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## FULLY INTEGRATED AND DOMESTICALLY FOCUSED: THE FUTURE CANADIAN ARMY RESERVE

Maj F. Sauvé

### JCSP 41

#### *Exercise Solo Flight*

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## Introduction

The Canadian Militia is one of the longest standing institutions in Canada. It was formed well before Confederation and helped to defend Canada and Canadians at home and abroad. However, the contemporary operating environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War and therefore the role of the Canadian Army Reserve (ARes) needs to be re-examined. Consequently, what operational employment concept and tasks should the ARes have in today's operating environment? The ARes should be fully integrated into the force structure of the Canadian Army (CA) using the total force concept. Based on this operational employment concept, the tasks assigned to the Reserves should align with their level of baseline training and maximize the fact that they are located throughout Canada. Therefore, the ARes should be first responders for domestic operations and provide individual and sub-unit augmentation for longer term expeditionary operations, while developing capabilities in specialized areas that can be drawn from their civilian expertise. This essay will not discuss the structure and organization of the ARes, nor will it cover the Rangers and Cadets.

The paper will look at the operational employment of the ARes and will not specifically address the strategic level. A review of the past operating environment and the contemporary operating environment, along with the employment of reserves in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and some of our Allies will allow us to draw out some of the key operational employment concepts and tasks upon which the ARes could fall into. These will be analyzed to determine the best fit for the ARes in today's operating environment. The basic assumption in this article is that there will be no change in the level of resource allocation (funds, personnel, or

equipment) for the ARes in the near future. The paper will be broken down into four sections. The first section will provide an overview of the Militia and the ARes since their inception to today, to include their operational employment concept and tasks. This will be followed by a review of how the RCN, the RCAF, the United States Army Reserve (USAR), and the United Kingdom Army Reserve (UKAR) employ their reserves. Thirdly, based on the two previous sections, possible operational employment concepts and tasks for the ARes will be examined. Lastly, this paper will propose a way ahead for the ARes in keeping with their proud traditions.

### History of the Militia

The Militia has its roots in the colonial past of the French and British presence in North America. During the past almost 400 years, the roles and tasks given to the Militia have changed based on the threat. Starting as a force to keep the peace and protect settlers, to mass mobilization for expeditionary operations for both World Wars, the Militia is now at a cross roads. This section, broken down into three parts, will review the operational employment of the Militia and ARes in relation to their operating environment. The first part will cover from colonial times to World War I, the second will cover the inter-war period, World War II and the Cold War, and the last part will cover the post-Cold War to Afghanistan period.

The origins of the Militia can be traced back to the early principle of *levée en masse* of colonial North America under the French regime. After the conquest of the British in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, the British Army was primarily used to keep the peace in

Upper and Lower Canada.<sup>1</sup> Following the withdrawal of the British Army in 1855, the Province of Canada enacted the first Militia Act.<sup>2</sup> The act provided for a small volunteer force of 5,000 soldiers to replace the British soldiers in keeping the peace at home. However, in response to the Fenian Raids in 1868, the number was raised to 40,000 volunteers. In 1885, the Militia's first large-scale operation was the put-down of the North-West Rebellion.<sup>3</sup> The Militia's first expeditionary operation came at the end of the century when a force of just over 8,000 men took part in the Boer War, although some were regulars.<sup>4</sup> World War I brought about mass mobilization and conscription, and the Militia formed the base for this mobilization. Almost 10% of Canadian soldiers during WWI were still in the Militia (not called up for regular service) and provided critical capabilities back in Canada.<sup>5</sup> Up to this point, the Militia was essentially the only fighting force in Canada since the threat was domestic, except for a very small Regular cadre, but this was about to change on the heels of World War II.

The inter-war period was characterized by large scale demobilization of the CA and the Army retained only a small Permanent Force to train the Militia.<sup>6</sup> Again, for the mass mobilization for World War II, the Militia served as the backbone. This was especially true for the training of the civilians. The CA grew from 7,945 in 1939 to 838,199 in 1945, in large part due to the efforts of the Militia.<sup>7</sup> Following World War II, Canada entered NATO and the defense of Europe became a major task. For the first time

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<sup>1</sup> David Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper* (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2011), 18.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>4</sup> Corinne McDonald, "The Canadian Armed Forces: The Role of the Reserves," <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/prb9911-e.htm> (accessed 12 Jan, 2015), 3.

<sup>5</sup> Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 18.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>7</sup> McDonald, *The Canadian Armed Forces: The Role of the Reserves*, 4.

in history, 'the focus had shifted from the reserves to the regulars.'<sup>8</sup> Regular forces were saved for Europe, while reservists were called upon to go fight in Korea (although most reservists were all veterans from World War II). During the Cold War, it was assumed that the nuclear threat would result in a short war giving insufficient time for mobilization, training and equipping the Militia.<sup>9</sup> The Militia was therefore given the tasks of 'national survival', essentially the civil defense of Canada in the event of nuclear war, while the regular force was responsible to help our European allies.<sup>10</sup> However, due to budget restraints in the late 1970s and 1980s, the government started to look at the total force concept for the integration of the regular and reserve forces.<sup>11</sup> This was going to be a significant change in the operational employment of the Militia following decades of being the basis for mass mobilization.

Following the end of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear war and massive state-on-state conflict diminished. Also, the cost of keeping a large regular force was not popular with the government since the threat was now from non-state actors. The total force concept, the integration of regular and reserve force into a total force, was put into practice.<sup>12</sup> Essentially, the role of the ARes was now to provide augmentation, either as individuals or formed groups, to the CA for operations. The Regular and Reserve Forces were amalgamated in the CA under a single chain of command. During operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, reservists made up between 15 and 20% of the personnel and in the Former Yugoslavia, even formed reserve platoons and infantry companies were

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>10</sup> Jack English, *The Role of the Militia in Today's Canadian Forces* (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2011), 12.

<sup>11</sup> McDonald, *The Canadian Armed Forces: The Role of the Reserves*, 4.

<sup>12</sup> Shahryar Pasandideh, "Total Force," Atlantic Council of Canada, <http://natocouncil.ca/total-force/> (accessed 13 Feb, 2015).

deployed.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, the CA shifted to a total force, but the integration, role and tasks of the ARes were never clear, either domestically or internationally, and current CDS direction and guidance barely acknowledge the reserves.<sup>14,15,16</sup> However, for Afghanistan new capabilities were required which the Army thought reservists were better suited to perform such as civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and psychological operations (PSYOPS). Today, the majority of those capabilities reside in the ARes and they are also looking at expanding into cyber defence.<sup>17</sup> However, the remainder of reservists feel they are second-class citizens and are only called upon when the regular force can no longer sustain a deployment or operation.

The ARes has a proud past from their colonial beginnings, through the mass mobilization for both War Worlds, to their integration into the total force of today. Generally, their operational employment has been dictated by the operating environment and the threats to Canada and its Allies. Now that the threat of state-on-state conflict has lessened and the threat from non-state actors in failed states is sharply on the rise, the CA is looking at new ways to benefit from the talent and potential residing in the ARes and to fully develop this critical capability. In order to better understand the possibilities available to the CA, we now turn our attention to how the other services and our Allies have organized their reserves to complement their total force.

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<sup>13</sup> English, *The Role of the Militia in Today's Canadian Forces*, 29.

<sup>14</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *Chief of Defense Staff Guidance to the Canadian Armed Forces* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 7 Jun 2013).

<sup>15</sup> Gen T. J. Lawson, *Primary Reserve Strategic Guidance: Vision, Mission, & Guiding Principles*, Vol. 1901-260\0 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 15 Dec 2012).

<sup>16</sup> Gen T. J. Lawson, *CDS Directive for CAF Force Posture and Readiness 2013* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 28 Jun 2013).

<sup>17</sup> LGen J. M. M. Hainse, *Presentation by Commander of the Canadian Army - Briefing to 4 Div HCol* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 25 Oct 2014), 15.

### What Are Other Reserve Components Doing?

Most reserve forces have now moved from the concept of the reserves being the basis for mass mobilization to the total force concept. However, each reserve force has adapted their reserve component in slightly different ways to maximize the capabilities they bring to the total force. This section will review four other reserve forces. The first will be the RCN and the domestic and specialized focus of its reserve component. The RCAF will then be examined and how they fully integrate their reserve component for routine and expeditionary operations. Thirdly, the concept of the Abrams Doctrine and the employment of the USAR will be reviewed and how this has divided the capabilities of the US Army between its active and reserve components. Lastly, the recent shift to the total force of the UKAR and especially the pairing of regular and reserve units will be examined.

The RCN reserve component is a fairly new concept, but they have fully integrated this capability into their total force. The Naval Reserve's primary role is to fill specific capabilities within the RCN. The biggest being the manning of the Maritime Coastal Defense Vessels, 10 of 12 which are manned by reservists, and they undertake surveillance, fisheries protections, drug interdiction and search and rescue missions.<sup>18</sup> The Naval Reserve is also responsible for harbour defence, naval control of shipping, mine countermeasures, and administrative and logistic support. They also maintain 24 divisions across Canada in order to 'maintain a naval presence, thereby fostering

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<sup>18</sup> Richard Weitz, *The Reserve Policies of Nations: A Comparative Analysis* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 59-60.



community and public relations.<sup>19</sup> The RCN has therefore decided to use regular forces for expeditionary, high threat, and high readiness missions, while utilizing the reserves for domestic routine operations and sustainment of the force.

Unlike the RCN, the Air Reserve is fully integrated into the RCAF. In order to achieve this, 'reserve units have been consolidated with their regular force counterparts into integrated units.'<sup>20</sup> This means that air reservists are 'employed on almost every type of aircraft in the Canadian Forces inventory' and this 'allows the optimisation of readiness and sustainment levels needed to fulfill the Air Force mandate.'<sup>21</sup> Their tasks include surveillance and control of Canadian airspace, world-wide airlift, support to the Navy and the Army, and search and rescue.<sup>22</sup> The RCAF therefore employs reservists for almost every task except to fly fighter jets. They have mostly employed reservists on domestic routine operations for the defence of Canada and on expeditionary operations in support roles. Despite the different employment concept from the RCN, they both employ reservists primarily for domestic routine operations and only have augmentees for high-readiness and deployed operations.

The focus will now shift to other Army reserves, starting with the US. The USAR has undergone major changes to its employment concept since the Vietnam War. The primary reason for this change is a political one in that the then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Abrams, wanted to ensure the US government would never again go to

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<sup>19</sup> McDonald, *The Canadian Armed Forces: The Role of the Reserves*, 13.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>22</sup> Canada. Senate. *Answering the Call, the Future of Canada's Primary Reserve* (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, 2011), 12.

war without the need to call up the reserves.<sup>23</sup> This would in effect ensure that the President and Congress would have the tacit approval of the population for going to war. The US Army therefore devised their employment concept, called the Abrams Doctrine, on the total force concept. Several capabilities, mostly combat support and combat service support including specialised trades, were transferred primarily to the reserve component. These include logistics, medical, transportation, construction engineering, civil affairs, and military information support operations (similar to PSYOPS).<sup>24</sup> Since the US Army reserve component is divided into two, the USAR and the Army National Guard, different tasks are assigned to each. The primary mandate of the Army National Guard, under the authority of the state governor, is to provide assistance in case of civil emergency and natural disaster. Army National Guard units also provide augmentation to deployed operations. On the other hand, USAR is part of the total force and deploys as part of the total force on all operations. In Iraq and Afghanistan, reservists comprised more than 30% of the ground force.<sup>25</sup> Lastly, in order to keep the USAR sustainable in the future, several efforts have been put in place such as the Army Force Generation process in order to cycle the reserve component formations and units through rest, training, and deployment phases much in the same manner as active units.<sup>26</sup> The US Army firmly believes that reservists have unique skill sets and capabilities that they bring from their civilian employment and they should harness this potential to make the

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<sup>23</sup> United States. Library of Congress, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components* (Washington: Library of Congress, 2007), 15.

<sup>24</sup> United States. US Army, *The United States Army Reserve 2014 Posture Statement* (Washington: United States Army Reserve, 2014), 3.

<sup>25</sup> Weitz, *The Reserve Policies of Nations: A Comparative Analysis*, 8.

<sup>26</sup> Joseph E. Whitlock, *How to make Army Force Generation Work for the Army's Reserve Components* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 4.

US Army a better fighting force. On the other hand, the British have looked at closer integration between regular and reserve units to foster integration.

The UK has gone through a major review of how to employ their reserve forces. A White Paper was published in 2013 crafting the way forward for their reserves. The UK Army has fully embraced the concept and has reorganised not only its reserves but also their regular units to ensure full integration of the UKAR into the total force. The White Paper expressed clear roles for the UKAR at home and abroad. At home, they are responsible for homeland security such as the Olympics, and resilience such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.<sup>27</sup> Abroad, they will be used for short-term operations such as non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), and long-term operations such as stability operations, standing commitments (Cyprus, Falklands, etc.), defence engagement, conflict prevention, and security sector reform.<sup>28</sup> In order to have soldiers ready to accomplish this myriad of tasks, each reserve unit is now paired with a regular force unit. The reason for this is two-fold, firstly it is to integrate the training of both units and foster closer ties between the reserve and the regular force, and the other is to have a broader local community engagement across the UK.<sup>29</sup> Two specialised tasks have also been given to the reserves: medical and cyber, since they are closely linked to civilian skills. In sum, their employment concept is to use regular units for high readiness and contingency tasks abroad, and reservists for routine domestic operations and low threat and longer duration tasks overseas.

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<sup>27</sup> United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued* (London, UK: Ministry of Defence, 2013), 17.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>29</sup> United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence, *Transforming the British Army: An Update - July 2013* (London, UK: UK Army, 2013), 3.

The RCN, RCAF, USAR and UKAR have implemented the total force concept in different ways to achieve integration of reservists. However, a few trends emerge from this study. Generally, reservists are used for routine domestic operations, while regular forces are used in high-readiness, high-threat and expeditionary situations. The other is that specialised skills that are readily transferable from the civilian sector to the military are generally given to the reserve component as an economy of effort. These are medical, cyber, and construction engineering. Apart for the USAR, which is structured for political reasons, all other reserve components are given roles and tasks which maximize the efficiency of the reserve component by ensuring similar training to regular forces, but understanding that they will never have the same equipment and training time to fully develop the same capabilities. Based on the employment concept and tasks of these reserve components, we will now examine the breadth of these which the ARes could be called upon to perform.

#### Employment Concept and Tasks for the Army Reserve?

The Militia and the reserve components have gone through several changes based on the history of the nation and the operating environment. Canada for the most part has very rarely been threatened on its home soil and therefore most of its combat operations have been overseas, which is very different from our British colleagues. The operating environment has shift from state-on-state conflict to non-state belligerents in failed states and this has required a different kind of mobilisation from the reserves. This section will detail the possible employment concept and tasks, at the operational level, that the ARes could be called upon to perform. The concept of mass mobilization versus total force, domestic versus expeditionary operations, and others considerations will be examined in

order to lay the foundation for the discussion on the proposed tasks in the last section of this paper.

The two broad concepts for the employment of any reserve component are mass mobilization and total force concepts. Mass mobilisation refers to the fact that the reserve component acts as the basis for mass mobilization in the event that the entire nation needs to be mobilised for war as was done for World War I and II.<sup>30</sup> Under this concept the reserves are structured as units throughout the country and during mobilisation, they recruit, train, and form units ready for deployment overseas. This process is generally lengthy and needs appropriate strategic warning to be effective, but is very cost effective during periods of little to no conflict. At the other end of the scale is the total force concept. This concept revolves around the premise that for the reserve force to be able to augment effectively the regular force, the full integration of reserve units and capabilities with their regular colleagues is essential.<sup>31</sup> However, funds and resources have to be allocated to the reserves to maintain their capabilities. As was mentioned in the two previous sections, the CA, its sister services and key allies, have all moved to the concept of total force, but with different levels of integration. The next parts will delve into the different levels of integration possible for the reserve component.

The first consideration is whether the reserve component should focus more on domestic or expeditionary operations and the types of tasks associates with each kind of operation. Traditionally, the role of the reserves, as with the *levée en masse* and the British Territorial Army, has been to defend the homeland. Therefore domestic

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<sup>30</sup> Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 46.

<sup>31</sup> Pasandideh, *Total Force*.

operations come to mind when talking about the reserves. Possible domestic tasks can include short lead-time tasks, such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance for natural disasters, aid to the civil power in the case of riots and civil disturbances, or longer lead-time tasks such as security for the Olympics and other international events. Although the immediate tasks require less training, they do require forces to be held at high-readiness levels to ensure an adequate response. The British have therefore decided to use regular forces for the immediate reaction and then handover the operation to reservists.<sup>32</sup> The US Army has the Army National Guard system to enable these types of missions. On the expeditionary front, short lead-time tasks include non-combatant evacuations, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, and warfighting crisis response operations and longer lead-time tasks could include rotations for stability and combat operations and foreign military training missions (although in Canada these are mostly done by the special forces). Recalling our earlier discussion, most of these tasks are given to regular force units due to the high readiness requirement and/or the amount of training required, the only exception being the UKAR being employed at the onset of stability operations. As can be seen from this discussion, the breadth of possible tasks that reserve forces could do is generally directly related to the level of readiness and the amount of training required of the force, which will be reviewed next.

This part of the discussion will concentrate of the level of readiness, the level of training, and the type of equipment required. Strategically, it is very hard to have reservists held at high-readiness levels, due to the hardship that civilian employers would have to endure. This is true for immediate response forces, but reservists could

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<sup>32</sup> Weitz, *The Reserve Policies of Nations: A Comparative Analysis*, 28-29.

reasonably be held at somewhat high-readiness levels such at 5 to 7 days' notice to move for domestic operations such as the UKAR high-readiness force.<sup>33</sup> The British are also using regular forces for the immediate response and then bring in reservists which frees up the regular force for contingency operations. Training is the other key aspect of any military force. LGen Hainse, the current Commander of the CA, has reiterated several times that reservists will train to the same standard, but not the same breath as their regular counterparts.<sup>34</sup> This means that reservists will generally be ready for low-intensity operations such as domestic and expeditionary stability operations, but will need to do additional training before deploying to high-intensity combat missions, which can be done as part of the pre-deployment training package of regular force units. Again, the British Army seems to have reduced this training deficiency by pairing regular and reserve units to capitalise on the funds available and the experience that can be exchanged during training events. Equipment allocation between the regular and reserve force is another hurdle to employment. Reserve units only have a wheeled fleet of unarmoured support vehicles. Although these vehicles are capable of delivering the required effects for domestic operations, they are not suited for medium to high threat environments. Again, this limits the tasks they could possibly do, and for any medium and high threat environments additional training on the equipment needs to be done prior to deployment, lengthening the readiness level of reservists.

Lastly, several reserve components and allies have given specialised tasks and capabilities to their reserve components. A few of these seem to be recurring across the USAR and UKAR. The first is medical capabilities. This is a capability that is best

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>34</sup> Hainse, *Presentation by Commander of the Canadian Army - Briefing to 4 Div HCol*, 8.

maintained in the civilian sector and can be drawn upon rather quickly for domestic operations and used for longer-term expeditionary operations. Operationally there are no concerns to such employment, but at the national level, provincial health care providers might not be happy losing experience health care professionals for expeditionary operations, but could be good for domestic operations. The second of these capabilities is PSYOPS. PSYOPS being a very niche capability, and only used on some deployed operations, makes it a good fit to be given to the reserves to develop. The only drawback is that such a capability, if not constantly developed, might not keep up with current trends and the contemporary operating environment. The last capability is the emerging domain of cyber defence. The USAR and UKAR have significantly used their reservists to fill this capability. Their argument is that civilians working in the IT field will always be up-to-date on the latest technology and this can be effectively transferred to the Army, without having to spend vast amounts of money on training.

This section provided a brief overview of the employment concepts and myriad of tasks that the reserve force could be called upon to perform. The key concept that determines the employment of reserve forces is generally the readiness and training levels at which the force can be held. Reservists are citizen soldiers and as such, being soldiers is generally not their primary duty, although they sacrifice a lot to become reservists. Therefore, the tasks and capabilities assigned to the ARes need to be in line with this reality. Although, the CA has slowly revamped the employment concept for the ARes, a proposed employment concept with accompanying tasks and capabilities will be argued next.



## Way Ahead for the Army Reserve

After an overview of the history of the Militia, the operating environment and the way other reserve components are employed, the focus now turns to how the ARes should be operationally employed and tasked. The CA has given specific domestic roles, with little further guidance, such as Territorial Defence Battalions and Arctic Response Company Groups, and specific capabilities such as CIMIC and PSYOPS to the ARes, but this is just the first step to capitalize on the potential the ARes has to offer.<sup>35</sup> This last section will be broken down into two parts, first an argument will be made for the total force concept to be the basis for reserve employment, and the second will be the tasks, in a domestic and expeditionary context, which should be assigned to the ARes.

Former Defence Minister David Pratt has argued in his review of the Militia that the ARes needs to be employed under the total force concept.<sup>36</sup> He further states that mass mobilisation should not be the basic role of the reserve because the operating environment has changed and the need to mobilise the entire nation is very unlikely.<sup>37</sup> Conversely, the group Reserve 2000, consisting of retired officers, argues that the reserves need to return to their origins as the basis for mass mobilisation because that is the only way to sustain recruitment and training in the reserve units.<sup>38</sup> However, the evidence overwhelming supports the full integration of the reserves and the regular force under the total force concept is the best way to achieve a trained and deployable reserve force at an adequate level of readiness in today's operating environment.

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<sup>35</sup> Samantha Bayard, "The Future of the Army Reserves," Department of National Defence, <http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/news-publications/national-news-details-no-menu.page?doc=the-future-of-the-army-reserves/hup7wgbk> (accessed 13 Feb, 2015).

<sup>36</sup> Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 75.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 74.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 22-24.

Integration can be divided into two aspects: personnel augmentation or by assigning specific capabilities to the reserve component. Personnel augmentation has been successfully done in the past using individual augmentees as was the case in Bosnia (up to the infantry company level) and in Afghanistan (up to the infantry platoon level). However, individual augmentees were never deployed with the initial entry force, and the platoons and companies were deployed either for camp force protection (specific task) or in the later stages of the missions when the threat was low. The second aspect of integration is the assignment of specific capabilities and the USAR has shown that it can be successfully applied. Several combat service support capabilities, such as logistics, transport, medical and construction engineering reside mostly in the reserves. For example, almost 70% of all medical personnel in the US Army are in the reserves.<sup>39</sup> The CA should therefore continue to develop the CIMIC, PSYOPS and cyber capabilities within the ARes. Based on this total force concept of integration of the reserves and regular force, tasks can now be assigned to the reserve in support of CA operational objectives.

As mentioned earlier, the 2013 reserve White Paper in the UK clearly laid out domestic and expeditionary tasks for the UKAR. The same can and should be done for the ARes. Domestically, reserve units are located in 117 communities across Canada and can provide an immediate response and local knowledge in the event of a natural disaster or aid to the civil power.<sup>40</sup> The only drawback to this concept is that the readiness level

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<sup>39</sup> United States. US Army, *United States Army Reserve: 2020 Vision & Strategy* (Washington: United States Army Reserve, 2011), 8.

<sup>40</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence., "Department of National Defence - Departmental Performance Report 2013-14, Canada's Reserve Force," <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-departmental-performance/2014-section-iv-canadas-reserve-force.page> (accessed 13 Feb, 2015).

required needs to be addressed at the national level with appropriate personnel policies. The other domestic task is national security which encompasses sovereignty operations, generally in the North, and security for international events, such as the Olympics or a summit. These tasks, which are generally planned, are a perfect way for the reserves to contribute to national security within their level of readiness and training and with the equipment they have available at their armouries. Internationally, the government generally deploys task forces for either immediate requirements, such as non-combatant evacuations, or in high threat environments, both of which reservists are not ready, nor trained to do at a moment's notice.

Therefore, the current model of using the reserve force as augmentees, for expeditionary operations, seems the prudent and best way to utilise their skills, since adequate pre-deployment training will bring them up to the required level for deployment. As the mission draws on, reserve platoons and companies could be trained to relieve the op tempo stress of the regular force. The only exception to this would be those reservists trained in the specialised capabilities, such as medical and cyber. These reserve units, would need to have personnel at the required readiness level at all times to support the regular force. Lastly, the pairing of regular and reserve units, just as the UK Army has done, would be an ideal concept to minimise the training and readiness gap prior to deployment. These units should remain paired not only for training but also for deployments. This would bridge the cultural divide between the regular and reserve force and reduce the accompanying friction visible during deployments.

The US Army and the UK Army, under the total force concept, have given clear tasks and capabilities to their reserve components and this has proven to be very

successful. On top of focusing the training, and allocation of funds and equipment, this has the potential of increasing the moral and therefore the recruitment of reservists – they can now expect to be treated in the same manner as regular force soldiers and are not just there to replace them when regulars become exhausted from too many missions. The CA is moving in this direction, but since the Land Reserve Restructuring Study of 1995, progress has been very slow. Domestic roles have been given to reserve units, but no specific tasks are assigned and readiness levels mandated. Also, now several capacities reside almost entirely in the reserve components, though very nascent such as PSYOPS and cyber defence.

### Conclusion

This paper argued the possible employment concept and tasks for the ARes in the future. The first section provided an overview of the Militia and the ARes since their inception to today and what their operational employment concept was based on the operating environment. This was followed by a review of how the RCN, the RCAF, the USAR, and the UKAR employ their reserves today. Thirdly, based on the previous two sections, possible operational employment concepts and tasks of the ARes were examined. Lastly, this paper proposed a way ahead for the ARes in keeping with their proud traditions.

The major conclusions from this paper are three-fold. Firstly, the ARes should be employed under the total force concept instead of mass mobilisation to permit a faster and better operational employment of reserve elements. Secondly, the key factors that should lead the discussion of which tasks to be given to the reserves are the level of

training and the level of readiness available in the reserve force. Thirdly, this generally leads to assigning low intensity and planned tasks to reservists, both domestically and internationally, while also assigning them specialised capabilities to draw from their civilian skills and experience. Therefore, the ARes should be fully integrated into the force structure of the CA using the total force concept and assigned tasks commensurate with their level of training and readiness.

In sum, the ARes should be first responders for domestic operations and provide individual and sub-unit augmentation for longer term expeditionary operations, while developing capabilities in specialized areas that can be drawn from their civilian expertise. This paper provided a brief overview of the possible employment concept and tasks for the ARes, but more detailed research and analysis into the structure and organisation required to sustain these tasks is required. Lastly, the Canadian Army Reserve has contributed immensely to the defence of Canada, from its early beginnings as a French colony to today's complex operating environment. It would be a disservice to these citizen-soldiers to just use them as replacement soldiers when the CA feels like it, instead of drawing on their vast experience and potential in today's complex operating environment.

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