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## CAF DOCTRINE: HELPING TO COPE WITH HAITI'S WICKED PROBLEM

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### JCSP 41

#### *Exercise Solo Flight*

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PROBLEM**

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## Introduction

On 12 January 2010 an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale struck Haiti, killing approximately 200,000 people, injuring more than 300,000, displacing an estimated 1.3 million and resulting in significant infrastructure damage to the country.<sup>1</sup> The Government of Canada's (GC) response to the call for aid was immediate; within 24 hours the first element consisting of 22 personnel, a combination of three government representatives and 19 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members were on ground in Haiti.<sup>2</sup> These numbers would grow substantially: at its peak the military component of the interagency response known as Operation HESTIA (Op HESTIA) saw approximately 2,050 CAF members deployed. The Canadian response also included several experts from governmental agencies ranging from the former Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), Correctional Services of Canada (CSC) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).<sup>3</sup> In total, the CAF was responsible for successfully evacuating 4,620 Canadians, medically treating over 20,000 patients, distributing over 1.4 million rations, purifying approximately 2.8 million litres of water and having cleared and maintained an estimated 212 kilometres (km) of road.<sup>4</sup> Op HESTIA serves as one of, if not, the Canadian military's greatest effort toward the conduct of humanitarian operations (HO).

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<sup>1</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Haiti Earthquake 2010: After Action Review of the Government's Response* (Ottawa: Development Assistance Committee, 2010), 3.

<sup>2</sup> Major Dave McQueen, "The Dart and Op HESTIA Canadian Forces: Helping in Haiti," last modified 15 October 2010, [http://www.epicc.org/uploadfiles/documents/Presentation2010/Haiti\\_DART\\_Presentation\\_for\\_Earthquake\\_Preparedness.pdf](http://www.epicc.org/uploadfiles/documents/Presentation2010/Haiti_DART_Presentation_for_Earthquake_Preparedness.pdf).

<sup>3</sup> Rick Leswick, "Operation Hestia: Five Years Later," *espritdecorps*, January 26, 2015, 35.

<sup>4</sup> Colonel Alain Gauthier, "Canadian Expeditionary Command.," last accessed 28 February 2015. <http://jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/viewFile/333/350>.

In spite of being a publically perceived success, Op HESTIA challenged the CAF's way of doing business. This essay will show that CAF doctrine failed to address political and strategic realities during Canada's disaster relief intervention in response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. In achieving this aim, this essay will first examine how doctrine was applied to the Op HESTIA mission; specifically how government policy and CAF doctrine influenced the Canadian military's response. A review of the contingency plan and joint doctrinal publications identifies areas in CAF doctrine that are completely lacking, or which insufficiently address government policy. Finally, an analysis of Haiti as a wicked problem will serve to offer possible areas for refinement of CAF doctrine to better reflect the political and strategic realities and ensure continued success in the conduct of future HO.

## **Op HESTIA: A Case Study**

### **Context**

The effects of the earthquake that originated from the town of Léogâne were devastating. Damage to the country's infrastructure was extensive; and affected areas included Port-au-Prince, Petit-Goâve, Léogâne, Jacmel and other communities in the southwest region of Haiti. According to the deputy mayor of Léogâne, ninety percent of the buildings were destroyed and the remaining ones remain unsafe resulting in a "city that has to be totally rebuilt."<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile the region's capital, Port-au-Prince, saw significant damage to its medical facilities, air and sea transport facilities and communication systems as well as the near complete loss of essential services such as water and electricity. The main road linking Port-au-Prince with Jacmel also remained blocked for a ten day period after the earthquake, limiting the ability to deliver aid to the region. Given Haiti's lack of capacity to deal with the overwhelming devastation and

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<sup>5</sup> Karen Allen, "Rebuilding Haiti from rubble and dust," *BBC News*. 28 January 2010.

destruction, the country's leadership had little choice but to solicit the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) assistance for an international response, which subsequently led to a formal request to the GC for emergency support to the disaster.

### **Strategic level**

Politicians opted to ignore “normal” process when the Prime Minister contacted the Department of National Defence (DND) directly to deploy something quickly. The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) was immediately identified as the strategic tool of choice. From that point onward, DFAIT assumed its role as the lead coordinating agency for disasters abroad and employed its internal capability, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) in accordance with Government of Canada Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in Response to Natural Disasters Abroad.<sup>6</sup> START is a branch within DFAIT that was created in 2005 “to respond to the increasing international demand for Canadian support and involvement in complex crises, conflicts or natural disaster.”<sup>7</sup> In view of achieving Canada's strategic choice, START develops and implements foreign policies that guide the GC “in programming, the deployment of expertise and the coordination of crisis response.”<sup>8</sup>

In the case of Op HESTIA, one of START's responsibilities was the convening of an Interdepartmental Task Force (ITF) on the evening of 12 January. The ITF comprised of several representatives: DFAIT; CIDA, DND; the Privy Council Office (PCO); CIC; CBSA; the Public Health Agency of Canada; Public Safety Canada; the RCMP; and Other Government

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<sup>6</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Government of Canada Response to Natural Disasters Abroad (Ottawa: Humanitarian Affairs Section).

<sup>7</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, “About the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force,” last modified 27 January 2014, [http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/about-a\\_propos.aspx?lang=eng](http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/about-a_propos.aspx?lang=eng).

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

Departments (OGDs)<sup>9</sup> and was responsible for assessing the situation, identifying consular concerns and potential humanitarian needs (water, food, housing/shelter and medical aid).<sup>10</sup> The Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team (ISST) is a mechanism at the government's disposal that is responsible for developing such recommendations for consideration by cabinet.<sup>11</sup> The ISST is a small team that includes, at minimum, one representative from DFAIT and CIDA each, and two CAF personnel. It is the first element to provide relief recommendations to the ITF and serves as Canada's "interdepartmental reconnaissance and assessment capability."<sup>12</sup> Within 18 hours of the onset of the disaster in Haiti, the ISST, an eleven member DART reconnaissance team and a seven member medical team, along with rations and water, were flown by a Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Hercules aircraft to Port-au-Prince serving as Canada's first *boots on the ground*.

Several intervention options are available to the ISST when providing their relief recommendations. These include: cash contributions in response to appeals, additional tools, deployment of Canadian technical experts, distribution of relief supplies, and the deployment of CAF assets.<sup>13</sup> Op HESTIA indeed saw all of the above mechanisms for relief employed; however, particular to the CAF, the ISST's evaluation recommended the employment of the DART in addition to a sizeable military force to deploy in the areas of Jacmel and Léogâne. Prime Minister Steven Harper announced his approval of the Minister of National Defence

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<sup>9</sup> Aaida Mamuji, "Canadian military involvement in humanitarian assistance: progress and prudence in natural disaster response," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 18, no. 2 (June 2012): 212.

<sup>10</sup> Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), "Canadian Forces Perspective on support to Canada's Contribution to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake," last modified 18 March 2010, [http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/Archive/17th/ARF-DOD-Nha-Trang-18March2010/OP%20HESTIA%20DPK%20Pol%20Brief%20Mar%202010\\_v4\(2\)-ANNEXURE%20H.ppt](http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/Archive/17th/ARF-DOD-Nha-Trang-18March2010/OP%20HESTIA%20DPK%20Pol%20Brief%20Mar%202010_v4(2)-ANNEXURE%20H.ppt).

<sup>11</sup> Mamuji, "Canadian military involvement...", 214.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of the DND Contributions to HO, DRO and NEO*, (Ottawa: Chief Review Services, 2013), 2.

Office's request to deploy 2,000 CAF members for a period of 30-60 days on 18 January directing the CAF to support the whole-of- government efforts lead by DFAIT; support the return of Canadian Entitled Persons and remains; provide immediate relief; and assist Canadian partners operating in Haiti.<sup>14</sup>

### **Operational/Tactical level**

The Haiti mission constituted both an HO, and a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). The CAF has developed policy and doctrine to cover both types of operations. In terms of NEO contingencies, Contingency Plan 20852/11 ANGLE (CONPLAN ANGLE), the Canadian Forces Joint Doctrine Manual for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-050) and the Canadian Forces Operations Manual (B-GJ-005-300/FP-000) serve to provide for the safe evacuation of Canadians abroad<sup>15</sup>. Meanwhile when a humanitarian emergency occurs, a CAF response relies on Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) Contingency Plan 20851/06 GRIFFON (CONPLAN GRIFFON<sup>16</sup>, , the Chief of Defence Staff Contingency Plan for Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) dated 15 December 2006, and the Canadian Forces Joint Publication for Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-040, also commonly referred to as CFJP 3-4.1) dated 31 May 2005 as shown in the 2010 humanitarian mission in Haiti. The NEO context to Op HESTIA is considered beyond the scope of this essay.

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<sup>14</sup> Gauthier, "Canadian Expeditionary...", <http://jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/viewFile/333/350>.

<sup>15</sup> Ryan Eyre, "Complexities in Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations" (Joint Command Staff Programme Course Master of Defence Studies Paper, Canadian Forces College, 2011), 32.

<sup>16</sup> Previously referred to as Contingency Operation Plan 20800/1 GRIFFON (CONPLAN OP GRIFFON)) dated 20 December 2006 and since superseded by CEFCOM CONPLAN 20855/10 RENAISSANCE – CEFCOM Humanitarian Operations Contingency Plan.

The Canadian Forces Joint Peace Support Operations Manual states that “the DART may be employed as either a stand-alone unit or within a joint task force.”<sup>17</sup> The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) directive for Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief reinforces this concept in asserting that the DART can deploy independently or as part of a larger organization. Meanwhile, other non-designated CAF assets could be employed as part of the high readiness-based response, or as a larger military contribution beyond the DART-based capabilities.<sup>18</sup> The directive also directs Commander CEFCOM to mount a Humanitarian Operations Task Force (HOTF), which includes the activation of a contingency plan. As previously mentioned, DND and the CAF’s response to natural disasters when the earthquake struck Haiti in January 2010 was formalized under CONPLAN GRIFFON; the operational plan for the deployment of the DART. It describes the DART as a company sized tactical element consisting of 205 personnel mandated to provide four core competencies: water purification, primary medical care, engineering assistance and a command, control and communications (C3) capability, with the imposed limit of being deployed for no more than 40 days.<sup>19</sup> The reality however, is that Op HESTIA saw ten times that amount of CAF personnel deployed.

On 16 January, the Minister of National Defence announced Brigadier-General Guy Laroche’s appointment as Commander Joint Task Force Haiti (JTF-H). In line with the CAF’s approach to joint operations, the JTF-H command structure consisted of a Maritime Component (MC), Air Component (AC), Land Component (LC) and Support Element made up of approximately 2,050 personnel, distributed between the towns of Port-au-Prince, Léogâne and

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<sup>17</sup> Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-307/FP-030, *Canadian Forces Joint Peace Support Operations Manual* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2002), 2-5.

<sup>18</sup> Department of National Defence, *CDS Directive for Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief* (Ottawa: Chief of the Defence Staff, 2010), 5/14.

<sup>19</sup> National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “The Disaster Assistance Response Team,” last modified 21 November 2014, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-recurring/dart.page>.



Jacmel. The MC, which had departed Canada on 14 January, was comprised of the destroyer Her Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS) *Athabaskan* carrying a CH-124 Sea King helicopter detachment located off the shores of Léogâne, and the frigate HMCS *Halifax* in proximity of the coast of Jacmel.<sup>20</sup> Six CH-146 Griffon helicopters (delivered to the theatre in C-117 aircraft) based in Port-au-Prince operated to/from all three locations and formed the initial capability of the AC. This quickly evolved to include the addition of the following aircraft: two CC-130 Hercules, two CC-177 Globemasters, one CC-144 Challenger and one CC-150 Polaris, operating from either Toussaint Louverture International Airport at Port-au-Prince and/or the municipal airfield in Jacmel.<sup>21</sup>

The Land Component was based in three separate locations: Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince housed not only the Support Element but also the JTF-H's headquarters, which included the Commander and his staff as well as a Signals Squadron; the DART was located in Jacmel; and 1 Canadian Field Hospital and 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment Group (specifically composed of two rifle companies, one support company and a squadron from 5 Combat Engineer Regiment) operated out of Léogâne.<sup>22</sup> The size of the force structure was aligned with CDS direction to "go fast, go big"<sup>23</sup> to achieve strategic effect, but also in concert with the PM's clear intent to employ CAF assets as part of a public relations operation. Although the CAF was also no stranger to operating in a joint environment, operational and tactical doctrine for HO was prescriptive in the sense that it was limited to the deployment of the DART leaving the employment of all other CAF assets at the discretion of the

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<sup>20</sup> National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, "ARCHIVED - Operation Hestia," last modified 12 January 2015, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/op-hestia.page>.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> Gauthier, "Canadian Expeditionary...", <http://jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/viewFile/333/350>.

Commander JTF-H.

### **Disaster Response: Rescue, Relief and Recovery**

There are three stages that occur during a disaster response. First, the *rescue* stage refers to activities that occur in the first seven days following the humanitarian emergency; second, the *relief* stage takes place approximately between days 8 and 50; and the third and last stage, *recovery*, refers to any response happening after day 50.<sup>24</sup> Under CONPLAN GRIFFON, the timelines for these stages were slightly different. Of greater importance is that the 2006 contingency plan called for the employment of the DART during the relief stage, which was not the case for Op HESTIA. Rather, the reconnaissance team<sup>25</sup> accompanied the ISST to Haiti, making it the CAF's *first boots on the ground*. Despite not being designed for the immediate post-impact period,<sup>26</sup> DART members (less HART personnel) departed Trenton to arrive in Haiti within 24 hours of the onset of the disaster. Given the Canadian Ambassador's top priority of evacuating Canadian Entitled Personnel (CEPs), the unit quickly established themselves at the Canadian Embassy in Port-au-Prince and assumed a NEO role. Through provision of security forces, escort of convoys, and coordination with the RCAF on timings and spaces for CAF flights, the unit was responsible for facilitating the successful evacuation of 3,000 CEPs – 300 of which were cared for medically as they awaited evacuation.<sup>27</sup> Given that the area had been estimated to be 30-50% destroyed (to include all medical facilities), lacked potable water, and no

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<sup>24</sup> Department of National Defence, *CEFCOM CONPLAN 20855/10 RENAISSANCE* (Ottawa: CEFCOM, 2010), 3/33.

<sup>25</sup> Current terminology refers to this element as Humanitarian Assistance Reconnaissance Team (HART).

<sup>26</sup> Tim Radley, "Heralding a new era for the Disaster Assistance Response Team" (Joint Command Staff Programme Course Master of Defence Studies Research Project, Canadian Forces College, 2009), 14.

<sup>27</sup> Major Dave McQueen, "The Dart and...", [http://www.epicc.org/uploadfiles/documents/Presentation2010/Haiti\\_DART\\_Presentation\\_for\\_Earthquake\\_Preparedness.pdf](http://www.epicc.org/uploadfiles/documents/Presentation2010/Haiti_DART_Presentation_for_Earthquake_Preparedness.pdf).

land access to Port-au-Prince, “Jacmel’s needs matched DART capabilities”<sup>28</sup> and therefore it was designated as the DART’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) on the evening of 17 January.

The region also benefitted from the GC’s scale of commitment as several Rapid Reaction Packages (RRPs) or “other immediate CAF capabilities,” arrived during the 14-19 January period. However, this presented a new challenge for the DART as the mission transitioned to the *relief* phase, namely one of competing priorities for key resources such as equipment supplies and security forces.<sup>29</sup> Had the established mechanisms such as the Task Force Movement Tables (TFMTs) been implemented and CEFCOM assumed its role as “the sole authority for implementing deployment priorities,”<sup>30</sup> the DART may have been employed more effectively and better postured for an HO mission in excess of the 40 day deployment length limit, as prescribed in CAF doctrine.

On 22 February, Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon announced the mission’s imminent drawdown from Haiti<sup>31</sup> initiating the *recovery* phase of the operation. Doctrine states that the CAF and other key government departments would have identified criteria, or transition conditions, to enable the successful handover of the relief effort with International Organizations, Non-governmental Organizations and Host Nation parties.<sup>32</sup> However, comments made by some aid groups such as U.S. based Conscious Alliance, state that the Canadian military’s withdrawal from Haiti was abrupt, indicating that handover criteria was either miscommunicated or not communicated at all when in reality, it was imposed by the political level.<sup>33</sup> Despite its success,

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<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Adrian Wyld, "Military rushed to Haiti without guns, ammo," *Canadian Press*, 9 July 2010.

<sup>30</sup> DND, *CEFCOM CONPLAN 20855/10 RENAISSANCE...*, 13/33.

<sup>31</sup> Juliet O’Neill, "Canada begins military withdrawal from Haiti," *The Montreal Gazette*, 22 February 2010.

<sup>32</sup> DND, *CEFCOM CONPLAN 20855/10 RENAISSANCE...*, 25/33.

<sup>33</sup> Jessica Leeder, "Departure of Canadian Forces hampers Jacmel’s reconstruction," *Globe and Mail*, 23 March 2010.

Op HESTIA serves as a case study of how DND and CAF doctrine did not reflect political and strategic realities. As HO continues to evolve and in particular necessitate a comprehensive approach, the demands on the CAF to adapt to this ever changing operating environment will also change. This requires a certain flexibility and scalability that must be prescriptive in nature. After reviewing how policy and doctrine was applied to the Haiti mission, this paper will now look to examine reasons why it was not adhered to before offering recommendations on a possible way ahead.

### **CAF Doctrine**

The Op HESTIA case study offers two possible interrelated explanations as to why CAF doctrine was not applied effectively to the relief efforts in Haiti. The existing doctrine was inadequate in terms of meeting the political and strategic realities, and this subsequently created a secondary effect of employing CAF assets to an operation where doctrine was entirely absent.

As mentioned previously, CONPLAN GRIFFON served as the only operational direction for the humanitarian emergency in Haiti. More generally however, it adopted a comprehensive approach that was primarily concerned with the employment of the DART and applied typically only in a humanitarian assistance role abroad.<sup>34</sup> It has since been replaced by CONPLAN RENAISSANCE (effective date of 3 September 2010) as a direct result of the considerable efforts the CAF has put forth toward the Lessons Learned (LL) process. Overall, the global changes made to this contingency plan require a CAF response capability for HO that is scalable and modular,<sup>35</sup> and a concept that extends to pan-CAF contributions. Further, the CAF's ability

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<sup>34</sup> DND, *CEFCOM CONPLAN 20855/10 RENAISSANCE...*, 1/33.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

to react must allow for the necessary flexibility within a broader Whole of Government (WoG) response, both at home and abroad.<sup>36</sup>

CONPLAN RENAISSANCE has also undergone several operational/tactical amendments that are aligned with its global aims; in some cases, it has served to bridge the gap with the political and strategic realities. The consequences of employing CAF assets beyond those originally prescribed in CONPLAN GRIFFON, namely the DART, are numerous. Given that the contingency plan prescribes sustainment only for the DART, it fails to describe the “process for sustaining the task force when the scope of the CAF operation is scaled up,”<sup>37</sup> which is an issue that remains unaddressed today (in both CONPLAN RENAISSANCE and CFJP 3-4.1). This resulted in competing priorities within and between CAF capabilities and OGD assets during the Haiti mission. Consequently, this had a negative residual effect on the DART in its ability to self-sustain introducing unnecessary risk to the success of the mission. Secondly, DART’s ability to deploy quickly often sees it employed in roles that are not part of its core competencies/mandate as seen during Op HESTIA, specifically as it relates to the evacuation of CEPs and conduct of a NEO. Although this reality has been incorporated in to CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, it was not present in doctrine at the time of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. This also speaks to a deficiency in terms of the DART and how it is employed in a disaster response.

DART’s recognized responsiveness combined with the degree of humanitarian response required creates an oddly natural vulnerability to act as the “first responder.” However, this violates two of the basic assumptions of both the previous and existing CONPLAN; DART’s contribution is focused in the relief phase and the unit or its elements are equipped to deploy up

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<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of the DND...*, 23.

to and including the limit of 40 days. To respect this timeline requires an appropriate exit strategy. As alluded to in the article by Leeder (2010)<sup>38</sup>, DND's redeployment plan during Op HESTIA was miscommunicated to some aid groups, which did not permit an effective handover of the mission to civilian organizations as outlined in the CONPLAN.

Lastly, although CONPLAN GRIFFON identifies four core capabilities that the DART must be prepared to provide, it does not, however, explicitly state what key components of the unit must be deployed on each and every mission.<sup>39</sup> Despite all 210 members of the DART deploying to Haiti, the reality remains that this force structure was insufficient in achieving the HO's mandate given that an additional 1,840 CAF personnel that participated in Op HESTIA. This serves as yet another instance where doctrine failed to "match" both political and strategic intent.

This paper has thus far considered examples where DND and CAF doctrine existed, but was not respected as evidenced by circumstances surrounding the mission in Haiti. A second reason offered for not adhering to doctrine is that it was absent altogether. In particular, there was no doctrine for the planning of both maritime and air HO during Op HESTIA. The Maritime Component Commander's (MCC) end tour report acknowledges that the joint doctrine served to execute planning and establish functional organizational and command and control structures during the earthquake in Haiti. However, he clearly states that the optimal solution must be to develop and incorporate specific maritime tasks for in doctrine to achieve efficiencies and effectiveness in HO that were not present during Op HESTIA<sup>40</sup>. At present, this issue remains

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<sup>38</sup> Jessica Leeder, "Departure of Canadian Forces hampers Jacmel's reconstruction," *Globe and Mail*, 23 March 2010.

<sup>39</sup> Tim Radley, "Heralding a new era...", 43.

<sup>40</sup> Capt(N) A.G. McDonald, "Op HESTIA – MCC End Tour Report," 8 March 2010, 26/31.

unaddressed: maritime operations continue to be conducted in support of CAF humanitarian assistance disaster relief efforts without prescriptive roles and responsibilities.

Air operations during Op HESTIA suffered from both a lack of adherence to and an absence of doctrine. The former was most prevalent in terms of the command and control relationship between the Air Force, Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) and CEFCOM. In particular, as a Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) study noted, “lesson learned reports found that there was a failure to view CANOSCOM as the supported commander for inter-theatre lift.”<sup>41</sup> This lack of integration and failure to communicate resulted in conflicting priorities and unfilled supply replenishment. The dual role of the Commander 1 Canadian Air Division (1 CAD) and Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC) caused confusion as the role and function of the CFACC was not clearly defined nor was it well understood, compounded by an absence of a well-defined CONOP and clear operating procedures.<sup>42</sup> A further consequence was that the roles of force generation, force employment and mission support also lacked clear definition, which resulted in significant overlap that introduced further confusion for 1 CAD and all participants of the mission.

The AC for the humanitarian assistance mission to Haiti compromised of four major elements: the Canadian Helicopter Force Haiti (CFH-H), the Mission Support Squadron (MSS) from 8 Wing Trenton, two Airlift Control Elements (ALCEs), and a headquarters. Quick-response capabilities like the DART and Immediate Response Unit (IRU) concept found in the Army did not translate to how the Air Force operated at the time of Op HESTIA, nor was it within their required mandate under CONPLAN GRIFFON. Regardless, the Air Force

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<sup>41</sup> Department of National Defence, *Designing a Seminar War Game: The Operation Hestia Case Study* (Ottawa: Defence R&D Canada, 2012), 64.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 65.

successfully employed both the MSS and the ALCEs in this capacity during the Haiti mission. The revision of the contingency plan in 2010 outlines the requirement for the Air Force, as well as any other Force Generator, to be prepared to deploy Rapid Reaction Packages (RRPs) that form High Readiness Components (HRC).<sup>43</sup> Notwithstanding the fact that CONPLAN RENAISSANCE has not been updated since its initial promulgation, the Air Force did not address this formally until January 2012 when it released the Air Force Expeditionary Capability CONOP. Shortly after, it published two key documents: 1 CAD's Air Component Coordination Element and Air Expeditionary Wing High Readiness Directive and the Royal Canadian Air Force Managed Readiness Plan 2012-2017, which align to the missions detailed in the Canada First Defence Strategy. Undeniably although this was "a step in the right direction" in terms of Air Force doctrine, there remains an opportunity to incorporate such strides in to joint doctrine, specifically in the conduct of HO.

At the end of October 2013, Chief Review Services released an evaluation report concerning DND's conduct of HO, Disaster Relief Operations (DRO) and NEO. One of the key findings determined that the review and updates of HO and NEO doctrine and CONPLANs are not being conducted as per the scheduled requirements (typically on an annual basis), which could have an adverse effect on future operations of these two types.<sup>44</sup> Although doctrine provides a relevance to the CAF, both internal and external to the organization, there is, however, need for caution. Doctrine needs to recognize that political and strategic priorities will always dictate any plan or doctrinal concept. Given that these priorities are determined outside the military chain of command; this paper will now look for an alternative means to shape DND

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<sup>43</sup> DND, *CEFCOM CONPLAN 20855/10 RENAISSANCE...*, 13/33.

<sup>44</sup> Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of the DND...*, 23.



and CAF doctrine to better reflect this reality.

### **Haiti: a Wicked Problem**

In the article by Rittel and Webber (1973), the authors state that the difficulty with problems of governmental planning is that they are ill-defined.<sup>45</sup> Moreover they constitute *wicked problems*, which ultimately have no solution. This paper will now look to examine some of Rittel and Webber's ten distinguishing properties of planning-type problems and how they were applied during the case study of Op HESTIA to determine areas in CAF doctrine that can be amended to better reflect Canadian political and strategic realities while also coping with Haiti as a wicked problem.

The first characteristic for consideration involves a definitive formulation of the problem. In the case of Haiti, this is not possible because to formulate the problem also requires the conception of a solution, thus why it constitutes a wicked problem. However, if we are to consider select specifications of the problem, in terms of specifications of the direction in which treatments are considered, then there are ways for Canada to assist in dealing with the wicked problem despite an absence in its definition.<sup>46</sup> For instance, DART capably deployed during Op HESTIA in accordance with existing doctrine. Since the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, CONPLAN RENAISSANCE has since replaced CONPLAN GRIFFON adopting a scalable and modularized concept that is more aligned with the GC's comprehensive approach to HO – specifically in the sense of its view of the DART as a public relations tool. In a similar manner, cash contributions, deployment of Canadian technical experts, and distribution of relief supplies all served as other mechanisms to achieve a greater effect; however, just as the DART, neither can serve as the

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<sup>45</sup> Horst Rittel, and Melvin Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," *Policy Science* 4 (1973): 160.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 162.

“locus of the difficulty”<sup>47</sup>. The GC’s perspective is not one concerned with solving the problem of Haiti. Rather it becomes an imperative for the Canadian government to be seen “doing something perceived as valuable.” In terms of conducting successful HO, this requires that CONPLAN RENAISSANCE be updated regularly, and that CAF doctrine be developed and/or amended both individually and from a joint perspective in relation specifically to air and maritime operations to reflect a WoG approach.

As stated above, it is impossible to develop an exhaustive list of all conceivable solutions to a wicked problem, which raises the question of “how much is good enough?” This in turn relates to three separate properties described by Rittel and Webber: wicked problems have no stopping rule, there is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution, and solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false but good-or-bad, and. The principle of a “no stopping rule” is a direct consequence of the inability to formulate the problem “because there are no criteria for sufficient understanding and because there are no ends to the causal chains that link interacting open systems,”<sup>48</sup> thus leading to the desire to continuously improve a solution. Compounding the implemented solution is what the authors refer to as “waves of consequences;” virtually boundless repercussions that are impossible to trace and for which the consequences cannot be fully assessed.<sup>49</sup> Given that wicked problems cannot be defined, do not terminate without some form of external influence and are impossible to assess, the question of “how much is good enough?” remains.

The answer lies in the last of the three properties and will be referred to as the “good enough” approach. Wicked problems typically involve multiple stakeholders that are “equally

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<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 161.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 162.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 163.

equipped, interested and/or entitled to judge the solutions”<sup>50</sup> but whose judgements are widely divergent (i.e. based on varying group or personal interests, values or ideologies). For this reason, their assessment of proposed courses of action is expressed as “good,” “bad,” or “good enough.” It is also well understood that the solution imposed will not provide a “lasting effect,” but rather serves to address a portion of the problem (or address partial solutions of the overall problem) until which time it can be said “that’s good enough.” The decision to drawdown the mission in Haiti was a political one, for which the CAF was subjected to some criticism in terms of “leaving too soon” – rightfully or wrongly. This highlights another important aspect of CAF doctrine that was absent during the mission in Haiti, namely the absence of clearly defined roles and responsibilities of the multiple stakeholders, specifically as it pertained to Op HESTIA’s exit strategy/transition criteria. With the publication of CONPLAN RENAISSANCE in 2010, these issues have been addressed to incorporate a fully integrated WoG approach however; future success in HO will rely heavily on the ability of CAF doctrine to be flexible and capable of meeting higher intent.

The need for doctrine to be flexible also speaks to a fifth property of planning-type problems, namely that every problem is unique. The same can be said of HO. Although the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 may share commonalities with the one that occurred in Turkey in 1999, the “good enough” solution applied to one may be far different from the other - not all too surprising given that Haiti and Turkey are conceptually “different” in their political, geographical, social, economic constructs (just to name a few). Radley (2009) attributes the DART’s lack of flexibility during Op HESTIA to its own configuration.<sup>51</sup> That is not to say that the DART or the CAF did not achieve success, rather it was simply inefficient in doing so. His

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<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> Tim Radley, “Heralding a new era...”, 40.

recommendation that alter the DART construct to be “modular and scalable” was incorporated in to CONPLAN RENAISSANCE in 2010. An obvious benefit from amending CAF doctrine is that it potentially serves as a “good enough” solution contributing positively to the wicked problem at hand.

The final two distinguishing characteristics for discussion are that every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem and the planner has no right to be wrong. The former reverts back to the formulation of the problem, but again in absence of being able to articulate the problem, Rittel and Webber recommend adopting an approach that consists of incremental steps “contributing systematically to overall improvement.”<sup>52</sup> Current CAF doctrine supports this approach evidenced by the promulgation of the CDS directive for HODR in 2010, which states that CAF assets will be employed to complement existing relief mechanisms.<sup>53</sup> In the case study of Op HESTIA, the DART’s CONOP was extremely prescriptive in nature, describing what Rittel and Webber refer to as “curing the symptom.” The authors also caution the reader from adopting a broader and more general problem formulation technique suggesting that the “ideal” solution lies somewhere in between. The recovery phase of HO is an area of CAF doctrine previously did not exhibit the requisite emphasis to achieve such a balance; however, CONPLAN RENAISSANCE has since rectified this deficiency stressing HO as a “short-term measure.” Dealing with an emergency until local authorities can resume their responsibilities and/or other international organizations can take over<sup>54</sup> was a critical element found lacking during the Haiti mission, yet it could be argued that the potential to positively influence Haiti is enormous.

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<sup>52</sup> Horst Rittel, and Melvin Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning...”, 165.

<sup>53</sup> DND, *CDS Directive for HODR...*, 3/14.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, B-1/7.

The CAF's withdrawal from Haiti also highlights another important aspect which is that "effects can matter a great deal to those people that are touched by those actions."<sup>55</sup> This is especially true in the case of Op HESTIA, specifically as it pertained to Haitian diaspora within Canada and (then) Her Excellency the Right Honorable Michaëlle Jean. Both unquestionably played a highly influential role in the GC's decision to contribute to the humanitarian emergency in Haiti, but equally important is not only theirs but the wider (global) view of Canada's involvement. All of the issues previously identified during Op HESTIA apply to this property of wicked problems and have been adequately addressed with the issuance of CONPLAN RENAISSANCE. CAF doctrine must continue to be developed and/or amended to build in further flexibility that is mindful of the liability inherent in the actions undertaken by the Canadian military in HO.

## **Conclusion**

The earthquake in Haiti resulted in the deployment of a Canadian Joint Task Force composed of land, maritime and air forces under a mandate to conduct HO and NEO. Second to only the United States, Canada was responsible for delivering over twenty-five percent of the humanitarian aid.<sup>56</sup> Op HESTIA was considered a success despite several issues present right from the very onset of the mission. Lessons learned have shown that there remains a requirement to develop maritime and air operations doctrine and update the CONPLAN for the conduct of HO. Joint doctrine needs to be revised in order to reflect new deployable capabilities and ensure that the structure, and roles and responsibilities are clearly defined. Once published, a revision schedule is required and must be enforced. Furthermore, it is imperative that these efforts be

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<sup>55</sup> Horst Rittel, and Melvin Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning...", 167.

<sup>56</sup> Department of National Defence, B-GA-404-000/FP-001, *Canadian Forces Areospace Move Doctrine*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2011), 25.

guided by the political and strategic realities.

Op HESTIA served to remind the CAF the importance of their ability to respond quickly and be effective in the conduct of HO, thus necessitating a Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public (JIMP) approach. The mission in Haiti highlighted areas in CAF doctrine that did not reflect the political and strategic reality of that time, which begs the question whether “more” can be achieved in the refinement of doctrine to address a wider issue, namely Haiti as a wicked problem. What became clear from the analysis of Rittel and Webber’s ten distinguishing properties of planning-type problems applied to Haiti is that doctrine is not written for wicked problems. Nonetheless, the underlying concept of a “good enough” solution consistently offered a potential way ahead for CAF doctrine. All of the considerations for future enhancement/refinement of doctrine discussed above are tied to a single factor: flexibility. This speaks to the need to foster cooperation and clearly define roles and responsibilities (command and control relationships both internal and external to the joint operating environment) amongst the multiple stakeholders, a requirement for the force structure to be task-tailored for a specific mission (similar in concept to the DART being scalable and modular), an ability to adapt to the type of mission in the sense of not being too prescriptive or too broad as well as consideration of higher’ s intent. The complexity of the “good enough” solution should not be underestimated, but CAF doctrine does have a role to play that is worthy of consideration. Ultimately the situation in Haiti cannot be solved; the best that Canada can do is to help cope with such a wicked problem.

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