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COMMUNITY-POLICING IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS: USE IT OR LOSE IT

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COMMUNITY-POLICING IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS: USE IT OR LOSE IT

Maj D.J.R. Riddle

Introduction

In the spring of 2005, the U.S. Army and its partnered Iraqi Security forces

outnumbered insurgents by more than 10:1, but the security situation deteriorated as Iraq

spiraled downward into what some argue was a full-blown sectarian civil war.[1] Yet, in

late 2005, something extraordinary happened in one of the most violent, insurgent

controlled areas of the Sunni triangle known as Al Anbar. Now known as the "Al Anbar

Awakening," Sunni tribesman openly swore allegiance to the government of Iraq while

local villages assumed responsibility for their own security, rooting out and eliminating

Al Qaeda safe havens from village to village with help from U.S. Marines and Iraqi

security forces. On the other side of the planet and under eerily similar circumstances, a

similar phenomenon occurred in the city of Springfield, Massachusetts. Like the Sunni

tribesmen of Al Anbar, local Springfield community leaders, along with their local police

department, assumed responsibility for the security of their own neighborhoods suffering

from significant criminal activity.

In both cases, community leaders and local police, not the U.S. Army, regained

control of their territory, improved security, and denied safe-haven to the criminal

networks that had previously terrorized their lives. So, if a few thousand citizens and a

handful of local security can defeat an insurgency and an organized crime network, why

does the U.S. Army struggle in counterinsurgency operations despite its capability to

deploy hundreds of thousands of Soldiers and its overwhelming technological advantage?

Although the recently updated U.S. Army Field Manual (FM 3-24, 2014) attempts

to improve upon the deficiencies associated with the recent counterinsurgencies in Iraq

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[1] United States of America, United States Government Accountability Office, *Stabilizing Iraq, Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces* (13 March 2007) p.6.

and Afghanistan, conventional military approaches to counterinsurgency have natural gaps that a trained law enforcement agency can remedy. If the United States Army wants to avoid making the same counterinsurgency mistakes that plagued it in Iraq, the United States Army should adapt its counterinsurgency strategy to incorporate aspects of "community policing," which have proven successful in Iraq, Springfield, Massachusetts and cities throughout the United States

In order to demonstrate the necessity to incorporate community-policing concepts into the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency operations, this paper defines and compares current U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine with community-policing concepts in both the U.S. and Iraq. First, this paper will describe the recently updated U.S. Army approach to counterinsurgency outlined in Field Manual (FM) 3-24, titled *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency* (2014).   Similarly, this paper defines "community policing," an contemporary term that describes a proactive and community-based law enforcement approach to defeating organized crime. By analyzing both approaches, one can easily recognize the similarities between the two approaches while recognizing the additional benefits that a community-policing approach could potentially provide to a counterinsurgency strategy.   Lastly, this paper describes how the Springfield, Massachusetts Police Department executed a community-policing strategy towards defeating an organized crime network that bares some similarities to the insurgency that plagued Iraq.

DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE

Although the concepts of community-policing have been around for years, the term itself is relatively contemporary and is often accompanied by a myriad of definitions

depending on the author or source. The U.S. Justice Department defines "community policing" as "a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime."[2] The International Association for Chiefs of Police (IACP) provides another example, defining community-policing as a process "involving three key components: developing community partnerships, engaging in problem solving, and implementing community policing organizational features."[3] The reader can find yet another definition in a recent study conducted by *The Center For Technology & National Security Policy*, where authors Samuel Musa, John Morgan, and Matt Keegan describe community-policing as a concept that "crime can be prevented through community engagement and non-kinetic force."[4] Despite the nuances associated with the aforementioned examples, it is possible to identify two common threads that exist within most definitions: proactivity and community engagement. Therefore, this paper defines community-policing as a *proactive* approach to law enforcement, centered on *community engagement*, that encourages problem-solving at the local level, thereby creating a bottom-up approach to security improvements and public safety concerns.

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[2] United States of America, United States Department of Justice, *Community Oriented Police Services (COPS)* (Washington DC: 2014) last accessed on 05 April 2015 at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/vets-to-cops/e030917193-CP-Defined.pdf.

[3] Discoverpolicing.org, "Community Policing," last accessed 23 April 2015 at http://discoverpolicing.org/whats_like/community-policing/

[4] Samuel Musa, John Morgan and Matt Keegan, "Policing and Coin Operations: Lessons Learned, Strategies, and Future Directions, in *Center for Technology and National Security Policy, the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office* (United States: 2011) p.8.

FIELD MANUAL 3-24: THE U.S. ARMY'S FOUR THEMES FOR DEFEATING AN INSURGENCY

U.S. Army publication 3-24, titled *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies* (2014) is the updated U.S. Army doctrine that outlines the military approach to counterinsurgency. Within this document, the U.S. Army outlines ten counterinsurgency "strategic principles" that are the foundation for how planners and practitioners think about counterinsurgency operations. Although FM 3-24 explicitly states that these principles are not exclusive, it does state that they are "normally relevant" regardless of the strategic or operational approach towards counterinsurgency operations.[5] After a thorough analysis of the ten U.S. Army principles, as defined within each of the following subsections, this paper simplifies the U.S. Army approach to counterinsurgency operations into four overarching themes: legitimacy, intelligence, decentralization, and persistence.

Theme One: Legitimacy

The first theme, *legitimacy*, is derived from principles one, four, seven and ten. The first principle, titled "legitimacy is the main objective," states that the U.S. Army must foster the development of a *legitimate* host nation government that can provide security and act in the best interest of its people. Since this principle explicitly highlights legitimacy as its main objective, it requires no further justification for incorporation into the *legitimacy* theme. Merriam-Webster defines legitimacy as the real, accepted, or official body who acts "in accordance with law or with established legal forms and

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[5] United States of America, United States Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency* (Washington DC, 2014) p. 1-19.

requirements."[6] The fourth principle directs all counterinsurgency forces to execute

security operations within a framework of the "rule of law." Since FM 3-24 directs that

all actions conform to the "rule of law," each action supports the development of a

legitimate host nation government and therefore warrants inclusion. The seventh

principle simply states that counterinsurgency and host nation forces must demonstrate

restraint in order to reduce suffering and prevent loss of life. Restraint has a direct

correlation to collateral damage, which the insurgents will use to discredit or *delegitimize*

counterinsurgency forces and the nation government it supports.[7] The last principle,

"Support the Host Nation," expounds on the first principle, stating that a *legitimate* and

functional government are necessary in order to defeat an insurgency, transition

responsibility to the host nation, and execute the long awaited exit strategy.

Theme Two: Intelligence

The second theme is *intelligence*, explicitly derived from principles two and three.

The second principle, titled "Understanding the Environment," describes how

counterinsurgency forces must understand the culture and society of the operating

environment they wish to influence. The third principle is focused on intelligence

gathering and dissemination, stating that effective counterinsurgency operations are

shaped by "timely, relevant, tailored, predictive, accurate and reliable *intelligence*

gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible level." Both principles are closely related to

the intelligence functioned outlined in Joint Publications (JP) 2-0 and 5-0, where the

purpose of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPoE) is to

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[6] Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, s.v. "legitimate."
[7] Kristian Williams, "The Other Side of COIN: Counterinsurgency and Community Policing," in Interface: A Journal For and About Social Movements 3, no. 1 (May 2011) p.85

describe the "relevant relationships within and between the various systems" of the Operational Environment that "directly or indirectly affect the problem at hand."[8]

Theme Three: Decentralization

Decentralization is a bit more abstract than the previous two themes because it is implicitly derived from principles three, eight, and nine. Although the third principle deals primarily with intelligence, it specifically highlights the criticality of counterinsurgency operations at the "lowest possible level." This concept is also explicitly mentioned in the title of the ninth principle, where "empowering the lowest level" is deemed critical to effective counterinsurgency operations because "local commanders have the best grasp in their situations."[9] According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the term decentralization is defined as the delegation of power from a central authority to regional and local authorities.[10] Therefore, one can conclude that principles three and eight easily fall within this definition. At this point, the reader should be asking the question: Why is decentralization important? The answer to that question is found within the eighth principle, which states that "skillful" counterinsurgency forces must adapt "at least as fast as the insurgency."[11] Therefore, this paper expands the Merriam-Webster definition and defines decentralization as the empowerment of counterinsurgency forces, at the lowest possible level, that can rapidly adapt in order to achieve the desired effects.

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[8] United States of America, *Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning* (Washington DC, 2011) p. III-11 and United States of America, *Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, Joint Intelligence* (Washington DC, 2013) p. I-3.

[9] United States of America, United States Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-24…*p.1-19.

[10] Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, s.v. "decentralization."

[11] United States of America, United States Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-24…*p.1-19.

Theme Four: Persistence

The fourth and last theme, *persistence*, highlights the criticality of time and the necessity to maintain a counterinsurgency force that can outlast the insurgency. Merriam-Webster defines persistence as "the quality that allows someone to continue doing something or trying to do something even though it is difficult or opposed by other people." This theme is supported by the fifth principle, which states that counterinsurgency forces must "prepare for a long-term commitment."[12] This principle acknowledges that insurgencies can last for many years and the concept of stamina, therefore, is just as important in counterinsurgency operations as any other. In conclusion, the U.S. Army's strategic principles for counterinsurgency operations, as outlined in the recently updated FM 3-24, are easily simplified into four overarching themes that are consistently referred throughout the remainder of this paper: legitimacy, intelligence, decentralization and persistence.

COMMUNITY POLICING AND CLOSING THE GAPS

Theme One: Legitimacy

Although a conventional military response to insurgencies may temporarily improve security, it typically bypasses the host-nation judicial process and therefore does very little to legitimize the actions of the host-nation government. The conventional application of military force not only bypasses the judicial process, but locals may perceive the use of military force against a local insurgent as excessive. As stated by Matthew Modarelli, the U.S. Army cannot achieve success with its "continued excessive

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[12] *Ibid.*

use of conventional military force."[13] This does not mean that conventional military force is not needed in counterinsurgency operations. It means that the U.S. Army must limit and conform the use of conventional military force by, with, and through the host-nation government and within the rule of law. In the event that conventional military force is required, according to Modarelli, it must "depend on military forces using police protocols to promote justice and legitimize the counterinsurgents cause."[14] In an article published in the *Small Wars Journal*, Kristian Williams agrees, stating that "the strictly military aspects of the counterinsurgency campaign are, of course, necessary; but so are the softer, subtler efforts to bolster public support for the government."[15] Instead of the application of conventional military force, Modarelli suggests that "COIN success ultimately requires building effective local and federal level police capabilities," who naturally operate within the limits established by law

Unlike the conventional military approach to counterinsurgency, a police force executing a community-policing strategy establishes government legitimacy because actions are based on the established laws. In addition to the authority derived from government, a police force executing a community-policing approach derives its authority from local government officials *and* community leaders. Police who adopt this approach balance the security needs of the government, but also focus their attention on the security needs of the population.   Williams states that "community-policing helps to legitimize police efforts by presenting cops as problem-solvers," who "form police-

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[13] Matthew R. Modarelli, "Military Police Operations and Counterinsurgency," in *Small Wars Journal* (December 2008) last accessed 10 April 2015 at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/151-modarelli.pdf?q=mag/docs-temp/151-modarelli.pdf

[14] *Ibid*.

[15] Kristian Williams, "The Other Side of COIN… p.85

driven partnerships that win the cooperation of community leaders."[16] Police gain

legitimacy by proving they can protect the citizens based on their needs, who in turn, feel

safe enough to work with the government and against the insurgents.[17] By operating

within the limits of the law, a functioning police force creates and expands government

legitimacy because its authority is by its very nature, an extension of the government it

serves.

Theme Two: Intelligence

Although the U.S. Army has access to resources that provide relevant and timely

intelligence as directed by FM 3-24, it often lacks the local knowledge or relationships

necessary to make the intelligence actionable.[18] As Musa, Morgan, and Keegan highlight

in the monograph *Policing and COIN Operations,* "police depend on superior situational

awareness within the local level of the human terrain every day. Conversely,

conventionally trained military units are trained to fight based on military intelligence

and not the sort of "cop on the beat" intelligence police live."

Unlike conventional military forces which typically live and deploy from fortified

bases, a police force naturally generates low-level intelligence because it lives, works,

and survives within the local community it serves. This "cop on the beat" intelligence is

derived from community members who "have lived in the area for generations" and

"know more about their surroundings, its history, and what may or may not work to

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[16] *Ibid*., p.90
[17] Gary D Calese, "Law Enforcement Methods for Counterinsurgency Operations," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2005) p.43
[18] Samuel Musa, John Morgan and Matt Keegan, "Policing and …p.4

address a community problem."[19] This subtle difference means that the police

engagements with local populations are not only more likely, but are required since the

police must understand the needs of the community if they wish to leverage the influence

of local community leaders towards mission success.[20] As Keegan accurately states,

these engagements are a critical component to the overall community policing strategy

because every interaction is an opportunity to collect police intelligence, intelligence that

is both timely and local.[21] Since the intelligence is derived from a conversation or

interview, it allows the officer to ask specific questions tailored to answer a specific

question while simultaneously giving him the ability assess the source for accuracy and

reliability. As stated by Williams, "by increasing daily, friendly contacts with people in

the neighborhood, community policing provides a direct supply of low-level

information," that when combined with their local knowledge and rule of law, is quickly

transformed into actionable intelligence.[22]

Theme Three: Decentralization

Despite the ability of the U.S. Army to conduct decentralized operations, a local

police force is by its mere existence more decentralized than any standard or

conventional military unit. If an insurgency is focused on garnering and maintaining

local support, then any successful counterinsurgency effort must also focus its attention at

the local level.[23] In military terms, former U.S. Marine General Charles Krulak describes

this concept in an article published in *Marines Magazine* in January 1999, where he

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[19] *Ibid*., p.21
[20] *Ibid*., p.5
[21] *Ibid*,. p.4
[22] Kristian Williams, "The Other Side of COIN…p.90
[23] Matthew R. Modarelli, "Military Police Operations …

argues that successful counterinsurgency operations are both decentralized and reliant on the "strategic corporal."[24] This logic continues to hinder U.S. Army counterinsurgency operations for two reasons. First, the U.S. Army does not have enough "strategic corporals" to deploy in every village or town it's directed to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Second, it assumes that counterinsurgency operations are the primary responsibility of the military, and not law enforcement. In an article titled "Streetwise," former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Bing West stated that the issue in Iraq is less of a military problem than a policing one. "If the insurgents are to be defeated," according to West, "it will have to be by local tough guys in town after town, as happened in the American West in the 1870s."[25] This "bottom-up" approach to security is reiterated by Modarelli, who states that COIN success ultimately requires building "effective local and federal level police" who can act as the "local tough guys" that Mr. West refers to.

At the local or tactical level, a functioning police force is the most effective and efficient option than can simultaneously conduct counterinsurgency operations across an entire country or vast battle space. Because of its inability to maintain a physical presence in every village throughout Iraq, the U.S. military fell into the "Syphean Trap" and had to repeatedly clear villages it simply could not "hold."[26] David Epstein, who wrote about the same failings in Vietnam, argues that only host-nation security force that can "reach to every corner of the country" while "maintaining a close connection to the

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[24] Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," In *Marine Corps Gazette* Vol. 83, Issue 1 (January 1999) last accessed 10 April 2015 at https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/1999/01/strategic-corporal-leadership-three-block-war

[25] Bing West, "Streetwise," in *The Atlantic Monthly* (January/February 2007) p. 72.

[26] Ahmed S. Hashim, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq*, (Itahca, NY: Cornell University Press: 2006) p.339

people," are the police.[27] If security efforts at the local level are critical during

counterinsurgency operations, and a police force is the only agency that operates at the

local level across the country, then one can conclude that a functioning police force

should be a major component to any counterinsurgency operation.

Theme Four: Persistence

If persistence is a critical component to defeating an insurgency and occupation is

not a viable option, than host-nation security forces are the best long-term options

available to fight the insurgency. Although FM 3-24 directs U.S. forces to prepare for a

long-term commitment, reality suggests that the U.S. Army is simply unable to directly

affect how long it remains engaged in a counterinsurgency operation. Additionally, most

would agree that the longer a counterinsurgency force remains in a country, the easier it

is for an insurgency to portray the counterinsurgency as an occupation force, therefore

delegitimizing the counterinsurgency and the host-nation government it supports.

Interestingly enough, this concept is explicitly referred to in FM 3-24, where the last

principle titled "Support the Host Nation," states that "eventually, all foreign armies are

seen as interlopers or occupiers." The inability to control its own commitment terms, and

the notion that "time is of the essence," has undoubtedly created the mindset that "the

sooner the decisive effort [security] can transition to host-nation institutions without

unacceptable degradation, the better."[28] Unfortunately, the U.S. history in Iraq has

proven that the rapid expansion in host-nation military capacity does very little to defeat

an insurgency. In Iraq, the U.S. Army focused its attention on the rapid build-up of Iraqi

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[27] David G. Epstein, "Police Role in Counterinsurgency Efforts," in *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* vol. 59(1), 1968, p. 149.
[28] United States of America, United States Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-24…*p.1-19.

security forces which had grown to more than 327,000 personnel in less than five years.[29]

However, by creating a streamlined training process that focused on a "superficial

introduction to western policing standards in human rights," some suggest that the U.S.

created a very large but completely ineffective counterinsurgency force.[30] In order to

support this claim, simply analyze the security situation in Iraq in 2006, where U.S.

military and Iraqi security forces outnumbered insurgents by more than 10:1, yet security

had deteriorated to its worst level since the invasion.[31]

However, a local police force is the epitome of persistence, because its existence

in counterinsurgency operations is a matter of survival. This concept is supported in an

article published in the Economist in 2007, which states that it is extremely difficult for

Western powers to defeat insurgencies in foreign lands because "Western armies lose the

will to maintain imperial domination" and subsequently go home.[32] On the other hand,

the local government and the local police force must fight the insurgency as a matter of

physical and political survival.[33] Keegan agrees, stating that the persistence of rule of

law is a critical element that only the local police can establish because military forces

are "both economically and politically unsupportable over a longer period of time in both

an international and local sense."[34] If persistence is a critical component to defeating an

insurgency, and local police forces are permanent local security forces that fight an

insurgency as a matter of survival, then one can conclude that a functioning police force

is a major component to any counterinsurgency operation and deserves more attention in

[29] United States of America, United States Government Accountability…p.6.
[30] Ahmed S. Hashim, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq…* p.330
[31] United States of America, United States Government Accountability…p.6.
[32] "Irregular Warfare: After Smart Weapons, Smart Soldiers," in *The Economist* (25 October 2007), last accessed 05 April 2015 at http://www.economist.com/node/10015844.
[33] *Ibid*.
[34] Samuel Musa, John Morgan and Matt Keegan, "Policing and …p.70

counterinsurgency operations. Incorporating community-policing concepts into counterinsurgency doctrine will undoubtedly require a change in how the U.S. Army thinks and operates in counterinsurgency operations. However, the U.S. Army does not need to look very hard to find evidence that a community-policing approach is an effective option to defeat established criminal networks that operate in failed areas.

SPRINGFIELD MASSACHUSETTES: COMMUNITY-POLICING AT WORK

The Springfield, Massachusetts Police Department has proven that a community-policing strategy is an effective method for dealing with organized crime, which bears striking similarities to the insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Mike Cutone, a Springfield, Massachusetts police officer and member of the U.S. Army Special Forces, has personal experience applying counterinsurgency and community-policing based strategies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the United States. In an interview conducted by *CBS 60 Minutes*, one can not only witness the similarities between an insurgency and organized crime, but can also witness how a community-policing strategy and local police force can defeat adequately address them both.

First, it is important to recognize the correlation between an insurgency and organized crime. An insurgency, like organized criminal networks, resorts to violent crime as a means to an economic or political end.[35] In addition to the ends, insurgents and gang members want to operate in a failed area, whether that is a failed community or a

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[35] Samuel Musa, John Morgan and Matt Keegan, "Policing and …p.25

failed state.[36] In both cases, they know they can live off the passive support of the

community, where the community is essentially coerced and simply not willing to call or

engage the local police. In the case of Springfield, Massachusetts, Officer Cutone details

how gang members would ride around the city on motorcycles with AK-47s on their

back, similar to insurgents in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In another example, he

described how fear of the gangs meant that parents and kids were "often afraid to walk

the streets," and as a result, children stopped going to school. Although it is not the

purpose of this paper to compare the structure or means of either criminal organization,

the similarities between organized criminal behavior and insurgent activity were "so

striking," according to Officer Cutone, that he felt his experience in Iraq would help him

solve the Springfield, Massachusetts problem. Either way, the Springfield community-

policing strategy is a valuable example that demonstrates how a local, decentralized and

persistent approach to criminal activity is an effective means to generate local

intelligence that is used to increase security and improve government legitimacy.

Theme One: Legitimacy

The Springfield, Massachusetts community-policing strategy to defeat organized

crime in the North End has increased government legitimacy. As previously stated, one

aspect of legitimacy is acting in accordance with rule of law. Therefore, the Springfield

Police Departments efforts to arrest and target criminal elements have increase

government legitimacy because those actions fell within the legal margins of the rule of

law. However, history dictates that arrests are not entirely indicative of legitimate

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[36] Michael Cutone, "Counterinsurgency Cops: Military Tactics Fight Street Crime," in *60 Minutes. CBS Online* (5 May 2013) last accessed 05 April 2015 at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/counterinsurgency-cops-military-tactics-fight-street-crime-04-08-2013/

government authority as perceived by the community. Although Merriam-Webster defined link legitimacy to the public's "acceptance" of the government, it still leaves the reader with doubts about how to measure whether ones actions improve legitimacy or not. Scholars Bayley and Perrito offer an interesting way of measuring legitimacy, by re-defining it as "a citizen's willingness to call 911 (or equivalent)."[37] Using Bayley and Perito's definition, one can now easily assess that Officer Cutone's community police approach to the Springfield organized crime network significantly improved government legitimacy because increased 911 calls are indicative of the public's perception that the government is the "accepted" authority to deal with the problem. "They're reporting crime," according to Officer Cutone, "and the residents of the North End realize they are their instrument to clean up their neighborhood."[38] Mike Cutone's effort in Springfield, Mass. adds credence to the argument that police improve government legitimacy by proving they can protect the citizens, who in turn, feel safe enough to work with the government and against the insurgents.

Theme Two: Intelligence

The Springfield, Massachusetts community policing approach has generated significant amounts of police intelligence, which in turn is used to deliberately target the criminal network. With regards to reporting and intelligence, Cutone described how the intelligence "floodgates have opened." More importantly, most of the intelligence is derived from "friendly sources," who according to Cutone, have become "the eyes and

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[37] Samuel Musa, John Morgan and Matt Keegan, "Policing and …p.28
[38] Michael Cutone, "Counterinsurgency Cops: Military Tactics Fight…

ears" for the police force.[39] The interview concludes with an impromptu raid on a house that was derived from a locally generated tip, resulting in the arrest of multiple gang leaders, and the seizure of weapons, and drugs. Until Cutone started his community policing approach, these tips simply didn't exist. The Springfield example demonstrates that a community police approach not only generates actionable intelligence, but that it also closes the gap identified during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, where commander's often lacked the local knowledge and relationships needed to make the gathered intelligence actionable.

Theme Three: Decentralization

With regards to decentralization, the Springfield Police Department empowered Cutone and his pilot team to engage with local leaders and to establish a community approach to solving its own problems. Burrowing from his counterinsurgency experience in Afghanistan, Cutone met with local community leaders every Thursday, something he referred to as his "elders meeting."[40] As a result of this meeting, Cutone empowered leaders to take the initiative, direct police efforts, and solve their own problems. For example, a local nurse recommended a "walking school bus," where police officers and local leaders would physically walk children to school every day. This not only addressed the problem of children not going to school out of fear, it solved it. Since the start of his efforts, attendance has increased; there are fewer discipline issues at school, fewer drug offenses, and a significant reduction in litter and gang graffiti.[41] When combined, these trends indicate a decrease in gang-control or influence over an area, and

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[39] *Ibid.*
[40] *Ibid.*
[41] *Ibid.*

conversely are indicative of government control. In this regard, the Springfield example demonstrated that a community-policing approach is ideally not only decentralized, but confirmed that local knowledge, initiative, and empowerment are critical factors in defeating any criminal group whose aim is delegitimizing the local government.

Theme Four: Persistence

Lastly, the Springfield, Mass. PD's persistent presence within the North End area denied the gangs physically ability to operate within its own safe-haven while simultaneously building trust within the community by demonstrating that the police were committed to producing lasting results. Although this sounds like common sense, many government departments within the U.S. who simply react to emergencies and crime, do not remain in an area long enough to build the relationships that make the community-policing approach so effective. Similar to the U.S. Army approach to counterinsurgency where units are redeployed within a year, Keegan states that a "short deployment or rotating assignment creates significant barriers to the development of successful relationships and has often been a challenge in law enforcement agencies. However, in the case of Springfield, the police department's creation of a dedicated team facilitated the persistence needed to deny criminal safe-havens and build the relationships that are now working against the criminal network.   Just like Iraq, where Cutone's Special Forces unit would move into a town, sending a message "were not going away," the Springfield Police Department is "determined to build something permanent in Springfield."[42]

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[42] *Ibid*.

The Springfield Police Department's "counterinsurgency" against organized crime in the troublesome North End has proven extremely successful. As previously mentioned, attendance at school has increased, crime and drug related offenses have decreased, and the community is actively working with police to deny the criminal network's ability to operate within their community.[43] The same results are found when analyzing the Los Angeles Police Department which adopted the same strategy. As highlighted by Musa, Morgan and Keegan, "Los Angeles took many years to implement the elements of community oriented policing and build the trust necessary for success." However, the "investment in time, money, and structural change has resulted in dramatic reductions of violent crime, especially in gang-ridden neighborhoods."[44]

COMMUNITY-POLICING, COUNTERINSURGENCY, AND THE U.S. ARMY: IMPLEMENTATION

Although some argue that the U.S. Army is inherently incapable of executing a community-policing strategy in counterinsurgency operations, it already has this capability within its military police organizations who execute community-policing in domestic operations. Although Morgan, Musa and Freeman argue for the need to incorporate community-policing into a counterinsurgency strategy, they are wrong when they state that "soldiers are not cops" and that "the military should not be expected to perform policing functions or to build Rule of Law in general."[45] On the contrary, the U.S. Army has five brigades of military police who execute community-policing on a daily basis and are equally capable of executing these tactics in a deployed environment

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[43] *Ibid*.
[44] Samuel Musa, John Morgan and Matt Keegan, "Policing and …p.20
[45] *Ibid*., p. 3, 14.

or while training host nation police. If the U.S. military wants to execute successful

counterinsurgency operations in the 21st century, according to Modarelli, then "the

Department of Defense must place organic police capabilities traditionally used for

stability and internal preservation of order and discipline at the forefront of 21st Century

COIN operations."[46] In addition to the benefits of incorporating community-policing into

the overall COIN strategy, military police provide a common link between community-

policing and a conventional military approach. As Epstein points out, "the Military

Police, who are fully cognizant of both police and military operations, can serve as the

connecting link between police and military commands."[47] Calese takes this argument

one step further, arguing that the Army should adapt a military police approach to all

counterinsurgency operations. Calese writes that "the U.S. Army would be a more

effective counterinsurgency force if it trained on these [police] skills."[48]

      Interestingly, the U.S. Marines have not only adopted this approach, they have

used it successfully in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Al Anbar, the U.S. Marines managed to

secure the town of Rawah, but only after they established a functioning police force and

incorporated the concepts associated with community-policing.[49] Additionally, "Cop on

the Beat" and the "Hunter" programs are two additional programs used by the U.S.

Marine Corps that have been "highly effective when employed."[50] Of course, this

approach requires a fundamental change in the way the Army conducts

counterinsurgency operations. Culturally, this approach relies less on weapons and

munitions, and more on law enforcement, rule of law, and cooperation, concepts that the

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[46] Matthew R. Modarelli, "Military Police Operations …
[47] David G. Epstein, "Police Role in Counterinsurgency…p. 150.
[48] Gary D Calese, "Law Enforcement Methods for Counterinsurgency…p.45
[49] Bing West, "Streetwise," in *The Atlantic Monthly* (January/February 2007) p. 45.
[50] Samuel Musa, John Morgan and Matt Keegan, "Policing and …p.13

conventional Army has widely ignored in 20th century counterinsurgency operations. Unfortunately, as Musa, Morgan, and Keegan have pointed out, "the Marines and Special Operations Forces (SOF) do it well," but the Army "has a long way to go."[51] If the U.S. Army wants to remain a relevant and successful player in counterinsurgency operations in the 21st century, it will stop ignoring the reality that it should incorporate community-policing concepts into its overall counterinsurgency operations and focus on building host-nation police forces.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the United States Army should adapt its counterinsurgency strategy to incorporate aspects of "community policing," which have proven successful in Springfield, Massachusetts and cities throughout the United States.   Although the recently updated U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24 attempts to improve upon the deficiencies associated with the recent counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, conventional military approaches to counterinsurgency have natural gaps that a trained law enforcement agency can remedy. From a community-policing perspective, a community policing strategy establishes government legitimacy by working with community leaders on behalf of the government within the framework of the rule of law. With regards to intelligence, a functioning police force has vast knowledge of its local surroundings and derives its own local intelligence through community engagement and interactions, which in then uses to its own benefit to improve security. A local police force is by its mere existence more decentralized than any conventional military unit and is the only security force capable of "holding" terrain.

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[51] *Ibid*., p.50

From a law enforcement perspective, one can easily identify similarities between the concept of community policing and the Army's strategic principles associated with a counterinsurgency. Although the U.S. Army has historically focused on building military capacity to fight a counterinsurgency, it could enhance its strategy by incorporating the fundamentals of community policing and focusing more attention on building a credible and effective police force. Interestingly, police departments within the United States apply the same principles against organized crime networks and achieve astounding results. Despite the obvious differences between the criminal network in Springfield, Massachusetts and the insurgency in Baghdad, Iraq, one can see that concepts associated with community-policing can undoubtedly enhance the overall U.S. Army approach to counterinsurgency. Although some argue that the U.S. Army is not structured to adequately implement a law enforcement approach to counterinsurgency operations, it already has five military police brigades, most of which execute this task on a daily basis. For those who argue that this strategy will not work in a deployed environment, the U.S. Marines have already incorporated community-policing into counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, and produced impressive results. Community-policing has proven itself effective in cities and towns across the United States, each of which has its own unique circumstances that drive criminal networks. Its success in small-town cities like Springfield, Massachusetts, large metropolitans like Los Angeles, and in full blown insurgencies like Iraq, are proof that the U.S. Army should adopt community-policing concepts into counterinsurgency operations.

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