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COMBATING THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

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Exercise Solo Flight

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EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT*

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COMBATING THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is the most populous country and has the largest economy in Africa.¹ Yet despite its natural and human wealth, Nigeria is troubled by a violent radical Islamic insurgency from the jihadist group known as Boko Haram. This paper proposes that international intervention against Boko Haram (BH) is justified under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept and that Canada can play an important role in helping to combat the insurgency. The paper begins with a review of the BH insurgency showing its strength and weaknesses based on counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine, and building a case for international intervention against BH under R2P. It then discusses the current efforts to combat BH by Nigeria, its neighbours, and the international community. Finally, it shows how Canada should provide vital assistance to combat BH.

OVERVIEW OF THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

Background

BH's official name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad which means *People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad*.² Boko Haram is actually a nickname from the Hausa language meaning *Western education is forbidden* and stems from the group's targeting of schools.³ Recent reporting indicates that BH may have changed its name to the Islamic State in West Africa in recognition of its alliance

¹ Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Fact Book – Nigeria," last modified 24 April 2015, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html>.

² Aryn Baker, "The Battle for Nigeria," *Time*, February 16, 2015, vol. 185, issue 5, 36.

³ The term 'Boko' is the Hausa name for Western education, while 'Haram' is an Arabic word which figuratively means 'sin' but literally means 'forbidden'. When these words are used together it strongly denotes that Western education is forbidden. Efehi Raymond Okoro, "Terrorism and governance crisis: The Boko Haram experience in Nigeria," *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* vol. 14, issue 2 (2014): 108.

with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).⁴ BH was founded when Mohammad Yusuf opened a religious complex in the town of Maiduguri in northern Nigeria in 2002.⁵ Despite the introduction of Islamic Sharia Law in 12 northern Nigerian states in 1999, Yusuf proselytized that the country's ruling class was too corrupt and tainted by 'Western-style' ambitions.⁶ Only governance by pure Sharia law would correct this. Thereafter, BH's goal remains the establishment of an Islamic caliphate under Sharia for all of Nigeria.

In 2003 the group launched its first attack against government buildings and police stations in Yobe state.⁷ BH continued conducting small scale attacks until 2009 when a larger uprising led to a crackdown by Nigerian security forces. This incident resulted in the death of over 700 BH members, including Yusuf who was killed while in custody.⁸ Many of the deaths at the hands of security forces were executions or reprisal killings.⁹ BH has used the harsh treatment by Nigerian security forces as justification for its increase in violence.¹⁰ In 2010 BH reemerged under their new leader Abubakar Shekau, who was Yusuf's second in command, and began an increasingly violent campaign of terror. BH has targeted schools, churches, state intuitions, public places,

⁴ RT, "Jihadi groups unite: Boko Haram changes name to Islamic State's West African Province," last modified 28 April 2015, <http://rt.com/news/253541-boko-haram-isis-name/>. See also The Guardian, "Isis welcomes Boko Haram's allegiance and plays down coalition 'victories'," last modified 13 March 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/12/isis-welcomes-boko-harams-allegiance-and-plays-down-coalition-victories>.

⁵ Stanford University, "Mapping Militant Organizations – Boko Haram," last modified 20 February 2015, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/553>.

⁶ Okoro, 108.

⁷ Stanford University, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/553>. Okoro, 110.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Abdulrahman Dambazau, "Nigeria and Her Security Challenges," *Harvard International Review* vol. 35, issue 4 (Spring 2014): 67.

¹⁰ Daniel E. Agbiboa and Benjamin Maiangwa, "Nigeria united in grief; divided in response: Religious terrorism, Boko Haram, and the dynamics of state response," *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* vol. 14, issue 1 (2014): 71.

Nigerian security forces and entire villages. Presently BH indiscriminately targets all persons in Nigeria regardless of religious or ethnic background and anyone that criticizes their actions is considered an enemy.¹¹

Causes

There are two perspectives on the root causes of the BH insurgency. The first is ideological, with BH's brand of radical Islam as a main motivating factor. BH has clearly stated it is waging jihad and uses radical Islam to justify its actions, attract followers and indoctrinate its members.¹² The religious motivation of BH is given further credibility through its links to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and more recently, allegiance to ISIS who are similarly ideologically motivated.¹³

The other perspective is that the deep socio-economic troubles in northern Nigeria provide justification for the insurgency. There is a significant economic and education imbalance between the Christian South and Muslim North.¹⁴ Northern provinces are poverty stricken with widespread unemployment, decaying infrastructure and poorly funded education programs.¹⁵ The North is also affected by substantial environmental stress from drought and desertification that further impacts economic and habitable

¹¹ Dambazau, 67

¹² Okoro, 115-116. See also Lynn L. Taylor, "Boko Haram Terrorism: Reaching Across International Boundaries to Aid Nigeria in the Humanitarian Crisis," *ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law* vol. 21, issue 1 (Fall 2014): 8-9.

¹³ RT, <http://rt.com/news/253541-boko-haram-isis-name/>. See also The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/12/isis-welcomes-boko-harams-allegiance-and-plays-down-coalition-victories>.

¹⁴ The Guardian, "Boko Haram: six reasons why the Nigerian militant group is so powerful," last modified 4 June 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/14/boko-haram-why-nigerian-militant-group-powerful>.

¹⁵ Dambazau, 68. Okoro, 117. Daniel E. Agbiboa and Benjamin Maiangwa, 75-76. See also Emmanuel Ikechi Onah, "The Nigerian State as an equilibrium of violence: An explanation of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria," *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* vol. 14, issue 2 (2014): 72.

conditions.¹⁶ The situation in the North has created resentment toward the central government and the South. This environment is fertile ground for a BH insurgency against the status quo.

Whether the primary cause for the insurgency is ideological or economic, the problems are exacerbated by weak or bad governance.¹⁷ In the 2014 Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Nigeria ranked 37 out of 52 African countries with a score of 45.8/100.¹⁸ Governance can be described as having three core elements:

(1) the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens' fundamental rights.¹⁹

Nigeria is failing in the last two elements and struggles to provide basic human needs in the North.²⁰ Widespread corruption within the Nigerian government inhibits good governance and extends to the military and police, undermining the legitimacy of these institutions.²¹ In addition, the manner in which Nigerian security forces have conducted operations against BH has perpetuated the insurgency. Nigerian security forces have been accused of assaults, execution, torture, illegal detention and destruction of property.²² These actions amount to serious human rights violations and have alienated the northern population.

¹⁶ Dambazau, 68. Daniel E. Agbibo and Benjamin Maiangwa, 75.

¹⁷ Dambazau, 68. Okoro, 122

¹⁸ The Ibrahim Index of African Governance assesses a country in four categories: Safety & Rule of Law; Participation & Human Rights; Sustainable Economic Opportunity; and Human Development. Mo Ibrahim Foundation, "2014 Ibrahim Index of African Governance," last accessed 15 May 2015, <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/interact/>.

¹⁹ Okoro, 105

²⁰ *Ibid*, 118-119.

²¹ Dambazau, 69 -70.

²² Taylor, 16. Okoro, 120-121.

Both BH's radical religious ideology and the poverty of the North, combined with the weak and corrupt Nigerian government, have produced conditions ripe for insurgency. Northern Nigeria is a place of disenfranchised people with a bleak future looking for hope. Unfortunately, BH's brand of hope has resulted in even greater human suffering.

CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

Humanitarian Disaster

Since 2009 BH has killed between 10,000 and 15,000 people.²³ BH is also responsible for routine violations of established universal human rights that include:

...the right to life, liberty, and security of person; the right to be free from slavery and servitude; and the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment.²⁴

Attacks against education and religious institutions for instance demonstrate BH's disregard for the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, peaceful assembly and education.²⁵ They have destroyed 900 schools and killed 176 teachers in Borno state alone.²⁶ BH has a history of crimes against women and girls through abduction, enslavement, forced conversion to Islam and forced marriage.²⁷

²³ Country Watch, "Special Report: Boko Haram's rampage of terror continues in Nigeria; regional powers including Chad and Niger pursuing assault against Islamist terror group," *Political Intelligence Briefing* (April 9, 2015), <http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=41ddb12-2ccd-4e9d-9717-954860871f6f%40sessionmgr4001&vid=0&hid=4102>. Vice News, "UN Adopts Resolution Calling for International Coordination Against Boko Haram," last modified 1 April 2015, <https://news.vice.com/article/un-adopts-resolution-calling-for-international-coordination-against-boko-haram>. See also Amnesty International, "Boko Haram at a glance," Last modified 29 January 2015, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2015/01/boko-haram-glance/>.

²⁴ Taylor, 8.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Baker, 36.

²⁷ Taylor, 6-7. See also Walter Gam Nkwi, "Putting Nigeria Together: The Internationalisation of Boko Haram Conflict," *Conflict Studies Quarterly*, issue 9 (October 2014): 22. Baker, 35.

In April 2014 BH gain worldwide notoriety when it abducted almost 300 girls from the Chibok Government Girls Secondary School in Borno State.²⁸ The Chibok abduction captured the world's attention and the 'Bring Back Our Girls' social media campaign prompted international support for action.²⁹ However, has Nigeria failed to recover these girls and many others have since become slaves under BH. Some of these women and young girls, 10 years old or younger, have been coerced or recruited to become suicide bombers.³⁰

Growing in strength and boldness, BH has attacked towns and villages for supplies and control of terrain. In January 2015 BH conducted one of its most deadly attacks when it seized Baga killing an estimated 2000 of its residents and destroying the town.³¹ At the time Baga housed the headquarters of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF - consisting of forces from Niger, Nigeria and Chad). This headquarters was forced to flee and BH looted their base.³²

BH's impact goes far beyond killing and violations of human rights. Development and aid for northern Nigeria suffers because of lack of security and fear of attacks.³³ This is exacerbating the situation in an area already very poor. The insurgency has also

²⁸ Taylor, 6. Nkwi, 21.

²⁹ Nkwi, 23-24.

³⁰ Aljazeera Center for Studies, "Boko Haram's use of Female Suicide Bombing in Nigeria," last modified 18 March 2015, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/03/2015317105714685938.htm>. Country Watch, <http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=41d1dbb12-2ccd-4e9d-9717-954860871f6f%40sessionmgr4001&vid=0&hid=4102>. See also France 24, "Female suicide bombers: Boko Haram's weapon of choice," last modified 25 February 2015, <http://www.france24.com/en/20150224-nigeria-boko-haram-female-suicide-bombers>.

³¹ Country Watch, <http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=41d1dbb12-2ccd-4e9d-9717-954860871f6f%40sessionmgr4001&vid=0&hid=4102>. Stanford University, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/553>.

³² Baker, 37. Country Watch, <http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=41d1dbb12-2ccd-4e9d-9717-954860871f6f%40sessionmgr4001&vid=0&hid=4102>.

³³ Taylor, 9-11.

displaced an estimated 1.2 to 1.5 million persons, many into neighbouring countries.³⁴

Finally, BH has launched raids into Niger, Cameroon and Chad.³⁵ The cross-border attacks and displaced persons have made BH a truly regional problem.

Responsibility to Protect

There is a provision that allows nations to intervene to take action against BH; the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This concept was first proposed in the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.³⁶ It grew out of failures of the international community to intervene during humanitarian disasters of the 1990s.³⁷ It gained worldwide endorsement at the 2005 United Nations World Summit.³⁸ R2P represents a shift in the view of the sanctity of state sovereignty in the face of mass genocide and atrocities:

Sovereignty no longer exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it is a charge of responsibility that holds States accountable for the welfare of their people.³⁹

The concept supposes that the international community has the responsibility to intervene through appropriate means when states fail to protect their people.⁴⁰ R2P has three pillars:

³⁴ Country Watch, <http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=41ddb12-2ccd-4e9d-9717-954860871f6f%40sessionmgr4001&vid=0&hid=4102>. Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html>. See also Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Nigeria IDP Figures Analysis," last accessed 14 May 2015, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/nigeria/figures-analysis>.

³⁵ Country Watch, <http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=41ddb12-2ccd-4e9d-9717-954860871f6f%40sessionmgr4001&vid=0&hid=4102>. Okoro, 120.

³⁶ Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, and Thomas G. Weiss, "Peace and Security: From Preventing State Conflict to Protecting Individuals," In *U.N. Ideas that Changed the World*, edited by Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, and Thomas G. Weiss (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), 174.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, "The Responsibility to Protect," last modified 16 April 2014, <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml>.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

1. The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement;
2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility;
3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.⁴¹

There are clear parallels between the core elements of governance and R2P's three pillars, suggesting that weak governance leading to a state's inability to protect its people makes R2P necessary.

Nigeria has manifestly failed to protect its people from BH, in great part because of weak governance. The resultant human suffering provides a clear case for the international community to intervene under R2P. Countering BH is not easy but the insurgency does have several key weaknesses.

STRENGTH AND WEAKNESSES

Weaknesses

The BH insurgency has two main weaknesses: lack of popular support and low external support. According to both US and Canadian COIN doctrine, popular support is a key tenet or factor in any insurgency.⁴² In fact, insurgents must "garner a decisive level

⁴¹ Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml>.

⁴² Department of National Defence, B-GL-323-004/FP-003, *Counter-Insurgency Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2008), 2-9. See also Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 5, 2009), VIII-18.

of popular support, or at least pervasive acquiescence” in order to achieve success.⁴³ BH may have started with a strong following but its atrocities and indiscriminate killing has alienated its support base.⁴⁴ Citizens have even taking up arms against BH in the form of the Civilian Joint Task Force.⁴⁵ Lack of popular support means BH must rely on coercion, ideology and the poor socio-economic conditions in the North to fill its ranks. Dwindling popular support means BH is vulnerable and possibly not sustainable in the long term.

External support is another key dynamic or factor as insurgencies “... are seldom successful at obtaining their goals without external assistance.”⁴⁶ External support can be funding, training, equipment, recruits, expertise, and provision of sanctuary. BH is not a state sponsored or supported insurgency but has received support from AQIM in the form of training, funding and weapons.⁴⁷ BH’s recent affiliation to ISIS is troublesome as this may provide additional funding and support, but the distances between BH and ISIS groups makes this difficult. The lack of direct external support forces BH to rely on bank robberies, kidnaping for ransom, human trafficking and other raids to secure funds, people and supplies.⁴⁸ BH’s lack of popular support and low external support mean that it is becoming increasingly isolated and vulnerable.

⁴³ Department of National Defence, 2-9.

⁴⁴ Aljazeera, “Bloodshed corrodes support for Boko Haram,” last modified 25 May 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/05/bloodshed-corrodes-support-boko-haram-201452084357414955.html>. Stanford University, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/553>.

⁴⁵ Daniel E. Agbibo and Benjamin Maiangwa, 84.

⁴⁶ Department of National Defence, 2-12. Department of Defence, II-12. See also Max Boot, *Invisible Armies* (New York, NY: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013), 566.

⁴⁷ Stanford University, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/553>. Taylor, 5.

⁴⁸ Okoro, 110. Daniel E. Agbibo and Benjamin Maiangwa, 74. See also The Independent, “Paying for terrorism: Where does Boko Haram gets its money from?” last modified 6 June 2014,

Strength

BH draws its main strength from its enemy's key weakness; weak Nigerian governance and legitimacy. Legitimacy is a vital and decisive factor in COIN and "The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government."⁴⁹ There are six indicators of legitimacy and, much like with the core elements of governance and the three pillars of R2P, Nigeria is failing in these too.⁵⁰ The poverty-stricken people in northern Nigeria are dissatisfied with government process, injustice, and corruption, and are therefore more easily coerced to support BH. No matter how successful a military campaign against BH might be, Nigerian governance and legitimacy needs to be addressed to ultimately eliminate the root causes of the insurgency.

BH's weaknesses mean that it can be beaten with the right application of COIN principles and reforms within Nigeria. The good news is that there is some very recent success in both areas.

CURRENT FIGHT AGAINST BH

Regional, international and Nigerian efforts to combat BH are currently achieving some military success. Chad, with one of the more capable armies in the region, launched

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/paying-for-terrorism-where-does-boko-haram-gets-its-money-from-9503948.html>.

⁴⁹ Department of Defense, III-11. Boot, 563.

⁵⁰ "There are six possible indicators of legitimacy that can be used to analyze threats to stability. First, the ability to provide security for the populace, including protection from internal and external threats, is a key indicator of legitimacy. Second, the selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered just and fair by a substantial majority of the populace strengthens the legitimacy of the HN. Other indicators of legitimacy include: a high level of popular participation in or support for political processes; a culturally acceptable level of corruption; a culturally acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development; the existence and acceptance of laws; and a high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions." Department of Defense, III-11.

operations into northern Nigeria to recapture towns from BH in February 2015.⁵¹ Niger and Chad responded to an attack on the border town of Bosso in February 2015 with a combined operation against BH into Nigeria's Borno state in March 2015.⁵² For its part Cameroon has been conducting successful defensive operations against BH where Chad has also sent troops to assist.⁵³

In the wake of the Chibok girls' abduction, several nations offered support to Nigeria including the US, UK and France. The US continues to provide counterterrorism support to Nigeria including diplomatic, military, law enforcement, intelligence and intelligence collection platforms.⁵⁴ The US also provided military training on professionalism, peacekeeping support, border security, and justice.⁵⁵ However, this training was cancelled by Nigeria in December 2014 possibly because of US reluctance to donate equipment or weapons.⁵⁶ This reluctance was likely from fears of human rights abuses by Nigerian forces with US donated equipment.⁵⁷ The UK continues to provide support to locate the Chibok girls and combat BH. This support includes experts from the Foreign Office, the Department for International Development and the Ministry of Defense assisting in planning, coordination and advice to local authorities.⁵⁸ In addition the UK committed to providing surveillance aircraft, military training, and support to

⁵¹ Country Watch, <http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=41ddb12-2ccd-4e9d-9717-954860871f6f%40sessionmgr4001&vid=0&hid=4102>.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Nkwi, 25. See also U.S. Department of State, "Boko Haram and U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance to Nigeria," last modified 14 May 2014, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/226072.htm>.

⁵⁵ Taylor, 17.

⁵⁶ Voice of America, "Nigerian Military Training Cancellation Baffles US Experts," last modified 3 December 2014, <http://www.voanews.com/content/nigerian-military-training-cancellation-baffles-us-experts/2544161.html>.

⁵⁷ Country Watch, <http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=41ddb12-2ccd-4e9d-9717-954860871f6f%40sessionmgr4001&vid=0&hid=4102>.

⁵⁸ Nkwi, 25.

reform and development within Nigeria.⁵⁹ For its part France has condemned the actions of BH and offered support. France hosted a summit in Paris in May 2014 focused on security in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region.⁶⁰ However, international support has been hampered by the corruption within the Nigerian government and concerns of human rights violations by Nigerian forces.⁶¹

Recently Nigerian forces themselves have had success against BH. In February 2015, Nigeria launched a ground offensive to recapture the northern states held by BH.⁶² Nigerian security forces have liberated many towns and closed in on a BH stronghold in the Sambisa forest. As part of this ongoing offensive, the Nigerian military has now freed a reported 700 women and children from BH.⁶³ The recent military success is being attributed to collaboration and efforts by Chad, Niger and Cameroon as well as the purchase of new equipment.⁶⁴ There are also reports of private security contractors from South Africa assisting the Nigerian Army by providing much needed advice on COIN operations.⁶⁵

There is further cause for hope as the recent election in Nigeria has brought a change in administration. Of note, this is the first time in Nigeria's history that an

⁵⁹ GOV.UK, "Foreign Secretary announces UK support following Ministerial on Boko Haram," last accessed 15 May 2015, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-announces-uk-support-following-ministerial-on-boko-haram>.

⁶⁰ France Diplomatie, "Nigeria – Commemoration of the abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls (April 14 to 15, 2015)," last accessed 14 May 2015, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/nigeria-229/events-6361/article/nigeria-commemoration-of-the>. See also Nkwi, 25.

⁶¹ Taylor, 16-18.

⁶² BBC News, "Boko Haram crisis: Nigeria begins Sambisa ground offensive," last modified 22 April 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32416155>.

⁶³ Aljazeera, "Nigeria frees more children and women from Boko Haram," last modified 3 May 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/nigeria-frees-children-women-boko-haram-150501221456077.html>.

⁶⁴ BBC News, "Is the tide turning against Boko Haram?" last modified 21 March 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-31911641>.

⁶⁵ The Guardian, "South Africa's ageing white mercenaries who helped turn tide on Boko Haram," last modified 14 April 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/14/South-africas-ageing-white-mercenaries-who-helped-turn-tide-on-boko-haram>.

opposition party has democratically taken control of the country from the ruling party.⁶⁶ The former president, Goodluck Jonathan, has been widely criticised for not doing enough to find the Chibok girls and combat BH which likely cost him the election.⁶⁷ Jonathan is from the predominantly Christian South and his successive terms as president caused resentment in the North.⁶⁸ Nigeria's new president, Muhammadu Buhari is a Muslim from the North and security was the center piece of his campaign.⁶⁹ Buhari is a former military general who took power of Nigeria for two years during a coup in 1983.⁷⁰ Buhari has a history of tackling corruption and his military experience should be an asset in the fight against BH.⁷¹ The very democratic nature of the election should give Buhari the required legitimacy to govern well. Buhari received a total of 15 million votes over Jonathan's 12.8 million.⁷² As legitimacy is critical in the battle against BH, Nigeria might now have the right leader at the right time:

The key to tackling Nigeria's security challenges rests on finding the right leadership that would demonstrate good governance: that would tackle

⁶⁶ Aljazeera, "Buhari secures historic election victory in Nigeria," last modified 5 April 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/03/opposition-party-declares-victory-nigeria-election-150331135603507.html>. See also The Guardian, "Nigerian election winner vows to crush Boko Haram insurgency," Last modified 8 April 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/01/nigerian-election-winner-muhammadu-buhari-boko-haram>.

⁶⁷ The Guardian, "The Guardian view on Nigeria's election: the right man is out, the right man is in," last modified 2 April 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/01/guardian-view-nigeria-elections-right-man-out-right-man-in>. BBC News, <http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-31911641>.

⁶⁸ Baker, 34.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 35.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 33.

⁷¹ The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/01/guardian-view-nigeria-elections-right-man-out-right-man-in>. Baker, 37. The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/01/nigerian-election-winner-muhammadu-buhari-boko-haram>. See also Aljazeera, "Buhari will 'spare no effort' to defeat Boko Haram," last modified 2 April 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/buhari-praises-jonathan-landmark-nigeria-poll-150401055812573.html>.

⁷² Aljazeera, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/03/opposition-party-declares-victory-nigeria-election-150331135603507.html>. See also The Guardian, "Nigerian election: opposition leader Muhammadu Buhari sweeps to victory," last modified 1 April 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/31/opposition-candidate-muhammadu-buhari-wins-nigerian-election>.

corruption as a matter of priority; that would be transparent and accountable; ... that would find solutions to the current insurgency, militancy, ... and that would give assurance and confidence to every citizen that his or her fundamental rights as enshrined in the constitution are guaranteed and protected.⁷³

With assistance from its neighbours and the international community, Nigeria is having military success against BH. The new Nigerian presidency provides an opportunity to address the core grievances and causes of the insurgency. Canada can reinforce this success by providing valuable assistance to Nigeria.

CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION

Using R2P as its justification, there are a number of things Canada can do to assist Nigeria and its neighbours to combat BH. Proper COIN operations require a comprehensive approach that brings together all elements of national power to address the root and systemic causes of an insurgency.⁷⁴ This is sometimes called a whole-of-government approach and Canada can draw on its experience from Afghanistan to provide multifaceted support to COIN operations in the Lake Chad region.⁷⁵ The Canadian High Commission in Abuja provides the perfect platform to implement elements of a comprehensive approach providing support in three areas: security, development and diplomacy.

Security

From a security standpoint, Canada can support the fight against BH by providing Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel to advise and assist the Nigerian military.

⁷³ Dambazau, 70.

⁷⁴ Department of National Defence, 5-1. Department of Defense, IV-1.

⁷⁵ Canadian Military Journal, "Canada's Whole of Government Mission in Afghanistan – Lessons Learned," last accessed 14 May 2015, <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol13/no2/page8-eng.asp>.

These advisors can provide training, mentorship and assistance in planning operations. The Nigerian Army is the second largest troop contributing African nation to peacekeeping operations and the fifth largest globally.⁷⁶ But Nigeria's army is primarily trained and equipped for conventional operations and peacekeeping, not counter-terrorism or COIN.⁷⁷ Traditionally, conventional tactics are not successful against unconventional insurgents.⁷⁸ This is an area where Canadian advisors can use their Afghanistan experience to assist the Nigerian army. Also, by providing training and mentorship in professionalism and proper application of COIN, Canadian advisors can help address the Nigerian Army's counterproductive operations, human rights violations and corruption. In the wake of the Chibok girls' abduction, Canada offered support to Nigeria in the form of surveillance equipment and specialist personnel.⁷⁹ However, this support never materialized. Canada can follow through on this offer by providing platforms such as the CP-140 Aurora aircraft currently assisting in counter ISIS operations in Iraq and Syria.⁸⁰ Another area in which Canada can provide assistance is in intelligence analysis and information processing. This will aid Nigeria in pinpointing BH elements so they can be attacked more precisely, limiting collateral damage. To address BH's employment of suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices (IED), Canada can again draw on its Afghanistan experience to provide both technical expertise and

⁷⁶ High Commission of Canada in Nigeria, "Canada-Nigeria Relations," last modified 26 January 2015, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/nigeria/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada_nigeria.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=299.

⁷⁷ The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/14/boko-haram-why-nigerian-militant-group-powerful>.

⁷⁸ Boot, 561.

⁷⁹ The Globe and Mail, "Canada to aid Nigeria in search for abducted schoolgirls," last modified 7 May 2014, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/nigeria-presses-canada-for-help-combatting-boko-haram/article18506509/>.

⁸⁰ National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, "Operation IMPACT," last modified 23 January 2015, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-impact.page>.

advice in countering these devices.⁸¹ Finally, advisors need not be limited to Nigeria. Planning, training and assistance to Chad, Cameroon and Niger would also significantly contribute to the long term COIN battle against BH. Canadian military advice, assistance, planning and intelligence support would help build the capability and legitimacy of Nigerian security forces as well as directly assisting them in COIN operations.

Development

In order to address one of the root causes of the insurgency, Canada can assist in poverty reduction, economic development and education in northeastern Nigeria. In fact, Canada's current development efforts in Nigeria are already focused on children and youth health; education; and stimulating sustainable economic growth.⁸² In 2012-2013 Canada provided a total \$43.39 million CAD toward development in Nigeria.⁸³ But these programs are only in two states: one in the South and one in the North.⁸⁴ Canada should shift its focus to the North and expand its projects to support a comprehensive COIN effort. Canada can also provide aid to address the immediate humanitarian crisis caused by displaced persons.

Diplomacy

On the diplomatic front, Canada can reinforce success by assisting the new Buhari government with governance reforms and strengthening its legitimacy. Canada can draw on its diplomatic experience with COIN from Afghanistan and provide personnel and

⁸¹ Dambazau, 67.

⁸² Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, "Nigeria," last modified 13 March 2015, <http://www.international.gc.ca/development-developpement/countries-pays/nigeria.aspx?lang=eng>.

⁸³ High Commission of Canada in Nigeria, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/nigeria/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada_nigeria.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=299.

⁸⁴ Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, <http://www.international.gc.ca/development-developpement/countries-pays/nigeria.aspx?lang=eng>.

expertise to assist Nigeria with tackling corruption and implementing a comprehensive approach.⁸⁵ Canada might also provide assistance in the establishment of state reconstruction teams much like the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) from Afghanistan.⁸⁶ A PRT integrates all elements of security, development and governance at the province or state level to help reform and rebuild an area. Canada's experience with the Kandahar PRT can greatly assist Nigeria with a similar approach in establishing security, legitimacy and good governance in the North.⁸⁷

Canadian security, development, and diplomacy assistance to Nigeria can exploit BH's weaknesses and address the need for better governance. A Canadian contribution can support Nigeria, its regional allies and the international community in combating BH while addressing the core grievances of the insurgency.

CONCLUSION

This paper has shown that international intervention against BH is justified under the R2P concept and that Canada can play an important role helping to combat the insurgency. BH continues its violent insurgency based on a radical ideology and fuelled by the socio-economic conditions brought on by weak governance in northern Nigeria. BH has routinely violated human rights norms and been particularly cruel to women and young girls. The human suffering caused by both the insurgency and counter-insurgency presents a clear case for international intervention under R2P. The BH insurgency can be beaten and is vulnerable because of its lack of popular support and limited external support. However, defeating the insurgency means addressing the core issue of weak

⁸⁵ Canadian Military Journal, <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol13/no2/page8-eng.asp>.

⁸⁶ Canadian Military Journal, <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol13/no2/page8-eng.asp>.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

Nigerian governance. The good news is that current military operations by Nigeria and its regional neighbours are having success. In addition, newly elected president Buhari is committed to combating BH and addressing the issues that are fuelling the insurgency. Canada can assist Nigeria by reinforcing current military and democratic success. With a comprehensive approach Canada can provide advice, planning, intelligence, aid, and expertise to assist Nigeria and its neighbours in COIN operations. One of the primary vehicles for this can be state reconstruction teams similar to the PRTs of Afghanistan. With the right level of support Nigeria can establish good governance and BH can be beaten.

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