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CIMIC CONSTRUCT

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JCSP 40

Exercise Solo Flight

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CIMIC CONSTRUCT

During the last two decades the world has undergone a momentous change within the power structure of the past. Many countries have fallen into civil unrest and there are many more states that require international assistance to help deal with insurgency forces or natural disasters. This changing environment has created an atmosphere that requires a shifting global response to handle this new complex milieu from both a military and political position. Many nations lack the resources, skill sets and manpower to effect change within this new environment. As new democratic societies attempt to develop functional governance within their newly found reality, Western allies are coming to the realization that military power alone cannot deliver the desired effects, nor can it effectively and financially provide the long term commitment to these fledgling nations. The need for a comprehensive approach has been recognized by the United Nations and NATO, as well as other Western allies. The need to coordinate and synthesize our response to both military and humanitarian operations has become evident in the literature and practices of our deployed forces over the past decades. The acceptance of this new reality has focused these organizations on the development and operationalizing on their Civil-military cooperation organization (CIMIC) model. This new construct also holds true for domestic operations within Canada. The Ice storm of 1998 and Hurricane Igor that hit Newfoundland in 2010 demonstrated that a whole of government approach was necessary to effectively address the challenges surrounding these natural disasters. Utilizing an appropriate and functional vehicle to provide support to local governments and the people of Canada proved to be a vital component towards synergizing both civilian and military resources. CIMIC has proven to be a key pillar in the effective

employment of military forces both internationally and domestically. However, Canada's present day CIMIC construct is not robust enough to effectively assist and support the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in this new and dynamic joint operational environment.

To fully comprehend the direction that CIMIC/CMO (civil-military operation) is immigrating towards, a comparison of the models must be examined to fully ascertain the complexity and mindset of CIMIC/CMO doctrine. The United Nations views CIMIC from the perspective of civilian predominance. Holshek notes that UN-CIMIC is a military staff function that provides the necessary linkages between civilian and military organizations on a UN mission. He states that "UN-CIMIC is qualitatively different from NATO, European Union, or US doctrines. These approaches mainly see it as a command and control function – to assist and serve the military commander in the execution of military tasks for the achievement of military objectives."¹ UN-CIMIC is intended to be an all-inclusive model designed to deal with the human dimension and not the military objective.

NATO has taken the lead with respect to CIMIC and has developed a centre of excellence to manage and develop CIMIC tactics, training and procedures (TTPs) and provides a cooperative and holistic environment for the advancement and education of civil affairs. The Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE) has the responsibility to maintain NATO CIMIC doctrine and train and educate NATO forces on CIMIC procedures and operations.² The CCOE defines CIMIC as "The coordination and

¹ Christopher Holshek. "United Nations Civil-military Coordination (UN-CIMIC)." Peace Operations Training Institute, 2013: 1

² Gabor. Hangya, "About NATO CIMIC Doctrine." Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, 2014: 11.

cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.”³

The United Kingdom follows the definition of CIMIC as laid out by NATO in Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation – AJP-3.4.9. However, unlike NATO the UK does not have a standalone J9 branch. CIMIC operation and planning at the joint operational level is conducted within the J3 branch. This allows for greater cooperation and linkages between the other staff branches and advisors.⁴ CIMIC operators and staff members are part of the regular army.

USA military views Civil-military operations (CMO) as those activities that influence and exploit partnerships between military and civilian actors. Their doctrine is based on the ability of the relationship between military and non-military actors to derive a positive outcome for the military operation. The US military views CMO from all three perspectives: strategic, operational and tactical. “Civil-military operations (CMO) are the activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation (HN). At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, and during all military operations, CMO are essential to the military instrument to coordinate the

³ AJP-9 NATO CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC) DOCTRINE. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2003, 2-1

⁴ 3-90 Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Interm Joint Warfare Publication. Shrivenham: UK Ministry of Defence, 2003, 4-2

integration of military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency, and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats.”⁵

Canada’s CIMIC organization and doctrine is a compilation of the UK, US Marine Corp and German military CIMIC doctrine. G-GG-005-004/AF-023 Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War lays out doctrinally how CIMIC will operate and function during full spectrum operations. The Canadian model has CIMIC residing only within the Canadian Army Reserve. The full time initial response element is managed by Class B reservists. G-GG-005-004/AF-023 basically states that, “The main objective of CIMIC is to achieve the necessary cooperation between civil authorities and the CF with a view to improving the probability of success of CF operations.”⁶ However, the document does require updating as it has CIMIC being conducted and planned in the J5 domain. This does cause some confusion when relating to other countries as noted by Celik.⁷ The document states that the CIMIC is an ad hoc organization within the CAF. This has been corrected in NATO’s CIMIC Handbook that reflects the present CAF CIMIC construct. All nations approach CIMIC from a different perspective. NATO, USA, and UK have a civil affairs unit within the full time cadre of their military, while other nations like Canada and Australia have the functions of CIMIC carried out by their reserve forces. However, all nations understand the importance and

⁵ Joint Publication 3-57 Civil-Military Operations. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 2013.

⁶ B-GG-005-004/AF-023 CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN PEACE, EMERGENCIES, CRISIS AND WAR. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1999.,1-4

⁷ Murat Celik,. Comparison of British and Canadian CIMIC and U.S. CMO Doctrines to the NATO CIMIC Doctrine. Thesis, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005., 58

requirement to engage all actors within the operational environment to ensure peace and security.

CIMIC construct differs greatly between divisions within the Canadian Army (CA) as well as within divisions themselves. The CA has outlined the basic structure for the Influence Activity Organization as detailed in figure one. It is interesting to note that regular force participation is extremely restricted and both the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) do not participate in CIMIC construct of the CAF. The full time Influence Activity Task Force (IATF) is comprised of full time Class B reservists and is stationed in Kingston, Ontario. The remaining corps of the IA organization is based solely on the employment of Class A reservists with an employment number capped at 525 personnel. “The Army Reserve Funding Model allocates 37.5 days to train personnel employed in the IA Coys. 26.5 days funding will be allocated to CBGs for their IA personnel. 4 Cdn Div Headquarters will retain control of funds for 11 days for part of the IA Continuation Training.”⁸ Soldiers applying for these positions have to sign a three year contract which outlines their commitment to this unit to include training and deployment requirements. The reserve IA soldiers provide the back fill for the IATF and must be prepared to sustain CIMIC after the initial deployment. The CA has set September 2016 for the IA units to reach 80% operational manning and capability. The IA companies are comprised of 52 soldiers of whom 22 are slated for the CIMIC role.⁹

⁸ Chief IA, 4 Division Influence Activities FG&E Directive. Operation Orders, Toronto: Department of National Defence, 2014.4-10-7

⁹ Operational manning




Figure 1- CA IA FG Baseline¹⁰

This unique and essential combat function seems to be personality driven within the individual brigades of each division surrounding the application and implementation of CIMIC. A review of the CIMIC organization and force laydown in 4 Canadian Division demonstrates the differing philosophies held at the command levels. 31 Canadian Brigade Group (CBG) has the CIMIC HQ collocated at the CBG HQ and the function is carried out and directed by the G9 as detailed in figure two.

¹⁰ Chief IA, 4 Division Influence Activities FG&E Directive. Operation Orders, 2014., Annex B




Figure 2 – 31 CBG IA Coy Dispersed Model¹¹

However, the CIMIC teams are distributed throughout the 31 CBG areas of responsibility (AOR) ensuring a greater outreach and connectivity with local government and community. Within the 31 CBG construct the CIMIC teams are dispersed to five locations within the AOR. This enables the team members to interact with local reserve units as well as provide situational awareness and support to the command element as shown in figure three. This increases the connectivity with local municipalities as well as other organizations operating within their geographic boundaries.

¹¹ G5 31CBG, 31 Canadian Brigade Group “Influence Activities Force Generation & Employment”. Back Brief Agenda Operation Orders, London: Department of National Defence, 2015.




Figure 3 -31 CBG Unit Locations¹²

31 CBG arrived at this structure after completing a detailed analysis of the possible courses of actions (COA) available to the command team during the implementation period. Figure four outlines the reasons for the selection of a dispersed model approach.¹³

¹² G5 31CBG, 31 Canadian Brigade Group “Influence Activities Force Generation & Employment”. Back Brief Agenda, 2015.

¹³ Major Carrie Riddell, Interview by Major Howard MacLachlan. 31 CBG - CIMIC Operations (May 14, 2015)

COA Comparison

Using a Go/No Go approach with 2 being go and 1 being no go with highest score being the recommended COA(s)

Criteria	Dispersed	Centralised	CBG HQ C2	Unit C2
1. Effective command and control structures	1	2	2	1
2. Ability to support MRP LoOs one and two (augmentation to TBG and other units/formations) (31 CBG ME - Weighting factor of 2)	4	1	4	1
3. Ability to FG for R2HR and employment in HR for MRP LoOs three and four	2	1	2	1
4. Ability to deliver Continuation Training	2	1	2	1
5. Effective use/adaptability of infrastructure	2	1	2	1
6. Effective/Efficient sustainment/ (Res Management)	1	2	2	1
7. Ability to support IA institutional tasks	2	1	2	1
8. Effective personnel management	1	2	2	1
	15	11	18	8

Figure 4 – COA Comparison¹⁴

32 CBG has organized their IA and CIMIC units under the umbrella of the CBG HQ. Members of the IA unit all parade in Toronto at the Denison Armoury. This centralized approach enables the unit to train together providing a greater concentration of capabilities at one location. However, this does remove the CIMIC members from their home units and limits their participation and connectivity within their AOR. 33 CBG has organized their IA and CIMIC organizations as a second mission element of the Governor General's Foot Guards (GGFG). The members of the IA unit parade with the GGFG and conduct their training under that unit's umbrella.¹⁵ This removes the Class A soldier from their home units, eliminating them from their peer group and restricting classification training opportunities. Similar to the CIMIC construct of our allies, every

¹⁴ G5 31CBG, 31 Canadian Brigade Group "Influence Activities Force Generation & Employment", Back Brief Agenda, 2015.

¹⁵ Major Carrie Riddell, Interview by Major Howard MacLachlan. 31 CBG - CIMIC Operations (May 14, 2015)

sub-unit has developed a different approach to the organization and implementation of the IA construct into the CA fabric of operational capabilities.

CIMIC still resides in the force generators domain of the CA and is not fully engaged nor represented at the force employer level, Canadian Joint Operation Command (CJOC). CJOC as the force employer for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has a committed J9 cell. This cell is devoted to the management and development of strategic engagement activities. The lack of a dedicated CIMIC cell is evident in the joint literature at CJOC. A review of the literature and operations orders noted absences of CIMIC in the planning process. Conplan RENAISSANCE has no mention of CIMIC within it. The only annex that references CIMIC is annex W, the public affairs (PA) annex that basically states that the senior public affairs officer (SPA0) will coordinate the narrative the CAF is attempting to project with Information Operations and CIMIC.¹⁶ The DART construct highlights the need for CIMIC engagement at the operational and strategic level, especially during Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations. The Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team (ISST) is a small DFAIT led team which includes DND members assesses and analyzes the scope of the disaster and provides initial assistance to the Head of Mission (HOM). This team consists of approximately six members, three of which are military, of which one normally is a liaison officer (LO) from CJOC. The Humanitarian Assistance Reconnaissance Team (HART) is a small section sized team that deploys with or shortly after the ISST. The HART construct is organized without CIMIC representation. CAF concept of operation is shown in figure five.

¹⁶ CONPLAN RENAISSANCE - Humanitarian Operations Contingency Plan, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, November 18, 2014.




Figure 5 –CAF Concept of Operation¹⁷

During the Op RENAISSANCE 15-1 NEPAL and in CONPLAN RENAISSANCE DART construct it is interesting to note that combat camera had priority over CIMIC for access to the operational theatre, as detailed in figure six. This may leave many with the perception that HA has more to do with political advantages than delivery of effects. Abiew notes “in exceptional circumstances, military forces may also be directly involved in the distribution of assistance. NGOs, tend to resent this, and understandably so, given the real danger that humanitarian principles and objectives are likely to be compromised since military operations are framed by a political agenda, and not by the humanitarian imperative.”¹⁸ During Op RENAISSANCE 15-1 NEPAL, CIMIC played a key role providing the Task Force (TF) Commander with both the situational awareness and the intelligence to effectively develop his limited resources.¹⁹

¹⁷ "CONPLAN RENAISSANCE - HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS CONTINGENCY PLAN." Ottawa: Department of National Defence, November 18, 2014.

¹⁸ Francis Kofi, Abiew “From Civil Strife to Civic Society: NGO-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations”, Ottawa: Centre for Security and Defence Studies, 2003.,10

¹⁹ Expeditionary Officer Watch. Op RENAISSANCE 15-1. Daily Situation Report, Ottawa: CFICC, 2015.

Longhurst noted the same planning issues with respect to CIMIC involvement during Operation Hamlet “This rapid time line, while appropriate for the situation, created some challenges for CIMIC. For example, the operational planning process for the mission was abbreviated to the point of being almost non-existent. Despite the fact that several of Canada’s national objectives for the mission seemed to involve CIMIC directly, actual CIMIC involvement in the planning process was minor.”²⁰ The absence of CIMIC in the planning process has shown to delay or hinder the delivery of need effects during humanitarian operations. By nature of HA operations, there is a limited timeframe in which to respond and implement a coherent plan to support a nation or community in need. Accurate and concise intelligence, with respect to needs and effects, is paramount to reducing suffering. CIMIC coordination and planning at the start of HA operations could provide these desired effects and assist in limiting unnecessary suffering.

²⁰ Graham Longhurst, "The Evolution of Canadian Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)", Canadian Military Journal, 2006/2007., 59

DART CAPABILITY CONSTRUCT




Figure 6 – Dart Capability Construct²¹

Domestically the same narrative is seen at the joint operational level. A CIMIC oriented planning cell is lacking within CJOC, therefore minimizing the positive effects and insights into the products and skill sets CIMIC could provide to domestic operational planning processes. Having limited involvement in the planning or design of organizational contingency plans, CIMIC duties and tasks seem to have been marginalized. This is evident in the operational planning bible for domestic operations, which is the Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO). A review of this document showed that CIMIC was only mentioned in Annex K – Health Services Support²². On a positive note, CJOC has incorporated a dedicated CIMIC annex in CONPLAN JUPITER – Annex W to 3000-2-2 (J5) - CIMIC. This annex demonstrates a

²¹ "CONPLAN RENAISSANCE - HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS CONTINGENCY PLAN." Ottawa: Department of National Defence, November 18, 2014., Appendix 1, Annex A

²² Standard Operation Order Domestic Operation. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2012., Annex K

positive move forward with the application and employment of CIMIC within the domestic domain. The CIMIC philosophy assists in increasing human capital at all levels within a comprehensive approach model. This holistic approach to operational goals and objectives affords that each actor's views and concerns are taken into account during the planning process. This ensures that second and third order effects are positive in nature and avoids adverse effects towards the CAF and Canadian Government's ultimate diplomatic and military goals. The lack of a highly trained and responsive CIMIC cell at the operational and strategic planning level lessens the credibility and marginalizes the unique and powerful toolbox CIMIC provides to the commander and the command planning team.

Grimes notes:

The next few years offers an excellent opportunity for Civil Affairs to expand its role in the whole of government environment. The years of engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan have firmed expectations that future engagements will be consolidated efforts involving multiple entities across the military, political, and civilian spectrum. Inevitably the turf wars and mission creep seen in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue; all the more reason for CA to forestall such problems in proactively pursuing engagements across the IA spectrum.²³

NGOs tend to be best positioned to react and interact with the public in the comprehensive construct model. In general, NGOs are apt to be in place for the long haul. The CAF's short mission rotations create problems with trust and communication, as the NGOs have to re-engage a new command team and develop new working relationships with CAF members. Developing the right balance between these organizations will require strong leadership, foresight and trust that can only develop over time, ensuring the creation of a coherent and respectful work atmosphere to deal

²³ Gregory Grimes, "Civil Affairs Redux", Small Wars Journal, 2012., 1

with complex issues. CIMIC trained and employed operators at joint headquarters would be best positioned to cultivate these relationships and build the rapport necessary to work in a holistic multiagency environment. This collaborative culture requires commanders and staff to engage all stakeholders in the decision making process so they do not feel isolated or marginalized. The command team will require the detailed knowledge and understanding that these organizations bring to the table. This comprehensive relationship cannot be fully developed during a crisis situation but is better nurtured during collaborate exchanges of knowledge and experience over time. A multifaceted approach will enable a commander to draw on the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses within his planning process such that limited resources are directed to the appropriate area of need vise a perceived expedient military solution. This will ensure that the commander and CAF are not overstepping their jurisdiction, enhancing operational transparency and supporting other organizations within the operational environment. “Evidence from previous research suggests that military style of communication may present barriers to effective collaboration with civilian actors.”²⁴ Therefore, an effective command structure must engage all stakeholders in an open discourse listening to their viewpoints and then decide on a course of action. This is where CIMIC can assist in safeguarding NGOs neutrality and responsibilities while increasing the probabilities for a positive outcome for all parties. A full time CIMIC organization at CJOC would be ideally suited to develop these necessary relationships at the strategic and operational level with other government agencies as well as NGOs.

²⁴ Michael H Thomson, Barbara D Adams, Courtney D Hall, Andrea L Brown, and Craig Flear, “Collaboration within the JIMP (Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public) Environment” Toronto: Defence R&D Canada, 2010., 23

Grimes further notes:

The value of 'jointness' has taken root over the past decade and remains a viable model. When the coming budget reductions take effect, all agencies will find themselves retrenching to core competencies. This plays to CA's strength: PMESII (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information) is the essence of jointness, and CA is the embodiment of PMESII.²⁵

No longer can organizations or departments within the government operate as independent agencies without having some effect on the actions of another organization. The experience of the past has demonstrated the interconnectedness that we all share during military operations internationally or while dealing with domestic crisis. The UN and NATO have seized on this understanding and embarked on a course of action to develop a better appreciation and working relationship between the military and non – military actors within an operational environment. The CCOE has set the standard for the desired outcomes for CIMIC interactions. Many other nations have also identified the need for a mechanism to bridge the gap between these actors in this multifaceted environment. Canada is no exception and has engaged their army reserve force to provide this needed conduit. However, like many other nations the construct of the forces employed to carry out these duties varies throughout the command structure. The lack of a full time cadre at the operational and strategic levels marginalizes the great work and knowledge CIMIC provides at the tactical level in both the expeditionary and domestic operational theaters. To fully capitalize on the tactical successes of CIMIC, the CAF will be required to have a permanent and effective CIMIC planning cell at the CJOC level. This would ensure that both the strategic and operational engagements between all actors are facilitated in an open and inclusive atmosphere.

²⁵ Gregory Grimes, "Civil Affairs Redux", 2012, 2

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