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A CASE FOR CIVILIAN MANAGERS

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Exercise Solo Flight

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EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT*

A CASE FOR CIVILIAN MANAGERS

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A CASE FOR CIVILIAN MANAGERS

Introduction

Commanding Officers of large non-deployed units (LNDU) in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are generally highly trained and experienced in command and leadership, but can struggle to employ effective management practices. The complexity of LNDU and competing priorities for resources force Commanding Officers (COs) to take a risk-managed approach to delivering their assigned programs, but they are frequently posted into the role without necessary contextual knowledge about the program they are to lead. Moreover, COs of LNDU are commonly succession planned for promotion and posted out of their command in one to two years. There are considerable benefits to introducing civilian support as staff officers to augment the management activities of COs. This paper will show how non-deployed CAF units with more than \$50M budget for operations employing more than 800 combined military and civilian personnel, LNDU, will operate more effectively with a civilian in a General Manager (GM), Chief of Staff (CoS) or Executive Officer (XO) role.

There are three main factors that limit a CO's ability to employ highly effective management skills. First, there are considerable time constraints that COs must deal with during the relatively short duration of their posting. Complex and wicked problems¹ can rarely be solved within a single posting. Second, COs are rarely trained in management to the level that would make them successful managing NDLU. Third, it takes significant staff effort to maintain current knowledge of the complex and highly integrated webs of

¹ Andrejs Skaburskis, "The Origin of 'Wicked Problems'." *Planning Theory & Practice* 9, no. 2 (June 2008): 277-280.

rules, policies and orders; and the information systems to support the CO's decision making frequently generate reports that are numerically or statistically correct but lack important context. These factors, combined with the responsibilities for leadership and command in LNDU, mean there are too many demands for COs to focus the necessary attention on management activities.

Institutional imperatives that demand change

This paper identifies four key factors why the historical command/hierarchical model is unsuitable for the future, all of which are rooted in the increasing complexity of the operating environment for COs of NDLU. First, the complexity of the regulatory and reporting requirements have increased. Whereas in the past the CAF valued command and leadership effectiveness over management ability, new demands for transparency and accountability in program administration that are set by organizations external to the CAF/DND and internally refocus attention on management. Treasury Board regulations on financial² and human resource administration,³ procurement⁴ and expenditure⁵ management have introduced a layer of reporting and regulation that can stifle program execution.

² Canada. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "Policy Framework for Financial Management", <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=18790>

³ Canada. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "Human Resources Management", <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/chro-dprh/hrh-eng.asp>

⁴ Canada. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "Contract Management", <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/cmp/index-eng.asp>

⁵ Canada. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "Directive on Expenditure Initiation and Commitment Control" <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=17061>

At the same time, the level of public scrutiny⁶ on hospitality, travel, training and defence procurement⁷ and contracting⁸ demand significant staff effort from what have historically been lean command teams. COs were delegated authorities who were notionally held accountable for their decisions. New policy and regulatory changes have increased visibility and management accountability for COs. It is now easier to see what is being done wrong, but COs have the wrong resources to make sure things are done right.

Second, the complexity of the institutional culture is increasing with changes in the composition of the population in the CAF. The persistent employment of CAF personnel since the Gulf War has had an impact on the serving members and Canadians' perceptions of them.⁹ Many of the current leaders in the CAF have been engaged in global security and peace-building efforts for most, if not all of their career.¹⁰ Demographic changes in the military population see high numbers of personnel retiring from the CAF which propels less experienced personnel through the ranks. New members joining the CAF are typically better educated on entry than enrollees of the past and have greater aptitude with information and communication technologies.¹¹ They also have higher expectations for the availability of information, stronger information

⁶ The Canadian Press, CBC News Website, "Military procurement changes to bring more scrutiny, trade focus", <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/military-procurement-changes-to-bring-more-scrutiny-trade-focus-1.2524133>

⁷ Canada. Public Works and Government Services Canada. "Defence Procurement Strategy." (September 2014). <http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/stamgp-lamsmp/eam-lmp-eng.html>

⁸ Canada. Public Works and Government Services Canada, "Canada First: Leveraging Defence Procurement Through Key Industrial Capabilities", <http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/stamgp-lamsmp/eam-lmp-eng.html>

⁹ Allan D. English, "Canadian Military Culture." In *Understanding Military Culture - A Canadian Perspective*, 500. Kingston: Queen's University Press, 2004.

¹⁰ Deborah Cowan, *Military Workfare - The Soldier and Social Citizenship in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008.

¹¹ Gilbert, J. (2011, Sept/Oct). THE MILLENNIALS: A NEW GENERATION OF EMPLOYEES, A NEW SET OF ENGAGEMENT POLICIES. Ivey Business Journal Online, 1.

seeking/finding skills and an increased desire to understand the “why” behind orders. The demand for information from command and the complexity of grievances and complaints submitted to COs have therefore increased.

Third, the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS)¹² provides an overview of the aims of the Government of Canada in creating the defence capabilities for the future, which lead to policy objectives supporting the development¹³ of a symbiotic military-industrial development program.¹⁴ In support of aligning resources to execute strategic imperatives¹⁵ outlined in the CFDS, the planning methods, systems, processes and reporting requirements that are in place within the department continue to mature.¹⁶

Two key outcomes of the maturation process are: 1) a constant state of change in expectations for how to use the models/frameworks/processes,¹⁷ and 2) increases in the complexity of the responses with a requirement to substantiate, quantify and validate the responses. A CO may not understand the details of their unit well enough to recognize what is missing in plans or reports – they ‘don’t know what they don’t know’ about how their unit operates.¹⁸

¹² Canada First Defence Strategy, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/canada-first-defence-strategy.page>

¹³ Peter Jones and Philippe Lagassé. "Rhetoric versus reality: Canadian defence planning in a time of austerity." *Defense and Security Analysis* 28, no. 2 (June 2012): 140-151.

¹⁴ Tom Jenkins, "Canada First: Leveraging Defence Procurement Through Key Industrial Capabilities." Public Works and Government Services Canada (February 2013).

¹⁵ Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton. *The execution premium: linking strategy to operations for competitive advantage*. Harvard Business Press, 2008.

¹⁶ Mark Rempel, "An Overview of the Canadian Forces' Second Generation Capability-Based Planning Analytical Process." DRDC CORA, no. TM 2010-198 (September 2010)

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Noel Burch, works cited as employee of Gordon Training International, "The Conscious Competence Ladder", http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newISS_96.htm

Finally the effects of such changes as Strategic Review, Deficit Reduction Action Plan and Defence Transformation and the advancement of national-level policies on such things as support to injured personnel,¹⁹ re-location, Boards of Inquiry (BOIs), Summary Investigations (SIs), harassment, sexual misconduct, communication and media relations, and procurement may be parts of complex or even wicked problems. COs are charged with delivering their programs while facing a maelstrom of change at the unit level.²⁰

For this paper, secondary research was conducted; it is supported by the analysis of constructs that highlight areas of incongruence and/or oversights that hamper managerial effectiveness. Key findings from the research are presented in support of the argument that the addition of civilian management will lead to superior outcomes. They answer three questions that contribute to the thesis: 1) are management skills different than leadership and command skills, 2) why do COs not employ the necessary management skills, and 3) in what ways do civilian managers contribute to the operational effectiveness of NDLU?

Are leadership and command skills different than management skills?

Leadership, command and management are described as “the conflated trilogy” where “the three constructs of command, leadership and management are necessarily interconnected but unfortunately often confused.”²¹ Management is a discrete body of

¹⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence. “Caring for Our Own.” Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2012.

²⁰ Michael Rostek, “Managing Change in DND.” In *The Public Management of Defence*, edited by J.C. Stone. Toronto: Breakout Education, 2009.

²¹ Alan Okros, “The Purpose of Military Leadership.” In *Leadership in the Canadian Military Context*. Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2010.

knowledge identified from its origins with Taylor²² in scientific management, through Henry Ford with process controls,²³ to Fayol²⁴ and the principles of management, and on to organizations that “deal with ambiguity.”²⁵ These lead to contemporary theories of management that adopt a construct where there are rigorous process controls²⁶ yet allow organizations to leverage the knowledge of workers²⁷ in order to be adaptable and respond to changing context.²⁸

There are competencies and skills that can be developed in the field of management.²⁹ Occasionally there will be a military officer who will develop such skills through study or experience (such as in an MBA or assignment to a project); however, COs of NDLU with these skills are not the norm. It is common, though, for civilians to be trained as managers. They have abundant opportunities to focus on the development of management skills. Management as a discipline offers breadth of generalist development that can be augmented with specialist management training and certification in: human resources, finance, projects, process/quality; marketing, and information systems.

²² Marvin Weisbord. *Productive Workplaces Revisited* (Chapter 2: Scientific Management Revisited: A Tale of Two Taylors; Chapter 3: The Consulting Engineer: Taylor Invents a New Profession.). ISBN 0-7879-7117-0, 2004.

²³ Sue R. Faerman, Michael P. Thompson, and Michael R. McGrath. *Becoming a master manager: A competency framework*. New York, NY: Wiley, 1990.

²⁴ Teri McConville, “The principles of management applied to the defence sector.” In *Managing Defence in a Democracy*, edited by Laura R. Cleary and Teri McConville. London: Routledge, 2006.

²⁵ Sue R. Faerman, Michael P. Thompson, and Michael R. McGrath. *Becoming a master manager: A competency framework*. New York, NY: Wiley, 1990.

²⁶ Milan Kubr, ed. *Management consulting: A guide to the profession*. International Labour Organization, 2002.

²⁷ Peter Ferdinand Drucker. *People and performance: The best of Peter Drucker on management*. Routledge, 1995.

²⁸ Sue R. Faerman, Michael P. Thompson, and Michael R. McGrath. *Becoming a master manager: A competency framework*. New York, NY: Wiley, 1990.

²⁹ Henry Mintzberg, Bruce Ahlstrand, and Joseph Lampel. “And Over Here Ladies and Gentlemen: The Strategic Management Beast.” In *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic Management*. New York: Free Press, 1998.

Why do COs not employ the necessary management skills?

COs of NDLU require a high level of knowledge of the CAF to be promoted into such positions.³⁰ They are not managers hired into leadership; they are trained operators of technical systems.³¹ They command and they lead.³² Management skills that they develop are a by-product of “learning as they go.”³³ This does not mean that the management skills are absent, but rather that they are usually not as well developed or exercised as command and leadership skills. The CO requires an understanding of the role of the unit, its mission and the context in which it operates.³⁴ This begins with an understanding of mandate and resources. For many COs of NDLU, this is their first exposure to the responsibilities and accountabilities required of a senior manager. COs face a tension in understanding and supporting organizational change while at the same time preparing their unit for mission success. While they are experts in their field and generally exceptional leaders with a strong command and technical background³⁵ they commonly do not understand the ‘business of the business.’³⁶ This can cause them to make assumptions about a suitable approach or response that is tactically accurate, but inadvertently undermines program activities.

³⁰ Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001 Canadian Forces Joint Publication - Canadian Military Doctrine

³¹ Gary W. Ivey and Theresa J.B. Kline, “Transformational and Active Transactional Leadership in the Canadian Military,” *Leadership & Organization Development Journal* 31, no. 3 (2010): 246–62, doi:10.1108/01437731011039352.

³² Huffington Post Business Blog, Huffington Post Website, “What the Military Can Teach Business Leaders”, http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/ivey-business-school/business-military_b_5605630.html

³³ Department of National Defence, “Leadership in the Canadian Forces,” *Leadership* (Ottawa, 2005).

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Gary W. Ivey and Theresa J.B. Kline, “Transformational and Active Transactional Leadership in the Canadian Military,” *Leadership & Organization Development Journal* 31, no. 3 (2010): 246–62, doi:10.1108/01437731011039352.

³⁶ Lieutenant-commander Brian Costello, “Continuing Canadian Naval Officer Training in the 21 St Century,” *Canadian Naval Review* 2, no. 2 (2006): 25–29, <http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/vol2num2/vol2num2art7.pdf>.

The enemy of effective management amongst COs of NDLU is time. There is not enough time to do all that is expected of the CO to the level that is expected.³⁷ There is a ‘battle rhythm’ for each command appointment that includes routine personnel administration, budgeting, program planning, and ceremonial activities. Also, non-routine activities at the tactical and operational level confound the CO’s ability to address longer-term, more strategic, issues. For example, compassionate leave requests, fires, traffic accidents, Ministerial Correspondence Unit/Access to Information requests, grievances, SIs, BOIs, and complaints are urgent, frequently complex, important, and need the CO’s attention. Add to this the normal routine for posting cycles where the CO will have 60-90 days of orientation and 30 days of departure preparation in a typical 2 year posting. Two basic methods for combatting the inefficiencies in organizational performance due to high rates of turnover – 1) individual and collective training, and 2) simplification and standardization of tasks³⁸ – are not suitable to address the complexity facing COs of NDLU.

COs of NDLU are responsible to lead change and set direction.³⁹ They are, however, rarely aware of the implications of changes that are in-progress on program delivery, a managerial responsibility. They must navigate a complex web of accountabilities and responsibilities, whether conferred through the CDS, Canadian

³⁷ “The Canadian Forces’ (CF) philosophy of command demands the highest standards of leadership; doctrine, and training; effective decision making; and mutual trust between leaders and their subordinates. The CF culture emphasizes mission command and empowers all commanders with the authority to execute their mission while holding them accountable for the actions of the forces under their command. Commanders at all levels require boldness, initiative, strength of will, and imagination and must be highly skilled in their profession, determined, and success-oriented.” Canadian Forces Military Doctrine, Ch.5 art. 0501. Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001 Canadian Forces Joint Publication - Canadian Military Doctrine

³⁸ Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001 Canadian Forces Joint Publication - Canadian Military Doctrine

³⁹ Alan Okros, “The Purpose of Military Leadership.” In *Leadership in the Canadian Military Context*. Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2010.

Forces Organization Orders, or the Queen's Regulations and Orders; through the Deputy Minister through the delegation of financial, human resources or labour relations authorities; or through Public Works and Government Services with procurement and contracting authorities. COs will also have responsibility for oversight of non-public assets. All throughout, the CO sets the tone for attitudes towards management responsibilities and the response to bureaucratic processes.

COs want to command, but the organizations they command will already be operating under the direction of the previous CO and will have a number of program initiatives already underway. Normally up to ninety-five percent of the program is defined before the CO arrives. The programs delivered by NDLU are not easily scaled and do not respond quickly to changes in direction.

The CAF is an archetypal learning organization.⁴⁰ While its notional core purpose is to employ “multi-purpose combat-capable forces”⁴¹ the employment of these forces is entirely dependent on the development of such forces – capability development.⁴² There is a cost to productivity in being a learning organization.⁴³ Superficial problems are addressed on a break-fix basis, but root causes and systemic faults are commonly overlooked.⁴⁴ Plotting productivity against role proficiency, the result is asymptotic with a gradual decline in productivity to the limit of median

⁴⁰ Peter M. Senge, *The fifth discipline fieldbook: Strategies and tools for building a learning organization*. Crown Business, 2014.

⁴¹ Canada First Defence Strategy, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/canada-first-defence-strategy.page>

⁴² Robert Michael. Hartfiel, "Planning without guidance: Canadian Defence policy and planning, 1993-2004." *Canadian Public Administration* 53, no. 3 (Sep 2010): 323-349.

⁴³ Major Devin Conley, and Dr. Eric Ouellet. "The Canadian Forces and Military Transformation: An Elusive Quest for Efficiency." *Canadian Army Journal* 14, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 71-83.

⁴⁴ Cannon and Edmondson, "Failing to Learn and Learning to Fail (Intelligently)."

proficiency. It creates a cycle of perpetual crisis management wherein the organization trends towards lower performance.⁴⁵

The confluence of these factors sees a dichotomy where the CO wants to ‘have an effect’ and ‘lead towards attaining institutional goals’ but can be prevented by organizational inertia and the limitations and constraints on the resources available to make desired changes. There is an expectation that changes can be made with the resources that will accrue from the change – a false expectation that under-values the importance of properly resourcing change initiatives.⁴⁶ The result is that institutional change, or meaningful, lasting change within NDLU requires a continuity and deliberate, persistent pressure towards attainment of objectives.⁴⁷

How a civilian manager contributes to operational effectiveness

The key issues that need to be addressed are 1) the churn amongst the leadership teams of NDLU, 2) the complexity of the operating environment for COs of NDLU, and 3) the ability to generate support staff the CO can rely upon. While there are many ways to address these problems, for the sake of simplicity two alternatives are presented. Option one is to introduce/maintain clear terms of reference for a military second in command (2 I/C) (i.e. CoS or XO) for each CO of NDLU and ensure that the posting cycle for these members is asynchronous to the posting cycle for the COs. Option two is to introduce a senior civilian manager to work in a CoS or XO role responsible for the

⁴⁵ Donella H. Meadows, “Drift to Low Performance,” *Systems Thinkers*, 2009, 109–18.

⁴⁶ Michael. Rostek, “Managing Change in DND.” In *The Public Management of Defence*, edited by J.C. Stone. Toronto: Breakout Education, 2009.

⁴⁷ Paul Strelbel, “Why Do Employees Resist Change?” *Harvard Business Review* 74, no. 3 (May/Jun 1996).

day-to-day operations of the unit. Note that this civilian role is not 2 I/C as command authorities cannot be delegated to a civilian.

There are benefits to the first option, the military 2 I/C. First, the military officer will be able to take command decisions and issue orders in accordance with delegated/conferred authorities. Second, the military officer will have a rich understanding of command and leadership principles that will augment and support that of the CO. Third, the military officer, others in the chain of command and the CO will share a common vocabulary and be familiar with the usual roles, responsibilities and accountabilities normally assigned to the 2 I/C. There will be cultural acceptance for what is viewed as normal amongst these parties.

The risks to this option drive attention back to the key problems. First, the military officer will be subject to the same career management processes as the CO and will have gained similar experiences and skills resulting in a 2 I/C that provides redundancy, but does not add significant breadth to the CO's toolkit. Further, it is unlikely the person will be guaranteed to remain in a billet on a cycle opposite to the CO to provide continuity. Finally, the normal two- to three-year posting cycle is insufficient to develop the contextual knowledge and fully understand the systems and processes that affect the CO's program, the 2 I/C will not become expert in these areas.

The second option presents a problem of 'square peg-round hole.' A civilian senior manager will be able to grow and develop within the unit and stay in position long

enough to provide context rich information to the CO as the decision maker.⁴⁸ The civilian will be a ‘force multiplier’ as the focus of their training and development will have a smaller amount of overlap with the CO’s areas of expertise than would a military officer and the civilian can be an expert in management. The civilian will be able to live through evolutions and iterations of process and system changes and will be able to provide the CO insight into potential pitfalls related to change implementation. Further, the civilian will provide continuity on the ‘major muscle movements’ related to the program for the unit, notice changes to the planning guidance, and offer insights into proposed guidance⁴⁹ that will affect program outcomes for years to follow. With this option, the main aspects of the problem are solved, but it is not a perfect fit.

The major risks with having a civilian CoS or XO are that subordinates to the CO will not accept or understand the role, and in the selection and development of the right candidate. It will be common for military officers posted into the unit to be reluctant to take direction from a civilian, even when the civilian speaks with the authority conferred by the CO. For COs who have not had civilian subordinates, especially senior civil servants who have the confidence and credentials to make them suitable to take on the role of CoS, it will be difficult for the CO to quickly establish the level of trust and rapport that is needed within the command team. Selection and development of the candidate will require care. The management skills can be trained relatively easily, but

⁴⁸ Rothwell, W. J. (2010). *Effective Succession Planning* Effective succession planning: Ensuring leadership continuity and building talent from within (4 ed.). AMACOM Div American Mgmt Assn. Retrieved February 28, 2015, from https://books.google.ca/books?id=S31wa8sb6rkC&printsec=frontcover&dq=effective+succession+planning&hl=en&sa=X&ei=mLD0VI68E4udyQS_u4H4Cg&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=effective%20succession%20planning&f=false

⁴⁹ Vadm P.D. McFadden, *MARCOM Capability Planning Guidance - 2011 to 2014* (Victoria, 2010).

characteristics such as initiative, ethical behaviour, respect, courage, and service orientation⁵⁰ are foundational to success. Finally, public servants at this level are not compensated well for level of qualifications required, so there is a threat that those who are successful will move on and those who are not successful will stay in the role too long.

One key to success will be to select individuals that have the skills to operate in this mixed, volatile and dynamic environment; to choose a person with the confidence to articulate the relevant context to command, the skills to remain credible and back up their commentary with sound management expertise, and a broad range of management skills that are complementary to the leadership and command skills the CO and other military leaders will bring to bear. The skills required are easily developed and can be sourced through academic programs such as an MBA, an MPA, a professional accounting designation or through less structured programs, such as executive education and certificate programs, that augment management skills in experienced professionals. There may be an inclination towards hiring a ‘known commodity’ – a retired officer – who has good organizational awareness, but this skillset must be secondary to exceptional management acumen to fully realize the benefits of this option.

Recommendation

Based on the analysis of key criteria to augment organizational management effectiveness in NDLU, it is recommended that each CO of NDLU select and hire a civilian CoS to provide continuity and support to the CO. Despite the cultural changes and potential friction from senior officers who would view this as the ‘civilianization of

⁵⁰ Credibility – Kouzes and Posner

the military'⁵¹ or the 'addition of unnecessary bureaucracy' the benefits of having continuity and a resource that is trained as a specialist in management outweigh the risks.

The costs to introduce a civilian CoS or XO are quite low compared to the potential benefits. For example, to have a civilian Administrative Services level 7 (AS 07), approximately a Cdr/LCol analogue, will require compensation of approximately \$100k per annum and \$15k in other funding. On a \$75M program this is approximately zero point one five of one percent (0.15%). If that person is able to provide continuity in program outputs that yield a one percent efficiency gain, the position recoups its costs more than six times over, every year.

The approach the CO takes in working with the civilian will set the tone for others to follow. If the CO is seen to value the insights provided and to demand accountability and responsiveness from the civilian CoS there will be less likelihood that military officers will seek to undermine, ignore or otherwise disaffect the power and accountability of the civilian CoS. With the pace of change and the continuing introduction of complex regulatory frameworks, systems and processes, this solution addresses the potential for change in the organization, the unit and the external environment. It is a relatively simple intervention that will, over the course of two or three posting cycles, become the new normal and will contribute to improved performance.

This recommendation yields a superior result but will significantly challenge the status quo. COs are used to a hierarchical organizational structure where accountabilities

⁵¹ Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control." *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 149-178.

can be delegated and subordinates can issue lawful orders on their behalf. With the increased scrutiny on accountability for resource management and the ubiquitous information systems that provide higher headquarters direct insight into program administration, the introduction of a civilian in a senior manager role will provide continuity⁵² in the program; it will offer a resource that lets COs focus on commanding their unit's program rather than the bureaucracy associated with command (which will become even more complex).⁵³ Without such a civilian manager, COs may spend the majority of their posting playing 'catch-up.' This will only cause the organization to remain mired in sub-optimal program delivery, and to continue to earn derision and perpetuate perceptions of defence administration ineffectiveness⁵⁴ and waste.⁵⁵

⁵² John P. Kotter, "Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail." *Harvard Business Review* 73, no. 2 (Mar/Apr 1995).

⁵³ Canada. Department of National Defence. *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030. Part 1, Current and Emerging Trends.* Winnipeg: 17 Wing Winnipeg Publishing Office, 2010.

⁵⁴ Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control." *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 149-178.

⁵⁵ Alan Okros, "Chapter 7." In *The Public Management of Defence*, edited by Craig Stone. Toronto: Breakout Education, 2009.

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