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IRANIAN NUCLEAR ARMS: UNSTABILIZING DECISIONS

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Exercise Solo Flight

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IRANIAN NUCLEAR ARMS: UNSTABILIZING DECISIONS

Proliferation of nuclear weapons presents a clear and present danger. If a state grows significantly more powerful than its rival, realists believe that it would then use its new status to increase its area of influence for motives such as wealth and security.¹ The traditional answer to why states developed nuclear weapons appeared obvious to international relations scholars and the reason was that the state could counter a military threat that was not conquerable through other means.² Scott Sagan challenges this one-dimensional view on nuclear weapon development and counters that just like any other weapon there are more objectives than just security. Nuclear weapons are also political objects domestically and serve as a symbol of modernity and identity in the global setting.³ Sagan offers a three-part framework to analyze why states make decisions to pursue nuclear weapons development. Sagan's three-pronged approach to studying proliferation consists of the Security Model, the Domestic Politics Model, and the Norms Model.

The framework proposed for studying why states make the decisions to pursue nuclear weapons development is a useful tool for analyzing Iran's possible reasoning critically. This paper will use Sagan's model to analyze Iran's position and then show that it is a combination of security, domestic and norms models that have driven Iranian decisions to acquire the nuclear weapons capacity. Further, the Iranian nuclear weapons development is driving a free-for-all arms race in the Middle East.

¹ Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy* 145 (Nov/Dec 2004): 55.

² Scott D. Sagan, "Why do states build nuclear weapons?" *International Security* 21, no. 3 (1996): 54.

³ *Ibid.*, 55.

The Security Model

In the international system, realists believe that states struggle for power. They exist in an anarchic world and must rely on self-help to guarantee sovereignty and security.⁴ Neorealist theory refined by Kenneth Waltz argues that weaker states would balance against more powerful counterparts rather than form alliances.⁵ Given a nuclear context, Sagan adds that states that are able will balance against a rival nuclear weapons state and will adopt an expensive, self-supporting approach to developing nuclear weapons.⁶ The concern with the security model to why states develop nuclear weapons is that it leads to nuclear weapons proliferation. "Proliferation begets proliferation."⁷

History provides examples of states countering the threat of nuclear weapons developed by rivals. The Soviet Union sought to return a balance of power countering the United States following the U.S. atomic attacks on Japan. Josef Stalin provides the classic example of realist logic and the beginning of nuclear proliferation in his request to the Soviet nuclear physicist Igor Kurchatov and Boris Vannikov, the overseer of the Soviet atomic bomb project:

A single demand... Provide us with atomic weapons in the shortest possible time... Hiroshima has shaken the whole world. The balance has been destroyed. Provide the bomb-it will remove a great danger from us.⁸

Once the Soviet nuclear retaliation ability developed, the United Kingdom and France acquired their own nuclear arsenal. China feared a U.S. nuclear attack following the Korean War and embarked on its own program. India followed suit countering the

⁴ Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy* 145 (Nov/Dec 2004): 55.

⁵ Stephen M. Walt, "International relations: One world, many theories," *Foreign Policy* no. 110 (Spring 1998).

⁶ Scott D. Sagan, "Why do states build nuclear weapons?" *International Security* 21, no. 3 (1996): 57.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, 58.

Chinese while Pakistan developed its program against the threat from India.⁹ Sagan argues that the security model does not explain how states truly made their decisions and that it requires further examination of the domestic and norms models.¹⁰

The Domestic Politics Model

The domestic politics model concentrates on the key players that influence the development of nuclear weapons. Even when the development of nuclear weapons favours the national interest of a state, it presumably also serves the interest of other individuals or groups within.¹¹ Three subsets of key players have turned up in case studies of historical proliferation. They are the nuclear energy institutions, significant elements of professional defence establishments and politicians who support nuclear weapons development. When these actors form a strong coalition that indirectly controls information or directly through political power, then nuclear weapons development flourishes.¹² The bottom up approach creates the conditions that favour development through creation of perceptions of external threat, support for proliferation oriented politicians and advocating for increased defence spending. The domestic politics model perspective sees the development of nuclear weapons as a solution in need of problem to legitimize its existence.¹³

In contrast to the realist's perspective of India developing its nuclear program, the domestic model proves otherwise. In 1964, following China's nuclear test, there was no political unanimity in the necessity for India to have a counter nuclear program. It was

⁹ *Ibid.*, 58-59.

¹⁰ Scott D. Sagan, "Why do states build nuclear weapons?" *International Security* 21, no. 3 (1996): 63.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 63.

¹² *Ibid.*, 64.

¹³ *Ibid.*

not until ten years later that India conducted its first nuclear test. India had nuclear energy and could have accelerated into a weapons program within several years. The Indian Prime Minister (PM) insisted that the program was excessively expensive while the country's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) head lobbied for a nuclear weapons capability.¹⁴ Finally in 1971, the AEC developed an alliance with defence laboratories and lobbied the new PM. The PM's decision to develop nuclear weapons was made with advice from nuclear scientists and a small group of advisors. By 1974, senior defence and foreign affairs officials had not been consulted for either development or testing of the device, providing evidence that security was not the primary reason for development of India's nuclear weapons.¹⁵

The Norms Model

Sagan's third model is concerned with the symbolic function of developing nuclear weapons. It looks at how the decision to acquire nuclear weapons shapes and reflects a states identity. The perspective argues that in international relations certain actions are appropriate and legitimate based on deeper norms and shared beliefs.¹⁶

Institutional isomorphism as studied in sociology suggests that contemporary organizations come to mirror each other.¹⁷ The perspective from political science is that coercion and power are the means to spreading global norms.¹⁸

Once again contrasting realist theory, France's nuclear weapons development as a counter to the Soviet threat stands out alone in Europe. Sweden, Norway, Italy,

66

¹⁴ Scott D. Sagan, "Why do states build nuclear weapons?" *International Security* 21, no. 3 (1996):

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 67.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 73.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 74.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 75.

Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands and West Germany chose not to develop nuclear weapons yet they faced the same threat of Soviet military power. In 1951, France's Five-Year Plan stated as its purpose "to ensure that in 10 years' time France will still be an important country."¹⁹ It was believed that nuclear weapons and energy gave relevance to a state in the international system.²⁰ In 1959, French President Charles de Gaulle remarked to U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower:

A France without world responsibility would be unworthy of herself, especially in the eyes of Frenchmen. It is for this reason that she disapproves of NATO, which denies her a share in decision-making and which is confined to Europe. It is for this reason too that she intends to provide herself with an atomic armament. Only in this way can our defence and foreign policy be independent, which we prize above everything else.²¹

The norms model also provides an optimistic outlook for nonproliferation. Since norms emerge in the international system it is important that nuclear powers maintain global nuclear disarmament commitments. The risk of instability and continued proliferation is high if nuclear powers fail to progress with nuclear disarmament.²² The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is an international treaty designed to promote peaceful use of nuclear energy, prevent nuclear weapons and technology from spreading, and ultimately complete disarmament. It is the only multilateral treaty with a binding commitment to the goal of disarmament of states with

¹⁹ Scott D. Sagan, "Why do states build nuclear weapons?" *International Security* 21, no. 3 (1996): 78.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, 79.

²² *Ibid.* 86.

nuclear weapons.²³ But efforts to disarm and concerns with certain states seeking nuclear energy raise significant challenges.²⁴

History of Iran's Nuclear Program

Iran entered into the nuclear energy program already under the Shah with plans to build 20 nuclear power reactors. However, this was halted following the Iranian revolution because Ayatollah Khomeini believed nuclear weapons were contrary to Islamic law. During the Iran-Iraq war the two nuclear reactors under construction were damaged by bombing. Subsequently the program has been restarted and the current plan seeks to construct 15 reactors and two research reactors.²⁵

In 1970, Iran ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and starting in 1992, has permitted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect its nuclear facilities. It is thought that Iran is building a nuclear weapons program clandestinely in parallel to its energy program. In 2002, the IAEA discovered two previously unknown facilities and in 2005, Iranian president Rafsanjani admitted to developing the program in secret. Iran had purchased material on the black market and was supplied secrets from the Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan.²⁶

Iran maintains that it has no interest in nuclear weapons and that it “does not have the means to engage in nuclear deterrence – directly or through proxies – against its

²³ United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” last accessed 24 May 2015, <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml>

²⁴ Scott D. Sagan, “Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament,” *Daedalus* 138, no. 4 (Fall 2009), 167.

²⁵ GlobalSecurity, “Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),” last accessed 24 May 2015. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/nuke.htm>

²⁶ Intelligence on Iran, “Program History,” last accessed 24 May 2015, <http://www.iranintelligence.com/program-history>

adversaries.”²⁷ However, the U.S. President has stated on 02 April 2015, “Estimates indicate that Iran is only two or three months away from potentially acquiring the raw materials that could be used for a single nuclear bomb.”²⁸ The analysis of why Iran may have covertly chosen to build nuclear weapons follows.

Iran Security Model

There exists strong evidence why Iran would use a realist approach to protect itself with nuclear weapons. Since the revolution, Iran has been determined not to collude with any power. During the Iran-Iraq war Ayatollah Khomeini wrote in a letter “that we consider collusion with superpowers and other powers as turning our back on Islamic principles.”²⁹ Geopolitically Iran has the neighbouring countries of Russia, Israel, India, and Pakistan that have nuclear weapons. Also, in the regional area are U.S. forces that have carried out operations that have resulted in regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq. In President Bush’s speech in 2002, he declared:

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. . . . In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.³⁰

²⁷ Mohammad Javad Zarif, “What Iran Really Wants,” *Foreign Affairs Volume 93*, No. 3 (May/June 2014), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2014-04-17/what-iran-really-wants>

²⁸ The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on the Framework to Prevent Iran from Obtaining a Nuclear Weapon,” last accessed 24 May 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/02/statement-president-framework-prevent-iran-obtaining-nuclear-weapon>

²⁹ Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, “Letter From Ayatollah Khomeini regarding weapons during the Iran-Iraq war,” *Council on Foreign Relations* (1988), last accessed 24 May 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/iran/letter-ayatollah-khomeini-regarding-weapons-during-iran-iraq-war/p11745>

³⁰ Peter Baker and Glenn Kessler, “Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ Comes Back to Haunt United States,” *Washington Post*, 10 October 2006, last accessed 24 May 2015, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/09/AR2006100901130.html>

Included was Iran in the ‘axis of evil’ and it did not help to encourage them to stop their uranium-enrichment program and in fact they reported to have made rapid progress.³¹

The current Minister of Foreign affairs in Iran, Mohammad Javad Zarif, states that the post-revolutionary foreign policy is based on ideals and objectives from the constitution. It includes preservation of independence, and territorial integrity and national security.³² In order to have these guarantees without colluding with any other state, the stage was set for a realist decision to acquire nuclear weapons.

Iranian Domestic Politics

Using the domestic model to analyze why Iran would pursue nuclear weapons is equally important; however, the possibility of achieving a powerful democratic coalition is not as apparent. During the Iran-Iraq war the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander wrote a letter to Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, requesting more equipment to retaliate against Iran. Among the request for more troops and equipment was a request for “having the ability to make a substantial number of laser and atomic weapons which will be the necessity of the war at that time.”³³ In this published letter the word nuclear had been removed at the request of the Iranian Security Council.³⁴ If the decision to acquire nuclear weapons occurred as a result of the commander’s request, it is not published.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Mohammad Javad Zarif, “What Iran Really Wants,” *Foreign Affairs Volume 93*, No. 3 (May/June 2014), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2014-04-17/what-iran-really-wants>

³³ Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, “Letter From Ayatollah Khomeini regarding weapons during the Iran-Iraq war,” *Council on Foreign Relations* (1988), last accessed 24 May 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/iran/letter-ayatollah-khomeini-regarding-weapons-during-iran-iraq-war/p11745>

³⁴ *Ibid.*

Currently, Iran claims to not want to acquire nuclear weapons due to a fatwa against such activities. A fatwa is a religious ruling given by the ultimate authority and in Iran's case the Ayatollah Khamenei. This fatwa is not recorded but is said to carry the same weight as written opinions.³⁵ The origin of the fatwa issued in 2003, stem from an earlier fatwa from the predecessor Ayatollah Khomeini banning the use and production of chemical weapons at the time of the Iran-Iraq war.³⁶ However, the record of following that religious ruling is not perfect. After Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, it admitted to producing chemical weapons and U.S. intelligence believes that it held a stockpile of these weapons until 2003.

It is important to note that fatwas are issued for specific situations and can be modified in changing circumstances. Shia tradition allows duplicity and deception when they serve the Islamic community or in a case between life and death. Also, any means available are authorized for use to intimidate and triumph over nonbelievers.³⁷

The possibility of lobbying politicians that support nuclear proliferation in Iran is not clearly evident. Laws passed in parliament determined to be unconstitutional or contrary to Islam are further vetted by the unelected Expediency Council to determine if they are in the interest of the regime. The Supreme leader may intervene to ensure expediency is maintained and lead to laws being passed that are not consistent with

³⁵ Glenn Kessler, "Did Iran's supreme leader issue a fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons?" *Washington Post*, 27 November 2013, last accessed 24 May 2015, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2013/11/27/did-irans-supreme-leader-issue-a-fatwa-against-the-development-of-nuclear-weapons/>

³⁶ Glenn Kessler, "Did Iran's supreme leader issue a fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons?" *Washington Post*, 27 November 2013, last accessed 24 May 2015, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2013/11/27/did-irans-supreme-leader-issue-a-fatwa-against-the-development-of-nuclear-weapons/>

³⁷ Michael Eisenstadt, *Religious Ideologies, Political Doctrines, and Iran's Nuclear Decision-making*, Policy Focus 115, (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2011), 7-8, last accessed 24 May 2015, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus115.pdf>

Islamic law. So it is also with nuclear policy decisions. The Ayatollah has the final authority and is not limited by previous fatwas. In the final analysis nuclear decision-making is “the imprint of one man’s personality and politics—unaffected by the will of other men, the decisions of other institutions, or even the moral scruples of religion.”³⁸ On the other hand, if the regime were to instigate limited conflict with the international community and the U.S., it would help to increase domestic support for the theocracy and to revitalize revolutionary ideals.

The conclusion is that internal domestic factors have dampened the clear realist approach to developing nuclear weapons. The weapons program was not been rapidly advanced as would have been expected following the realist model and similar to the decision taken by Stalin. The remaining decision model is the norms analysis model.

Iranian Norms

Iran recognizes that international norms and consensus play an important role in the international system following the rise of multilateralism since World War II.³⁹ Iran has been seeking to establish itself within the region and among other Islamic countries. The former Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, had commented at a gathering of leaders at the United Nations; “Iran is ready to transfer nuclear know-how to the Islamic countries due to their need.”⁴⁰ Thus Iran is now capable of setting and influencing nuclear norms within the Islamic states. Nonpolarity in the international order has given the opportunity for the rise in Iranian power and nuclear development. Iran has achieved the

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Mohammad Javad Zari, “What Iran Really Wants,” *Foreign Affairs Volume 93*, No. 3 (May/June 2014), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2014-04-17/what-iran-really-wants>

⁴⁰ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “Iran is ready to transfer nuclear know-how to the Islamic countries,” 15 September 2005, last accessed 24 May 2015, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/iran-is-ready-to-transfer-nuclear-know-how-to-the-islamic-countries-1.541340>

ability to wield influence in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine with capabilities to reach beyond including the OPEC. It has energy exports, and sources of finance and technology that it has used to rise in power.⁴¹ Iran is able to capitalize from the changing world because the U.S. cannot alone prevent the access to nuclear materials and technology.⁴²

Threat of Nuclear Iran

The concern over Iran's actions is the uncertainty they would bring to world peace if it were successful in building nuclear weapons. Western allies will have difficulties in containing or deterring Iran. The Supreme leader has allowed a culture of resistance to be inculcated in politics as well as increased efforts to advance Shia Islam. The effect is that Iran is constantly pushing boundaries and is unyielding on matters of principle. It is steadfastly fighting what are perceived as enemies of the Islam Republic. Iran has been emboldened by what it senses as successes in resistance in Gaza and Lebanon and the inability of the international community to stop its nuclear developments. The theocracy does not easily respond to international and domestic opinion and it has a history of catering to radicals who are involved in duplicitous activities.⁴³

Without change to Shia interpretations of the sacred scriptures of Islam, all non-believers need to be concerned. A destructive verse from the Quran that would apply against not only nonbelievers but also secular states surrounding Iran:

And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows.

⁴¹ Richard Haas, "The Age of Nonpolarity," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 3 (May/June 2008).

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Michael Eisenstadt, *Religious Ideologies, Political Doctrines, and Iran's Nuclear Decision-making*, Policy Focus 115, (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2011), 7-8, last accessed 24 May 2015, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus115.pdf>

And whatever you spend in the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged.⁴⁴

Iran openly provides financial and military support to external Shia groups.⁴⁵

They have helped create Shia militias in Syria and Iraq. It is fighting the spread of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) while propping up the Hezbollah, “the most effective enemy of Israel.”⁴⁶ True peace in the Middle East is further unachievable between Muslims and Jews as a result of Muslims pointing to anti-Semitic Quran verses.⁴⁷ An example from the Quran: “You will surely find the most intense of the people in animosity toward the believers [to be] the Jews...”⁴⁸

The security situation in the Middle East has been made increasingly tricky for the U.S. and its allies with the new world order and nonpolarity. Nations are losing their grip on the monopoly of power. States have multiple challenges from regional to global organizations, militias, nongovernmental organizations and corporations.⁴⁹ The U.S. through air strikes against ISIS in Iraq is supporting the increasingly present Iranian proxies while in Yemen the U.S. is supporting the Saudi forces against Shia Houthis.⁵⁰

In 2012 President Obama remarked:

It will not be tolerable to a number of states in that region for Iran to have a nuclear weapon and them not to have a nuclear weapon. Iran is known to sponsor terrorist organizations, so the threat of proliferation becomes that much more severe... The dangers of an Iran getting nuclear weapons that

⁴⁴ Quran 8:60 (Sahih International).

⁴⁵ Max Gross, “Shi’a Muslims and Security: The Centrality of Iran,” In *The Routledge Handbook of Religion and Security*, edited by Chris Seiple, Dennis R. Hoover, and Pauletta Otis. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 66.

⁴⁶ Economist, “The Shia Crescendo. 28 March 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21647367-shia-militias-are-proliferating-middle-east-shia-crescendo>

⁴⁷ Steven Simpson, “Why Islam Will Never Accept the State of Israel,” *American Thinker* (30 June 2010), last accessed 24 May 2015, http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2010/06/why_islam_will_never_accept_th.html

⁴⁸ Quran 5:82 (Sahih International).

⁴⁹ Richard Haas, “The Age of Nonpolarity,” *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 3 (May/June 2008).

⁵⁰ Economist, “The Shia Crescendo. 28 March 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21647367-shia-militias-are-proliferating-middle-east-shia-crescendo>

then leads to a free-for-all in the Middle East is something that I think would be very dangerous for the world.⁵¹

The Presidents estimate is coming to light. In 2015, Saudi Arabia has signed a secretive deal with North Korea and vows to match Iran's capabilities in addition to nuclear power initiatives underway since 2008.⁵² A 2012 survey in Turkey found that 54 percent of the population supported Turkey instituting policies leading to the development of nuclear weapons.⁵³ The Turkish president remarked in 2013: "Turkey will not accept a neighboring country possessing weapons not possessed by Turkey herself."⁵⁴ Both states are initially taking the realist approach to countering Iran however; Israel has held nuclear weapons for some time already. The states of United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, Turkey, Algeria, Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia, Syria and Oman are in varying stages of nuclear power development with several having started energy developments as early as 2006.⁵⁵ These nuclear energy developments may have received policy impetus from the Iranian program. If there are parallel reasons why these nations wish to develop nuclear expertise remains to be seen. The Middle East is rich with oil and it is not immediately evident that the cost of nuclear energy development is initially necessary if it were not the growing nuclear norm in the region.

Any military option to stop Iran by the U.S. or Israel would add to the instability in the region. As already mentioned in Sagan's domestic model, why states decide to develop nuclear weapons, an external strike would help the regime unite the Shia Muslim

⁵¹ Jeffrey Goldberg, "Obama to Iran and Israel: 'As President of the United States, I Don't Bluff,'" *Atlantic* (2 March 2012), <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/obama-to-iran-and-israel-as-president-of-the-united-states-i-dont-bluff/253875/>

⁵² Intelligence on Iran, "MidEast Nuclear Proliferation," last accessed 24 May 2015, <http://www.iranintelligence.com/facts-prolif#develop>

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

factions under revolutionary Islam. Israel has acknowledged that they have plans and the capability to strike against nuclear developments in Iran if the time comes even though it is not imminent.⁵⁶

Waltz indicates that a nuclear-armed Iran would bring stability to the region balancing against Israel. He points to how other nuclear weapons states have traditionally acted to make his point.⁵⁷ With the deeply complex and historical reasons for issues in the Middle East, a nuclear weapons armed Iran would not bring stability to the region.

Conclusion

Analysis using Sagan's framework for studying why Iran has taken to pursuing nuclear weapons development has shown that it is a combination of security, domestic and norms models that have driven Iranian decisions. Geopolitically Iran has the neighbouring countries of Russia, Israel, India, and Pakistan that have nuclear weapons. In the domestic analysis, nuclear decision-making is solely under the authority of the Supreme leader and how he interprets the requirement. Lastly, Iran is now capable and willing to set and influence nuclear norms within the Islamic states by transferring nuclear know-how to the Islamic countries due to their need. Further, because of deeply complex and historical reasons, for issues in the Middle East, a nuclear weapons armed Iran would not bring stability to the region. Iranian nuclear weapons development is driving a free-for-all arms race in the Middle East and will impact Western foreign policies and strategies undoubtedly.

⁵⁶ Agence France-Presse, "Sanctions on Iran may not be enough: Netanyahu," *UK.News.Yahoo.com*, 16 April 2013. <https://uk.news.yahoo.com/israel-capable-attacking-iran-own-army-chief-100355017.html#Nn1OKuF>

⁵⁷ Kenneth Waltz, "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 4 (Jul/Aug 2012).

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