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## JOINT FORCE DEVELOPMENT: WHAT ARE WE MISSING?

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### JCSP 40

#### *Exercise Solo Flight*

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### PCEMI 40

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## **JOINT FORCE DEVELOPMENT: WHAT ARE WE MISSING?**

Today's military officer must be capable of leading highly technical, complex operations in dynamic environments with multiple cooperating organizations. To do this, an essential competency is the ability to lead multi-service or joint operations. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has done very well to incorporate jointness into the institution, primarily its strategic and operational level organizations and activities. There are joint committees and boards at the executive level and command of the CAF's domestic and international operations is executed through the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and its subordinate Joint Task Forces. The Canadian Forces Warfare (CFWC) Centre develops joint doctrine and jointness is a consideration in senior officer professional education courses.

The United States Department of Defence (DOD) relies on the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 which mandates that before achieving Flag/General rank, officers must have joint education and experience. A result of this legislation is that jointness is a significant priority in an U.S. officer's career. There is mandatory Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), joint qualifications and designated joint billets. Canada has no equivalent mandate.

This essay argues that the CAF does not instill a deep understanding of joint operations into its officers. The critical development pillar of operational experience is missed as a means to develop officers prepared to lead and command joint activities. This essay examines the need for jointness, how well it is incorporated into the organization, and the current officer professional development system. It suggests potential solutions to provide joint operations experience and incorporate joint activities earlier into an

officer's career. It concludes that the lack of priority in providing joint operations experience at the junior officer level jeopardizes the CAF's ability to prepare its officers to conduct joint operations seamlessly and as an integrated force.

### **Why Joint?**

Joint refers to those “activities, operations, organizations in which elements of at least two services participate.”<sup>1</sup> Joint operations are conducted in order to incorporate the capabilities of the respective services as a means to increase overall effectiveness: “...it is the integration and interdependence of these capabilities that achieve jointness and exponentially multiply the value that each alone brings to the fight.”<sup>2</sup> The lack of understanding between services was first identified as an educational issue in the U.S. during World War Two. It was identified that “...they could have done a better job if they had more officers who understood the challenges and opportunities of using land, sea, and air forces together in joint operations.”<sup>3</sup>

When studying joint policy it becomes quickly evident that there are a variety of terms used to imply similar concepts. Terms quickly overlap. In this essay, these terms are defined as:

- Combined – Those “...activities, operations and organizations, in which elements of more than one nation participate.”<sup>4</sup> This is a multi-national force.

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<sup>1</sup> Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001, *Canadian Forces Joint Publication CFJP 01: Canadian Military Doctrine*, (Ottawa, Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, 2011), GL-4.

<sup>2</sup> George J. Flynn. “Joint Force Development Vision: Adapting to New and Future Realities,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 64, (1<sup>st</sup> Qtr 2012): 148.

<sup>3</sup> Vincent C. Bowhens, “Manage or Educate: Fulfilling the Purpose of Joint Professional Military Education,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 67, (4<sup>th</sup> Qtr 2012): 26.

<sup>4</sup> Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001, *CFJP 01: Canadian Military Doctrine*...GL-2.

- Joint – “...activities, operations, organizations in which elements of at least two services participate.”<sup>5</sup> This is a multi-service force.
- Interoperability – “The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks.”<sup>6</sup> It is the ability of different organizations to work together and can be applied to joint, combined and interagency operations with government and non-governmental actors.
- Integrated – Separate forces that operate together as one force.
- Unified – A single entity.<sup>7</sup> This implies dissolving the separate services and having a single service that possesses all the component capabilities.

The Canada First Defence Strategy states that “...the Canadian Forces must be a fully integrated, flexible, multi-role, and combat-capable military.”<sup>8</sup> The 2005 Defence Policy Statement indicated that Canada must establish fully integrated units, and that “Maritime, land, air and special operations forces will emphasize cooperation and teamwork...”<sup>9</sup> Although the term joint is not used in defining characteristics in these two policy statements, reflecting back to the definitions described above, integrated implies joint.

While joint can clearly provide benefits, it does not mean that this concept must be taken to the extreme. Referred to as “...absolute jointness - the complete absorption of

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, GL-4.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, GL-4.

<sup>7</sup> Canadian Forces College, “Integration and Unification” National Security Programme 6, Slide 4.

<sup>8</sup> Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, (Ottawa, Department of Defence, 2008), 14.

<sup>9</sup> Department of National Defence, *Canada’s International Policy Statement: A role of Pride and Influence in the World - Defence*, (Ottawa, Department of National Defence, 2005), 12.

all the services into a single organization...”<sup>10</sup> This is what Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer attempted in the late 1960’s with Unification. The benefits of joint do not point to absolute jointness. It is well understood that the culture of the different services matches very well the unique demands of operating in that respective environment. The culture of each service needs to remain, but the services need to be able to understand each other and work together seamlessly.

### **The Canadian Forces Professional Development System**


An objective of the CAF is that it “...must prepare its members intellectually and professionally, to meet the anticipated challenges in the ambiguous, chaotic and complex security environment.”<sup>11</sup> This is a significant challenge and will involve joint operations. To prepare CAF members for the tasks and challenges they will receive, the CAF utilizes the CF Professional Development System (CFPDS). This system is structured so that professional development takes place throughout a member’s career. This continual development is based on education, training, employment experience and self-development.<sup>12</sup> These mechanisms occur throughout five Developmental Periods (DPs), each relating to progressing rank and responsibility. The development mechanisms and the DPs are shown in Figure 1.

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<sup>10</sup> Seth Cropsey, “The Limits of Jointness,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Summer 1993), 76.

<sup>11</sup> National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development,” last accessed 14 May 2015, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*



**Figure 1 – The Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development System**

Source: DND, “Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development.”<sup>13</sup>

The DPs represent segments within the rank structure that link to competency and knowledge expectations as the rank increases. Table 1, created from the Officer’s Programmes and Qualifications website shows common qualifications and training as an Officer progresses through the DPs.<sup>14</sup> This provides the framework against which one can see the progressing development, so that senior leaders are prepared for the responsibilities of higher rank.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Programmes and Qualifications - Officers,” last modified 26 July 2013, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/officer.page>

DP	Rank	Officers will acquire ...
DP1	NCdt/OCdt/ A/SLt/2Lt	Basic training; Environmental qualification; Basic occupational qualification;
DP2	SLt/Lt Lt(N)/Capt	Applicable common, environmental and occupational qualifications; Increased general, environmental and occupational skills and knowledge; Initial experience at the unit level;
DP3	LCdr/Maj Cdr/LCol	Applicable common, environmental and occupational qualifications; Experience in common, environmental and occupational activities; Continued experience at the unit level; Experience at formation and higher levels; Increased occupational expertise; An understanding of joint and combined operations; The JCSP qualification for selected officers;
DP4	Capt(N)/Col	Skills in planning and conducting joint and combined national and international operations; Further experience in common, environmental and occupational activities; The NSP qualification for selected officers;
DP5	Flag/General Officer	Skills in strategic leadership, development of national security policy and the management of resources at the national level.

**Table 1 – Officer Developmental Periods**



## Joint Structure

### Joint Organizations

Gen Hillier's and subsequent transformation initiatives achieved several remarkable feats, they inspired CF personnel, generated strong loyalty to the institution, brought command of military operations under military authority, and established joint organizations to command operations. CJOC commands almost all domestic and international CAF operations. There are six Regional Joint Task Force (RJTF) HQs that are responsible for CAF operations within their geographic areas. There also exist other joint organizations such as the Strategic Joint Staff that advises the CDS on operational matters and the CFWC which develops multi-service doctrine and procedures.

There are drawbacks, the commander of each Regional Joint Task Force HQ is double hatted, typically as the commander of the service that has the most significant presence in that region. For example, the Commander of RJTF (Pacific) is also the Commander of Maritime Forces Pacific. The Commander of RJTF (Western) is also the Commander of 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Division. Therefore, although the examples are truly joint organizations, the commander will never be from a service other than the Navy and Army, respectively. In a 2011 article on the lack of RCAF Officers being in positions of command of joint units, he noted that "...of the 14 principal CF General Officer positions that were available for joint service in 2010, the assignments plan saw only a single air force officer posted among these most influential senior joint positions."<sup>15</sup> Although jointness does not imply equality between services, the fact that a joint organization can

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<sup>15</sup> Michael J. Hood, "Why Canadian Airmen are not Commanding," *Canadian Military Journal* 11, no. 3 (Summer 2011): 41.

only be commanded by a single service results in a missed opportunity to develop joint awareness at the most senior levels.

Joint Task Force commanders are not experts in the detailed operations of all services. “They must therefore be provided with a staff that will enable them to effectively command and control resources from other environments and support agencies.”<sup>16</sup> The drawback is that the objective of the staff is to provide parent service expertise. What this means is that the prime means of gaining joint experience is limited to providing parent service expertise, not in learning in detail how the other services operate. A result of this staff focus is that joint education is targeted towards preparing people for this staff exposure, resulting in a limited scope of joint education. “...the system expends most of its efforts educating officers serving on joint and combatant command staffs, not those executing in the field.”<sup>17</sup>

### Joint Doctrine

With CF Transformation came the understanding of the importance of joint doctrine. There has been a great deal of activity from the CFWC and the Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre developing multi-service doctrine. The result is the significant volume of publications seen in Figure 2. When joint doctrine is considered with service doctrine, it is apparent that there must be considerable study put into comprehending the sum of doctrine available. “The scope of American military capabilities is potentially overwhelming, and the list continues to grow and evolve. It takes years to learn how to


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<sup>16</sup> Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-300/FP-001, *Canadian Forces Joint Publication CFJP 3.0 - Operations*, (Ottawa, Canadian Forces Warfare Centre, 2011): 4-2.

<sup>17</sup> Rhonda Keister, Robert Slanger, Mathew Bain, and David Pavlik. “Joint PME: Closing the Gap for Junior Officers,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 74, (3<sup>rd</sup> Qtr 2014): 66.

employ a single Service’s capabilities, not to mention staying abreast of new tactics...”<sup>18</sup>

Yet this understanding is critically important, “Service doctrine comparison and exposure to joint planning are two areas in which a small investment in curriculum will provide a large return...”<sup>19</sup>



**Figure 2 – CF Joint Doctrine Hierarchy**

Source: CFJP-A1, “Canadian Forces Joint Doctrine Development Manual”.<sup>20</sup>

## The Current Approach to Joint Development

A problem exists in that the CFPDS is primarily focussed on developing a member for progression within their parent service. “...the Services feel the purpose [of military education] is to qualify officers for promotion under JOM [Joint Officer

<sup>18</sup> William O. Odom and Christopher D. Hayes, “Cross-Domain Synergy: Advancing Jointness” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 73 (2<sup>nd</sup> Qtr 2014): 125.

<sup>19</sup> Rhonda Keister, Robert Slanger, Mathew Bain, and David Pavlik. “Joint PME: Closing the Gap...”, 67.

<sup>20</sup> Department of National Defence, A-AE-025-000/FP-000, *Canadian Forces Joint Publication CFJP A1-Joint Doctrine Development Manual*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2008), 1A-1.

Management] policy, not to prepare them for joint duty.”<sup>21</sup> It can be observed from Table 1 – Officer Developmental Periods that occupational and environmental experience and qualifications is the primary focus for DPs 1 through 4. “The Services invest tremendous amounts of time and money in developing young officers into capable practitioners, yet they spend precious little time on formal joint instruction during basic officer courses and specialty training.”<sup>22</sup> Although there are courses that incorporate jointness as part of the curriculum, such as the Joint Staff Operations Programme<sup>23</sup>, this is not mandatory training as part of every officer’s development. “Emphasis at the junior level must encompass more than broad overarching topics on the unique capabilities of each Service.”<sup>24</sup> The first formal joint education is the Joint Command and Staff Program (JCSP). Yet the actual knowledge acquired of the other services doctrine and conduct of operations is fairly superficial. The priority of this education is to enable progression through the parent service. “Familiarity with joint operations from a Service perspective does not transform into joint competency.”<sup>25</sup>

The U.S. DOD faces similar situations. A common joint education is only taught to senior officers. The DOD Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) programme focuses on Major/LCdr ranks and at senior ranks, officers with more than 15 years of service. The lack of JPME at junior officer ranks “...leaves out the most important part of

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<sup>21</sup> Vincent C. Bowhars, “Manage or Educate Fulfilling the Purpose of JPME...”, 27.

<sup>22</sup> Rhonda Keister, Robert Slanger, Mathew Bain, and David Pavlik. “Joint PME: Closing the Gap...”, 67.

<sup>23</sup> Canadian Forces College, “Joint Staff Operations Programme,” last modified 02 July 2014, <http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/230-eng.html>

<sup>24</sup> Rhonda Keister, Robert Slanger, Mathew Bain, and David Pavlik. “Joint PME: Closing the Gap...”, 65.

<sup>25</sup> Scott A. Carpenter. “The Joint Officer: A Professional Specialist,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 63, (4<sup>th</sup> Qtr 2011): 126.

joint education – the portion received in the first half of an officer’s career.”<sup>26</sup> The DOD also faces a similar situation with regards identifying the purpose of the joint education, whether it is to actually prepare graduates for operational joint employment or to allow the officers to progress within their own service. The problem is that most service senior leaders feel that “...‘service expertise comes first’ and that ‘finding time for both service and joint training is difficult.’”<sup>27</sup> A result is that minimal effort is expended on joint development.

Joint operations exposure must be started earlier in an officer’s career and for the education to be truly impactful, the expectation must be that the officer will be truly employed in a joint operational environment, using and applying the doctrine and concepts of other services, not solely in a staff position as a service subject matter expert in a joint HQ.

### **The Necessity of Experience**

Employment experience is one of the pillars of the CFPDS. It is critically important as it is the segment where the knowledge and competencies gained through education, training and self-development are put into use and acquire context. Experience “...is the de facto means of developing competencies and professional expertise.”<sup>28</sup> While attending the Advanced Military Studies Course as a Colonel, LGen Beare, who later commanded CJOC, wrote that the experience pillar “...is a determining factor in

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<sup>26</sup> David K. Richardson, “The Case for JPME Phase Zero: Building a Joint Culture in the U.S. Navy,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 50, (3<sup>rd</sup> Qtr 2008): 123.

<sup>27</sup> David K. Richardson, “The Case for JPME Phase Zero...”, 125.

<sup>28</sup> Scott A. Carpenter. “The Joint Officer: A Professional Specialist...”, 127.

determining an officer's confidence and competence."<sup>29</sup> Additionally, he finds that the experience pillar, critical though it is, is not formally entrenched within the Officer Professional Development System. Resources and tracking of this developmental concept are not directed towards experience in the same manner as education and training. He wrote "...the experience pillar is eroding, that there exists no unified approach to managing its role and relationship to other development pillars..."<sup>30</sup> He found that experience, as a method of developing an officer is conducted largely in an ad-hoc fashion. He identified that the problem in the framework of the CFPDS is that it provides "...no vehicle to quantify the balance of training and education time versus employment experience"<sup>31</sup> This problem still exists within the CFPDS.

Additionally, although experience is considered such a critical component of development, the CFPDS does not comparatively assess the importance of the different pillars. It appears to be an underlying assumption that once education is received, any experience in which that education is applied is satisfactory. Recognizing that they are not all equal, a qualification of the importance of experience would result in a more systematic emphasis on gaining experience. This is not a problem unique to the CAF, an article in *Military Review* found the formal application of the experience pillar to be lacking in the U.S. Army. "Of the three pillars of Army leader development, experience...may be the most elusive to quantify."<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Colonel Stuart A. Beare, "Operational Leadership Experience in Officer Professional Development: A Pillar in Peril" (Advanced Military Studies Course Paper, Canadian Forces College, 2000), 2.

<sup>30</sup> Colonel Stuart A. Beare, "Operational Leadership Experience...", 2.

<sup>31</sup> Colonel Stuart A. Beare, "Operational Leadership Experience...", 24.

<sup>32</sup> Maj. Adam Wojack, "Is Experience the Missing Link in Junior Officer Development?" *Military Review*, (March-April 2014): 35.

Experience is recognized as an essential component when developing new competencies. As described previously, there is a systemic problem in adequately qualifying experience as part of the development process. Considering the amount of effort directed at gaining expertise within a parent service, it is evident that experience must also be considered when developing joint competency. A deep understanding of all services in order to understand why things are done, has to be started early in every officers career in order to develop joint expertise.

### **The Way Ahead**

The question then becomes what can be done to allow officers to be exposed to joint operations, gain this valuable joint experience, early in their careers. Enhanced joint education, targeted to officers earlier in their careers, while beneficial in enhancing joint awareness does not address the experience gap. More education in jointness will achieve nothing if the career is still managed by the service and this additional education is viewed as another hurdle to surpass for service progression. Additionally, this does not address the lack of experience in joint matters and the fact the experience pillar of the CFPDS is not adequately measured.

A potential solution is the creation of a joint qualification that requires joint education and joint experience. This qualification would be necessary for progression. The U.S. DOD implemented a similar progressive joint qualification system.<sup>33</sup> Experience is gained through employment at designated joint positions. There are progressive levels of qualification with the first level intended for junior officers. This

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<sup>33</sup> Department of Defence, "Department of Defence Instruction 1300.19 - DOD Joint Officer Management Program," 04 Mar 2014, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130019p.pdf>

would start with a familiarization of service capabilities and joint experience would be provided on an opportunity basis. Beyond the first level, progression to the next level is based on experience, training, exercises and education. Each development pillar would provide points with experience in the designated positions receiving the most points. The qualification level would then be linked to promotion. This would allow junior officers to focus their efforts on developing service expertise early in their career with a fairly rapid shift in focus to joint matters as they progress, putting more emphasis on experience as the critical means of developing joint expertise.

A second option to address the issues identified in this paper is the creation of designated joint operational units with representatives of the multiple services integrated into that unit. Past efforts at creating joint organizations have focussed on headquarters, or on creating units that are already purple in origin. CJOC and the RJTFs are examples of joint units at the headquarters level. The United Kingdom's Joint Force Command (JFC), established in 2012, created "... a virtual fourth branch of the armed forces to ensure the appropriate management of 'enablers' such as communications and information..."<sup>34</sup> It manages cross service capabilities such as medical services, intelligence and cyber operations.<sup>35</sup> While technically joint, this did not bring the various component capabilities into one force. However the United Kingdom also created another joint unit, the Joint Helicopter Command. It brings together under one command the helicopter forces of the Royal Army, Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force.<sup>36</sup> The benefit

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<sup>34</sup> Trevor Taylor, "The Limited Capacity of Management to Rescue UK Defence Policy: A Review and a Word of Caution," *International Affairs* 88 No. 2, (2012), 236.

<sup>35</sup> Government of the United Kingdom. "Joint Forces Command." Last accessed 21 May 2015, <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/joint-forces-command>.

<sup>36</sup> Army. "Joint Helicopter Command." Last accessed 21 May 2015, <http://www.army.mod.uk/structure/32411.aspx>



that this unit brings to the joint development issue is that the members of the unit will be exposed to the operational concepts of the other services as they are employed. The command will task elements of the command based on the effect required and that means that service assets will be tasked to support all services. This will create a situation where the junior officers will develop a deeper understanding of the component services and that they will all have a common understanding and common procedures. The current issue is that “Organizations do not exist for the purpose of providing Officers joint experience, traditional or otherwise.”<sup>37</sup> The creation of a joint operational unit would allow members to develop a deeper understanding of the doctrine of the other services and would serve as a starting point for developing a deep understanding of joint operations throughout their career.

## **Conclusion**

The expectations for today’s CAF officer are high. They must be capable of creative thinking in complicated environments with limited information. They must be able to lead people, understand highly technical subjects and work with other services and organizations. Unfortunately the ability to work with other services, in a joint environment has taken a back seat to developing and progressing within the parent service. The CAF is well-prepared to succeed in instilling a deep understanding of jointness in its officers. There are joint HQs, joint staffs and joint doctrine. However, what is lacking is gaining this joint expertise through the experience pillar, earlier in the officer’s career.

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<sup>37</sup> Scott A. Carpenter. “The Joint Officer: A Professional Specialist...”, 127.

The experience pillar is under-developed. The U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, observed to the Senate Armed Services Committee that “...we have pushed enormous capability, responsibility and authority to the edge, to captains and sergeants of all services. And yet our leader development paradigms really haven’t changed very much.”<sup>38</sup> There is much room for improvement in quantifying experience as part of the CFPDS.

It was shown that joint education only commences at the Senior Officer level, and then it is a basic understanding of the capabilities of the other services. The CAF must now commence joint education earlier in an officer’s career and establish joint operational experience as a priority in the development of its officers. Potential avenues of achieving this are by establishing an operational joint unit, one that possess a variety of capabilities that would allow the contributing services members to interact on a daily basis and develop an understanding of why things are done that way in the other services, an understanding of the service cultures. Another option is the creation of a joint qualification that is formally part of an officers developmental periods. This qualification would be achieved progressively through education, training and experience in approved joint positions.

The CAF must stand by its commitment to prepare its members for the tasks and challenges it will present to them. To prepare its officers for joint operations it must institutionalize joint education earlier in an officer’s career and solidify operational joint experience as a necessary requirement for progression.

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<sup>38</sup> Clay Fuller, “Squadron Officer School and Professional Military Education: Checking Boxes or Building Leaders?” *The Reporter* 40, no. 3 (2013): 13.

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