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AN OPERATIONAL JOINT TARGETING COURSE: THE NEXT STEP IN THE CAF COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

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Exercise Solo Flight

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SOLO FLIGHT

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“Understanding and executing joint targeting will be the key to future successes in complex multinational operations.”¹

INTRODUCTION

The twenty-first century has seen western militaries recognizing that the complex nature of today’s conflicts require more than military intervention alone to produce lasting solutions. Military coordination with other governmental departments and non-military partners is essential in their approach to operations across the *spectrum of conflict*, ranging from peace support to counter-insurgency operations. Since 2007, the Canadian Government has emphasised a comprehensive style approach to operations dubbed *Whole of Government* (WOG) to deal with today’s complex operating environment.² The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) uses the phrase *JIMP*, standing for *Joint, Interagency, Multi-national, Public*, to categorize this approach.³ The US military uses the term *JIIM*, standing for *Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational*, while the British military uses the term Comprehensive Approach.⁴ No matter what term is used, there is a strong focus on joint and collaborative operability with today’s militaries.

¹ Thomas J. Murphy and Bernd L. Ingram, “Joint Targeting Doctrine,” *Field Artillery*, no. 5 (September 2001): 38, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/231152634?accountid=9867>.

² Andrew Leslie, Peter Gizewski and Michael Rostek, “Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Canadian Forces Operations,” *Canadian Military Journal*, vol.9, no.1: 12.

³ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁴ John Bilas, *et al.*, “Targeting the JIIM Way: A More Inclusive Approach,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, issue 72 (2nd Quarter 2014): 60.

As “targeting is an inherently joint activity,” many western militaries have begun to focus new attention towards targeting and how it can be applied in a collaborative method.⁵ The CAF joint targeting doctrine, CFJP 3-9 *Targeting*, describes targeting as:

The purpose of targeting is to integrate and synchronize fires... during the employment of forces in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of common objectives. Fires include both kinetic and non-kinetic means. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities. This process consists of the evaluation of legitimate targets and legal implications to select targets, followed by the selection of the means (kinetic and / or non-kinetic) to be used to achieve the effects desired.⁶

Targeting is divided into two categories, *Deliberate* and *Dynamic*. Deliberate targeting is conducted against targets identified and located during the planning phase of operations and can be prosecuted on a scheduled or on-call basis. Dynamic targeting is conducted against opportunity targets not located during the planning phases of operations. These targets may have been planned for, yet not located so an accelerated targeting cycle is executed to engage them when found. The target may also have been unplanned as its presence was not anticipated, yet upon locating, requires immediate action due to its significance.⁷

Although the CAF in the past has paid little attention to targeting, sending a select few to attend NATO courses, they have recently renewed their interest in joint targeting. The Canadian Forces Warfare Centre has just published new joint targeting doctrine, the Canadian Army has just completed the pilot serial of the Joint Tactical Targeting Course, and a Strategic Targeting Directive from the Chief of the Defence Staff is currently in

⁵ Department of National Defence, CFJP 3-9 *Targeting*, 3rd ed. (Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Branch, Canadian Forces warfare Centre, 2014), 1-1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1-1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1-4 and 1-5.

draft form. Likeminded western militaries recognize the importance of joint targeting too, yet have had the past few decades to gain operational experience in this realm. As they move forward, improving targeting doctrine and training, with emphasis on its relevance in the comprehensive approach, the CAF must make a concerted effort towards the development and running of an Operational Level Joint Targeting Course in order to stay relevant and keep from being left behind. Running an operational level targeting course is imperative for several reasons. First, it allows Canada to capitalize on the lessons learned and advancements made by other likeminded nations without having to actually fail in this task first at the operational level. By capitalizing on the headway already made by its allies, the CAF can keep at the forefront of joint targeting, even without having our own depth of experience to draw upon. Second, the running of the course will both promote the initial steps that the CAF has already made towards joint targeting, as well as further promoting the JIMP and WOG approaches within the operation level of the CAF. Last, Canada can no longer rely upon sending members to the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, in order to gain targeting expertise as the current rendition of the course, N3-17 NATO Targeting Orientation Course, offers next to nothing in the development of knowledgeable operational level targeteers capable of operating in today's complex environment.

CURRENT LEVEL OF CAF JOINT TARGETING

The Canadian Forces Warfare Centre published the 3rd edition of CFJP 3-9 *Targeting*, in early 2014.⁸ Although many of the terms, processes, and diagrams are drawn directly from the U.S. Joint Publication 3-60 *Joint Targeting*, which is arguably a

⁸ Department of National Defence, CFJP 3-9 *Targeting*, 3rd ed..., title page.

good thing, it still provides a solid framework for joint targeting unique to CAF operations. At the tactical level, the Canadian Army Command and Staff College has just recently completed the pilot serial of the Joint Tactical Targeting Course. The training plan for this course is actually still in draft form, and ironically the aim of the course is blank within this current draft.⁹ However, it does clearly lay out all enabling objectives that a student must learn. Although the course is specifically focused on targeting to support land operations and skewed heavily on kinetic effects, its emphasis is on a joint approach. What is lacking is the overarching operational level training that will link strategic policy within a campaign to ensure that the target sets developed from the joint targeting process at the operational level translate to effective execution at the operational and tactical levels to achieve the intended results.

Targeting is a key element of the *operational art* as “targeting is the process of addressing the strategic factors that prevent progress from current to desired conditions.”¹⁰ Although targeting can be executed at the tactical level, the decision on what needs to be targeted and how in order to achieve the strategic aims can only be made at the operational level. It is imperative that targeteers also understand more than just the Laws of Armed Conflict. In Canada, targeting takes into account international and Canadian law, as well as *national* and military *strategic objectives*.¹¹ This sets a frame work for the rules of engagement (ROE) that would come into use during an operation. This includes following the CDS Strategic Targeting Directive. An Operational Joint Targeting Course would incorporate this directive in its curriculum,

⁹ Department of National Defence, A-P1-002-AOC/PH-B01 *Training Plan: Joint Targeting for Land Operations* (Ottawa: Land Force Doctrine and Training System, 2014 Draft), 1-1/4.

¹⁰ John Bilas, *et al.*, “Targeting the JIIM Way: A More Inclusive Approach”..., 63.

¹¹ Department of National Defence, CFJP 3-9 *Targeting*, 3rd ed..., 1-1.

ensuring that CAF targeteers operate fully within the guidance of the Government of Canada.

CAPITALIZING ON OUR ALLIES

Canada lacks experience in targeting at the operational level. The adoption of the operational level of war is a relatively new concept for the CAF. In fact, as it was being adopted between 1987 and 1995, very little study or debate was exercised concerning its utility and that of its accompanying doctrinal ideas like structured campaign planning.¹² Since that time, Canada has had limited, if any involvement at planning and executing operational level joint targeting. Other militaries however have applied joint targeting in various operations over the past decades ranging from peace support operations in Kosovo, to the Allied Air Campaign in Libya.¹³ Though there has been mixed results, there have been several lessons learned. There now exists a concerted effort to gain from these experiences as “a change in the [U.S.] military’s training and mindset, how it performs command and control and *targeting* is required.”¹⁴ As western militaries make this change, integrating a more effective application of operational joint targeting into their approach to operations, the CAF must capitalize on these changes too or risk being left behind and becoming irrelevant.

¹² Howard Coombs and Michel Gauthier, “Campaigning in Afghanistan: A Uniquely Canadian Approach,” in *No Easy Task: Fighting in Afghanistan*, ed. Bernd Horn (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2011), 102.

¹³ Rui Romao, “Targeting and Adaption in Combat: Examining the Libya Case,” *Baltic Security and Defence Review*, vol. 15, issue 1 (2013): 5 and Richard L. Gonzales and Marc J. Romanych. “Nonlethal Targeting Revisited.” *Field Artillery* no. 3 (May 2001): 6, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/231153242?accountid=9867>.

¹⁴ Matt B. Dennis, “Training, Targeting, C2 for Today’s COE,” *Fires* (May 2009): 32, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/199683346?accountid=9867>.

United States Military

The U.S. military has had several epiphanies while reflecting over the past decades regarding the effectiveness of their operational joint targeting. Of the dozens of articles, after action reviews, and editorials regarding joint targeting, there are some main themes which consistently appear. The first commonly identified problem is the poor integration of operational targeting into a JIMP or Comprehensive Approach design during complex operations. Too often the targeting team is divided between lethal and non-lethal elements. This was often the case for U.S. forces during operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.¹⁵ The results were less than optimal as a “separation of a staff into lethal and non-lethal working groups creates gaps within their operational framework and degrades their ability to synchronize their efforts.”¹⁶ It is not just a problem between kinetic and non-kinetic military elements, but there is also a lack of understanding for “including nonlethal activities [of] interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities.”¹⁷ Although the U.S. Joint Publication “JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, discusses the importance of synchronizing plans and operations with interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and partner entities, it too fails to address fully how these parties should be included in targeting or focused operations to achieve desired effects.”¹⁸ Some even argue that JP 3-60 *Joint Targeting* is just as vague in its ability to explain how to incorporate these elements in targeting methodology in any spectrum of

¹⁵ Tommy S. Green, "Targeting: A Process for Wizards or Methodology for Patriarchs?" *Fires* (September 2011): 15, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/896357910?accountid=9867>.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁷ John Bilas, *et al.*, “Targeting the JIIM Way: A More Inclusive Approach”..., 61.

¹⁸ John Bilas, *et al.*, “Targeting the JIIM Way: A More Inclusive Approach”..., 61.

conflict.¹⁹ The end result is an immediate loss of cohesion and synergy and divides unity of purpose.

There have been several suggested solutions including the adoption of various models and flow charts to help walk operational staff through targeting in a full spectrum environment and integrating targeting with the Military Decision Making Process has been suggested.²⁰ One such model overlays the *dynamic* targeting cycle of Find, Fix, Finish, Analyze, Exploit, Disseminate used by U.S. Special Operations Forces in Iraq over the standard Army Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess model of land targeting.²¹ A flow chart is handy, but does nothing in the way of adding expertise. Some critics argue that the U.S. Joint Targeting doctrine already needs to be updated to “specify the one joint targeting process to be accepted by all... [and] come to grips with the definitions of effects based operations and how they impact this targeting process.”²² “To provide the requisite guidance to commanders and staff on fully examining both lethal and nonlethal activities and incorporating all of the JIIM partners, JP 3-60 needs further revising.”²³ However, the most logical solution offered is furthered “professional development/ education programs and training exercises.”²⁴ One article even suggests the establishment of a single “executive targeting/fires curriculum” taught by establishing a “National Targeting and Fires Centre under Joint Staff auspices.”²⁵ Essentially a course would allow students to learn to work together in a common instituted framework, practicing

¹⁹ David N. Propes, "Targeting 101: Emerging Targeting Doctrine," *Fires* (March-April 2009): 15, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/199658503?accountid=9867>.

²⁰ Matt B. Dennis, "Training, Targeting, C2 for Today's COE"..., 34.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 34 and David N. Propes, "Targeting 101: Emerging Targeting Doctrine"..., 17.

²² Thomas J. Murphy and Bernd L. Ingram, "Joint Targeting Doctrine"..., 38.

²³ John Bilas, *et al.*, "Targeting the JIIM Way: A More Inclusive Approach"..., 67.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 67.

²⁵ John Patch, "Obstacles to Effective Joint Targeting," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, issue 45 (2nd Quarter 2007): 77.

joint targeting under simulated conditions. The same holds true for the CAF, as an Operational Joint Targeting Course would provide instruction and practice; ensuring the process becomes common dogma for all.

A second commonly identified issue is the lack of ownership and oversight of the targeting process at the operational level. During Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, U.S. Central Command (USCentCom) failed to take charge and lead the joint targeting process. As a result, the USCentCom Air Forces charged ahead with the air campaign, taking complete control of the targeting process.²⁶ This resulted in the ground component being left out of the targeting process, and a lack of balanced input towards what required targeting to achieve the strategic end state. Eventually USCentCom re-asserted itself and gave direction to re-orient priorities for the ground offensive.²⁷

The key lesson learned here is that direction and guidance must come from the operational level headquarters regarding joint targeting to prevent components from stove piping and utilizing their own process in an attempt to fill the targeting void, and to ensure that there is balanced input in the targeting cycle and clear target priorities to ensure that the right effects are being produced to achieve the strategic aims.²⁸ Balanced input is vital, even if only one element is the one delivering the means as other actors play a vital role in advising on what is to be targeted. This was seen during the Allied air campaign in Kosovo in 1999. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe made a conscious effort to ensure army personnel played a significant part of the *air campaign*. The rationale was that although the effects were being delivered by air, “army manoeuvre

²⁶ John W. Schmidt and Clinton L. Williams, “Disjointed or Joint Targeting?” *Marine Corps Gazette*, (September 1992): 67, 68.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 68.

²⁸ Thomas J. Murphy and Bernd L. Ingram, “Joint Targeting Doctrine”..., 37.

expertise [was] needed to determine the strategy for defeating enemy ground forces. This strategy includes determining the priorities and focus for collecting against, tracking, targeting and attacking enemy ground forces.”²⁹ Although imperative that this ownership and direction comes from the operational level headquarters, it is also essential that the headquarters staff realize that if this is neglected, the targeting process will still happen, causing adverse effects as component specific targeting or tactical level targeting may not be aimed or run counter to supporting the overall campaign objectives. Essentially “to succeed in joint warfare, commanders and staff must understand both the critical need for effective joint targeting and its inherent limitations.”³⁰

A final issue commonly cited among the U.S. military is that the assessment portion of the joint targeting cycle is not being exploited effectively despite its extreme importance in operations. The consequences have been described as such:

The most important issue about assessment in targeting is that it permits strategy to be steered. Assessment is the commander’s eyes and ears in a military operation. Without assessment capability, one will fight blind and deaf and be at the opponent’s mercy.³¹

In the kinetic realm, Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) is not being effectively disseminated in a way that allows higher levels to assess the effects accurately, nor is its continued assessment being conducted and passed to others which may lead to other follow on targets. Exploiting BDA and further assessment can often provide actionable intelligence that can result in immediate follow on strikes.³² When that happens, it allows

²⁹ Robert S. Bridgford and Luke G. Grossman, “BCD Targeting for Operation Allied Force,” *Field Artillery*, no. 1 (January 2000): 14, 15, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/231147648?accountid=9867>.

³⁰ John Patch, “Obstacles to Effective Joint Targeting”..., 74.

³¹ Rui Romao, “Targeting and Adaption in Combat: Examining the Libya Case”..., 20.

³² Matt B. Dennis, “Training, Targeting, C2 for Today’s COE”..., 34.

commanders to gain the initiative. “Assessment capability is essential to guarantee information superiority and a faster OODA loop.”³³

Within a joint environment, there also tends to be lack of clarity on who makes the final call on the assessment of the effects on a target; there are often issues on the coordination of the short and longer term evaluations of targets.³⁴ Concerning non-lethal targeting, assessment is even more difficult:

Lacking quantifiable physical evidence, nonlethal targeting effects are necessarily subtle. Engagement effects may be a target’s *response* or *non-response* or changes in efforts and techniques. Targeting effects may be manifested as trends, activities and patterns in the operational environment. Effects can also be as simple as the absence of activity.³⁵

This is a particular problem in irregular warfare where the desired effect may not be the specific destruction of a particular target, making it difficult to determine if the effects produced are synonymous with the commander’s intent.³⁶

The key to solving these issues is to place more emphasis on the last phase of targeting. “Was the desired effect achieved and did it contribute to the strategy?”³⁷ Although a significant issue, there has been headway in finding solutions which should be incorporated into a CAF Operational Joint Targeting Course. First, regarding assessing effects in a complex, full spectrum environment, often it is necessary to assess the effect produced by engaging multiple targets within a larger target set. Not one target may

³³ Rui Romao, “Targeting and Adaption in Combat: Examining the Libya Case” ..., 19.

³⁴ Dan Smith, “Doctrinal issues in joint targeting,” *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* vol. 20, issue 4 (October-December 1994): 4, <http://eds.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=050490f7-77bf-46aab7958ef6cf789218%40sessionmgr113&vid=4&hid=107&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=9603204482>.

³⁵ Richard L. Gonzales and Marc J. Romanych, “Nonlethal Targeting Revisited” ..., 10.

³⁶ Rui Romao, “Targeting and Adaption in Combat: Examining the Libya Case” ..., 19.

³⁷ John Patch, “Obstacles to Effective Joint Targeting” ..., 75.

produce a desired result, but the sum of engaging several will.³⁸ In accordance with this, assessment must be a constant process, revisiting the assessment of targets multiple times, and this must happen over a longer time scale, especially in full spectrum operations as “longer cycles allow for a more robust analysis and allocation cycle.”³⁹ During Operations in Kosovo in 1998, U.S. forces with the 1st Armoured Division had some significant success with assessing non-lethal effects by modifying the targeting cycle by lengthening the phase to allow time for effects to take place.⁴⁰ Targeteers waited a minimum of a week before tasking elements to begin gathering effects data.⁴¹ Additional to this, the targeting team spent a significant amount of time gaining an intimate knowledge of the Area of Operations prior to engaging any targets so that there would be a control state that they could compare data to in order to determine if positive or negative effects had taken place.⁴²

Besides capitalizing on U.S. military lessons learned and ways ahead for developing a CAF Operational Joint Targeting Course, it is imperative to note that the British military has also made some significant advancements in operational level joint targeting which the CAF should utilize as well in order to stay on par with her two closest allies.

British Military

The U.K. Joint Doctrine Publication 3-00 *Campaign Execution*, Annex 3B – *Joint Action Targeting Process* explains the British method of targeting to support their

³⁸ Ministry of Defence. JDP 3-00 *Campaign Execution, Annex 3B – Joint Action Targeting Process*. 3rd ed. (Shrivenham, England: The Development, Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2012), 3B-8.

³⁹ Tommy S. Green, "Targeting: A Process for Wizards or Methodology for Patriarchs?" ..., 18.

⁴⁰ Richard L. Gonzales and Marc J. Romanych. "Nonlethal Targeting Revisited" ..., 7.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 10.

comprehensive approach to operations. Labelled *Full Spectrum Targeting*, it is “a holistic approach to targeting reviewing all targets together and apportioning action (lethal and non-lethal) in accordance with the campaign information strategy and desired behavioural objectives.”⁴³ The annex goes on to explain the *Audience-Based Effects Process* used at the operational level by the J3 Joint Effects Staff in order to “take the campaign objectives and define desired effects and associated targeting priorities.”⁴⁴ The annex is concise, and clearly illustrates the process from initial guidance through to execution and assessment. Several figures are provided displaying examples of Joint Targeting Cycles that incorporate both military component lethal and non-lethal effects with traditional non-lethal means like CIMIC and the media, all the while emphasizing a collaborative approach.⁴⁵ The development of a CAF Operational Joint Targeting Course would certainly benefit from adopting portions of the U.K. Full Spectrum Targeting model, especially since the Full Spectrum Targeting Model mirrors the Canadian Government’s WOG approach to operations.

While developing a course that incorporates the experiences of its allies would further operational joint targeting by allowing the CAF to avoid mistakes without having to learn them first hand, it would have the further benefit of advancing the current steps the CAF has made towards joint targeting and further promote JIMP and WOG operability.

⁴³ Ministry of Defence. JDP 3-00 *Campaign Execution, Annex 3B...*, 3B-1.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 3B-5, 6.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 3B-7, 8.

PROMOTE CURRENT PROGRESS AND FURTHER JOINT OPERABILITY

As noted earlier, the CAF has made some initial headway towards joint targeting. The publication of the CFJP 3-9 *Targeting* is an essential starting point as it sets in place a single source reference for all elements of the CAF. The U.S. has had a particular problem with multiple publications of various targeting doctrine which has caused many problems with joint cooperation.⁴⁶ Many services within the U.S. military still hold on to legacy targeting publications with their accompanying processes, which only confounds the problem.⁴⁷ Although the CAF has one single publication, allowing it to avoid this friction, there is still the issue of learning how to put the doctrine into practice. Just as one cannot be expected to learn to drive a car merely by reading a driver's educational manual, a course is required to bridge the knowledge contained in doctrine with its practical application, especially when there is little to no true experience in the CAF. A course will do this, allowing students to learn the principles, and then be assessed on their effectiveness at applying it through a simulated targeting environment. A course will also ensure that there is a standard set of enabling objective that each student must meet. This would stand as an outstanding step towards furthering the progression of the new doctrine.

The further improvement and promotion of *jointness* and the WOG approach to operations can be accomplished through the development and execution of an Operational Joint Targeting Course. It has been argued that "targeting is the most noticeable joint function in military operations and has the greatest impact on them."⁴⁸ If joint targeting became a successful staple of operations for the CAF due to the

⁴⁶ John Patch, "Obstacles to Effective Joint Targeting"..., 74.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 75.

⁴⁸ Rui Romao, "Targeting and Adaption in Combat: Examining the Libya Case"..., 22.

effectiveness of a course, it could act as an anchor for the further improvement of joint and military-civilian interaction. Robert Egnell argues in his article “Explaining US and British performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations: The Civil-Military Dimension,” that civil-military relations will only be effective if two things are set in place by a government. First, *direct ways*, which constitutes specific direction for cooperation between the military and other departments. And second, *indirect ways* which constitutes funding, doctrine and arenas that can make this collaboration work.⁴⁹ Here the CAF can play a role in providing the arena, an Operational Joint Targeting Course that would be open to members of other governmental departments.

The development of this course could also help improve the CAF operational capacity to operate in complex operating environments. In full spectrum operations, there is considerable difficulty in determining how to achieve a desired strategic effect, and as highlighted in the previous section, there is considerable difficulty in determining the effectiveness of the results. “The major challenge of targeting for peace support operations is to shape the operational environment using non-lethal assets and means.”⁵⁰ A course would help develop the requisite skill to translate strategic aims into specific non-lethal effects that could be delivered at the operational and tactical levels. It would also allow future targeteers to organize and plan out the specific use of a myriad of military and non-military resources to achieve an overall strategic effect. “The greatest value of employing the targeting process for peace support operations is its ability to direct disparate assets and means into a single, focused operation.”⁵¹ The final step of

⁴⁹ Robert Egnell, “Explaining US and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations: The Civil-Military Dimension,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 29, no. 6 (December 2006), 1042.

⁵⁰ Richard L. Gonzales and Marc J. Romanych. “Nonlethal Targeting Revisited”..., 6.

⁵¹ Richard L. Gonzales and Marc J. Romanych. “Nonlethal Targeting Revisited”..., 10.

learning how to incorporate longer targeting cycles and targeting multiple target set to achieve and assess the effectiveness of non-lethal engagements, as highlighted earlier would tie the entire process together, producing a well-rounded targeteers capable of operating in any level of conflict.

Additionally, targeteers within peace support operations have an even larger job than in operations of a purely kinetic nature as target sets can include friendly and neutral leaders and population groups. “Unlike a conventional high pay-off target list (HPTL) that contains only adversary targets, the HPTL for a peace support operation also includes “friendly” leaders and populace groups that support task force operations.”⁵² An Operational Joint Targeting Course would also give future targeteers the training to manage a larger and more diverse set of targets that require both positive and negative effects upon them.

A final benefit that would result from the effective training of operational level targeteers by the CAF is that it will offer an increased ability as a multinational coalition partner. The U.S. military has noted that it has few qualified targeteers. It takes time to effectively train targeteers as there is both *art* and *science* that revolves around targeting.⁵³ This includes an intimate knowledge of the Law of Armed Conflict, the art of transferring the strategic aims to tactical effects, and the science of assessing measures of effectiveness. Some have even argued that due to their specific skill set and experience, targeteers should be a career specialty designation.⁵⁴ As this is the case, the development of CAF operational targeteers may offer greater opportunities for CAF personnel to deploy on exchanges with the U.S. military. The same issue of a lack of qualified

⁵² *Ibid.*, 9.

⁵³ John Patch, “Obstacles to Effective Joint Targeting”..., 75.

⁵⁴ John Patch, “Obstacles to Effective Joint Targeting”..., 76.

targeteers exists within NATO. Of the various conclusions drawn from Operation Unified Protector over Libya in 2011, it was recognized that the Alliance is quite short of this critical capability and that increased targeting training within NATO is required.⁵⁵ The CAF, with the advent of an Operational Joint Targeting Course, would be able to supply qualified targeteers and contribute to NATO in an area of where they are experiencing significant shortfalls. Again this would offer CAF military members increased opportunities for deployment and the gaining of useful experience as well as possibly allowing Canada to increase its commitment to NATO. Additionally, there again may come a time that the CAF will take a lead role within a portion of a NATO operation such as the case of Regional Command South in the province of Kandahar, Afghanistan. If this is the case, it would behoove the CAF to effectively develop an operational level targeting ability so that it could make the best use of all resources that it had at its disposal.

Today, advancing the CAF's capability towards operational joint targeting is not only a step in the right direction for the future, it is an imperative. The CAF can no longer afford to stand still as the status quo of external training with NATO is no longer an effective approach to training CAF military members to be targeteers.

NATO TRAINING IS NO LONGER A VIABLE OPTION

Currently the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany runs only a basic introductory course on targeting. The N3-17 NATO Targeting Orientation Course is

⁵⁵ Rui Romao, "Targeting and Adaption in Combat: Examining the Libya Case"..., 21.

aimed to familiarize students with the NATO Joint Targeting Cycle.⁵⁶ Furthermore, the main focus of the course is conventional air to surface targeting.⁵⁷ Essentially it is geared towards supporting land operations with kinetic means and the joint element is using air power to destroy land targets. Weaponizing and Collateral Damage is also discussed somewhat, but the outline explicitly denotes that *non-lethal targeting* is outside the scope of the course.⁵⁸ This has dire impact on any nation that wishes to utilize NATO schooling as a platform for training their targeteers for use in full spectrum operations. Furthermore, the NATO Targeting Orientation Course supports very little of its own doctrine. NATO is currently one of the world leaders in adopting the comprehensive approach for conducting operations, yet its targeting course does not even attempt to incorporate non-lethal effects into its targeting training. This is a gross oversight, especially when the course objectives list students as being able to “Discuss Effects-Based Operations and the Comprehensive Approach and the impact it has on the evolution of targeting.”⁵⁹

A final point is that the course has been reduced to only 1 week in duration, which only allows students to skim the surface of the many aspects of joint targeting without actually going into any depth of study that would allow some expertise to take root. Perhaps this can explain why during the Allied air campaign over Libya, NATO’s Operation Unified Protector, the Combined Forces Air Component Commander, Lt. Gen. Ralph Jodic realized that he “needed more skilled targeting personnel capable of both deliberate and dynamic targeting.”⁶⁰

⁵⁶ NATO School, “N3-17 NATO Targeting Orientation Course General Course Description,” last accessed 23 April 2014, http://www.natoschool.nato.int/documents/course_descriptions/Course%20Information%20N3-17.pdf.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Rui Romao, “Targeting and Adaption in Combat: Examining the Libya Case”..., 11.

In the end, the lack of depth of the course content, its short duration, and complete disregard for incorporating the study of non-lethal aspects of targeting in the comprehensive approach to operations leaves the NATO Targeting Orientation Course severely lacking. Even the pilot serial of the Joint Tactical Targeting Course is 20 days in duration, allowing for a more in depth study of the dynamics of targeting.⁶¹ The training plan even allocates 150 minutes of instructional time to integrating Information Operations as part of the Act function of targeting.⁶²

THE WAY AHEAD

This paper has justified the need for an Operational Joint Targeting Course for the CAF, but in order to do this there are some elements that need to be identified. First, who should take ownership of the course and joint targeting at the operational level? Second, who should attend the course and vice versa, to whom should the course orient its curriculum towards? Last, what are the ramifications if the course is not developed and run?

Ownership of the course should be that of the Canadian Forces Warfare Centre. Not only because this organization was the publisher of CFJP 3-9 *Targeting*, it is important that the curriculum and instruction be kept in a joint environment free from any connection to a specific environment. This would ensure that no component over take the process, causing “stove piping” or component specific direction to occur.⁶³

⁶¹ Department of National Defence, A-P3-002-JTE/PC-B01 *Qualification Standard: Joint Tactical Targeting* (Ottawa: Land Force Doctrine and Training System, 2013), 1-2/2.

⁶² Department of National Defence, A-P1-002-AOC/PH-B01 *Training Plan: Joint Targeting for Land Operations...*, 3-30, 3-31.

⁶³ Thomas J. Murphy and Bernd L. Ingram, “Joint Targeting Doctrine”..., 37.

Military candidates should come from all areas of the CAF. Besides the likely Army, RCAF, and RCN candidates, it is imperative that lawyers and intelligence personnel attend the course as well. In the current operating environment, lawyers play a greater and increasingly more important role during military operations. Their input is imperative as “targeting decisions are critical events for commanders because incorrect decisions can have devastating strategic, operational and tactical consequences.”⁶⁴ As for intelligence analysts, “without intelligence, there is no targeting process.”⁶⁵ For this same reason, political advisors, public relations and information operations personnel should also be encouraged to attend the course. Much like the National Security Program course offered at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, the course should be open to members of other non-military government departments that may have a role in contributing to non-lethal activities, specifically personnel from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development, and members from the Department of Public Safety. In the end “collective training must incorporate other governmental departments (OGDs), international organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and public volunteer organizations (PVOs)” to ensure a common operating framework and a common language that all contributors to a comprehensive approach can work within to be successful.⁶⁶

The ramifications of the CAF neglecting to develop and execute a national course of this level leaves it at risk to becoming left behind other western militaries as they

⁶⁴ James K. Carberry and M. Scott Holcomb, “Target Selection at CFLCC, A Lawyer’s Perspective,” *Field Artillery Journal* 9, no. 2 (March 2004): 39, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/218362000?accountid=9867>.

⁶⁵ Rui Romao, “Targeting and Adaption in Combat: Examining the Libya Case”..., 10.

⁶⁶ Andrew Leslie, Peter Gizewski and Michael Rostek, “Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Canadian Forces Operations”..., 17.

advance elements of their organization and doctrine towards a more comprehensive approach to operations. The knock on effect is that the CAF may then no longer be able to effectively participate with its allies in coalition operations, and may lose an effective tool for dealing with complex operations. Targeting has been recognized as a key enabler for future operations in full spectrum operations, and one that stands to promote the joint and comprehensive approach more than any other process. Secondly, the momentum of JIMP and WOG approaches that the Land Force and the Canadian Government have touted thus far may also risk slowing down if it is seen that there is less effort being put towards their cause. “The successful implementation of a JIMP concept will require a continued active endorsement from CF and Land Force Leadership, as well as from other Government of Canada Departments,” and a course will have the potential to provide this.⁶⁷

COUNTER ARGUMENT

In the past, the CAF have been content to send their personnel to attend targeting courses with NATO, vice running their own course. Targeting may not have been a priority for the CAF then, but it is now becoming a subject of considerable interest for its closest allies and so should be for the CAF’s as well. However, would the investment in an Operational Joint Targeting Course be cost effective in terms of money and resources, versus the quality of the training received? The current cost of running the pilot Joint Tactical Targeting Course is roughly \$25,000 dollars, and that is after the curriculum had

⁶⁷ Andrew Leslie, Peter Gizewski and Michael Rostek, “Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Canadian Forces Operations”..., 16.

already been developed.⁶⁸ The cost of development would obviously be additional. Although the cost may be significant in a time of fiscal restraint, and there may exist the requirement to import some expertise from our allies for initial development based off of their breadth of targeting experience at the operational level, the overall value of the level of training that will be produced will be more than worth it, especially if one considers the benefits of the cross pollination of ideas that could come from non-military students attending the course. If money is to be put towards improving jointness in the military and a WOG approach, this is an effective way to do it. There also may exist the possibility of eventually opening up attendance to international military students, offering the option of some cost capturing.

There may also be an argument concerning legal ramifications. Article 82 of Additional Protocol I of the 1977 ratifications to the Geneva Convention of 1949 stipulates the aim of requiring legal advisors in the armed forces, and that there must be a hierarchical relationship between legal advisors and the commanders they support.⁶⁹ However, due to the level of expertise that may be offered from the execution of this course, there may be the potential for commanders to be less reliant on their legal advisors during targeting decisions, being confident in the training of their targeting team. This however is an unlikely event. The CAF takes great pride in the professional merits of its soldiers and officers and commanders should take due diligence in consulting their legal advisors, and military lawyers should always make sure their concerns are known and advice is heard, whether it is considered or not.

⁶⁸ Wade McHattie, course staff for pilot serial of Joint Tactical Targeting Course, email received 29 April 2014.

⁶⁹ International Committee of the Red Cross. "Legal Advisors in Armed Conflict," *Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law* (January 2003): 1-2.
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/legal_advisers_ffaa.pdf.

CONCLUSION

The action of targeting has gained greater attention by western militaries in recent years as its process has been recognized as being an innately joint activity. As approaches to operations continue to revolve around collaborative methodologies that promote military and non-military cooperative engagement, the progression of operational joint targeting doctrine and training will continue to be a key aspect of what is deemed vital for future successful operations.

While the CAF has in the past paid little attention to the development of experienced targeteers and joint targeting at the operational level, it has taken some vital steps forward in this realm very recently. However, a tactical level targeting course, a recently published joint doctrine and a Strategic Targeting Directive that is still in its draft form, is not enough to further the promotion of a comprehensive approach to operations, develop targeteers with the expertise to operate at the operational level, stay on par with the advances that allies are making, and finally further develop the tools required for adapting to operations within today's complex operating environments. The CAF must endeavour to develop and run an Operational Joint Targeting Course to do this. A course that capitalizes on the key lessons learned and advancements made by its closest allies: harmonizing the collaboration of military and non-military actors, using kinetic and non-kinetic effects throughout all phases of the targeting process; the requirement for centralized ownership and oversight at the operational headquarters to ensure a balanced approach and an effective development of means to achieve strategic ends; and enabling the development of effective means of conducting the assessment of non-kinetic effects.

An Operational Joint Targeting Course, open to personnel of other governmental departments and non-governmental organizations would also help further promote the Government of Canada's WOG approach to operations, offering a common framework for all participants to operate within, ensuring a mutual understanding of the process and the shared development of what the strategic end state is, and how to achieve it. "This is the most important phase of the targeting process. It is about translating strategy into tasks. It is about translating the political and military objectives, guidance and intent into specific actions that are logically linked to [the] desired end state."⁷⁰

Finally, the CAF can no longer afford to carry on with the status quo in regards to the development of their military personnel as experts in targeting. The current curriculum of the NATO Targeting Orientation Course lacks the depth and content of the concept of a collaborative approach that would allow it to be a viable option for the CAF to use as a training tool for the development of effective targeteers.

⁷⁰ Rui Romao, "Targeting and Adaption in Combat: Examining the Libya Case," *Baltic Security and Defence Review*, vol. 15, issue 1 (2013): 6.

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