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ANALYSIS OF THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT OF ITS MILITARY PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMUNICATORS: AN EXPLORATION OF A POST-GRADUATE EDUCATION PROGRAM FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS IN ORDER TO EXPAND THEIR PROFESSIONAL CAPABILITIES

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By/par LCol George Vriniotis

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-------|
| Table of Contents | i |
| List of Figures | ii |
| List of Tables | iii-v |
| List of Abbreviations | vi-x |
| Acknowledgements | xi |
| Abstract | xii |
| Chapter | |
| 1. Introduction | 1 |
| 2. Overview of the Canadian Forces Professional Development System | 20 |
| 3. Synopsis of the Development of Canadian Armed Forces Public Affairs Officers | 84 |
| 4. Describing the Professional Capabilities of Canadian Armed Forces Public Affairs Officers | 142 |
| 5. Presentation of Survey Results and Discussion | 180 |
| 6. An exploration of a Post-Graduate Education Program for Public Affairs Officers | 194 |
| 7. Conclusion and Recommendations | 210 |
| Annex A Surveys Completed by Canadian Armed Forces Public Affairs Officers | 223 |
| Annex B Surveys Completed by Canadian Armed Forces Commanders and DND Senior Corporate Communicators | 234 |
| Annex C Comparing Different Post-Graduate Education Programs | 242 |
| Bibliography | 270 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| | |
|--|-----|
| Figure 2.1: The Canadian Forces Professional Development System | 28 |
| Figure 2.2: Theoretical Construct of the Profession of Arms in Canada | 41 |
| Figure 2.3: The Military Ethos | 44 |
| Figure 2.4: Integrated Canadian Forces Leadership Model | 58 |
| Figure 2.5: The General System of War and Conflict | 63 |
| Figure 2.6: Leader Development Framework | 65 |
| Figure 2.7: Relative Importance of Areas of Professional Development | 79 |
| Figure 3.1: PAOs Relationship with the Chain-of-Command | 92 |
| Figure 3.2: Public Affairs Branch Talent Management | 123 |
| Figure 3.3: Spectrum of Conflict and Continuum of Operations | 124 |
| Figure 3.4: Public Affairs Branch Coaching-Mentoring Support | 127 |
| Figure 3.5: Succession Planning Considerations | 129 |
| Figure 3.6: Current PAO Professional Development Through the Four Pillars during the 5 Developmental Periods | 135 |
| Figure 4.1: DND/CAF Target Audiences: A Migration of Information | 153 |
| Figure 4.2: Illustration of How the Public Affairs Gaps Affect the Public Affairs Functions and Capabilities | 173 |
| Figure 6.1: Aligning PA Functions and Capabilities with Future Operational and Professional Development Requirements | 209 |

LIST OF TABLES

| | |
|---|-----|
| Table 2.1: CAF Professional Body of Knowledge | 49 |
| Table 2.2: Four Principles of Leadership as Related to this Research Project | 60 |
| Table 2.3: CAF Common Officer Qualifications and PD Milestones | 77 |
| Table 2.4: Military Employment Structure Principles | 81 |
| Table 3.1: 1998 DND/CF Public Affairs Policy | 87 |
| Table 3.2: Regular Force CAF Public Affairs Positions 1956 to 2017 | 89 |
| Table 3.3: 18 Public Affairs Functions | 100 |
| Table 3.4: The Four Public Affairs Capabilities Provided to a Commander | 101 |
| Table 3.5: The Public Affairs Branch Code of Conduct | 109 |
| Table 3.6: PAO Common and Occupational Qualifications and PD Milestones | 115 |
| Table 3.7: Basic Public Affairs Officer Course Performance Objectives, PAO JBOS and DAOD 2008 | 118 |
| Table 3.8: Advanced Public Affairs Officer Course Performance Objectives | 120 |
| Table 3.9: Non-Exhaustive List of PA Support to CAF Operations: 2006 to Present | 125 |
| Table 3.10: Four Long-Term Development Areas of the CF Coaching-Mentoring Program | 128 |
| Table 3.11: Specific Goals of the Coaching-Mentoring Program | 128 |
| Table 3.12: Roles of the Coach, Mentor and Mentee within the PA Branch Coaching-Mentoring Program | 128 |
| Table 3.13: Acts, Regulations, Orders, Policies and Directives Applicable to PAOs and PA Policy | 139 |
| Table 4.1: 18 Public Affairs Functions | 144 |
| Table 4.2: Standardized Tasks and Responsibilities of a PAO to Execute in support of Knowing the Public Environment | 145 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| Table 4.3: Standardized Tasks and Responsibilities of a PAO to Execute in support of Providing PA Advice | 147 |
| Table 4.4: Standardized Tasks and Responsibilities of a PAO to Execute in Support of Communicating | 150 |
| Table 4.5: Regional DECPR Offices and Activities | 156 |
| Table 4.6: Standardized Tasks and Responsibilities of a PAO to Execute in Support of Managing | 164 |
| Table 4.7: PA Planning Activity and PA Contribution to the OPP during Tactical/Operational/Strategic Levels | 166 |
| Table 4.8: PA Evaluation Tools (non-exhaustive) | 169 |
| Table 4.9: The Four Public Affairs Capabilities Provided to a Commander | 169 |
| Table 4.10: Public Affairs Gaps and Identified Issues and Requirements | 173 |
| Table 5.1: Consolidated Survey Responses: Current Level of Professionalization of CAF PAOs | 183 |
| Table 5.2: Proposed Mater's Degrees: Comparison between PAOs and Commanders/DND SCCs | 185 |
| Table 5.3: Public Affairs Officers Priorities Based on Survey Responses | 186 |
| Table 5.4: Commanders/DND SCCs Priorities Based on Survey Responses | 187 |
| Table 6.1: Consolidated Top PA Functions, Gaps and Capabilities and Scores | 196 |
| Table 6.2: Criteria to Assess Post-Graduate Education Programs | 197 |
| Table 6.3: Top Three Identified Types of Post-Graduate Education Programs | 197 |
| Table 6.4: Comparing Different Post-Graduate Education Programs – Strategic Communications | 199 |
| Table 6.5: Comparing Different Post-Graduate Education Programs – Strategic Communications (Continued) | 200 |
| Table 6.6: Comparing Different Post-Graduate Education Programs – Crisis Communications/Management | 201 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Table 6.7: Comparing Different Post-Graduate Education Programs – Social Media Communications/Digital Communications Strategies | 202 |
| Table 6.8: Top Three Programs per Academic Field Related to the Strategic/Crisis/Social Media Communications | 203 |
| Table 6.9: Top Three Post-Graduate Education Programs | 204 |
| Table 6.10: Criteria to assess Master’s Degrees in Political Science, International Relations and Behavioural Psychology | 206 |
| Table 6.11: Comparing Different Post-Graduate Education Programs: Political Science, International Relations and Behavioural Psychology | 206 |
| Table 6.12: Top Three Programs per Academic Field Related to the Information Environment | 207 |
| Table 6.13: Top Assessed Master’s Degrees | 208 |

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|----------|--|
| ADM (PA) | Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs) |
| AFC | Armed Forces Council |
| AMOR | Annual Military Occupational Review |
| APAOC | Advanced Public Affairs Officer Course |
| ATI | Access to Information |
| ATL | Advanced Training List |
| BMOQ | Basic Military Officer Qualification |
| BOQ | Basic Occupational Qualification |
| BPAOC | Basic Public Affairs Officer Course |
| CA | Canadian Army |
| CAF | Canadian Armed Forces |
| CAFJOD | Canadian Armed Forces Junior Officer Development |
| CCT | Combat Camera Teams |
| CDA | Canadian Defence Academy |
| CDS | Chief of the Defence Staff |
| CF | Canadian Forces |
| CFAO | Canadian Forces Administrative Order |
| CFB | Canadian Forces Base |
| CFCC | Canadian Forces Combat Camera |
| CFPDS | Canadian Forces Professional Development System |
| CFITES | Canadian Forces Individual Training and Education System |
| CFLI | Canadian Forces Leadership Institute |

| | |
|--------|---|
| CFRG | Canadian Forces Recruiting Group |
| CJOC | Canadian Joint Operations Command |
| CLPA | Command Liaison Public Affairs |
| CNC | Canadian National Commander |
| CPRS | Canadian Public Relations Society |
| CSC | Corporate Strategic Communications |
| CSSP | Canadian Security Studies Programme |
| DAOD | Defence Administrative Orders and Directives |
| DECPR | Directorate of External Communications and Public Relations |
| DEO | Direct Entry Officer |
| DGPA | Director General Public Affairs |
| DIN | Defence Information Network |
| DINFOS | Defense Information School |
| DL | Distance Learning |
| DND | Department of National Defence |
| DP | Developmental Period |
| DPALC | Defence Public Affairs Learning Centre |
| DRDC | Defence Research and Development Canada |
| DSCPRA | Director Strategic Communications Planning, Research & Analysis |
| E2ER | End to End Review |
| ECS | Environmental Chief of Staff |
| ELP | Executive Leaders Programme |
| FOB | Forward Operating Bases |

| | |
|------------|--|
| GoC | Government of Canada |
| GSWC | General System of War and Conflict |
| IABC | International Association of Business Communications |
| IBDP | Initial Baccalaureate Degree Programme |
| IE | Information Environment |
| IL | Institutional Leader |
| IO | Information Operations |
| IS | Information Services |
| JBS | Job Based Specification |
| JBOS | Job Based Occupational Specification |
| JCSP DL | Joint Command and Staff Programme Distance |
| JCSP RESID | Joint Command and Staff Programme Residential |
| JIMP | Joint Interagency Multi-national and Public |
| JSOP | Joint Staff Operations Programme |
| JTFC | Joint Task Force Commanders |
| LDF | Leader Development Framework |
| MBA | Master of Business Administration |
| MDS | Master of Defence Studies |
| MES | Military Employment Structure |
| MILPERSGEN | Military Personnel Generation |
| MND | Minister of National Defence |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NDHQ | National Defence Headquarters |

| | |
|------------|---|
| NDPAO | National Defence Public Affairs Offices |
| NSP | National Security Program |
| ODRB | Officer Development Review Board |
| OFP | Operational Functional Point |
| OGD | Other Government Departments |
| OGS | Officer General Specification |
| OLA | Official Language Act |
| OPP | Operational Planning Process |
| OS | Occupational Specifications |
| PA | Public Affairs |
| PAO | Public Affairs Officer |
| PAOSP | Public Affairs Officer Succession Planning |
| PA TechNet | PA Technical Network |
| PBK | Professional Body of Knowledge |
| PCO | Privy Council Office |
| PD | Professional Development |
| PEARS | Public Environment Analysis and Research Services |
| PGEP | Post-Graduate Education Program |
| PR | Public Relations |
| RCAF | Royal Canadian Air Force |
| RCN | Royal Canadian Navy |
| RegF | Regular Force |
| RMCC | Royal Military College of Canada |

| | |
|----------|---|
| ROE | Rules of Engagement |
| SCC | Senior Corporate Communicators |
| SCRITS | Scoring Criteria |
| SJS | Strategic Joint Staff |
| SLP | Second Language Profile |
| SOLET | Second Official Language Education and Training |
| SS | Specialty Specifications |
| StratCom | Military Strategic Communications |
| TFC | Task Force Commander |
| TMST | Theatre Mission Specific Training |
| U o S | Universality of Service |
| WCPT | Written Communication Proficiency Test |

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ABSTRACT

Since the First and Second World Wars, the collection, evaluation and dissemination of information have played an increasingly important role during military operations – and as a result the role of the PA Function and the CAF PAO has grown. Major technological advances during the last few decades, have made today’s Information Environment (IE) more complex, unpredictable and ambiguous. Accordingly, PAOs are required to better understand the IE and be able to function at the strategic/political levels earlier in their careers. As a result, PAOs need to be professionally developed specifically as it relates to higher education so that they can gain the requisite knowledge and cognitive capabilities required to operate at higher levels. This research project aims to show that there is an academic deficit in PA education for senior PAOs. It was decided to conduct a research project on a Branch sponsored Post-Graduate Education Program (PGEP) at the Master’s level for senior PAOs that would help prepare them to better support the institutional military requirements at the strategic/political levels. This research project uses the Canadian Forces Professional Development System as the foundation for the development of PAOs, and incorporates information and data from related primary, secondary and tertiary sources. Additionally, PAOs, Commanders and Senior Corporate Communicators completed surveys in order to gather empirical data. The study concludes that a PGEP in either Corporate Strategic Communications (CSC) or military Strategic Communications (StratCom) would help alleviate the current academic deficit. While StratCom would better prepare a PAO to support military operations in line with expectations from NATO and the realities of threats faced in the IE, CSC would best support the corporate objectives which complement military objectives.

INTRODUCTION

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS AS STRATEGIC ENABLERS: THE EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER IN THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

It matters little whether the Forces have their present manpower strength and financial budget, or half of them, or double them; without a properly educated, effectively trained, professional officer corps, the Forces would in the future be doomed to, at the best mediocrity, at the worst disaster.¹

– General Jean V. Allard, Chief of Defence Staff, Forward to the Rowley Report, 1969

Background of Canadian Military History

While Canadian families were sound asleep, or enjoying the tranquility of Easter Sunday, across the Atlantic in Northern France “at 5:30 a.m. on Easter Monday, April 9, 1917”², their fellow Canadians, “many heavily laden with equipment, attacked [fortified German positions] through the wind-driven snow and sleet into the face of deadly machine gun fire”³ in the Battle of Vimy Ridge. The valiant actions of these selfless Canadians resulted “in a distinctly Canadian triumph,”⁴ which led to “a tremendous victory for the entire Allied forces.”⁵

Even though Canada became a nation on July 1, 1867, it was not until Canada’s First World War victory at Vimy Ridge that Canadians gained “a new and stronger sense

¹ Dr. Ronald G. Haycock, “The Labours of Athena and the Muses: Historical and Contemporary Aspects of Canadian Military Education,” *Canadian Military Journal*, 2001, last accessed 18 May, 2017, <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo2/no2/doc/5-22-eng.pdf>

² Canada. Veterans Affairs Canada. “The Battle of Vimy Ridge.” Last accessed 2 May, 2017. <http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/first-world-war/vimy-ridge>

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Canada. “Government of Canada Publications,” last accessed 7 Apr, 2017, <http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/home.html>

of Canadian identity.”⁶ Celebrating the victory’s centennial, Veterans Affairs Canada stated: “Canada came of age as a country on those harsh April days in 1917.”⁷ This sentiment was confirmed after the war with a firsthand account by Brigadier-General A.E. Ross when he stated that: “in those few minutes I witnessed the birth of a nation.”⁸ While the victory at Vimy was important, there is a debate on the significance of Vimy as it pertains to the birth of a nation.⁹ In addition to boosting Canada’s morale back home, “Canada’s military achievements during the war raised our international stature and helped earn us a separate signature on the Treaty of Versailles that ended the First World War.”¹⁰

⁶ Canada. Veterans Affairs Canada. “The Battle of Vimy Ridge . . . ,” <http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/first-world-war/vimy-ridge>

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Canada. Canadian War Museum, “The Battle of Vimy Ridge,” last accessed 2 May, 2017, <http://www.warmuseum.ca/the-battle-of-vimy-ridge/>

⁹ Note: The issue of Vimy as the birth of a nation is being debated by known historians, where Tim Cook states: “Canada was indeed forever changed by the Great War, but Vimy did not make the nation. It was the nation that made Vimy.” (Tim Cook, “The Battle of Vimy Ridge was not a nation-builder, historian Tim Cook writes,” last accessed 2 May, 2017, <http://ottawacitizen.com/entertainment/books/the-battle-of-vimy-ridge-was-not-a-nation-builder-historian-tim-cook-writes>) In his book titled: *The Greatest Victory*, historian Jack Granatstein states that it was more of a symbolic victory rather than a strategic one. He states that while Vimy is significant it didn’t win the war. He believes Canadians may have overestimated the impact of what happened. (Jack L. Granatstein, *The Greatest Victory: Canada’s One Hundred Days* (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2014). Likewise, in *Vimy, April 1917: The Birth of Which Nation?*, Jean Martin states that: “It was only a few years after the war that Vimy began to acquire the symbolic value it has today. That value would be defined slowly over a long evolution in time . . . In celebrating Vimy, we celebrate a great accomplishment of the Canadian nation, not its birth.”(Jean Martin, “Vimy, April 1917: The Birth of Which Nation?” *Canadian Military Journal* Vol.11, no.2 (Spring 2011): 34.)

¹⁰ Canada. Veterans Affairs Canada. “The Battle of Vimy Ridge . . . ,” <http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/first-world-war/vimy-ridge>

The Maple Leaf, the national publication of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), stated that the Battle of Vimy Ridge “was a defining moment in the history of Canada and its armed forces,”¹¹ and was not without considerable cost with “10,600 casualties, nearly 3,600 of which were fatal.”¹² While substantial for Canada, the losses paled in comparison to the “Previous Allied assaults on Vimy Ridge in 1914 and 1915 [which] had resulted in hundreds of thousands of casualties but had been largely unsuccessful.”¹³

Canada’s success can be directly attributed to the extensive planning, preparations and rigorous training¹⁴ that were undertaken months prior to their advance on Vimy Ridge. While Canada’s Army (CA) was mainly made up of citizen-soldiers and only comprised of a small percentage of professional soldiers¹⁵ at the outset of the War, “by November 11, 1918, they were recognized as consummate professionals.”¹⁶ In commemorating this important national milestone, the Canadian Forces (CF) Ombudsman Gary Walbourne reiterated the salient factors in Canada’s victory by specifically linking them to today’s professional military force stating: “The planning,

¹¹ The Maple Leaf, *Vimy Ridge Centennial Sparks Transatlantic Bonds* (Ottawa: Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs), Volume 20, Number 4, April 2017) 7.

¹² Canada. Veterans Affairs Canada. “The Battle of Vimy Ridge . . . ,” <http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/first-world-war/vimy-ridge>

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Canada. Veterans Affairs Canada, “The Way to Victory After Vimy,” last accessed 2 May, 2017, <http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/first-world-war/road-to-vimy-ridge/vimy6>

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

preparation, and professionalism of the Canadian soldier at Vimy still stands as an example to militaries around the world, and is an important legacy which has been passed down from generation to generation of Canada's soldiers, sailors, and air personnel."¹⁷

Similar in the way that crucial military activities were undertaken by the Canadian soldiers prior to their assault on Vimy, today's CAF personnel continue to commit resources and time in support of extensive planning and preparation work prior to military operations. What's drastically different is how Canadians are informed about military operations in the 21st century.

The Public Affairs Connection

During the First World War, there were no military units tasked with the intent of informing the general public (from a Public Relations (PR) perspective), and there were very few journalists covering the war. The vast majority of journalists that did cover the war, did so under severe restrictions and rules. Ira Basen, a Canadian radio producer reported in *Canadian Broadcasting Corporation News* that weeks after the war began:

Parliament passed the War Measures Act. It provided for 'censorship and control and suppression of publications, writings, maps, plans, photographs, communication and means of communication' whenever the government determined that 'the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada' was under threat.¹⁸

¹⁷ Canada. Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces Ombudsman, "Ombudsman Recognizes the Commemoration of 100th Anniversary of the Canadian Victory at the Battle of Vimy Ridge on April 9, 1917," last accessed 2 May, 2017, <http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca/en/ombudsman-news-events-messages/ombudsman-message-vimy-ridge.page>

¹⁸ Ira Basen, "Why Canadian media embraced censorship during WWI: Canadian government introduced War Measured Act in 1914," *Canadian Broadcasting Corporation News*, last accessed 3 May, 2017,

But as the casualties began to mount, the government was worried that bad coverage would have an adverse effect on recruiting and fundraising efforts. As a result, a year into the war the Canadian government:

... established the office of the Chief Press Censor, which was responsible for insuring stories that were critical of military policy did not appear in the press. It would also ban stories that in the opinion of the censor were assisting or encouraging the enemy, or preventing, embarrassing, or hindering the successful prosecution of the war.¹⁹

The restrictions faced by Canadian journalists during this time were also experienced by their British counterparts, in that “from the start of the war the British government was eager to control the flow of information from the front line, passing legislation in 1914 which allowed the War Office to censor the press and raising the spectre of the death penalty for anyone convicted of assisting the enemy.”²⁰ Roy Greenslade, professor of journalism at City University of London reported in the *Guardian* that during the First World War “The catalogue of journalistic misdeeds is a matter of record: the willingness to publish propaganda as fact, the apparently tame acceptance of censorship and the failure to hold power to account.”²¹ These were difficult times for the press, as journalists “were prevented from informing the public by three powerful forces – the government, the military and their own proprietors.”²² These

<http://www.cbc.ca/news/why-canadian-media-embraced-censorship-during-wwi-ira-basen-1.2722786>

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Frank Gardner, “Why were journalists threatened with execution in WW1?” British Broadcasting Corporation News, last accessed 3 May, 2017, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/guides/zs9bwmn>

²¹ Roy Greenslade, “First World War: how state and press kept truth off the front page,” *The Guardian*, last accessed 3 May, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jul/27/first-world-war-state-press-reporting>

factors made it difficult for the public to receive unbiased, unfiltered and factual news reports of the war in general, and specifically as it related to Canadian military units.

By the end of the First World War the Canadian government had realized the importance of information, specifically in its ability to control its dissemination to its advantage. As a result, it would try and replicate this control during the Second World War understanding that the environment had changed in that “the volume of war news and publicity greatly exceeded that of the First World War ... [and] ... a greater number of war correspondents also accompanied the armies and accordingly sent more reports.”²³ To try and manage this the allies deployed field press censors,²⁴ and continued to rely on wartime propaganda. In Canada, the “Canadian Bureau of Public Information (BPI), later renamed the Wartime Information Board (WIB)”²⁵ was responsible for producing or commissioning “posters and other items to support recruitment, promote military production, inform citizens about proper conduct, and assure people that their governments are taking appropriate action.”²⁶

As the Second World War progressed, the attention it garnered from the public continued to increase directly resulting in an amplified demand for coverage from the government and private sources. As a result, the period between 1939 to 1945 was known

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Timothy John Balzer, “The Information Front: The Canadian Army, Public Relations, and War News during the Second World War” (Doctorate Dissertation, University of Victoria, 2009), 1-2. <https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/1346/Dis%20complete%20Final%20Feb%2024%202009.pdf?sequence=1>

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

²⁶ Canada. Canadian War Museum, “Propaganda: Canadian Wartime Propaganda,” last accessed 4 May, 2017, http://www.museedelaguerre.ca/cwm/exhibitions/propaganda/index_e.shtml

as when war reporting came of age,²⁷ and when “compared with all previous wars, the Second was uniquely the Publicity War.”²⁸ To manage this, allied forces employed Public Relations Officers (PROs).²⁹ But due to budgetary limitations, the “CA began the war with no PR organization at all ... Yet by the end of the war, CA PR was a substantial organization employing hundreds of personnel.”³⁰ The CAF PA Branch concurs with this by stating that: “There were no PROs in National Defence or the military prior to the Second World War and no role for PA.”³¹ However, by the mid-1950s, the DND/CF would acknowledge the need for full time PR support and institute an official PR directorate. Two decades thereafter the PA Branch would be established leading to the beginning of the PA Function.

Public Affairs Role in Canadian Forces Operations

The requirement of an official PA Function within the CAF would be based on various key factors: changes in government communications policy, an increase in the

²⁷ Media History, “Journalism in WWII: On the Front with Bill Mauldin and Ernie Pyle,” last accessed 3 May, 2017, http://j387mediahistory.weebly.com/uploads/6/4/2/2/6422481/25_mauldin-pyle-wwii.pdf

²⁸ Paul Fussell, *Wartime: Understanding and Behaviour in the Second World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 153.

²⁹ Timothy John Balzer, “The Information Front ...”, 2. <https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/1346/Dis%20complete%20Final%20Feb%2024%202009.pdf?sequence=1>

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

³¹ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, *History of Public Affairs in National Defence and in the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 6.1, 2009), 1.

media's role in society, technological advances and an increasingly complex operational environment.

Instead of trying to censor and restrict information from the public during military operations (except for reasons related to privacy and operational security), the Canadian government through CAF personnel including Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) have an obligation to be open and transparent with Canadians.³² Second, the role and the power the media yields has changed drastically since the Second World War, and there are many more national and international media outlets that make requests for information and access to CAF installations, exercises and operations. Third, since the end of the Second World War, advances in technology including: satellite communications and digital media, real-time news coverage, the internet (i.e. impact of social media), and various on-demand wireless applications have radically changed the media landscape in ways that make it virtually impossible for governments to actually control information the way they did in the Second World War. This has significantly changed how Canadians access and share information, and increased the importance of the PA Function in that PAOs are responsible for managing the Information Environment (IE) and advising their respective Chain-of-Command on how best to balance these factors, specifically during operations. Lastly, since the 2000's, the CAF have experienced an upsurge in operational tempo in increasingly complex operational environments.³³ While

³² Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, "DAOD 2008-0, Public Affairs Policy," last accessed 29 Apr, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-2000/2008-0.page>

past peacekeeping missions had their challenges, today's CAF need to be prepared to deploy "across the full spectrum of operations on both domestic (routine, contingency, sovereignty) and expeditionary missions (humanitarian, stabilization, reconstruction, combat) that call for both conventional and asymmetric capabilities."³⁴ During any operation, but specifically during complex operational environments, PAOs act as an enabler for the Commander by effectively managing the complex and ever changing IE, while ensuring that the PA Function supports mission success. As a result of these factors, and since the end of the Second World War, "every CAF mission or undertaking has had a PA element as part of the planning and deployment process."³⁵

Lessons Learned: Importance of Leadership, Military Ethos and Professionalism

The international geo-political environment has changed dramatically since the late-1930s, requiring the CAF to continuously evolve their military doctrine as well as ensure that their personnel, as leaders and members of the profession of arms maintain the institution's relevance in the eyes of the Canadian public. Both of these factors are crucial to any legitimate military force. The *CF Joint Publication: Canadian Military Doctrine* states that: "The role of doctrine within the conceptual component of military power is to provide a framework within which operations are planned, executed, and

³³ Martin Auger, Parliament of Canada, "Current and Emerging Issues: Canadian International Military Operations in the 21st Century," Library of Parliament, 41st Parliament, 2011, last accessed 25 June, 2017, <https://bdp.parl.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/cei-17-e.htm>

³⁴ Department of National Defence, A-FD-005-001/AF-001, *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030 - Part I: Current and Emerging Trends* (Ottawa: Chief of Force Development, 2009), 103.

³⁵ Department of National Defence, A-AD-207-001/AG-000, *Public Affairs Handbook* (Ottawa: Director General Public Affairs, 2000), 3.

evaluated. This framework is measured against the perceived future security environment in order to make recommendations on potential changes to future capability development for the CF.”³⁶ While this process is not infallible, as it is virtually impossible to forecast future threats and the types of capabilities required to address them, it is “therefore, not static; to remain relevant it needs to remain in concert with how forces evolve in response to experience, new technologies, and a multitude of other factors. In this way, doctrine must be continuously revalidated and never be considered as dogma.”³⁷

Even more important than effective military doctrine, is the requirement for professionalism amongst those in uniform. While the CAF has had a long history of predominantly heroic, selfless and dignified military service to the nation, there have been instances where a lack of leadership and ethics have brought into question the level of professionalism of its members, and the public’s trust in the institution. For example, Canada’s 1993 Somalia mission placed a spotlight on professionalism and the deficiencies within the military and the department at the time, specifically as it pertained to military ethos and leadership. The CAF adherence to the importance of military ethos was questioned when some of its members committed reprehensible acts while deployed, and institutional leadership was questioned when senior military leaders and the department failed to ensure that the necessary capabilities for mission success were made

³⁶ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001, *Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP 01): Canadian Military Doctrine* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2009), 2-6,2-7.

³⁷ Canada. Royal Canadian Air Force, “Chapter 1: Introduction to Doctrine,” last accessed 5 May, 2017, <http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/cf-aerospace-warfare-centre/doctrine/b-ga-400-000-fp-000-chapter-1.page>

available.³⁸ The resulting public inquiry into the Somalia Affair led to over 300 recommendations,³⁹ which included a full review “of its military ethos, [and] a revision of the Professional Development (PD) of leadership.”⁴⁰ As a consequence, “The Canadian government remodeled the CF by completely revamping education and professional standards.”⁴¹

While a Canadian Forces Professional Development System (CFPDS) already existed prior to the end of the Cold War, the domino effect of the Somalia Affair and prior concerns “over the PD of Officers in the wake of the end of the Cold War,”⁴² eventually created enough pressure to update the system, which “is a career – long, comprehensive, integrated and sequential development process of education, training, self-development, and experience [and it] provides a continuous learning environment to develop and enhance the capabilities and leadership of CAF members.”⁴³ The CFPDS

³⁸ Minister of Public Works and Government Services, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Legacy of the Somalia Affair. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*. (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 1997), Executive Summary, 50.

³⁹ Victor E. Morris, “Conscience and the Canadian Armed Forces,” *Canadian Military Journal* Vol. 17, no. 2 (Spring 2017): 18.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Jane Gerster, “20 Years After Somalia Affair of Tortured Teen,” *Toronto Metro News*, 16 March, 2013, last accessed 28 April, 2017, <http://www.metronews.ca/news/canada/2013/03/16/saturday-marks-anniversary-of-somalia-affair.html>

⁴² Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Bentley (ret’d), *Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms in Canada* (Kingston, Ontario: Canadian International Council, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 37.

⁴³ Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development.” Last accessed 8 Apr, 2017. <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

highlights the importance of leadership abilities throughout an Officers career. This instilled a new level of professionalism where members are continuously learning new skills and increasing their knowledge through educational and training opportunities, experience and self-development. This has placed today's CAF personnel and the institution in a better position to "intellectually and professionally meet the anticipated challenges in [today's] ambiguous, chaotic and complex security environment."⁴⁴ History has shown that military tactics, techniques and procedures and operational experience are insufficient to maintain a professional fighting force intact in the long run. In other words, "warfighting skills alone are not enough,"⁴⁵ to meet the security challenges that lie ahead. The CAF requires a continuous and concerted effort in the development of its members' critical thinking ability and PD.

Vital Role of Public Affairs Officers and the Public Affairs Function

A key component to any organization's long-term success is its ability to effectively communicate internally and with its customers and external stakeholders, especially during times of crisis. For the CAF, there is no question that a well-informed populace that understands the merits of a professional military is more apt to support costly procurement requirements and multi-year expeditionary operations in politically sensitive regions of the world. The CAF image and reputation as a professional force and reputation as a national institution is directly connected to its ability to effectively

⁴⁴ Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. "Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development ...", <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

communicate how it is meeting its mandate. By their function, PAOs have a fundamental role to play here. As stated in the *Defence Administrative Orders and Directive (DAOD) 2008-0, PA Policy*, “the role of PA is to promote understanding and awareness among Canadians of the role, mandate and activities of the CAF/DND, and of the contributions that they make to Canadian society and the international community.”⁴⁶

By fulfilling the PA Function, whether it be at a local base or at the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa, PAOs play an important role in informing a wide range of audiences including the general public, key stakeholders, the media and elected officials about every issue that could involve or affect the CAF and the public’s perception of their effectiveness (i.e. training, procurement, deployment, operations, crises, etc.). These issues require a PAO to be cognizant of many issues and to effectively comprehend the IE in order to be able to deliver clear, concise and factual messages to its audience (both internally and externally) in a transparent and open manner while respecting operational security and the various federal laws (i.e. *Privacy Act*, etc.). The unique demands placed on PAOs, requires them to have high competencies (i.e. cognitive capacities and analytical abilities) in line with the CAF Leader Development Framework.⁴⁷ Their effectiveness relies on their ability to multi-task using information

⁴⁶ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “DAOD 2008-0, Public Affairs Policy ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-2000/2008-0.page>

⁴⁷ Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces, A-PA-005-000/AP-006, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2007), 150.

from various sources in different environments that usually have strategic, institutional and political implications.

The relative importance, and in some cases, the operational and institutional relevancy of today's PAOs depends largely on their ability to understand, engage in and advise on the various aspects related to the IE. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines the IE as "The physical, virtual and cognitive space in which information is collected, processed, perceived, disseminated and acted upon. It consists of individuals, organizations and information systems as well as the information itself."⁴⁸ Information, specifically how it is perceived by those involved in a conflict (as well as by the general public), has become an increasingly important part of the CAF's planning and decision-making process. The evolution of the current security environment coupled with the heightened influence that information has on any military mission, has also been incorporated into Canada's new Defence Policy, which states that: "The Defence team will increase its intelligence capacity, and will examine its capabilities to understand and operate in the IE, in support of the conduct of information and influence operations."⁴⁹ This highlights how information is now increasingly being used as a weapon of choice in today's operational environment.

Pursuant to this reality, the CAF Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) recently mandated the Director General PA (DGPA) to conduct a study in order to more

⁴⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Understanding NATO StratCom," last accessed 2 Jun, 2017, http://stratcomhellas.weebly.com/uploads/5/1/6/5/51658901/1-4-nato_stratcom_policy_concept_and_principles_updated_d_feb_2015.pdf

⁴⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence, "Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy, 2017," last accessed 7 June, 2017. <http://dgpapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf>

effectively operationalize the PA Function, specifically, to operationalize the institution's military PA and its imagery capability.⁵⁰ This effort has resulted in DGPA producing a report, titled: *Conceptual Vision and Proposal for Enabling the CAF in the Information Domain*.⁵¹ A key recommendation is the role of military Strategic Communications (henceforth referred to as StratCom), and the importance of producing StratCom-capable specialists, who can competently manage the IE.⁵² While DGPA's report does not diminish in any way the overall efforts and contribution of today's PAOs, the report is merely trying to ensure that a PAOs expertise and operational readiness, as well as their overall effectiveness is aligned with the needs of the CAF. Expecting PAOs to continue meeting their currently identified institutional responsibilities while also requiring them to become key contributors to the IE through the use of StratCom, necessitates that PAOs are able to progressively develop their skills and knowledge through a PD framework with clearly delineated objectives in each of the pillars of the PD system: education, training, experience and self-development. This in turn will support the PAOs ability to attain, maintain and expand on these obligations, especially as it relates to the requirement for PAOs to function earlier in their career at the strategic and political levels.

The Importance of Developing PAOs To Function at the Strategic Level

⁵⁰ Director General Public Affairs, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, *A Conceptual Vision of the Operationalization of the Canadian Armed Forces Military Public Affairs Capability* (Ottawa: DGPA Report: 2017), 3.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*, 4.

While all CAF members need to continuously and progressively develop themselves as they increase in rank in order to remain effective and relevant in the performance of their duties, some military occupations require that their members be able to function at the strategic level earlier in their career. This specifically relates to PAOs who are required to function at the strategic and political levels earlier than Officers from other occupations of similar rank (i.e. General Service Officer). A PAO Lieutenant/Sub-Lieutenant or Captain/Lieutenant(Navy) acts as a PA advisor to a Colonel/Captain(N) Formation Commander and a PAO at the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel/Commander acts as a PA advisor to a Lieutenant-General/Vice-Admiral (i.e. Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), CA or Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF)), while an Infantry Officer at the Lieutenant or Captain rank would normally report to a Major, and an Infantry Officer at the Lieutenant-Colonel rank would normally report to a Colonel. This means that while an Infantry Officer is able to progressively gain experience and employ that experience at each level, a PAO is required to function almost immediately at levels above his/her experience threshold. In addition to the rank relationship, PAOs currently only receive a basic occupational course early in their career and little else to maintain their skills (until recently with the development of an advanced PA course at the DP 2 level), whereas many other Officer occupations have pre-determined occupational training throughout one's career in order to ensure that their personnel have the skills to operate effectively at higher ranks. Additionally, besides the initial university degree requirement, PAOs have no educational requirements that are mandated or supported by the PA Branch for senior PAOs, which limits their cognitive and intellectual capacity to manage increasingly complex issues at higher levels.

The requirement for PAOs to work at the strategic/political levels earlier in their careers, places great importance on how PAOs are professionally developed in order to ensure that they are able to effectively function and support senior leadership at the strategic level in support of the institution's objectives. While education, training, experience, and self-development all contribute to one's understanding of, and eventual functioning at the strategic level, an academic deficit in the education pillar at higher levels of one's career may limit their effectiveness at the strategic level. PAOs adhere to the CAF standard for education requirements (i.e. Bachelor's Degree) upon enrolment, which supports their cognitive ability to function at the tactical and operational levels. But there is currently no PA Branch sponsored Post-Graduate Education Program (PGEP) for senior Officers at the Master's level that would help prepare senior PAOs to better support the institutional military requirements at the strategic/political levels. The majority of CAF Officer occupations all have progressive training greater than basic occupational training allowing them to expand their skills and knowledge as they progress, but PA only has that one level, therefore there is a vital requirement to address this deficiency in the PD of PAOs.

Thesis Statement

This research project will show that there is an academic deficit in PA education for senior PAOs as defined by the CFPDS, and that this can be improved by a PGEP at

the Master's level. Additionally, this research project will propose which PGEP(s) best address this academic deficit in order to provide the opportunity for PAOs to expand their professional capabilities in line with their requirement to function earlier in their career at the strategic and political levels.

This project will focus on two main research questions in addressing the stated aim, first, what are the current gaps of the PA Function, and second, what PGEP(s) address the professional capabilities that could enhance the main functions employed by a PAO.

Hypotheses

This research project has two main hypotheses, the first is that there is no type of PGEP that will address all the identified gaps sought after by the PA Branch. The second hypothesis is that within the PA Branch, there is no formal correlation between education, training, experience and self-development in the career progression of PAOs.

Outline

This research project is divided into seven chapters, which includes this chapter, the introduction. The second chapter will be an overview of the CFPDS and how it applies to Regular Force (RegF) CAF Officers. While CAF Non-Commissioned Members and Non-Commissioned Officers are a vital and indisputable part of the CAF, this research project will only focus on Officers. The third chapter will provide a synopsis of the development of CAF PAOs and will be accomplished by looking at how PAOs are developed based on the CFPDS. The fourth chapter will then describe the professional

capabilities of CAF PAOs and the various PA Gaps that may exist at some level throughout a PAOs career progression/PD. This chapter will also look at future challenges and strategic considerations for PAOs as it relates to StratCom and the importance of Professional civilian PR Strategic Communications (henceforth referred to as Corporate Strategic Communication). The fifth chapter will focus on presenting the survey results received by PAOs, CAF Commanders and DND Information Services (IS) Public Servants at the Executive level (henceforth shall be referred to as Senior Corporate Communicators (SCC)). The sixth chapter will explore various PGEPs at the Master's level in order to address the professional capabilities that could enhance the main functions employed by a PAO. The conclusion will then provide recommendations based on the various research and findings discussed throughout the research project.

CHAPTER 2

OVERVIEW OF THE CANADIAN FORCES PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM

*To perform well, Officers must be trained and educated to master the art of war. A foundation of military skill is essential, as is the ability to think creatively and to reason critically. Officers must acquire a comprehensive understanding of the political, economic, social, cultural and military issues and trends that may effect the security of Canada....the nation can accept nothing less.*⁵³

– Lieutenant-General Robert W. Morton, Officers Development Review Board, 1995

Similar to how Canadian society has evolved over the last 100 years, so has the composition and construct of the CAF changed in order to meet the demands of the day. While “Canada has had a professional military since the 1870s,”⁵⁴ its military has not always had a PD system in which to ensure that its members developed in line with Canadian norms and values. This chapter will provide an overview of the CFPDS and its importance in developing today’s military Officers so that they can lead their subordinates against any threat, as well as lead the institution into the next generation. This can only be accomplished over the long run if the CAF remain an effective and relevant fighting force while equally adhering to the profession of arms. The CFPDS was created with this in mind, and is the standard system by which all CAF Officers (regardless of occupation) professionally develop themselves throughout their career. This chapter is vital to understanding how CAF Officers, PAOs included, are developed based on the CFPDS. Specific PAO PD is further explained in Chapter Three.

⁵³ Dr. Ronald G. Haycock, “The Labours of Athena and the Muses . . . ,” <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo2/no2/doc/5-22-eng.pdf>

⁵⁴ David J. Bercuson, “Up From the Ashes: The Re-Professionalization of the Canadian Forces After the Somalia Affair,” *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 9, no. 3 (2009): 32.

History of the Canadian Forces Professional Development System

Since the inception of Canada's military, the focus has been predominantly on training its force to ensure operational effectiveness. From the end of the Second World War until the end of the Cold War in 1991, the CA "focused upon technology, weaponry, and the training required to fight the opening battle of the Third World War ... that particular army demonstrated little or no particular interest in furthering military ethics and values, the development of a Canadian military ethos, maintaining ties with a changing Canadian society, or permanent PD."⁵⁵

While Canadians were looking at ways of increasing their level of education in record numbers during these years, the Canadian military did the opposite, it neglected the thought that expanding a member's knowledge base and cognitive abilities outside of military tactics and operations was worth the investment. The Canadian military leadership "'saw the world in black and white'; nuance or independent thinking was unnecessary, perhaps even dangerous. If truly serious strategic thinking was required, the Americans and the British could do it."⁵⁶ Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley further describe the problem during this time:

Within this model, higher education had little importance. [The army] stressed training (a predictable response to a predictable situation) to the virtual exclusion of education, a reasoned response to an unpredictable situation, that is, critical thinking in the face of the unknown. In fact, a rabid anti-intellectualism thrived. Those seeking higher education (a Master's degree, as a PhD was unfathomable) were deemed suspect; they were obviously trying to prepare themselves for a life outside the military. What was important within the military hierarchy

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

were individuals who understood the system: the operating environment; the Soviet enemy; NATO doctrine and standard operating procedures; and Canadian equipment, tactics, and staff work. Significantly, this fervent anti-intellectualism denuded the officer corps of individuals capable of, or willing to undertake, analysis, critical thinking,⁵⁷ reflection and visioning in the larger geo-political and societal context.

This description demonstrates the pervasive culture at the time that saw education as a waste of time, in other words, educating one's military force to be able to respond to an unpredictable situation was not deemed important. Under this environment, it would be difficult to find new ways of operating against unknown threats or looking at institutional problems from a different perspective. Due to this culture "the CF in general and the CA in particular did little in the way of modern PD, or toward raising or improving educational standards from the late 1940s to the late 1990s."⁵⁸ While the period during the Cold War was not conducive to necessarily supporting PD, it became even more acrimonious near the end of the Cold War due to decreased morale, widespread drinking, a drop in physical standards, low pay and little incentive to pursue self-advancement.⁵⁹ It is worth noting that there was a difference in how the CF saw education and PD during this time. PD initiatives would not necessarily focus on graduate level education but rather on conducting military operations in a Division and Corps structure. Even today where more Officers receive graduate level education, the CAF still prioritize operational effectiveness, but this is achieved in a manner that understands the benefits of higher education and its contribution to an Officers overall PD.

⁵⁷ Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley, "The Road to Transformation: Ascending from the Decade of Darkness," *Canadian Military History*, Vol. 16, Issue. 4, Article 4 (2012): 36.

⁵⁸ David J. Bercuson, "Up From the Ashes . . .", 34.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

Notwithstanding the overall institutional indifference and lack of action in implementing any serious program in professionally developing its Officers in the past, there were instances where various valiant efforts were made, specifically the Major-General Roger Rowley Report in 1969, the Major-General C.G. Kitchen Report in 1985, the Colonel David Lightburn Study in 1986 and the Lieutenant-General Rick Evraire Paper in 1988.”⁶⁰ These efforts did not see any traction, and as a result little was done in advancing the PD of Canada’s military Officers. The underlying military ethos and leadership deficiencies in the force would rise up and shock the Canadian population as a result of the CAF mission in Somalia. As fingers were pointed in each direction in an effort to deflect blame, there was little doubt that ignoring the PD needs of its members bore a huge responsibility. As Bentley stated, “The Somalia affair was a pivotal event in the history of the Canadian profession of arms at the end of the 20th century.”⁶¹

The public outcry, demanded immediate action which resulted in Canada’s Prime Minister Jean Chrétien appointing General John Gardyne Drummond de Chastelain to the position of CDS (for a second time).⁶² With the full attention of the media and the nation, General de Chastelain “commissioned the *Officer Development Review Board (ODRB)* under the chairmanship of Lieutenant-General (Retired) Robert Morton”⁶³ in 1994. The

⁶⁰ Colonel (ret’d) Bernd Horn, and Dr. Bill Bentley, *Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2015), 13-15.

⁶¹ Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Bentley (ret’d), *Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms in Canada ...*, 38.

⁶² Royal Roads University, “John de Chastelain,” last accessed 7 May, 2017, <http://www.royalroads.ca/news-events/convocation/awards/john-de-chastelain>

⁶³ Colonel (ret’d) Bernd Horn, and Dr. Bill Bentley, *Forced to Change ...*, 15.

Morton Report provided recommendations that would directly influence the current CFPDS. Specifically it mentioned that officer PD would “include the four pillars of education, training, experience and self-development, structured in four Developmental Periods (DPs).”⁶⁴ Another observation by the Morton Report was that:

... the weak officer development process in the CAF was rooted in a defective and inadequate Officer General Specification (OGS) ... The major failing of the OGS was to define all elements of the military profession, particularly the importance of the military ethos. Furthermore, it did not define the specific training and educational requirements for the four stages of officer development.⁶⁵

While these recommendations and reforms would eventually be implemented, the effort expended by the “team of 14 Officers and civilian equivalents”⁶⁶ in drafting the Morton Report was not fully acknowledged or well received by the CAF.⁶⁷ As with previous departmental efforts to bring much needed change in how its Officers were developed, “These recommendations did not go far enough, lacking the boldness of vision necessary to generate decisive action. The Report itself concluded that the scope of the study was excessively ambitious to be accomplished in the time available.”⁶⁸ Bercuson concurred that not much would change, in that “virtually every suggestion for

⁶⁴ Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Bentley (ret'd), *Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms in Canada ...*, 37.

⁶⁵ Colonel (ret'd) Bernd Horn, and Dr. Bill Bentley, *Forced to Change ...*, 15.

⁶⁶ Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Bentley (ret'd), *Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms in Canada ...*, 37.

⁶⁷ Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley, "The Road to Transformation ...", 41.

⁶⁸ Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Bentley (ret'd), *Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms in Canada ...*, 37.

change was met by apathy and hostility, or was spurned as being unnecessary and time-consuming.”⁶⁹

Within years after the Cold War ended, the National Defence budget took a hit. It saw a 25% decrease from the mid-1990s to 1998, and during that same time period the size of the RegF went from 85,000 to 60,000.⁷⁰ As a result of these factors and the military’s indifference to advanced learning, “little effort was made within the military to redefine what professionalism meant in the new post Cold War,”⁷¹

With the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of CF to Somalia’s publication in 1997 of its report titled: *Dishonoured Legacy. The Lessons of the Somalia Affair: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of CF to Somalia*, the report “directly questioned the health of the profession of arms in Canada.”⁷² If the CF were to continue operating with the public’s trust, major changes in how its members were educated and professionally developed was needed. In 1997, the Minister of National Defence (MND) Douglas Young issued a report that would be instrumental in forcing the much-needed changes required, specifically:

Young’s recommendations came down heavily in favour of almost totally revamping the education and professional development systems for both Officers and senior non-commissioned officers. Officers were henceforth to be degree holders. The military education curriculum was to be revised, an independent professional military journal was to be established, an ombudsman – working outside the chain of command – was to be appointed, work was to begin on defining a Canadian Forces’

⁶⁹ David J. Bercuson, “Up From the Ashes . . .”, 34.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Bentley (ret’d), *Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms in Canada* . . ., 38.

ethos, and the Canadian Forces Staff College was to broaden and to liberalize its educational offerings.⁷³

With the attention of the nation on the CF and the health of the profession of arms in question, “the new CDS, General Maurice Baril [appointed] Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire as his Special Advisor for PD in February, 1999.”⁷⁴ Young’s Report and overall direction on this issue was instrumental in leading Lieutenant-General Dallaire in producing *Officership in the 21st Century*. This document:

... broke the log jam in the PD system and led to fundamental change ... [it also] described the requirement for a CF University ... [and] ... strongly recommended the establishment of a CF Leadership Institute responsible for research and the creation and promulgation of doctrine and concept development in regards to leadership and the profession of arms.⁷⁵

With the subsequent input of members from junior, intermediate and senior ranks, *Officership in the 21st Century* evolved into *Officership 2020*.⁷⁶ For the first time, the institutional leaders within DND and the CAF supported a PD initiative – *Officership 2020*. This resulted in the “endorsement of the CF University concept to ensure that the education pillar of PD would receive the much needed attention that it deserved [and] proposed the creation of three pan-CF capstone manuals: the profession of arms in Canada manual to define, describe and explain the concept of Canadian military professionalism; a leadership manual to update leadership doctrine; and a CF strategic

⁷³ David J. Bercuson, “Up From the Ashes ...”, 36.

⁷⁴ Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Bentley (ret’d), *Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms in Canada* ..., 38.

⁷⁵ Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley, “The Road to Transformation ...”, 42.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

doctrine manual to provide the context for PD for the next 20 years.”⁷⁷ Additionally, through this initiative, the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) was established “with the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) and the CF Leadership Institute (CFLI) acting as its academic engines.”⁷⁸ These actions showed that the department and the CAF were serious about reassessing the “concept of military professionalism, as it was understood in the CAF, and to take whatever measures necessary to realign this concept with the highest standards of professionalism.”⁷⁹

By understanding the history of how Officer PD has evolved within the CAF, one is better able to appreciate the sacrifices made by those before, and ensure that one applies the current CFPDS to their benefit as they continue to develop themselves personally and professionally as distinct members of the profession of arms.

Description of the Canadian Forces Professional Development System

The evolution of Officer PD in the CAF has resulted in the current CFPDS, shown graphically as Figure 2.1. Understanding how all of the component parts of CFPDS work together in the development of Officers is an important part of understanding where the gaps are for the PAO.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Bentley (ret'd), *Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms in Canada ...*, 39.




Figure 2.1 – The Canadian Forces Professional Development System

Source: Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development.” Last accessed 8 April, 2017. <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

The CAF defines PD as something that is “sequenced throughout an individual’s CAF career to impart skills, knowledge and attitudes necessary to rank and responsibilities and to allow each member to exercise sound judgment.”⁸⁰ As previously stated, the benefit of the CFPDS can only be achieved if it is adhered throughout one’s career, especially as one’s responsibilities and accountability increase with rank, this can also be seen through the five DPs. Throughout these different periods, it is important to keep in mind the overall purpose of the CFPDS, which is “the ethical, social and intellectual development of CAF personnel and the accumulation of a sufficient Professional Body of Knowledge (PBK) to deal with the broad range of leadership and staff responsibilities throughout the full spectrum of military activities that can be

⁸⁰ Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development . . . , <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

anticipated during an individual's career."⁸¹ This is highlighted in the seven objectives outlined in the CFPDS, three of which are of note to this project, starting with the importance of ensuring that:

CAF members are capable of critical thinking, managing change, effective leadership and resource management, across the full spectrum of military service ... [to enabling] ... CAF members to develop professional competencies and attitudes required to successfully perform their duties and tasks ... [and to finally preparing] CAF members for the demands of a progressive careers.⁸²

In the long run, the success of the CFPDS can be directly connected to the ability of its Officers to professionally perform their duties consistent with its military ethos and employ effective leadership skills. Likewise, the mission success for the CAF is also directly connected to its ability to adhere to the benefits provided by the CFPDS. Horn and Stouffer make the connection between the CFPDS and CAF success, "For the CF its success had been dependent on highly trained well-educated personnel that have been able to respond correctly to a myriad of complex, dangerous and ever-changing circumstances in diverse environments."⁸³

Foundation Components of the Canadian Forces Professional Development System

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ Bernd Horn and Jeff Stouffer, *Educating the Leaders and Leading the Educated: The Defence Learning, Education and Training Handbook* (Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2012), 281.

When a building is constructed, the first thing that is built is the foundation, without it there would be nothing to hold up the structure and allow it to weather the elements. This is precisely why the most important part of the CFPDS is its foundational elements: PBK, War Fighting and Leadership skills. This foundation needs to be strong enough to hold up the system's four pillars (education, training, experience and self-development) as an Officer progresses in rank. In other words, an Officer cannot effectively pursue the four pillars unless he/she understands and continues to develop their PBK, War Fighting and Leadership skills, "In essence, the CFPDS provides a continuous learning environment to develop and enhance the capabilities and leadership of CF members."⁸⁴

Professional Body of Knowledge: Civilian Professions.

The PBK is not only a key component of the CFPDS foundation, but perhaps the most important aspect of the CFPDS in that it allows the military the opportunity to be known and referred to as a profession – specifically as the profession of arms. This can only be maintained so long as the CAF continue to adhere to the unique components that make up their PBK: body of work, ethics and a code of professional standards. Without adhering to these components, the CAF would eventually stray from representing Canadian values and norms and perhaps repeat the errors made in Somalia, or worse. In order to look at this from a CAF perspective, an understanding of a 'traditional' profession is required. Only with that understanding can the legitimate differences

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

between civilian professions and the military profession of arms be examined. The following two sections will define what is a ‘traditional’ profession and the profession of arms, as well as demonstrate the different components of each.

In comparison, Bentley stated: “How does the profession of arms relate to other professions such as law and medicine, engineering and the scholarly disciplines? Perhaps more importantly, what distinguishes it from all those other occupations spread throughout society in the business world, government and the bureaucracies characteristic of most large organizations?”⁸⁵ The answer to this specific question, which will be elaborated further in this chapter, can be found in the cornerstone document within the CFPDS - *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. Prior to looking at these details, let’s first look at the definition of a profession as provided by *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*:

A profession is an exclusive group of people who possess and apply a systematically acquired body of knowledge derived from extensive research, education, training and experience. Members of a profession have a special responsibility to fulfill their function competently and objectively for the benefit of society. Professionals are governed by a code of ethics that establishes standards of conduct while defining and regulating their work. This code of ethics is enforced by the members themselves and contains values that are widely accepted as legitimate by society at large.⁸⁶

Body of Work.

⁸⁵ Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Bentley (ret’d), *Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms in Canada* ..., 2.

⁸⁶ Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2009), 6.

When one thinks of a civilian profession, what usually comes to mind are the medical, dental and legal professions. Society has accepted that in order for these disciplines to be considered professions, their PBK consists of a specialized body of work, employed through the adherence of both stringent ethical standards and a specific code of professional standards.

The first part of the definition above basically states that a profession is comprised of an ‘exclusive group’ of individuals who have acquired and employ a specific body of knowledge (or body of work) that they have gained through lengthy ‘research, education, training and experience’.⁸⁷ Eliot L. Friedson, whose work on professions was internationally known and spanned over 35 years stated that: “two of the most general ideas underlying professionalism are the belief that certain work is so specialized as to be inaccessible to those lacking the required training and experience ... at the core of professionalism is its claim, therefore, to discretionary specialization”.⁸⁸ There is little argument that doctors, dentists and lawyers meet this strict requirement, and do so in a competent and objective manner for the benefit of society, thus satisfying the second part of the definition.

Ethics.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ Eliot Friedson, *Professionalism: The Third Logic* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001), 1.

The second part of a PBK is ethics, and it vital to any professions long-term viability. When one discusses ethics, ethical treatment or an ethical dilemma, it is synonymous with asking oneself what is moral, fair and the right thing to do. Cornell University Law School provides the following origin for the word ethics:

The word ‘ethics’ is derived from the Greek word *ethos* (character), and from the Latin word *mores* (customs). Together, they combine to define how individuals choose to interact with one another. In philosophy, ethics defines what is good for the individual and for society and establishes the nature of duties that people owe themselves and one another.⁸⁹

Without ethics, any profession would have no moral compass to guide its body of work. This is critical to any profession, and specifically to the medical profession where society’s trust is absolute, and any unethical activity (by the profession) would be detrimental to the profession. In line with this, the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) Code of Ethics refers to certain fundamental responsibilities like:

“Consider first the well-being of the patient ... [and] ... Practise the profession of medicine in a manner that treats the patient with dignity and as a person worthy of respect ... [and] ... It also states that they have ‘responsibilities to: the patient, society, the profession and oneself.’”⁹⁰

Likewise, another highly respected Canadian profession, the Canadian Dental Association principle of ethics “define the fundamental commitments that guide a dentist's ethical practice and to which the dental profession aspires. It forms the foundation of a dentist's professional responsibilities to his or her patient, to society, to

⁸⁹ Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute, “Ethics,” last accessed 5 May, 2017, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ethics>

⁹⁰ Canadian Medical Association, “CMA Code of Ethics,” last accessed 22 April, 2017, https://www.cma.ca/Assets/assets-library/document/en/advocacy/policy-research/CMA_Policy_Code_of_ethics_of_the_Canadian_Medical_Association_Update_2004_PD04-06-e.pdf

the profession, and to him or herself.”⁹¹ It is not surprising to see that their respective code and principle of ethics are very similar, focusing on the patient’s health and well-being.

Code of Professional Conduct.

The third requirement of a PBK is a code of professional standards, this is the part that allows a profession to be able to self-regulate itself and ensure that the service/product that it provides its patients/customers is in line with its ethical standards or principles. Bentley stated that “Professional ideology relates to both the nature of professional expertise and the ethical standards that adjudicates how this expertise is applied and how those applying it should conduct themselves.”⁹²

The Federation of Law Societies of Canada Code of Professional Conduct provides a pertinent example. It states that: “Canadians expect members of the legal profession to conduct themselves ethically in accordance with high standards of professionalism set out in enforceable rules of conduct.”⁹³ This prestigious body reinforces the fact that the public’s trust in its profession is based on its ability to effectively self-regulate itself, it states that: “Self-regulatory powers have been granted to the legal profession on the understanding that the profession will exercise those powers in

⁹¹ Canadian Dental Association, “CDA Principles of Ethics,” last accessed 22 April, 2017, <https://www.cda-adc.ca/en/about/ethics/>

⁹² Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Bentley (ret’d), *Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms in Canada* ..., 2.

⁹³ Federation of Law Societies of Canada, “Model Code of Professional Conduct,” last accessed 22 April, 2017, <http://flsc.ca/national-initiatives/model-code-of-professional-conduct/>

the public interest. Part of that responsibility is ensuring the appropriate regulation of the professional conduct of lawyers.”⁹⁴

By the examples provided above, it is evident that the Canadian Medical and Dental Associations and the Federation of Law Societies of Canada meet the final part of the definition of a profession in that they “are governed by a code of ethics that establishes standards of conduct while defining and regulating their work ... [and that] ... this code of ethics is enforced by the members themselves and contains values that are widely accepted as legitimate by society at large.”⁹⁵

Summary of Professional Body of Knowledge: Civilian Professions.

In conclusion, the capstone document *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, states that a profession is characterized by four specific attributes: responsibility, expertise, identity and vocational ethic; I will extrapolate on each one using the medical profession as an example.⁹⁶ It identifies responsibility in that a profession “acknowledges a special duty to society,”⁹⁷ the medical profession has a responsibility to provide vital health care and life-saving treatments to society. A profession’s expertise “describes the body of abstract theoretical knowledge they possess,”⁹⁸ for the medical profession this equates to the ability for a surgeon to operate

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, 6.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

or a doctor to diagnose an illness or prescribe the appropriate medicine. For the third attribute, identity, “reflects the members’ unique standing within society,”⁹⁹ the medical profession definitely enjoys a unique identity in that society accepts that there is a monopoly on health care. The final attribute, vocational ethic, focuses on “particular values and obligations that form the foundation of the profession, underpinning and binding it together,”¹⁰⁰ for the medical profession, abiding by their ethical standards confirms their legitimacy and ensures the public’s trust in performance of their expertise.

Professional Body of Knowledge – Profession of Arms (Military).

Having just examined the definition of a profession, its specific components or attributes, and how it relates to a civilian profession, this section will now look at the military’s PBK and demonstrate that the military as a profession of arms is also seen and accepted as a legitimate profession in the eyes of the public, and that “Canada has had a professional military since the 1870s.”¹⁰¹ While a ‘typical’ profession (i.e. medical profession) and the profession of arms have three main components, there are distinct differences within those components that distinguish them.

Canadian Armed Forces Body of Work.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ David J. Bercuson, “Up From the Ashes . . .”, 32.

While different professions have very similar styles of body of work, notwithstanding their respective skillsets that differentiate them, the military is a unique profession. This is due to the fact that: “The essential function of the military profession is the ordered application of military force in defence of the state and its interests.”¹⁰² This in essence, requires that the military’s body of work to encompass unique sub-components, namely: military as a profession, Universality of Service (U o S), and the fact that all Officers are expected to be able to do the same type of work at the basic level as specified in the OGS.

Canadian Armed Forces as a Profession of Arms.

The first sub-component of the military’s body of work is the criteria that differentiates it from other professions. With this basic understanding, one will be able to comprehend the other sub-components of the military’s body of work and then be able to accept the rationale for the differences in the other two components that make up the military’ professional body of work: its military ethos and code of professional standards.

Visually, many professions can be distinguished by what its members wear, what type of equipment or resources they use to perform their function, where they perform their body of work and what service or product one receives in return. These simple criteria allow one to visualize a CAF member and understand that they are different than other professions. In essence, the profession of arms is distinguished from other

¹⁰² Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, 7.

professions in two respects: “it is a collective profession and it serves the state,”¹⁰³ and most importantly, the profession of arms is about the management of violence on behalf of the state.

First, most professions (i.e. medical, dental and legal) are part of an association, where the members are able and expected to function independently as they deal with their patients or clients, whereas the CAF is a collective profession, where “no individual or even a subgroup of individuals can accomplish the ends sought; rather, it is the collective as a whole that acts. A higher degree of organization and specialization is therefore required for collective professions than is normal for associational professions.”¹⁰⁴ When the CAF are deployed, there are many elements that come together to ensure that the forward leaning unit is prepared to undertake the mission and has operational support “provided by a supporting command either within a theatre of operations or along strategic lines of communication.”¹⁰⁵ No individual military member or unit can achieve mission success, it takes a team of military professionals working collectively in order to achieve the Commander’s intent as directed by the elected government.

The second difference is that the “profession of arms serves the state.”¹⁰⁶ In essence, the CAF receives its orders and its authority to operate directly from the elected government, on behalf of the population. *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001 ..., 5-9.

¹⁰⁶ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, 9.

Canada states that “armed forces in Western democracies are subordinate to the elected civil authority and prohibited from operating outside the boundaries that authority sets.”¹⁰⁷ Other professions are not subordinate to a government, and definitely operate outside of these limitations. Being that the military is an extension of the government and functions at its behest, “the military professional [cannot] practice his or her profession outside the organizational structure of the armed forces.”¹⁰⁸ Related to this point is the fact that members of the profession of arms accept that they may be “lawfully ordered into harm’s way under conditions that could lead to the loss of their lives.”¹⁰⁹ This second distinguishing factor definitely demonstrates the difference between the profession of arms and every other profession. Based on the preceding information provided, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* defines the profession of arms as follows:

The profession of arms in Canada is composed of military members dedicated to the defence of Canada and its interests, as directed by the Government of Canada (GoC). The profession of arms is distinguished by the concept of service before self, the lawful, ordered application of military force, and the acceptance of the concept of unlimited liability. Its members possess a systematic and specialized body of military knowledge and skills acquired through education, training and experience, and they apply this expertise competently and objectively in the accomplishment of their missions. Members of the Canadian profession of arms share a set of core values and beliefs found in the military ethos that guides them in the performance of their duty and allows a special relationship of trust to be maintained within Canadian society.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ Department of the National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-002, *Summary of Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003), 9.

¹¹⁰ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, 10.

This definition captures the essence of being a distinguished member of the profession of arms, and any action or inaction (when applicable) that would go counter to these criteria would jeopardize the sacred relationship the military has with the population it serves, and affect its ability to function and to govern itself. This solemn trust was damaged as a result of the Somalia Affair, when “the professionalism of the Canadian military was, effectively, suspended. One of the main attributes of a profession is the ability to fairly and objectively govern itself. When the government appointed the Somalia Commission, it effectively suspended that condition of the profession of arms in Canada.”¹¹¹ From a civilian professional perspective, this would be similar to the Medical Association suspending a Doctor’s license or certificate to practice medicine as a result of unethical, improper or unprofessional behavior.

The Somalia Affair reinforces the fact that the ‘profession of arms serves the state’, and any conduct outside of the norms and values prescribed by the state will be dealt with without reservation (see Figure 2.2). The second sub-component of the military’s body of work is the requirement for every member of the profession of arms to meet the U o S, which equates to being physically fit, employable and deployable – these criteria further delineates the profession of arms from all other professions.

¹¹¹ David J. Bercuson, “Up From the Ashes . . .”, 35.



Figure 2.2 – Theoretical Construct of the Profession of Arms in Canada

Source: Canada. Department of National Defence. A-PA-005-000/AP-001, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2009.

Canadian Armed Forces Officer General Specifications.

The third sub-component of Body of Work is the requirement for all Officers to be able to do the same body of work, in other words, they “must be capable of performing the common tasks contained in the OGS.”¹¹² While different military occupations require their personnel to execute certain tasks based on the occupation or occupational specification (i.e. role of Dental Officers compared to Artillery Officers), “these common tasks are universal in nature and pertain to fundamental expertise, cognitive, social, change and professional ideology competencies, which when combined deliver the appropriate leadership and management capacities.”¹¹³ The OGS provides further substantiation of the differences between a CAF member and civilian employee, where the “open-ended nature of military service is one of the features that distinguish it

¹¹² Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

from the civilian notion of employment governed by a contract, which obliges employees to perform only those duties specified in their job description or contract.”¹¹⁴ While these details demonstrate that there are functional differences between the profession of arms and other professions, the unique military ethos of the CAF represents the fundamental difference – service before self.

Canadian Armed Forces Military Ethos.

The second part of the military PBK is military ethos, whereas other professions refer to it as ethics – either way, it is a vital component of the PBK for any profession. While unethical conduct has the capacity to question or undermine the public’s trust in any legitimate profession, for the CAF, its legitimacy depends upon its ability to conduct itself and perform its duties ethically. In referring to military ethos, *Duty with Honour* states that it is “the foundation upon which the legitimacy, effectiveness and honour of the CF depend.”¹¹⁵ In order for military ethos to permeate the organization, all of its members and specifically its leaders need to ensure that their conduct accurately represents Canadian values and principles. The *DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics* states that “all decisions and actions [by CAF personnel are to be] taken in the public interest [and that] the ethical principles are consistent with our most fundamental democratic ideals [which include] respect the dignity of all persons, serve Canada before

¹¹⁴ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “DAOD 5023-0, Universality of Service,” last accessed 17 April, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-5000/5023-0.page>

¹¹⁵ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, 25.

self and obey and support lawful authority.”¹¹⁶ The last two further differentiate the additional limitations placed on military personnel, when compared with other professionals. While professionals in all other professions represent themselves and their industry, members of the profession of arms represent their nation, and as such, the standard of ethical conduct is non-negotiable. Whether responding to an aid to civil power request anywhere in Canada or deploying across the globe in support of expeditionary operations as part of a coalition force, CAF personnel represent Canada and must adhere to the specific values applicable to CF members, they are: “integrity, loyalty, courage, stewardship and excellence.”¹¹⁷ In line with the CAF identified ethical principles and values, the CFPDS has been designed to foster and encourage such conduct amongst its personnel, it states that:

The uniquely Canadian military ethos is made up of three fundamental components: beliefs and expectations about military service, Canadian values, and Canadian military values. The CFPDS was designed to ensure that the PD of CAF members throughout their careers takes into account these components: establishing the desired institutional culture of the CAF, in which CAF members perform their mission and tasks to the highest professional standards and meeting the expectations of Canadians.¹¹⁸

While military service is a fundamental component of military ethos, it is an all-encompassing term that includes many factors, but most important is the clause of unlimited liability along with the personal sacrifices a member (and his/her immediate family) accepts to make in service to their nation (see Figure 2.3). In essence, the

¹¹⁶ Canada. Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces, “The DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics,” last accessed 11 May, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/code-of-values-and-ethics.page>

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development . . .”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

fundamental difference between the ethical requirement of all other professionals and that of a member of the profession of arms is that the latter accepts the clause of unlimited liability in the event that they need to sacrifice their life in the defence of their nation.

The *Somalia Commission of Inquiry* explains this clause:

This remarkable quality depends for its existence on two conditions. The first is discipline, which begins with the example of self-discipline that leaders impart ... The second is respect for the military ethos, with emphasis on the core values of integrity, courage, loyalty, selflessness, and self-discipline.¹¹⁹




Figure 2.3 – The Military Ethos

Source: Canada. Department of National Defence. A-PA-005-000/AP-001 *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2009.

Note: This Figure depicts the components of the ethos and illustrates how it shapes military professionalism to achieve the desired end of performing duty with honour.

Canadian Armed Forces Code of Professional Standards.

¹¹⁹ Minister of Public Works and Government Services, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Legacy of the Somalia Affair...* Executive Summary, 45.

The third and final component of the military's PBK is its code of professional standards, while referred to as the *DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics*, it serves the same function and equates to the military's ethical values and conduct of its personnel as members of the profession of arms – specifically the principles of serving Canada before self and obeying lawful authority. Similar to how other professions have a code of professional standards in which their members must adhere to certain guidelines and conduct, CAF personnel must adhere to “common values and expected behaviours that guide [them] in all activities related to their professional duties.”¹²⁰

Part of the military code of professional standard states that CAF personnel “are expected to abide by *DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics* and demonstrate the values of this code in their actions and behavior ... [and that those] ... in a leadership role have a particular responsibility to exemplify the military values of the CAF and the common values and expected obligations of the *DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics*.”¹²¹

When other professionals adhere to their respective code of professional standards, their profession earns the trust and support of their clients/patients. Likewise, by upholding the ethical standards within the *DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics*, “CF members conserve and enhance public confidence in the honesty, fairness and integrity of the public service, which includes DND, and of the CF. These requirements also form part of

¹²⁰ Canada. Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces, “The DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/code-of-values-and-ethics.page>

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

Canada's international commitments as a signatory to international agreements on values and ethics."¹²²

Summary of Professional Body of Knowledge – Profession of Arms (Military).

As discussed during the concluding remarks for the PBK for civilian professions, similarly, the identical four attributes apply to the profession of arms in Canada: responsibility, expertise, identity and military ethos (in lieu of vocational ethics).¹²³ Beginning with responsibility, the CAF are mandated to “protecting Canada and defending its sovereignty,”¹²⁴ including other stated national interests. As a result of this, and through the current organizational structure and official Chain-of-Command within the CAF and the DND, “the country’s military professionals are collectively accountable to the government and the people of Canada for the successful execution of this primary duty.”¹²⁵ In terms of being responsible for Canada’s defence, Officers have a unique role to play. The OGS states that: “Officers share a broader responsibility to maintain the integrity and reputation of the profession of arms by ensuring Canadian values and the Canadian military ethos guide their collective and individual actions,”¹²⁶ especially when

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, 14.

¹²⁴ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “About the Canadian Armed Forces,” last accessed 27 April, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/canadian-armed-forces.page>

¹²⁵ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, 14.

¹²⁶ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-55-002/PP-003, *Canadian Forces Officer General Specification* (Ottawa: CMP, 2014), 2-2, 2-3.

making decisions that directly affect the operational effectiveness of the military and what kind of rules of engagement (ROE) and military force will be applied.

In terms of expertise, there is a distinct difference between a civilian profession and the profession of arms, specifically, “the expertise required by the military professional is determined by the direction, operation and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of military force.”¹²⁷ This requires an organization that specializes in skills that differ vastly from other professions, and can only peacefully exist under a democratically elected body on behalf of its citizens. The role that Officers play in terms of expertise is vital. The OGS states that:

While Officers become experts in their specific military occupations, their expertise as members of the profession of arms derives from a deep and comprehensive understanding of the theory and practice of armed conflict in its many forms, ranging from war fighting to humanitarian missions. This includes mastery of joint, multi-national, and interagency operations, national security issues, and the law of armed conflict. Critical thinking and sound judgement complement the Officer’s expertise, and contribute to the appropriate use of military force. These qualities are required of all Officers because in an organization sophisticated, fast-paced, highly technical conflict environment, decisions made at all levels can have immediate and far-reaching implications.¹²⁸

While most civilians would characterize the ‘identity’ attribute of a military member as someone who wears a military uniform, it is much more than that. The analogy of an iceberg is applicable here, whereas, the majority of a military member’s identity is not specifically what one sees or perceives, but rather what lies within, specifically its commitment as seen through its “voluntary military service, unlimited

¹²⁷ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, 17.

¹²⁸ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-55-002/PP-003 ..., 2-3.

liability; and service before self.”¹²⁹ Other important factors that contribute to the unique identity of a military member can be found in the different environmental (i.e. sea, land and air) traditions, history and culture. All of this is held together on the grounds that “Canadian military professionals share a common understanding of the military ethos that unifies the CF around the concept of duty with honour.”¹³⁰

Finally, the last attribute, military ethos, is a key component in the long-term effectiveness and legitimacy of the profession of arms, the military ethos:

Embodies the spirit that binds the profession together. It clarifies how members view their responsibilities, apply their expertise and express their unique military identity. It identifies and explains military values and defines the subordination of the armed forces to civilian control and the rule of law.¹³¹

Canadian Armed Forces Professional Body of Knowledge.

Due to the specific mandate of the CAF, its members are required to have a certain level of knowledge so that they may meet their responsibilities to the nation. This knowledge in turn allows members of the profession of arms to be able to employ their expertise at the behest of the nation. The requirements of this exclusive profession led to the creation of a PBK, specifically for Canada’s profession of arms – the CAF. Table 2.1 provides the details on the CAF PBK, which is “comprised of ‘Core’, ‘Supporting’ and ‘Specialized’ bodies of knowledge. The CAF’s *Core* and *Supporting* bodies of knowledge are the knowledge that are required to operate within the General System of War and

¹²⁹ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, 20.

¹³⁰ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-55-002/PP-003 ..., 2-2.

¹³¹ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, 21.

Conflict (GSWC) model and are what makes a member of the CAF a ‘Professional’ within the ‘Profession of Arms’.”¹³² The effective functioning of the CAF also depends heavily upon certain expertise and the *Specialized* knowledge that they bring to the organization. While this knowledge “is not specific to the military, but organized in its own right by civilian professions,”¹³³ it is nonetheless a contributing factor in ensuring that the CAF is able to meet its responsibilities.

Table 2.1 – CAF Professional Body of Knowledge

| | |
|------------------------------|---|
| Core Knowledge | Includes tactics and tactical doctrine, the broad and deep discipline of operational art, the operational, technological, logistical and social dimensions of strategy, civil-military relations, command and leadership theory and practice, and the theory and practice of military professionalism. |
| Supporting Knowledge | Includes everything necessary to support a large organization whose primary function is to operate effectively across the spectrum of conflict, up to and including combat. This expertise is normally organized through highly differentiated systems of support, such as the communications, logistics, human resources, legal, and professional development systems. Also in this category is a very wide range of expertise encompassed in such disciplines as Canadian history, military history, political science, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and management theory, among others. |
| Specialized Knowledge | Includes doctors, lawyers, clergy, engineers and psychologists, to name but a few, belong to external professional associations and hold themselves responsible to a second professional ethic, as well as the military ethos. In effect, groups external to the military profession can legally discipline these professionals under certain circumstances. |

Source: Canada. Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces. “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development.” Last accessed 8 April, 2017.
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

Canadian Armed Forces Officer General Specifications.

¹³² Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development . . . , <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

¹³³ *Ibid.*

As a result of the many complexities involved in generating, managing, operating, sustaining and supporting members of the profession of arms to be able to deploy anywhere in the world under any condition, its ability to remain effective depends heavily on the fact that it is structured in an efficient and logical way. Part of this requirement is that its members clearly understand what tasks they need to do and how to perform them, for Officers, this is detailed in the OGS. The OGS outlines “the breadth and depth of requirements for CF Officers and reflects the demands the CF places on its Officer Corps,”¹³⁴ furthermore, it is an “integrated policy and quality control document that describes the performance and PD requirements pertaining to CF Officers.”¹³⁵ The intent is that all Officers have to be capable of performing or have the innate capacity in carrying out certain common or routine tasks as outlined in the OGS, “these common tasks are universal in nature and pertain to fundamental expertise, cognitive, social, change and professional ideology competencies, which when combined deliver the appropriate leadership and management capacities.”¹³⁶ As leaders of the profession of arms, Officers have additional responsibilities and are more accountable to the institution as a result of their commission, in essence, the OGS states that “Officers are expected to understand national policies, military doctrine and their application to diverse national

¹³⁴ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-55-002/PP-003 ..., i.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 1-1.

¹³⁶ Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

and international circumstances, and accept the risks and ambiguity inherent in the profession's demands."¹³⁷

In order for the OGS to be relevant over the duration of an officer's career, it incorporates the unique requirements as detailed in the PBK and for this to happen, CAF Officers must be "continually improving their professional competence through education, training, experience and self-development."¹³⁸ Highlighting the importance of connecting the OGS and PD, the CFPDS states that:

To perform these duties/tasks effectively, which involve activities outside their occupation and environment, members of the CAF must attain levels of competencies commensurate with their rank. These common competencies complement and reinforce the environmental and occupational skills and knowledge acquired through occupational training and enable members of the CAF to perform effectively at all levels in the CAF. It is these specifications that call up the type, timing, and quality of PD required by each Officer at each stage of their development and consequently form the foundation of PD in the CAF as reflected by the design of the DP within the CFPDS.¹³⁹

This section has shown that the CAF definitely meet all of the stated requirements found within a profession, while respecting the unique identity of the CAF based on the special role they play on behalf of Canada. In addition to the unique body of work, military ethos and its stated code of professional standards: the *DND and CAF Code of Values and Ethics*, the CAF have also incorporated a PBK further ensuring that the profession of arms continues to remain relevant and effective in the execution of its primary duty – the use of lethal force as directed by the elected civil authority.

¹³⁷ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-55-002/PP-003 ..., i.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 2-1.

¹³⁹ Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. "Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development ...", <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

Canadian Armed Forces War Fighting.

The ultimate role of the any legitimate military force is its use of force in the defence of the state, and this cannot be accomplished without effective War Fighting skills – they are not only critical, but the *raison d'être* of the CAF. The first component of the foundational elements of the CFPDS, the PBK is what develops a new member into an effective war fighter and leader within the membership of the profession of arms. While the CAF can be directed to engage in “domestic missions such as search and rescue, assistance to other government departments (OGD) and agencies, aid to civil power, and for disaster relief operations both at home and abroad,”¹⁴⁰ their main role is armed conflict. The *CF Joint Publication: Canadian Military Doctrine* describes this requirement:

Although the CAF train for and may be called upon to perform many tasks short of war, the central tenet of the CF is to have adaptable, combat-ready, deployable forces trained and willing to fight and win in support of Canadian government interests. A warrior ethos coupled with a willingness of all members to engage, when necessary, in combat operations in pursuit of legitimate national interests, underpins CF military doctrine.¹⁴¹

This military doctrine is fundamental to the legitimate and lawful application of military force through the use of War Fighting skills in ensuring that it is employed in line with the fundamentals of warfare while respecting the Geneva Conventions, et al

¹⁴⁰ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001 ..., 2-2.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 6-9.

“with a view of creating military effects that support [the] nation’s defence and security needs and GoC objectives.”¹⁴²

For these reasons, a nation cannot afford to have an impotent military force unable to respond to a call to action. As a result, “CAF Doctrine provides the fundamental principles upon which the CFPDS is based, including: The War Fighting skills are those skills that allow a soldier to conduct the full spectrum of military operations from the tactical to the strategic level.”¹⁴³ While all members of the profession of arms share the responsibility of ensuring that they maintain their War Fighting skills, as leaders within the organization Officers are uniquely accountable to their subordinates, themselves and to their Chain-of-Command for the overall effectiveness of the application of military force and the War Fighting skills required to achieve it.

In line with the specific and important role that Officers play in the overall fighting spirit of the CAF, the CFPDS capstone document, *Leadership in the CF: Leading People* states that:

CF leaders develop a competitive spirit in their followers that seeks to prevail in all situations — the will to win. Fighting spirit imparts to individuals the moral, physical and intellectual qualities necessary for them to operate in conditions of extreme danger, to endure hardship, and to approach their assigned missions with confidence and tenacity. Leaders who embody the fighting spirit are not intimidated by adversity or danger.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, v.

¹⁴³ Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

¹⁴⁴ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. A-PA-005-000-AP-005, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading People* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2007), 18.

The current complexity of the geo-political environment has resulted in an unpredictable security environment in the world, which demands that Officers not only continue to develop their own War Fighting skills throughout their careers through the CFPDS, but as leaders that they also impart the importance of continually developing one's skills to their subordinates. The better Officers understand the global security environment, notwithstanding unpredictable developments, the more effective they will be able to “plan for and evolving contingencies.”¹⁴⁵ United States Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak (Ret'd) who coined the term, ‘Three Block War’¹⁴⁶ highlighted this importance, in that: “For the modern military professional, the battlespace today lacks the clarity and concrete definition of the last century and demands a much broader understanding of both the spectrum of conflict and the society in which the conflict is resident.”¹⁴⁷

While the ability of being able to meet this challenge begins with a good foundation in the profession of arms' PBK, it ultimately requires an Officer to use their unique leadership skills and position within the institution to decipher through the almost infinite amounts of information and constantly changing factors as efficiently as possible so that they be may able to provide the most effective decision considering the extenuating circumstances.

¹⁴⁵ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001 ..., 5-8.

¹⁴⁶ Dr. Walter A. Dorn, and Michael Varey, “The Rise and Demise of the “Three Block War”,” *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol 10, no. 1 (2009): 38.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 2-10.

Canadian Armed Forces Leadership.

Leadership makes up the last component of the CFPDS foundational elements, and is vital to the functioning of the other two components: PBK and War Fighting. Leaders have a critical role to play, regardless of the level at which they operate, they are responsible for supporting and ensuring that the entire construct of PBK is structured effectively and is adhered to by all, as well, that the nation's War Fighting capabilities and efforts are effectively led. While there may be some similarities with the leadership practiced in civilian professional organizations, "leadership in the CF is premised on the performance of a critical societal function – ensuring the defence and security of Canada and Canadians through the controlled application of military capabilities."¹⁴⁸ While there are many valid definitions of leadership, for the purpose of this research project I will use the definition provided by the CAF document titled *Leadership in the CF: Doctrine*, which defines leadership as: "directly or indirectly influencing others, by means of formal authority or personal attributes, to act in accordance with one's intent or a shared purpose."¹⁴⁹

The style of leadership that an officer will choose to use in the performance of his/her duties, will depend on the overall situation, their subordinates and the environment. Of course, an Officer is responsible for leading their subordinates, but there is a lot more to it, the Officer needs to ensure that they lead in a way that accomplishes

¹⁴⁸ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PA-005-000/AP-004, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), vii.

¹⁴⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PA-005-000/AP-003, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 3.

“the mission professionally and ethically, while developing or improving capabilities that contribute to mission success.”¹⁵⁰ If an Officer wants immediate results on an issue (i.e. motivation, performance issues, training, discipline, etc.), they will use direct influence as this allows them to meet face-to-face with the individual(s) – this is predominantly used at the tactical and operational levels.¹⁵¹ Whereas, if an Officer wants to influence issues that cannot be changed immediately (i.e. procedures, administrative policies and services, organizational culture, etc.), they will use indirect influence to effect change – this is predominantly used at the strategic and institutional levels.¹⁵² In coordination with this, a leader in the CAF may have two major social classes of power available to them – position and personal.¹⁵³ Position power is that which is given based on the individual’s rank and if they hold a specific position within the unit, and as a result only lasts as long as the individual holds the position. Whereas personal power is earned by the individual’s actions and cannot be taken away, unless the individual’s conduct and/or performance makes it so.

The CFPDS was designed in part due to leadership failures in the past and the need to ensure that the leaders of tomorrow were professionally developed in a way that would augment their professionalism as members of the profession of arms. Therefore, leadership became a cornerstone of the CFPDS, where all military personnel would be

¹⁵⁰ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-55-002/PP-003 ..., 2-1.

¹⁵¹ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PA-005-000/AP-004 ..., 6.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 58-59.

required to ‘step-up’ and take on the role of a leader if the situation dictated. *Leadership in the CF: Conceptual Foundations* refers to this as distributed leadership, and is defined as: “people at all levels are assumed to have some capacity for leadership, that they have the situational awareness to make informed judgments, and that they possess sufficient professionalism to take the initiative and assume a leadership role if and when circumstances require.”¹⁵⁴ This is important in the context of the CAF, as any member is expected to be able to lead, especially in support of mission success. Equally important in the CAF leadership lexicon is values-based leadership, whereas it is fundamental to how Officers must lead, in that:

Leaders are to be guided in their decisions and actions by the institutional values that define CF effectiveness: accomplishing the mission; contributing to and acting as part of a co-ordinated and cohesive team; developing and looking after CF members; anticipating and adapting to change; and exemplifying and upholding the ideals of conduct inherent in the military ethos.¹⁵⁵

All of the aforementioned CAF leadership terms contribute to create the *CF Leadership Model and Philosophy* (see Figure 2.4), whose purpose is to “illustrate how various leader variables interact with the other classes of variables and influence.”¹⁵⁶ Specifically, the *CF Leadership Model and Philosophy* is an effective tool in that it demonstrates that the “principle of distributed leadership addresses the question of who

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, xii.

¹⁵⁵ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PA-005-000/AP-003 ..., 11.

¹⁵⁶ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PA-005-000/AP-004 ..., 122.

should lead, while the principle of values-based leadership addresses the question of how CF Officers should lead.¹⁵⁷




Figure 2.4 - Integrated CF Leadership Model

Source: Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. A-PA-005-000/AP-004, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005.

The Integrated CF Leadership Model shows how distributed leadership and values-based leadership work holistically to ensure that the right leader leads in line with the military ethos. This is made possible as a result of the CFPDS, as it allows Officers to progressively develop from rank to rank, all the while preparing them to take on additional responsibilities, which has become ever more challenging due to the increased

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 122.

complexity of the global security environment. In today's operational environment, Task Force Commanders (TFC) have to be prepared to balance political, diplomatic, information, humanitarian and war fighting aspects simultaneously. Based on this reality, "the CF needs a new type of military professional and leader ... who are broadly educated, who understand this new interconnected and volatile world, and who are expert in conflict resolution in its broadest sense – from traditional warfighting to humanitarian and nation-building interventions."¹⁵⁸ The new challenges faced by today's leaders demands that they progressively increase their competencies through education, training, experience and self-development so that they can responsibly lead tomorrow's force; while this begins with leading the people, it evolves to leading the institution and subsequently supporting the stewardship of the institution.

Leading the People.

Early in an Officer's career, they will predominantly spend their time leading at the tactical and operational levels where "the focus of leadership is on influencing people to accomplish missions and tasks. This is the 'leading people' function."¹⁵⁹ It is vital that Officers at this level are able to evolve their direct influence capabilities when dealing with their subordinates, and if the situation allows the use of position and/or personal power can also be applied. The CFPDS plays an important role in developing junior Officers so that they may gradually increase their leadership skills and understand the

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, xiv.

¹⁵⁹ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-55-002/PP-003 ..., 2-3.

importance of social class power as they take on increased responsibilities in line with increases in rank and position.

In supporting the leadership development of junior Officers, the CAF rely “on a short list of principles as a way of summarizing the key responsibilities of small-unit leadership and communicating them to leaders in training and apprentice leaders.”¹⁶⁰ These principles are referred to as the ‘principles of leadership’ and lay out the junior leader’s responsibilities, and the sooner an officer understands their relevance and applies them, the sooner he/she will develop as a leader and move on to leading the institution. While there are currently 12 principles of leadership, the four identified at Table 2.2 are specifically related to this research project in that they specifically focus the Officer on those principles which will support and guide him/her in their PD as it pertains to all four pillars (education, training, experience and self-development).

Table 2.2 – Four Principles of Leadership as Related to this Research Project

| Principle of Leadership | Description |
|--|--|
| 1. Achieve professional competence and pursue self-improvement. | Leader competence is critical to mission accomplishment and the preservation of lives. Very early on, junior leaders must master the technical and tactical skills of their military specialty, maintaining and improving proficiency through self-study, experiential learning, formal training, and education. |
| 2. Train individuals and teams under demanding and realistic conditions. | Being operationally ready means being able to deal effectively with normal and worst case scenarios, handle the unexpected, and recover from setbacks. Demanding and realistic training provides these capabilities. |
| 3. Learn from experience and those who have experience. | In both training and operations, leaders must constantly review performance with a critical eye and ask if there isn’t a better way. Learning from personal experience and the experience of others is critical to ensuring high reliability performance and maintaining a competitive edge. |

¹⁶⁰ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PA-005-000/AP-003 ..., 31.

| | |
|--|--|
| 4. Exemplify and reinforce the military ethos; maintain order and discipline; uphold professional norms. | Disciplined, obedient, and law-abiding military forces are a mark of civilization. Leaders must ensure that their personal conduct and the conduct of their subordinates at all times reflect the best of Canadian military professionalism. |
|--|--|

Source: Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. A-PA-005-000/AP-003, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005.

Leading the Institution.

The higher CAF Officers move up in their careers, the more responsibility they will be expected to manage, specifically related to issues that affect the institution. Officers at this level equally rely on their ability to indirectly and directly influence subordinates and other institutional leaders, as well as the ability of using their position power, and for some, personal power may also be in the leadership tool box. While challenges faced by more junior Officers are still important, sometimes more so as it involves the troops on the ground, the issues senior Officers are faced with at the institutional level (i.e. procurement, doctrine development, meet government goals, etc.), require them to have a deep cognitive capability and “strong strategic thinking,”¹⁶¹ and the ultimate costs of any wrong decision is felt down the road by those responsible for executing the initial decision.

An example of this is the institutional leadership failures associated with the Canadian mission in Somalia. While the Canadian Airborne Regiment achieved its operational mission in Somalia, the killing of a Somali teen was a leadership failure.

¹⁶¹ Canada, Department of National Defence, A-FD-005-001/AF-001, *The Future Security Environment 2013-2040* (Ottawa: Chief of Force Development, 2014), 91.

The *Commission of Inquiry* also highlighted that institutional leadership was to blame for the Somalia Affair.¹⁶² The lessons learned from the Somalia mission, underscores the importance of effective leadership at the institutional level, as their decisions and actions also affect the stewardship of the profession of arms in Canada. The CAF document titled *Leadership in the CF: Leading the Institution*, states that:

The function of the profession of arms is the lawful, ordered application of military force at the direction of the government. This profound responsibility gives rise to the concept of the primacy of operations. It demands the highest standards of professionalism from all members. Ensuring that such standards are established and strengthened is a matter of stewardship and is certainly one of the most important roles for institutional leaders in the Canadian Forces.¹⁶³

Ultimately, senior Officers at the institutional level, as a professional necessity, need to be aware of and understand the GSWC as it supports the *raison d'être* of the CAF and the need for the military members that make up the profession of arms. The GSWC is illustrated in Figure 2.5. The CFPDS “is designed to provide CAF members with the right PD at the appropriate DP to ensure understanding of the GSWC at the tactical, operational, strategic and political level(s).”¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² Minister of Public Works and Government Services, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Legacy of the Somalia Affair...* Executive Summary, 45.

¹⁶³ Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces, A-PA-005-000/AP-006 ..., 4.

¹⁶⁴ Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>



Figure 2.5: The General System of War and Conflict

Source: Canada. Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces. A-PA-005-000/AP-006, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2007.

Canadian Armed Forces Leader Development Framework.

The leadership component is most vital to the functioning and development of an Officer. Effective leadership skills become increasingly important as an Officer advances in their career, and they progressively have the ability and authority to make decisions that will have strategic/institutional effect. To ensure that Officers adequately develop their leadership skills throughout their career, an initial approach was developed based on the *Canadian Forces Individual Training and Education System (CFITES)*, but unfortunately, this approach did not meet the requirements as it failed to create a PD model based on competencies.¹⁶⁵

As a result of efforts by the CFLI, the Leader Development Framework (LDF) was created. The LDF is based on five meta-competencies (expertise, cognitive

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

capacities, social capacities, change capacities, and professional ideology) and allows Officers to develop their competencies by following four clearly delineated leader levels (junior, intermediate, advanced and senior) throughout their career as they progress in leadership focus from leading people to leading the institution.¹⁶⁶

The LDF is therefore an effective tool in supporting the development of leaders in that “the 20 ‘cells’ resulting from this framework are populated by the specific competencies that must be developed through the four pillars of the CFPDS – education, training, experience and self-development,”¹⁶⁷ in line with the system’s leader levels and DPs, where “Junior equates to DP-1 and DP-2, Intermediate DP-3, Advanced DP-4 and Senior DP-5,”¹⁶⁸ (see Figure 2.6).




Figure 2.6 – Leader Development Framework

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

Source: Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. "Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development." Last accessed 8 Apr, 2017.
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

In the book titled: *The Defence Learning, Education and Training Handbook: Educating the Leader and Leading the Educated*, Bernd Horn and Jeff Stouffer provide a detailed description of how all of the elements come together within the LDF in support of the member's PD:

CF Doctrine provides the fundamental principles upon which the CFPDS is based, including: the PBK comprising core knowledge, supporting knowledge and specialized knowledge; the War Fighting skills required to conduct the full spectrum of military operations from the tactical to the strategic level; and, the required leadership competencies that span from leading people to leading the institution. They are contained in the Leader Development Framework.¹⁶⁹

The foundational components of the CFPDS (PBK, War Fighting and Leadership) are also at the core of what a CAF Officer is. In other words, it is these same components that an Officer will continue to professionally develop throughout his/her career as they increase in rank and its respective DP (DP 1 to DP 5). In order to achieve this, the CFPDS has incorporated four pillars (education, training, employment experience and self-development) upon which an Officer can use to achieve their PD goals.

Canadian Forces Professional Development System: The Four Pillars

While the four pillars are separate, they work holistically in allowing an Officer to meet their PD requirements. Each pillar (education, training, employment experience and self-development) is an important part to one's development and requires the constant

¹⁶⁹ Bernd Horn and Jeff Stouffer, *Educating the Leaders and Leading the Educated* ..., 284.

effort and attention of the member in order to ensure that they are not only developing in line with their current rank and responsibilities, but that they are also able to develop those competencies, knowledge and skills that will allow them to move up to the next rank or DP. Horn and Stouffer reiterate this point by stating that: “The basis upon which PD is achieved during a career in the CF are the four pillars of the CFPDS.”¹⁷⁰

First Pillar: Education.

The Rowley Report in 1969 argued “that all Officers obtain a university degree”¹⁷¹ in order to ensure that military leaders of tomorrow would have the cognitive and intellectual capacity to look at problems from a different perspective and be able to lead the institution into the future, regardless of the challenges. The CAF define education as “the provision of a body of knowledge and intellectual skill sets, upon which judgement among competing facts, information and ideas can be critically examined, assessed and interpreted.”¹⁷² In line with this, in the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) section of the CAF recruiting website, in response to the question: ‘*Why do Officers need university degrees?*’, it states that: “Officers in the Forces are required to think critically, develop innovative solutions to problems and use their intellectual abilities to analyze, plan and make decisions. A university degree is a very good indicator that an applicant

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ Major Simon Bernard, “Educating Officers for the 21st Century: Card Punching of Profession of Arms?” *Canadian Army Journal*, Vol. 8, no. 4 (Winter, 2005): 50.

¹⁷² Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

has the intellectual skills that Officers need on the job.”¹⁷³ *DAOD 5031-7, Initial*

Baccalaureate Degree Programme further states that:

Education is an integral part of Officer PD and the ... CAF has established a goal to have all Officers, with the exception of those commissioned from the ranks, hold a university degree. In support of this goal, the CAF has established a programme to provide subsidized education to eligible Officers in pursuit of their Initial Baccalaureate Degree Programme (IBDP).¹⁷⁴

By requiring that Officers have a basic level of university education, the CAF ensure that these leaders will have the basic intellectual and cognitive ability upon which to build on as they continue to develop and take on more responsibilities. The *CFITES Manual Volume 1* states that: “Through the progressive development of individuals’ education at military and or civilian institutions, members of the CF will be better able to understand their role in, and contribution to the profession of arms. Education builds on the member’s potential to respond to future needs and goals.”¹⁷⁵ The current security environment and unknown future challenges that the CAF will face requires that its leaders be in a position to not only address these challenges but to intellectually hypothesize what those threats may be and how to best counter them. Training alone cannot provide an Officer the ability to understand and manage complex situations, it

¹⁷³ Canada. Department of National Defence, “Frequently Asked Questions: Joining the Forces,” last accessed 13 May, 2017, <http://www.forces.ca/en/page/faq-220>

¹⁷⁴ Canada. Department of National Defence, “DAOD 5031-7, Initial Baccalaureate Degree Programme,” last accessed 22 May, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-5000/5031-7.page>

¹⁷⁵ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-P9-050-000/PT-001, *Canadian Forces Individual Training & Education System: Volume 1* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy), 8.

requires a “highly developed cognitive capacity as well as interpersonal and change capacities,”¹⁷⁶ which can only be achieved through continuous formal education.

Through the use of today’s technology, Officers have many options by which they can professionally develop their educational needs, either through a CAF institution or through the many legitimate civilian academic institutions (in person or through distance learning). The goal of educating oneself, “is not synonymous with the classroom and credentials such as diplomas and degrees; it is an intellectual process involving the development of the ability to think critically.”¹⁷⁷ The CFPDS allows an Officer to manage and complete their current educational requirements and the opportunity to plan those that will be required in order to support the requirement for an increased intellectual capacity as they move from leading people to leading the institution and becoming stewards of the profession of arms. While specific Officer occupations (i.e. Infantry, Fighter Pilot or PAO) will undertake “specialized education relating to military occupation classifications, broader educational objectives need to be set that provide access to the common body of knowledge of the profession.”¹⁷⁸

The future effectiveness, viability and long-term relevancy of the CAF depends on the intellectual and cognitive ability of its leaders, specifically its Officers. Education can provide Officers with the ability to formulate “a reasoned response to an

¹⁷⁶ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. A-PA-005-000-AP-005 ..., 58-59.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

unpredictable situation,”¹⁷⁹ allowing them to be even more effective in using the skills they acquired through training.

Second Pillar: Training.

Officers will undergo different types of training throughout their career, initially, and at different levels of complexity the training will be directly related to the Officer’s specific role. The CAF defines training as “the provision of specific skills, knowledge and attitudes required to perform assigned tasks and duties.”¹⁸⁰ It is crucial that an Infantry Officer or a PAO is trained on the skills and knowledge they will require to perform their respective roles. The *CFITES Manual Volume 1* further states that: “All training should be based on CF common, environmental, occupational and/or specialty requirements. Training enables CF members to develop their functional, technical, tactical and leadership competencies so that they are capable of performing their assigned duties.”¹⁸¹

While an Officer will focus on mastering the specific skills related to their duties and tasks, they will also have the opportunity, and requirement, in some cases to undertake certain training which will allow them to further broaden their skills and knowledge. By combining the benefits of education and training that are gained throughout one’s career, an Officer will be that much more competent and effective. This

¹⁷⁹ Bernd Horn and Jeff Stouffer, *Educating the Leaders and Leading the Educated* ..., 284.

¹⁸⁰ Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

¹⁸¹ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-P9-050-000/PT-001 ..., 8.

is demonstrated by the fact that while education allows an Officer to be able to respond to an unpredictable situation, “Training is a learned response to a predictable situation, that is the skills and knowledge to perform specific duties and tasks.”¹⁸²

While education allows one to deliberate a complex issue over a period of time prior to making a rational decision, training instills the skills and techniques required for an Officer to be able to make instinctive decisions “in times of crisis and danger ... Training, therefore, is extremely important. It must be regular, consistent and realistic. Training must be rigorous and under circumstances that are as close as possible to expected operational conditions.”¹⁸³ Continues training opportunities at the individual and group-level throughout one’s career will allow an Officer to gain invaluable experience that will allow them to be able to lead more effectively.

Third Pillar: Experience.

Experience is invaluable in any organization, however in the CAF, experience many times allows an individual to make the right decision in a life or death situation. The CAF define experience as “The application and continued development of the skills, knowledge and attitudes acquired through training, education and self-development in the performance of assigned roles and duties, especially in operations and command.”¹⁸⁴ Experience allows an Officer to refine and further intellectually develop what they have

¹⁸² Bernd Horn and Jeff Stouffer, *Educating the Leaders and Leading the Educated* ..., 284.

¹⁸³ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. A-PA-005-000-AP-005 ..., 58.

¹⁸⁴ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “DAOD 5031-8, Canadian Forces Professional Development,” last accessed 8 Apr, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-5000/5031-8.page>

gained through education, training and as a result of their own self-development initiatives, in other words, experience is “designed to reinforce their training and increase their knowledge, self-confidence, thinking ability and interpersonal skills.”¹⁸⁵ While education, training and experience are somewhat routine throughout an Officers PD, self-development on the other hand, depends largely on the individual’s self motivation.

Fourth Pillar: Self-development.

As leaders within the CAF, Officers have a unique responsibility to ensure that they develop themselves in line with their specific function and leadership requirements throughout their career. While the institution mandates that certain levels of education and training be achieved as one progresses, and of course, experience is gained throughout one’s career, self-development which may include education, training or experience, “is taking personal responsibility for one’s own learning and development through a process of assessment, reflection, and taking action.”¹⁸⁶ Likewise, the CAF define self-development as “self-initiated training and/or education that refines or further develops an individual’s body of knowledge, intellectual and/or professional skill sets, and attitudes that leads to improving the level of a desired competency or competencies.”¹⁸⁷ The attainment of self-development goals can only be realized if an

¹⁸⁵ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. A-PA-005-000-AP-005 ..., 59.

¹⁸⁶ Bernd Horn and Jeff Stouffer, *Educating the Leaders and Leading the Educated* ..., 284.

¹⁸⁷ Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

Officer is willing to invest the time in researching, planning and fully accomplishing the stated objective, and this during their own time.

While difficult, Officers need to find the time to balance the different requirements and expectations that will be placed on them by both the institution and themselves. Only by prioritizing their limited time will they be able to take advantage of the numerous self-development opportunities that will continue to become available throughout one's career through the remaining three pillars: education, training and experience. The ultimate benefits provided through the CFPDS can only be secured through genuine efforts.

Canadian Forces Professional Development System: The Five Developmental Periods

The career of an Officer in the CAF may span up to 35 years or more, and for some who are able to and actually attain the highest levels of leadership, they will have experienced first-hand the extent of what is referred to as Officer DP progression. A DP is “a timeframe in a career during which a CAF [Officer] is trained, employed and given the opportunity to develop specific military occupation or professional skills and knowledge.”¹⁸⁸ As an Officer progresses through the DPs, as a result of time in rank and promotion, the DPs will progressively “increase in the levels of accountability, responsibility, authority, competency, military leadership ability and the knowledge of operations.”¹⁸⁹ The career of an Officer is divided into five DPs, Table 2.3 outlines the

¹⁸⁸ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “DAOD 5031-8 ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-5000/5031-8.page>

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

CAF Common Officer Qualifications and the common PD milestones required for progression to the next DP.¹⁹⁰

Developmental Period 1.

An Officer begins his/her career in DP 1 where they initially “develop the required skills and knowledge for CAF entry level employment and further training.”¹⁹¹ This equates to attaining the Basic Military Officer Qualification (BMOQ), which “provides the requisite competencies to perform the duties of a junior officer in the CF.”¹⁹² Upon completion of BMOQ, they will then undertake their respective Basic Occupational Qualification (BOQ), and any other environmental qualifications as applicable. These qualifications under DP 1 encompass “the period from time of entry to the point when an officer completes all qualifications required for initial employment in their occupations (referred to as the Operational Functional Point (OFP)).”¹⁹³

Developmental Period 2.

In DP 2, an Officer has already spent a few years in the military and has become accustomed to the unique culture and experienced its rich traditions, all of which

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁹¹ Canada. Department of National Defence, “Programmes and qualifications – Officers,” last accessed 13 May, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/officer.page>

¹⁹² Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-55-002/PP-003 ..., 2D-1.

¹⁹³ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “DAOD 5031-8 ..., <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-5000/5031-8.page>

contribute to solidifying his/her identity with the organization, their respective occupation (trade) and environment (RCN, CA or RCAF). During this period, Officers focus on further developing “functional, occupational, and environmental skills. The focus is on unit level employment at the tactical level of operations.”¹⁹⁴ The common CAF requirement for this DP are met when the Officer completes the “Canadian Armed Forces Junior Officer Development (CAFJOD) programme.”¹⁹⁵ The CAFJOD programme prepares junior Officers to work in staff roles and operations.

Developmental Period 3.

During this period, most Officers have been in multiple positions where they have been responsible for subordinates and now may have the opportunity to take official command of a unit or be employed as an advisor to a higher command headquarters. It is during this period (if offered), that Officers will complete Joint Command and Staff Programme (JCSP), Residential (JCSP RESID) or through Distance Learning (JCSP DL). Its aim “is to prepare selected senior Officers of the Defence Team for command and/or staff appointments in a contemporary operating environment across the continuum of operations in national and international settings.”¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-55-002/PP-003 ..., 2A-1.

¹⁹⁵ Canada. Department of National Defence, “Programmes and qualifications ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/officer.page>

Developmental Period 4.

Officers at this level have senior appointments where they are Directors of major files or Commanders of CF Bases/Wings (henceforth shall be referred as CFB). The next level up (DP 5) will require them to work at the strategic/institutional level, and is the focus of their development within DP 4, namely the National Security Programme (NSP). This course is intended “To prepare senior Officers for employment as strategic level leaders, operational-level Joint Task Force Commanders (JTFC), and General/Flag staff Officers.”¹⁹⁷ During this DP, any additional PD initiatives undertaken by these Officers will focus almost exclusively on the “national and international environment, decision making within states and their civil-military interface.”¹⁹⁸

Developmental Period 5.

Officers at this level have reached the last DP, based on their rank and position they have a lot of influence on the strategic and institutional direction of department, its policies and its personnel. In order to further develop these senior Officers, the CFPDS provides them with the Executive Leaders Programme (ELP), whose purpose is to “prepare General Officer/Flag Officers for the highest levels of command and staff employment within the CAF, including formation Commander and defence executive.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-55-002/PP-003 ..., 2A-1.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

Education in this DP will prepare these Officers for institutional command, leadership, and management responsibilities.”¹⁹⁹ Refer to Table 2.3 for the CAF common Officer qualifications and PD milestones.

Table 2.3 – CAF Common Officer Qualifications and PD Milestones

| DP | Rank | Common Officer Qualifications | Common PD Milestones |
|----|---|--|--|
| 1 | Officer Cadet/Naval Cadet to Second Lieutenant/ Acting Sub-Lieutenant | (a) Basic Military Officer Qualification (BMOQ). (b) Basic Occupational Qualification (BOQ), and other environmental training/qualifications. | (a) Second Official Language Education and Training (SOLET), for some occupations. |
| 2 | Lieutenant/Sub-Lieutenant to Captaain/Lieutenant(Navy) | (a) Intermediate Occupational & Environmental Qualifications | (a) Officers employ their occupational skills, environmental skills, and knowledge, enhancing them through on-the-job training, self-study, and formal courses, includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Canadian Armed Forces Junior Officer Development (CAFJOD) Programme • Joint Staff Operations Programme (JSOP) • Management Training • SOLET (as required) |

¹⁹⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence, “Programmes and qualifications ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/officer.page>

| | | | |
|----------|--|---|---|
| 3 | Major/Lieutenant-Commander to Lieutenant-Colonel/Commander | (a) Advanced Officer Qualification | (a) Development is about understanding joint, combined, and interagency operations. (b) Selected Officers may also participate in: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint Command and Staff Programme (JCSP) • Management Training • Post-Graduate Education • Canadian Security Studies Programme (CSSP) • SOLET (as required) |
| 4 | Colonel/Captain(Navy) | (a) Develop Advanced Management & Institutional Leadership Ability | (a) The focus is on the national and international environment, decision making within states and their civil-military interface. (b) Selected Officers may also participate in: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Security Programme (NSP) • Post-Graduate Education • SOLET (as required) |
| 5 | Flag/General Officers | (a) Develop Executive Level Management & Institutional Leadership Ability | (a) To prepare for the highest levels of command and staff employment within the CF, including formation Commander and defence executive. (b) Selected Officers may also participate in: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Executive Leader Programme (ELP) • SOLET (as required) |

Sources: Canada. Department of National Defence. A-PD-55-002/PP-003, *Canadian Forces Officer General Specification*. Ottawa: CMP, 2014. [and]

Canada. Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces. "DAOD 5031-8, Canadian Forces Professional Development." Last accessed 8 April, 2017.
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-5000/5023-1.page>

Note: As stated in the OGS Manual, information represented in Table 2.3 "does not capture the entire professional development requirement for CF Officers. Environmental, occupational, and specialty training, as well as job experience, self-study, second language training, and academic upgrading are integral to individual development."

Summary.

By applying the CFPDS throughout their careers, Officers will naturally have to go through the five DPs as they progress from one rank to the next. While there are

certain mandated elements within each DP, there is sufficient latitude which allows Officers to be creative in how and which type of PD they choose. While improving one's knowledge and skills in their specific trade is always beneficial, an Officer who finds the time to develop his/her understanding of matters related to the geo-political security environment, international relations and key global issues will provide them with the opportunity to understand the strategic, institutional and political spheres that much sooner, while also becoming a more rounded leader.

Figure 2.7 provides an illustration of the relative importance of the four pillars of Officer PD during the 5 DPs²⁰⁰ as identified in *Educating Officers for the 21st Century*.




Figure 2.7 – Relative Importance of Areas of Professional Development

Source: Bernard, Major Simon. “Educating Officers for the 21st Century: Card Punching of Profession of Arms?” *Canadian Army Journal*, Vol. 8, no. 4 (Winter, 2005): 50-64.

Canadian Forces Professional Development System: Policy Framework

²⁰⁰ Major Simon Bernard, “Educating Officers for the 21st Century ...”, 55.

On the grounds that the CFPDS covers a wide range of topics, from the Profession of Arms, to the U of S, to military ethos, to war fighting, leadership, education, training, etc., its policy framework is required to cover these important issues. According to the CAF, the “Orders, Policies and Instructions which govern the CFPDS are contained within the CAF DAOD, CDA Policies with respect to PD and CAF Military Personnel Instructions.”²⁰¹ These were developed through the various Training Authorities and “approved by the Armed Forces Council (AFC). They constitute the CFPDS policy framework which is applicable to all Officers.”²⁰²

CAF Military Employment Structure and Job Based Specification

While the CFPDS is effective at providing a comprehensive and “continuous learning environment to develop and enhance the capabilities and leadership of CAF members,”²⁰³ its overall success is dependent upon the CAF Military Employment Structure (MES) framework. The MES is the system by which the CAF arranges its various ‘jobs’ into “structural elements consisting of officer and non-commissioned member (NCM) occupations and sub-occupations.”²⁰⁴ The *DAOD 5031-8, CF Professional Development* provides the direct link with the CFPDS, it states that: “The

²⁰¹ Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

²⁰² *Ibid.*

²⁰³ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “DAOD 5031-8 ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-5000/5031-8.page>

²⁰⁴ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-055-001/AG-001, *The CAF Military Employment Structure (Volume 1 of 4)* (Ottawa: Director Personnel Generation Requirements, 2015), 1-1.

MES specifications are the foundation of the CFPDS. These specifications are policy and quality control documents that identify the functions, working conditions and tasks for general, environmental, military occupation and specialty capabilities of CAF members.”²⁰⁵ Seeing that the MES provides the work descriptions for each occupation, it also “provides the foundation for the development of required skill-sets and competencies to meet current tasks and is intended to be flexible enough to respond to future roles in support of strategic through tactical CAF capabilities.”²⁰⁶ Horn and Stouffer further demonstrate the connection between the CFPDS and the MES:

The CFPDS is designed to ensure that CF members meet the applicable work and job requirements identified in the appropriate MES specifications: to ensure that CF members are capable of critical thinking, managing change, effective leadership and resource management, across the full spectrum of military service; to strengthen understanding of the military profession; to enhance general, environmental and occupational expertise; to enable CF members to develop professional competencies and attitudes required to successfully perform their duties and tasks; to prepare CF members for the demands of a progressive career; and, to prepare retiring CF members for transition to civilian life.²⁰⁷

DAOD 5070-1, Military Employment Structure Framework identifies the MES Principles and shows how the MES framework works jointly with the CFPDS in supporting the development of the member (see Table 2.4).

Table 2.4 – Military Employment Structure Principles

| MES Principles | Amplification |
|----------------|---------------|
|----------------|---------------|

²⁰⁵ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “DAOD 5031-8 ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-5000/5031-8.page>

²⁰⁶ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-055-001/AG-001 ..., 1-1.

²⁰⁷ Bernd Horn and Jeff Stouffer, *Educating the Leaders and Leading the Educated* ..., 283-284.

| | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Operational effectiveness | Recognize the primacy of deployed operational requirements. |
| Work scope optimization | Group the work requirements in a rational way to optimize the development of CAF members with related skill sets. |
| Training optimization | Support the effective, efficient and timely delivery of individual training and education. |
| Career path rationalization | Establish a progression of work that is to be performed to form the foundation for the management of CAF members who demonstrate potential for employment at higher ranks or with a broader scope of responsibility at the same rank. |

Source: Canada. Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces. "DAOD 5070-1, Military Employment Structure Framework." Last accessed 25 April, 2017.
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-5000/5070-1.page>

Summary

This chapter has shown that the evolution of the CFPDS has resulted in a system where Officers can systematically plan their PD requirements over the span of their career with the assistance of 5 DPs. As distinguished members of the profession of arms, their level of expertise and professionalism depends heavily on their ability to develop their PBK, War Fighting and Leadership skills. By balancing their PD objectives through the use of the four pillars: education, training, experience and self-development, they should be able to realize their personal and professional goals while honourably serving in the CAF.

While the MES is effective in providing the overall details of the work requirements necessary for each member to be able to meet the needs of the CAF, "The occupational duties and tasks that Officers are required to perform are detailed in each of their respective Occupational Specifications (OS), also known as Job Based Specification

(JBS).”²⁰⁸ Like all other CAF Officers, PAOs have a responsibility and a duty to meet all of the common OGS requirements and the PAO OS.

The next chapter will provide a synopsis of the development of CAF PAOs based on the CFPDS, and will refer to the job performance requirements for PAOs and the PA Function as outlined in the Job Based Occupational Specification (JBOS) for the PAO Occupation.²⁰⁹ As specialist Officers, PAOs have a unique role in supporting the CAF mandate, specifically, as advisors to senior commanders they have to be able to function earlier in their career at the strategic and political levels. A PGEP would further expand a PAO’s professional capabilities in order to operate at these levels.

²⁰⁸ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-55-002/PP-003 ..., 1-3.

²⁰⁹ Note: The JBS has replaced the JBOS but the PAO OS is still in JBOS format.

CHAPTER THREE

SYNOPSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CANADIAN ARMED FORCES PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS

The PA function cannot operate in isolation within the modern battle space and coordination of PA information with other information enablers is essential so that PA staff can properly support the overall mission objectives.²¹⁰

– CF Joint Public Affairs Doctrine Manual, 2004

The collection and dissemination of information has always been an important part of conflict, but due to recent technological advances the IE has become a dominant factor in today's military operations. This, coupled with the fact that the world today has become even more unstable, places an increased importance on the ability for military forces to manage the IE effectively. As the professional military communicators of the CAF, PAOs and the PA Function have a specific responsibility to ensure that its members are developed in line with the CFPDS so that they can provide relevant PA advice and support in line with the tactical, operational, strategic and institutional requirements of the CAF. This chapter will provide a synopsis of the development of CAF PAOs based on the CFPDS, but in order to better understand the current development of PAOs, a brief background on the PA Branch and the PA Function is appropriate.

Abbreviated History of the Public Affairs Branch and the Public Affairs Function

While today's PAO is expected to provide PA support and guidance on a variety of issues like: media relations, stakeholder outreach and support to operations, this was not the case when the function was first developed. While PA had no role initially in the

²¹⁰ Canada. Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-361/FP-000 ..., 4-22.

Second World War, by the end of the war efforts were made to communicate with Canadian military members. The fact that Canadian soldiers were receiving their news from “outdated English newspapers and on rare occasions, the British and U.S. troops’ newspapers, the 8th *Army News* and *The Stars and Stripes*,”²¹¹ led to the creation of the CA newspaper *The Maple Leaf*, in 1944.²¹² This was the first foray of the Canadian military to formally communicate with its internal audience, who’s main “objective was to provide Canadian soldiers with news from home as well as news from other Canadian units in Europe.”²¹³

By 1956, an official PR directorate at DND was coordinating PR efforts with support from a directorate in the RCN, CA and the RCAF.²¹⁴ These directorates initially had two main functions: “to facilitate a flow of unclassified news about the armed forces to the Canadian public ... [and] ... to advise and inform their respective service on the various aspects of a suitable overall PR program.”²¹⁵

While there were various changes over the years, it was not until 1 October, 1977 that the PA Branch would be established with an initial cadre of 33 military members.²¹⁶ Understanding the importance of providing PAOs PD opportunities in the information

²¹¹ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, *History of Public Affairs in National Defence and in the Canadian Forces ...*, 9.

²¹² Canadian Public Relations Society, “Jack Donoghue APR,” Last accessed 14 May, 2017, http://www.cprs.ca/foundation/jack_yocom/jack_donoghue.aspx

²¹³ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, *History of Public Affairs in National Defence and in the Canadian Forces ...*, 9.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 13.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 18.

domain in 1978, the PA Branch encouraged its “personnel to join the Canadian PR Society (CPRS) and the Information Services Institute and the International Association of Business Communications (IABC),”²¹⁷ which is still encouraged today. Furthermore, the PA Branch worked diligently to incorporate PA input into CF operational doctrine. Realizing the importance of properly developing its members in order to be able to support operations and the numerous other routine responsibilities the PA Branch prioritized formal training for its members. By early in 1979 various PAOs were attending the NATO Defence College, the CF Staff School and the U.S. Basic Information Officer’s course at the Defense Information School (DINFOS) at Fort Benjamin Harrison at Indianapolis, Indiana, US. The PA Branch would eventually create the Defence PA Learning Centre (DPALC) in 2006.²¹⁸

In the early 1980s great efforts were made by the PA Branch to connect the role of PA within the department to the government’s commitment to serving the public. This led to an increased role for PAOs in supporting DND communications strategy. There were two components; the first was to increase the public’s “awareness of Canadian defence policy, and the second was to encourage the public to develop informed opinions about defence. In essence, DND was striving to provide information to the public that was accurate, complete, objective, timely, relevant, and understandable.”²¹⁹ Throughout the 1990s, it was decided that PAOs would be assigned to CFBs supporting all

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 20.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 19-20.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 22.

commands across the country.²²⁰ But this decade still brought challenges, most notably budget cuts due to the end of the Cold War and the Somalia inquiry.²²¹

As a consequence of a DND/CF report to the Prime Minister in 1997 committing “the department to develop a new PA policy to ensure the principles of openness, transparency, and responsiveness were embedded in the day-to-day operations,”²²² all members of the CAF immediately became spokespersons. The new DND/CF PA policy that took effect in 1998 was instrumental in propelling the importance of the PA role in the CAF. The policy stated that the public had a right to know, notwithstanding privacy and operational limitations. This was instrumental and is still in effect today. Table 3.1 details the results of the 1998 DND/CF PA policy.

Table 3.1 – 1998 DND/CF Public Affairs Policy

| Ser. | Three Main Points | Key Initiatives | Main Results |
|------|---|--|--|
| 1. | Strengthen DND/CF’s capacity to communicate with Canadians and employees. | 1. Re-organization of NDHQ PA; | 1. The new policy increased openness and transparency within the law; |
| 2. | Improve the quality of information available to Canadians and employees. | 2. Re-design of the CF’s recruiting advertising program; | 2. Enhanced internal communications; |
| | | 3. Re-design of DND/CF’s Internet site; | 3. Strengthened PA’s capacity to support Commanding Officers and managers; and |
| 3. | Improve the visibility of the CF. | 4. A new DGPA Intranet site, and | 4. Improved the quality of PA management and practices. |
| | | 5. New newspaper, <i>The Maple Leaf</i> . | |

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 23.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 24.

²²² *Ibid.*, 26.

| | | | |
|--|--|--|--|
| | | | |
|--|--|--|--|

Source: Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *History of Public Affairs in National Defence and in the Canadian Forces*. Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 6.1, 2009.

In the 2000s, an escalation in operations focused on counterterrorism combined with the rapid evolution of mass media led to an increased demand for PA support and the official inclusion of PA trained photographers and videographers.²²³ This addition allowed the CAF to be able to document and show the public its operations, even when the media could not travel, or chose not to.

Table 3.2 shows the ebb and flow of PAOs since 1956. Throughout the years, the requirement for PA support has continued to grow, while in many years the requirement for PA resources has outpaced the ability of the PA Branch to meet the demand. Specifically, when the CAF are deployed on operations the request for PA increases, resulting in regular billet positions having to go vacant due to those PAOs being deployed. This inadvertently creates a lot of pressure on a small Branch and its ability to meet its domestic PA requirements. For PAOs, while it may provide many opportunities for them to deploy and gain invaluable operational experience, if a PAO is deployed multiple times over a short period of years it can affect the time they are able to invest on their own self-development (i.e. education, training, etc.).

Table 3.2 – Regular Force CAF Public Affairs Positions 1956 to 2017

²²³ *Ibid.*, 28.

| Year | Number of Officers | Percentage Change | Remarks |
|------|--------------------|---|--|
| 1956 | 59 PROs | N/A | |
| 1960 | 79 PROs | 34 % increase (over 4 years) | Number of Public Relations Officers (PROs) is approximate. |
| 1961 | 83 PROs | 5 % increase (over 1 year) | Number of PROs is approximate. |
| 1964 | 74 PROs | 10.8 % decrease (over 3 years) | |
| 1966 | 37 PIOs | 50 % decrease (over 2 years) | Number of Public Information Officers (PIOs) decreased due to the three directorates (RCN, CA and RCAF) of PR being disbanded. |
| 1969 | 40 PIOs | 8.1 % increase (over 3 years) | |
| 1973 | 37 PIOs | 7.5 % decrease (over 4 years) | |
| 1977 | 33 PAffOs | 10.8 % decrease (over 4 years) | Three of whom were untrained at the time. Note: The abbreviation for Public Affairs Officer at the time was PAffO. |
| 1987 | 48 PAffOs | 45.5 % increase (over 10 years) | Ten of whom were brought into the PA Branch in one year (1986-87). |
| 1995 | 68 PAffOs | 41.7 % increase (over 8 years) | |
| 2005 | 131 PAOs | 92.6 % increase (over 10 years) | |
| 2006 | 141 PAOs | 7.6 % increase (over 1 year) | Only 121 positions were actually filled by PAOs due to the fact that the PA Branch could not train enough to satisfy the institutional demand and some PAOs were deployed. |
| 2009 | 155 PAOs | 10 % increase (over 3 years) | |
| 2016 | 171 PAOs | 10.3 % increase (over 7 years) | Only 165 positions were actually filled by PAOs due to the fact that the PA Branch could not train enough to satisfy the institutional demand and some PAOs were deployed. |
| 2017 | 174 PAOs | 1.8 % increase (over 1 year) | Only 163 positions are currently filled by PAOs due to the fact that the PA Branch could not train enough to satisfy the institutional demand and some PAOs were deployed. |

Source: Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *History of Public Affairs in National Defence and in the Canadian Forces*. Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 6.1, 2009.

Note: The years presented are those for which data was available.

Current Professional Development Status of Public Affairs Officers

The increased demand for PA support over the last three decades has placed continued pressure on the PA Branch to be able to provide enough PAOs to meet the various institutional requirements. This demand has been driven primarily as a result of the establishment of new positions and the increased operational tempo. While these pressures have been experienced by other CAF occupations, the relatively small size of the PA Branch (current Trained Effective Strength of 163 Officers all ranks) makes it exceptionally difficult to ensure that all institutional PA demands are met. This reality makes it uniquely challenging for some PAOs to adequately invest the time needed in their own PD goals, specifically as it pertains to higher education and various training requirements.

Foundational Elements of the CFPDS: How They Relate to the Development of PAOs

As members of the profession of arms, PAOs must also adhere to and continuously develop the various elements found within their PBK, their War Fighting skills and Leadership qualities. While the components of a PAOs PBK is identical to that of any CAF Officer (body of work, military ethos and CF Code of Values and Ethics), its body of work is specific to its role. PAOs also adhere to the “four attributes of the profession of arms – responsibility, expertise, identity and military ethos.”²²⁴ In addition (or within) to these attributes, the PAO body of work also encompasses: the responsibility of PAOs as part of the profession of arms, mission of the PA Function, special language requirement, PA expertise, the PAO JBOS and PA identity. While PAOs continue to

²²⁴ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, 14.

develop their skills and knowledge throughout their careers, they have a requirement to ensure that while they continue to expand their PA expertise, that they also maintain their ability of being capable of performing certain common tasks as outlined in the OGS.

Maintaining their unique and privileged status as Officers in the CAF demands that they continuously expand their knowledge in support of their roles as military leaders.²²⁵

First Component of a Public Affairs Officers Body of Work: Responsibility as Members of the Profession of Arms.

As previously stated, the CAF are mandated and have a specific responsibility to Canada, to ensure its protection and defend its sovereignty, to defend North America and to contribute to international peace and security.²²⁶ As equal members of the profession of arms, PAOs carry out their obligations in line with this requirement by adhering to the U o S requirements (of being physically fit, employable and deployable), maintaining their ability of being capable of performing certain common tasks as outlined in the OGS, and by effectively performing their role through the application of their skills, expertise and knowledge.

In terms of responsibility, the *PA Branch Advisor Guiding Principles and Direction* states that: “PAOs are accountable to their Government, DND/CF, Commanders, supervisors, peers, subordinates and their Branch. It is expected that the PAO will always assume the responsibility for their actions and those of their

²²⁵ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-55-002/PP-003 ..., i.

²²⁶ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. “About the Canadian Armed Forces ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/canadian-armed-forces.page>

subordinates.”²²⁷ While responsibility to the nation is paramount, at the Branch/occupational level, a PAO is also responsible to his/her Chain-of-Command (see Figure 3.1), peers, subordinates and the PA Branch. This specific responsibility highlights the importance of being accountable and loyal to the CAF and its units and formations. For PAOs, being able to comply with this requirement at the occupational level begins with the requirement for a PAO to know and understand the mission of the PA Function.




Figure 3.1 – PAOs Relationship with the Chain-of-Command

²²⁷ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *PA Branch Advisor Guiding Principles and Direction* (Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 1.1, 2008), 2.

Second Component of a Public Affairs Officer's Body of Work: Public Affairs Function Mission Statement.

To be relevant, the PA Function needs to support the mandate of the CAF, and in doing so it must adhere to the requirements of a mission statement: “illustrates the purpose of the [PA Function], what it does and what it intends on achieving.”²²⁸ Hence, the mission of the PA Function is “To inform, internal and external audiences of the role, mandate and activities of the DND/CAF through the provision of accurate, relevant and timely PA advice and services, within the law and the constraints of operational security.”²²⁹ Like any other CAF occupation, the mission statement of the PA Function is vital to the PA Branch and to PAOs in that it defines its purpose and then provides overarching direction of where the PA occupation should focus its resources and efforts as it supports and contributes to the overall institutional responsibilities of the CAF/DND. From this, the PA Branch mission statement is extrapolated and states that its mission is to “sustain an operational, administrative and professional framework for the Branch which enables military PAOs to be employed and excel anywhere, anytime.”²³⁰ By looking at both mission statements, PAOs understand that their purpose is to perform their specialized role anytime, anywhere in line with the U o S requirements and in the belief of service before self. In order to motivate its members in fulfilling the mission statement, the PA Branch provides its vision of where it sees itself in the future. The PA

²²⁸ Paula Fernandes, Business News Daily, “What is a Vision Statement?” last accessed 19 May, 2017, <http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/3882-vision-statement.html>

²²⁹ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, *PA Branch Strategic Intent* (Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 1.2, 2008), 2.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

Branch's vision is that its "members are recognized within government and by our allies as being among the best professional communicators, who are well-trained, highly creative, and ready to lead and deliver a strategic effect in Canada or abroad."²³¹

While the PA Function mission statement is still valid, like any other strategically inclined direction it is periodically reviewed in order to ensure that it continues to take into account the continuously evolving operational environment in reflecting the needs of the CAF. In line with this and in "response to the CDS directive to strengthen, modernize and operationalize the military PA capability,"²³² DGPA's report stated that the PA mission and vision statements may be "amended in order to more accurately reflect CAF operational priorities and to position the current PA team as partners with other players in the information spectrum."²³³

A simple demonstration of this is the fact that the mission statement of the PA Function uses the term "...PA advice and 'services' ...", the issue is that by using the word 'services' it gives the impression that one has the option of whether or not they need to use the 'services' provided by PAOs, and the word 'services' is not synonymous with being known and referred to as an indispensable component to supporting operations. While this may be a valid introspection, it does not minimize in any way the fact that over the last three decades Commanders have increasingly understood the vital importance of and become dependent upon the advice and services provided by the PA

²³¹ *Ibid.*

²³² Director General Public Affairs, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, *A Conceptual Vision ...*, 5.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 53.

Function in achieving mission success. While the PA mission and vision statements are still valid and in effect, this specific initiative, whether eventually approved and implemented or not, is a welcomed effort in that it demonstrates the willingness of the PA Function to continuously assess how best it can focus its purpose in order to align its effort (and resources) in the interest of the CAF.

For the purpose of this research project, which is focused on identifying the academic deficit in PA education for senior PAOs and proposing that it can be improved by a PGEP at the Master's level, whether the PA mission and/or vision statements will be amended to better reflect CAF operational priorities and to position PA as a partner in the information spectrum, will also support the aim of this research project. In essence, it will place the spotlight even more on the importance of addressing the academic deficit in PA education for senior PAOs. This is the case due to the increasingly complex role played by senior PAOs, and the fact that higher education provides PAOs with the cognitive abilities required to work at this level. While junior PAOs need to be able to effectively function at the tactical and operational levels, senior PAOs take on a lot more responsibility in that they are accountable to synthesize all of the information and manage the IE alongside other key players while considering the strategic, institutional and political implications. Post-secondary education is known to augment one's cognitive and intellectual critical thinking skills and knowledge required to function at this level.

In comparing the current CAF PA mission and vision statements with those of our closest ally, we find similarities. While the US Army mission statement mentions that "PA fulfills the Army's obligation to keep the American people and the Army informed, and helps to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in America's Army and its

readiness to conduct operations in peacetime, conflict and war,”²³⁴ the US Joint Chiefs of Staff mentions that “The US military has an obligation to communicate with its members and the US public, and it is in the national interest to communicate with international publics.”²³⁵ Likewise, there are also similarities with NATO’s military PA mission statement, in that its mission is to: “support Commanders by communicating accurate information in a timely manner to audiences to improve public awareness and understanding of the military aspects of the Alliance’s role, aims, operations, missions, activities and issues, thereby enhancing organisational credibility.”²³⁶ They all have very similar purposes, which is to inform their respective audiences on what they do through the release of timely and accurate information within the limits imposed by operational security.

Third Component of a Public Affairs Officers Body of Work: Special Language Requirement.

The third component of a PAOs body of work required in order for a PAO to be fully capable of performing their duties as a specialized occupation is the requirement to attain and maintain an elevated level of proficiency in their second language. That this must be done before they can undergo occupational training. This requirement is stated in the PAO occupational specifications, unique compared to other CAF occupations. While

²³⁴ United States of America. Army Public Affairs, “Telling the Army Story,” last accessed 23 April, 2017, <https://www.army.mil/info/institution/publicAffairs/>

²³⁵ United States of America, “United States Military Joint Publication

²³⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Military Public Affairs Policy,” last accessed 23 April, 2017, <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/mil-pol-pub-affairs-en.pdf>

Officers attending RMCC need a SLP of BBB in order to graduate, this requirement is not identified in their respective occupational specifications, unlike that for PAOs.

While “CF Officers have a leadership responsibility for promoting the advantages of Canada’s linguistic duality ... Linguistic requirements for CF Officers vary according to rank, occupation, and specific functions of the Officer.”²³⁷ This particularly relates to the PA occupation and the overall effectiveness of the PA Function. *PA Branch Directive 4.2, Second Language Profile (SLP) to Attend the Basic PAO Course (BPAOC)* states that “bilingualism for all PAOs is extremely important because they are at the service of the Government and the public. This is particularly more important than any other Military Occupation Structures given the fact that PA are a specialty in the domain of communications.”²³⁸ The PAO JBOS reinforces the importance and requirement of higher levels of language proficiency for PAOs, it states that:

To be accepted into the Branch, prospective PAOs must meet the minimum cut-off score on the Public Service Commission’s Written Communication Proficiency Test (WCPT) in their first official language. The second official language requirement for Reg F PAO is to achieve a functional (BBB) level as part of BOQ.”²³⁹

While the CFPDS states that an Officer’s “ability in both official languages becomes increasingly important for progression through the DP,”²⁴⁰ this is more so a

²³⁷ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-55-002/PP-003 ..., 2-4.

²³⁸ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *Second Language Profile to Attend the Basic Public Affairs Officer Course* (Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 4.2, 2009), 1.

²³⁹ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-055-002/PP-001, *Canadian Forces Manual of Military Occupational Structure: Job Based Occupational Specification for the Public Affairs Officer Occupation* (Ottawa: Director Personnel Generation Requirements, 2013), 1-8.

²⁴⁰ Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

priority for PAOs in terms of their overall effectiveness as professional communicators and in their ability to progress to higher levels. While Director General Military Careers (DGMC) states that CAF Officers need to achieve BAB for full points when being promoted from Captain/Lieutenant(Navy) to Major/Lieutenant-Commander, and BBB when being promoted from Major/Lieutenant-Commander to Lieutenant-Colonel/Commander. PAOs require CBC for Captains/Lieutenant(Navy's) and CCC for Majors/Lieutenant-Commanders to receive the full points.

Fourth Component of a Public Affairs Officers Body of Work: Public Affairs Expertise.

While the PA Function mission statement provides the purpose for the PA Function, how it will be accomplished is identified in PA expertise. This section will provide a general overview of the different elements that make up this PA expertise and Chapter Four will describe the professional capabilities of CAF PAOs. Generally speaking, PAOs are specialists who advise Commanders and managers on PA related matters at CFBs and formations across the CAF/DND and in various OUTCAN locations, and when required on domestic and expeditionary operations.²⁴¹ According to the PAO JBOS, the main role of the PAO occupation is to:

Develop PA policies and programs in support of the DND/CF. In addition to being responsible to communicate to the public, members of the PAO occupation advise military Commanders, senior staff and senior management on PA matters. Furthermore, they communicate with the internal DND/CF audience, analyse the public environment, manage information dissemination systems (such as internal publications, Web sites and advertising), provide marketing expertise, and manage the

²⁴¹ Department of National Defence. A-AD-207-001/AG-000 ..., 3.

overall PA Function using both official languages in compliance with the Official Language Act (OLA).²⁴²

The PA Branch, while evaluating the unique responsibilities and role of the PA Function (PAO occupation) in a constantly changing IE, developed a Strategic Intent in order to be able to implement its current mission and vision, and to “collectively enable the Branch to strengthen its position as a flexible and integrated component fully contributing to the CF role and being recognized internationally for the quality and innovation of its PAOs.”²⁴³ The Strategic Intent put forward by the PA Branch is that: “The Canadian PAO will be recognized as an expert and a leader amongst communications practitioners.”²⁴⁴

To achieve this the PA Branch placed an emphasis on the role PAOs play across the CAF and to strive for excellence, in that the PA Function would continue to “reflect the characteristics of professionalism, leadership, and the standardization of PA practices across the board.”²⁴⁵ Through these continued efforts, the PA Branch would be able to achieve its mission and support its Strategic Intent and “must be capable of offering credible advice, guidance, expertise, implementation overview and PA support in a variety of other areas whether operating in Canada or internationally.”²⁴⁶ After examining a multitude of factors and components within PA expertise, and the

²⁴² Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-055-002/PP-001, *Canadian Forces Manual of Military Occupational Structure: Job Based Occupational Specification for the Public Affairs Officer Occupation* ..., 1-5.

²⁴³ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, *PA Branch Strategic Intent* ..., 4.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

requirement that what it would propose would be applicable (and adaptable) to any subsequent changes in strategic direction; the PA Branch determined that PA expertise would be represented by 18 PA Functions split up among four sections: Know Public Environment, Advice, Communicate and Manage, (see Table 3.3), which was formally endorsed by the PA Branch.

Table 3.3 – 18 Public Affairs Functions

| Ser. | Public Affairs Functions |
|--------------------------------|---|
| Know Public Environment | |
| 1. | Environment and Media Analysis |
| Advice | |
| 2. | Public Affairs Advice |
| 3. | Partnering, Collaborative Arrangements, Sponsorship, Liaison and Coordination with Commands/ECS, MND, Privy Council Office (PCO) and OGDs |
| Communicate | |
| 4. | Media Relations |
| 5. | Internal Communications |
| 6. | Internet and Electronic Communications |
| 7. | Crisis and Emergency Communications |
| 8. | Community Outreach |
| 9. | Exhibitions and Displays |
| 10. | Public Affairs Support to Operations |
| 11. | Marketing |
| 12. | Recruitment & Advertising |
| 13. | Production and Services – Publishing/Creative Services |
| 14. | Imagery |
| 15. | Events and Announcements |
| Manage | |
| 16. | Public Affairs Planning |
| 17. | Public Affairs Training |
| 18. | Evaluation |

Source: Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *PA Branch Strategic Intent*. Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 1.2, 2008.

The main purpose of the 18 PA Functions is for a PAO to employ them in order to provide certain PA capabilities to a Commander. According to the *CAF Joint PA*

Doctrine, there are four PA capabilities provided to a Commander: “Providing advice and guidance, enhances morale of internal audiences, fosters audiences trust and support, and [PA] TechNet support.”²⁴⁷ In essence, PA expertise represented through the 18 PA Functions are employed by a CAF PAO in the performance of his/her duties as professional military communicators so that they can support and provide the Commander with the identified four PA capabilities, anywhere at any time (see Table 3.4).

Table 3.4 – The Four Public Affairs Capabilities Provided to a Commander

| Ser. | Capabilities Provided to a Commander |
|------|--------------------------------------|
| 1. | Provides Advice and Guidance |
| 2. | Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences |
| 3. | Fosters Audience Trust and Support |
| 4. | Public Affairs TechNet Support |

Source: Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-361/FP-000, *CF Joint Public Affairs Doctrine Manual*. Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Manual, 2004.

While PA expertise and how it is employed is influenced by the operational environment and the needs of the CAF, or new developments within NATO or from our allies, changes in technology and how society communicates also plays an important role. As a result, the PA Branch and all PAOs have a responsibility to ensure that the PA Function is as relevant as possible. The senior members of the PA Branch hold periodic PD discussions and presentations for their members. As identified in the CFPDS, PAOs are expected to maintain their expertise by acquiring and developing proficiency. From a personal perspective, they have a responsibility as professional communicators to ensure

²⁴⁷ Canada. Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-361/FP-000, *CF Joint Public Affairs Doctrine Manual* (Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Manual, 2004), 4-4,4-5.

that their self-development objectives include keeping abreast with changes in the IE, and as previously mentioned, this also includes becoming members of the CPRS and the IABC.

Additionally, DPALC ensures that the occupation's newest members are trained and developed in line with the latest practices and methods, which includes bringing in different experts from the communications and PR industry as guest speakers, as they have done with members of the CPRS and IABC. In order to ensure that all of this collective effort benefits the PA Function and supports the future development of the PA occupation, the *DPALC Implementation Directive Lessons Learned Function* states that: "The PA environment therefore demands that every PAO be able to consistently consult, populate, and integrate the PA body of knowledge by employing the Lessons Learned function."²⁴⁸

Fifth Component of a Public Affairs Officers Body of Work: The Public Affairs Officer Job Based Occupational Specification.

Chapter Two discussed the role of the OGS and how it would work with any occupation by providing the structure in which an occupation could manage and develop its members. In terms of its relationship with others specifications, the OGS manual states that: "The OGS, together with OS and Specialty Specifications (SS) guide the development of Officers towards achieving the breadth and depth of professional knowledge, skills, attributes, and other characteristics required to obtain professional

²⁴⁸ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, *Implementation Directive Defence Public Affairs Learning Centre Lessons Learned Function* (Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch, 2017), 1.

competence.”²⁴⁹ The PA expertise identified in the previous section is the cornerstone of the PA Function, and by using the OGS it is formally expressed through the JBOS for the PAO Occupation, and states that “The primary purpose of the PAO Occupational Specification (OS) is to describe the job performance requirements for the PAO.”²⁵⁰

The aim of this section is to reinforce from a CAF perspective the important factors that need to be considered in the development of PAOs, so that they may effectively employ the 18 PA Functions in support of the four PA capabilities provided to a Commander. While the JBOS for the PAO occupation has been amended as recently as July 2013, it was originally approved in 2002 and as a result will need to be re-assessed in the near future in order to ensure that its content accurately reflects the recently approved PA Branch initiatives and also takes into account the new operational requirements and industry changes affecting the PA Function. For the purpose of this research project, the current PAO JBOS will be used with the caveat that it does have some limitations in that the JBOS has been replaced by the JBS format for occupational specifications.

Job Requirements as Identified in the Public Affairs Officer Job Based Occupational Specification.

²⁴⁹ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-55-002/PP-003 ..., 1-3.

²⁵⁰ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-055-002/PP-001, *Canadian Forces Manual of Military Occupational Structure: Job Based Occupational Specification for the Public Affairs Officer Occupation* ..., Foreword.

The PAO JBOS identifies specific job requirements, which are in addition to the performance requirements detailed in the OGS. They are: *Comprehension and Judgement, Occupational Training and Experience, Responsibility and Consequence of Error.*²⁵¹ As it is reflected through the 18 PA Functions, PAOs are constantly in the process of accessing and receiving, analyzing and interpreting a tremendous amount of information from almost limitless sources in order for them to be able to effectively perform their role, especially during expeditionary operations where the IE becomes increasingly complex. As this requires PAOs to have effective *Comprehension and Judgement* skills, they must:

... be capable of assessing the public environment and the media to develop PA actions and products in response to or in advance of events. This requires the ability to quickly understand and effectively manage complex information dealing with a wide range of subjects, often under prohibitive time restraints, high stress, and minimum supervision.²⁵²

While all PAOs have to be prepared to function at this level of complexity, as a PAO progresses through their career and takes on a more senior role in the occupation, they will have to be able to manage this environment while being responsible for subordinates and accountable to the strategic/institutional Chain-of-Command. The requirement to balance Canadian needs with those of other nations and international organizations in a multilateral environment demands increased cognitive and intellectual abilities from a PAO.

The second identified job requirement is *Occupational Training and Experience*, while addressed in the previous section, PAO JBOS states that a “PAO is required to be

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 1-4, 1-5.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 1-5.

well versed in the fundamental aspects of PA gained through in-and out-service courses. PAOs must remain current with the latest trends in PA, media and technology.”²⁵³ CFPDS clearly identifies that this is a key component to PD, and is fully supported by the PA Branch.

The third identified job requirement is *Responsibility*, and requires “PAOs to work independently for extensive periods.”²⁵⁴ While many CAF Officers will have to work independently many times throughout their career, this is almost the standard for PAOs as it is inherent in their function as specialized advisors on a Base, Wing or overseas. This inadvertently also limits their available time for PD initiatives.

The fourth and final identified job requirement is *Consequence of Error*, while making an error in any occupation in the military is a serious issue, especially when lives are at risk. The *Consequence of Error* in the PA Function can most definitely affect the credibility of an operation or even the institution. While all PAOs need to safeguard against making errors, the fact that senior PAOs operate at higher levels means that the *Consequence of Error* for them could have grave consequences. This job requirement further highlights the importance of higher education for senior PAOs, in that the additional cognitive and intellectual skills obtained will better support a senior PAO’s requirement to understand and operate at the strategic and political levels. The PAO JBOS further describes the repercussions of any errors within the PA Function:

Failure to properly research, process or disseminate information ... could compromise national security, and/or discredit the DND/CF, the Canadian government, foreign governments or international agencies.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

Ultimately, errors could lead to loss of life, damage to equipment and claims against the Crown.²⁵⁵

While the PAO JBOS highlights important factors as it pertains to the job requirements of the PA occupation, both the PA Branch and each PAO have their respective responsibilities as it pertains to these important issues. In line with the CFPDS, the PA Branch has the responsibility to ensure that DPALC training at all levels, experience gained through Branch postings and deployment decisions for its members and Branch supported PD initiatives (including education) all support a PAO's ability to more effectively meet these job requirements. Likewise, in line with the CFPDS, PAOs have a responsibility to take advantage of these opportunities and to be pro-actively involved in any future initiatives that will equally benefit their career progression and the relevancy of the PA Function. The success of such endeavours, in some capacity is connected to how strong a PAO identifies with his/her occupation.

Sixth Component of a Public Affairs Officers Body of Work: Public Affairs Identity.

The final component of a PAOs *Body of Work* is PA Identity. While PAOs identify first and foremost as members of the profession of arms and in line with voluntary military service, unlimited liability; and service before self,²⁵⁶ they also identify as members of the PA Branch based on their unique function and role. Connecting with the PA identity also increases the effectiveness of the PA Function in the sense that PAOs are more inclined to get involved in Branch initiatives and take an

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 1-5, 1-6.

²⁵⁶ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, 20.

interest in supporting their peers, and in mentoring and coaching their subordinates. Additionally, the PA Branch highlights the importance that its customs and traditions play in contributing to PA identity, whereas it states that “Branch members are expected to contribute to the Branch Heritage and ensure customs and traditions are maintained, respected, and promoted. The richness and *esprit* that tradition brings to life in a military Branch is essential.”²⁵⁷

Military Ethos and Public Affairs Officers.

The second component of the PA professional body of work is military ethos, and like other CAF Officers, PAOs adhere to the requirements of ethical conduct in line with Canadian norms and values. The development of ethical behavior and conduct in PAOs is no different than how it is achieved with other Officers, perhaps from an occupational perspective PAOs receive additional development in this matter due to the fact that they are the ones that have to create the departmental products (i.e. news release, etc.) and receive media inquiries pertaining to any unethical behavior by any CAF member. The *CAF Joint PA Doctrine* highlights the importance of military ethos and PAOs:

The key elements of the PA Function are truth, credibility and ethics ... Credibility can't be won overnight nor can it be bought. If CF policies aren't in the public's best interest, no amount of PA will obscure the reality. The PAO provides connectivity with various audiences with whom they must build and maintain credibility. Credibility with all audiences is ensured with the application of truth and ethical reporting of information.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁷ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, *PA Branch Strategic Intent* ..., 3.

²⁵⁸ Canada. Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-361/FP-000 ..., 1-3.

The requirement to provide factual and accurate information is at the cornerstone of a PAOs legitimacy, and appropriate PA efforts shall be taken “to correct factual errors, misquotes and misleading information attributed to the DND or the CF.”²⁵⁹

The DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics and the Public Affairs Branch Code of Conduct

In addition to PAOs adhering to the *DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics*, they also adhere to the PA Branch Code of Conduct (refer to Table 3.5). When comparing the PA Code of Conduct with the Code of Professional Standards of professional civilian communications organizations like the CPRS and IABC, we see that there are similarities. They all highlight the importance of telling the truth and upholding high ethical standards. Also, similar to how the PA Branch requires its members to earn respect and credibility, the CPRS states that its members “shall deal fairly and honestly with the communications media and the public,”²⁶⁰ and IABC states that its members shall be honest in that their “actions bring respect for and trust in the communication profession.”²⁶¹

Table 3.5 – The Public Affairs Branch Code of Conduct

| Ser. | Conduct |
|------|---------|
|------|---------|

²⁵⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces, “DAOD 2008-2, Media Relations and Public Announcements,” last accessed 29 Apr, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-2000/2008-2.page>

²⁶⁰ Canadian Public Relations Society, “Ethics in Public Relations Society,” last accessed 22 April, 2017, <https://ethicsinpr.wikispaces.com/Canadian+Public+Relations+Society>

²⁶¹ International Association of Business Communicators, “IABC Code of Ethics for Professional Communicators,” last accessed 22 April, 2017, <https://www.iabc.com/about-us/governance/code-of-ethics/>

| | |
|----|---------------------------------------|
| 1. | Always tell the truth |
| 2. | Use best judgement |
| 3. | Earn their respect |
| 4. | Obtain credibility |
| 5. | Develop a relationship based on trust |
| 6. | Be proactive |
| 7. | Communicate with conviction |

Source: Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *PA Branch Advisor Guiding Principles and Direction*. Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 1.1, 2008.

War Fighting Skills and the Development of Public Affairs Officers.

In line with the mandate of the CAF and as outlined in the OGS, all Officers irrespective of their specific occupation have a responsibility as members of the profession of arms to be able to employ their basic War Fighting skills when required. As a specialist occupation where one or only a few PAOs will deploy during an operation, PAOs are not part of the main fighting force like Combat Arms occupations (i.e. infantry, armoured, artillery and engineers), but they nonetheless contribute to the overall effort. This section will demonstrate what PAOs do to develop their War Fighting skills, and how their expertise contributes to the overall success of CAF operations.

First, in addition to the CF-wide requirement that they be prepared to deploy at all times, PAOs identified to support a specific mission will usually conduct pre-deployment training and Theatre Mission Specific Training (TMST) with the deploying force. Second, prior to deployment, PAOs will provide media awareness training to all deploying members but specifically provide spokesperson training to certain key military leaders of the deploying team in order to ensure that they will be prepared to effectively and properly conduct media interviews.

Once deployed, the PAO's focus turns to supporting mission success. The *CAF Joint PA Doctrine* identifies two specific PA goals in a CF operation. The first is to

“contribute to the success of the Commander’s mission by increasing audience knowledge and promote its understanding of CF operations, its roles and capabilities,”²⁶² and the second is to “keep audiences as accurately and fully informed as possible about CF operations, within communications policy established by the GoC and the principles of operational security.”²⁶³

The PAO meets these goals by managing the media embedded program once in theatre and ensuring that they are provided with opportunities to document different aspects of the operation and have access to forward deployed units and Forward Operating Bases (FOB). In order to protect operationally sensitive information when something serious happens (i.e. death, attack, etc.) “a communications lockdown is imposed on the camp, including media, until the families of the affected soldiers are informed.”²⁶⁴ Such internal regulations agreed to by embedded media do not apply to media outside of the camp referred to as ‘stringers’. The mission in Afghanistan proved that “the practise of embedding media on Op ATHENA was extremely positive. Embedded media were instrumental in communicating the many stories of Canadian troops deployed in Afghanistan.”²⁶⁵

²⁶² Canada. Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-361/FP-000 ..., 1-2.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁴ Captain (Navy) Chris Henderson, “Reporting Live from Kandahar,” *Canadian Military Journal*. Vol 7, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 85.

²⁶⁵ Major Jay Janzen, “Operation ATHENA ROTO 0 – Embedded Media,” *The Canadian Army Journal*. 7,3 / 7,4 (Fall/Winter 2004): 51.

Due to the fact that the “PA Function has moved from a peripheral support role to a core function in CF operations,”²⁶⁶ the decision for it to be employed as an enabling force has increased. The *CF Joint PA Doctrine* reinforces this point, in that “The function is now capable of enabling operations and of being a force multiplier by providing the Commander with multi-skilled and fully trained PAOs able to work in a number of associated tasks and implement PA plans to achieve mission objectives.”²⁶⁷ The ever changing geo-political environment where adversary forces use conventional and asymmetric capabilities including information warfare, coupled with the ability for anyone to document and live-stream almost any portion of an operation around the world has created the need for Commanders to rely on PAOs to manage this complex environment. According to Horn and Stouffer:

The continuing ubiquitous presence of the global media will further challenge military personnel. Instantaneous feeds from operational areas around the globe direct into the living rooms of civilians worldwide in real time ... will continue to catapult seemingly innocuous tactical situations on the ground to strategic significance. The reporting of ostensibly minor events will have the potential to generate hostility around the world and create international incidents for domestic governments if the actions or words are construed as disrespectful or unnecessary (particularly if taken out of context).²⁶⁸

Leadership Development - Public Affairs Officers.

Leadership rounds out the last component of the foundational elements of the CFPDS, and is also a vital component in the development of a PAO as it plays an

²⁶⁶ Canada. Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-361/FP-000 ..., 1-3.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁸ Bernd Horn and Jeff Stouffer, *Educating the Leaders and Leading the Educated* ..., 8.

important part in their ability to effectively adhere to the important elements within its PBK and in its crucial contribution to the war fighting effort. While leadership development is a cornerstone piece for some other Officer occupations, for PAOs it is not necessarily about leading the people of the institution, it is about understanding how to best support those who are charged to lead the people and the institution.

Notwithstanding the ability for PAOs to be able to portray and employ leadership skills and qualities, it is important to highlight here that the current training framework regarding the provision of leadership skills for PAOs is limited and will be further explained in the following section.

While a CAF Medical Officer when on deployment will not lead soldiers into battle, however no one questions their level of leadership skills in an operating room when there are multiple casualties and lives depending upon decisions that are quick and free of error. Likewise, while PAOs will not lead a unit into combat or be formally responsible for the lives of other soldiers, their ability to apply leadership qualities and skills are vital to ensure that they can effectively function in an extremely complex IE and can pro-actively seek and confirm accurate information prior to advising their Chain-of-Command and then informing the national media. The PAO JBOS further highlights the importance of leadership for the PAO:

PAOs must lead by personal example and assume responsibility and accountability for the morale, discipline, safety, effectiveness and efficiency of their assigned personnel. They must display a high level of diplomacy and loyalty when managing sensitive information and/or dealing with the media. Emphasis is given to communication skills and abilities as well as PA judgement.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁹ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-055-002/PP-001, *Canadian Forces Manual of Military Occupational Structure: Job Based Occupational Specification for the Public Affairs Officer Occupation* ..., 1-7.

As specialists, PAOs often work without subordinates and as a result they require high levels of interpersonal skills, maturity and leadership qualities so that they can take charge and be accountable and responsible for briefing senior Commanders on strategic matters that can have institutional implications. While PAOs usually work independently, they also work in teams especially in strategic headquarters and during large-scale operations, and as a result senior PAOs apply their leadership skills in order to “take care of subordinates and act as coaches/mentors while leading the change for both, the PA Branch and the PA Function.”²⁷⁰ The actions and conduct of senior PAOs is also important in the development of their subordinates in that they must ‘lead by example’. In reference to this, the *PA Branch Advisor Guiding Principles and Direction* states that:

This is the very essence of leadership and subordinates deserve leadership that embodies the four core military values at the heart of the CF military ethos – duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage. All PAOs, and most particularly the senior Officers, must embody this principle in their conduct and ensure subordinates are cared for, their well-being is considered, and that they are properly supported.²⁷¹

PAOs are equally responsible in developing their PBK, War Fighting and Leadership skills. The CFPDS’ four pillars provide the structure by which PAOs can progressively develop themselves and the PA Function so that they can continue to be a vital component to Canada’s contribution during complex international missions. The body of work, war fighting and leadership skills required by a senior PAO supports the requirement for a PGEP. A Master’s Degree enhances critical thinking skills and will

²⁷⁰ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, *PA Branch Strategic Intent ...*, 2.

²⁷¹ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *PA Branch Advisor Guiding Principles and Direction ...*, 1.

better provide a senior PAO with the ability to meet DND's Corporate Strategic Communications, and to provide vital PA expertise in support of CAF operations.

Professional Development of Public Affairs Officers: Over the Four Pillars and Five Developmental Periods

The identified four pillars (education, training, experience and self-development) work holistically and are all-important in the PD of CAF PAOs. A deficiency or lack of PD opportunities in any one of the four pillars can strain or affect the development needed for a PAO to effectively perform his/her role, especially at the senior level. Table 3.6 connects the four pillars with the five identified CFPDS DPs, to show how each pillar supports (or affects) the development of a PAO throughout the respective DP.

Table 3.6 – PAO Common and Occupational Qualifications and PD Milestones

| DP | Rank | PAO Common and Occupational (Training) Qualifications | PAO PD Milestones: Education, Experience and Self-development | Limitations |
|----|--|--|--|---|
| 1 | Officer Cadet/ Naval Cadet to Second Lieutenant/ Acting Sub-Lieutenant | (a) Basic Military Officer Qualification (BMOQ) (b) Second Language Proficiency (BBB) Required (c) Basic Public Affairs Officer Course (BPAOC) | <u>Education</u> : Bachelor Degree, CAF pre-requisite for Officers <u>Experience</u> : Any previous military or civilian sector experience <u>Self-development</u> : at this level, it is based on the member's personal situation and individual drive/initiative | <u>Leadership</u> : Leadership development is very limited for PAOs at this level. It is mainly based on the CAF model in that new PAOs receive practical leadership from BMOQ and some from BPAOC, but very limited theoretical leadership is gained from BPAOC and again from CAFJOD during DP 2. |
| 2 | Lieutenant/ | (a) Canadian | <u>Education</u> : Initial | <u>Training</u> : (a) Currently there |

| | | | | |
|---|---|--|---|--|
| | <p>Sub-Lieutenant to Captain/Lieutenant(Navy)</p> | <p>Armed Forces Junior Officer Development (CAFJOD) Programme</p> <p>(b) SOLET to attain minimum BBB proficiency – <i>if selected</i></p> | <p>Baccalaureate Degree Programme (IBDP). – <i>only for those lacking a Degree.</i></p> <p><u>Experience:</u> occupational employment/postings, exercises, deployments, tasks, Branch initiatives including coaching-mentoring program and succession planning</p> <p><u>Self-development:</u> mainly based on PAO Scoring Criteria (SCRIT) for promotion from Captain/Lieutenant(Navy) to Major/Lieutenant-Commander</p> | <p>is no PA Advanced Officer Qualification Course at the DP 2/DP 3 levels to bridge the deficiency between junior and senior PAOs,</p> <p>(b) To address this deficiency, the PA Branch is working on creating an Advanced Public Affairs Officer Course (APAOC) scheduled to begin in 2019, and</p> <p>(c) This course will only be offered to senior Captains/Lieutenant(Navy's) to Majors/Lieutenant-Commanders</p> <p><u>Education:</u> (a) Limited seats provided through Branch sponsored Advanced Training List (ATL) credit, and</p> <p>(b) Formal education options at this level are only for PAOs who need to complete a Bachelor Degree.</p> <p><u>SOLET:</u> Limited seats provided through Branch sponsored Advanced Training List (ATL) credit.</p> |
| 3 | <p>Major/Lieutenant-Commander to Lieutenant-Colonel/Commander</p> | <p>(a) Joint Command and Staff Programme (JCSP) – <i>if selected</i></p> <p>(b) SOLET to attain minimum BBB proficiency or higher – <i>if selected</i></p> | <p><u>Education:</u> Nil</p> <p><u>Experience:</u> occupational employment/postings, exercises, deployments, tasks, Branch initiatives including coaching-mentoring program and succession planning.</p> <p><u>Self-development:</u> mainly based on PAO SCRIT for promotion from Major to Lieutenant-Colonel</p> | <p><u>Education:</u> No Branch supported post-graduate education program at the Master's level.</p> <p><u>Training:</u> See DP 2 remarks regarding no PA Advanced Officer Qualification.</p> <p><u>JCSP Training:</u> (a) PAOs have to be succession planned to attend, and</p> <p>(b) The PA Branch only receives (1) seat every year for the Residency program and (1 to 2) seat(s) for the Distance Learning (DL) version.</p> |

| | | | | |
|---|---------------------------|--------------------------------|--|--|
| | | | | <u>SOLET</u> : Limited seats provided through Branch sponsored Advanced Training List (ATL) credit. |
| 4 | Colonel/ Captain(Navy) | Nothing mandatory or required. | <u>Education</u> : Nil <u>Experience</u> : occupational employment/postings, exercises, deployments, tasks, Branch initiatives including coaching-mentoring program and succession planning. <u>Self-development</u> : individual preference and based on identified requirements for promotion to the next rank or in order to maintain relevant. | <u>Education</u> : No Branch supported post-graduate education program at the Master's level. <u>National Security Program (NSP)</u> : Currently no PAOs have been selected thus far. Future operational and/or institutional requirements may change on a case-by-case basis. <u>SOLET</u> : ATL credit offered to a PAO at this level is only done in unique circumstances or for very specific reasons, since most Colonels requiring language training already received an ATL for maintaining their SL proficiency. |
| 5 | Flag/General Officers | Nothing mandatory or required. | Same as outlined in DP 4. | Nothing mandatory or required. |

Like any CAF Officer, acquiring the invaluable skills and techniques gained through realistic occupational training affords PAOs the ability to be able to naturally and instinctively make the appropriate decisions under any circumstance, and specifically during crisis situations.

During DP 1, in addition to completing BMOQ junior PAOs are required to meet a Second Language proficiency of BBB in order to be able to attend the BPAOC. This is in line with the PAO JBOS where it states that: "PAOs reach the OFP upon achieving the

required language profile (BBB), followed by completing the BOQ. BOQ consists of a formal course: BPAOC.”²⁷²

In terms of leadership development for PAOs during DP 1, it is very limited. While the PA Branch strives to have a good leadership model, it is limited due to the fact that leadership development at this level is primarily based on the CAF model, where new PAOs gain their practical leadership skills from BMOQ, and very little from BPAOC where they have minor leadership roles on the course in line with the ‘Officership system’. Also, BPAOC only provides its students with limited theoretical leadership. Table 3.7 provides the performance objectives of BPAOC and correspondingly shows where they are referred to in the PAO JBOS and the CAF DOADs that apply to the PA Function.

Table 3.7 – BPAOC Performance Objectives, PAO JBOS and DAOD 2008

| Basic Public Affairs Officer Course | | | |
|--|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Performance Objectives (PO) | Title | Included in PAO JBOS | Included in DAOD |
| PO 001 | Manage the Public Affairs Function | Yes (PA Advisor) | DAOD 2008-0 through to DAOD 2008-6 |
| PO 002 | Conduct Public Affairs Planning | Yes (PA Advisor) | DAOD 2008-5 |
| PO 003 | Create a Communication Product | Yes (PA Advisor) | DAOD 2008-2 and DAOD 2008-3 |
| PO 004 | Conduct Media Relations | Yes (Media Relations PAO) | DAOD 2008-2 and DAOD 2008-3 |

²⁷² Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-055-002/PP-001, *Canadian Forces Manual of Military Occupational Structure: Job Based Occupational Specification for the Public Affairs Officer Occupation* ..., 2-25.

| | | | |
|---------------|--|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| PO 005 | Coordinate a Media Event | Yes (PA Advisor) | DAOD 2008-2 |
| PO 006 | Conduct Internal Communications | Yes (Internal Communication PAO) | DAOD 2008-5 |
| PO 007 | Conduct Public Affairs in an Operational Setting | Yes (Operations PAO) | DAOD 2008-4 |
| PO 008 | Foster Community Relations | Yes (External Relations PAO) | DAOD 2008-0 and DAOD 2008-5 |
| PO 009 | Manage an Issue | Yes (Media Relations PAO) | DAOD 2008-2 and DAOD 2008-3 |
| PO 010 | Manage the Production of Imagery/Audio Products | Yes (Combat Camera PAO) | DAOD 2008-5 |

Source: Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *Public Affairs Occupational Qualification Standard (ADEP)*. Ottawa: Canadian Defence Academy. 2003.

Note: The above-mentioned Performance Objectives are the ones that a member shall achieve in order to meet the requirements of the PA Occupational Qualification (ADEP).

During DP 2, the main training requirement for PAOs is the CAFJOD Programme, and this is where they expand on their theoretical leadership knowledge. Specifically, the CAFJOD Programme is “intended to orient the junior [PAO] to select topics within a PBK related to the military profession. From this body of knowledge, [PAOs] will begin to enhance their critical thinking skills and develop innovative responses to a myriad of issues.”²⁷³ In addition to this requirement, some PAOs may be afforded the opportunity to further develop their SLP if they joined the occupation prior to ‘BBB’ becoming a requirement or if their language profile has expired (SLPs are only valid for five years unless exemption level of proficiency is achieved).

Currently there is no occupation specific training or PA Advanced Officer Qualification Course at the DP 2/DP 3 levels to bridge the occupational training deficiency between junior and senior PAOs. To address this deficiency and in line with the requirement to operationalize the PA Function as a result of the continuously

²⁷³ Canada. Department of National Defence, “Programmes and qualifications ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/officer.page>

evolving operational and IE, DPALC is working on creating an Advanced PAO Course (APAOC) that will address these needs, and once approved is scheduled to begin training senior Captains/Lieutenant(Navy's) and Majors/Lieutenant-Commanders in 2019.

DPALC has stated that by being course loaded on the 30-day long APAOC, candidates will:

Learn about different aspects of strategic communications with an emphasis on operations; leadership and managerial skills; government communications processes; social media as a strategic asset; and support to operations, specifically PA inclusion in the Operational Planning Process (OPP) and the linkages between PA and Information Operations (IO).²⁷⁴

The launch of this course will help operationalize the PA occupation, as the Performance Objectives (POs) identified in Table 3.8 will focus on the OPP and the importance of the PA Function to Mission Success. This advanced course will increase a PAO's skills, knowledge, approach and perspective on how it performs its role during operations in today's complex geo-political environment. While it will provide candidates with additional skills and knowledge, it is intended to fill the deficiency at the training level and not to address the educational or academic deficit. As a result, this course will directly support and augment the benefits a senior PAO will gain from attending a PA Branch supported PGEP at the Master's level, in that they will have acquired the PA skills commensurate with the ability to better comprehend the strategic elements inherent in a Master's Degree.

Table 3.8 – Advanced Public Affairs Officer Course Performance Objectives

| |
|---|
| Advanced Public Affairs Officer Course (APAOC) |
|---|

²⁷⁴ Major Allison Delaney, "Advanced Public Affairs Officer Course," *Public Affairs Branch Notes*, April 2016, <http://veritas.mil.ca/ab-ap/index-eng.asp>

| Performance Objectives (PO) | Title |
|------------------------------------|---|
| PO 001 | Manage Strategic Communications |
| PO 002 | Advise of Operational Planning from the PA context |
| PO 003 | Manage PA planning within the Initiation stage of the OPP |
| PO 004 | Manage PA planning within the Orientation stage of the OPP |
| PO 005 | Manage PA planning within the COA development stage of the OPP |
| PO 006 | Manage PA planning within the Plan Development stage of the OPP |
| PO 007 | Manage PA planning within the Plan Review stage of the OPP |
| PO 008 | Develop a Business Plan for a PA office |
| PO 009 | Manage CAF/DND branding and marketing |

Source: Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *Advanced Public Affairs Officer Course Performance Objectives*. Ottawa: Defence Public Affairs Learning Centre, 2017.

Currently, training available for (selected) PAOs at the DP 3 level is Second Official Language Education and Training (SOLET) and the opportunity for a select few to attend the JCSP RESID or JCSP DL. In line with the lack of framework in place during DP 1 and DP 2 to equally develop PAOs regarding leadership, unless a PAO is afforded the opportunity to attend JCSP RESID or JCSP DL they will not be able to develop their leadership skills through the training pillar during DP 3. JCSP is considered a career course for PAOs, and in order for a PAO to be enrolled they need to be succession planned. However, even if a PAO is succession planned they are not guaranteed to attend due to the fact that the PA Branch only receives one seat per serial every year for JCSP RESID and one to two seats per serial every year for JCSP DL. PAOs benefit from JCSP in that they gain additional theoretical leadership skills and can better support the operational environment and Commanders in an operational context. Also, PAOs are better able to inform the public on the complexities of operating at the operational level. Canadian Forces College states that: “The aim of the JCSP is to prepare selected senior Officers of the Defence Team for command and staff appointments in the

contemporary operating environment across the continuum of operations in national and international settings.”²⁷⁵

While PAOs at the DP 4 and 5 levels may receive SOLET if required, it is only done in unique circumstances or for very specific reasons since most Colonels requiring language training have most likely already received an ATL for maintaining their SL proficiency. While CAF Officers at DP 4 normally attend NSP, due to the fact that PAOs at the Colonel rank are not operational level JTFC, they are not seen as a priority or required to take the course. While there is no formal occupational specific training at DP 4 and DP 5 for PAOs, currently no PAOs have been selected to attend NSP thus far. Future operational and/or institutional requirements may change on a case-by-case basis.

PA training development over the five DPs is limited, specifically as it relates to leadership, operational knowledge and strategic communications at the advanced level for senior PAOs. While the PA Branch is addressing some of these deficiencies by looking at introducing the APAOC by 2019, the fact is that, the only training currently identified as mandatory for PAOs is in DP 1 (BMOQ, SOLET, BPAOC) and DP 2 (CAFJOD), as outlined in Table 3.6 and confirmed by the PAO JBOS. The only mandatory training a PAO currently receives is at the junior level, but it has been shown that PAOs operate at the strategic level a lot sooner than Officers in other occupations. While junior PAOs are trained in line with the PAO JBOS to perform their duties (but it will be shown later on that even training at this level requires review in the near future to address certain training deficiencies), there is nothing available for senior PAOs. There is currently a dearth between the training PAOs receive throughout the DPs and the level at

²⁷⁵ Canada. Canadian Forces College, “Joint Command and Staff Program,” last accessed 5 June, 2017. <http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/226-eng.html>

which they are expected to operate at, as they progress throughout their career. The lack of training due to a lack of career courses at the senior PAO level makes it a lot more difficult for these Officers and the PA Function to be able to continuously meet essential institutional requirements. Often it is only by dint of their extensive experience that allows them to bridge the gap.

The Experience Pillar: How Public Affairs Officers Gain Experience Throughout the Five Developmental Periods.

As defined in Chapter Two, experience is “The application and continued development of the skills, knowledge and attitudes acquired through training, education and self-development in the performance of assigned roles and duties, especially in operations and command.”²⁷⁶ For PAOs, experience becomes increasingly important as they progress through their career and take on more responsibility in ever more challenging situations from DP 1 to DP 5. As detailed in Table 3.6, PAOs gain experience from many venues throughout the DPs, including: training, education, self-development, occupational employment/postings, exercises, deployments, tasks, PA Branch initiatives including Coaching-Mentoring Program and succession planning.

The wide-ranging posting opportunities available to PAOs is also instrumental in increasing their experience, and is where a PAO is able to build on their current experience and bring their knowledge and skills to the next level. Seeing that PAOs are most often posted off the BPAOC as a Lieutenant/Sub-Lieutenant to a CFB on their own, this is where the pressure to perform demands that he/she learn quickly, this experience

²⁷⁶ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “DAOD 5031-8 ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-5000/5031-8.page>

will increase their leadership qualities and maturity – vital to moving on to the next level in their career. Whether a PAO is employed with the CF Recruiting Group (CFRG), the CDS’s Office, Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), Canadian Forces Combat Camera (CFCC) or with the CF Snowbirds Demonstration Squadron, he/she will be able to gain invaluable experience that will increase their competencies as they move up in rank into more senior positions (see Figure 3.2).




Figure 3.2 – Public Affairs Branch Talent Management

Source: Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *PA Branch Coaching-Mentoring Program: Competencies Management*. Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch, 2012.

PAOs gain tremendous experience at the tactical, operational and strategic levels from tasks, deployments and exercises, and provide PAOs with additional opportunities to hone their skills and gain valuable experience as a result by performing their role in “a variety of conditions that challenge and test their skills to ensure readiness for a wide spectrum of operations,”²⁷⁷ especially when these are in a Joint Interagency Multi-

national and Public (JIMP) environment. Table 3.9 illustrates various types of operations where PAOs have provided support and Figure 3.3 demonstrates the “spectrum of conflict and continuum of operations”²⁷⁸ that PAOs must be prepared to operate in. PAOs also gain experience from varied postings across the CAF and internationally at the various operating levels including the institutional level.



Figure 3.3 – Spectrum of Conflict and Continuum of Operations

Source: Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-000/FP-001, *Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP 01): Canadian Military Doctrine*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2009.

Table 3.9 – Non-Exhaustive List of PA Support to CAF Operations: 2006 to Present

| Ser. | Operation Name | Operation Type | Year | Location |
|------|----------------|------------------------------------|---------|---------------------|
| 1. | DRIFTNET | Fisheries Patrols | Ongoing | Atlantic & Pacific |
| 2. | NANOOK | Sovereignty | Yearly | Arctic, Canada |
| 3. | SAR | Search and Rescue (SAR) | Ongoing | Canada-wide |
| 4. | CARIBBE | Fight illicit trafficking & crime | Yearly | Caribbean & Pacific |
| 5. | HAMLET | UN Stabilization Mission | Ongoing | Haiti |
| 6. | KOBOLD | Contribution to NATO (KFOR) | Ongoing | Kosovo |
| 7. | REASSURANCE | Support to NATO Assurance Measures | Ongoing | Europe |
| 8. | SNOWGOOSE | UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) | Ongoing | Cyprus |
| 9. | CROCODILE | UN Stabilization Mission in Congo | Ongoing | Congo |

²⁷⁷ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Military Exercises,” last accessed 23 April, 2017, <http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/exercises/index.html>

²⁷⁸ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001 ..., 2-13.

| | | | | |
|-----|-------------|--|-----------|--------------------------------------|
| 10. | SOPRANO | UN Mission in South Sudan | Ongoing | South Sudan |
| 11. | ARTEMIS | Maritime security & Counter-terrorism | Ongoing | Arabian Sea |
| 12. | CALUMET | Multinational Force and Observers | Ongoing | Egypt |
| 13. | FOUNDATION | Counter-Terrorism efforts | Ongoing | Middle East, Africa and Asia |
| 14. | IMPACT | Contribution to coalition assistance to security forces against ISIL | Ongoing | Republic of Iraq |
| 15. | JADE | Participation in the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) | Ongoing | Middle East |
| 16. | PROTEUS | Contribution to the Office of the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) | Ongoing | Jerusalem |
| 17. | SIRONA | Combat the Ebola outbreak | 2015 | Sierra Leone |
| 18. | ATTENTION | NATO Training Mission | 2011-2014 | Afghanistan |
| 19. | RENAISSANCE | Humanitarian operations | 2013 | Philippines |
| 20. | LUSTRE | Aid-of-the-civil-power - flood | 2011 | Manitoba, Canada |
| 21. | MOBILE | Participation in the international response | 2011 | Libya |
| 22. | BRONZE | NATO Stabilization Force Mission | 2004-2011 | Bosnia&Herzegovina |
| 23. | ATHENA | Participation in ISAF (NATO-led, UN-authorized mission) | 2003-2011 | Afghanistan |
| 24. | HIESTIA | Humanitarian operations | 2010 | Haiti |
| 25. | SEXTANT | Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 | 2006-2009 | Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean |
| 26. | ARGUS | Team of Strategic Military Planners | 2005-2008 | Kabul, Afghansitan |
| 27. | ALTAIR | Contribution of warships | 2004-2008 | Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea |
| 28. | UNIFY | Support before Hurricane Gustav | 2008 | New Orleans, U.S. |
| 29. | HORATIO | Humanitarian Assistance | 2008 | Republic of Haiti |
| 30. | LION | Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation | 2006 | Lebanon and Cyprus |

Source: Canada. Department of National Defence (DND), "Operations", Last accessed 11 June, 2017.
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations.page>

Public Affairs Branch Coaching-Mentoring Program.

While PAOs gain relevant experience in their career, the fact that they work independently makes it more difficult for them to receive adequate support. As a result of this and in order to ensure that PAOs benefit from the experience pillar, the PA Branch instituted a Coaching-Mentoring Program to follow through with its members and to ensure that no PAO develops in isolation. The *PA Branch Coaching-Mentoring program Directive* provides the following explanation:

Coaching-Mentoring is a leadership tool that provides benefits to the individual (i.e. mentee), the coach/mentor and the organization as a whole. The mentee who is coached and mentored will have an earlier socialization into the organization, increased self-confidence, a better feeling of belonging, and greater career satisfaction, which may, in turn, increase productivity. The coaches and mentors themselves develop leadership skills, foster a sense of pride in themselves and in others, and keep on the cutting edge of their career field ... [and] ... Contrary to regular members of a unit, PAOs can work in isolation from and with no regular contact with other PAOs. As a consequence the coaching-mentoring requirements for the PA Branch are unique and diverse and focus on the career progression, course requirements and skill set training to make PAOs as good as possible in that area.²⁷⁹

Senior PAOs have a unique responsibility either through face-to-face interaction or by the PA TechNet, in that as the occupational leaders for coaching-mentoring “they mentor people in apprenticeship positions and challenging assignments, and encourage and support subordinate participation in educational, professional, and personal-growth activities over the career span.”²⁸⁰ The PA Branch Coaching-Mentoring is represented by the vertical support as demonstrated in Figure 3.4

²⁷⁹ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, *Public Affairs Branch Coaching-Mentoring Program*, (Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 5.1, 2008), 3-4.

²⁸⁰ Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-PA-005-000/AP-004 ..., 50.




Figure 3.4 – Public Affairs Branch Coaching-Mentoring Support

Source: Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *PA Branch Coaching-Mentoring Program*. Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 5.1, 2008.

In line with developing future PAOs, “the Branch will focus on the four long-term development areas of the CF Coaching- Mentoring Program”²⁸¹ (refer to Table 3.10). Also, some of the specific goals of the Coaching-Mentoring Program that are pertinent to this research project have been identified in Table 3.11. Additionally, Table 3.12 highlights the fact that the roles of the Coach, Mentor and Mentee within the PA Branch Coaching-Mentoring Program focus on the overall PD of the member.

Table 3.10 – Four Long-Term Development Areas of the CF Coaching- Mentoring Program

| Ser. | Development Areas |
|------|--------------------------|
| 1. | Leadership development |
| 2. | Professional development |

²⁸¹ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, *Public Affairs Branch Coaching-Mentoring Program ...*, 6-7.

| | |
|----|----------------------|
| 3. | Career development |
| 4. | Personal development |

Source: Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *PA Branch Coaching-Mentoring Program*. Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 5.1, 2008.

Table 3.11 – Specific Goals of the Coaching-Mentoring Program

| Ser. | Goals of the Coaching-Mentoring Program |
|------|---|
| 1. | Contribute to the framework that guides the career development of the PAO |
| 2. | Develop competencies |
| 3. | Promote teamwork (which may include PA TechNet) |
| 4. | Increase leadership and managerial skills |

Source: Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *PA Branch Coaching-Mentoring Program*. Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 5.1, 2008.

Table 3.12 – Roles of the Coach, Mentor and Mentee within the PA Branch Coaching-Mentoring Program

| Ser. | A. Specific roles of the Coach |
|------|--|
| 1. | Plan and manage the leadership development of the mentee. |
| 2. | Plan and manage the professional development of the mentee. |
| 3. | Plan and manage the career development of the mentee. |
| 4. | Support the mentor in the planning and management of the personal development of the mentee. |
| | B. Specific roles of the Mentor |
| 1. | Plan and manage the personal development of the mentee |
| 2. | Support the planning and management of the leadership development of the mentee |
| 3. | Support the planning and management of the professional development of the mentee |
| 4. | Support the planning and management of the career development of the mentee |
| 5. | Challenge the mentee and stimulate learning |
| 6. | Act as a role model |
| | C. Specific roles of the Mentee |
| 1. | Set realistic and challenging goals |
| 2. | Commit to accept responsibility for personal growth and self-development |
| 3. | Dedicate to enhance leadership, professional, career, and personal competencies |
| 4. | Take an active role for development to occur |

Source: Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *PA Branch Coaching-Mentoring Program*. Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 5.1, 2008.

Public Affairs Branch Succession Planning.

The formal PAO Succession Planning (PAOSP) process supports and encompasses all of the items found within the four pillars of CFPDS including Branch

specific items like the Coaching-Mentoring programme. The PAOSP process is “specifically intended to ensure that PAOs are afforded appropriate developmental experiences throughout their entire careers. The intended result is that, not only will they be better prepared for increasingly challenging positions, but it will also make them more competitive for senior key appointments.”²⁸² While there are many challenges in having the right person in the right place, at the right time, the PA Branch acknowledges that it is vital to identify “all those Officers with the potential to succeed and to use specific levers (e.g. postings, shortened postings, courses and deployments) to develop, nurture and hone their skills (Figure 3.5 highlights succession planning considerations). This will also aid the Branch by ensuring that there are sufficient candidates from which to select Lieutenant-Colonels/Commanders and Colonels/Captain(Navy)’s.”²⁸³



Figure 3.5 – Succession Planning Considerations
The Self-Development Pillar: How Public Affairs Officers Conduct Self-Development Throughout the Five Developmental Periods.

While the CFPDS provides the structure by which all CAF Officers can plan out and accomplish their PD goals, it is not specific to any one occupation or element, but

²⁸² Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, *Public Affairs Officer Succession Planning Policy* (Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 4.1, 2009), 1.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*

rather an open-ended framework meant to be adjusted based on an individual's circumstances. As mentioned in Chapter Two, self-development is largely based on an individual's own time and personal motivation, and involves the remaining three pillars. In the book titled: *The Military Leadership Handbook*, Brent Beardsley provides a detailed description of the main factors that concern self-development:

Self-development is a critical requirement in all professions. As such, self-development is considered an individual responsibility to learn and to stay current with the PBK and skills above and beyond that, which is provided in the overall formal PD system [and] may take the form of education, training, or experience. Throughout a career, the military professional must take advantage of various postings, employment positions, activities, or any other opportunity that presents itself in which to conduct self-development.²⁸⁴

While the PA Branch has their own Coaching-Mentoring Programme and Succession Planning support, the de-centralization of its members and the fact that many are on their own without any direct PA support and guidance, has made it more difficult for many PAOs to focus their limited time on the 'right' self-development objectives. Currently the PA Branch PD for PAOs is dependent on two factors: the individual and the Scoring Criteria (SCRIT). Basically, there is no formal guidance/direction on self-development other than the SCRIT, meaning that it is not interconnected with a career progression, just a list that seems to make sense but not included with a strong framework and in line with LDF. It is more a tick in the box in line with getting promoted as opposed to real PD needs.

Summary.

²⁸⁴ Brent Beardsley, "Self-Development." in *The Military Leadership Handbook*, ed. Colonel Bernd Horn and Dr. Robert W. Walkler, 461-470 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2008).

PAOs are usually posted alone during DP 1 and DP 2, working independently without any or little support makes it more difficult for them to attain their PD goals, specifically as it relates to their self-development objectives. Likewise, senior PAOs have to juggle busy schedules and also manage subordinates, which equally limits their time for self-development (but this is no different than their peers experience in other occupations).

As a result of time constraints, PAOs will usually focus on the main PD objectives identified in the PA Branch SCRIT that will help them attain the next rank, therefore, most PAOs use the SCRIT to make their self-development decisions, and not necessarily base their decision on what they actually need in order to further develop any of their important skills or knowledge, or any specific professional deficiencies they may have. For these reasons, there is no connection between the self-development, education and training pillars in the development of PAOs, it is strictly based on what is in the SCRIT. The consequence of this is that the SCRIT is connected to the CF Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS) and not connected with the CFPDS for PAOs.

The Education Pillar: How Public Affairs Officers Attain Educational Objectives Throughout the Five Developmental Periods.

Education is the first pillar of the CFPDS and is vital to the effective functioning of any CAF Officer. In the context of the need for a university degree, the CAF recruiting website states that: “Officers in the Forces are required to think critically, develop

innovative solutions to problems and use their intellectual abilities to analyze, plan and make decisions.”²⁸⁵ The history of the CAF and operations in general have proven that Officers who can think critically, and who have an increased cognitive and intellectual capacity will be able to look at problems from a different perspective and be open to different types of solutions, resulting in greater probability that their decisions as leaders will lead to mission success.

As a PAO progresses throughout their career going from DP 1 to DP 5, the responsibilities increase substantially and the need to fully comprehend the ever-evolving IE is paramount to the relevancy of the PA Function and to the effectiveness of PAOs as the CAF professional military communicators. While the other three pillars are important to the development of a PAO, the education pillar and in particular higher education is essential to the effective functioning of a PAO at the senior level. When looking at Table 3.6, the only required education a PAO needs is their initial Baccalaureate Degree when they join the CAF during DP 1 as a Direct Entry Officer (DEO) or through RMCC, or during DP 2 through IBDP if they joined under a different entry program. There is no Branch supported PGEP (at the Master’s level) for PAOs at the senior level of their careers. Additionally, the Branch SCRIT awards points towards promotion to the next rank if a PAO has completed any type of Master’s Degree, regardless of the academic field of study – currently the requirement to complete a Master’s Degree is mainly for promotion purposes and not specifically to fill a void in line with CAF/PA Branch requirements. While PAOs can continue to develop in the other three pillars there is

²⁸⁵ Canada. Department of National Defence, “Frequently Asked Questions: ...”, <http://www.forces.ca/en/page/faq-220>

nothing from DP 3 to DP 5 that supports the increased educational needs for a PAO to operate at increasingly higher levels – this has resulted in an academic deficit in the education pillar for senior PAOs, hence the purpose of this research project.

The CFPDS defines education as “The provision of a base of knowledge and intellectual skills upon which information can be correctly interpreted and sound judgement exercised.”²⁸⁶ Table 3.6 shows that up to DP 3, PAOs receive and acquire the provision of knowledge and intellectual skill to critically think and perform the duties reflective of their rank and position, but once they are promoted to a senior position there is no further provision of knowledge and intellectual skills for them to be able to correctly interpret and make sound decisions with. Horn and Stouffer provide a compelling argument for the benefits of educating military professionals, and unquestionably applies to PAOs:

Education arms the warrior with the ability to deal with the ambiguity and complexity that our soldiers face in the battlespace of today and tomorrow. Beyond the practical there is also the intangible. That is to say, a greater breadth of knowledge, tolerance to alternate interpretations and ideas, a comfort with critical debate and discussion, the honing of analytical skills, as well as the exposure to completely new bodies of literature and thought that expand the mind just make the warrior that much more capable. General Petraeus pronounced, “The future of the U.S. military requires that we be competent warfighters, but we cannot be competent warfighters unless we are as intelligent and mentally tough as we are aggressive and physically rugged.” It is no different for the Canadian Forces.²⁸⁷

Summary.

²⁸⁶ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “DAOD 5031-8 ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-5000/5031-8.page>

²⁸⁷ Bernd Horn and Jeff Stouffer, *Educating the Leaders and Leading the Educated* ..., 15.

This section reviewed how PAOs professionally develop through the CFPDS four pillars from DP 1 to DP 5. It has shown how the PD of a PAO is limited as a result of the current PA Branch framework that is in place. From the lack of formal leadership training to a deficiency in occupational training after DP 1, at least until the APAOC begins to train PAOs in 2019. Notwithstanding this challenge, the PA Branch, with the introduction of the Coaching-Mentoring Programme and the Succession Planning process has instituted a framework by which to try and best support its members to gain from their experience. In terms of self-development, it was shown that currently PAOs mainly base their PD decisions on the PA Branch SCRIT, which is not the intent of the CFPDS. Also, as articulated above, the current development of PAOs as it pertains to the education pillar offers nothing for its Officers past DP 1, making it additionally difficult for senior PAOs to operate at higher level (see Figure 3.6). While these deficiencies in the PD of PAOs can be rectified with time and appropriate action, they currently compound the difficulty of a PAOs career progression.




Figure 3.6 – Current PAO PD Through the Four Pillars during the 5 DPs

The Career Progression of Public Affairs Officers.

Notwithstanding the valiant efforts made by the PA Branch to support its members career progression through Branch Directives and efforts like the Mentoring-Coaching Programme and the Succession Planning process, the PAO career progression is not well established. While the PAO JBOS provides a recommended career pattern, it is ambiguous and not clearly defined. It states:

RegF PAOs' first tour following BOQ will preferably be in an entry-level PA Advisor position at base, wing or mid-level HQ. This will provide practical experience for the second tour, in which RegF PAOs will likely be employed in an independent position. Subsequent tours for Captains/Lieutenant(Navy's) and Majors/Lieutenant-Commanders provide a greater range of employment options and specialty training to broaden their experience and to improve their leadership and management skills. Lieutenant-Colonels/Commanders and some Majors/Lieutenant-

Commanders are employed in Senior PAO and specialty positions. Colonels/Captain(Navy)'s are solely employed as Senior PAOs.²⁸⁸

Due to the fact that PAOs are one ofs, they do not have a clear career path or pattern. In most cases, PAOs have many different career paths that are difficult to plan for. The limited number of PAOs required to fill individual increasingly more positions domestically while supporting operational needs and continuous joint and multi-national exercises creates a resource problem and makes it extremely difficult to have the right person, in the right position at the right time.

CFPDS Policy Framework: How it Applies to the Government of Canada Communications Policy and the Role of Public Affairs Officers

PAOs need to be developed and employ the 18 PA Functions in line with both the GoC Communications Policy and the DND/CAF communications policies. The CFPDS Policy Framework as described in Chapter Two, highlights the important role that the different DND/CAF “Orders, Policies and Instructions which govern the CFPDS” play in ensuring that all the vital components of the CFPDS are in line with the requirements of the institution and equally support the member. Being in the ‘business’ of communications, how the CFPDS Policy Framework applies to the GoC communications policy and the role of the PAO is vital to the PA Function, and translates into PAOs being

²⁸⁸ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-055-002/PP-001, *Canadian Forces Manual of Military Occupational Structure: Job Based Occupational Specification for the Public Affairs Officer Occupation* ..., 2-30.

able to provide their Chain-of-Command with effective communications guidance and the public with accurate and timely information as it relates to CAF activities.

Making the connection between the different communications policies and how they work together is important. First, PAOs need to understand that *Canada's Policy on Communications and Federal Identity* and “its supporting instruments apply to departments.”²⁸⁹ So what is inherent in Canada’s communications policy directly relates to DND/CAF, Canada’s communications policy further states that: “Communications are central to the GoC’s work and contribute directly to the Canadian public’s trust in their government. “The government also has a responsibility to communicate with Canadians to help protect their interests and well-being.”²⁹⁰ In line with Canada’s Communications policy requirements, the DND/CAF aligned its policy as seen through *DAOD 2008-0 PA Policy*, which states:

Public support for the CAF and DND follows from public understanding of how the CF and DND make a difference at home and abroad. Public confidence, in turn, is enhanced by the ability of the CAF and DND to achieve its mandate in a manner that is open, transparent, and consistent with Canadian values and expectations. The intent of the PA policy is to ensure that Canadians are well-informed and aware of the role, mandate, operations and contributions of the CAF and DND [while respecting privacy and operational security] ... While these restrictions place legal limits on the ability of the CAF and DND to live up to demands for complete openness, every effort should be made to be as open and transparent as possible within the law. Regardless of rank or level, CF members and DND employees are accountable to their Chain-of-

²⁸⁹ Canada. “Policy on Communications and Federal Identity,” last accessed 30 April, 2017, <https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=30683>

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

Command for the accuracy and currency of the information they make available to the public.²⁹¹

Notwithstanding the unique role of the PAO, seeing that PA is a command responsibility, all members of the CAF are responsible to share information in accordance with the applicable policies. *DAOD 2008-1, Accountability and Responsibility for PA* states that:

To make the PA policy work as intended in practice, it is imperative that all CAF members and DND employees understand their PA roles and responsibilities. CAF members and DND employees are responsible for ensuring that any information that they make available to the public is up-to-date, released within the law, and respectful of the principle of operational security.²⁹²

This further reinforces the point that the CAF PA policy is indeed “consistent with the federal government’s communications policy.”²⁹³ As a result, the PA Branch ensured that its PA expertise as represented by the 18 PA Functions were established in line with the government’s and the DND/CAF communications policies and the other various Acts, Regulations, Orders and Directives, refer to Table 3.13. Additionally, the 18 PA Functions were further divided into four different sections (Know Public Environment, Advice, Communicate and Manage), representing the different communications activities.

²⁹¹ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “DAOD 2008-0, Public Affairs Policy ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-2000/2008-0.page>

²⁹² Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “DAOD 2008-1, Accountability and Responsibility for Public Affairs,” last accessed 29 April, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-2000/2008-1.page>

²⁹³ Department of National Defence. A-AD-207-001/AG-000 ..., 4.

Table 3.13 – Acts, Regulations, Orders, Policies and Directives Applicable to PAOs and PA Policy

| | |
|---|--|
| 1. National Defence Act | 11. QR&O 19.14, Improper Comments |
| 2. Official Languages Act | 12. QR&O 19.36, Disclosure of Information or Opinion |
| 3. Access to Information Act | 13. QR&O 24.02, Press Releases Regarding Casualties |
| 4. Privacy Act | 14. DAOD 2008-1, <i>Public Affairs Accountabilities and Responsibilities</i> |
| 5. Copyright Act | 15. DAOD 2008-2, <i>Media Relations and Public Announcements</i> |
| 6. Official Secrets Act | 16. DAOD 2008-3, <i>Issue and Crisis Management</i> |
| 7. Canada Evidence Act | 17. DAOD 2008-4, <i>Public Affairs, Military Doctrine, and CF Operations</i> |
| 8. Financial Administration Act | 18. DAOD 2008-5, <i>Public Affairs Planning and Program Delivery</i> |
| 9. Government Communications Policy | 19. DAOD 2008-6, <i>Internet Publishing</i> |
| 10. DND and CF Security Orders and Directives | 20. DAOD 5039-0, <i>Official Languages</i> |

Source: Canada. Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces. “DAOD 2008-0, Public Affairs Policy.” Last accessed 29 April, 2017.
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-2000/2008-0.page>

Note: This is not an exhaustive list, there may be additional requirements.

Summary

This chapter has provided a synopsis of the development of CAF PAOs based on the CFPDS, and as a result it has also highlighted the various components that need to be addressed in order to ensure that the PD needs of PAOs are met. Beginning with the history of the PA Function and the first PAOs, it is evident that the contribution provided by CAF military communicators across Canada and around the globe in service to their nation has become an invaluable component of CAF operations.

The PA Function, due to its unique and specialized role has had to periodically re-assess how it can best meet its present-day requirements while ensuring its relevancy into the future in line with evolving threats and the rapid changes in communications technology. As a result, the PA Branch recently instituted a Strategic Intent through which it established the 18 PA Functions in support of its requirement to provide Commanders with four PA capabilities. Additionally, in line with the operationalization of the PA Function, DGPA is looking into how future PAOs will be increasingly part of the Commander's decision process. While this would directly augment the War Fighting skills a PAO currently provides, there is little doubt that past operations have shown that a PAOs contribution prior to and during operations have been vital.

In order to maintain and build upon previous gains made by the PA Branch, its members have to be adequately developed. Although PAOs receive initial leadership training through BMOQ and BPAOC, and later on through JCSP (if selected), it is insufficient. The fact that there is no current framework or model initiated by the PA Branch, PAOs depend on the CAF leadership development model to gain their leadership skills. Other than that, PAOs have to rely on their experience and self-development pillars to develop their leadership qualities. This current deficiency is yet another reason that supports looking into offering senior PAOs the opportunity to do a post-graduate degree that is supported by the PA Branch. While a PAO's occupational training is sufficient at the junior rank level, the lack of an advanced occupational course for more senior Officers directly affects their ability to develop their skills as they progress in their careers.

While PAOs have many opportunities from which to gain invaluable experience, they are usually posted independently from other PAOs. In order to ensure that they do not develop in isolation the PA Branch initiated the Coaching-Mentoring Programme and the Succession Planning process. For the self-development pillar, it was shown that generally PAOs base their PD decisions on the PA Branch SCRIT, their decisions are made primarily on what will get them promoted as opposed to where the individual needs to develop. The final pillar, education, does not contribute anything to the PD of a PAO, because there is nothing currently or formally available. Because the PA Branch does not have a PGEP in place, this academic deficit affects the PD needs of senior PAOs.

These points collectively support the argument that the PD of a PAO is limited as a result of the current PA Branch framework in place. There is no formal PD framework within the PA Branch, this may be due, in part, to the fact that the professionalization of the PA Branch / PA Function has not matured or evolved when compared to other military occupations (i.e. Infantry). As a result, in order for a PAO to expand his/her PA professional capabilities, they can only rely on the three existing pillars: training, experience and self-development. For the PA Branch, its lack of PD framework has resulted in the four pillars not being connected or working together in support of the PD needs of CAF PAOs.

CHAPTER FOUR

DESCRIBING THE PROFESSIONAL CAPABILITIES OF CANADIAN ARMED FORCES PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS

*Because terrorism requires an open flow of information, Western-style republics need to be able to respond offensively—even preemptively—with their own convincing ideas.*²⁹⁴

– John David, *Taking the Offensive*, 2015

Private organizations largely succeed based on their ability to focus their capabilities (i.e. sales, pricing, customer service, product development and design, etc.) in the most effective way. Likewise, for the DND/CAF: “a fundamental part of military power is the procurement of the best and most effective equipment that can be afforded, the aim being to maintain a technological advantage that represents a war-winning capability over adversaries.”²⁹⁵ These examples clearly highlight the vital importance that capabilities have in terms of an organization’s success and relevancy. For PAOs, their ability to effectively perform their role in any type of environment depends largely on their professional capabilities, and the requirement to periodically develop those professional capabilities. If capabilities, or the manner in which they are employed are not routinely reviewed and modernized, or revised from time-to-time, they can become stagnant, ineffective, or worse yet, counterproductive.

For these reasons, this chapter will describe the professional capabilities employed by CAF PAOs in the function of their responsibilities, as represented by the 18 PA Functions. This chapter will provide a general overview of the four PA capabilities

²⁹⁴ Public Diplomacy Council, “Quotable: John David on John Davis ‘Taking the Offensive’,” last accessed 3 May, 2017, <http://www.publicdiplomacycouncil.org/topics/g-john-david>

²⁹⁵ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001 ..., 2-9.

provided to a Commander and also identify the 18 PA Gaps that may exist at some level throughout a PAOs career progression/PD. The last section of this chapter will look at the future challenges and strategic considerations for PAOs, specifically as it relates to the changing operational environment and the increased importance of StratCom and the institutional requirement to maintain a PAOs professional capabilities through the skills and knowledge gained from Corporate Strategic Communications related education. By better understanding these elements and how they are interconnected, the easier it will be to interpret the survey results (Chapter Five), identify deficiencies and recognize which PGEP(s) best address the PA Gaps (Chapter Six), specifically as it relates to the academic deficit in PA education for senior PAOs.

The 18 Public Affairs Functions and How They Operate for Public Affairs Officers

According to *PA Branch Directive 1.2: Strategic Intent*, there are 18 PA Functions providing a professional framework that guide PA support. They are split up into four groups: Know Public Environment, Advice, Communicate and Manage, (see Table 4.1). While all PAOs are initially trained on these 18 Functions, not all PAOs will work in an environment where they will need to perform certain functions, and no PAO will employ all of the 18 PA Functions at the same time, or during a specific posting. But even if a PAO has not worked in an environment or position that requires a specific PA Function (i.e. Exhibits and Displays) for an extended period of time, they should be able to employ a basic level of skills and knowledge if they are required to do so.

Table 4.1: 18 Public Affairs Functions

| Ser. | 18 Public Affairs Functions |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| I. Know Public Environment | |
| 1. | Environment and Media Analysis |
| II. Advice | |
| 2. | Public Affairs Advice |
| 3. | Partnering, Collaborative Arrangements, Sponsorship, Liaison and Coordination with Commands/ECS, MND, PCO and OGDs |
| III. Communicate | |
| 4. | Media Relations |
| 5. | Internal Communications |
| 6. | Internet and Electronic Communications |
| 7. | Crisis and Emergency Communications |
| 8. | Community Outreach |
| 9. | Exhibitions and Displays |
| 10. | Public Affairs Support to Operations |
| 11. | Marketing |
| 12. | Recruitment & Advertising |
| 13. | Production and Services – Publishing/Creative Services |
| 14. | Imagery |
| 15. | Events and Announcements |
| IV. Manage | |
| 16. | Public Affairs Planning |
| 17. | Public Affairs Training |
| 18. | Evaluation |

Source: Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *PA Branch Strategic Intent*. Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 1.2, 2008.

First Group of Public Affairs Functions: Know Public Environment

The first group of the 18 PA Functions titled *Know the Public Environment*, incorporates the first PA Function – *Environment and Media Analysis*. It is first because a PAO cannot perform his/her duties unless they understand the environment in which they operate, specifically as it pertains to the views and opinions of the public, DND/CAF stakeholders and others.

Prior to looking at how PAOs acquire (contribute to) and perform *Environment and Media Analysis*, it is important to know the target audience in order to focus institutional resources. The PA Branch identifies seven standardized tasks and responsibilities for a PAO to execute in support of this PA Function. In other words, these are areas in which PAOs should focus their efforts to better understand the public environment (see Table 4.2).

Table 4.2 – Standardized Tasks and Responsibilities of a PAO to Execute in support of Knowing the Public Environment

| PA Function – Know/Understanding Public Environment | |
|---|---|
| Ser. | Standardized tasks and responsibilities of a PAO to execute and to support this PA Function |
| 1. | Political Environment |
| 2. | Public Opinion |
| 3. | Third Party's Opinion |
| 4. | Commander's Intent |
| 5. | Media coverage |
| 6. | Internal Rumors |
| 7. | Own organization's mission |

Source: Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *Public Affairs Branch Coaching-Mentoring Program*. Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 5.1, 2008.

First Public Affairs Function: Environment and Media Analysis.

Effective PA advice and guidance is largely dependent upon being thorough, contextual and relevant. For these reasons media and public environment analysis is crucial. Vital information is gathered through these efforts and is an important part of a PAO's occupational specification. The PAO JBOS states that:

The PAO must competently analyse and interpret DND and CF policies and regulations to provide PA advice and recommendations. PAOs must be capable of assessing the public environment and the media to develop PA actions and products in response to or in advance of events.

This requires the ability to quickly understand and effectively manage complex information dealing with a wide range of subjects, often under prohibitive time restraints, high stress, and minimum supervision.²⁹⁶

Identifying, consolidating, processing and disseminating a plethora of information is a major undertaking, and PAOs are directly supported by Director Strategic Communications Planning, Research & Analysis (DSCPRA). This is the DND/CAF central media monitoring and analysis hub where its products inform PAOs about current news and issues being covered by social media and traditional news sources. A key component of DSCPRA is the Public Environment Analysis and Research Services (PEARS) unit, which is part of Assistant Deputy Minister PA (ADM(PA)) and is composed of three sections: Public Inquiries, Media Analysis, and Media Monitoring.²⁹⁷ By incorporating the information gained through this PA Function, a PAO is better prepared to provide timely and relevant advice.

Second Group of Public Affairs Functions: Advice

The second group of the 18 PA Functions is comprised of two PA Functions, *PA Advice* and *Partnering, Collaborative, Arrangements, Sponsorship, Liaison and Coordination with the different Commands and Environmental Commands (RCN, CA and RCAF), MND, Privy Council Office (PCO) and OGDs*. Similar to the first PA Function, the PA Branch identifies six standardized tasks and responsibilities of a PAO to execute

²⁹⁶ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-055-002/PP-001, *Canadian Forces Manual of Military Occupational Structure: Job Based Occupational Specification for the Public Affairs Officer Occupation* ..., 1-5.

²⁹⁷ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Director Strategic Communications Planning, Research and Analysis – Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs),” last accessed 28 April, 2017, <http://veritas.mil.ca/org/dgpasp-dgpsap/dsepar-dcspra/index-eng.asp>

in support of these two PA Functions (see Table 4.3). These six main tasks and responsibilities comprise the main ‘clients’ that a PAO will provide advice to. Of specific importance to this research project is the fact that there are many strategic, institutional and political ‘clients’ that PAOs will have to be able to provide advice to fairly early in their careers once qualified.

Table 4.3 – Standardized Tasks and Responsibilities of a PAO to Execute in support of Providing PA Advice

| PA Function - Provide PA Advice | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| Ser. | Standardized tasks and responsibilities of a PAO to execute and to support this PA Function |
| 1. | MND office |
| 2. | Chain-of-command |
| 3. | Subject Matter Expert (SME) and spokespersons |
| 4. | Defence Critics |
| 5. | Other Governmental Departments (OGDs) |
| 6. | Internal PA Community |

Source: Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *PA Branch Coaching-Mentoring Program*. Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 5.1, 2008.

Second Public Affairs Function: PA Advice.

The capacity for PAOs to provide competent advice and guidance in a manner that will contribute to the overall mission or mandate is the cornerstone of their function, whether deployed or not, and in any environment. As a PAO develops throughout his/her career, they will be responsible for providing PA advice that ranges from the tactical level up to strategic, institutional and political levels. While junior PAOs may at times be required to operate at the highest levels, senior PAOs will almost invariably be required to operate at the institutional level. The PAO JBOS provides the following explanation differentiating the roles of PAOs based on rank:

PA Advisor: this is the core PAO job. It encompasses a broad group of PAOs (Lieutenant/Sub-Lieutenant to Major/Lieutenant-Commander) employed at base, formation and command levels, as well as those employed on foreign deployments. These members advise Commanders on all PA matters. They are also the conduit between the military organisation they represent and the media/public. Consequently, they interact extensively with the media, providing information to the public, journalists, subject matter experts and members of various organisations. They also monitor, review and analyse their public environment, anticipating public/media interest and coverage. They will occasionally coordinate photo shoots, write captions, and disseminate images. They will have varying degrees of involvement in PA planning, operations, briefings, visits, requests for information and crisis communications. They will produce external and internal communications products. Entry-level PAOs will be employed in this job under direct or indirect supervision ... [and] ... Senior PAO: This senior level job will be performed by Major/Lieutenant-Commander to Colonel/Captain(Navy) [now Brigadier-General]. They will generally be located in operational and strategic level HQs and Commands – including domestic and international operations. These senior Officers will provide PA advice and guidance to the senior leadership of the CF and DND. These members will review and approve the development of PA plans and policies, contingency and crisis operations, as well as the production and delivery of communications products. They will lead and mentor subordinate PA staff. They will also be responsible for the effective management of personnel and financial resources at the Command and national HQ levels.²⁹⁸

The additional responsibilities placed on senior level PAOs, in terms of the requirement for them to operate at much higher levels of the institution in terms of their rank when compared with other military occupations, highlights the importance of the CFPDS in their ability to operate at these levels.

²⁹⁸ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-055-002/PP-001, *Canadian Forces Manual of Military Occupational Structure: Job Based Occupational Specification for the Public Affairs Officer Occupation* ..., 2-3.

Third Public Affairs Function: Partnering, Collaborative, Arrangements, Sponsorship, Liaison and Coordination with Commands/ECS, MND, PCO and OGDs.

This PA Function deals with the need to liaise and coordinate with the highest levels of CAF command, the office of the MND and other OGDs. While senior PAOs have the responsibility to advise the Environmental Commanders (RCN, CA and RCAF including CJOC), all other liaison at this level is coordinated through the Command Liaison section. Under the leadership of the Director of PA Operations:

The Command Liaison section is a vital PA interface between Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) PA and the Environmental Chief of Staffs (ECSs), operational commands and OGDs and central agencies. The senior Command Liaison PA (CLPA) Officer and a staff of Officers have, as their primary task, the responsibility to manage and coordinate the PA flow of information for strategic, tactical and daily issues. It is intended as the central communications interface for all internal DND/CF formations, organizations and agencies and external offices such as PCO and OGDs.²⁹⁹

Whether it is dealing with a national news story that needs immediate attention due to the institutional implications, or preparing a General or Flag Officer for an upcoming presentation with the Standing Senate Committee on National Defence, the implications are far-reaching and requires senior PAOs entrusted with these responsibilities to understand the gravity of their guidance and advice.

²⁹⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, "Directorate Public Affairs Operations – Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs)," last accessed 28 April, 2017, <http://veritas.mil.ca/ab-ap/index-eng.asp>

Third Group of Public Affairs Functions: Communicate

The third group of the 18 PA Functions (see Table 4.1), is to *Communicate*, and it encompasses the bulk of the PA Functions – from *Media Relations* to *Events and Announcements*, for a total of 12 functions. The ability to communicate the CAF story is done through the employment of these 12 functions. Like the first two groups, the PA Branch has identified four standardized tasks and responsibilities of a PAO to execute in support of the ability to Communicate (see Table 4.4).

Table 4.4 – Standardized Tasks and Responsibilities of a PAO to Execute in Support of Communicating

| PA Function - Communicate | |
|---------------------------|---|
| Ser. | Standardized tasks and responsibilities of a PAO to execute and to support this PA Function |
| 1. | Through various channels: (a) Face to face; (b) Print; (c) Media; and (d) Web. |
| 2. | Various purposes: (a) Promotional; (b) Responsive; (c) Crisis management; and (d) Informative |
| 3. | At various levels: (a) External; (b) Internal; (c) Cross-departmental; and (d) OGDs. |
| 4. | Themes and messages |

Source: Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *PA Branch Coaching-Mentoring Program*. Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 5.1, 2008.

Fourth Public Affairs Function: Media Relations.

Perhaps the most synonymous role associated with PA, is that of media relations. While PAOs continue to field queries from traditional media sources, the media landscape has changed drastically since the 1980s. Where the focus before was on national news networks, today, social media and the growth of many online-based news organizations have changed the media landscape. *DAOD 2008-2 Media Relations and Public Announcements* defines media relations as: “all activities related to developing and maintaining effective communications with representatives of the media.”³⁰⁰ Although this is primarily managed by PAOs, “PA, including media relations, is a responsibility of the CF and DND Chain-of-Command.”³⁰¹ As a result, “an important component of the media relations function is the provision of spokespersons,”³⁰² which directly involves spokesperson training provided by PAOs. The relationship fostered between PAOs and the media is:

... multi-faceted. Information is released into the public domain through a variety of means – via Defence PA products, responses to media queries, Government responses in Question Period, ATI requests, media and stakeholder briefings, embedded media in operations, and leaks – to name just a few. All contribute to the shaping of media coverage.³⁰³

³⁰⁰ Canada. Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces. “DAOD 2008-2 ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-2000/2008-2.page>

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*

³⁰² Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-055-002/PP-001, *Canadian Forces Manual of Military Occupational Structure: Job Based Occupational Specification for the Public Affairs Officer Occupation* ..., 1-3.

³⁰³ Canada. Department of National Defence, *DND and CAF Public Affairs Strategy 2017* (Ottawa: Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs), 2017), 25.

The importance of also communicating with Canadians through the media is crucial to informing them of what the CAF are doing and why. A population that is not informed about what its military is doing on its behalf, is less inclined to support expensive procurement purchases or to approve of additional benefits for its personnel. It is vital to the relevancy of the CAF that its population understands the value of their military, in particular as it relates to their willingness to deploy in harm's way on their behalf. *CF Joint PA Doctrine* states that:

Experience has shown that the presence of journalists can have a profound effect on a mission. Commanders and their staffs must be cognizant of the need to maintain a positive relationship with the media and to foster a spirit of co-operation that is consistent with operational security and mission objectives. The availability of accurate and timely information during an operation will be a prime concern for the media, therefore, as much information as possible will be disclosed during a mission commensurate with DAODs and the security requirements of that operation.³⁰⁴

Fifth Public Affairs Function: Internal Communications.

Equally important, is the ability of the CAF to communicate directly with its own members, whether in Canada, posted overseas or while on operations about “CAF policies, programs, services, operations, activities, issues, and initiatives through major internal PA materials such as the Intranet, bulletins, newsletters, the Defence Information Network (DIN), *The Maple Leaf*,”³⁰⁵ as well as through multimedia and social media. CAF PAOs have a vital role to play in ensuring that internal communications efforts are effective, and for this to happen, “internal communications must be embedded into our

³⁰⁴ Canada. Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-361/FP-000 ..., 2-4.

³⁰⁵ Department of National Defence. A-AD-207-001/AG-000 ..., 25.

chains of command, fully integrating PA into the decision-making process for policy development, program design, service delivery, and military doctrine and operations.”³⁰⁶

Internal communications are used to inform the “core internal audiences ... (serving military members including those ill and injured)”, as well as the “extended internal audiences (veterans, senior leadership, families [and the] public service).”³⁰⁷ Refer to Figure 4.1 for DND/CAF target audiences.




Figure 4.1 – DND/CAF Target Audiences: A Migration of Information

Source: Canada. Department of National Defence. *DND and CAF Public Affairs Strategy 2017*. Ottawa: Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs), 2017.

Sixth Public Affairs Function: Internet and Electronic Communications.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁷ Canada. Department of National Defence, *DND and CAF Public Affairs Strategy 2017 ...*, 11.

In today's communications environment where technological advances have allowed organizations and private citizens to share information at blistering speeds, the CAF have also adopted this mode of communicating its message, specifically, "Internet publishing encompasses all activities related to preparing and distributing information about a policy, program, service, operation, activity, or initiative using Internet technologies such as the World Wide Web."³⁰⁸ By being able to release information almost instantly (pending approval), PAOs provide their Commanders with the ability to shape the information battle space while informing Canadians. PAOs and their staff play an integral part in ensuring that any information released through online communications services has been approved and comply with the requisite orders, policies, regulations and directives.

Seventh Public Affairs Function: Crisis and Emergency Communications.

Inherent in a crisis is the fact that there is rarely advance warning (i.e. CF-18 crash). When this happens PAOs have to be prepared to instinctively use their skills to get certain key duties and tasks completed (i.e. coordinate news release, prepare a news conference, media calls, etc.). During more complex crises over an extended period of time (i.e. the 1998 Ice Storm), a PAOs experience and knowledge, specifically their ability to think critically and to perform independently during prolonged stressful conditions makes a huge difference, for "how we handle the crisis contributes directly to

³⁰⁸ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, "DAOD 2008-6, Internet Publishing," last accessed 24 Apr, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-2000/2008-6.page>

the public's perception of our capabilities and professionalism."³⁰⁹ For PAOs, the coordination of information and confirmation of facts is vital to informing the public on what the DND/CAF are doing in response to the crisis. Although the media will want information instantly, facts can only be released once confirmed by the Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and approved for dissemination within the context that "operational security and protection of personal information under the *Privacy Act* shall be maintained at all times."³¹⁰

As a recent example in May 2017, the CAF deployed more than 400 personnel to assist civilian authorities with floods in Québec.³¹¹ The vital importance of informing the public and responding to media queries, as well as coordinating interviews with senior Commanders, the PAOs involved in this process have a vital responsibility to manage the communications aspect of the crisis by ensuring that accurate and timely information is shared.

Eighth Public Affairs Function: Community Outreach.

³⁰⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, "DAOD 2008-3, Issue and Crisis Management," last accessed 28 Apr, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-2000/2008-3.page>

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹¹ Canada. Department of National Defence, "Canadian Armed Forces deploy to assist civilian authorities with the management of flooded areas in Quebec," last accessed 7 Jun, 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2017/05/canadian_armed_forcesdeploystoassistcivilianauthoritieswiththema.html

The Directorate of External Communications and PR (DECPR) “functions as the strategic PR arm of DND/CAF delivering consistent messaging in support of GoC and Defence priorities.”³¹² Through DECPR, the CAF have an extensive community outreach and external relations program that spans the country where PAOs continuously engage the community through various outreach initiatives. The five Regional National Defence PA Offices (NDPAO), their activities and primary target groups are found in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5 – Regional DECPR Offices and Activities

| Ser. | Regional DECPR Offices | DECPR Activities (employed by all offices) | Primary Target Groups (for all DECPR offices) |
|------|--|--|---|
| 1. | DECPR HQ in Ottawa | Managing stakeholder relations across Canada | Elected officials |
| 2. | NDPAO Atlantic in Halifax | Organizing speaking opportunities for CF/DND personnel | Academics and educational institutions |
| 3. | NDPAO Québec in Montréal | Organizing Roundtables and Editorial Boards | The media |
| 4. | NDPAO Ontario in Toronto | Coordinating activities in collaboration with our partners | Business leaders |
| 5. | NDPAO Prairies and Northern Area in Calgary (satellite office in Winnipeg) | Coordinating Familiarization Visits | Law-enforcement agencies |
| 6. | NDPAO Pacific and Yukon in Vancouver | Coordinating visibility events for CF recognition | Special-interest groups and industry stakeholders |

Source: Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Director External Communications & Public Relations – Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs).” Last accessed 28 April, 2017. <http://veritas.mil.ca/org/dgpasp-dgpsap/decpr-dcerp/index-eng.asp>

By undertaking the outreach activities identified in Table 4.5 across Canada, PAOs perform a vital role for the CAF in that they keep a “finger on the public pulse by

³¹² Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Director External Communications & Public Relations – Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs),” last accessed 28 April, 2017, <http://veritas.mil.ca/org/dgpasp-dgpsap/decpr-dcerp/index-eng.asp>

tracking issues, events, and opportunities; identifying potential outreach events and opportunities; arranging high-value public engagements for specialist briefing teams and subject-matter experts; producing and distributing outreach support material.”³¹³

Ninth Public Affairs Function: Exhibitions and Displays.

Exhibits and displays are an integral part of connecting with Canadians across the country. CBFs play a pivotal role by staging open-house events like CAF Day and signature events (like the CA Run). The public-oriented use of exhibits and displays “support specific departmental communications objectives, and often come with print and video material dealing with the more detailed aspects of departmental policies, programs, or activities.”³¹⁴ PAOs at the regional DECPR offices also coordinate the use of exhibits and displays in support of their outreach efforts when required. While exhibits and displays are a great way of showing the public some of the equipment used in the CAF, it is also used and directly benefits recruiting efforts across the country, especially in areas where there is a negligible military footprint.

Tenth Public Affairs Function: PA Support to Operations.

³¹³ Department of National Defence. A-AD-207-001/AG-000 ..., 17.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 23-24.

During CAF operations, the demands for information from the media, elected officials, families, the general population, industry stakeholders and academia increases substantially. PAOs have to be prepared to pro-actively manage the influx of interest from two spheres. The first sphere is national and it “concerns the demand for information related to the Government's decision to deploy the CAF and the nature of the CAF's mandate for the operation. The second is operational, and it concerns the demand for information regarding the structure, people and activities of deployed forces.”³¹⁵ PAOs must be capable of managing the demand for information while continuing to provide PA support to the Commander as it relates to de-conflicting the IE with other key players and continuing to being “fully integrated into operational planning, decision making and implementation of CAF activities,”³¹⁶ as it relates to the operation.

In order for a PAO to continue to deliver in this challenging environment, and to continue to provide the public with information that is “accurate, complete, timely and respectful of the principles of openness, transparency and operational security. This requires the effective integration of PA into all aspects of military operations, from doctrine to the execution and coordination of PA in theatre during operations.”³¹⁷ In line with a PAO's contribution during operations, the *CF Joint PA Doctrine Manual* highlights the fact that “The capabilities of the PA Function constitute a force multiplier in a deployed operation because it has the potential of lessening tensions by providing

³¹⁵ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “DAOD 2008-4, Public Affairs, Military Doctrine and Canadian Forces Operations,” last accessed 29 April, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-2000/2008-4.page>

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*

accurate and timely information to local audiences about the roles, tasks and activities of the deployed force.”³¹⁸

While PAOs play a vital role during operations, their contribution and support to operations is also made from PAOs back in Canada (alongside the important contribution made by DND IS personnel). Collectively, PA organizations across DND/CAF:

Provided PA support to more than 26 military operations – ranging from Canada’s participation in the Global Coalition Against Daesh through Operation (Op) IMPACT to drug interceptions in the Caribbean and support to the province of Alberta during the devastating fires in Fort McMurray.³¹⁹

Eleventh Public Affairs Function: Marketing.

PAOs are not directly responsible for developing major CAF marketing campaigns, however, as part of ADM(PA’s) marketing team they do participate and contribute to the institutional exhibits, posters and other promotional efforts.³²⁰ At a unit level, PAOs may have more leeway to design and produce displays and other marketing products in an effort to inform a select audience on a specific CAF capability or another issue. In the execution of these duties, PAOs “will liaise extensively with the Department’s creative services, imagery, and public environment analysis sections.”³²¹

³¹⁸ Canada. Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-361/FP-000 ..., 4-2.

³¹⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence, *DND and CAF Public Affairs Strategy 2017* ..., 7.

³²⁰ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-055-002/PP-001, *Canadian Forces Manual of Military Occupational Structure: Job Based Occupational Specification for the Public Affairs Officer Occupation* ..., 1-3.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, 2-27.

These are all marketing efforts to ensure the continued visibility of the institution as an employer of choice and its relevancy in the eyes of the public.

Twelfth Public Affairs Function: Recruitment & Advertising.

Similar to using marketing efforts to communicate a specific message, PAOs also communicate through recruitment and advertising efforts. In addition to supporting recruitment and advertising efforts from coast-to-coast through CFBs, PAOs are also a vital part of CFRG. In addition to the traditional recruiting initiatives (i.e. recruitment office, pamphlets, etc.), PAOs at CFRG are responsible for the CAF social media attraction and recruitment efforts. The PA team at CFRG provided the following details regarding CAF recruiting efforts:

Web and social media occupy an increasingly prominent presence in the lives of millennials, CFRG's target recruitment demographic. Whereas CFRG could previously rely solely on conventional marketing and physical attractions resources, current prospective members assess the CAF's employment brand and various opportunities within virtual spaces. In order to position the CAF as a relevant, competitive, and attractive employer, CFRG employs various social media recruitment efforts to reach, engage and attract its target demographic. Their common objective is to not only inform prospects about specific opportunities, but also to leverage media-rich content to enfranchise them into the CAF's larger employment brand and inspire them to join. These efforts complement CFRG's conventional attraction efforts in order to fulfill its strategic intake plan and achieve its mission.³²²

Thirteenth Public Affairs Function: Production and Services – Publishing/Creative Services.

³²² Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, *Summary of CFRG's Social Media Recruitment Efforts* (Borden: Canadian Forces Recruiting Group Briefing Note for CMPC 5671-1 (R3 Virtual Recruitment O), 2017), 1.

In line with *DAOD 2008-5, PA Planning and Program Delivery*, when there are official requests to support production companies and various other services in the creation of a new recruiting video, or a Canadian war film (i.e Passchendaele in 2008), PAOs will support the process by providing “PA support to the film industry.”³²³ This comes in the form of assisting other DND/CAF officials during the review and approval process, as well as assisting in the coordination of certain requirements on the ground. As for publishing and creative services, PAOs are part of teams that: “prepare, produce and distribute audio-visual and multi-media production, as well as corporate identity and publishing.”³²⁴

Fourteenth Public Affairs Function: Imagery.

Perhaps one of the most effective methods by which the CAF communicate with the public, is through the use of high-definition imagery - still photographs and broadcast quality video. While PAOs oversee imagery units across the CAF and within the Environmental commands, the most effective imagery capability within the military is CFCC through the deployment of Combat Camera Teams (CCT). CFCC is a strategic PA resource that provides “imagery support for joint international and domestic operations and exercises. CCTs utilize the latest in computerized satellite communications and digital photo/videographic technology [in order to collect] still and video imagery for

³²³ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “DAOD 2008-5, Public Affairs Planning and Program Delivery,” last accessed 29 April, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-2000/2008-5.page>

³²⁴ *Ibid.*

internal and external uses.”³²⁵ CFCC is a force enabler in that it “maintains a virtual window for Canadians to witness the operations of their military around the world,”³²⁶ and for deployed Commanders to also be able to showcase the advancement of humanitarian and development projects. A senior PAO is responsible for overseeing all CFCC operations, while junior PAOs deploy with every CCT. PAO JBOS outlines the responsibilities of a CFCC PAO as being:

.... responsible to provide PA audio-visual products to internal and external audiences. They will direct the work of Imagery Technicians (including qualified Combat Camera Operators) in the production and dissemination of PA audio-visual products. They will work mainly with the forward elements of the mobilised force providing audio-visual products that normally could not be captured by other media. As well, Combat Camera PAOs will direct the conception, editing and the dissemination of imagery, video news releases and other audio-visual products ... [and] ... These members must stay abreast of new developments in emerging technology, advise senior management on these issues and, if required, coordinate the implementation of these modern tools in PA operations. They may also perform media relations tasks, including coordinating interviews, producing news articles, and writing media advisories related to their operations.³²⁷

Fifteenth Public Affairs Function: Events and Announcements.

This PA Function is synonymous with the numerous outreach and routine PA

³²⁵ Canada. Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-361/FP-000 ..., 4-13.

³²⁶ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Directorate Public Affairs Operations ...”, <http://veritas.mil.ca/ab-ap/index-eng.asp>

³²⁷ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, A-PD-055-002/PP-001, *Canadian Forces Manual of Military Occupational Structure: Job Based Occupational Specification for the Public Affairs Officer Occupation* ..., 1-13, 2-26.

activities undertaken by PAOs across the CAF. While PAOs posted to the regional DECPR offices will regularly support national level announcements with special events in major city centres, PAOs in the Environmental Commands and defence headquarters are equally involved with coordinating the release of announcements (i.e. new overseas deployment, new procurement decision, etc.). *DAOD 2008-2, Media Relations and Public Announcements*, reinforces this by stating that by having an event or issuing a public announcement, a PAO is informing “the public of a new initiative, or the institution’s position on a policy, program, service, operation activity, initiative, issue and/or crisis.”³²⁸

Fourth Group of Public Affairs Functions: Manage

The final group of the 18 PA Functions is *Manage* and is composed of the last three PA Functions: *PA Planning*, *PA Training* and *Evaluation*. These functions are vital to the long-term effectiveness and relevancy of the PA occupation, in that PAOs are the experts at managing the message. *PA Planning* allows a PAO to set priorities and to focus on the activities that best support the main objective. *PA Training* ensures that PAOs have the skills and knowledge to instinctively perform their role, especially during a crisis or any other stressful situation. *PA Evaluation* allows a PAO to assess the overall effectiveness of the *PA Planning* process, and in some instances, may even require changes in *PA Training*. The PA Branch identifies seven standardized tasks and responsibilities of a PAO to execute in support of the PA Functions that are part of the *Manage* group (see to Table 4.6).

³²⁸ Canada. Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces. “DAOD 2008-2 ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-2000/2008-2.page>

Table 4.6 – Standardized Tasks and Responsibilities of a PAO to Execute in Support of Managing

| PA Function - Manage | |
|----------------------|---|
| Ser. | Standardized tasks and responsibilities of a PAO to execute and to support this PA Function |
| 1. | Issue Management |
| 2. | Crisis Management |
| 3. | Reputation Management |
| 4. | Relationship Management: (a) Media; (b) Stakeholders; (c) Partners; and (d) PA Community. |
| 5. | Resources Management (leadership): (a) Human; (b) Financial; and (c) Time. |
| 6. | Event Management |
| 7. | Expectations: (a) Media; (b) Chain-of-Command; and (c) Public. |

Source: Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *PA Branch Coaching-Mentoring Program*. Ottawa: Public Affairs Branch Directive 5.1, 2008.

Sixteenth Public Affairs Function: PA Planning.

Whether preparing to deploy overseas in support of an operation, or required to support a major activity or initiative on a CFB, a PAO needs to plan accordingly. *DAOD 2008-5, PA Planning and Program Delivery* states that: “PA plans are specific documents that articulate the PA objectives, themes, approaches and activities required to support the implementation of a policy, program, operation or initiative, and/or to

manage an issue or crisis.”³²⁹ While all *PA Planning* is crucial to the success of any issue, the PA Planning includes specific objectives that occur prior to, and during an operation and are of vital importance to a PAOs ability “to provide the Commander with advice, guidance and direction to support the Task Force (TF).”³³⁰ *DAOD 2008-5* identifies the objectives:

The primary objectives of PA strategic and operational planning are to establish PA priorities and guide PA investments in order to support and advance the achievement of the DND and CAF mission. To achieve these objectives, PA strategic and operational planning processes must be integrated with the overall strategic planning processes of DND and the CAF.³³¹

As a result, it is imperative that PAOs are engaged in the CF OPP, so that strategic PA input and guidance can be included into the OPP and to be able to “assist the TFC or Canadian National Commander (CNC) and PA staffs at the Operational and Tactical levels in their planning activities.”³³² Table 4.7 provides the various PA planning activities and PA contribution to the OPP during the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

Table 4.7 – PA Planning Activity and PA Contribution to the OPP during Tactical/Operational/Strategic Levels

³²⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “DAOD 2008-5 ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-2000/2008-5.page>

³³⁰ Canada. Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-361/FP-000 ..., 3-2.

³³¹ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “DAOD 2008-5 ...”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-2000/2008-5.page>

³³² Canada. Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-361/FP-000 ..., 3-2.

| Three levels | PA Planning Activity | PA Contribution to the OPP |
|-----------------------|---|---|
| 1. Tactical | Tactical level PA planning is the responsibility of the PAO assigned to the deploying formation or unit. | A PA Plan. |
| 2. Operational | The operational PA plan contains national as well as operational messages necessarily tied to coalition messages and the Op level Commander's intent. | PA plan and PA inputs to the Information Operation (IO) plan. |
| 3. Strategic | PA planning for Joint operations may involve other Canadian government departments and/or allied PA offices. | Detailed support like: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA assessment, • Public Affairs Guidance, • PA COA, • PA Concept of Operation (CONOP) and the • Corporate strategic PA Plan for the CF Mission, and various annexes. |

Source: Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-361/FP-000, *CF Joint Public Affairs Doctrine Manual*. Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Manual, 2004.

Seventeenth Public Affairs Function: PA Training.

The effectiveness and relevancy of any military occupation depends largely on its training. This PA Function ensures that its members are capable of performing their role while operating in any environment. *DAOD 2008-5, PA Planning and Program Delivery* states that:

PA training refers to all activities involved in the coordination, preparation, and delivery, by or on behalf of an organization, of education programs or instruction pertaining to the planning, management, and delivery of PA plans, programs, activities and materials [and] is essential to building and maintaining an effective PA capacity throughout the CAF and DND ... all major training programs shall incorporate appropriate PA elements into their design and delivery (this specifically includes training programs for CAF recruits, leadership and management development, and pre-deployment training).³³³

³³³ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, "DAOD 2008-5 ...", <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-2000/2008-5.page>

Similarly, the *CF Joint PA Doctrine Manual* states that: “The overarching goal of PA training is to enhance the ability of military personnel to effectively communicate with key military and/or operational stakeholders. PA training focuses on four core audiences: the PAO, the Commander, the soldier and the journalist.”³³⁴ Through effective and relevant training, PAOs will acquire the skills they need to continue demonstrating their value and integrating “themselves within military decision-making organizations. As such, the training ensures that PAOs can be an integral part at the tactical and strategic levels of operations.”³³⁵ On 21 September, 2016, General J.H. Vance, CAF CDS signed the *CDS Directive to Implement Changes to the CAF Professional Development System (PDS)*, it stated that:

With the continued emphasis for the CAF to play major roles on the national and international stage it is imperative that our personnel are properly developed with the required competencies to deal with complex issues from the tactical to strategic/institutional levels ... [and identified Mission as:] ... The CAF, through Military Personnel Generation (MILPERSGEN), will lead an end to end review (E2ER) of the CAF PDS to implement the recommendations from the CAF PDS Study related to formal PD, whilst ensuring alignment with the new General Specifications (GS), Institutional Leader (IL) 2030 and Operation HONOUR in a holistic manner.³³⁶

The PA Branch’s efforts on implementing the APAOC in the near future and the recent DGPA Report into the operationalization of the PA Function, is in line with the CDS’s Directive to conduct and E2ER of all of the CFPDS, in that it ensures that PAOs

³³⁴ Canada. Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-361/FP-000 ..., 4-4.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*

³³⁶ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces, *Chief of Defence Staff Directive to Implement Changes to the Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development System* (Ottawa: 4500-1 (Comd MILPERSGEN), 2016), 1-3.

will PD in line with future CAF requirements. In agreement with this direction, the *2017 DND and CAF PA Strategy* states that: “PA training is critical to ensuring that CAF PA personnel and other departmental spokespersons are equipped to effectively support strategic communications and IO.”³³⁷

Eighteenth Public Affairs Function: Evaluation.

The last PA Function is *Evaluation*. This function allows a PAO to manage various tools used to assess the overall effectiveness of PA Plans, training, outreach efforts, lessons learned programs post-deployment, etc. Through the use of these tools (see Table 4.8), PAOs are able to refine their skills and institute better operating procedures. While the process of honest and genuine evaluation efforts is important, what is more important is what changes or improvements result from this process. In other words, the effectiveness of any PA evaluation tool can only be measured against the action or changes that resulted from the initial evaluation or analysis.

Table 4.8 – PA Evaluation Tools (non-exhaustive)

| Ser. | PA Evaluation Tools |
|------|-------------------------------|
| 1. | Media reports (news coverage) |

³³⁷ Canada. Department of National Defence, *DND and CAF Public Affairs Strategy 2017 ...*, 28.

| | |
|----|--|
| 2. | Ministerial inquiries |
| 3. | Letters to the editor |
| 4. | Polls and surveys |
| 5. | Focus-group testing |
| 6. | Direct correspondence from private citizens |
| 7. | Feedback from defence associations and other special-interest groups |

Source: Canada. Department of National Defence. A-AD-207-001/AG-000, *Public Affairs Handbook*. Ottawa: Director General Public Affairs, 2000.

Through their training PAOs are provided with the skills and knowledge to be able to perform the 18 PA Functions, which in turn, PAOs employ in order to provide the four PA capabilities to a Commander: providing advice and guidance, enhances morale of internal audiences, fosters audiences trust and support, and PA TechNet support (see Table 4.9). This section will provide a general description of each capability.

The Four Public Affairs Capabilities Provided to a Commander

Table 4.9 – The Four Public Affairs Capabilities Provided to a Commander

| Ser. | Capabilities Provided to a Commander |
|------|--------------------------------------|
| 1. | Provides Advice and Guidance |
| 2. | Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences |
| 3. | Fosters Audience Trust and Support |
| 4. | Public Affairs TechNet Support |

Source: Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-361/FP-000, *CF Joint Public Affairs Doctrine Manual*. Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Manual, 2004.

Providing advice and guidance to a Commander is the main responsibility of a PAO, and it incorporates all of a PAOs skills, knowledge and experience. Prior to providing advice and guidance to a Commander and his/her staff, a PAO needs to ensure its accuracy and how this information may affect aspects of the operation. In order to do

this, there is a tremendous amount of liaison, coordination and research that a PAO needs to undertake:

... including analyzing and interpreting the audience environment, monitoring attitudes of foreign and domestic audiences, providing PA lessons learned, forecasting the possible impact of military operations on public information, and preparing the Commander to communicate with the various audiences.³³⁸

Whether in garrison or deployed overseas, the importance of enhancing the morale of CAF personnel directly benefits the effectiveness of a unit and an operation's probability of mission success. Through those identified PA Functions (i.e. internal communications, media relations, community outreach, etc.), a PAO's role is invaluable in that:

The PAO provides information that enables military personnel to understand their roles in the operation by explaining how policies, programs and operations affect them and their families. Media interest in military operations will initially be high and military members will likely be asked to participate in interviews. The PAO keep family members informed about operations, events, and programs to reduce uncertainty and stress caused by operations and deployments.³³⁹

The importance of fostering audience trust and support is unquestionable; without it there would be no CAF. The privilege of being members of the profession of arms depends largely on the conduct (in line with military ethos) and the personal sacrifices made by its personnel. A PAO has a unique role, through the use of imagery, marketing and advertising efforts, outreach activities, etc., to be able to demonstrate to Canadians the selfless acts made on their behalf. These activities directly benefit the image of the

³³⁸ Canada. Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-361/FP-000 ..., 4-4.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*

CAF, further enhancing audience trust and support. The *CF Joint PA Doctrine Manual*

states:

Military leaders are able to conduct effective operations with the positive backing of the public. The PAO supports the operation by building audience trust and understanding for the military's contribution to national security. During national crisis, the PAO gives audiences the information needed to understand the importance of military action.³⁴⁰

The PA Technical Network (PA TechNet) is an unofficial and unrestrictive network where PAOs anywhere (in Canada or deployed) can connect with each other for professional feedback or PA support in terms of advice and guidance on a specific issue. By having access to other PAOs during an operation, "This gives the TFC the advantage of a wider view on issues surrounding the operation by saving considerable time and effort in research and collation of information needed to resolve a developing issue associated with the operation."³⁴¹ The TechNet provides the Commander additional support and expertise "with their day-to-day operations while respecting and not interfering with the existing Chain-of-Command."³⁴² Additionally, the PA Branch highlights the importance of senior PAOs in supporting their subordinates and more junior members of the occupation as required through the PA TechNet.³⁴³

The 18 Public Affairs Gaps

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*

³⁴² Department of National Defence. A-AD-207-001/AG-000 ..., 53.

³⁴³ Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *PA Branch Advisor Guiding Principles and Direction* ..., 3.

So far, the chapter has explained the professional capabilities of PAOs. While the 18 PA Functions are divided into four groups that allow a PAO to provide four capabilities to a Commander, and may seem exhaustive, there are still some gaps in the way PAOs support the PA Functions. Coincidentally, there are 18 PA Gaps, which are further split in four categories (see Table 4.10). After conducting an analysis, the PA Branch identified categories where certain gaps may exist at some level throughout a PAO's career progression/PD (see Figure 4.2). These 18 PA Gaps will be further discussed when presenting the survey results in Chapter Five, and in terms of how they affect the decision of which PGEP(s) best supports a senior PAOs PD needs. The surveys provided to PAOs and Commanders, provides a better understanding on which of the 18 PA Gaps will be identified as having the most critical impact on a Commander's overall mandate/mission. This information will then allow a better focus on the search for types of PGEP(s) based on the academic field that will most effectively address the most critically identified gaps (at the strategic/political levels) by expanding a PAO's capabilities through the enrolment and completion of the identified Master's program(s).




Figure 4.2 – Illustration of How the PA Gaps Affect the PA Functions and Capabilities

Table 4.10 – Public Affairs Gaps and Identified Issues and Requirements

| Ser. | Public Affairs Gaps | Identified Issues and Requirements |
|--|---|---|
| I. Public Affairs (1-9) | | |
| 1. | Public Affairs input to the Operational Planning Process | Increase Public Affairs input to the Operational Planning Process |
| 2. | Strategic communications and campaign planning | Improve Strategic communications and campaign planning knowledge and input |
| 3. | Imagery and social media planning (digital communications) | Increase ability and scope of Imagery and social media planning (digital communications) |
| 4. | Public Affairs input to Information Operations (IO) and Influence Activities (IA) | Increase Public Affairs input to Information Operations (IO) and Influence Activities (IA) and improve liaison and coordination with non-PA contributors in the IE |
| 5. | Liaison and coordination with other departments and agencies | Improve Liaison and coordination with other departments and agencies |
| 6. | Training senior Officers and spokespersons for media interviews | Increase frequency of Training senior Officers and spokespersons for media interviews and expand the training to additional CAF Commanders |
| 7. | Readiness for operations and deployments | Improve Readiness for operations and deployments |
| 8. | Collective training for pre-deployment and Joint Operations | Require additional Collective training for pre-deployment and Joint Operations that covers the spectrum of operations |
| 9. | Lessons Learned | Need to capture and more effectively disseminate Lessons Learned |
| II. Human Resources (10-11) | | |
| 10. | Staffing and human resources management | Improve member's abilities in Staffing and human resources management responsibilities |
| 11. | Performance appraisal (CFPAS, PDRs and PERs) | Improve staffing of Performance appraisal (CFPAS, PDRs and PERs) |
| III. Finance / Administration (12-15) | | |
| 12. | Resource management and managerial skills | Increase knowledge of Resource management and managerial skills |
| 13. | Budget management | Increase knowledge of Budget management skills |
| 14. | Business planning | Increase knowledge of Business planning skills |
| 15. | Contracting and procurement | Improve Contracting and procurement knowledge and skills |
| IV. Leadership (16-18) | | |
| 16. | Advising senior Officers | Increase confidence of junior members in Advising senior Officers and increase theoretical and practical advisory abilities/skills in order to provide strategic advice for senior Officers |
| 17. | Leadership skills | Increase theoretical and practical Leadership skills and abilities |
| 18. | Mentoring, coaching and counseling | Expand Mentoring, coaching and counseling skills to all |

| | |
|--------|-----------------------|
| skills | members of the Branch |
|--------|-----------------------|

Source: Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *Public Affairs Gaps*. Ottawa: Defence Public Affairs Learning Centre, 2017.

It has been demonstrated that there are 18 PA Functions providing a professional framework that guide PA support. PAOs are trained with the skills and knowledge to be able to perform the 18 PA Functions, which they then use to provide the four capabilities to a Commander. While performing these functions and providing these capabilities some PAOs will experience certain gaps at some level throughout their career progression/PD. While the gaps are self-explanatory, and do not necessarily apply to every PAO, they nonetheless need to be addressed by the PA Branch, and each PAO has a personal and professional responsibility as well to close any gaps that they may have. Table 4.10 further lists the identified issues and requirements for each PA Gap, which are currently being assessed by the PA Branch. Some of these gaps may be addressed through the completion of a PGEP, as this will increase their knowledge (i.e. strategic communications, imagery and social media, advising skills, etc.), cognitive skills, and leaderships abilities. While there are 18 PA Gaps that the PA Branch is currently addressing, it is also vital that the PA occupation incorporate future challenges and strategic considerations.

Future Challenges and Strategic Considerations for Public Affairs Officers

While the 18 PA Functions and the four PA capabilities provided to a Commander are vital to the institution's official requirement to share information with the public and to be able to meet its current responsibilities, it is important to ensure that these functions and capabilities are continuously aligned with CAF operational

requirements. Part of this important process was the DGPA Report as previously referred to in Chapters One and Three, where the CDS' mandate is to “operationalize military PA and imagery capability.”³⁴⁴ The most important question is not how this report may affect the current PA Functions and capabilities, as they should always evolve to remain relevant, but why? The answer to this question and as mentioned in the DGPA Report is directly related to the operational need to manage the increasingly complex IE, using StratComs as the overarching umbrella:

Strategic Communications as an articulated military concept came out of the counter insurgency experiences of the US and UK in Iraq where impacts in the cognitive domain as part of the IE urgently required management. The recognition that there were words and deeds, official and unofficial, creating perceptions leading to behaviours in a number of audiences gave rise to an attempt at managing and coordinating ‘own’ activities impacting the IE – that is Strategic Communications. NATO adopted this concept in 2008 with its first guiding policy approved by all nations in 2009.³⁴⁵

Changing Operational Environment and the Role of Military Strategic Communications

Over the last decade, the importance of employing StratCom techniques to manage the IE has only increased in importance, where in 2014 during its Summit in Wales, NATO stated that: “It is essential that the Alliance possesses the necessary tools and procedures required to deter and respond effectively to hybrid warfare threats, and the capabilities to reinforce national forces. This will include enhancing strategic communications.”³⁴⁶ Since then, in 2016 the NATO draft Military Committee Policy on

³⁴⁴ Director General Public Affairs, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, *A Conceptual Vision ...*, 3.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 42.

StraComs defines the functions as, "...the integration of communication capabilities and information staff function with other military activities, in order to understand and shape the IE, in support of NATO aims and objectives."³⁴⁷ While NATO has made progress in this area, the CAF do not currently have such an integrated framework in terms of its ability to counter threats within the IE. By genuinely assessing these concerns through open and candid introspection, similar to the DGPA Report, will eventually lead the CAF to make a decision on this operationally important issue. For the PA Function, regardless of what direction or decision is taken by the institution, the importance is that PAOs and their professional capabilities remain relevant so that they are viewed as a weapon of choice (or a key component) in response to threats across the information spectrum.

While former military operations have shown that an increase in information sharing and coordination amongst the different communication capabilities (i.e. public diplomacy, PA, IO, etc.) increases a Commanders visibility, options and overall effectiveness, in today's operational environment where an "attack would not be conventional or kinetic, but cognitive, originating in the intangible realm of the IE,"³⁴⁸ the importance of StatComs is self-evident. With information becoming a weapon of choice, the PA Function has both a unique opportunity, and a responsibility to ensure that its professional capabilities continue to serve as an enabling force to the overall

³⁴⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Wales Summit Declaration," last accessed 6 June, 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm

³⁴⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Military Policy on Strategic Communications* (Brussels: Military Committee 0628, IMSWM-0348, 2016).

³⁴⁸ Director General Public Affairs, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, *A Conceptual Vision ...*, 3.

operational efforts, in that “the ‘weaponization’ of information also requires the professionalization of military operators involved in the planning and delivery of information-based activities.”³⁴⁹ A crucial part of this professionalization for PAOs is the need to ensure that they have access to PD opportunities that increase their understanding of StratComs, and their fundamental role within the IE.

The Importance of Corporate Strategic Communications to Public Affairs Officers

An important point to clarify is the difference between the StratCom identified above and Corporate Strategic Communications. In the public domain, Strategic Communications has various definitions. The Financial Times defines it as: “Communication is strategic when it is completely consistent with a corporation’s mission, vision, values and is able to enhance the strategic positioning and competitiveness of the organization.”³⁵⁰ Of course, whether one is in the business sector or the military, the ability to communicate strategically in today’s oversaturated IE requires strategic messaging based on long-term planning and in-depth research, where amongst other factors, key to its overall effectiveness is the incorporation of human behavioural and effective marketing principles.

While the incorporation of military StratComs will be an increasingly important component of a PAOs professional capabilities, the benefits of also obtaining the knowledge synonymous with effective Corporate Strategic Communications is also vital to the long-term effectiveness and relevancy of the professional capabilities offered by

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

³⁵⁰ Financial Times. “Definition of Strategic Communications,” last accessed 3 June, 2017, <http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=strategic-communication>

CAF PAOs. For this to come to fruition and to be sustained, requires for PAOs to increase their cognitive ability and analytical skills through specifically focused training and access to higher education, at the Master's level and above.

Summary

While the focus of this chapter is on describing the current professional capabilities provided by PAOs, it is vital to the overall discussion that the research project also elaborated on the changing operational environment and how these existential pressures being faced by the CAF requires PAOs to understand the importance of military StratComs and its effective incorporation as a tool against IE threats. Likewise, the knowledge and skills required to successfully obtain and effectively implement a Corporate Strategic Communications plan or process is also vital in meeting the requirements of the institution. Before PAOs can devote valuable time and resources to these matters, they need to ensure that they have mastered the basic skills and attained the requisite knowledge required to build a solid foundation upon which they can then eventually add the strategic elements to.

PAOs have the basic skills and knowledge to perform the 18 PA Functions that then deliver the four PA capabilities. It has also been identified that to provide these capabilities at higher levels, there are gaps. These gaps may exist at some level throughout a PAOs career progression/PD, and is the main reason for this research project. In order to find effective long-term solutions to these gaps within the PAO occupation, specifically at the senior level where an academic deficit (and other gaps)

could have disastrous effects, these deficits (and gaps) need to be addressed through the CFPDS, and in particular the education pillar.

In line with the aim of this research project, the remaining chapters will demonstrate that by addressing the academic deficit in PA education for senior PAOs, specifically through the introduction of a PGEP at the Master's level, will provide senior PAOs the opportunity to expand their professional capabilities in line with their requirement to function earlier in their career at the strategic and political levels.

CHAPTER FIVE

PRESENTATION OF SURVEY RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

*Education thus makes it possible to prepare better for the complexity of the battlefield of the future and the challenges that await leaders at all levels.*³⁵¹

– Major Simon Bernard, *Educating Officers for the 21st Century*, 2005

In order to achieve an adequate analysis of the CAF development of its military PA communicators, specifically as it pertains to an exploration of a PGEP for PAOs with the intent of expanding their professional capabilities and/or closing the gaps identified in Chapter Four. It was decided that surveys would be sent to both PAOs and those they report to: CAF Commanders and DND SCCs. This feedback allows recommendations to be in line with current information, perspectives and requirements of the PA Branch and the CAF. This chapter will first describe the methodology used and the survey limitations before presenting the survey results (represented in Annexes A and B), followed by an analysis and discussion of the findings. The chapter will conclude by discussing future operational considerations and their implication on educational requirements for PAOs.

Methodology Applied and Survey Limitations

While there is a substantial amount of information available as it pertains to the CFPDS, the PD of all CAF Officers, the current training requirements of a PAO and about the professional capabilities of PAO, including the gaps that may exist at some level throughout a PAOs career progression/PD, there was no available research or information that showed how all of these factors together affect the PD of a PAO. For

³⁵¹ Major Simon Bernard, “*Educating Officers for the 21st Century* ...”, 56.

this reason, PAOs and CAF Commanders/DND SCCs were provided a slightly different set of questions. Additionally, these two groups were provided with slightly different questions because of the different perspectives they bring to this subject. It was vital to see if both groups would come up with the same priorities as it pertains to the PA Functions, PA Gaps and PA capabilities and any recommendations for a PGEP.

The 24 PAOs chosen to participate in the survey were done randomly and included members from the rank of Captain/Lieutenant(Navy) and above, and represent the gender (male 60% and female 40% female) and the Distinctive Environmental Uniform (DEU) distribution (Sea 21%, Land 41% and Air 38%) of the PA Branch at the time the surveys were sent out and was also in line with the most recent PA Annual Military Occupational Review (AMOR) from 2016/17. Additionally, six CAF Commanders/DND SCCs were sent surveys. There were three limitations identified with the surveys, mainly as a result of time and resource restrictions. First, only a limited number of PAOs and CAF Commanders/DND SCCs could be asked to participate due to their availability. Second, the number of questions in the surveys had to be limited in the interest of timely completion and survey response return as well as to keep the scope focused on the aim of the research project. The final limitation is the fact that at the time the surveys were sent out, there was a pending PA Occupational Analysis (last one was in 2000), which was going to focus on a certain demographic within the PA Branch and Director Personnel Generation Requirements staff requested that I limit my participants to PAOs with 10 or more years' experience in the occupation.

Presentation of Survey Results

In addition to providing an overarching analysis and discussion of the survey results in the next section, the results and details of both surveys are presented in great detail in Annex A (CAF PAOs) and Annex B (CAF Commanders/DND SCCs). For questions where a simple ‘x’ was required, responses from all surveys received were totaled in each respective column. Then those numbers were multiplied by the value of that column (i.e. 1,2,3,4,5) in order to tabulate the total score, which was then entered on the far right of each identified item (row). Basically:

- a. Any entry in the first column (Not at all Important) is worth (1) point,
- b. Any entry in the second column (Slightly Important) is worth (2) points,
- c. Any entry in the third column (Important) is worth (3) points,
- d. Any entry in the fourth column (Fairly Important) is worth (4) points, and
- e. Any entry in the fifth column (Very Important) is worth (5) points.

This method of calculating total scores was applied to all questions (in Annexes A and B) regardless of the phrasing employed (i.e. Important, Critical, Risk or Supported). For an example of how the total scores for each item were calculated see details in footnote.³⁵²

Analysis and Discussion of Survey Results

³⁵² Note: *Question #4 – PAOs* from Annex A will be used as an example to show how each identified item received its total score. The first Gaps Category ‘*Public Affairs*’ will be used, it received a total score of 107 out of 120 points. This was calculated because it had:

- (1) entry in the first column (Not at all Important), each worth (1) point, so $1 \times 1 = 1$ point
- (1) entry in the second column (Slightly Important), each worth (2) points, so $1 \times 2 = 2$ points
- (1) entry in the third column (Important), each worth (3) points, so $1 \times 3 = 3$ points
- (4) entries in the fourth column (Fairly Important), each worth (4) points, so $4 \times 4 = 16$ points,
- (17) entries in the fifth column (Very Important), each worth (5) points, so $17 \times 5 = 85$ points

This provides a total score of 107 points.

This section will now analyze and discuss the survey results received by PAOs and CAF Commanders/DND SCCs, in three parts. The first part will look at the survey responses as it pertains to the current level of professionalization of CAF PAOs, specifically if it is sufficient to meet today’s CAF requirements. The second part will compare the proposed PGEPs provided and the third part will then compare the identified priorities of PAOs and CAF Commanders/DND SCCs.

Level of Professionalization: Do Public Affairs Officers Meet Current Requirements?

Table 5.1 – Consolidated Survey Responses: Current Level of Professionalization of CAF PAOs

| Based on the CAF leadership model do you think that the level of professionalization of CAF Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) is sufficient to meet CAF requirements? | | | | | |
|--|----|-----|---------------------|---|-----|
| PAOs | | | Commanders/DND SCCs | | |
| Yes | 1 | 4% | Yes | 2 | 33% |
| No | 23 | 96% | No | 4 | 67% |

Beginning with CAF Commanders/DND SCCs, those that stated PAOs current level of professionalization was not sufficient to meet CAF requirements said that they could benefit from a Master’s degree at the senior rank. This is due to the fact that “PAO training as it currently sits is adequate for the Captain/Lieutenant(Navy) and junior Major/Lieutenant-Commander levels, but a focused Master’s level education specifically tailored for the type of work PAOs do in briefing Level-2 and Level-1 Commanders

would better prepare them for this role.”³⁵³ Additionally, another Commander highlighted the importance that higher education plays in supporting a PAO in managing ever more responsibilities:

I can attest to the changing roles of PAOs over the years and the increased reliance that Commanders have on their PA resources. It is much more than just ‘preparing the Commander for an interview or a media scrum’. The PAOs of today are relied upon to manage a plethora of PR interactions, outreach activities/opportunities and Key Leader Engagement preparation. It therefore stands to reason that additional professionalization would be prudent as PAOs roles and responsibilities continue to increase. This would include academic upgrading.³⁵⁴

As for PAOs, 96% of those surveyed responded no, and in response to the question on what would help better professionalize PAOs, the vast majority stated that PAOs should have access to a PGEP (focused on Strategic/Crisis communications), in support of their requirement to deliver expert PA advice. In line with this a PAO stated that: “We should be subjecting our public communications professionals to a degree of academic and professional rigour similar to that seen in the practice of law.”³⁵⁵

³⁵³ Canadian Armed Forces Commanders, “Responses to Survey Questions May 2017,” *Research Project Survey for CAF Commanders and DND Information Services Public Servants*, 2017.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁵ Canadian Armed Forces Public Affairs Officers. “Responses to Survey Questions May 2017.” *Research Project Survey for CAF PAOs*, 2017.

A Comparison of Proposed Master's Degrees: PAOs and Commanders/DND SCCs

Table 5.2 – Proposed Mater's Degrees: Comparison between PAOs and Commanders/DND SCCs

| Based on the 18 Public Affairs Gaps, which post-graduate education program (at the Master's level) would you ... | |
|---|---|
| ... as a PAO propose in order to augment your capabilities in support of your Chain-of-Command's mandate: | as a CAF Commander/DND SCC propose in order to augment a PAOs capabilities in support of your mandate: |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic communications • Crisis communications • Social Media communications • Marketing and communications • International/Intercultural communications • Media Relations and communications • Public Relations and communications | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic communications • Crisis communications. • Digital Communications Strategies |

Reference Table 5.2, both PAOs and Commanders/DND SCCs equally identified that a Master's in Communications (i.e. Strategic, Crisis and Social/Digital Media) would best allow a PAO to improve their capabilities in support of the Chain-of-Command's mandate. In addition to the justifications already provided by PAOs in Annex A (Question #8) and Commanders/DND SCCs in Annex B (Question #8) as it relates to the benefits of a PGEP, I will provide additional substantiation as provided by PAOs. As a PAO progresses in rank, leadership and strategic decision-making becomes increasingly important. Based on this, a PAO highlighted the importance of education in meeting this requirement: "The education pillar is a critical component to expanding PAOs' PA expertise and one that is valuable to PAOs as they progress in rank."³⁵⁶ In line with this, another PAO affirmed the importance of strategic communications, "in my experience,

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

one of the areas where we have been truly lacking in terms of institutional capacity is the ability to think and communicate strategically.”³⁵⁷ The CAF, PA Branch and the member will all benefit from this increased knowledge, and the burden of obtaining the proficiency should be somewhat shared in line with how it’s done in other occupations.

Providing post-graduate opportunities is extremely important to develop highly capable senior PAOs and increase Branch credibility ... PA and communications specialists are a marketable skillset. In order to retain talented communicators, the CAF needs to have a robust capability to allow PAOs to continue their education and training.³⁵⁸

A Comparison of Priorities: Public Affairs Officers and Commanders/DND SCCs

Table 5.3 – Public Affairs Officers Priorities Based on Survey Responses

| PAOs identified Top 3 most Critical PA Functions in support of their CoC’s mandate/mission (out of the 18 PA Functions) | PAOs identified Top 3 most Critical PA Gaps based on their impact to their overall mandate/mission (out of the 18 PA Gaps) | PAOs ranked the 4 PA capabilities provided to a Commander, in the order in which they feel they have been adequately trained for, gained through experience or acquired through self-development. |
|--|---|--|
| 1. Crisis and Emergency Communications | 1. Advising senior Officers (Leadership) | 1. Provides Advice and Guidance |
| 2. Public Affairs Advice | 2. Strategic communications and campaign planning (Public Affairs) | 2. Public Affairs TechNet Support |
| 3. Public Affairs Support to Operations | 3. Leadership skills (Leadership) | 3. Fosters Audience Trust and Support |
| | | 4. Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences |

Table 5.4 – Commanders/DND SCCs Priorities Based on Survey Responses

| Commanders identified Top 3 | Commanders identified Top 3 | Commanders ranked the 4 PA |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

| most Critical PA Functions in support of their mandate/mission (of the 18 PA Functions) | most Critical PA Gaps based on the impact to their overall mandate/mission (out of the 18 PA Gaps) | capabilities that are provided to a Commander, in the order in which they feel that a trained PAO has supported them in line with these capabilities. |
|--|---|--|
| 1. Crisis and Emergency Communications | 1. Strategic communications and campaign planning (Public Affairs) | 1. Provides Advice and Guidance |
| 2. Public Affairs Advice | 2. Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) (Public Affairs) | 2. Public Affairs TechNet Support |
| 3. Media Relations | 3. Advising senior Officers (Leadership) | 3. Fosters Audience Trust and Support |
| | | 4. Enhances Morale of Internal Audiences |

Tables 5.3 and 5.4 represent the top PAO and Commander/DND SCC priorities based on the 18 PA Functions, 18 PA Gaps and the four PA capabilities provided to a Commander. Upon consolidating the data, it became evident that PAOs and Commanders/DND SCCs have similar priorities. In order to focus the analysis and guide the overall exploration in this chapter (and in Chapter Six), only the top three most critical PA Functions and PA Gaps as identified by Commanders/DND SCCs were considered, however, all four PA capabilities provided to a Commander were considered.

Top Three Most Critical Public Affairs Functions in Support of the Commander's Mandate/Mission.

PAOs and Commanders both chose the same first and second PA Functions as the most critical in supporting their Commander's or their mandate/mission: 1. 'Crisis and Emergency Communications' and 2. 'PA Advice'. This is most likely the case because PAOs are trained to react quickly to a crisis or emergency (i.e. CF-18 crash, death on a CFB, etc.), to gather information from key players, then brief their Commander and obtain the requisite approvals prior to informing the public through the media or other

direct means (i.e. social media, etc.). Commanders understand this, and rely on this during an emergency or crisis. The second choice, 'PA Advice', is the cornerstone of a PAOs function, the fact that both PAOs and Commanders agreed of its importance, only second to 'crisis and emergency communications' shows that when a PAO is not dealing with a crisis, or an issue that could result into a crisis, that his/her primary role is to advise the Commander on all other activities (i.e. media engagement, outreach activities, internal communications, etc.). For the third most critical PA Function in supporting their Chain-of-Command's mission/mandate, PAOs chose 'Public Affairs Support to Operations', while Commanders chose 'Media Relations'. For PAOs, choosing 'PA Support to Operations' is in line with their requirement to always be prepared to deploy in support of Mission Success, specifically to be able to simultaneously manage the requests for information back home while supporting the PA pressures placed on the deployed command team and subordinate units, (as a point of interest, Commanders scored 'PA Support to Operations' fourth). For Commanders, choosing 'Media Relations' as their third choice is in line with a Commander's requirement to not only ensure that media (and public inquiry) requests for information are dealt with in a timely and accurate fashion, but also the fact that Commander's understand the importance of maintaining the reputation and legitimacy of what they do, and the need to share this with Canadians (as a point of interest, PAOs scored 'Media Relations' as 10th, this may be due to the fact that communicating to Canadians through social media has increased).

Top Three Most Critical Public Affairs Gaps Based on Their Impact to the Overall Mandate/Mission.

The first PA Gap identified by PAOs as being the most critical based on its impact to their overall mandate/mission is ‘Advising senior Officers’, and Commanders had this as their third choices. Seeing that ‘PA Advice’ was very critical to both PAOs and Commanders in terms of PA Function, it makes sense that they would also both choose the importance of not having a gap in this area. While PAOs chose ‘Strategic Communications and campaign planning’ as their second choice, this was the first choice for Commanders. Both agreed that a PA Gap in this area would have big impact on the overall mandate/mission, being able to understand and effectively coordinate information from across various sources in support of the CAF, is paramount. As for Commanders, their second choice is ‘Imagery and social media planning (digital communication)’, this is in line with the ways in which Canadians are communicating and sharing information today. Commanders understand that in order to continue connecting with the public and sharing the CAF’s story, that we must be able and prepared to inform them through these new means of communicating. The third choice made by PAOs was ‘Leadership skills’, as PAOs move up in rank and/or take on additional responsibilities they will have to ensure that they have the requisite leadership skills. One PAO stated that: “The gaps that exist for PAOs are leadership and management related, as we have few opportunities to develop in this regard (in comparison to our operational counterparts).”³⁵⁹

Top Three Identified Public Affairs Capabilities Provided to a Commander.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

The PAOs and Commanders surveyed came up with the identical order for the PA capabilities provided to a Commander: (1. ‘Provides Advice and Guidance’, 2. ‘PA TechNet Support’, 3. ‘Fosters Audience Trust and Support’ and 4. ‘Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences’). PAOs ranked the 4 PA capabilities provided to a Commander, in the order in which they felt they have been adequately trained for, gained through experience or acquired through self-development. Furthermore, Commanders ranked the four PA capabilities that are provided to a Commander, in the order in which they felt that a trained PAO has supported them in line with these capabilities. While there is room for improvement, this at least demonstrates that PAOs have focused their PD efforts in PA Functions that directly support their capability to ‘Provide Advice and Guidance’ to a Commander, and this has been reflected from a Commander’s perspective. The second capability, ‘PA TechNet Support’ shows that PAOs can rely on the effective use of this network to support the requirements of the first capability, Commanders realize this and understand its significance in the advice and guidance they receive, in that PAOs refer to the “PA TechNet on PA professional matters and to expedite the flow of information during a crisis, always keeping the Commander informed.”³⁶⁰ While the last two capabilities, ‘Foster Audience Trust and Support’ and ‘Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences’ are also important, they are ranked behind the first two mainly due to the fact that a PAO’s primary responsibility is to be able to advise and guide his/her Commander. With this capability secured, a PAO can then engage with external and internal audiences understanding the institutional requirements.

³⁶⁰ Canada. Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-361/FP-000 ..., GL-7.

Future Operational Considerations and Their Implication on Educational Requirements for PAOs

The majority of participants have concluded that a post-secondary degree in communications focused on Strategic, Crisis and/or Social Media would best serve senior PAOs and the CAF. While this assessment is valid, in that knowledge and experience gained through such a program would increase a PAO's ability to comprehend the multitude of issues required to implement institutional Strategic Communications plans, we also have to consider the changing operational environment. There is little question that certain conventional communications degrees will benefit a PAO's ability to provide many of the identified 18 PA Functions, but as one PAO stated:

The full value of PAOs is their capability as specialists. When a PAO has only one stream of academic capability, their credibility at higher levels of responsibility is limited. A broad academic palette combined with a varied operational base of experience is vital for CAF Commanders when employing a PAO ... [and] ... there is a definite need – actually a requirement – for the [PA] Branch to cultivate an environment to encourage PAOs to seek a broad selection of academic disciplines that enhance the specialists needs of the CAF.³⁶¹

This perspective complements the need identified in the DGPA Report, where future operational considerations are demanding that in order for PAOs to continue to be effective in a “current and rapidly evolving IE,”³⁶² they will also have to be educated in academic fields that directly support the future PA requirements. The vast majority of

³⁶¹ Canadian Armed Forces Public Affairs Officers, “Responses to Survey Questions May 2017,” *Research Project Survey for CAF PAOs*, 2017.

³⁶² Director General Public Affairs, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, *A Conceptual Vision ...*, 5.

participants, specifically the CAF Commanders surveyed are most likely not aware of the CDS mandated DGPA Report, and the fact that the PA Function is currently looking at courses of action to meet this emerging operational threat. Thus, the academic programs identified by the participants, while valid, did not necessarily consider the current pressures to increase the operationalization of the PA Function. For this reason, I will also consider PGEs, some of which were already mentioned by the participants (i.e. Political Science/International Relations, Behavioural Psychology), that directly support the educational development (specifically as it relates to cognitive and analytical) of senior PAOs so that they can competently contribute from a military StratCom perspective.

Summary

This chapter has shown that PAOs and Commanders/DND SCCs have very similar outlook/opinions in terms of PA Functions, PA Gaps and PA capabilities. The question is how to use this information in order to address the known gaps and provide the opportunity for PAOs to improve their professional capabilities allowing them to function earlier in their career at the strategic and political levels. The skills, knowledge and increased intellectual capacity gained through the training and education pillars are crucial in a PAOs ability to function at higher levels. While the deficiency within PA training will soon be addressed (at least at some level) with the commencement of the APAOC, there is currently no PA Branch proposed solution for the academic deficit in PA education for senior PAOs as defined by the CFPDS.

Additionally, as demonstrated through the surveys, PAOs and Commanders have identified similar PA Functions ('Crisis and Emergency Communications' and 'PA Advice') and PA Gaps ('Advising senior Officers' and 'Strategic communications and campaign planning') as being critical to the success of the overall mandate/mission. While junior PAOs are trained to manage some of these issues at their level, there is nothing supporting the PD requirements that senior PAOs need in order to deal with these issues at the higher levels, where crisis communications, strategic communications and campaign planning become increasingly complex involving other nations, OGDs and the political dimension. While the APAOC will bridge some of the training deficiency and increase a PAOs skills to be able to more effectively function at higher levels, there is nothing from the education pillar's perspective.

This research project is proposing that the academic deficit in the education pillar for senior PAOs can be addressed by a PGEP at the Master's level, which will provide the opportunity for PAOs to expand their professional capabilities in line with their requirement to function earlier in their career at the strategic and political levels. The next chapter will explore various PGEPs based on the priorities identified in this chapter, as well as consider programs in academic fields that directly address the future operational needs of the CAF.

CHAPTER SIX

AN EXPLORATION OF A POST-GRADUATE EDUCATION PROGRAM FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER

*Formal education becomes the mechanism that allows an individual to better comprehend and understand the integrated, multifaceted, intricate and complex content of the military profession within the larger world it exists in. It is critical to mastering the necessary body of knowledge.*³⁶³

– Dr. Bill Bentley and Colonel Bernd Horn, *Educating the Leader and Leading the Educated*, 2012

This research project has identified a academic deficit in the education pillar for senior PAOs and posited that a PGEP at the Master's level could help address it by expanding a senior PAOs capabilities in line with their requirement to function earlier in their career at the strategic and political levels.

This chapter will be split in three sections. The first section will look at and analyze the PGEP(s) identified in the surveys. The second section will look at PGEP(s) in certain academic fields (i.e. International Relations/Political Science, Behavioural Psychology) that more directly support a PAOs development as it relates to their need to understand and effectively function in an operationally-driven IE, in line with CAF future requirements. The last section will discuss the overall results and provide recommendations.

Analysis of Master's Degrees: As Identified in the Surveys

First, I will look at the different types of PGEPs that were proposed by the participants in Table 5.2, and then I will score them (process described below) based on how they meet the criteria identified (using PA Functions, PA Gaps and PA capabilities)

³⁶³ Bernd Horn and Jeff Stouffer, *Educating the Leaders and Leading the Educated* ..., 247.

by both PAOs and Commanders/DND SCCs as the most critical in supporting or having an impact on the overall mandate/mission while also enhancing/augmenting a PAOs capabilities.

Assigning Points to the Criteria identified by PAOs and Commanders/DND SCCs

Table 6.1 consolidates the information from Tables 5.3 and 5.4. In order to score and rank the top identified PA Functions, PA Gaps and PA capabilities by both PAOs and Commanders/DND SCCs, each item chosen was assigned a numerical value based on if it was identified as the first, second or third priority (a fourth was identified for PA capabilities). For Tables 5.3 (PAOs Priorities) and Table 5.4 (Commanders/DND SCCs Priorities):

- a. Items identified as the 1st choice in each column (PA Functions, PA Gaps and PA capabilities) will receive a score of 6,
- b. Items identified as the 2nd choice in each column (PA Functions, PA Gaps and PA capabilities) will receive a score of 3,
- c. Items identified as the 3rd (and 4th as applicable) choice in each column (PA Functions, PA Gaps and PA capabilities) will receive a score of 1, and
- d. If the same item is identified by a PAO and a Commander, then it will receive points from both.³⁶⁴

This results in a total score of 10 per column/topic (PA Functions, PA Gaps and PA capabilities) or 30 per Table, and a combined total score of 60 when both Tables 5.3

³⁶⁴ Note: *Crisis and Emergency Communications* will be used as an example to show how each item is scored. In Table 5.3, PAOs identified *Crisis and Emergency Communications* as their first choice under the column PA Functions, and as a result receives (6) points. Additionally, in Table 5.4 Commanders/DND SCCs also identified *Crisis and Emergency Communications* as their top choice under the column PA Functions, and as a result receives (6) points. The total score for *Crisis and Emergency Communications* from both Tables is 12 points, and this can be seen in Table 6.1.

and 5.4 are combined. After assigning the appropriate scores to Tables 5.3 and 5.4, we have the ranking of each item per column with its score (out of 60) and then expressed out of 100 points in Table 6.1. In order to simplify the list with the intent of assessing the different PGEPs with these criteria, Table 6.2 lists all of the items from most important to least, and consolidated the scores of the three criteria that specifically deal with PA Advice into one ('Public Affairs Advice', 'Advising senior Officers' and 'Provides Advice and Guidance' are represented by 'Public Affairs Advice' in Table 6.2). Then, the criteria identified in Table 6.2 will be used to score the top three types of PGEPs that both PAOs and Commanders/DND SCCs proposed (refer to Table 6.3), in order to augment a PAOs capabilities in support of a PAO's Chain-of-Command's mandate.

Table 6.1 – Consolidated Top PA Functions, Gaps and Capabilities and Scores

| Topic | Score Value Current requirements /60 | Expressed /100 points |
|--|---|-----------------------------|
| Top 3 PA Functions – PAOs and Commanders | | |
| Crisis and Emergency Communications | 12 | 20 |
| Public Affairs Advice | 6 | 10 |
| Media Relations | 1 | 1.5 |
| Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1 | 1.5 |
| Top 3 PA Gaps – PAOs and Commanders | | |
| Strategic communications and campaign planning (Public Affairs) | 9 | 15 |
| Advising senior Officers (Leadership) | 7 | 12 |
| Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) (Public Affairs) | 3 | 5 |
| Leadership skills (Leadership) | 1 | 1.5 |
| Top 4 PA Capabilities – PAOs and Commanders | | |
| Provides Advice and Guidance | 10 | 17 |
| Public Affairs TechNet Support | 6 | 10 |
| Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 2 | 3.25 |
| Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 2 | 3.25 |

Table 6.2 – Criteria to Assess Post-Graduate Education Programs

| Ser. | Criteria to assess post-graduate education programs | Expressed /100 |
|------|---|----------------|
|------|---|----------------|

| | | points |
|------------|---|---------------|
| 1. | Public Affairs Advice | 39 |
| 2. | Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 |
| 3. | Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 |
| 4. | Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 |
| 5. | Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 |
| 6. | Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 |
| 7. | Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 |
| 8. | Media Relations | 1.5 |
| 9. | Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 |
| 10. | Leadership skills | 1.5 |

Table 6.3 – Top Three Identified Types of Post-Graduate Education Programs

| Ser. | Types of Master’s Degrees |
|-------------|---|
| 1. | Strategic Communications |
| 2. | Crisis Communications / Management |
| 3. | Social Media Communications / Digital Communications Strategies |

Scoring Master’s Degrees Based on the Criteria Identified by PAOs and Commanders

More than 100 accredited universities were examined from Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom that currently provide a Master’s Degree in the three identified academic fields in Table 6.3. Included in these 100 were the PGEPs that were proposed by all survey participants, and in some cases, some of these programs were not even considered as their academic field (i.e. MBA) did not meet the afore-mentioned criteria. Of the programs that were scored, only the ones that attained a minimum total score of 70 were included in the following Tables. To view all of the PGEPs that were examined and scored, refer to Annex C.

The assessment on what score each Master’s Degree receives per criteria will be based on: the information that is publicly available on that specific program, its overall curriculum and the details of each course (both required and elective). Additionally, and in line with this research project, all of the programs basically identified that upon

completing the degree requirements that students would increase their ability to critically evaluate and research issues, and likewise improve their analytical skills so that they can more effectively manage complex issues. An increase in these cognitive and intellectual skills will improve/augment a senior PAO's ability to more effectively operate at the higher levels (strategic, institutional and political), better supporting a Commander's overall mandate/mission.

The total scores of each PGEP based on the proposed academic field are shown in the following Tables:

- a. Strategic Communications (Tables 6.4 and 6.5),
- b. Crisis Communications/Management (Table 6.6), and
- c. Social Media Communications/Digital Communications Strategies (Table 6.7).

Table 6.4 – Comparing Different Post-Graduate Education Programs– Strategic Communications

| | Max | University 1 | University 2 | University 3 | University 4 |
|--|-----|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
|--|-----|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|

| | Score per criteria /100 | | | | |
|---|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 35 | 31 | 31 | 34 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 16 | 14 | 14 | 15 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 14 | 13 | 15 | 13 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 9 | 4 | 8 | 8 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3 | 3 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2.25 | 2 | 2 | 3.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1.5 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 89 | 76 | 82 | 86 |

Table 6.5 - Comparing Different Post-Graduate Education Programs– Strategic Communications (Continued)

| | Max Score | University 5 | University 6 | University 7 |
|--|-----------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | | | |

| | per criteria /100 | | | |
|--|-----------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 31 | 34 | 34 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 13 | 15 | 13 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 5 | 5 | 6 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 3 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 78 | 85 | 84 |

Table 6.6 – Comparing Different Post-Graduate Education Programs– Crisis Communications/Management

| | Max Score per | University 1 | University 2 | University 3 | University 4 | University 5 |
|--|---------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | | | | | |

| | criteria /100 | | | | | |
|---|------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 29 | 35 | 30 | 31 | 34 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 11 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3.25 | 2 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3.25 | 2 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1.5 | 1 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 74 | 84 | 76 | 81 | 82 |

Table 6.7 – Comparing Different Post-Graduate Education Programs– Social Media Communications/Digital Communications Strategies

| | Max Score per criteria | University 1 | University 2 | University 3 | University 4 | University 5 |
|--|------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | |
|--|-------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | /100 | | | | | |
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 31 | 33 | 29 | 29 | 30 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 14 | 15 | 13 | 14 | 14 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 11 | 12 | 10 | 10 | 12 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2.25 | 2 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 77 | 79 | 71 | 72 | 75 |

Ranking the Top Master's Degrees Based on Criteria Identified in the Survey

After assigning the scores to each respective PGEP based on the identified criteria, it is evident that a Master's Degree in Strategic Communications best meets the PAOs and Commanders educational requirement as the most critical in supporting or having an impact on the overall mandate/mission while also enhancing/augmenting a PAOs capabilities. While Table 6.8 provides the top three programs per academic field, Table 6.9 provides the top three programs based on total score based on the identified

criteria. While a Master’s Degree in any of the three academic fields identified would increase a PAOs knowledge and ability to operate at more senior levels, the results show that a Master’s Degree in Strategic Communications would best provide a senior PAO with the ability to meet the institutionally mandated corporate communications-related responsibilities.

Table 6.8 – Top Three Programs per Academic Field Related to the Strategic/Crisis/Social Media Communications

| Top 3 Strategic Communications Master’s Degrees | Total Score /100 |
|---|-------------------------|
| 1. University 1 | 89 |
| 2. University 4 | 86 |
| 3. University 6 | 85 |
| Top 3 Crisis Communications/Management Master’s Degrees | |
| 1. University 2 | 84 |
| 2. University 5 | 82 |
| 3. University 4 | 81 |
| Top 3 Social Media Communications/Digital Communications Strategies Master’s Degrees | |
| 1. University 2 | 79 |
| 2. University 1 | 77 |
| 3. University 5 | 75 |

Table 6.9 – Top Three Post-Graduate Education Programs

| Top 3 most Critical PA Functions identified by PAOs and Commanders | Top 3 most Critical PA Gaps identified by PAOs and Commanders | Top 3 capabilities provided to a Commander identified by PAOs and Commanders | Top 3 Post-Graduate Education Programs Identified based on total score |
|---|--|---|---|
| | | | |

| | | | |
|--|--|---------------------------------------|---|
| | | | |
| 1. Crisis and Emergency Communications | 2. Strategic communications and campaign planning | 1. Provides Advice and Guidance | 1. University 1 in Strategic Communications |
| 2. Public Affairs Advice | 1. Advising senior Officers | 2. Public Affairs TechNet Support | 2. University 4 in Strategic Communications |
| 3. Public Affairs Support to Operations, and Media Relations | 2. Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 3. Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3. University 6 in Strategic Communications |

Analysis of Master’s Degrees: Increasing the Operationalization of Public Affairs Officers

The requirement to increase the operationalization of the PA Function, specifically when PAOs are forward deployed will require them to increase their knowledge and skills in areas that are directly linked to being able to better understand the different components of the IE, and their role in it. In order to meet this specific requirement, the focus has to be less on traditional communications requirements and more on increasing a PAO’s competency in areas related to better understanding human behavior and managing the IE, specifically through military StratCom. Matthew A. Lauder, Defence Scientist in the Socio-Cognitive Systems/Adversarial Intent Section at Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) states that:

Military forces that operate in the IE will need to fully grasp and adapt to the social and psychological processes of human interaction in the physical and virtual realities ... [and they] ... must be prepared to compete against, and defeat, alternate sources of information, in particular non-state actors.³⁶⁵

³⁶⁵ Matthew A. Lauder, “The Janus Matrix: Lessons Learned and Building an Integrated Influence Activities Capability for the Future Security Environment,” *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol 15.2 (2013): 44.

Academic areas that would increase a PAOs knowledge in these areas and the socio-cultural environment in particular are: political science, international relations, behavioural psychology, etc.

Assigning Points Based on Operational Requirements

With the exception of replacing Strategic Communications with military StratComs in Table 6.10, the remaining criteria identified as critical to PAOs and Commanders in the surveys was used in order to assess the different PGEPs in political science, international relations and behavioural psychology. The score value that is assigned to each criteria is based on the factors that are vital to operating in the IE: military StratCom, PA advice, imagery and social media planning, PA support to operations, crisis and emergency communications and leadership skills. The criteria in Table 6.10 will then be used to score the different Master's Degrees, refer to Table 6.11.

Table 6.10 – Criteria to assess Master's Degrees in Political Science, International Relations and Behavioural Psychology

| Ser. | Criteria | Expressed /100 points |
|------|---|-----------------------|
| 1. | Military StratCom | 18 |
| 2. | Public Affairs Advice | 15 |
| 3. | Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 15 |
| 4. | Public Affairs Support to Operations | 15 |
| 5. | Crisis and Emergency Communications | 15 |
| 6. | Leadership skills | 15 |

| | | |
|-----|--------------------------------------|---|
| 7. | Media Relations | 3 |
| 8. | Public Affairs TechNet Support | 2 |
| 9. | Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 1 |
| 10. | Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 1 |

Scoring Master's Degrees Based on the Criteria Identified to Operate in the Information Environment

Table 6.11 – Comparing Different Post-Graduate Education Programs: Political Science, International Relations and Behavioural Psychology

| | Max Score per criteria | University 1 Master in Political Science | University 2 Master in Political Science | University 3 Master in International Relations | University 4 Master of Arts in Psychology (Behavioural and Cognitive) | University 5 Master of Arts in Psychology (Applied Social Psychology) |
|---|------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Military StratCom | 18 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 18 | 18 |
| (2) Public Affairs Advice | 15 | 10 | 12 | 10 | 14 | 13 |
| (3) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 15 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 11 |
| (4) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 15 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 11 |
| (5) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 15 | 11 | 12 | 11 | 13 | 13 |
| (6) Leadership skills | 15 | 12 | 15 | 14 | 15 | 14 |
| (7) Media Relations | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (8) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| (9) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 73 | 83 | 77 | 91 | 87 |

Note: The scores assigned to criteria '3' was based on a PAO's increased ability to effectively employ imagery and social media as a result of taking the identified programs.

Ranking the Top Master's Degrees in Support of Operating in the Information Environment

After assigning the scores to each respective PGEP based on the identified criteria, it is evident that a Master's Degrees in Psychology and Political Science have

merit in supporting a PAOs role in an IE environment focused on human behavior. Table 6.12 lists the top three Master's Degree of those that were assessed.

Table 6.12 – Top Three Programs per Academic Field Related to the Information Environment

| Top 3 Master's Degrees to Operate in the Information Environment | Total Score /100 |
|--|-------------------------|
| 1. University 4 – Master of Arts in Psychology (Behavioural and Cognitive) | 91 |
| 2. University 5 – Master of Arts in Psychology (Applied Social Psychology) | 87 |
| 3. University 2 – Master's in Political Science | 83 |

Discussion and Recommendations

This chapter has identified two sets of PGEPs, one focused on the requirement to educate PAOs through the 'conventional', yet still institutionally relevant Strategic Communications path, while the other is focused on the emerging need to have the military's professional PA communicators to be knowledgeable in human behavior as it relates to the coordinated use of different communication activities and capabilities to deter, validate and counter threats within the IE. Both are important, while we accept the Master's programs proposed by PAOs and Commanders in Chapter Five, we also have a responsibility to balance this with the future requirement to operationalize aspects of the PA Function in line with a military StratCom concept as the foundation.

It is important to acknowledge that the PGEPs that were assessed in this chapter were not assessed through any particular professionally accepted method or elaborate process, nor was the list of programs exhaustive. However, for the purposes of demonstrating and reinforcing the fact that there is an academic deficit in PA education

for senior PAOs as defined by the CFPDS, and that this can be improved by a PGEP at the Master's level, the information is informative and sufficient to make recommendations.

While all of the programs assessed were of high caliber, for the purposes of this research project and in line with the aforementioned criteria and requirements, the PGEPs that addressed most of the issues as a result of the surveys and the need to operationalize the PA Function can be found in order of priority in Table 6.13. All of these programs could provide PAOs with the opportunity to increase their knowledge and professional capabilities on the various academic fields through critical analysis, intellectual discourse and the use of analytical skills. Regardless of the program chosen, these cognitive benefits will allow a senior PAO to be able to increase his/her professional capabilities in line with their requirement to function earlier in their career at the strategic and political levels, as well as meeting the new operational requirements.

Table 6.13 – Top Assessed Master's Degrees

| Top Master's Degrees | Total Score /100 |
|--|-------------------------|
| 1. University 4 – Master of Arts in Psychology (Behavioural and Cognitive) | 91 |
| 2. University 1 – Master's in Strategic Communications | 89 |
| 3. University 5 – Master of Arts in Psychology (Applied Social Psychology) | 87 |
| 4. University 4 – Master's in Strategic Communications | 86 |
| 5. University 6 – Master's in Strategic Communications | 85 |
| 6. University 2 – Master's in Political Science | 83 |

Figure 6.1 illustrates that the PA Gaps and certain PA PD deficiencies (like the academic deficit) can be addressed by aligning the PA Functions and Capabilities with the future operational needs of the CAF as outlined in the DGPA Report. This will ensure that future PD requirements support a PAO's ability to function at higher levels, and

likewise be able to operate in the ever evolving and complex IE in support of future CAF operational needs.




Figure 6.1 – Aligning PA Functions and Capabilities with Future Operational and PD Requirements

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

TOWARDS THE MASTER STRATEGIC COMMUNICATOR: POST-GRAD EDUCATION AND CLOSING THE ACADEMIC DEFICIT FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS

The investment in graduate education in both time and resources is undisputedly high. However, the responsibility of senior officers to navigate the institution through an often ambiguous, perpetually changing, and always complex and dangerous world, imposes the obligation on its stewards. After all, those who claim the title of professional, and who society has entrusted with the safety of the nation and the lives of its sons and daughters, are obliged to ensure they are as prepared as possible to provide advice to the government and lead the nation in harm's way.³⁶⁶

– Dr. Bill Bentley and Colonel Bernd Horn, *Educating the Leader and Leading the Educated*, 2012

Access to, and the dissemination of information has transformed the battlespace, and as a result, has increased the importance of the PA Function and the role of PAOs, in how they support their Commanders, to how they inform the public. The security environment and what Canadians believe about it, is continuously evolving, “there is a growing recognition that the pace at which situations can change from relatively benign to a full-blown crisis will necessitate more nimble, responsive and considered government action than we have formerly seen.”³⁶⁷

The ability and necessity for PAOs to be able to effectively respond to increasingly complex and pressure-ridden situations and crises with political ramifications requires that they continuously develop their skills, knowledge, intellect and overall ability to think critically and work independently – specifically as they take on more senior roles and responsibilities. This level of professional competency,

³⁶⁶ Bernd Horn and Jeff Stouffer, *Educating the Leaders and Leading the Educated* ..., 250.

³⁶⁷ Dr. Michael Hennessy and Dr. Scott Robertson, “The Canadian Forces of Tomorrow: Maintaining Strategic Effectiveness and Relevance in the 21st Century,” *Canadian Military Journal* (Spring 2003): 54.

emotional intelligence and maturity cannot be attained over a few years, or by focusing on only one or two of the pillars, it requires PAOs to have access to various PD opportunities/options across all four pillars so that they can appropriately develop themselves, any deficit, gap or limitation in any of the pillars can have adverse and counter-productive effects on a PAO's ability to perform at higher levels.

This research project has shown that there is an academic deficit in PA education for senior PAOs as defined by the CFPDS, and that this can be improved by a PGEP at the Master's level. Furthermore, this research project has demonstrated that a Master's Degree in Strategic Communications and/or Behavioural Psychology/Political Science best address this academic deficit by providing the opportunity for PAOs to expand their professional capabilities in line with their requirement to function earlier in their career at the strategic/political levels, and in meeting the evolving operational threats posed through the IE. The remainder of this chapter will provide a recap of all of the previous chapters, address the two main research questions and hypotheses originally raised, and then conclude with recommendations that are relevant to this research project.

The Importance of Professional Development for Public Affairs Officers

As members of the profession of arms, and in contrast to all other professional organizations, PAOs have a responsibility and a duty to ensure that their PD objectives, both service mandated and personally chosen, support their requirement to adhere to the U o S requirement in support of their ability to perform both general and occupational specific duties and tasks. In line with this, a PAO's PD initiatives need to support the development of his/her PBK, War Fighting skills and Leadership qualities conforming to

the military ethos and the CF code of values and ethics/professional standards, specifically as it relates to “the concept of service before self, the lawful, ordered application of military force, and the acceptance of the concept of unlimited liability.”³⁶⁸

While the CFPDS is instrumental in supporting a PAOs requirement to meet these service expectations and conditions, it is also vital in supporting their ability to progressively gain the skills and knowledge required to meet the correspondingly more numerous and complex vocational responsibilities that accompany PAOs at more senior ranks. In line with this requirement is one of the CFPDS’ main objectives, which is to ensure that: “CAF members are capable of critical thinking, managing change, effective leadership and resource management, across the full spectrum of military service.”³⁶⁹

This directly supports the unique role PAOs have as specialists, in that while they need to be cognizant of the many different issues that span the three levels of command and touch on the institutional and political spheres, their advice and guidance needs to focus less on how specific operational capabilities operate and more on how their use and employment will benefit an operation or the ability for the CAF to meet their mandate of protecting Canadians. Notwithstanding a PAO’s increasingly important contribution to the overall operational efforts of the CAF as it relates to the IE, through the currently developing military StratCom efforts.

By providing a professional framework in which PAOs may attain the PD objectives that allows them to meet these responsibilities, “the CFPDS is a critical

³⁶⁸ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, 10.

³⁶⁹ Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development . . .”, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

component of CF effectiveness.”³⁷⁰ While most CAF Officers have the time to benefit from the CFPDS’ four pillars as they progress through the 5 DPs, a PAOs requirement to operate at more senior levels a lot sooner means that they currently either receive the requisite PD later than they need it, or do not receive it at all (i.e. higher education for senior PAOs).

Current Challenges with Professional Development and Career Progression

While the overall development of CAF PAOs is crucial to their effectiveness, it is largely dependent upon: available resources, the member’s free time, support from their Chain-of-Command, and the occupational direction provided by the PA Branch, specifically as it relates to the future operational and institutional requirements of the PA Function. PAOs need to invest their limited time into PD objectives that meet their professional needs and augment the PA Function’s capacity to meet CAF requirements. For these reasons, the development of PAOs is in many ways a balance between what is currently required by the occupation (and may still be valid in the future), with what will be required in order to meet future threats (i.e. IE).

While PAOs cannot afford to develop their capabilities solely focused on future requirements at the expense of institutionally mandated corporate communications-related responsibilities, there needs to be a healthy balance where the evolution of the PA Function will find ways to develop its members so that it continues to meet both directives. As the IE becomes an increasingly important part of a Commander’s decision-making process, PAOs need to ensure that their PD decisions are in line with this new

³⁷⁰ Bernd Horn and Jeff Stouffer, *Educating the Leaders and Leading the Educated* ..., 281.

operational environment. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, while the current development of PAOs has generally supported the operational and institutional demands made on the occupation, it has not been able to address all of the limitations inherent in its PD framework – specifically related to the training and education pillars. This has been overcome only due to the fact that PAOs have relied more on their personal and professional experience and less on skills and knowledge gained through mandated training (i.e. leadership, operationally related and advanced occupational), and the fact that there is no PA education for senior PAOs.

While PAOs need to meet higher second language proficiency levels than all other CAF Officers, their limited access to leadership training, specifically as it relates to practical training places many PAOs at a disadvantage when they are posted to a base as a junior Lieutenant/Sub-Lieutenant–Captain/Lieutenant(Navy) and are expected to provide advice and guidance to a Commander at the rank of Colonel. Likewise, the occupational requirements for PAOs to be able to operate at more senior levels is not supported by any training, whereas the APAOC will only be in place by 2019. While this course will support the training requirements to better operate in the increasingly complex IE, till then PAOs have to rely on the experience and self-development pillars. When PAOs reach the DP 3 level, once again their PD options are limited in that only very few have the opportunity to attend JCSP RESID or JCSP DL, and there is currently no formal occupational specific training for PAOs at DP 4 or DP 5.

The lack of occupational direction/guidance and in some cases support, has resulted in PAOs (specifically at the more senior levels) basing their self-development decisions on their own personal requirements and the Branch SCRIT – in line with their

motivation to reach the next rank. This has created the current situation where a PAO's self-development is not connected to career progression as defined by the CFPDS, but rather the member's understanding of what they need in order to progress to the next rank.

From an educational perspective, the options available to PAOs is even less. Other than their requirement to complete their initial Baccalaureate degree when they join the CAF during DP 1, there is an academic deficit after that level. While some PAOs may find the time and resources to undertake and complete a PGEP on their own, there is no Branch supported Master's Degree for senior PAOs. Additionally, while the Branch SCRIT provides points towards promotion for a completed Master's Degree, there is no requirement that the academic field chosen actually benefits the PA Function or augments the professional capabilities of a PAO as the CAF's military communicators. This means that while PAOs can develop in the other three pillars, there is nothing from DP 3 to DP 5 that supports the increased educational needs for PAOs to operate at increasingly higher levels – this has resulted in an academic deficiency in the education pillar for senior PAOs.

Based on this information, and the overwhelming comments from survey participants, there is no connection between the self-development, education and training pillars in the development of PAOs, and the education pillar does not contribute anything to the PD of a PAO (past DP 1), as there is nothing currently or formally available. For the PA Branch, its lack of PD framework has meant that there is no formal correlation between education, training, experience and self-development in the PD of CAF PAOs. The DGPA Report confirms this by stating that the “military PA organization is

disjointed, and that has little influence over training, career progression, employment, deployment and overall ownership.”³⁷¹

Capabilities of the PA Function: The Need to Remain Relevant

While PAOs are provided with the basic skills and knowledge to perform the 18 PA Functions which then deliver the four PA capabilities to a Commander, the lack of a PA PD Framework in line with the CFPDS directly limits a PAO’s ability to adequately develop their skills and capabilities, particularly in terms of supporting more senior requirements. As previously noted, in order to provide these capabilities at higher levels, there are gaps which may exist at some level throughout a PAO’s career progression/PD, and the lack of a PD Framework only compounds the issue.

Notwithstanding these challenges, the PA Function and PAOs have been able to meet their operational and corporate requirements over the past decades largely based on their ability to incorporate their basic occupational skills with experience and various self-development initiatives. But as the requirements to operate at higher levels become ever more complex and pressure laden, and the changing operational environment exacts more from senior PAOs, they need to ensure that their capabilities evolve and are developed in line with the new reality – or risk becoming operationally irrelevant and/or relegated to only supporting routine PA communications functions.

The continuously emerging IE and its ability to affect the battlespace, and in many ways actually become the battlespace is taking on more relevance as users of social media platforms and other online venues are able to shift public opinion, and in some

³⁷¹ Director General Public Affairs, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, *A Conceptual Vision ...*, 3.

cases, be the impetus for the uprising in the first place. Referring to social media's role in the 2011 Egyptian revolution, Sam Gustin states in *Social Media Sparked, Accelerated Egypt's Revolutionary Fire*, that:

Did social media like Facebook and Twitter cause the revolution? No. But these tools did speed up the process by helping to organize the revolutionaries, transmit their message to the world and galvanize international support ... What has shocked most observers of the current Egyptian scene is the sheer speed with which the regime fell – 18 days. And that's where modern communications technology has had the most potent impact.³⁷²

As the PA Function has done many times in the past, it needs to ensure that its evolving vision and mission statements are in line with where and how its capabilities are most needed. As the DGPA Report stated: “The absence of PAOs who are true SMEs in all aspects of the IE will detrimentally influence the CAFs preparedness, readiness and international reputation.”³⁷³ As discussions related to this important issue are currently ongoing within the CAF, we can take note of the lessons learned on this issue from US operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere,³⁷⁴ as well as the significance behind “the establishment of the NATO-accredited Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia as a meaningful contribution to NATO's efforts in this area.”³⁷⁵ While it is imperative that PAOs continue to develop and employ the 18 PA Functions, the manner

³⁷² Sam Gustin, “Social Media Sparked, Accelerated Egypt's Revolutionary Fire,” *Wired Magazine*, last accessed 29 April, 2017, <https://www.wired.com/2011/02/egypts-revolutionary-fire/>

³⁷³ Director General Public Affairs, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, *A Conceptual Vision ...*, 27.

³⁷⁴ Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, “A Closer look at Russia's ‘Hybrid War’,” *The Wilson Centre*, last accessed 10 June, 2017, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7-KENNAN%20CABLE-ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf>

³⁷⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Wales Summit Declaration ...,” http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm

in which PA capabilities are provided to a Commander, especially during operations will definitely need to incorporate an understanding of “both the political-strategic end state and the military objective to be accomplished,”³⁷⁶ as it relates to the IE. The role of IE and the use of military StratCom to manage and address threats emanating from the IE will require PAOs that are not only trained in these domains, but intellectually able to manage the increasingly complexity subject matter, directly supporting the need for a PGEP focused in these areas. To further demonstrate the complexity at which senior PAOs will be expected to provide advice and guidance on, I refer to comments provided in 2013 by General Gerasimov, Russia’s Chief of General Staff:

The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness ... [and] ... New information technologies have enabled significant reductions in the spatial, temporal, and informational gaps between forces and control organs. Frontal engagements of large formations of forces at the strategic and operational level are gradually becoming a thing of the past. Long-distance, contactless actions against the enemy are becoming the main means of achieving combat and operational goals.³⁷⁷

Consensus on Priorities and the Need for Higher Education

The surveys identified that PAOs and Commanders have similar priorities as it relates to the 18 PA Functions, the 18 PA Gaps and the four PA capabilities (refer to Tables 5.3 and 5.4). The identified priorities (crisis and strategic communications,

³⁷⁶ Director General Public Affairs, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, *A Conceptual Vision ...*, 17.

³⁷⁷ General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” trans. by Robert Coalson, *US Army Military Review* – January-February 2016, last accessed June 10, 2017, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art008.pdf

advising senior Officers and the importance of imagery and social media/digital communications) all directly support the need for education in these areas, and a PGEP at the master's level would provide that option for PAOs as represented through the education pillar. While the survey participants identified that a PGEP focused on Corporate Strategic/Crisis Communications would best address the gaps and support a PAO's requirement to operate at higher levels, a PGEP focused on military StratCom would also have great merit in supporting a senior PAOs requirement to understand, manage and address threats emanating from the IE.

Addressing the Academic Deficit in Education for Senior Public Affairs Officers

This research project focused on two research questions: first, what are the gaps of the PA Function, and second, what PGEP(s) address the professional capabilities that could enhance the main functions employed by a PAO. In Chapter Four the 18 PA Gaps were identified and from these, the survey participants identified the most critical gaps to their mandate/mission (refer to Tables 5.3 and 5.4). These identified gaps, along with the identified PA Functions and capabilities were then used as the only criteria in assessing the PGEPs that addressed the gaps, and that would increase a PAOs professional capabilities further enhancing the main function employed by a senior PAO – whether it was in Strategic Communications or military StratComs.

Likewise, the two identified hypotheses were also addressed in this research project, that there is no type of PGEP that will address all identified gaps, and second that within the PA Branch there is no formal correlation between the four pillars in the career progression of PAOs. First, it was identified that no type of PGEP would be able to

address all of the identified gaps, none of the Master's degrees scored received full marks in all of the identified gaps. Basically, a PGEP on its own cannot address all of the PA capability development requirements, but ideally a mixture of education, training, experience and self-development is required. Second, it was shown that within the PA Branch, there is no formal correlation between the four pillars in the career progression of PAOs, rather individual choices and the PA Branch SCRIT currently drive the PD of most PAOs. The *CFITES* highlights the importance of all four pillars working together:

Each of these pillars contributes to the PD of Officers and soldiers in varying degrees throughout their careers. Each pillar is dependent upon the others since one pillar is incapable, on its own, of imparting all the necessary attributes required by a military professional.³⁷⁸

Based on the evidence provided throughout this research project, there is an academic deficit in PA education for senior PAOs as defined by the CFPDS, which can be addressed by a PGEP at the Master's level. Also, based on the direction that the PA Branch chooses to take or best supports the operational needs of the CAF, a Master's degree in either of the academic fields identified in Table 6.13 would provide the opportunity for PAOs to expand their professional capabilities in line with their requirement to function earlier in their career at the strategic and political levels.

Recommendations

These recommendations, which address all four pillars, will serve to reinforce the knowledge gained through the education pillar for a PAO. The education pillar on its own is not be able to solve the challenge faced by PAOs operating at more senior levels, it

³⁷⁸ Canada. Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, A-P9-050-000/PT-001 ..., 5.

requires for PAOs to be equally developed in all areas. As a result, these recommendations may also serve to support future initiatives in order to continue advancing the overall effectiveness and relevancy of the PA Function.

1. That a PGEP will help a senior PAO work at higher levels as per the education pillar in line with the CFPDS. This will also bring more credibility and complement the other pillars in reducing gaps. However, which gaps will be addressed and at what level will depend on the Master's program selected, its curriculum and how it connects together these capabilities, functions and gaps.

2. A PGEP in either Corporate Strategic Communications or StratCom would help alleviate the current academic deficit. While StratCom would better prepare a PAO to support military operations in line with expectations from NATO and the realities of threats faced in the IE, Corporate Strategic Communications would best support the corporate objectives which complement military objectives.

3. That the PA Branch should submit a Post Graduate Qualification Requirement (PGQR) in order to allow a PAO to be able to obtain a Master's Degree in a sought-after field that will augment the PA Function's effectiveness, specifically in areas it currently lacks expertise. This process will also require the PA Branch to confirm two items: first, identify what specific knowledge (academic field) is required to complement a specific position(s) (i.e. SJS, CJOC, CDS, PCO, ADM(PA), etc.). Once this is confirmed, then the specific institution(s) can be identified that provide a Master's Degree in the identified academic field.

4. The PA Branch should reinforce leadership training earlier in a PAO's career to coincide with their requirement to work at higher levels. This should be in line with a PAO's career path options and complemented by the four pillars.

5. The APAOC should be developed and approved as soon as possible. The skills obtained through this advanced course will support a PAO's ability to support operations and support the knowledge gained through the Master's Degree.

6. There is a need to better align the four pillars through a PA Branch PD Framework in line with the CFPDS. Once achieved, the pillars will complement each other and career path options will become clearer for PAOs, making it easier for them to align their career progression with the requirements of the PA Function and the CAF.

Annex A to

Research Project: Analysis of the CAF Development of its Military Public Affairs Communicators: An Exploration of a Post-Graduate Education Program for PAOs in order to Expand their Professional Capabilities

Surveys Completed by Canadian Armed Forces Public Affairs Officers

| Question #1 - PAOs | |
|---|----|
| Based on the CAF leadership model, do you think that the level of professionalization of CAF Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) is sufficient to meet CAF requirements? | |
| Yes | 1 |
| No | 23 |
| Question #2 - PAOs | |
| If you responded no, what would help to professionalize better the CAF PAOs? | |
| <p>In response to this question:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The vast majority of participants (over 70%) stated that PAOs should have access to a post-graduate education program (focused on communications), in support of its requirement to deliver 'educated' expert public affairs advice. An adequate number of participants also highlighted the importance of broadening a PAOs educational/academic background/experience with Political Science/International Relations/Human Behavioural focused area in order to expand their overall effectiveness. 2. A good number of participants (over 30%) mentioned the importance of introducing a PA Leadership Course or highlighted that this deficiency needs to be importance of addressing this deficiency. 3. Some participants also stated that PAOs would benefit from a second PA career course, in line with the Advanced Public Affairs Officer Course (APAOC) that is currently being planned. 4. Additional points raised were about: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased access to JCSP, and • More trade training specific to operational deployments, perhaps where BPAOC could focus additional time on the importance of, and how a PAO is expected to function in an operational environment. Additionally, the importance of teaching about the wider information spectrum, military StratCom principles and the role of PA in military in StratCom. | |

Question #3 - PAOs

In order to support the Public Affairs Function, do you think that the CAF need a Public Affairs military occupation, or should institutional Public Affairs requirements and responsibilities be taken care of by a non-PAO who has been provided with basic unit Public Affairs Training?

In response to this question:

Everyone agreed on the fact that the CAF should have its own PA military occupation, the following general remarks were provided (in no particular order):

1. PA advisors to Commanders should be full-time, accredited and professionally educated and trained Officers who hold in depth expertise in the communications domains in order to assist/support Commanders with operations, advice, guidance, media queries, internal/external communications, etc.
2. CAF PAOs have the military training that helps them integrate easier with units (units are more responsive to someone in uniform and PAOs are accustomed to the military way of life). This also helps them think in a military way which is essential for planning, and gives a better understanding of military processes. When dealing with the public or media, having members in uniform conducting PA activities supports the professional image of the CAF.
3. PAOs are often the most direct link to the strategic/political level within their unit alongside their Commander who must understand how to operate in this cognitive context with a wide variety of experience at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. A full-time military PAO is required to advise Commanders on issues of strategic/national level importance, or to be able to lead communications-driven operations as many recent domestic operations have been.
4. The CAF is an operational organization separate but housed within the DND, and a PAO has the perspective and ability to understand and integrate well into construct. As well, PAOs can focus on Chain-of-Command issues and serve operational Commanders, and by virtue of their service are able to advise their Commanders in all operational environments.
- 5 – Information warfare has become too complex and important to be left to a non-PAO or unit PA representative. There is too much at stake and at risk from an institutional perspective in terms of relevancy, legitimacy and overall operational effect as it pertains to the IE to not have a CAF PAO.

Question #4 - PAOs

Using a scale of 1 = Not at all important to 5 = Very Important, based on your views and experience please rate each of the following Gaps Categories which impacts Public Affairs support provided to the Canadian Armed Forces (place one 'x' per serial):

| Ser | Gaps Category | Not at all Important (1) | Slightly Important (2) | Important (3) | Fairly Important (4) | Very Important (5) | Total Score /120 |
|-----|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|----------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| 1. | Public Affairs | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 17 | 107 |
| 2. | Human Resources | | 1 | 5 | 14 | 4 | 93 |
| 3. | Finance / Administration | | 2 | 7 | 11 | 4 | 89 |
| 4. | Leadership | | 1 | | 4 | 23 | 113 |

| Question #5 - PAOs | | | | | | | |
|--|---|------------------|-----------------------|--------------|---------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Using a scale of 1 = Not Critical to 5 = Very Critical, based on their impact to your overall mandate/mission, please rate each of the following Public Affairs Gaps (place one 'x' per serial): | | | | | | | |
| Ser | Public Affairs Gaps | Not Critical (1) | Slightly Critical (2) | Critical (3) | Fairly Critical (4) | Very Critical (5) | Total Score /120 |
| Public Affairs (1-9) | | | | | | | |
| 1. | Public Affairs input to the Operational Planning Process | | 2 | 2 | 7 | 13 | 99 |
| 2. | Strategic communications and campaign planning | | 1 | 1 | 5 | 17 | 110 |
| 3. | Imagery and social media planning (digital communications) | | | 5 | 7 | 12 | 104 |
| 4. | Public Affairs input to Information Operations (IO) and Influence Activities (IA) | | | 5 | 8 | 11 | 102 |
| 5. | Liaison and coordination with other departments and agencies | 2 | 3 | 6 | 9 | 4 | 82 |
| 6. | Training senior Officers and spokespersons for media interviews | 1 | 3 | 10 | 6 | 4 | 81 |
| 7. | Readiness for operations and deployments | | 1 | 2 | 7 | 14 | 106 |
| 8. | Collective training for pre-deployment and Joint Operations | 1 | 1 | 5 | 8 | 9 | 95 |
| 9. | Lessons Learned | | 4 | 6 | 11 | 3 | 85 |
| Human Resources (10-11) | | | | | | | |
| 10. | Staffing and human resources management | | 2 | 10 | 9 | 3 | 85 |
| 11. | Performance appraisal (CFPAS, PDRs and PERs) | 1 | 3 | 8 | 7 | 5 | 84 |
| Finance / Administration (12-15) | | | | | | | |
| 12. | Resource management and managerial skills | | | 9 | 9 | 6 | 93 |
| 13. | Budget management | | 4 | 8 | 8 | 4 | 84 |
| 14. | Business planning | | 4 | 10 | 7 | 3 | 81 |
| 15. | Contracting and procurement | 3 | 5 | 9 | 3 | 4 | 72 |
| Leadership (16-18) | | | | | | | |
| 16. | Advising senior Officers | | | 4 | 1 | 19 | 111 |
| 17. | Leadership skills | 1 | | 1 | 5 | 17 | 109 |
| 18. | Mentoring, coaching and counselling skills | | | 2 | 11 | 11 | 105 |

Question #6 - PAOs

According to the Joint Public Affairs Doctrine, there are four Public Affairs capabilities provided to a Commander. Based on the CAF Professional Development System (CFPDS), which of these capabilities do you feel that you have been or have not been adequately trained for, gained through experience or acquired through self-development?

In response to this question, please use a scale of 1 = Not adequately supported to 5 = Very well supported (place one 'x' per serial):

| Ser | Capabilities Provided to a Commander | Not Adequately Supported (1) | Slightly Supported (2) | Supported (3) | Fairly Supported (4) | Very well Supported (5) | Total Score /120 |
|-----|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|---------------|----------------------|-------------------------|------------------|
| 1. | Provides Advice and Guidance | | 1 | 5 | 8 | 10 | 99 |
| 2. | Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 2 | 6 | 9 | 3 | 4 | 73 |
| 3. | Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 1 | 4 | 12 | 4 | 3 | 76 |
| 4. | Public Affairs TechNet Support | | 2 | 8 | 5 | 9 | 93 |

Question #7 - PAOs

Based on your views and experience, are there any academic fields of study that you can propose that could have enhanced your capabilities as a PAO?

In response to this question:

1. The vast majority of participants stated that the academic field should be communications driven, with the following variances:

- Strategic communications
- Crisis communications
- Digital communications
- Social Media communications
- Marketing and communications
- International/Intercultural communications
- Political communication
- Media Relations and communications
- Internal communications
- Public Relations and communications
- Journalism and communications

2. The following academic fields were also mentioned by some participants:

- Political Science/International Relations
- Behavioural Psychology
- Leadership
- Organizational/Change Management
- Marketing/Advertising
- Non-kinetic targeting / Target audience analysis
- Master of Business Administration (MBA)

Question #8 - PAOs

Based on the Public Affairs Gaps outlined in Question #5, which post-graduate education program (at the Master's level) would you propose in order to augment a PAOs capabilities in support of your Chain-of-Command's mandate?

(a) Propose a post-graduate education program(s):

In response to this question:

1. The vast majority of participants stated that the post-graduate education program they would propose should be communications driven, with the following variances:

- Strategic communications
- Crisis communications
- Social Media communications
- Marketing and communications
- International/Intercultural communications
- Media Relations and communications
- Public Relations and communications

2. The following post-graduate education programs were also mentioned by an adequate number of participants:

- Political Science/International Relations
- Behavioural Psychology (Cognitive and Analytical requirement)
- Master's in Business Administration (MBA)
- Master of Defence Studies (MDS)

(b) Justify why:

The following justifications were provided for each respective academic field of focus for the proposed post-graduate education program:

Communications

1. The CAF PAO occupation is one of the few military occupations that does not have a Master's ATL, yet we advise the highest authority on communications. It could also be mentioned that civilian counterparts at the senior level have received advanced post-graduate education/training.

2. With a Graduate Degree for PAOs, the CAF can rely on educational institutions to deliver (cost savings) and update courseware (also savings but as well, relevancy of training) designed on the latest trends and technologies. As well, with a sponsored ATL, PAOs can focus on the education and not in trying to fit a Master's Degree into an almost 24/7 job.

3. The nature of military public affairs is evolving significantly. Moreover, "hybrid warfare" is changing how militaries engage in operations. The majority of military activities now are meant to influence the IE and create strategic effects. Military activities are far less about tactical (kinetic) activities these days. Understanding how to think strategically (from a communications perspective) and blend military activities with political, diplomatic, economic and information approaches is

essential.

4. A Master's in Communications is a broad-ranging program that offers a spectrum of specialties pertinent to today's IE. It is an internationally recognized field of study, providing legitimacy, credibility and versatility.
5. In many institutions, a Master's in Strategic Communications offers scientific methodology to communications, which further enables a PAO to really hone and refine the PA craft in line with the current operational environment, thus allowing him/her to become a more effective advisor in any situation.
6. A Masters in Communications would allow a CAF PAO to gain more knowledge and become more educated within the communications field, further excelling as a PA practitioner. This would indirectly better support the senior PAO in their role as a leader within the occupation and as a mentor to more junior members.

Political Science/International Relations

1. PAOs should understand how humans interact with each other in terms of the political environment, understand different perspectives and how relations between states are fostered and maintained.

Behavioural Psychology

1. Behavioural psychology can be used to better influence audiences during operations within the confines of approved doctrine. It will also allow one to refine techniques to respond to misinformation and propaganda. In order to effect behavioural change, there has to be better understand of what motivates this change at the cognitive level.
2. Cognitive and analytical is in line with the future CAF requirements.

MBA

1. Are generally designed to meet the development needs of experienced managers who occupy or are destined to senior management positions.
2. To operate as an effective advisor, PAOs must understand how decisions in organizations are made and also must understand how to manage resources and people in an organization to balance the demands of acting as an advisor, but also an administrator of significant pools of personnel and finances.

MDS

1. Comprehensive program covering Leadership, history, politics, military science, etc.

| | |
|---|----|
| (a) Based on the CAF Professional Development System, do you have a clear understanding/view of your career progression enabled by a combination of education, training, experience and self-development? | |
| Yes | 8 |
| No | 16 |
| (b) If you responded yes, please explain your answer below: | |
| <p>A small percentage (35%) of the participants responded ‘Yes’ to this question, even though they stated that they understood their career progression, it was not without mentioning the challenges. Below is a summary of their comments:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. While they understand the CFPDS, they are not necessarily satisfied due to the fact that they are left to develop on their own after BPAOC. The Branch should do a better job at developing and articulating what follow-on training and education members should focus on to advance their careers. 2. They have taken their career into their own hands, and continue to liaise with senior members of the Branch for support when required. They feel that they have had to rely on their own pursuit of education, experience and self-development objectives. 3. While the CFPDS works well for traditional / large CAF occupations, it seems to be problematic for small occupations. While the demand is high, there are not enough ATLS or opportunities to meet the demand. Also, due to being one-off’s or in very busy units, it is difficult to convince a member’s Chain-of-Command to free up their PAO so that they can take advantage of these opportunities. | |
| (c) If you responded No, what would you recommend? | |
| <p>The vast majority (65%) of the participants responded ‘No’ to this question, a tremendous amount of information and opinions were shared. Below is a summary of their comments:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The PA occupation needs to develop a precise DP progression for all Officers at each rank level. This would help the Branch to better plot an Officer’s career path. It would also tell the Officer exactly what he/she has to achieve in terms of education, training, employment experience in order to develop and be promoted to each rank. 2. Once a PA DP progression model is developed, PAOs will be able to connect it to their individualized 5-year or longer learning plans that extend beyond the CFPAS process where learning objectives are identified on a yearly basis. 3. There is a requirement to standardized the CFPDS for PAOs, a more formalized Branch-driven approach or model should be developed explaining the interconnections between education, training, experience and self-development, for PAOs who wish to advance their careers. The model would provide a road-map for those who wish to self-improve. | |
| Question #10 - PAOs | |

According to the Public Affairs Branch Directive 1.2, there are 18 Public Affairs Functions providing a professional framework that guide Public Affairs support.

Using a scale of 1 = Not Critical to 5 = Very Critical, looking at the Public Affairs Branch identified Public Affairs Functions, please rate each one based on how critical they are in support of your Chain-of-Command's mission/mandate (place one 'x' per serial):

| Ser. | Public Affairs Functions | Not Critical (1) | Slightly Critical (2) | Critical (3) | Fairly Critical (4) | Very Critical (5) | Total Score /120 |
|-------------|--|-------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. | Environment and Media Analysis | 1 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 7 | 86 |
| 2. | Public Affairs Advice | 1 | | 2 | 1 | 19 | 106 |
| 3. | Partnering, Collaborative Arrangements, Sponsorship, Liaison and Coordination with Commands/ECS, MND, PCO and OGDs | 1 | 2 | 3 | 7 | 10 | 92 |
| 4. | Media Relations | 1 | 1 | 7 | 9 | 5 | 85 |
| 5. | Internal Communications | | 3 | 8 | 11 | 1 | 89 |
| 6. | Internet and Electronic Communications | 1 | 1 | 3 | 10 | 9 | 97 |
| 7. | Crisis and Emergency Communications | 1 | | 1 | 2 | 19 | 107 |
| 8. | Community Outreach | 2 | 2 | 12 | 6 | 1 | 71 |
| 9. | Exhibitions and Displays | 5 | 12 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 52 |
| 10. | Public Affairs Support to Operations | | 2 | 1 | 4 | 16 | 103 |
| 11. | Marketing | 5 | 9 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 54 |
| 12. | Recruitment & Advertising | 5 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 57 |
| 13. | Production and Services – Publishing/Creative Services | 4 | 9 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 58 |
| 14. | Imagery | | 2 | 2 | 5 | 14 | 100 |
| 15. | Events and Announcements | 2 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 68 |
| 16. | Public Affairs Planning | 1 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 11 | 94 |
| 17. | Public Affairs Training | 3 | | 6 | 5 | 10 | 91 |

| 18. | Evaluation | 1 | 3 | 8 | 4 | 7 | 82 |
|---|------------|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| | | | | | | | |
| Question #11 - PAOs Is there anything else you would like to add in support of the Public Affairs Branch's objective to look at which post-graduate education program(s) would best benefit PAOs in order to expand their professional capabilities? | | | | | | | |
| In response to this question, a vast majority of PAOs stated that a post-graduate program is extremely important in developing highly capable senior PAOs and in increasing Branch credibility, and that this program should be tied to specific job requirements / positions requiring the member to be posted into the pre-identified position. | | | | | | | |

Annex B to

Research Project: Analysis of the CAF Development of its Military Public Affairs Communicators: An Exploration of a Post-Graduate Education Program for PAOs in order to Expand their Professional Capabilities

Surveys completed by Canadian Armed Forces Commanders and DND Senior Corporate Communicators

| Question #1 – CAF Commanders and DND Information Services Public Servants | |
|--|---|
| Based on the CAF leadership model, do you think that the level of professionalization of CAF Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) is sufficient to meet CAF requirements? | |
| Yes | 2 |
| No | 4 |
| Question #2 - CAF Commanders and DND Information Services Public Servants | |
| If you responded no, what would help to professionalize better the CAF PAOs? | |
| In response to this question, all the participants responded with: | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Academic upgrading • Master's program | |
| Question #3 - CAF Commanders and DND Information Services Public Servants | |
| In order to support the Public Affairs Function, do you think that the CAF need a Public Affairs military occupation, or should institutional Public Affairs requirements and responsibilities be taken care of by a non-PAO who has been provided with basic unit Public Affairs Training? | |
| Please provide an explanation of your point of view below: | |
| In response to this question: | |
| Everyone agreed on the fact that the CAF should have its own PA military occupation, the following general remarks were provided (in no particular order): | |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. CAF need a PA military occupation that are fully conversant with military culture, operations and procedures. This becomes specifically important when managing effective communication strategies during deployed domestic or expeditionary operations. 2. Basic PA training would not be sufficient to meeting the needs of the CAF. 3. The PA occupation (PAO) is essential for the CAF. Dealing with investigative reporters or responding to sensitive issues like Suicide and Sexual Harassment within the CAF require Commanders to seek advice from skilled advisors. | |
| | |

Question #4 - CAF Commanders and DND Information Services Public Servants

Using a scale of 1 = Not at all important to 5 = Very Important, based on your views and experience please rate each of the following Gaps Categories which impacts Public Affairs support provided to the Canadian Armed Forces (place one 'x' per serial):

| Ser. | Gaps Category | Not at all important (1) | Slightly important (2) | Important (3) | Fairly Important (4) | Very Important (5) | Total Score /30 |
|------|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| 1. | Public Affairs | | | | | 6 | 30 |
| 2. | Human Resources | | | 3 | 3 | | 21 |
| 3. | Finance / Administration | | 2 | 4 | | | 16 |
| 4. | Leadership | | 1 | | 2 | 3 | 25 |

| Question #5 - CAF Commanders and DND Information Services Public Servants | | | | | | | |
|--|---|------------------|-----------------------|--------------|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| Using a scale of 1 = Not Critical to 5 = Very Critical, based on their impact to your overall mandate/mission, please rate each of the following Public Affairs Gaps (place one 'x' per serial): | | | | | | | |
| Ser. | Public Affairs Gaps | Not critical (1) | Slightly critical (2) | Critical (3) | Fairly Critical (4) | Very Critical (5) | Total Score /30 |
| Public Affairs (1-9) | | | | | | | |
| 1. | Public Affairs input to the Operational Planning Process | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 23 |
| 2. | Strategic communications and campaign planning | | | | 2 | 4 | 28 |
| 3. | Imagery and social media planning (digital communications) | | | 1 | 1 | 4 | 27 |
| 4. | Public Affairs input to Information Operations (IO) and Influence Activities (IA) | | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 20 |
| 5. | Liaison and coordination with other departments and agencies | | 2 | 1 | 3 | | 19 |
| 6. | Training senior Officers and spokespersons for media interviews | | | 1 | 3 | 2 | 25 |
| 7. | Readiness for operations and deployments | | | 3 | 3 | | 21 |
| 8. | Collective training for pre-deployment and Joint Operations | | 2 | 2 | 2 | | 18 |
| 9. | Lessons Learned | | 3 | 1 | 2 | | 17 |
| Human Resources (10-11) | | | | | | | |
| 10. | Staffing and human resources management | 1 | 2 | 3 | | | 14 |
| 11. | Performance appraisal (CFPAS, PDRs and PERs) | | 5 | 1 | | | 13 |

| Finance / Administration (12-15) | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| 12. | Resource management and managerial skills | | 3 | 2 | | | 15 |
| 13. | Budget management | | 5 | | | | 13 |
| 14. | Business planning | 1 | 4 | | | | 11 |
| 15. | Contracting and procurement | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | | 14 |
| Leadership (16-18) | | | | | | | |
| 16. | Advising senior Officers | | | 1 | 2 | 2 | 26 |
| 17. | Leadership skills | | | 2 | 2 | 1 | 24 |
| 18. | Mentoring, coaching and counselling skills | | | 2 | 3 | | 22 |

Question #6 - CAF Commanders and DND Information Services Public Servants

According to the Public Affairs Branch Directive 1.2, there are 18 Public Affairs Functions providing a professional framework that guide Public Affairs support.

Using a scale of 1 = Not Critical to 5 = Very Critical, looking at the Public Affairs Branch identified Public Affairs Functions, please rate each one based on how critical they are/were in support of your mission/mandate (place one 'x' per serial):

| Ser. | Public Affairs Functions | Not critical 1 (1) | Slightly critical (2) | Critical (3) | Fairly Critical (4) | Very Critical (5) | Total Score /30 |
|------|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| 1. | Environment and Media Analysis | | 1 | 1 | | 4 | 25 |
| 2. | Public Affairs Advice | | | | 3 | 3 | 27 |
| 3. | Partnering, Collaborative Arrangements, Sponsorship, Liaison and Coordination with Commands/ECS, MND, PCO and OGDs | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 23 |
| 4. | Media Relations | | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 26 |
| 5. | Internal Communications | | | 2 | 4 | | 22 |
| 6. | Internet and Electronic Communications | | | 2 | 2 | 2 | 24 |
| 7. | Crisis and Emergency Communications | | | | 2 | 4 | 28 |
| 8. | Community Outreach | | | 5 | | 1 | 20 |
| 9. | Exhibitions and Displays | | 3 | 1 | 2 | | 15 |
| 10. | Public Affairs Support to Operations | | | 2 | 1 | 3 | 25 |
| 11. | Marketing | | 3 | 3 | | | 15 |
| 12. | Recruitment & Advertising | | 2 | 4 | | | 16 |
| 13. | Production and Services – Publishing/Creative Services | | 2 | 2 | 2 | | 18 |
| 14. | Imagery | | 2 | | 4 | | 20 |
| 15. | Events and Announcements | | 3 | 1 | 2 | | 17 |
| 16. | Public Affairs Planning | | | 2 | 1 | 3 | 25 |
| 17. | Public Affairs Training | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 24 |
| 18. | Evaluation | | 2 | 2 | 2 | | 18 |

| Question #7 - CAF Commanders and DND Information Services Public Servants | | | | | | | |
|---|---|--------------------|------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|
| Using a scale of 1 = No Risk to 5 = Enormous Risk, of the following Public Affairs Gaps, please rate each one based on the risk they pose to your mandate/mission (place one 'x' per serial): | | | | | | | |
| Ser. | Public Affairs Gaps | No Risk (1) | Slight Risk (2) | Risk (3) | A lot of Risk (4) | Enormous Risk (5) | Total Score /30 |
| Public Affairs (1-9) | | | | | | | |
| 1. | Public Affairs input to the Operational Planning Process | | 2 | 2 | 2 | | 18 |
| 2. | Strategic communications and campaign planning | | | 3 | 3 | | 21 |
| 3. | Imagery and social media planning (digital communications) | | 3 | 1 | 2 | | 17 |
| 4. | Public Affairs input to Information Operations (IO) and Influence Activities (IA) | | 2 | 4 | | | 16 |
| 5. | Liaison and coordination with other departments and agencies | | 2 | | 4 | | 20 |
| 6. | Training senior Officers and spokespersons for media interviews | | | 3 | 1 | 2 | 23 |
| 7. | Readiness for operations and deployments | | 2 | 2 | 2 | | 18 |
| 8. | Collective training for pre-deployment and Joint Operations | | 3 | 3 | | | 15 |
| 9. | Lessons Learned | | 4 | 2 | | | 14 |
| Human Resources (10-11) | | | | | | | |
| 10. | Staffing and human resources management | 1 | 5 | | | | 11 |
| 11. | Performance appraisal (CFPAS, PDRs and PERs) | 2 | 4 | | | | 10 |
| Finance / Administration (12-15) | | | | | | | |
| 12. | Resource management and managerial skills | 2 | 4 | | | | 10 |
| 13. | Budget management | 3 | 3 | | | | 9 |
| 14. | Business planning | 3 | 3 | | | | 9 |
| 15. | Contracting and procurement | 2 | 4 | | | | 10 |
| Leadership (16-18) | | | | | | | |
| 16. | Advising senior Officers | | | 2 | 1 | 3 | 25 |
| 17. | Leadership skills | | 2 | 1 | 3 | | 19 |
| 18. | Mentoring, coaching and counselling skills | | 2 | 1 | 3 | | 19 |

Question #8 - CAF Commanders and DND Information Services Public Servants

Based on the Public Affairs Gaps outlined in Question #7, which post-graduate education program (at the Master's level) would you propose in order to augment a PAOs capabilities in support of your mandate?

(a) Propose a post-graduate education program(s):

In response to this question:

1. All of the participants stated that the post-graduate education program they would propose should be communications driven, with the following variances:

- Strategic communications
- Crisis communications.
- Digital Communications Strategies

(b) Justify why:

The following justifications were provided:

1 – The CAF need uniformed PA specialists to deal with high operational tempo, quickly evolving situations and ongoing military operations. Effective Strategic / Crisis communications should be the bread and butter for uniformed PAOs.

2 – Master's in Strategic Communications offers a specialization in media studies and the dynamic of how information is transformed in today's environment by the media or other players and digested by the public.

3 - The knowledge that PAOs would gain and the networking opportunities with other communicators, specifically in new areas of communicating and sharing information would benefit their Chain-of-Command as well as maintaining and increasing the member's and the occupation's credibility within the institution.

Question #9 - CAF Commanders and DND Information Services Public Servants

According to the Joint Public Affairs Doctrine, there are four Public Affairs capabilities provided to a Commander. Based on the CAF Professional Development System (CFPDS - see Annex B), which of these capabilities do you feel that you have been or have not been adequately supported by a trained PAO?

In response to this question, please use a scale of 1 = Not adequately supported to 5 = Very well supported (place one 'x' per serial):

| Ser | Capabilities Provided to a Commander | Not Adequately Supported (1) | Slightly Supported (2) | Supported (3) | Fairly Supported (4) | Very well Supported (5) | Total Score /30 |
|-----|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|---------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|
| 1. | Provides Advice and Guidance | | | | 3 | 3 | 28 |
| 2. | Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 1 | | 4 | | 1 | 18 |
| 3. | Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 1 | | 2 | 1 | 2 | 21 |
| 4. | Public Affairs TechNet Support | | | 3 | 1 | 2 | 23 |

Question #10 - CAF Commanders and DND Information Services Public Servants

Is there anything else you would like to add in support of the Public Affairs Branch's objective to look at which post-graduate education program(s) would best benefit PAOs in order to expand their professional capabilities?

In response to this question, the participants stated that:

As an institution, we need to be careful that we don't develop our future leaders in silos. It would be beneficial to post a PAO (if available) in a non-PA position to better understand a different functional area of the organization. Perhaps even look at exchange programs with other militaries and OGDs, this could also provide a depth of experience that would make a better, more rounded PAO.

Annex C to

Research Project: Analysis of the CAF Development of its Military Public Affairs Communicators: An Exploration of a Post-Graduate Education Program for PAOs in order to Expand their Professional Capabilities

Comparing Different Post-Graduate Education Programs

- I. Strategic Communications,
- II. Crisis Communications/Management,
- III. Social Media Communications/Digital Communications Strategies, and
- IV. Political Science, International Relations and Behavioural Psychology

| I. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Strategic Communications | | | | | |
|--|------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|
| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 1 | University 2 | University 3 | University 4 |
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 35 | 31 | 31 | 34 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 16 | 14 | 14 | 15 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 14 | 13 | 15 | 13 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 9 | 4 | 8 | 8 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3 | 3 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2.25 | 2 | 2 | 3.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1.5 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 89 | 76 | 82 | 86 |

| I. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Strategic Communications (Continued) | | | | | |
|--|------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 5 | University 6 | University 7 | University 8 |
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 31 | 34 | 34 | 29 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 14 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 13 | 15 | 13 | 8 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 3 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 3 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 78 | 85 | 84 | 68 |

I. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Strategic Communications (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 9 | University 10 | University 11 | University 12 |
|--|---|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 29 | 29 | 25 | 24 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 15 | 13 | 14 | 12 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 68 | 67 | 64 | 61 |

I. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Strategic Communications (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 13 | University 14 | University 15 | University 16 |
|--|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 23 | 22 | 23 | 22 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 10 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 8 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 60 | 58 | 59 | 57 |

I. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Strategic Communications (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 17 | University 18 | University 19 | University 20 |
|--|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 23 | 23 | 21 | 19 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 7 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 56 | 55 | 53 | 50 |

I. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Strategic Communications (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 21 | University 22 | University 23 | University 24 |
|--|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 19 | 18 | 19 | 20 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 8 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 2.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 50 | 49 | 51 | 53 |

I. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Strategic Communications (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 25 | University 26 | University 27 | University 28 |
|--|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 21 | 20 | 19 | 18 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 7 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 55 | 53 | 51 | 49 |

I. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Strategic Communications (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 29 | University 30 | University 31 | University 32 |
|--|------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 17 | 18 | 17 | 18 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 47 | 49 | 50 | 52 |

I. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Strategic Communications (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 33 | University 34 | University 35 | University 36 |
|--|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 18 | 17 | 17 | 16 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 7 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 2.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 54 | 52 | 51 | 48 |

I. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Strategic Communications (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 37 | University 38 | University 39 | University 40 |
|--|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 19 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 50 | 51 | 53 | 55 |

II. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Crisis Communications/Management

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 1 | University 2 | University 3 | University 4 |
|---|-----------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 29 | 35 | 30 | 31 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 11 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 74 | 84 | 76 | 81 |

II. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Crisis Communications/Management (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 5 | University 6 | University 7 | University 8 |
|---|---|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 34 | 27 | 27 | 26 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 20 | 17 | 16 | 17 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 9 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 82 | 68 | 66 | 67 |

II. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Crisis Communications/Management (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 9 | University 10 | University 11 | University 12 |
|--|---|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 25 | 24 | 24 | 25 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 16 | 14 | 13 | 14 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 10 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 65 | 62 | 60 | 64 |

II. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Crisis Communications/Management (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 13 | University 14 | University 15 | University 16 |
|---|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 23 | 24 | 24 | 22 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 13 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 8 | 10 | 11 | 11 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 59 | 63 | 65 | 61 |

II. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Crisis Communications/Management (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 17 | University 18 | University 19 | University 20 |
|---|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 21 | 19 | 17 | 16 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 13 | 12 | 10 | 9 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 7 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 59 | 55 | 49 | 46 |

II. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Crisis Communications/Management (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 21 | University 22 | University 23 | University 24 |
|--|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 16 | 17 | 17 | 18 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 11 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 9 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 48 | 49 | 51 | 52 |

II. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Crisis Communications/Management (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 25 | University 26 | University 27 | University 28 |
|---|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 18 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 12 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 53 | 48 | 50 | 52 |

II. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Crisis Communications/Management (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 29 | University 30 | University 31 | University 32 |
|--|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 19 | 18 | 20 | 19 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 11 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 53 | 51 | 54 | 52 |

III. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Social Media Communications/Digital Communications Strategies

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 1 | University 2 | University 3 | University 4 |
|---|-----------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 31 | 33 | 29 | 29 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 14 | 15 | 13 | 14 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 11 | 12 | 10 | 10 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2.25 | 2 | 2.25 | 2.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 77 | 79 | 71 | 72 |

III. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Social Media Communications/Digital Communications Strategies (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 5 | University 6 | University 7 | University 8 |
|---|-----------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 30 | 27 | 26 | 25 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 14 | 12 | 11 | 10 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 12 | 10 | 9 | 9 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 75 | 68 | 65 | 63 |

III. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Social Media Communications/Digital Communications Strategies (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 9 | University 10 | University 11 | University 12 |
|---|-----------------------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 25 | 22 | 20 | 18 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 7 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 8 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 62 | 58 | 56 | 52 |

III. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Social Media Communications/Digital Communications Strategies (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 13 | University 14 | University 15 | University 16 |
|---|-----------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 15 | 14 | 11 | 12 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 8 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 7 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 50 | 48 | 44 | 46 |

III. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Social Media Communications/Digital Communications Strategies (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 17 | University 18 | University 19 | University 20 |
|---|-----------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 13 | 12 | 15 | 15 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 48 | 47 | 52 | 54 |

III. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Social Media Communications/Digital Communications Strategies (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 21 | University 22 | University 23 | University 24 |
|--|-----------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 12 | 12 | 15 | 13 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 8 | 10 | 11 | 9 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 9 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 47 | 50 | 55 | 50 |

III. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Social Media Communications/Digital Communications Strategies (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 25 | University 26 | University 27 | University 28 |
|---|-----------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 15 | 12 | 15 | 15 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 9 | 8 | 11 | 12 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 11 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 52 | 47 | 55 | 57 |

III. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Social Media Communications/Digital Communications Strategies (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 29 | University 30 | University 31 | University 32 |
|---|-----------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (1) Public Affairs Advice | 39 | 17 | 18 | 15 | 16 |
| (2) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 20 | 13 | 13 | 10 | 13 |
| (3) Strategic communications and campaign planning | 15 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 |
| (4) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 10 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (5) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| (6) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 |
| (7) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 3.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 |
| (8) Media Relations | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| (9) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Leadership skills | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 60 | 61 | 54 | 59 |

IV. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Political Science, International Relations and Behavioural Psychology

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 1 – Master in Political Science | University 2 – Master in Political Science | University 3 - Master in International Relations | University 4 - Master of Arts in Psychology (Behavioural and Cognitive) |
|--|------------------------------------|--|--|--|---|
| (1) Military StratCom | 18 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 18 |
| (2) Public Affairs Advice | 15 | 10 | 12 | 10 | 14 |
| (3) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 15 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 12 |
| (4) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 15 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| (5) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 15 | 11 | 12 | 11 | 13 |
| (6) Leadership skills | 15 | 12 | 15 | 14 | 15 |
| (7) Media Relations | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (8) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| (9) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 73 | 83 | 77 | 91 |

IV. Post-Graduate Education Programs in Political Science, International Relations and Behavioural Psychology (Continued)

| | Max Score per criteria /100 | University 5 - Master of Arts in Psychology (Applied Social Psychology) | University 6 – Master in Political Science | University 7 - Master in International Relations | University 8 - Master of Arts in Social Psychology |
|--|------------------------------------|--|---|---|---|
| (1) Military StratCom | 18 | 18 | 11 | 8 | 9 |
| (2) Public Affairs Advice | 15 | 13 | 9 | 9 | 8 |
| (3) Imagery and social media planning (digital communication) | 15 | 11 | 11 | 8 | 7 |
| (4) Public Affairs Support to Operations | 15 | 11 | 9 | 9 | 8 |
| (5) Crisis and Emergency Communications | 15 | 13 | 10 | 10 | 13 |
| (6) Leadership skills | 15 | 14 | 11 | 14 | 15 |
| (7) Media Relations | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| (8) Public Affairs TechNet Support | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| (9) Fosters Audience Trust and Support | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (10) Enhance Morale of Internal Audiences | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Score per Master's Degree | 100 | 87 | 68 | 65 | 67 |

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