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## DEVELOPING A PERSONNEL RECOVERY DOCTRINE FOR THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

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### JCSP 41

#### *Exercise Solo Flight*

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Maj Y.R. Soulard

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## INTRODUCTION

*It is essential that you ensure you have the knowledge, information, and training necessary for you to properly assess and solve the problems which will face you and your men. All this must be done to the very best of your ability regardless of the size or importance of the problem. Never accept the second best or mediocre solution because you think the problem is not worth your time and effort.*

– Air Commodore (retired) Leonard Birchall, 17 September 1997

On Christmas Eve 2014, Lt Muath Kassarbeh, a young Jordanian F-16 fighter pilot, unknowingly took-off from Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in northern Jordan for what would become his last sortie.<sup>1</sup> He was tasked to conduct a bombing run over the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) stronghold of Raqqa in Syria but incurred an aircraft malfunction requiring him to eject from his doomed aircraft. After safely parachuting to the ground, Lt Kassarbeh's bad run of luck continued as he was subsequently found and captured by ISIL. Given that his captors were non-state actors, at least for the time being, and were not signatories to the Geneva convention regarding the treatment of detainees and Prisoners of War (POW), Lt Kassarbeh's was not afforded any of the customary rights and privileges normally afforded to individuals in his unfortunate and dire position. Negotiations for his release were initiated between his home nation of Jordan and ISIL but stalled<sup>2</sup> and ultimately failed, resulting in Lt Kassarbeh being executed in a horrific manner by being burnt alive in a locked cage as a number of ISIL militants looked and cheered on.<sup>3</sup> The graphic nature of his death, released by ISIL to the world on a video titled "Healing of the Believers' Chests" via social media left nothing to the imagination.

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<sup>1</sup> Taylor Luck, "'How Hostage Pilot Drama is Feeding Antiwar Movement in Jordan," *The Science Monitor*, January 30, 2014.

<sup>2</sup> Courtney Coren, "Jordan: Release our Pilot, or we'll kill all ISIS captives," *NEWSMAX*, 30 January 2015.

<sup>3</sup> Abby Ohlheiser, "Islamic State Video Appears to show Burning Death of Jordanian Pilot," *The Washington Post*, February 2015.

The propaganda video highlighted the dangers to service men and women partaking in modern combat operations, especially those against non-state actors, who may not abide by any international convention regarding POW or detainees.

At first glance, this brutal and savage act appears to serve no other purpose than to fulfill some sort of depravity for the offenders and on-lookers. However, this act did indeed serve a far higher, strategic purpose. The murder was a means in order to achieve a specific end. It was a mechanism designed to attack and compromise political decision makers in the hopes of gaining leverages at the tactical and strategic levels. Most states, even non-democratic ones, are susceptible to the whims of public opinion and must guard against any significant blowback against the perceived non-legitimacy of military operations. Jordan is no different. It was reported that this incident “plunged the government and King Abdullah into crisis mode as [Jordan] scrambles to return its pilot and justify the country’s role in the anti-IS coalition before an increasingly skeptical, and deeply divided, Jordanian public”.<sup>4</sup> Losing public opinion, even when confronting an entity as vicious and determined as ISIL, would inevitably affect the decision makers and their desire and ability to remain committed to the fight. Ironically, ISIL’s recent public execution of a number of captured individuals be it American journalist James Foley,<sup>5</sup> Japanese journalist Kenji Goto and his country man, adventurer and traveler Harura Yukawa<sup>6</sup> and Lt Kassasbeh might actually be a provocation by the group in order to goad a more aggressive response by western states in the hopes of initiating a major conflict within the region. A number of prominent ISIL members such as Sheikh Abu

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<sup>4</sup> Taylor Luck, "How Pilot's Capture Threatens Jordan's Position in Islamic State Fight," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 26 December 2014.

<sup>5</sup> CBS / Associated Press, James Foley: U.S. should do more for hostages," *CBS*, Feb 2015.

<sup>6</sup> Global Post, "The Islamic State Beheading are Firing Up Japan's Hawks," February 2015.

Muhammad al-Adnani, the Islamic State's chief spokesman, have repeatedly expressed the group's desire of triggering the Apocalypse, to which "they are key agents"<sup>7</sup>, in order to "restore the Islamic caliphate."<sup>8</sup> Any major conflict would provide the jihadist group with more propaganda fodder that could be used to sway more individuals, especially young Muslims to their side. By triggering a more aggressive military response, ISIL hope to demonstrate the real intentions of the West, and most notably the United States, that they "want to embark on a modern day Crusade and kill Muslims"<sup>9</sup> thereby increasing their image as the only viable vehicle to fight against this western oppression and sway more individuals to their cause.

This type of propaganda requires available individuals to be exploited. Be it downed airmen, captured sailors,<sup>10</sup> or unfortunate civilians in the wrong place and time, any time a group can exploit individuals for the explicit purpose to exert pressure on political decision makers, it behoves states to implement measures to mitigate such impacts. These measures can take the form of policy, doctrine, training, equipment, capabilities and willpower; however, ignoring the problem and hoping that such an event won't affect them is not a viable course of action nor is it sufficient or ethical to implement an *ad hoc* solution to a predictable problem. For Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel deployed overseas in operations such as Operation MOBILE over Libya supporting rebels against the pro-Gadhafi forces<sup>11</sup> or for Operation IMPACT, Canada's

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<sup>7</sup> Graeme Wood, "What ISIS really Wants," *The Atlantic*, no. 2 (2015), 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>10</sup> "Iranian Hostage Crisis Criticism." *The Press and Journal*, July 23, 2007.

<sup>11</sup> Department of National Defence, Government of Canada, "Operation MOBILE," <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/op-mobile.page>

contribution to the Middle East Stabilization Force, in the hopes to halt and degrade ISIL in the Republic of Iraq and in Syria<sup>12</sup>, can they expect that the current Personnel Recovery (PR) doctrine and policy are robust enough to satisfy and meet the requirements of current operations? Given Canada's recent propensity to engage and participate in international operations, is the government prepared to handle a PR incident such as the Jordanian case? What mechanisms, if any, have the Government of Canada (GoC) and by extension, the Department of National Defense (DND) and the CAF in place to facilitate a recovery of an Isolated Personnel (IP)?

Although impractical to provide preventative training to all individuals such as civilians that venture in risky locations, this cannot be the case for CAF. Military personnel that find themselves isolated from friendly forces for whatever reason should know what is expected of them and more importantly, what they can expect from their Chain of Command (CoC) in the form of support. However, for a great majority of Canadian military personnel, this is not the case. Although there is some training and minimal doctrinal guidance on the subject, it is certainly uneven and definitely not holistic in nature. This paper will argue that in order to mitigate a crippling moral degradation and a public relations fiasco of having a military personnel exploited and possibly executed for the gains of another actor, be it state or non-state, it behooves the CAF to not only articulate but also implement a comprehensive PR doctrine that is feasible and realistic for an organization the size of the CAF to achieve. By doing so, it would not only demonstrate the ethical and leadership commitment to its personnel but

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<sup>12</sup> Department of National Defence, Government of Canada, "Operation IMPACT," <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-impact.page>

also provide the GoC with the means to counter possible criticism by its populace regarding the way that it is willing to deploy its personnel to hostile environments without providing the required support to do.

This paper will achieve this by first examining the current CAF PR doctrine and available training. It will compare and contrast this to its closest allies, namely the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and Australia. The chapter will also look at the NATO requirements for PR and ascertain if Canada is attaining its obligations. Chapter two will provide the reader with more concrete PR vignettes such as the downed American F-15E, callsign Bolar 34 during the Libyan campaign and the case of the Canadian civilian Amanda Lindhout and highlight how these individuals were or could have been exploited by enemy forces which will emphasize that the threat is real and must be acknowledged as an inevitable occurrence that will affect a CAF personnel. Chapter three will provide direction as to how to tackle this deficiency by suggesting feasible and realistic solutions that can be implemented without requiring any new capabilities or a major inject of new capital.

## CHAPTER ONE

*“We have learned from our experiences during the Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo that CF personnel, deploying into harm’s way, must be properly trained and prepared for any possible situation, including capture as a result of combat operations. These situations may be anticipated and trained for in the context of Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) training.”*

– General R.R. Hénault, 9 August 2000

Given the seriousness of the consequences of having a captured CAF military personnel exploited for the benefit of propaganda, tactical advantages, or for pure sadist desires, it is imperative that deployed personnel are afforded the best chance of avoiding such a scenario. Regardless of how diligent a state is in preparing its personnel to face such a fate, doctrine, training and capabilities cannot and will not prevent all scenarios. However, what it will do is provide confidence to personnel that they matter and are important, provide guidance to Commanders and their staff as to how to maximize the chances of recovery and reintegration and ultimately provide the government with a justifiable mechanism as to minimize their liability to the public, its military, and its allies. This chapter will examine the CAF PR doctrine and compare and contrast it to the “Gold Standard”, the US PR doctrine and also look at doctrines from more comparable sized allies such as the UK and Australia as well as NATO given the obligations has in regards to that military alliance.

### CANADIAN PR DOCTRINE

As implied earlier, the consequences of having military personnel exploited after they have become IPs during the course of executing their mission for a government



approve operation can prove disastrous at the political level. Given these consequences and Canada's current propensity to engage and participate in international military operations such as Afghanistan, Libya, and most recently Iraq / Syria, one would expect that such a nation would in fact have a robust, overall encompassing and realistic PR doctrine already in place. Sadly, this is not the case. Perplexingly, neither the GoC nor the CAF have as of yet promulgated any overarching strategic guidance or doctrine regarding PR. Furthermore, at the component level, neither have the Canadian Army (CA) nor the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) put forth any direction or guidance on PR. Currently, only the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) has produced any guidance on the subject, and that only recently and as a subset of its Move sub-function of its overall aerospace doctrine. Of note, this paper will not look at SOF PR doctrine and will exclude it for a number of reasons given their unique composition, tasks, and employability would require a security classification and more importantly is not germane to this discussion since their specific guidance and direction would not translate to the entire CAF. The aim of a strategic PR doctrine is to provide guidance and direction namely for Operational Commanders and their staffs, conventional forces either effecting the recovery or being recovered and to the government as a whole.

As indicated, the RCAF aerospace doctrine identifies PR as one of the two capabilities comprising its Move doctrine, the other being Air Mobility. It is the highest level document within the CAF which attempts to provide a definition of what PR is and determines that: "PR has application across the spectrum of conflict, and relies on a comprehensive approach that integrates military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to recover

IP.”<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, it provides the roles associated with PR namely “search and rescue (SAR), combat recovery (CR), combat SAR (CSAR), and non-conventional assisted recovery (NAR)”<sup>14</sup> and highlights that “the level of hostiles and the individual training of the IPs” is the criteria for role selection between roles.”<sup>15</sup> Given the scope of this definition, indicating that it is not solely a military domain but a Whole of Government (WoG) one, which it is or at least should be, the document is implying that there is higher level guidance as to whom a WoG approach to PR would take form.

Furthermore, the PR definition within the aerospace doctrine is not consistent. Within the Aerospace Move doctrine, it articulates that PR is “the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to recover and reintegrate IP and/or recover persons in distress.”<sup>16</sup> The difference in both definitions is subtle but significant nonetheless. Clearly, one incorporates reintegration into the definition, which is an important aspect. It is the implication of the term “reintegration” that important to note. As we shall see, reintegration does not simply imply retrieving an IP and bringing them back to a friendly base. It implies how the CoC will provide medical, including specialized mental and psychological care for the IP which further implies that the CAF Health Services has been actively engaged and has an all-encompassing plans or procedures for such an event which is not necessarily the case. It is important to note that this particular PR definition

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<sup>13</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, ed., *B-GA-400-000/FP-000-Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine*, 2nd ed., 2010), 73., 44.


<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, ed., *B-GA-404-000/FP-001- Canadian Forces Aerospace Move Doctrine*, 1st ed., 2011), 76., 37.

was taken directly from the US doctrine, as per the footnote within the reference.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, what can be deduced from these two slightly different definitions is that it is not an organically CAF derived solution for the problem set and it probably did not result from a top-down approach which may not necessarily suit the CAF and the GoC's intent. However, as we shall see further on in this chapter, those particular definitions are generally those accepted within western nations. The point of highlighting this discrepancy was to emphasize the ad hoc approach taken by the CAF to deal with this problem and that a serious review of PR activities may be required.

Continuing the examination of the Aerospace PR doctrine, it differentiates between two types of events within the military PR area of responsibility as depicted in Figure 1.1



**Figure 1.1 – The Personnel Recovery Spectrum**  
Source – Aerospace Move Doctrine..., Chap 3

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

The capabilities depicted on Figure 1.1 represent the entire scope of the military PR options superimposed against a threat axis. Military PR is separated into two branches, Personnel Recovery Activities and Personnel Recovery Operations (PRO). Before moving on, it would be useful to provide the reader with definitions of each recovery options so as to understand how they all fit together.

Under PR activities, there are three main aspects: Domestic SAR, Urban SAR and Deployed SAR. All of these activities are conducted in a no-threat or permissive environment. Domestic SAR according to the RACF Move doctrine is “the use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea.”<sup>18</sup> Urban SAR (USAR) is “the capacity to rescue victims from major structural collapse or other entrapments”<sup>19</sup> while Deployed SAR is “the recovery of persons in distress, located in an international theatre of operations, where there is no risk of hostile interference.”<sup>20</sup> It should be highlighted that the reference material continually switches between the terms “personnel” and “persons” which are two different groups of peoples. It is unclear if this was done by design or by accident, regardless, it reinforces the previous point that this section might not have been vetted by Subject Matter Experts prior to its dissemination.

With regards to Combat Rescue operations compared to SAR activities, there is an implication that any recovery of an IP would be conducted in a non-permissive

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<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

environment with some level of threat against the IP or the recovery asset(s). Combat Recovery (CR) operations are conducted when “either the recovery force, or the isolated personnel, or both, have not been trained in CSAR tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).”<sup>21</sup> Given the inherent danger of conducting such operations with either the IP or the recovery forces untrained in PR procedures, the risk associated with these types of operations must be clearly understood up the CoC and should not be undertaken lightly. By its very definition, any military, component or Command can conduct CR but it should not be the primary solution. Ideally, militaries would conduct CSAR which is “the application of specific TTPs by dedicated forces to recover isolated personnel, who themselves are trained and appropriately equipped to receive this support, from a situation where hostile interference may be expected.”<sup>22</sup> By doing so and by having all concerned parties trained and familiar with these types of operations, it greatly reduces uncertainty, risk and inefficiency. However, such operations come at a cost, be it a training cost, resource cost or personnel cost. Not all militaries can realistically meet these costs, however, there are alternative which are practical and achievable which will be covered later on in Chapter Three. The last element is Hostage Rescue which involves “the recovery by Special Operations Forces (SOF) of isolated personnel who have been taken hostage by hostile adversaries. Recovery situations may need the assistance of SOF when conventional means are not suitable.”<sup>23</sup> This last type of operations would most likely result after the Diplomatic and or the Civil options have failed to secure the release of the IP. In Canada’s case, it would certainly involve the Department of Foreign Affairs,

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<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

Trade and Development (DFATD), SOF and other CAF support elements working in an integrated approach framework. These types of operations do not normally involve conventional military forces and require the highest level of approval.

According to the RCAF Move doctrine, the differentiation between PR activities and PRO is that: “These distinctions are consistent with *CFJP 3.0, Operations*, which discuss the differences between classical military operations and whole-of-government approach (or comprehensive approach) activities”<sup>24</sup> and that “Canada recognizes a distinction between personnel recovery *activities* and *operations*, based on the status of the personnel being recovered (i.e., whether they are isolated or in distress) and/or the level of threat.”<sup>25</sup> Unfortunately by differentiation between PR activities and PRO, terms which are not used by any of Canada’s allies just confuses the issue. Given that one of the provided definitions of PR is the “sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to recover and reintegrate IP and/or recover persons in distress”, does that not imply a WoG approach to PR for all recovery activities / operations? Furthermore, when does a Deployed SAR activity, arguably limited to military personnel since Canada has no mandate to conduct SAR “activities” of isolated persons in other nation’s SAR jurisdiction without their consent and approval, cease to be an activity and becomes an operation given that the recovery would be conducted using “classical military operations” regardless of threat level? By utilizing the terms PR activities and PR operations, under the same umbrella confuses the issue.

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, footnote 37.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

Delving deeper into the PRO, the reference indicates that for such operations to be successful, “elements must be thoroughly trained, organized, and equipped to perform its own unique actions,”<sup>26</sup> all of which will help in the accomplishment of “the five PRO execution tasks (report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate).”<sup>27</sup> Presumably, given the importance of these tasks, one would expect that some sort of definition or context to guide the reader as to what exactly these tasks entail. Sadly, this is not the case. Nowhere are these terms explained with respect to PRO, therefore requiring the reader to look elsewhere for the answer further diluting the relevance of the RCAF PR doctrine. The answer can be found in allied publications, which will be examined later on in the chapter but the point to remember is these PRO tasks require, “elements that are trained, organized, and equipped” but without a strategic direction and guidance, this notions seems far removed from reality.

Interestingly, the RCAF is the only agency that considers Urban SAR as a standalone activity instead as a subset of Domestic and Deployed SAR. Why not maritime SAR, mountain SAR, arctic SAR? As mentioned, the RCAF aerospace doctrine is the only one to include references to isolated persons. All the other publications that will be reviewed in this chapter only utilize the term Isolated Personnel inferring a military connexion be it actual military personnel or civilians under contract and employed by their respective militaries. Finally, most of the aerospace chapter pertaining to PR describes domestic SAR activities in great detail spanning issues from SAR missions, Canadian SAR area of responsibility, SAR Agreement, characteristic of SAR

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<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

forces, etc... comparatively to Combat Rescue Operation definitions as the sole subheading for PRO. The issue being drawn out is that by including domestic, national SAR activities for civilians, it confuses the overall PR topic. This is not to imply that such activities are not important, to the contrary, they are and will remain a national priority and should be treated as such; a critical capability that shouldn't be confused with any other capability. Furthermore, by simply categorizing all other PRO under the umbrella of combat rescue and the subsequent three operations of CR, CSAR and Hostage Rescue, it leaves the reading with the impression that PRO is a reactionary only capability requiring little forethought and planning. By doing so, the RCAF doctrine fails to highlight all that is required to achieve a minimal level of readiness regarding PR and how to actually conduct such operations, or in the case of the CAF, how its allies will facilitate such them on our behalf.

The review of CAF PR doctrine has revealed a significant doctrinal gap within the organization. The little doctrine that has been produced, although helpful, is severely lacking in any detail, overly focuses on domestic SAR to the detriment of military personnel deployed in overseas operations and finally doesn't showcase the normal robustness and Canadian content that normal CAF doctrine possesses. Given that doctrine is the foundation to base follow-on operations, training and direction, it should come to no surprise that PR within the CAF has been ignored for far too long which will lead to disastrous results for personnel, the CAF and the GoC. With a review a doctrinal review of CAF conducted, it is time to examine what, if any, type of guidance Canada's closes allies take.



## **UNITED STATES PR DOCTRINE**

Without a doubt, the US has developed and implemented the most robust, comprehensive and all-encompassing PR doctrine available. Unlike the Canadian one, the US PR is acknowledged in their very highest strategic documents which have had a trickle-down effect for the CoC. US PR guidance, as it is currently known, was implemented immediately after the Korean War when President Eisenhower signed into effect the US Code of Conduct. Since then, it has grown, developed, and changed to fit the various operating environments in which the US finds itself working in. Furthermore, in 2008 President G.W. Bush signed the National Security Presidential Direction (NSPD) – 12, Annex 1 moving PR from simply a US Department of Defence (DoD) concern to a WoG one. Building on such high level direction, the US government has promulgated a number of supporting documents such as DOD Directive (DODD) 1300.7, Training to Support Code of Conduct, DODD 3002.01E, PR in the DOD, DODD 3003.1, Code of Conduct Training and Education, DOD Instruction (DODI) 1300.23, Training for Civilians Contractors, DODI 2310.4, Repatriation of US POW's, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3270.01A, Personnel Recovery and there are many others. The US DOD Joint PR doctrinal publication, JP 3-50 is the end result of these higher level documents and serves as the primary PR doctrinal document for the US military. To ensure that all aspects of PR are identified and covered, each service thereafter drafted their own specific PR direction. For example the US Army has promulgated Field Manual (FM) 3-50, Army PR and the US Air Force has issued the Air

Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 3-50, PR Operations to further refine their individual service PR requirements. There are a number of supporting documents, but the point is that the US government, as a whole, has taken ownership of this issue and is providing direction for subordinate agencies.

There are a number of reasons as to why the US has dedicated and provided so much guidance on the subject. The historical evolution of this mindset is a complicated and convoluted, one deserving its own paper; however, their current desire to maintain and enhance this capability is due to increased operational tempo in non-conventional campaigns. “The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report identifies Afghanistan and Iraq as indicative of the shift in warfare from major conventional combat to multiple, asymmetric operations.”<sup>28</sup> This shift in warfare is perceived as a real, lasting one in American operations requiring the US to have and implement a “strategic emphasis on PR due to the advent of today’s overseas contingency operations and continuing emphasis on the need to conduct major combat operations.”<sup>29</sup> Unlike the Canadian position, PR is understood as a fundamental operating principle that requires the attention of the entire government to achieve and carries with it significant weight and interests from the highest level of government to the individuals conducting the actual operations. Building upon the strategic direction, PR operations are now entrenched in the DoD mindset in that the CoC has an ethical and moral obligation to do what it can to recovery all IPs including but not limited to preparing, training, conducting and setting such

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<sup>28</sup> David Meggett C, "Evolution of Rescue: Personnel Recovery for a New Environmnet" Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California), 55., 1.

<sup>29</sup> Chad Sterr USAF, "Strategic Rescue: Vectoring Airpower Advocates to Embrace the Real Value of Personnel Recovery," *Air & Space Power Journal* 25, no. 3 (Fall 2011.), 26-36., 26.

operations as a high priority<sup>30</sup> for success, a somewhat different take than the Canadian approach.

For the scope of this paper, I will restrict the range of US PR publication to the JP 3-50 given that its broad enough to encompass all US military Services but narrow enough to avoid discussing the WoG approach. Unlike the Canadian PR doctrine, JP 3-50 provides clear direction and guidance to subordinate organizations as to how the US understands, frames and tackles the PR problem. Furthermore, it delineates a comprehensive PR system addressing the entire PR architecture and how all the pieces fit together. So, how does the US define PR? It frames it as “the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to affect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.”<sup>31</sup> As previously indicated, this is the same definition that the RCAF uses; however, unlike the RCAF, the US publication further expands as to what is expected by all involved and how this task is to be achieved. Furthermore, it expands on the objectives of PR namely that:

PR is a system in which the objectives are to return isolated personnel to duty; sustain morale; increase operational performance; and deny adversaries the opportunity to influence our military strategy and national will by exploiting the intelligence and propaganda value of isolated personnel. It is a system comprised of preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation functions.<sup>32</sup>

The JP 3-50 concept of PR is much more defined, comprehensive, and mature than the RCAF’s. According to the reference “The RCAF has an operational and moral

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<sup>30</sup> United States Department of Defence, *Joint Publication 3-50, Personnel Recovery*, Vol. 1, 2007), 283., I-1.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

obligation to protect and recover military and civilian personnel alike, from any type of hazardous or hostile environment.”<sup>33</sup> There is no inference of the operational reasons as to why such activities should be conducted, the repercussion if failing to do so or any reference to any system under which to conduct such operations. Clearly, the RCAF concept of PR requires some more forethought.

The US definition of IPs also helps to cage the problem set by restricting to those that it applies to. Accordingly, JP 3-50 defines IPs as:

US military, DOD civilians, and DOD contractor personnel (and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense [SecDef]) who are separated (as an individual or group) from their unit while participating in a US-sponsored military activity or mission and who are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape (SERE). Additionally, when directed by the President of the United States or the SecDef, DOD shall provide PR support to other governments, agencies, organizations, and individuals in accordance with (IAW) all applicable laws, regulations, and memoranda of agreement or understanding.

Although much more verbose than the Canadian definition, again, it frames the problem set in a very specific fashion thereby allowing decision makers to properly understand the problem and then provide solutions. The RCAF definition is too broad in scope, encompasses too many similar but different mandates resulting in a diluted and useless guidance.

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<sup>33</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GA-404-000/FP-001- Canadian Forces Aerospace Move Doctrine*, 76, 37.

As alluded to earlier in this section, the keystone aspect of the DoD PR doctrine is the creation and articulation of a robust PR system. The entire system is summarized in Figure 1.2.



Figure 1.2. DoD PR System  
Source: DoD PRETC PR 301 Student handbook..., Chap 2<sup>34</sup>

Although the model appears convoluted, it does convey the breath of forethought that is required in order to be able to conduct some level of PRO. It should be noted that the DoD differentiate between deployed and domestic SAR operations and they do not include the latter since it is the purview of the US Coast Guard to execute. What is clear is that the DoD PR model does showcase the “Gold Standard” of PR operations, a standard that can be tailored to fit any nation’s requirement as long as the minimum aspects are considered. The model can be more readably understood by looking at the top four broad functions, namely and in chronological order of execution: preparation, planning, execution and adaption.

<sup>34</sup> United States Department of Defence, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, *Personnel Recovery Planning and Operations Student Handbook*, ed. Personnel Recovery Joint training Center, Vol. 1, 2013, 120.

Preparation requires some sort of policy and doctrine, the appropriate training and education for the various roles, be it as an IP with SERE, PR planning for staffers or PR considerations for commanders and the appropriate equipment. Currently within the CAF, and as previously indicated, there is very little policy and doctrine provided, no all-encapsulating PR specific equipment programme. There are some tactical level units that do provide some measure of PR training such as the Canadian Forces School of Survival and Aeromedical Training (CFSSAT) in Winnipeg Mb and the Conduct After Capture (CAC) School in Kingston On. The former is an RCAF unit, conducting training for RCAF aircrew and the latter is a Canadian Defense Academy (CDA) unit conducting resistance after capture training for personnel deemed at high risk for exploitation. Although both units produce extremely high training results, they are nonetheless conducting training independently of each other, with separate CoC. Furthermore, the training is targeted almost exclusively to IPs and not to conventional recovery assets (once again excluding SOF units) nor to the commanders and staff thereby missing key and fundamental PR elements. The goal of the preparation function is to increase the situational awareness (SA) of the IP, recovery forces and the commander and his or her staff. This SA produces and is in turn required for the different inputs and outputs at all levels, be it tactical, operational and strategic, but all working together with the goal of diminishing the overall assessed and associate risk level for PRO.

For any military operation to be successful, planning is a critical aspect, should not be circumvented and should be the purview of the appropriate commander and his or her staff. They must consider any and all available PR options and categories such as Joint,

multinational, component specific, Other Government Agencies (OGA) and the IP to successfully plan such operations. Plans must consider other government mechanism for recovery such as diplomatic and civil and always consider the specific environment, friendly and adversarial capabilities. Specific environment considerations may require a thorough analysis of the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) factors in order to determine and ascertain if the mission is feasible and how such mission may affect the overall instruments of national power such as the Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME) capabilities.

The execution is normally where most individuals focus their attention<sup>35</sup>, especially since it is the one function that has the most tangible results, focuses at the tactical level to achieve. This is not to say that it is not a critical component but simply one of four. It is within this function that we find the report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate tasks. Also within this function is where we find the SERE concept. That is to say that the first five tasks are what the CoC and friendly forces are conducting while SERE is what the IP should be doing, and hopefully only requiring the “survival” and “evade” portion of SERE and not the “resist” nor “escape” elements.

“The report task consists of actions required to provide notification that personnel are or may have become isolated. The report task begins with the recognition of an isolation event and ends when appropriate command authorities are informed.”<sup>36</sup> Clearly

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<sup>35</sup> United States Department of Defence, " *Joint Personnel Recovery Agency*," <http://www.jptra.mil/> (accessed May, 10, 2015).

<sup>36</sup> United States Department of Defence, *Joint Publication 3-50, Personnel Recovery*, 283, I-6.

this is an essential step, requiring the Command and Control (C2) network to be in sync in order to minimize time delays.

“The locate task involves the effort taken to precisely find and confirm the identity of the IP. It starts upon recognition of an isolation event and continues until the IP is recovered.”<sup>37</sup> This task is continually refining and updating the IP’s location. Given that recoveries could take days and be conducted far from the initial position that the IP became isolated, especially if the threat level is high and with an enemy force saturating the area, this task can be just as challenging as actual recovery. A critical aspect to this task is the notion of authentication, normally a pre-requirement to initiate a recovery. IPs that do not have the means to accurately self-locate and self-report can cause tremendous challenges for recovery forces, hence the requirement to have the proper equipment in place.

“The support task involves providing support to both the isolated person and to the isolated person’s next of kin. The support to the isolated person may begin upon recognition that an individual is isolated and ends when the person is recovered.”<sup>38</sup> There are a number of different ways that the CoC can support the IP, be it by establishing two-way communications, increasing the IP’s SA, providing morale-building support, suppressing adversary threats, delivering subsistence and supplies, or providing directions to a cache. Small levels of support can have a tremendous positive effect on the IP thereby not only increasing their desire and belief that they can and will be recovered

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<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, I-7.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*



but this act also decreases the overall risk level for the mission. A motivated IP is a strong asset for PRO.

Arguably the most critical task is recovery. “This task involves the coordinated actions and efforts of commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel to bring isolated personnel under the physical custody of a friendly organization.”<sup>39</sup> Even with the assets available to the US, no single recovery system, force or organization is suitable for or can meet all requirements in any given situations. As such and in order to cover all contingencies, the US employs a mix of conventional and non-conventional recovery capabilities such as trusted locales, other government agencies and allies to assist.

Flexibility and redundancy are key tenets for such operations. One fundamental aspect of recovery is the amount of responsibility that the IP has in the overall process and they are expected to facilitate their recovery with whatever means possible. This would be one of the major differences between recovering personnel and persons in distress. The latter are under no obligation or expectation to help in their recovery, the former are.

The last task and the one that is often overlooked is the reintegrate task. “This task begins when the recovery force relinquishes positive control of the recovered isolated personnel to a designated member of a reintegration team or organization.”<sup>40</sup> The critical aspect of this task is that there are individuals, organizations that are trained and ready to assist IPs in this function. It comprises not only the medical system but the IP’s own unit,

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<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> United States Department of Defence, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, *Personnel Recovery Planning and Operations Student Handbook*, 120, I-8.

service and family as well, all designed to minimized the physical and psychological injuries suffered by the IP. “The reintegrate task employs systematic and controlled methods to process recovered isolated personnel from the time they are recovered until they are fully reintegrated with their unit, their family, and society.”<sup>41</sup> This task cannot be left to the individual units to sort of but instead requires a whole of service and even WoG approach.

The final function is adaptation. Not critical during a PR event *per se*, it is still nonetheless important in that it assures continuous improvement to the PR system through lessons learned, assessments and concept development and enables recovery forces to better prepare for PR mission thereby reducing overall risk.

A critical element to the overall US PR system is that they understood very early in this process that in order to facilitate the smooth function of this system, it requires an agency to champion the issue. As such, the US created the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA). The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) is a Chairman's Controlled Activity. JPRA is designated as the “DoD's office of primary responsibility for DoD-wide personnel recovery matters, less policy”.<sup>42</sup> The agency has evolved since its inception, initially being under the “US Air Force as executive agent (EA) for escape and evasion activities. Training was mostly for pilots and aircrew as they were considered

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<sup>41</sup> United States Department of Defence, *Joint Publication 3-50, Personnel Recovery*, 283, I-8.

<sup>42</sup> United States Department of Defence, "Joint Personnel Recovery Agency," <http://www.jptra.mil/> (accessed May 10, 2015).

the most likely to be isolated.”<sup>43</sup> Since then, the agency has evolved into its current form and ensures standardize training for all aspect of PR and is a critical node for analytical support, technology research and integration, maintenance of databases and archives, and development of lessons learned and is the primary point of contact for initiating outside DoD discussions and liaison.

Another key difference between the US and Canada is that unlike Canada, the US has designated combat recovery assets identified and trained for such operations. The list is long and won't be repeated here but suffice to say that the problems plaguing the US PR recovery asset do not revolve around the legitimacy of such activities but instead are questioning how to best imply such assets. The changing operating environment has caused a shift in thinking from a predominantly Air Force focus activity to a Joint one.<sup>44</sup>

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By establishing a PR system and more importantly identifying all of the core military functions within it, be it Command, Sense, Act, Shield and Support, the model provides a legitimacy and framework for dealing with the problem set. Clearly, the amount of resources required to meet the US level of effort cannot be currently matched by any other nations, including Canada; however, the framework is sound and can be

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<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> "Giambastiani: Expanding Personnel Recovery Capacity Critical to U.S., Allied Success." *Defense Daily International* 8, no. 3 (Jan 19, 2007,) 1.

<sup>45</sup> Andrew Drwiega, "Personnel Recovery: The Risk of Cutting "Insurance" Cover," *Rotor & Wing*, Jan 2015.

<sup>46</sup> Meggett, *Evolution of Rescue: Personnel Recovery for a New Environmnet*, 55

<sup>47</sup> William J. Rowell, "Whole of Government Approach to Personnel Recovery" United States Army War College).

modified to fit as required. This aspect will be examined later on in Chapter Three. What is clear is that PR is an important aspect of military planning and cannot be left to chance. The moral and ethical obligation that the CoC has towards its deployed personnel is reciprocated by a trust from its personnel. Individuals know that in such an event, the organization will do what it can to retrieve them and they in turn know what to do to facilitate their own recovery. However, this level of effort requires significant amount of resources, time, and money to achieve. Clearly, there is a huge delta between the “Gold Standard” and the Canada’s. The question now, is what direction have smaller and like-minded nation’s such as the UK and Australia provided regarding PR to their militaries and can any insight be gleamed for improving Canada’s anemic PR doctrine.

## **UNITED KINGDOM PR DOCTRINE**

Just like the US, the UK has promulgated a detailed PR doctrine at the strategic and joint level. Within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) publication, Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-66, it highlights the obligation of the government to “reduce, wherever possible, the risk to the lives and welfare of its citizens, including servicemen and women. The provision of a capability to recover personnel who may be placed at risk is a moral obligation recognisable to all.”<sup>48</sup> Again the same theme of a moral obligation on the part of the host nation to do what it must to effect the recovery of its deployed personnel. Interestingly, the UK definition of PR does not include a reintegrate function within it. Accordingly, the UK defines PR as: “Joint Personnel Recovery is the aggregation of

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<sup>48</sup> United Kingdom, Ministry of Defece, *Joint Warfare Publication 3-66, Joint Personnel Recovery*, Vol. 1, 2003), 59., 1-1.

military, civil and political efforts to obtain the release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether they are captured, missing or isolated.”<sup>49</sup> The publication goes on to explain PR operations by utilizing a PR model contrasted against a threat level which is almost identical to the RCAF model although much less developed implying that RCAF model was heavily based on the UK model.




Figure 1.3. UK Spectrum of Personnel Recovery  
Source: JWP 3-66..., Chap 2

The UK model fails to include the civil and diplomatic aspect of PR and replaces Hostage Rescue with Special Forces (SF) Operations. Otherwise, it is striking similar with the RCAF model. One of the disappointing aspects of the publication is that it never defines what an IP is. It never specifies if it includes civilians or not thereby leaving some confusion on the matter. It does, however, indicate that Search and Rescue operations, as defined within the scope of PR, is “to save lives and is directed principally towards but is

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-2.

not restricted to, the rescue of military personnel of the Allied Nations.”<sup>50</sup> This implies that IPs, at least with regards to the UK definition, is restricted to military and does not include civilians as does the RCAF definition. One of the more surprising omissions within the publication is that it makes no mention of reintegrating of personnel within units. Given the importance of such a function, the omission is curious and may highlight the immaturity of the document. Interestingly, the UK SERE Training Plan (TP) does rectify this shortcoming and includes the reintegrate function as a critical pillar of PR.<sup>51</sup> It should be noted that the UK SERE TP was issued in 2010, time enough to identify the shortcoming, however, perhaps not enough time for a new edition for the JWP 3-66 to be issued. It will be worthwhile to examine if future editions correct this omission, however, such omissions are still valuable lessons for others, such as Canada, trying to develop their own doctrine.

The UK, unlike Canada has established a focal point for PR training and doctrine development. The Department of SERE Training Organization (DSTO) located at the St Mawgan’s Royal Air Force Base (RAF) has a mandate to “delivery and assurance of quality SERE training on behalf of Defence in order to support current and contingent operations.”<sup>52</sup> DSTO is a recent creation and incorporates the RAF’s and Royal Navy’s (RN) survival with the Resistance Training Centre in one location in order to standardize training and policy. The impetus for the creation and the amalgamation of multiple separate school occurred as a response to the RN’s HMS CORNWALL hostage incident

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<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*,1-3.

<sup>51</sup> United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, "RAF St Mawgan, Defence SERE Training," <http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafstmawgan/aboutus/defenceseretraining.cfm> (accessed May 10, 2015)., 398.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

with Iran in 2007<sup>53</sup> and the findings report by the House of Commons issued in March 2008.<sup>54</sup> This example will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 2 and serves as an example of how vulnerable states are to IPs being exploited by states and non-state actor alike.

The UK, unlike Canada, has had a recent PR incident that caused embracement to government requiring an overall haul of their PR system. It could also be argued that their doctrine possess some deficiencies, however, compared to the Canadian doctrine, it is much more robust and serves as good starting point planning development and guidance. Having a central agency responsible for the overall coordination of all PR elements creates a level of robustness to their programme that is seriously lacking within the Canadian context. The merit of having any joint PR doctrine serves as an excellent starting point for discussion and refinement; without one, it is difficult to even initial such discussion.

## **AUSTRALIAN PR DOCTRINE**

Comparable in size to Canada with regards to population and military, the Australian PR model should showcase what is achievable for Canada. The Australian PR system, unlike Canada, does include a strategic, joint oversight document that provides guidance to subordinate commanders. The Australian Defence Doctrine Publication

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<sup>53</sup> Daniel Dombey, Steve Negus and Gareth Smyth, "UK Plays Down Hopes on Captives as Iranian Envoy Freed TENSIONS IN GULF," *Financial Times* Apr 4, 2007.

<sup>54</sup> United Kingdom, House of Commons Defence Committee, *The Iran Hostages Incident: The Lessons Learned. Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2007–08.*, 2008.

(ADDP) 3.6—*Joint Personnel Recovery* is to be used by commanders, staff and key personnel employed in the planning or conduct of JPR.<sup>55</sup> The publication describes the concepts, process, capability, command, control, communications and planning for the effective conduct of JPR, guidance that is clearly lacking within the Canadian context.

The Australian PR doctrine defines PR as “the military, diplomatic and civil efforts to recover and reintegrate isolated personnel”<sup>56</sup> and has been identified as a fundamental commitment of the Australian Chief of Defence Force to ensure. Interestingly the Australian definition of IP is robust and includes:

Isolated personnel are those who are separated from either their unit or organization and/or in a situation requiring them to be recovered. This includes personnel who are held against their will or not in control of their situation. Isolated personnel are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist or escape. The term includes military personnel, civilians, contractors and other people as required by the mission.<sup>57</sup>

Much broader in comparison to the previous three examples, it would be interesting to examine if such a broad perspective is an advantage or a detriment to their system. Furthermore, like Canada, the Australian model includes SAR operations but it clearly indicates that it is not a military mandate but an Australian Maritime Safety Authority one. It does indicate that the ADF can and has been called in to assist in such operations and that it must be prepared to do so in the future. Ingeniously, the Australians have developed a PR spectrum model that is not overly restrictive in nature and is broad

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<sup>55</sup>Australian Government, Australian Defence Force, *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.6—Joint Personnel Recovery*, 2nd ed. (Cambera, Australia: Defence Publishing Service, Department of Defence, 2011).

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*, 1-1.

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid.*



enough as to avoid any pigeon holes and clearly delineates between civil and military obligations.




Figure 1.4. Australian JPR Spectrum  
Source: ADDP 3-6..., Chap 1

This may not be possible for Canada given the CAF's mandate to conduct civil SAR, however, it may be useful in changing the RCAF nomenclature from domestic SAR to civil SAR and separate military and civil operations. By avoiding the unnecessary division of PR activities versus PRO that Canada utilizes or the overly restrictive PR model that the UK uses, the Australian model diminishes the confusion between the military and civil operations thereby reducing any possible conflict between the two. The ADF doctrine does identify all the necessary types of operations but stops short of placing them in a hierarchal model implying that such operations are not tied to specific criteria but all unique with individual considerations.

Furthermore and demonstrating a maturity in the doctrine development, the Australians have borrowed and modified the American PR system with the understanding that it requires a holistic PR approach to implement and be successful.



Figure 1.5 – ADF Recovery Operations Process  
Source – ADDP 3-6..., Chapter 2

The model is clearly based on the American one and utilizes the same four PR functions of preparation, planning, execution and adaption but definitely shows an ADF modification of limiting the focus of system to the commander and their staff, the IP and

recovery forces and omitting WoG approach. Clearly an examination of what is and is not feasible for the Australian model was carried out and showcases a genuine desire to maximize their effect while remaining realistic with regards to scope, resources and expectations. It was not simply a copying of an ally's doctrine and passing it off as their own, it was a concerted effort to address the problem while remaining consistent within their own overall doctrinal guidance.

### **ALLIED PR DOCTRINE**

To complete the material review, this paper will examine if any PR guidance exists within any alliance in which Canada is already a member. Not surprisingly, due to the important nature of PR, that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has already established clear and robust guidelines for its members to adhere to. In 2011, NATO issued a BI-SC Joint Personnel Recovery Joint Operational Guidelines indicating that “a doctrinal gap concerning NATO Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) could impact mission accomplishment in ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) and other current and future operations”<sup>58</sup> indicating that there was a discrepancy and disparity between NATO members. The document is extremely robust and delineates the expectations of participating nations and why each contributes to the overall PR system. It implies that each nation is expected to provide a minimum level of training prior to their personnel prior to entering any operational deployment and indicates that due to the nature of the alliance, it is imperative to minimize negative PR situation such as an IP without the

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<sup>58</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Agreement, *BI-SC Joint Personnel Recovery Joint Operational Guidelines*, 2011.

proper training. As such, the NATO direction seeks to establish a system that provides protection to operational security and morale of NATO personnel by ensuring for their recovery and reintegration, in case they become isolated, enhancing the PR capabilities of NATO by sharing, where possible, the lessons learnt during PR exercises and missions. It also provides the applicable documentation for the preparation and conduct of PR operations, a suitable infrastructure plan (including commanders, staffs and recovery forces) prepared for PR and the establishment of agreements with other organizations and the appropriate PR training and equipment standards.<sup>59</sup>

The document covers all aspects of PR including setting standards for training and tactical level consideration. It touches upon this aspect, although being careful not to overstep its bounds and infringe on national sovereignty issues, however, given the nature of the alliance, it was imperative to have a common language to base policy on. Furthermore, given the nature of this alliance, the guidance provide makes it clear that its applicability applies to “both military and non-military participants involved in NATO operations, NATO led operations and training”<sup>60</sup> but makes sure to avoid domestic, civilian SAR within its scope although it does indicate that NATO militaries can provide such service if requested. By separating these two capabilities, the NATO PR spectrum focuses on deployed operations and avoids any confusion of including civilian and domestic SAR operations. The distinction provides clarity and limits the scope of the problem thereby focusing the solutions. It also provides very specific definition with regards to PR, IPs, SERE and reintegration. Accordingly, PR is “The sum of military,

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<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, iii.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-1.

diplomatic and civil efforts to effect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel”, IPs are “Military or civilian personnel who are separated from their unit or organization in a situation that may require them to survive, evade, resist exploitation, or escape while awaiting recovery” while reintegration is “the operational process of providing medical and psychological care to personnel recovered from isolation and debriefing them for intelligence and lessons learned purposes.”<sup>61</sup>

Canada’s definition of PR is almost identical to NATO’s which was borrowed from the US doctrine except that it takes on “persons in distress” to ensure that civilian SAR is incorporated in the definition. The NATO definitions of both IP and reintegration are more focused than Canada’s and even to some of the other nations that have been examined. Furthermore, whereas Canadian doctrine places great importance on the PR activities, PRO definitions and how they contrast with a threat level, NATO simply considered these terms as a recovery mechanisms with each PR event. NATO simplifies the PR problem down to factors, PR elements, recovery method and PR option within a diplomatic, military and civil environment with education and training tying it all together as per Figure 1.5.

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<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*




Figure 1.6 – NATO PR System  
 Source - BI-SC Joint Personnel Recovery Joint Operational Guidelines..., Chap 2

By simplifying all the elements down to the ones depicting in the figure, NATO has removed most of the nation specific considerations and concerns that may cause friction within an alliance. The rest of the document continues by expanding on all the principles and then provides specifics including guidance as to how to train for all aspects of PR in the event that a nation has yet to develop a coherent PR doctrine of their own. Ironically, by being a signatory and member to NATO, unless a particular nation has reservations on certain direction and guidance, NATO expects that each member will strive to meet the minimum standards promulgated; a standard that Canada falls well short of achieving and is one of its founding members.

Interestingly, some European nations have found the NATO standard too low for their requirements and have begun conducting specific PR training and developing PR doctrine outside of NATO. These nations, collectively known as the European Air Group (EAG) comprised of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the UK and seek to “develop suitable ideas and initiatives into projects with the aim to produce useable end-products that promote interoperability between the EAG or partner Air Forces.”<sup>62</sup> One of the most notable services that the EAG provides to their partner nations is a yearly PR training event. The event known as the Combined Joint Personnel Recovery Standardization course (CJPRSC) provides training to both staff and recovery units in a joint, combine and realistic scenario.<sup>63</sup> The realization that no nation, except for the US, can produce enough resources to conduct full spectrum PRO, is not lost on a number of nations and demonstrates what they will do in order to ensure that they do possess this capability.

NATO by its very nature seeks to ensure that all members have a common understanding, at least with regards to military operations. This interoperability is key to their success and could almost be considered one of its Centre of Gravity's (GoC). Therefore, NATO goes to great lengths as to ensure that a minimum standard is promulgated and is achievable by all its member nations and PR guidance is no different. By providing broad enough guidance and reinforcing it with implementable training, NATO is seeking to ensure that any PR event will be handled and conducted as a plan

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<sup>62</sup> European Air Group, "The EAG Home Page," <http://www.euroairgroup.org/> (accessed May, 10, 2015).

<sup>63</sup> "Spanish Scenarios Test Personnel Recovery Techniques." *Rotor & Wing*, February 2012.

scenario thereby minimizing risk to all involved but more importantly diminishing the political risk that such an event can have on nations and the alliance. Canada would be well served to review this doctrine and incorporate what it can.

## **CONCLUSION**

The literary review of the Canadian PR doctrine contrasted against a number of likeminded nations has revealed that in this particular domain, Canada has fell behind. Arguably, the most egregious lapse is the CAF's failure to develop a comprehensive PR doctrine. This chapter has demonstrated that even nations of comparable size and capacity such as Australia, have managed articulate and craft sound PR doctrine that is not only applicable but achievable. It demonstrates the seriousness of the matter and their willingness to tackle the problem instead of ignoring it. Furthermore, the "Gold Standard" was examined and showcased a mature policy with a WoG approach to deal with such events. Given their propensity to deploy their personnel to overseas operations, the US has recognized the importance of having such an insurance policy in place. They are keenly aware that a PR event, arguably a tactical incident, can have devastating and negative consequences at the strategic levels. They have crafted and communicated the importance and seriousness of properly handling any PR events to the CoC with the intent of minimizing their effects.

Nations such as the UK, stung by such a recent negative PR event, have overhauled their PR system and produced doctrinal guidance resulting in excellent



tactical education and training for their armed forces. Furthermore, Canada needs to look no further than to Australia or NATO to find doctrinal guidance. Its very nature makes Australia an ideal nation to follow in this area. Coincidentally, the very meaning of NATO guidance is to ensure that all members have a common understanding of any particular problem, direction or procedure to avoid misunderstandings and to facilitate operations. It is surprising that the CAF has of yet put forth any such joint PR doctrinal guidance.

The literature has also shown striking similarities between the main definitions but enough variance as to imply individual state influence. The RCAF doctrine clearly shows elements from the US and UK doctrine while also attempting to reconcile the unique Canadian aspect of national civil domestic SAR. It is the only doctrine reviewed that does so and the only one to include the term “persons in distress” obviously referring to civilians in need of recovery within national boundaries in a permissive environment. However, by doing so, it muddles the issue, detracts from the true purpose of PR. This is not to imply that domestic SAR in support of civil authorities is less important than PR, quite the contrary, given its history and importance within the RCAF and the GoC it has and shall remain so. Interestingly, by incorporating civil SAR to the extent that the RCAF has done within its doctrine implies that its doing an overall good job of addressing PR issues given its outstanding track record regarding civil SAR. Arguably, the CAF could argue that given that it is meeting most of the PR activities and operations delineated within doctrine with only a small gap within the combat recovery umbrella, that overall, its successful with regards to PR. Doing so denies the true intent of PR, that is recovering deployed personnel that may be exploited for the gain of an enemy state or non-state

actor. Canadian allies have recognized this fact and have developed their doctrine to reflect these ideas, however, for some unknown reason, perhaps due to its relatively few PR events involving Canadians; Canada has failed to address this deficiency.

Canadian allies are unanimous in their treatment of PR as a serious issue requiring forethought and planning to overcome. Perhaps, as just implied, this is due to the relatively small number of Canadian PR incidents. Perhaps, it is not a serious enough problem or that the CAF has developed other doctrinal guidance and direction as to avoid or minimize such incidents as to become almost improbable thereby minimizing the risk. This line of reasoning, one of only a few possible reasons given the moral and ethical obligation for the CoC to meaningfully attempt a recovery of a Canadian IP, will eventually be proven erroneous. Given Canada's current rate of overseas operational deployments, eventually Canadian personnel will find themselves as an IP requiring all their training and knowledge to assist in their own recovery. The following chapter will provide some recent PR examples spanning the entire gambit of operations highlighting the requirement for the CAF to address the issue in a meaningful way.

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