatives in areas such as cyber, space, air defence, and amphibious warfare.[154] Included is a recruiting policy in the policy statement, acknowledging the competition that the Department of Defence will face in attracting appropriate recruits. The policy is used to announce an extension to the Department's successful "Gap Year" program.[155]

Perhaps most strategically important for the CAF under personnel policy, is exemplified in the 2016 DWP's "Pathway to Change," sexual misconduct prevention program and connecting it to the defence policy. As the CAF seeks to prove it is taking sexual-cultural change seriously and is being effective in its efforts, entrenching the principle message of the CAF's response to the Deschamps Report, Operation HONOUR, would be yet another sign that the CAF is planning for long term changes to its culture.[156]

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[153] *SDSR 2015*. 33.
[154] *2016 DWP*. 147.
[155] *Ibid.,* 150.
[156] National Defence and Canadian Armed Force. "CDS Op Order- Op HONOUR." Last Accessed 28 April 2016, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/caf-community-support-services/cds-operation-order-op-honour.page

Canada spends nearly fifty percent of its defence budget on personnel.[157] Historically, the amount of attention dedicated to such a significant aspect of the defence budget has not been equal to that of equipment and other capital. Just as Canada communicates priorities and objectives with its allies through its defence policy, the inclusion of a detailed personnel section would effectively communicate the same to the Canadian public if properly emphasized and promoted.

Risk Assessment and Lessons Learned

QDR 2014 highlights risk and lessons learned within the policy statement. Much like engagement and deployment criteria outlined previously in this paper, adding appropriate lessons learned to a defence policy statement can serve to both justify a key decision as well as add transparency to the policy process. Acknowledging the risks being accepted in a policy and outlining mitigating actions, makes a policy better able to withstand the informed scrutiny of Parliament and the media. While the risks outlined in QDR 2014 are not the ones which would be of use to the US' enemies, they do signal a requirement for Congress to approve of proposed savings in order to mitigate those risks.[158]

The lessons learned outlined in QDR 2014 such as the requirement for "additionally forward deployed naval forces," and "regionally focused forces," identify that the Department of Defense has conducted analysis and is using the outcome to formulate its strategy. Addressing risks and highlighting lessons learned in a policy statement acknowledges the complexity of the issue and serves to demonstrate that the analysis phase of the policy process was detailed and thorough.

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[157] CDA Institute. "Defence Budget Scans: Canada, the US and Australia." Last Accessed 28 April 2016, https://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/blog/entry/defence-budget-scans-canada-the-us-and-australia
[158] QDR 2014., 38.

Environment

The impact of the environment on the global security situation is something that Canada's allies are not, according to their defence policy statements, concerned about. The level of detail that characterizes their defence statements in other topic areas is notably omitted on the topic of the environment. With the expected impact that climate change will have on the Arctic as well as the environmental concern that characterize Canadian domestic politics, (and thus the role that it could play in Canada's defence policy), the real debate for the Canadian Government will be how future environment issues will define Canada's defence policy. Canada's allies for the most part, only treat environmental degradation and climate change as an issue of stewardship. There is very little analysis of how climate change and other issues of the environment will impact their security. Moreover the global security questions that will arise from access to resources and the environmental impacts on civilian populations globally.

The United States is the only ally of the three examined in this paper that comes close to addressing the potential for environmental related security questions. Climate change as well as the requirement to have "energy efficient" forces are briefly mentioned in the QDR 2014.[159] While environmental stewardship is important, there is an increasing amount of studies since 2008 that link global environmental issues to the issues of human security. The current Canadian Federal Government has made statements linking security to environmental issues such as climate change.[160] These linkages are not free from debate. In February 2016, the Canadian Minister of National Defence was criticized by the official opposition for his linkages of the

[159] *QDR 2014*, 25.
[160] Government of Canada. "Address by Minister Dion at the Climate Change and Security: Fragile States conference." Last Accessed 1 May 2016, http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1044349

situation in Syria to climate change.[161] If an issue that is perceived to effect human security is worthy of attention by key Cabinet Ministers, and is debated in the House of Commons, it is worthy of proper analysis and addressing in a Canadian defence policy statement.

Partisanship

As noted in Chapter 1, partisanship in Canadian defence policies has been the exception rather than the rule. The current defence statements of the three allies listed in this chapter for the most part are absent overt partisanship. The UK and Australian policy statements lack any hint of partisanship, notwithstanding the existence of domestic debates on some issues such as that on British nuclear disarmament.[162]

In QDR 2014, there is an element of partisanship in that it speaks to the very unique American budget phenomenon of financial sequestration. Chapter 10 of the statement details the implications and risks if sequestration continues, notably to levels of readiness, and is essentially both a rebuke and warning to the US Congress. A differing political system, with less of a division between the executive and legislative branch in Canada (under a majority government), it is unlikely for a Canadian defence policy to require a chapter dedicated to partisan warnings and threats.

Australia has been noted as an example by Canadian Journalist, Matthew Fisher as a Country that can agree on a defence policy without partisanship, also noting that policy is not

[161] CTV News. "Conservatives blast Sajjan for linking Syrian conflict to climate change." Last accessed 1 May 2016, http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/conservatives-blast-sajjan-for-linking-syrian-conflict-to-climate-change-1.2765391

[162] BBC News. "Corbyn: UK could keep Trident submarines but without warheads." Last Accessed 1 May 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35337432

likely to be reversed by subsequent governments.[163] That assessment is likely only half accurate. There has been substantial political debate in Australia over procurement issues, specifically on the issue of submarines.[164] The difference being the debate is not on capability, but more partisanship on issues such as regional industrial benefits, a debate that is absent however from the final defence policy.

The conventional absence of partisanship from Canadian defence policies is a trend that is reflected by like-minded allied countries. There is a certain degree of strength that appears to flow from the appearance of unanimity in a country's defence effort. In keeping with the notion that a defence policy serves, in part, to signal a country's defence intent, capabilities, and resolve to its allies, Canada's defence policy can benefit from being void of overt partisanship.

Examining the defence policies of Canada's allies offers inspiration and other good practices for the improvement of the structure and content of future Canadian defence policies. The examination of the US', UK's, and Australian's defence policies offer some key omissions in Canada's policies historically. Further, Canadian defence policy could benefit from the level of analysis that is achieved in its allies' defence policies.

CHAPTER 3- Informing the Defence Policy Statement Model

In suggesting a structure for future Canadian defence policy statements it is important to identify a method for informing that structure. This paper does not recommend a radical new model of the public policy process but rather seeks to highlight considerations for informing the defence policy structure outlined in Annex A.

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[163] The National Post. "Matthew Fisher: Lessons on national defence from Down Under." Last Accessed 1 May 2016, http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/matthew-fisher-lessons-on-national-defence-from-down-under

[164] The Conversation. "Submarines decision ultimately shows the merits of partisan debate on defence." Last Accessed 1 May 2016, http://theconversation.com/submarines-decision-ultimately-shows-the-merits-of-partisan-debate-on-defence-57796

The Policy Process

Dr. Bruce G. Doern formerly of Carleton University has written extensively on the public policy process in Canada as well as comparative policy studies. Dr Doern states the policy process has six steps: identification, definition, alternative search, choice, implementation, and evaluation.[165] These six steps align with the policy process model widely accepted throughout the Western World. James Anderson of Texas A&M University states that there are five steps to the public policy process: problem identification and agenda setting, formulation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation.[166] In these five steps, the first step of problem identification and agenda setting encompass the first two steps outlined by Doern: identification and definition. Thus, this chapter will use the six step policy process as outlined by Doern in order to demonstrate how the recommended defence policy structure can be achieved by the policy process.

In understanding the nuances of public policy in the context of Canadian defence policy, there are a number of considerations. Bland writes that there are five elements to a defence policy: strategic analysis, defence problems, roles, budget, and "the dynamic process by which each White Paper is produced."[167] This comment on the distinct process by which past Canadian governments have created their defence policies reinforces the fact that the defence policy can differ as much as the process itself. The difference between defence policy and other public

[165] Doern, G. Bruce and Richard W. Phidd. "Canadian Public Policy Ideas, Structure, Process 2nd Ed." Nelson Canada, Scarborough, 1992. 82.
[166] Anderson, James E. "Public Policy Policymaking, 7th Ed." Texas A&M University, 2011. 3.
[167] Bland, Douglass L. "Controlling the Defence Policy Process in Canada: White Papers on Defence and Bureaucratic Politics in the Department of National Defence." Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, Kingston, March 1988. 4.

policy processes is the purpose of the final product is "building and sustaining of combatant capabilities" and has a potentially very high cost other than just fiscal terms.[168]

The driving force behind a defence policy process in Canada has a tremendous influence on the remainder of the process. This includes the final structure of policy itself and thus the information contained within it. The initiation of a policy process and its subsequent steps have been called policy pathways, including pluralist, partisan, expert, and symbolic pathways.[169] The names of the individual pathways describe the primary driving force behind a policy option. A strong symbolic pathway is a process characterized by "value-laden beliefs", while a partisan pathway would be driven by a strong leader with a strong majority. The type of policy pathway will impact the focus of a defence policy, including its structure and content. Decision makers and contributors should be aware of the driving influence (the pathway) in order to ensure a transparent process free of bias as much as realistically possible. The potential for a biased approach due to differing pathways only further supports the standardization of defence policy content in order to ensure the achieving of a well-rounded policy.

Bland writes that defence policy planning "rarely begins with a blank piece of paper."[170] As future defence policies are authored and released, they will have to integrate or at the very least eliminate pre-existing equipment, missions and issues. The policy process is cyclical even if focus is mostly paid to release of the defence policy instrument. It is therefore important to understand that policy is often being shaped by the decisions of government, independent of actual release of a defence policy statement. The activities of the government must be considered

[168] *A Vigilant Parliament*. 8.
[169] Conlon, Timothy J, Paul L. Posner and David R. Beam. "Pathways of Power; The Dynamics of National Policymaking." Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C. 2014. 2.
[170] Bland, Douglas J and Sean M. Maloney. "Campaigns for International Security." McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal-Kingston. 2004. 41.

"whether or not a government's objectives and strategies are explicit, or are congruent with its activities."[171] It is important that these factors are considered prior to embarking upon the policy process and matching the structure of a defence policy with the information required.

Identification Phase of the Policy Process

The identification phase involves the identification of a policy issue or problem. This first step in the policy process will inform key parts of the structure of the defence policy such as the introductory tone of the policy instrument as well as the strategic assessment. Key to this step and to achieving the required information are effective lines of communication between the Cabinet (Minister), the CAF, DND, and other departments. The history of Canadian defence policy is replete with examples of poor communication failing to enable the policy process. 1964's policy statement is famous (in policy circles) for the lack of influence by senior military officers on the policy process.[172] Thus the "classic realist image of international affairs" subscribed to by senior officers was ignored by the Government,[173] resulting in the writing of strategic assessments that were not based on an accurate perception of world affairs. In 1971, the Management Review Group criticized the Government for not seeking appropriate departmental (DND) input into the 1971 policy statement.[174]

Identifying the requirement to formulate defence policy in a formal process will not be done in isolation by the Minister or DND. Defence policy is not a process controlled wholly by

[171] Doern, Bruce G and Peter Aucoin. "Public Policy in Canada, Organizing, Process, and Management." Macmillan of Canada, Toronto. 1979. 2.
[172] *Controlling the Defence Policy Process in Canada: White Papers on Defence and Bureaucratic Politics in the Department of National Defence.* 12.
[173] *Ibid.*
[174] *Ibid*., 16.

DND.[175] In 2015, the new Prime Minister of Canada publically released individual mandate letters to his ministers. The mandate letter sent to the newly appointed Minister of National Defence included direction to work with one minister or another on most of the items listed in the letter.[176] Doern stated that "policy is almost never made one policy field at a time."[177] It could also be said that policy is almost never made by one minister at a time. The Canadian Federal Government is much too interconnected for policy to be made in departmental isolation. Active cooperation between the Ministers of National Defence and Global Affairs Canada is required in order to align these key policies. In 1963, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, stated that "it is axiomatic that defence policy and foreign policy should be two different aspects of the same policy and should be closely coordinated."[178] Janice Gross Stein writes that members of the Defence Committee looking at foreign policy "felt that defence policy was only intelligible within the broader context of Canada's global objective and priorities. It made little sense, they argued, to consider defence policy out of context."[179] The risk is that if the right policy issues are not established at the outset of the policy review process, such as in areas of strategic assessments or capability deficits, key defence policy content will be either omitted or incorrect. A policy structure can be utilized to guide the communication of the policy, however a predictable and effective structure requires accurate information and analysis.

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[175] Dewitt, David B. and David Leyten-Brown. "Canada's International Security Policy." Prentice Hall Canada Inc. Scarborough. 1995. 344.
[176] Office of the Prime Minister. Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter. Last Accessed 29 April 2016, http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-national-defence -mandate-letter.
[177] *Canadian Public Policy Ideas, Structure, Process 2nd Ed*, 88.
[178] Brewing, Andrew. "Stand on Guard, the Search for a Canadian Defence Policy." McClelland & Stewart Ltd. Toronto. 1965. 119.
[179] Stein, Janice Gross. "Ideas, even good ideas, are not enough: changing Canada's Foreign and Defence Policy." *International Journal*. (Winter 1994-5): 60.

Definition Phase of the Policy Process

The second step in the policy process is definition. More fully defined as agenda setting, this step in the process will encompass a competition from various sources of input. In the past, defence policy has contended with a limited "profile" and significant "ignorance" in general regarding defence issues.[180] The competition to set the defence policy agenda will impact the final outcome of the policy statement. Those who must set the agenda will feel pressure from those who offer strategic assessments, threat assessments, information from "externalities" (allies and other departments), as well as those who seek to define Canada's defence policy through a defence capability based planning process.[181] While problems can be identified early as requiring a policy shift, it is in the definition stage where an issue has to make the agenda for consideration. This has been referred to as the "mobilization of public policy" and can originate from the public through a "publically recognized grievance."[182] The number of inputs into the policy process are numerous. It is these inputs that compete for inclusion on the policy agenda. A consistently structured defence policy statement can add some predictability to the policy process agenda but will not entirely remove the element of contest. There will always be jockeying for prominence within the policy.

Defence policy statement topics such as budget, roles, and readiness, (to name a few), are all limited by constraints established during the policy process. During the definition phase, the political leadership should be not only seeking advice on defining the issues, but also give guidance on the limits and boundaries of the future policy. Janice Gross Stein states that key terms must be defined and offers the example of *security* as a term and whether it includes items

[180] Planning Without Guidance: Canadian Defence Policy and Planning, 1993-2004. 333.
[181] *Campaigns for International Security*. 45.
[182] Howlett, Michael. "The Policy Process" The Handbook of Canadian Public Administration 2nd Ed. Edited by Christopher Dunn. Oxford University Press. 2010. 389.

such as environmental and economic?[183] Luprecht and Sokolsky point to conflicting visions of defence between a once top military leader and the Canadian public in general: "the more the endgame of Hillier's vision of a kinetic expeditionary force crystalized, the more it became clear that this vision did not resonate with the Canadian public."[184] Governments and public opinion will always play critical roles in defining the issues and solutions that may be proposed during the defence policy process.

To what degree partisanship defines defence policy is difficult to evaluate. While Canadian political parties have had wildly differing views in public policy, the little change in actual defence policy over the past fifty years would suggest that partisan difference is less in defence policy than other public policy areas. The potential of less partisan effect on policy has a significant impact on the way that defence policy is defined. Dr. Brian Bow, Director of Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies has explained that this lessoned partisan influence is the result of three factors. Firstly, Canada's relatively small size and role in the World has had a "constraining effect" on the range of policy options. Secondly, Canada's "unique geographic location" means that there is little to threaten Canada and thus little public attention to defence issues. Thirdly, there is a lack of general knowledge and information on defence issues, to inform both members of parliament as well as the general public.[185]These three factors can be interpreted, perhaps mistakenly, as self-evident truths that can influence the defining of defence policy options. Because Canada has never been engaged in World affairs in a certain way, some may interpret that to mean that Canada can never be engaged in that way.

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[183]Stein, 62.
[184] Luprecht, Christian and Joel J. Sokolsky. "Defense Policy 'Walmart Style': Canadian Lessons in not so Grand Strategy." *Armed Forces and Society* 41 no. 3 (Kingston 2015): 554.
[185] Bow, Brian. "Parties and Partisanship in Canadian Defence Policy." *International Journal*, (Winter 2008-09): 69.

How the defence policy process is defined will ultimately play out in the defence policy statement itself. Throughout the structure of the defence policy, there are numerous topics, such as roles, that can be directly impacted by how the policy process is framed. Limits, whether implicit or explicit can be set by governments while public opinion can further work to influence the definition of the policy's content.

Alternate Search for Policy Phase

The third step of the public policy process, alternate search, is the formulation of potential policy courses of action the Government may pursue. In this stage there are two factors which will inform the structure, and by influence, the content of a defence policy statement. The first is the long list of those who would be expected to contribute to the policy formulation process. The second are the questions that may be asked in order to develop and guide policy formulation.

Contributors to the Defence Policy Process

The number of potential contributors to the defence policy process is significant. Bland highlights the contributors to the process by describing a list that can best be described as spherical rings where contributors sit at various distances from the centre: the defence establishment.[186] Bland describes the defence establishment as being composed of political leaders, the most senior military officers, senior DND officials, and senior scientist within DND.[187] The next closest ring of players consists of Cabinet, (specifically Ministers of Global Affairs Canada, Finance, President of the Treasury Board, and Public Safety), key Senators, opposition defence critics and Members of Parliament who have ridings which are significantly

[186] Controlling the Defence Policy Process in Canada: White Papers on Defence and Bureaucratic Politics in the Department of National Defence. 4.
[187] *Ibid.*

impacted by defence issues. The next ring of contributors and influencers are considered to be senior agency representatives, media defence experts, senior military subject matter experts, and academics. The final ring would be composed of Non-Government Organizations and any other parties who may be able to "barge into the core estimate" but would ultimately have only a "diffused impact" on policy.[188]

The political input into defence policy can originate from Cabinet or through parliament via the Standing Committee on National Defence. It has been noted that the level of expertise in defence matters held by members of the Standing Committee can vary greatly, but essentially they are considered to be "amateurs who can provide excellent scrutiny" to Parliament's oversight of defence in Canada.[189] While the Standing Committee doesn't write the national defence policy it does have a mandate to "review all matters pertaining to the (DND) ("the department") and the (CAF). It may examine and report on matters referred to it by the House of Commons or it may undertake studies on its own initiative."[190] This makes the Committee an important source of background information, testimony and also evaluation for a defence policy process or review. In many ways the Standing Committee becomes the pulpit by which contributors to the policy process can have their voice heard. The influence of parliamentarians must not be underestimated, which makes it more imperative for senior military officers to reach out to elected representatives. Bland describes DND's parliamentary liaison as "reactive" and the

[188] *Ibid.*
[189] Stand on Guard, the Search for a Canadian Defence Policy. 92.
[190] Parliament of Canada. Standing Committee on National Defence. Last Accessed 4 May 2016, http://www.parl.gc.ca/Committees/en/NDDN/About

vast majority of parliamentarians as having never had significant contact with the CAF's senior leadership.[191]

Finally, the role of the public in the policy process and its impact on informing the policy structure and content cannot now more than ever be ignored. The current Federal Government announced a Defence Policy Review in April 2016 which will have public hearings and an electronic means for all Canadians to have their say about what they believe the role of the CAF should be.[192] The advantage of this is that the policy process appears to be much more accessible by being widely consultative. This can lead to a policy with arguably more legitimacy as a public policy. Conversely, so called "citizen initiated policy dialogue" can generate a flood of information via contributions from the wider public. The risk with this approach is that vital resources dedicated to supporting the process may be better allocated to obtaining expert input which would better inform the defence policy structure.

Questions in the Alternate Search

Questions asked during the policy process will directly influence the content of the final defence policy. If a question is added or omitted it will either contribute to, or deprive a defence policy of potentially critical information. An example of this is the list of questions that the Government asked in 1994's defence policy review process. The following questions were asked[193]:

1. What has changed about Canada's security situation?
2. What has not changed about Canada's security situation?
3. What is the purpose of the Canadian Forces in the new environment?

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[191] Bland, Douglas L. Parliament's Duty to Defend Canada, Canadian Military Journal. 2000-2001. Winter. 39.
[192] Government of Canada. Defence Policy Review. Last Accessed 4 May 2016, http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/index.asp
[193]Morrison, Alex and Susan McNish. "The Canadian Defence Policy Review 1994" in Canadian Strategic Forecast 1995. Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies. 1994. 129-134.

4. What don't we need?
5. What we do need?

These questions were asked in a defence review with all but the mandate to cut the defence budget and find efficiencies. The questions asked above would be used to inform the topics found within the defence policy structure and indeed concluded in many cases that efficiencies could be attained. Other questions could have been asked which would have led to other conclusions within the defence policy statement that didn't support a decrease in the defence budget.

The Choice (Decision) Stage of the Defence Policy Process

Bland identifies two approaches to defence policy formulation: the normative, and the pragmatic approach.[194] The normative approach is considered the "realistic school" where "winning at war" is the primary consideration. The pragmatic approach to defence policy is to ensure that policy is in "harmony" with the "facts of national life," such as fiscal restraints.[195] Each approach will have its own champions within the various establishments, institutions, and departments that will advise on defence policy. Bland has characterized the contest between each category adherer as a battle between "managers" and "operators".[196] In such battles, Bland concludes that the managers win. Certainly a struggle that is worth avoiding, Bland states that the most important factor in avoiding policy failure is achieving "consensus or shared analysis amongst the major actors in the defence establishment…"[197]

Consensus amongst those closest to the centre of defence policy decision making, those who are making the choice between policy alternatives, is not a guarantee nor a requirement.

[194] Campaigns for International Security. 55.
[195] *Ibid*., 55.
[196] Controlling the Defence Policy Process in Canada: White Papers on Defence and Bureaucratic Politics in the Department of National Defence. 17.
[197] *Ibid*., 3.

Bland states that in "in the absence of policy consensus…the policy process is likely to become increasingly fractious and to produce random outcomes."[198] Achieving a consensus in the chosen policy course of action will ensure that success is much more likely in the execution of the policy.

Implementation Phase of the Policy Process

Once a defence policy statement is released, DND and the CAF must execute the policy. At this point, the structure of the policy has been informed by the process and the desire is that the policy will be adequate to direct Canada's defence efforts. If the structure of the policy is not adequately informed by the process, the implementation of the policy may not be successful. Implementation of the policy must see "coordinated political guidance necessary to ensure that the several aspects of strategy, priorities, defence, judicial, economic, financial, and foreign policies that affect Canada's security are systematically addressed."[199] If the defence policy is not based on thorough analysis and does not have the support of those who must implement it, there can be challenges. While the defence policy of 1988-89 was quickly rendered not applicable due to the changing global situation, it has been suggested that it failed "in the face of internal distrust and external disinterest."[200] The defence policy and process used to arrive at the policy will often set the tone between the senior DND and CAF leaders and the Government, especially if released early in the mandate of a new government. A well-structured defence policy based on accurate and relevant information will aid in ensuring the proper tone is set for successful implementation. If effective relations are maintained between military and political leadership, gaps in the policy may be overcome. Bland points out that "when real defence and

[198] *Ibid*., 2.
[199] Canada's International Security Policy. 335.
[200] Canada's National Defence, Vol 1. 189.

internal security crisis appear, Prime Ministers often turn to their chiefs of defence and generally accept their advice."[201]

The Evaluation of Defence Policy

Chapter 2 highlighted the policy review functions included in the structure of allied defence policies and the benefit of their inclusion in Canada's defence policy. Evaluation is the final phase of the defence policy process. Evaluation demonstrates the requirement for the policy statement to have a formalized review practice embedded within it.

Reviews of policies do occur in Canada through a variety of mechanisms. One example of review of public policy was Prime Minister Paul Martin's 2003 creation of the Expenditure Review Committee which halted all public projects in order to conduct a review of all Federal spending. This Expenditure Review Committee utilized the following criteria to determine the validity of the policy decisions: whether it is in the public interest, is the role of the Government legitimate and necessary, does it promote federalism, are there opportunities for partnership, does it represent value for money, and efficiency and affordability.[202]

There is the potential for resources and time to be conserved in the evaluation of defence policy. By entrenching in the defence policy instrument the criteria by which it is to be reviewed and evaluated, it is much less likely that a drift in policy will occur. It is not enough to have an overarching review criteria for public policy to also apply to defence policy. Criteria used by the Expenditure Review Committee will naturally put defence spending at a disadvantage owing to the unique requirements of defence policy that don't always represent value as most bureaucrats would understand the term.

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[201] Bland, Douglas L. "Parliament, Defence Policy and the Canadian Armed Forces." School of Public Policy Studies, Queen's University, 1999. 15.
[202] Miljan, Lydia. "Public Policy in Canada, an Introduction 6th Ed". Oxford University Press, 2012. iii.

Conclusion

There is a well-established public policy process in Canada. Driven by convention, the order is appropriate and intuitive. The process invites analysis and participation at various steps but also presents the risk of bias and pre-conceptions entering the analysis. By understanding the influence, both intended and un-intended, that the process can have on the final policy statement, greater consideration can given to the identification of issues, the definition of the policy options, and the development of policy courses of action. Being cognizant of the contest between differing schools of policy approaches in adopting a policy will impact critical relations that are required for the ongoing administration and implementation of defence policy. Finally, entrenching expectations and the tools of policy evaluation within the defence policy statement, will better guide the administration of defence policy in Canada.

Final Conclusion

Defence policy is unique amongst public policy. The objective of a defence policy is to prepare for a series of eventualities that the Canadian public would rather not have to contemplate. Defence policy is tied to foreign policy in a way that often makes it the most recognizable face of Canada's actions abroad. This paper has reviewed the past seven defence policies and statements of Canada dating back to 1964. There are some constants and conventions as well as some outlying practices that have appeared throughout these policies. Adding structure to the defence policy product, the document that becomes the statement of the Government's defence policy can help guide the policy process and ultimately turn out a more effective and detailed defence policy. Chapter 1 of this paper has identified best practices and conventions from Canada's past defence policies and incorporate them into a model for future defence policies. In turn these practices provide a series of considerations, both advantages and

risks for governments in the statement of policy detail. Depth of detail is a constant requirement for an effective policy. Whether it is the depth of analysis of the current strategic environment, detailed expectations of the roles of the CAF or detailed funding priorities and procurement plans, brevity in the policy process and written policy, does not serve Canada well.

Chapter 2 of this paper has analyzed the most current defence policy statements of Canada's allies in order to determine best practices that may benefit a model for Canadian defence policy. The outcome of this analysis was again a finding that depth of detail characterized these allied policies. Additional information traditionally not found within Canadian defence policies such as executive summaries, detailed global regional analysis, a link to industrial policy, cyber, and the environment, would all serve to guide planning and aid in the administration of defence.

Chapter 3 establishes the role that the defence policy process plays in informing the defence policy structure. Retaining a commitment to the use of a consultative process that strives for consensus is the best means for ensuring that a defence policy will be successfully executed. Ensuring that a common understanding of how a defence policy is to be implemented and reviewed by enshrining the processes within the structure of the defence policy would facilitate the administration of defence in Canada.

With few exceptions in Canada's past defence policies, defence policy statements have been non-partisan in their expression. Internationally amongst our closest allies, defence policies have also been non-partisan. Like the men and women who execute defence policy in Canada, the structure of the defence policy should also be characterised by a lack of partisanship in order to reflect Canada's resolve to maintain its sovereignty and its position in the World. Future research may look at the success of various defence policies in achieving their stated goals and

policy objectives. The use of a familiar and effective structure for a Canadian defence policy, with an appropriate level of analysis, would be much more likely to see that policy achieve its objectives.

Canadian Defence Policy Structure and Content- a Model



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