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EXCHANGING BATTALIONS FOR BALACLAVAS:

A NEW ERA IN WARFIGHTING

Major P.A. Umrysh

JCSP 40

Exercise Solo Flight

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**EXCHANGING BATTALIONS FOR BALACLAVAS: A NEW ERA IN
WARFIGHTING**

By Major P.A. Umrysh
Par le major P.A. Umrysh

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INTRODUCTION

The world is changing, and warfare along with it. Nation-state borders are becoming blurred, economies intertwined, and state on state conflict a thing of the past. Threats are morphing from a near peer military into an adversary that shows no outward affiliation to a particular state, yet fights and is often successful against a numerically and technologically superior foe. This is the new, balaclava covered face of conflict.

Due to globalization and the associated blurring of state borders combined with the interdependence of nation-state economies, state on state conflict is fading into the annals of history. As we transition from traditional Clausewitzian Trinitarian-warfare into a new era of fighting, future conflicts will be fought by non-state actors bearing no military insignia, yet likely backed by a great power. These types of conflicts are characterized by the unrest currently taking place in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Taking into account this evolution of warfare, how should nations structure their forces to best prepare for the spectrum of future events?

GLOBALIZATION

International relations expert Ken Booth states “globalization is a defining feature of the contemporary world.”¹ But what exactly is it? Intellectuals define globalization as a process of change in all of a given nation’s standards. Standards of politics, economics, and the environment are all evolving: globalizing, and tuning themselves to an emerging world standard.²³

¹ Ersel Aydinli and James Rosenau, *Globalization, Security, and the Nation State: Paradigms in Transition* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 30.

² Robert J. Holton, "Globalization and the Nation-State," *INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH JOURNAL OF ARTS & HUMANITIES (IRJAH)* (1998), 163.

The homogenization of global standards means that more than ever we are living in an era in which a greater part of our life is determined by global process. National cultures, economies and borders are increasingly fluid.⁴ Furthermore, blurring of borders and blending of economies has led some theorists to opine, “security concerns as traditionally conceived by scholars and practitioners of international relations have become marginal, if not totally irrelevant, to the functioning of international society.”⁵ Others espouse that although national borders are blurring, other barriers are replacing them – namely the economic divide between the haves and the have-nots. As this disparity increases, so too does the potential for increased conflict between groups, states, or nations.⁶

Accomplished author Gwynn Dyer contends that globalization can bring enormous economic potential to a nation, and that the spread of education and the ability of modern media to penetrate borders can lead to a triumph of democracy in many countries.⁷ He notes that the globalization phenomenon has “brought the ideas of democracy and human rights to practically every society on the planet and triggered the avalanche of democratization that is the defining political trend of our time.”⁸

Not all views on globalization are as positive. Mass media has portrayed globalization as merely jobs being outsourced and the demise of traditional cultures. It is often depicted as the impoverishment of the working class, while giant multinational

³ Frank G. Hoffman, "Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs," *Orbis* 50, no. 3 (2006), 397.

⁴ Holton, *Globalization and the Nation-State*, 158.

⁵ Aydinli and Rosenau, *Globalization, Security, and the Nation State: Paradigms in Transition*, 10.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁷ Gwynne Dyer, *Behind the Headlines: Globalization and the Nation-State*, Vol. 53 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1996), 2.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

corporations push domestic governments aside and take over the world.⁹ There is no doubt that globalization is uneven and that there are losers in the periphery of the system.¹⁰ Under the globalization construct, some states are less equal than others, and the overriding factor that decides whether states intervene in the affairs of another is often potential economic gain. The globalization trend is slanted to favour America, Europe and Japan economically. Furthermore, not all countries face the same levels of accountability – Israel, for example, has routinely disregarded UN Security Council resolutions with impunity.¹¹

Because of this Westward slant, some countries are suspect of the true purposes behind the thrust for global homogeneity. Many in Russia, for example, contend that globalization is simply an attempt to divide Russia and turn it into an American colony – a source of cheap resources and labour.¹² Moreover, many Russian academics caution that transnational/global corporations erode the ability of nation states to regulate their own economies. This may very well be the case. As the ability to control the economic inflow / outflow from a given nation is reduced, some of the decision power of that state is surely lost.¹³ Thus it is safe to state that globalization does not necessarily improve quality of life for everyone, and as a result there exists oppugnancy towards states that appear to come out as the victors.

Globalization underpins changes in the state, particularly an erosion of state authority as well as social vulnerability. Additionally, globalization generates increased

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁰ Aydinli and Rosenau, *Globalization, Security, and the Nation State: Paradigms in Transition*, 94.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹² *Ibid.*, 127.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 127.

opportunities for economic motives in civil war as a result of trans-border trade, both legal and illegal.¹⁴ Moreover, according to modern thinker Dietrich Jung economic globalization facilitates the privation of physical force in various ways. He states “it not only aids in spreading cheap weaponry, but also offers a number of economic opportunities for the predatory interests of warlords and militia leaders, turning war into a lucrative business for local war entrepreneurs.”¹⁵

So what then will the future global state resemble? There are many views on the future geopolitical arena, among them two prominent positions from Realists and Liberalists. Realists contend that the world will remain with America as the sole superpower, with many great powers underneath. These great powers will form alliances to counter-balance any other regional great power that may be elevating its status. Liberalists on the other hand foresee the United States decreasing (either by choice or not) from superpower status to just being a great power and confining its activities closer to its front steps. What this means for future conflict is that according to Liberalists, there will not be a unipolar system, and all great powers will find ways to get along and continue the globalization of the world’s economic marketplace.¹⁶ Moreover, calls for multipolarity by Russia, China, and others are not so much about making themselves into superpowers, but rather about the United States giving up its superpower pretensions.¹⁷

It is clear then that some nations benefit greatly from globalization, but not all. Those that don’t benefit risk conflict characterized by state failure and a domestic social

¹⁴ Tetyana Malyarenko, *Low Intensity Conflict* (Ukraine: Donetsk State Management University, 2009), 12.

¹⁵ Dietrich Jung, "New Wars, Old Warriors and Transnational Crime Reflections on the Transformation of War," *Cooperation and Conflict* 40, no. 4 (2005), 426.

¹⁶ Aydinli and Rosenau, *Globalization, Security, and the Nation State: Paradigms in Transition*, 181.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 187.

transformation, driven by globalization, economic competition over natural resources, illegal commercial entrepreneurship, private armies, and criminal warlords.¹⁸

Furthermore, contrary to the expected era of peace and prosperity anticipated with the collapse of the former Soviet Union, due to the dynamics of globalization the United States now finds itself in a continuous state of conflict – made incredibly complex by the interdependence of its economy to that of many of its potential adversaries.¹⁹

INTERDEPENDENCE

States remain formally independent, but are increasingly tied to each other by economic interdependence and through networks of multilevel governance.²⁰ As a result, many experts contend that international relations are evolving toward a greater emphasis on economics rather than security.²¹

These commentators advocate that war between nation states has become “subrationally unthinkable” due to the economic interdependence of postmodern states in the globalization era. Additionally, some state that the classical basis for violent conflict (aggrandizement through the conquest of territory) is historically obsolete.²² A prime example of this interdependence affecting a nation is Britain’s response to Crimea. Britain’s economy is dependent on Russian money and Russian investment, and as such, Britain has exercised restraint in its response to the crisis to prevent alienating Russia.²³

¹⁸ Malyarenko, *Low Intensity Conflict*, 7.

¹⁹ Steven P. Basilici and Jeremy Simmons, "Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare," *Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare* (2004), 2.

²⁰ Aydinli and Rosenau, *Globalization, Security, and the Nation State: Paradigms in Transition*, 88.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 67.

²² *Ibid.*, 89.

²³ Jonathan Hopkin and Mark Blyth, "**Londongrad Calling: The United Kingdom's Dangerous Dependence on Russian Money**," the Council on Foreign Relations,

Another example is the United States and Chinese economic interdependence. The chance of a state on state conflict between China and the United States is low as they are so closely related. China is a significant trade partner and were it to attack the US, both economies would surely suffer or perhaps even collapse as a result of the relationship.

Modern conflict is transforming from clashes over area or power, to clashes over economics. Clausewitz said that war is the continuation of *politics* by other means.²⁴ With a more recent analysis we can evolve the theory to war is the continuation of *economics* by other means. In fact, often there are parties involved in modern conflicts that have vested economic interests in the continuation of conflict.²⁵ Academic Edward Newman goes further and argues that economic agendas appear to be central to understanding why some wars start. Civil wars, for example, appear far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities rather than by grievance.²⁶

The phenomenon of globalization has brought about a level of economic interdependence never seen before and cannot be ignored (or overlooked). Nation states must take serious consideration of the economic impacts of aggression and determine if the perceived economic outcome is better or worse. State on state conflict will certainly have a negative impact on a global scale, not only affecting the warring nations but the global commons as well.

<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141350/jonathan-hopkin-and-mark-blyth/londongrad-calling> (accessed April 21, 2014).

²⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 87.

²⁵ Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, "The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation," *Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin*. [[Http://Www.Berghof-Handbook.Net/Articles/BHDS3_BallentineNitzschke230305.Pdf](http://www.Berghof-Handbook.Net/Articles/BHDS3_BallentineNitzschke230305.Pdf)] (2005), 3.

²⁶ Edward Newman, "The 'new Wars' Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 2 (2004), 177.

TRINITARIAN WARFARE

Clausewitzian Trinitarian warfare theory is defined as a war of state against state, and army against army.²⁷ For more than a century, great powers have structured their military forces and operational plans on Clausewitzian rational assumptions.²⁸ The four foundations of military strategy that drive a nation's military force structure – offense, defense, deterrence, and compellence, all assume that the opponent is a rational actor who would make cost/benefit calculations and would not engage in war if the costs of attacking are higher than the payoffs.²⁹ This method can typically lead to an arms race, with multiple regional actors striving to have some measure of superiority to deter or discourage another from achieving a near peer capability. This can be either a numerical, technological or economic advantage.

In recent years, numerical superiority is not always an accurate indicator of superiority. Often western countries have become reliant on long logistical supply lines at the expense of combat capability. On the other hand, an insurgency force has no other option but to field a force with the exact opposite mindset. During the Vietnam War even though America greatly outnumbered the Viet Cong / North Vietnamese forces upwards of three quarters of the American troops served in noncombat positions.³⁰ American numerical superiority did not result in victory.

²⁷ Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 49.

²⁸ Aydinli and Rosenau, *Globalization, Security, and the Nation State: Paradigms in Transition*, 50.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 53.

³⁰ van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, 30.

The classic Clausewitzian viewpoint is that the side with the larger force has the advantage. The thought that troop numbers are the most important consideration often leads to arms races, but little actual difference in the modern battlespace.³¹

Why can't one side gain an advantage? Basic war theory, from the days of Sun Tzu, leads an astute adversary to avoid fighting where he is clearly at a disadvantage. In the case of a frontal assault, a distinct mismatch in force size will assure him a crushing defeat. Thus, the pure advantage of numbers is nullified, or at least significantly reduced, by an adversary that elects to fight asymmetrically rather than in the classical Clausewitzian fashion.

Furthermore, the classic Clausewitzian tenet of war as politics by other means breaks down when a nation believes that it is fighting for its very existence. In this case, it is not politics, but rather a struggle for survival – strategy plays a part, but losses in this case are expected, accepted, and the country struggling will commit to total war lest it perish.³²

If victory in conflict is not just about troop numbers, technology must make a significant difference. Technology can make a difference, however it is not the panacea of warfighting. There is no doubt that there have been revolutionary advances in warfighting technology. A single aircraft and one precision-guided munition is said to be as effective as a 1000-plane raid with over 9000 bombs in WWII – and without the associated collateral damage.³³ The first Gulf War, as an example, began with striking

³¹ *Ibid.*, 104.

³² *Ibid.*, 145.

³³ David A. Deptula and Effects-based Operations, "Change in the Nature of Warfare," *Aerospace Education Foundation, Arlington, VA* (2001), 9.

more targets in the first day than the total number of targets hit by the Eighth Air Force in 1942 and 1943 combined.³⁴

There are certainly parallel technological advances that affect not just Air Force capabilities but also those of the Navy and the Army. These advances often leave the reader with the impression that war is now surgical, efficient, and rapid – minimizing any collateral damage while overwhelming a technologically inferior adversary. This is the likely outcome should an adversary attempt to fight in a Trinitarian way. However, the ever-increasing technology of weapons has caused a shift in current conflict to environments where those weapons no longer maintain an advantage.³⁵

Some aspects of conflict have not changed over the millennia. Even in the time of knights, often the most effective way to attack was to eliminate the serfs that paid the knights wages – taking away his financial support and thus his ability to wage war.³⁶ Lines of logistical support are equally critical in modern battles, and equally targeted. Funding and logistical support are critical to any modern military.

History has shown the costs of maintaining a large conventional army can lead to the collapse of a nation trying to maintain and field those troops. The collapse of the Roman Empire, under Septimus Severus, is an example of how the economic strain of a large conventional army led to the demise of a once powerful empire. Modern thinkers contend that the United States is at risk of collapsing in a similar fashion due to its

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

³⁵ van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, 32.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 53.

current debt load and multiple military commitments within which it is presently engaged throughout the world.³⁷

It is certainly challenging to justify the expense of a large conventional force during times of fiscal restraint, although some critics argue that the deterrence effect of having a large national military is invaluable and inevitably cheaper in the long term. Indeed, since 1945 no superpower has engaged another in conventional hostilities, and in almost all cases even the threat of launching such hostilities against a superpower has bordered on the ludicrous.³⁸

Experts have noted that in the new era of relations between postmodern states, war is out of the question.³⁹ Barry Buzan in his chapter about security dynamics in

Globalization, Security and the Nation State states:

Superpower status in the twenty-first century hangs much more on the ability to create and sustain international societies (at which the United States proved remarkably talented during the Cold War), than on warfighting ability (now relevant mostly at the margins, no longer in head-to-head world wars).⁴⁰

Are the days of conflict then over? Various political platforms have stated such. Even though Clausewitz, along with many other great military theorists, recognized the need for violence and commitment to a conflict in order to emerge victorious, modern politicians have forgotten some of his beliefs. An exasperated Van Creveld exclaims, “let us hear no more about generals who conquer without bloodshed!”⁴¹

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 100.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 17.

³⁹ Aydinli and Rosenau, *Globalization, Security, and the Nation State: Paradigms in Transition*, 97.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 217.

⁴¹ van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, 64.

Some academics argue that contrary to a decrease in bloodshed, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) increases the likelihood of the US using military might as a means to political ends, and that as such, the chances of state on state conflict actually increase.⁴² Not all accept this logic. Many others contend that as RMA advances and weapons become cheaper, more accurate, and more prolific, the likelihood of large-scale conflict actually decreases. The undesirable threat of prolonged conflict increases as more nations can afford advanced technology, reducing the technological advantage of one side. Thus even if the desire to use military means exists, it will likely involve smaller, isolated strikes rather than the mobilization of a large-scale army.⁴³

Whether one agrees with Realists or Liberalists, Clausewitz or politicians, it is irrefutable that warfare is changing. There has been a steady decrease in state on state warfare since WWII. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute analysis shows from 1998 to present, out of 73 major armed conflicts only five were fought between states.⁴⁴ In fact, of all the current conflicts throughout the world, not one fits the traditional Trinitarian pattern of war fighting.⁴⁵

In addition to the previously stated influence of economic factors on modern warfare, Mary Kaldor, an oft quoted British Academic that coined the phrase ‘new wars’ suggests that the goals of modern conflict are about identity politics in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of earlier wars.⁴⁶ She further states “regular armed forces are in decay, particularly in areas of conflict. Cuts in military spending, declining

⁴² Aydinli and Rosenau, *Globalization, Security, and the Nation State: Paradigms in Transition*, 79.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁴⁴ Patrick A. Mello, "Review Article: In Search of New Wars: The Debate about a Transformation of War," *European Journal of International Relations* 16, no. 2 (2010), 298.

⁴⁵ van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, 58.

⁴⁶ Newman, *The ‘new Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed*, 177.

prestige, shortages of equipment, spare parts, fuel and ammunition, and inadequate training all contribute to a profound loss of morale.”⁴⁷

Many international relations pundits point out that conflict is moving beyond Westphalian concepts. Westphalian politics (formed during the treaty of Westphalia in 1648) is a relatively new concept in the grand timeline of conflict throughout the ages. The concept suggests that armies serve the government, which in turn serves the best interests of the people. The goal is to minimize the damage of conflict or total war with the intent is to keep the civilian populace out of the conflict to the maximum extent possible. Global conflict is pivoting away from these Westphalian ideals towards low intensity conflict and insurgency type models.⁴⁸ Theorists have declared that it is time to reassess the Clausewitzian model of warfare in an age that sees violence applied most often in non-Westphalian ways by non-state actors.⁴⁹

THE FUTURE IS IRREGULAR

The evolution of warfare is inevitable and continuous. If warfare is no longer conventional (in a Trinitarian sense of the word), then it must be *ipso facto* unconventional. With that said, unconventional warfare can be challenging to define. There are presently multiple terms used to essentially describe the unconventional construct; small wars, low intensity conflicts, substate conflicts, wars of liberation, insurgency / counterinsurgencies, terrorism, irregular war, and so on and so forth.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era* (John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 97.

⁴⁸ van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, 50.

⁴⁹ Sebastian L. Gorka, "The Age of Irregular Warfare: So what?" *The Age of Irregular Warfare: So what?* (2010), 34.

⁵⁰ Basilici and Simmons, *Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare*, 30.

Many academics have taken to defining current conflicts as complex irregular warfare – or more precisely nontraditional modes of warfare that are causing violent perturbations to the existing world order.⁵¹ Broken down even further, unconventional warfare is fighting taken in the absence of two relatively equally matched opponents, where a style of warfare emerges that is employed by the weaker side to optimize its strengths, minimize its weaknesses, and thus negate the advantages of the stronger opponent.⁵²

Adversarial groups and factions around the world are beginning to realize (and accept) that they have neither the strength nor the technology to face a superpower in a frontal assault. As a result, these factions are choosing to wear down their opponent through minor skirmishes rather than confront its forces in a decisive, all-out battle.⁵³ Weaker adversaries employ asymmetric tactics to account for the economic and technological superiority of its adversary. In these cases, outlasting the enemy is more important than winning military skirmishes, as success comes through psychological exhaustion of the enemy.⁵⁴ An essential characteristic of these new wars is that they are asymmetric in nature.⁵⁵

Asymmetric battles are often against adversaries that are widely dispersed, globally connected and possess no permanent bases of operations or headquarters.⁵⁶

⁵¹ Hoffman, *Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs*, 396.

⁵² Basilici and Simmons, *Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare*, 30.

⁵³ Monika Heupel and Bernhard Zangl, *On the Transformation of Warfare: A Plausibility Probe of the New War Thesis* (Berlin: JIRD, 2010), 39.

⁵⁴ Mello, *Review Article: In Search of New Wars: The Debate about a Transformation of War*, 302.

⁵⁵ Mello, *Review Article: In Search of New Wars: The Debate about a Transformation of War*, 301.

⁵⁶ Belinda Heerwagen, "Carl Von Clausewitz and His Relevance as a Contemporary Theorist," *Carl Von Clausewitz and His Relevance as a Contemporary Theorist* (2007), 3.

Moreover, these battles are characterized by fragmented actor constellations featuring many different warring parties such as militias, paramilitary units, mercenaries, security companies, and privately organized self-defence units.⁵⁷ These adversaries' recruiting pool is not limited to a certain geographical area.⁵⁸

Frank Hoffman, member on the U.S. Commission on National Security, succinctly lays out his version of future conflict which he contends will be “a world of asymmetric and ethno-political warfare – in which machetes and Microsoft merge, and apocalyptic millenarians wearing Reeboks and Ray Bans dream of acquiring WMD.”⁵⁹ Our technological advantage will be nullified either by the methods adversaries employ, or by the terrain where the conflict takes place. Using Israel as a modern day example, some of the most technologically advanced forces in the world are being harassed and hampered by youths armed with little more than sticks and stones.⁶⁰

Accomplished author and political scientist Martin van Creveld questions whether advances in technology have actually made any real difference in battle, or whether it is just a question of “more people using more advanced circuitry to keep one another informed about nothing at all.”⁶¹

Moreover, future adversaries will not remain entirely low-tech. Instead, adversaries will acquire access to encrypted command systems, man portable air defense

⁵⁷ Heupel and Zangl, *On the Transformation of Warfare: A Plausibility Probe of the New War Thesis*, 27.

⁵⁸ Gorka, *The Age of Irregular Warfare: So what?*, 36.

⁵⁹ Hoffman, *Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs*, 398.

⁶⁰ van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, 25.

⁶¹ Martin Van Creveld, *The Changing Face of War. Combat from the Marne to Iraq* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), 256.

missiles (as was just demonstrated in the Ukraine with the shoot down of two helicopters by insurgent forces), and other modern lethal systems.⁶²

Advanced militaries stress that the conduct of war has become surgical, sensitive and scrupulous, however facing modern adversaries capable of nullifying a technological advantage a nation has will prove challenging.⁶³ Significant advances in military technology (drones, PGMs, communications systems, GPS) dramatically lower the cost of conflict in terms of blood and national treasure. However, when facing an adversary who fights asymmetrically, the advantages of technology may be reduced or nullified completely. Conflict of late involves adversaries that blend into societies, attack swiftly and disappear promptly thereafter blending back into whence they came.⁶⁴

Academics agree that conventional methods of planning and fighting a conflict become challenging during this paradigm of insurgency battles because an adversary is virtually undetectable, and is often intermixed amongst the population. Moreover, the initiative cannot be gained because intelligence is lacking and decisive force meant to mass effects against an adversary's center of gravity is not possible because that center of gravity is the non-combatant population.⁶⁵

The erosion of the state's monopoly on the use of force, as well as the dissolution of traditional distinctions concerning actors, territory and international law typically characterizes these conflicts. During the most recent hostilities, rarely was there a

⁶² Hoffman, *Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs*, 398.

⁶³ Derek Gregory, "From a View to a Kill Drones and Late Modern War," *Theory, Culture & Society* 28, no. 7-8 (2011), 188.

⁶⁴ Aydinli and Rosenau, *Globalization, Security, and the Nation State: Paradigms in Transition*, 68.

⁶⁵ Basilici and Simmons, *Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare*, 17.

declaration of war. Furthermore, combatants are continuously more difficult to distinguish from civilians, and seldom is there an identifiable front line in combat.⁶⁶

Increasingly, the combatants themselves do not wear any sort of identifiable insignia or military uniform that displays allegiance to any given country. It is possible that these combatants are supported by one or more nation states, but do not outwardly show so. This can provide a supporting country plausible deniability in the meddling of another nation's affairs.

Is this really new? Some argue that not that much has changed since the days of Clausewitz – weapons capabilities have improved, and the granularity and rapidity of information transfer has increased, yet the fundamentals behind war fighting remain.⁶⁷

There has been much scholarly debate about the use of the term 'new wars'. Many point out that new wars are very similar to what is historically considered low-intensity conflict. Perhaps the focus of warfighting has shifted along the spectrum of conflict options available towards low-intensity conflict vice fundamentally altering the warfighting landscape.⁶⁸

Conversely, it is also plausible that warfare has not changed, but rather only the way that we perceive and analyze warfare. Historically, state on state warfare has been the exception vice the norm. The globe is merely returning to more of the traditional type tactics of early warfare years.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Mello, *Review Article: In Search of New Wars: The Debate about a Transformation of War*, 299.

⁶⁷ Heerwagen, *Carl Von Clausewitz and His Relevance as a Contemporary Theorist*, 1.

⁶⁸ Mello, *Review Article: In Search of New Wars: The Debate about a Transformation of War*, 305.

⁶⁹ Heupel and Zangl, *On the Transformation of Warfare: A Plausibility Probe of the New War Thesis*, 28.

Indeed, Herfried Münkler, a professor of political theory at Humboldt University in Berlin, analyzes the context of new wars and has come to the conclusion that:

the so-called new wars resemble forms of violent conflict which predated the rise of the modern state, as well as the territorial, political and legal borders that distinguished the legitimate use of physical force in modern times.⁷⁰

In essence, one could define new wars as a relapse into premodern times.⁷¹

Whether the globe is relapsing towards pre-Westphalian conflict styles, or is entering an entirely new era of warfighting, there is no doubt that the enemy is likely to be more unconventional over time rather than more conventional.⁷² Balaclavas will be more predominant than battalions. Adversaries will not openly identify themselves as combatants with things such as uniforms or insignia declaring allegiance to a given nation, but will most definitely receive support from one. Globalization factors and the interdependence of world economies combined with the challenges of identifying our adversaries will make future conflicts increasingly complex.

CRIMEA AND EASTERN UKRAINE

Tetyana Malyarenko, professor at Donetsk University in the Ukraine highlighted these trends towards low intensity conflict and new wars during her papers written in 2009.⁷³ Ironically, she uses Crimea as an in class example for students of her courses to examine ways the ‘new war’ paradigms can be used by insurgent forces to capture Crimea. It serves as an excellent exercise for her class, and due to current global events,

⁷⁰ Herfried Münkler, "Die Neuen Kriege [the New Wars]," *Reinbek: Rowohlt* (2002), 75.

⁷¹ Jung, *New Wars, Old Warriors and Transnational Crime Reflections on the Transformation of War*, 425.

⁷² Basilici and Simmons, *Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare*, 7.

⁷³ Malyarenko, *Low Intensity Conflict*, 24.

Crimea and the Eastern Ukraine also serve as excellent examples in this paper to highlight the new era in warfare.

The annexation of Crimea by Russia in addition to the civil unrest in the Eastern Ukraine region highlights the previously described evolution in warfare. Historically, the unilateral movement of armed forces into another nation is considered an act of war, and is treated as such usually resulting in an armed response. In the case of the Crimean peninsula, masked soldiers surrounded key military and government establishments in the region yet bore no identifying insignia. They, along with global media, labeled themselves as pro-Russian militants from that same region.⁷⁴ It was not until weeks later, after Crimea had separated from the Ukraine through a questionable referendum, that Russia admitted that those soldiers were in fact Russian state troops.⁷⁵

Throughout history, the Crimean peninsula has been a contested area on several occasions. Crimea was originally transferred to the Ukraine in 1954. However, since then many prominent Russian politicians have challenged the constitutionality of that transfer, including current president Vladimir Putin. They consider Crimea “sacred Russian land”.⁷⁶ In 1992 the Russian-dominated parliament in Crimea attempted to declare the region’s independence from Ukraine, but that move was quickly overruled by the

⁷⁴ David Ignatius, "Putin Steals the CIA's Playbook on Anti-Soviet Covert Operations," The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-putin-steals-from-the-cias-playbook-with-anti-soviet-covert-operations/2014/04/08/2fd4f73a-bf57-11e3-b195-dd0c1174052c_story.html (accessed April 8, 2014).

⁷⁵ Yuras Karmanau and Vladimir Isachenkov, "Vladimir Putin Admits for First Time Russian Troops Took Over Crimea, Refuses to Rule Out Intervention in Donetsk," The National Post, <http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/04/17/vladimir-putin-admits-for-first-time-russian-troops-took-over-crimea-refuses-to-rule-out-intervention-in-donetsk/> (accessed April 17, 2014).

⁷⁶ Lubomyr Luciuk, *Welcome to Absurdistan: Ukraine, the Soviet Disunion and the West* (Kingston: Kashtan Press, 1994), 64.

Ukrainian state.⁷⁷ Both sides want Crimea due to its economic potential, and access to the strategically important Black Sea. Boris Yeltsin famously asserted in 1992 that the Black Sea Fleet “was Russian, is Russian and will always be Russian.”⁷⁸

The Ukraine was in fact Russian governed up until it achieved independence 24 August 1991.⁷⁹ Since that date, Ukraine has struggled to maintain its independence from Russian rule.

In 1991 Russian politician Galina Starovoitova, deputy in both the Soviet Union and Russian Federation parliaments, asserted that Russia has a right to intervene in neighbouring Ukraine’s affairs whenever necessary to ensure the rights of that country’s Russian-speaking population.⁸⁰ Interestingly, these same words were used as recent justification by Russian President Vladimir Putin to intervene in the affairs of Ukrainian sovereign territory.⁸¹

So Crimea was taken – by soldiers wearing balaclavas, clearly professional, but not confirmed as belonging to Russia.⁸² This lack of outward affiliation has allowed Russia to deny interference in the Ukraine. Russia’s denials of directly supporting civil strife effectively minimized possible responses from the West and NATO. Had the world known it was Russian troops illegally operating in Crimea, the global response may have been dramatically different.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 64.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 64.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁸¹ Jeffrey Mankoff, "Russia's Latest Land Grab: How Putin Won Crimea and Lost Ukraine," The Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141210/jeffrey-mankoff/russias-latest-land-grab> (accessed May 2, 2014).

⁸² Mark Nuckols, "Make no Mistake: Russia is Invading Ukraine," Newsmax, <http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Russia-invasion-Ukraine-Putin/2014/04/22/id/567044/> (accessed April 22, 2014).

Despite the fact that the United Nations Charter expressly forbids the use of force for altering national boundaries,⁸³ Russia has done essentially just that. While Russian forces have annexed parts of the Ukraine, the rest of the world has stood by metaphorically wringing its hands while pondering what to do but suffering from strategic paralysis. Nations want to stop what is happening, but at the same time, globalization and the interdependence of their economies with Russia's prevent action lest they alienate Russia affecting their own economic stability and growth. For example, Britain's economy depends greatly on Russian money and investment⁸⁴, while Turkey is dependent on Russian natural gas.⁸⁵ Moreover, The United States depends on the Russians for significant economic trade.⁸⁶

NATO troops and aircraft have been sent to Romania and Poland for 'NATO exercises' as a veiled show of force,⁸⁷ but for the most part the West now favours economic rather than military instruments for pressure on Russia.⁸⁸ The question becomes how much economic pressure can the west place on Russia before impacting its own economic well-being?

Leveraging the interdependence of western nations' economies with its own, Vladimir Putin has been able to annex Crimea and operate in the Eastern Ukraine with

⁸³ van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, 154.

⁸⁴ Hopkin and Blyth, *Londongrad Calling* *The United Kingdom's Dangerous Dependence on Russian Money*, 6

⁸⁵ Trinh Theresa Do, "Ukraine Crisis: Why Turkey is Silent as NATO Operations Ramp Up," CBC News, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-crisis-why-turkey-is-silent-as-nato-operations-ramp-up-1.2625991> (accessed May 1, 2014).

⁸⁶ Alan Boyle, "Trampoline to Space? Russian Official Tells NASA to Take a Flying Leap," NBC News, <http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/trampoline-space-russian-official-tells-nasa-take-flying-leap-n92616> (accessed April 29, 2014).

⁸⁷ Steven Chase and Kim MacKrael, "Canadian Fighter Jets to Support NATO Response to Ukraine Crisis," The Globa and Mail, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-sending-cf-18s-as-nato-mobilizes-over-ukraine-crisis/article18053391/> (accessed April 17, 2014).

⁸⁸ Aydinli and Rosenau, *Globalization, Security, and the Nation State: Paradigms in Transition*, 127.

impunity. Using unidentifiable troops, and operating unconventionally, Putin has thus far been successful. How this conflict finishes, and whether it winds up as a battle in the economic or geographic battlespace remains to be seen. At present, due to economic interdependence of nations with Russia, it does not look as though it will become a large-scale state on state conflict.⁸⁹

THE FUTURE FORCE

To be an effective force in the new era of warfighting, a nation's military must be agile, flexible, and able to rapidly deploy globally. Due to the challenge in identifying the modern insurgent there must be a great emphasis on surveillance and intelligence aspects of the force – thus drones are essential, along with satellite surveillance. There will be a greater need for ISR and the ability to show 'persistent patterns of life' consistent with the emerging paradigm of activity-based intelligence. Advances in drone capabilities are working to fill this ISR requirement (GORGON STARE, and ARGUS-IS as two such examples). A paradox of these greater surveillance capabilities is the risk of swimming in sensors and drowning in data.⁹⁰

Furthermore, a robust intelligence network needs to exist to collect, analyze, and disseminate information of all types. Intelligence that is obtained by personnel who are as familiar with the environment as the enemy you face will prove decisive.⁹¹ Some academics contend that in future conflict, survival may very well have far more to do with a given community's desire and capacity to absorb and manipulate large amounts of

⁸⁹ Gwynne Dyer, "Gwynne Dyer: West Will Never Go to War Over Non-Nato Ukraine," New Zealand Herald, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=11246384 (accessed May 4, 2014).

⁹⁰ Gregory, *From a View to a Kill Drones and Late Modern War*, 194.

⁹¹ Van Creveld, *The Changing Face of War. Combat from the Marne to Iraq*, 332.

information than with classic metrics of power.⁹² This intelligence collection and information analysis will be crucial to identify who the adversary is, where he is located, and to develop operational plans to defeat him.

Fighting troops should be a combination of Special Forces (highly trained, highly skilled, able to deploy in small numbers leveraging technology, and able to train indigenous forces in a given country) coupled with combat aircraft able to provide near instantaneous strikes should they be required. SOF will be pivotal in the modularity, agility, and endurance of future forces and have the potential to provide greater results at less cost than maintaining a large standing force.

Power projection and war-winning capabilities must be lethal and decisive in the future, and readiness, versatility, and credible military power are key.⁹³ Future conflicts will rely on precision guided munitions employed against targets that have been identified and handed off most likely by drones, space-based sensors, or special operations troops on the ground.⁹⁴

This is not to say that state on state capabilities should be entirely shelved. A nation that underestimates the deterrence effect of having a large standing force does so at its own peril. What *is* recommended is that forces be optimized for the type and caliber of conflict a nation expects to see in the future. Nations must balance the size of conventional force required to ensure deterrence versus the structure and type of force required to successfully win future conflicts.

⁹² Gorka, *The Age of Irregular Warfare: So what?*, 33.

⁹³ Hoffman, *Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs*, 399.

⁹⁴ Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* (1996), 48.

Of note, deterrence continues to rest on a profound paradox. The objective is to prevent war from breaking out; the means to do so is by making it very clear to the other side that, should necessity demand, one is able and willing to fight.⁹⁵ *Si pacem vis, bellum para* – If you want peace, prepare for war.

As a final word of caution, the end of state on state conflict has previously been incorrectly declared. Colmar von de Goltz, a leading German strategist, contended in his book *Das Volk in Waffen* in 1883 that state on state conflict was over and that future wars would no longer be fought by armies as traditionally understood.⁹⁶ History proved him wrong. WWI was described as the war to end all wars, yet in just over two decades the world found itself mired in global conflict once again.

Only time will tell whether this new era of warfare will last, or whether nation states revert to state on state total war. For the near future, the future is unconventional war, and nations must align their forces accordingly.

CONCLUSION

Warfare is changing. Globalization, beneficial for many but not all, has led to disparity between nations and widening economic and sociopolitical gaps around the world. The result is an increase in animosity between states and a propensity for conflict. Moreover, the technology gap between state actors and non-state entities has forced potential adversaries to irregular warfare styles; they have no option but to fight this way.

In addition to globalization, nation state economies are increasingly interdependent. This interdependence reduces the likelihood of state on state conflict as the economic impact of such a conflict is simply too great for all sides.

⁹⁵ Van Creveld, *The Changing Face of War. Combat from the Marne to Iraq*, 218.

⁹⁶ Colmar van der Goltz, *Das Volk in Waffen* (Berlin: , 1883), 43.

In the future when hostilities are the chosen option, soldiers who bear no outward insignia of those supporting them will likely instill the national will. Essentially, this entails blending in with the local population to nullify any advantage brought on by numerical or technological superiority.

Current activities in Ukraine highlight a transition from a traditional state military to irregular and asymmetric options of conducting warfare. Clausewitzian Trinitarian theory is difficult to apply to an asymmetric ideology; in fact, it may not apply at all. Nations must structure their forces, develop tactics, train, equip soldiers, and prepare doctrine to meet this transformation in warfighting. Doing so will ensure an ability to triumph in future conflict and yet still retain an adequate level of deterrence in their home states.

The future enemy is irregular and the future fight is asymmetric. Technology is not the panacea that some believe. Our nation must understand this evolution and ultimately train, equip, and prepare our entire force to prevail under all conditions. The enemy is adapting, we must therefore anticipate and adapt faster.

Mutantur omnia nos et mutamur in illis – All things change, and we must change with them.

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