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## OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR *IN EXTREMIS* NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS: OPERATION FREQUENT WIND, 1975

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**JCSP 40**

***Exercise Solo Flight***

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**SOLO FLIGHT: OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR *IN EXTREMIS* NON-  
COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS: OPERATION FREQUENT  
WIND, 1975**

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Word Count: 5456

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*Mr. Secretary, there are reports that there are still Marines at the embassy in Saigon. Can you confirm that, and why are they still there?*

– A reporter’s question to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at the State Department press conference on 29 April 1975 to announce that US Ambassador Graham Martin had safely departed left South Vietnam.<sup>1</sup>

## INTRODUCTION

On the morning of 30 April, 1975, the United States completed an evacuation of the personnel manning and guarding the US Embassy in Saigon. Operation FREQUENT WIND, the evacuation of Saigon in 1975, demonstrates that Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) can succeed in hostile situations, provided that they involve a detailed yet flexible plan that can quickly adapt to a chaotic and deteriorating situation.

Focusing on the planning and execution of Operation FREQUENT WIND, this paper will demonstrate that the volume of resources and flexibility plans enabled the evacuation to succeed. FREQUENT WIND is a valuable example of expeditionary NEO operations under hostile conditions, benefitted from continual staff planning, full support of the national command authority, and the experience and lessons learned from two full NEOs conducted in the month prior to the fall of Saigon. The officers planning the NEO faced the dual threats of the approaching North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the frenzied mobs of South Vietnamese desperate to escape from the North Vietnamese.

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<sup>1</sup> Bob Drury and Tom Clavin, *Last Men Out: The True Story of America's Heroic Final Hours in Vietnam* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2011), 240.

## THE VIETNAM WAR

After the global chaos of the Second World War, Vietnamese communist Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam from exile in Paris and began organizing an independence movement. First fighting against the reconstituted French colonists in 1946, his communist Viet Minh guerillas decisively defeated the French Expeditionary Force at Dien Bien Phu in May, 1954. This defeat prompted the division of Vietnam into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the communist regime in the North, and the Republic of Vietnam, the western-aligned, but autocratic government in the South, and the withdrawal of French forces from Vietnam in 1956. When John F. Kennedy was elected President of the United States in 1961, he sent advisor teams to support South Vietnamese forces under the “domino theory”<sup>2</sup> that communism would spread across Southeast Asia and ultimately takeover the free world if unchallenged. After Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, his successor Lyndon B. Johnson dramatically escalated American involvement in Vietnam, ultimately deploying over 500,000 American servicemen to Vietnam.

The ensuing Vietnam War, which lasted from 1963-1975, was characterized by a series of strategic errors and a fundamental misunderstanding by America of the nature of the war they fought. In 1968, the spring Tet Offensive, provided a strategic victory for the North Vietnamese. Although North Vietnamese forces were defeated in the field, the Tet

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<sup>2</sup> The domino theory developed from a speech by President Eisenhower on April 7, 1954 where he compared the spread of communism to falling dominoes.

Offensive turned American public opinion against the war. The limited war America fought to prevent the spread of communism failed in the face of North Vietnam's total war of national unification.

Elected on an anti-war platform in 1969, President Richard Nixon sought "peace with honor"<sup>3</sup> in order to achieve a political solution that would allow America to disengage. Designed to drive the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table, the 1972 strategic bombing campaign Operation LINEBACKER II damaged the North Vietnamese military production capability, and forced peace talks with the US.<sup>4</sup> In 1973, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese envoy Le Duc Tho met and signed the Paris Peace Accords, allowing an American withdrawal. Under the Accords, North Vietnam agreed to respect South Vietnamese sovereignty.

As American forces withdrew, it became clear that the Peace Accords had been a tactic for North Vietnam to remove their biggest opponent and achieve their strategic goal of national unification.<sup>5</sup> In 1975, NVA forces attacked south of the border, defeating the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces until the North Vietnamese closed to the outskirts of Saigon, the capitol of South Vietnam. (See ANNEX A and B.) While America had significant military forces floating off the coast of Vietnam, and at bases in Okinawa and the Philippines, by this time the only US military forces in South Vietnam

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<sup>3</sup> From President Nixon's speech on 23 January 23 1973, celebrating the Paris Peace Accords.

<sup>4</sup> A.J.C. LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon: USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series Volume IV* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office), 3.

<sup>5</sup> George J. Veith, *Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973-75* (New York: Encounter Books, 2013), 498.

were the Defense Attaché Office at Tan Son Nhut Airbase in Saigon and the Marine Security Guards at the US Embassy and Consulates.<sup>6</sup> These 209 military servicemen were to evacuate over 100,000 people out of Vietnam and to safety.<sup>7</sup>

## EVAUCATION PREPARATION

On 25 March 1975, the State Department requested that the military begin planning for the evacuation of American citizens in Vietnam.<sup>8</sup> Based on military staff analysis of known and suspected American citizens and Vietnamese employees and dependents, US military planners calculated that they would be required to evacuate 167,620 people.<sup>9</sup> This estimate included visa eligible family members of American citizens, South Vietnamese intelligence sources, South Vietnamese cabinet officers and legislators, US Government employees of Vietnamese citizenship, US contractors, non-governmental organizations, and members of the press. The estimate deliberately did not include members of the US military stationed at the Defense Attaché Office (DAO), US consulates, and the US Embassy in Saigon.

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<sup>6</sup> In 1975, and in American embassies around the world today, the US Marine Corps provided Security Guards to provide internal security. These Marines were responsible for interior security and to coordinate the evacuation of embassy staff and any American citizens seeking protection from enemy forces. The Defense Attachés attached to the Embassy were responsible for planning evacuations.

<sup>7</sup> LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 5.

<sup>8</sup> Richard D. Johnston, "Operations Analysis Group Report 2-75: HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE EVACUATION OF SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM UNDER OPERATION FREQUENT WIND." (San Francisco: Headquarters of the Commander In Chief Pacific, 16 May 1975), 14.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

Ideally, a NEO would evacuate over land, the simplest method of travel. From Saigon however, land evacuation was impossible. Bounded to the north by enemy territory and to the west by hostile Cambodia and Laos, the only escape avenues were by air to American bases in the Philippines and Guam, or by water to the South China Sea. With few options for safely putting evacuees on ships, the emphasis would be on using fixed-wing evacuation to US bases and rotary-wing evacuation to naval ships offshore.

Code-named Operation FREQUENT WIND, the plan for the evacuation contained four distinct options. Option I allowed for State Department control of the evacuation using a combination of civilian, military, and contracted transportation assets. This option implied a permissive environment that would not need the military to provide security. Option II was a military controlled fixed-wing evacuation from Tan San Nhut airport. The fixed-wing only evacuation option was calculated to transport 7,300 people per lift cycle<sup>10</sup> and required nine hours of advance notice.<sup>11</sup> This second option assumed a fairly permissive environment where the enemy would not interfere with fixed-wing flights or airfield operations. Option III was a military-controlled sealift departure from the port at Newport Pier. Option III required a permissive environment.<sup>12</sup> The fourth and final option was a military-controlled evacuation using fixed-wing, sealift, and rotary-wing assets, but predominantly emphasizing helicopter evacuation.<sup>13</sup> Option IV implied a rapidly deteriorating security environment where the emphasis was on evacuating as

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<sup>10</sup> A “lift cycle” is defined as one wave of aircraft making one round trip from an American base or ship to the landing zone in Vietnam and returning to that base. The terms “waves” or “multiple waves” refers to multiple lift cycles.

<sup>11</sup> Johnston, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE EVACUATION OF SAIGON . . . , 22.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 25-26.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

many people as possible as quickly as possible. Option IV required helicopters to move the evacuees from Saigon to US Navy ships off the coast.<sup>14</sup> In the end, the DAO executed Option II until NVA attacks forced the execution of Option IV.

The evacuation of Saigon benefitted from advanced warning and rehearsal opportunities provided by the evacuations of Da Nang and Cambodia. On 27 March 1975, the northern-most province of South Vietnam collapsed under the NVA assault. (See ANNEX B.) In the face of this attack, the Marine Security Guards at the US Consulate in Da Nang performed an air and naval evacuation. In their message to the Marine Corps Command Center in Washington, the Marines at the Consulate said that “City overflowing with refugees and soldiers. Absence of policemen. Immediate threat is internal, i.e., mob violence.”<sup>15</sup> Da Nang Airfield was so overrun by desperate crowds of fleeing South Vietnamese that fixed-wing aircraft could not take off or land.<sup>16</sup> Helicopters were used to move evacuees and consulate personnel to Marble Mountain airfield, southeast of Da Nang.<sup>17</sup> Off the coast of Vietnam, Marine and Navy personnel rescued an estimated 70,000 Vietnamese refugees fleeing Da Nang by boat.<sup>18</sup> The Da Nang evacuation provided a clear vision of the kind of frenzied mob that would threaten the evacuation of Saigon.

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<sup>14</sup> LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 9.

<sup>15</sup> George R. Dunham and D.A. Quinlan, “US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End, 1973-1975”, (Washington DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, History and Heritage Division, 1990). 127.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 128.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 128.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 131.



Just one week later, on 12 April 1975, communist Khmer Rouge forces closed in on the US Embassy in Phnom Penh, in neighboring Cambodia. Operation EAGLE PULL required an aerial evacuation over 130 miles from the Embassy in Phnom Penh to US Navy ships in the Gulf of Thailand. Lasting nearly five hours, the NEO evacuated 84 American citizens and 203 Third Country Nationals (TCNs).<sup>19</sup> During Operation EAGLE PULL, the ambassador and Landing Zone (LZ) took heavy fire during the helicopter loading. The experience of EAGLE PULL drove the use of helicopter gunships to escort troop-carrying assault helicopters and provide terminal guidance of fixed-wing attack jets.<sup>20</sup> Observing the volume of evacuees from Operation EAGLE PULL, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the aircraft carrier USS *Hancock* (CVA-19) to transition from a strike aircraft carrier to a helicopter transport ship. The converted aircraft carrier provided the flexibility to carry more helicopters than a traditional amphibious assault ship and to accommodate more refugees.<sup>21</sup> It was through the experience of these two evacuations and the building communist momentum that DAO officers began planning for the NEO in earnest.

## PLANNING

Focusing heavily on the lessons learned from Da Nang and Cambodia, NEO planning began on 12 April with the possible requirement to evacuate up to one million

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<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 119-23.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 122. This is commonly referred to as Forward Air Control (Airborne) or FAC(A).

<sup>21</sup> Headquarters Marine Corps, "Responsiveness of Marine Corps Forces to meet Southeast Asia Contingency Requirements." Memorandum for use by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. 21 April 1975.

refugees.<sup>22</sup> Evacuees would need to be collected, transported, received, processed, screened, and accounted for before boarding US aircraft and ships. The evacuation was planned to be open-ended due to an unknown ground situation and inability to accurately estimate a precise number of evacuees.<sup>23</sup> The plan, “Assumed one full daylight period of approximately 12 hours” and required three hours of advance notice to commence operations, in order to launch supporting non-transport aircraft.<sup>24</sup> While the plan was for daylight evacuation, there was a plan for AC-130 gunship support of a nighttime evacuation as well.<sup>25</sup>

Several potential Saigon evacuation zones were explored during planning. The largest and most capable evacuation facility was the Newport Pier shipping facility. The shipping facility was considered the best option for a combined air-sea evacuation because it could evacuate the most people in a single wave. The Military Sealift Command dedicated four ships to Newport Pier to evacuate up to 20,000 people in one departure, and kept ships designated to replace full ships.<sup>26</sup> Despite this capability, the pier was eliminated as an option for fear that it could be cut off from the US Embassy and DAO.<sup>27</sup> The elimination proved wise on 26 April 1975, when the highway connecting Newport Pier to Saigon was seized by the NVA.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Smith, “End of Tour Report.” US DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE . . . , 16-C-5.

<sup>23</sup> Johnston, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE EVACUATION OF SAIGON . . . , 65.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 66.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 89.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 25-26.

<sup>28</sup> LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 70.

The next best evacuation site was the Tan Son Nhut military airfield, which also housed the DAO compound. Tan Son Nhut allowed for fixed and rotary-wing departure, and provided an existing secure perimeter. Tan Son Nhut could simultaneously support a single flight of 12 CH-53 heavy lift helicopters, which allowed an entire battalion of Marines to be landing in one wave for a security force.<sup>29</sup> Increased security provided tremendous flexibility to allow the DAO to process evacuees until the last minute. Under the FREQUENT WIND plan, the US Embassy would be evacuated first with embassy personnel falling back to the DAO. The DAO would be the final location from which Americans would be evacuated from Vietnam.<sup>30</sup> The fixed-wing evacuation option assumed Tan Son Nhut's security for use as an operating base.<sup>31</sup>

Saigon rooftops were considered as potential evacuation sites as well, but were ruled out because it was difficult to transport and process evacuees to these sites. None of the rooftops could accommodate aircraft larger than a UH-1, so only the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Air America UH-1s would be able to use the rooftops as extraction zones.<sup>32</sup> The CIA would famously use this method to evacuate their agents, personnel, and informants. The small size and number of the UH-1s meant that this option would severely limit the number of people that could be evacuated in this manner.

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<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

<sup>30</sup> Dunham and Quinlan, "US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End" . . . , 171.

<sup>31</sup> HQMC Point Paper 18 Apr 1975. From Marine Corps Command Center, "Morning Operational Summaries, 18-30 April, 1975." (Washington, DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 18-30 April, 1975).

<sup>32</sup> LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 36.

Since it had an airfield, the Vung Tau Peninsula to the southeast of Saigon was also considered as an evacuation site, but was less desirable because there was no existing military infrastructure on the peninsula. Using Vung Tau required an amphibious assault to secure the site.<sup>33</sup> This complicated the plan because it required a large force and big footprint, and as such was discarded in favor of a more flexible location.<sup>34</sup>

Ironically, given the actual events, the US Embassy in Saigon was never seriously considered as an evacuation site due to its small size and lack of LZs. Only one building in the embassy compound was assessed to be strong enough to support the weight of a CH-46 helicopter. A large tamarind tree obstructed the use of the embassy parking lot as an additional LZ. FREQUENT WIND planners anticipated using the embassy roof only to evacuate the Ambassador and a few remaining Marine Guards, who would fit into one or two helicopter loads.<sup>35</sup>

Fire support for the operation would be provided by air and naval surface fire support. The US had withdrawn all artillery from South Vietnam, and the nature of the NEO meant that bringing artillery would slow down the evacuation. Air support was

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<sup>33</sup> Johnston, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE EVACUATION OF SAIGON . . . , 29.

<sup>34</sup> Landing amphibious forces on the Vung Tau peninsula specifically required Joint Chiefs of Staff approval because securing the peninsula could be construed as violating the terms of the treaty by re-introducing American forces into Vietnam. *Ibid.*, 29.

The Vung Tau peninsula was kept as an option until the very end. In an agreement with the RVN Marine Corps (RVNMC) division, the DAO agreed to evacuate RVNMC families if the RVN Marines would defend the Vung Tau Peninsula. USAF C-130s evacuated 183 RVN Marine dependents. It is believed that the division held and fought to the last. LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 69.

<sup>35</sup> Dick Camp, *Assault from the Sky: U.S Marine Corps Helicopter Operations in Vietnam*. (Havertown: Casemate Publishers, 2013), 229-230.

provided by USAF, Navy, and Marine jets. Naval surface fires were provided by seven Navy frigates and destroyers protecting amphibious ships of the coast.<sup>36</sup>

The NEO planners included an *in extremis* contingency plan for a final stand for evacuation at the DAO Compound at the Tan Son Nhut airfield. Dubbed “Project Alamo” this contingency would accommodate only American citizens and TCNs; this situation would be so dire that no Vietnamese would be allowed protection.<sup>37</sup> The Alamo plan provided food, shelter, and security for 5,000 people for up to five days while they awaited rescue.<sup>38</sup> The Alamo plan was developed on the assumption that fixed-wing transport aircraft would be the primary means of evacuation, with helicopters as the secondary method.

NEO planners included a second contingency plan was for two “Sparrowhawk” forces. Each force consisted of two CH-46 helicopters with fifteen Marines on each helicopter, designated to land and provide security for any FREQUENT WIND helicopters that were shot down during the operation.<sup>39</sup> The Sparrowhawk team could also provide medical evacuation for any friendly force requiring aid. Each Sparrowhawk force was escorted by AH-1 attack helicopter gunships providing escort and forward and tactical air control.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 194.

<sup>37</sup> Dunham and Quinlan, “US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End”..., 155.

<sup>38</sup> LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 35.

<sup>39</sup> Richard E. Carey, and D.A. Quinlan, “Frequent Wind.” (*Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, April 1976), 38-39.

<sup>40</sup> Dunham and Quinlan, “US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End”..., 187.

## EVACUATION FORCES

It is easy to argue that the evacuation of Saigon succeeded because of the sheer mass of assets the American military was able to bring to bear for the evacuation. Operation EAGLE PULL execution and FREQUENT WIND staff exercises convinced the staff planners that massive amounts of sea and air transport would be required, as well as a large security force. After years of combat in Vietnam, the operational level American military was a combat seasoned force. At the tactical level, most pilots, sailors, and Marines were familiar with the weaponry and tactics of the North Vietnamese Army. This gave the planners realistic expectations of the risk and requirement for flexibility in this operation.

In March 1975, the 9<sup>th</sup> Marine Amphibious Brigade (9<sup>th</sup> MAB) was formed to provide the amphibious evacuation force for FREQUENT WIND. Commanded by Marine Brigadier General (BGen) Carey, the 9<sup>th</sup> MAB possessed over 80 helicopters and 6,000 Marines and Navy personnel.<sup>41</sup> The 9<sup>th</sup> MAB consisted of the 31<sup>st</sup>, 33<sup>rd</sup>, and 35<sup>th</sup> Marine Amphibious Units (MAU).<sup>42</sup> Each MAU contained its own infantry Battalion Landing Team (BLT) and helicopter squadron. The infantry battalions comprised

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<sup>41</sup> BGen Richard Carey had served as an infantry officer in Korea before undergoing flight training and commanding a fighter squadron in Vietnam. Carey's experience as both an infantry officer and an aviator gave him expertise in planning and commanding Operation FREQUENT WIND. Dunham and Quinlan, "US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End"..., 136-138.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 138.

Regimental Landing Team Four (RLT-4) which would provide the amphibious Ground Security Force (GSF).<sup>43</sup> Additionally, a company of Marine Security Guards provided perimeter security at the Embassy and evacuation sites until reinforced by the RLT Marines. The 9<sup>th</sup> MAB was embarked upon Naval Task Force 76.

The Naval Force was designated Task Force 76 (CJTF-7), which was divided into two Amphibious Ready Groups, and an Amphibious Squadron with an amphibious command ship.<sup>44</sup> This force was joined by two aircraft carriers, three amphibious ships, and eight destroyers for escort and defense. The aircraft carriers USS *Hancock* and *Midway* were loaded with helicopters in preparation for the evacuation, instead of their normal load of fixed-wing strike aircraft. Two additional aircraft carriers provided combat air patrol.<sup>45</sup> This force totaling 25 US Navy ships was marshaled seventeen miles off the coast of Saigon in the South China Sea.<sup>46</sup> (See Annex D.)

The 7<sup>th</sup> Air Force commanded the US Support Activities Group (USSAG), which provided combat air patrol, electronic warfare support, and command and control relay aircraft to fly continuously throughout FREQUENT WIND. The Air Force also supplied sixty-five C-141 transport, C-130 transport, C-130 airborne command and control, and KC-135 aerial refueling planes to support the evacuation.<sup>47</sup> In addition, the USAF embarked ten HH-53 heavy lift helicopters on the USS *Midway* to support lift

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<sup>43</sup> RLT 4 was commanded by Colonel Al Gray, a decorated Marine infantry officer veteran of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Gray would later become Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1987.

<sup>44</sup> Dunham and Quinlan, "US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End" . . . , 138.

<sup>45</sup> <http://www.history.navy.mil/seairland/chap5.htm> (accessed 31 March 2014)

<sup>46</sup> Camp, *Assault from the Sky* . . . , 194.

<sup>47</sup> Johnston, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE EVACUATION OF SAIGON . . . , 48.

requirements. Although the USAF owned C-5 heavy lift transport aircraft, a C-5 crash on 5 April 1975 removed C-5s from the operation plan for fear of subsequent mishaps.<sup>48</sup>

In addition to military transport, civilian and allied transport assisted in the evacuation.<sup>49</sup> World Airways provided several contracted civilian transport aircraft to move American personnel and Vietnamese dependents out of Vietnam.<sup>50</sup> World Airways completed twenty evacuation flights from Vietnam, including two orphan flights on the 21<sup>st</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> of April. These flights evacuated 470 orphans and their escorts.<sup>51</sup>

Eight Maritime Sealift Command contracted ships supported the operation.<sup>52</sup> Five RVN Navy ships and allied naval ships from Taiwan, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, and the Federal Republic of Germany also moved evacuees away from Vietnam.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> The mishap, caused by explosive decompression of the cabin, came tragically on the flight dubbed "Operation Baby Lift." This flight was an opportunity to evacuate large numbers of Vietnamese orphans while using the opportunity to evacuated DAO support personnel as caregivers. Sadly, only 175 survivors were pulled from the wreckage from the original manifest of almost 300 on board including 250 orphans. LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 29-32.

<sup>49</sup> No US Army units participated in Operation FREQUENT WIND. The only Army participation came from Army officers assigned to the DAO Office at Tan Son Nhut. Johnston, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE EVACUATION OF SAIGON . . . , 59.

<sup>50</sup> On March 29th, the World Airways flight at Da Nang was overrun by frenzied crowds, and nearly crashed on takeoff. LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 18.

To this day, World Airways provides contracted passenger transport to the US Military, including transport of the author on three separate combat deployments to Iraq. <http://www.worldairways.com/heritage.php>, Accessed 1 May 2014.

<sup>51</sup> LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 67.

<sup>52</sup> These ships were planned to carry up to 6,000 Vietnamese passengers, but in execution carried as many as 10,000. Johnston, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE EVACUATION OF SAIGON . . . , 22 & 57.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 57.



## OPERATION FREQUENT WIND

The completion of the NEOs at Da Nang and Phnom Penh helped FREQUENT WIND planners because both operations used the same evacuation force as Operation FREQUENT WIND.<sup>54</sup> Beginning on 1 April 1975, the DAO office began flying American citizens and Vietnamese dependents from the Tan Son Nhut airfield as they executed their plan for Option II. In the days before April 29<sup>th</sup>, the DAO was able to evacuate 50,493 people from Saigon, including 2,678 orphans.<sup>55</sup>

Fixed-wing flights at Tan Son Nhut did not stop until April 29<sup>th</sup>, when the Ambassador was notified that heavy fire prevented the further use of fixed-wing flights.<sup>56</sup> At 0400 on the morning of April 29<sup>th</sup>, NVA engineers launched an artillery barrage on Tan Son Nhut that killed two Marines and destroyed a C-130 transport plane.<sup>57</sup> This shut down runway operations, and announced the coming NVA attack.<sup>58</sup> At 0600, an NVA armored column launched an assault on Tan Son Nhut. Attempting to cross a bridge eight miles from Tan Son Nhut, the weight of the NVA tanks collapsed the bridge, halting their advance.<sup>59</sup> This stroke of good fortune gave Marine forces time to collapse the Tan Son Nhut perimeter, evacuate more Americans, and destroy classified material. The NVA was unable to take Tan Son Nhut before the last Americans departed.

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<sup>54</sup> Headquarters Marine Corps, Memorandum: USSAG/7AF OPLAN 5060V-2-75(TALON VISE), 18 April 1975.

<sup>55</sup> Drury and Clavin, *Last Men Out* . . . , 258.

<sup>56</sup> LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 85.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.

<sup>58</sup> Veith, *Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam* . . . , 486.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 487.

At 1048 on the 29<sup>th</sup>, after inspecting the damage to the airfield himself, US Ambassador Graham Martin formally requested Option IV of Operation FREQUENT WIND to begin.<sup>60</sup> <sup>61</sup> Ambassador Martin's request to commence Option IV transferred civilian control of the operation to the military.<sup>62</sup> At 1051 local time on 29 April 1975, the 7th Air Force and 7th Fleet were ordered by the State Department to commence Operation FREQUENT WIND.<sup>63</sup> This prompted the first wave of helicopters to launch for Tan Son Nhut. Over the next sixteen hours, Marine and Air Force helicopters were able to evacuate 395 Americans and 4475 Vietnamese and TCNs from the DAO.<sup>64</sup>

In an adjustment to the FREQUENT WIND plan<sup>65</sup>, the first wave of evacuation helicopters carried BLT 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 4<sup>th</sup> Marines (BLT 2/4).<sup>66</sup> Landing an entire battalion as the GSF increased the security of the DAO compound and provided a show of force that helped to subdue the panicked crowd that begged for rescue from the North Vietnamese. However, once 2/4 landed and secured the DAO<sup>67</sup>, the Embassy contacted

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<sup>60</sup> This ended fixed-wing transport participation in FREQUENT WIND and transitioned to all rotary-wing transportation. LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 90.

<sup>61</sup> Ambassador Martin was a recurrent stressor for DAO planners since he refused to acknowledge the reality of the impending evacuation. Marine Major James Kean, Commanding Officer of the Marine Security Guards at the embassy, believed Martin desired to die in Saigon if the city fell. Drury and Clavin, *Last Men Out* . . . , 61.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 112.

<sup>63</sup> Dunham and Quinlan, "US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End" . . . , 185.

<sup>64</sup> Drury and Clavin, *Last Men Out* . . . , 258.

<sup>65</sup> Smith, "End of Tour Report." US DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE . . . , 16-B-12.

<sup>66</sup> Dunham and Quinlan, "US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End" . . . , 195. US Marine Corps infantry battalions use the nomenclature of the numbered battalion and the Marine regiment they belong to. For example, the Second Battalion of the Fourth Marine Regiment is referred to as "2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 4<sup>th</sup> Marines" or simply "2/4."

<sup>67</sup> 865 Marines provided security at the DAO and 130 augmented the Marine Guards at the Embassy. Johnston, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE EVACUATION OF SAIGON . . . , 47.

the MAB requesting evacuation of over 2000 people from the embassy.<sup>68</sup> Planners had only intended to use the embassy to evacuate the Ambassador, a few remaining Embassy Staff, and the Marine Guards.<sup>69</sup> Although 9<sup>th</sup> MAB planners had not planned to evacuate people from the US Embassy due to the size of the zone, BGen Carey ordered the shift of priority to the embassy.<sup>70</sup> After the Marine Guards removed the tamarind tree from the parking lot, helicopters quickly began landing at the Embassy. The flexibility of the FREQUENT WIND plan, and the FREQUENT WIND command and control network, allowed the evacuation force to shift priority to the US Embassy.<sup>71</sup>

At 2250 on the 29<sup>th</sup>, Marine engineers detonated the DAO's classified material and boarded the last helicopter to leave the DAO.<sup>72</sup> Marines on that helicopter observed NVA tanks crossing the Tan Son Nhut flightline as their helicopter headed to the coast. The US Embassy in Saigon was now the final American presence in Vietnam.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> James H. Kean, "After Action Report: 17 April – 7 May 1975." (Reprinted by *The Fall of Saigon Association*, <http://fallofusaigon.org/orig/final/htm>.)

<sup>69</sup> Johnston, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE EVACUATION OF SAIGON . . . , 69. The Historical Summary states that the ability to flex operations to the embassy extended the length of the operation dramatically, and increased the risk to the mission force.

<sup>70</sup> Dunham and Quinlan, "US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End" . . . , 195.

<sup>71</sup> One of the main reasons that the embassy was not considered as a primary zone was that the embassy roof could only accommodate one CH-46 helicopter. The only other potential LZ was the embassy parking lot, which was obstructed by the tamarind tree. Once FREQUENT WIND commenced, Embassy Marines and attached Naval Construction engineers (SeaBees) took great joy in cutting down the tree and removing it from the parking lot. The resulting LZ was large enough to accommodate a CH-53. Drury and Clavin, *Last Men Out* . . . , 114.

<sup>72</sup> Drury and Clavin, *Last Men Out* . . . , 195.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 195.

By 0215 on 30 April, two helicopters landed at the Embassy landing zones every ten minutes.<sup>74</sup> At 0327, newly sworn-in President Ford<sup>75</sup> ordered that only twenty more helicopters would land at the Embassy and that Ambassador Martin would be on the twentieth helicopter.<sup>76</sup> Only Americans were to be evacuated; the remaining South Vietnamese, desperate for evacuation, would be abandoned to the North Vietnamese. At 0458 on 30 April, the Ambassador boarded a CH-46 and departed Vietnam.<sup>77</sup> The pilots flying the helicopter announced “Tiger, Tiger, Tiger” over the radio to signify the Ambassador’s departure.<sup>78</sup> Unfortunately the evacuation force assumed that this call meant that all Americans were evacuated from the Embassy. In fact, Marine Security Guards were still at the Embassy, surrounded by an angry Vietnamese mob that was slowly beginning to realize that they would not be rescued by the Americans.<sup>79</sup> Finally at 0753, a CH-46 rescued the final eleven Marines who had provided LZ protection for the Ambassador’s departure.<sup>80</sup> Operation FREQUENT WIND, and America’s involvement in Vietnam, was complete. Marine pilots had flown 1,054 flight hours in support of the evacuation and evacuated 978 American citizens and 1,220 Vietnamese and TCNs from the US Embassy to freedom.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Dunham and Quinlan, “US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End”..., 199.

<sup>75</sup> Gerald R. Ford became President of the United States in 1974 after President Richard Nixon resigned due to the Watergate Scandal.

<sup>76</sup> Drury and Clavin, *Last Men Out* . . . , 201.

<sup>77</sup> Dunham and Quinlan, “US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End”..., 199.

<sup>78</sup> Drury and Clavin, *Last Men Out* . . . , 219.

<sup>79</sup> The last Marines had slowly retreated to the top of the embassy building, having destroyed the elevators and barricaded several stairwells leading to the roof. After barricading the door to the roof, tear gas grenades kept the mob at bay. The Marines checked and rechecked their ammunition. Believing they had been abandoned, the Marines voted to fight to the last, and awaited the rush of the mob. *Ibid.*, 237-246.

<sup>80</sup> Dunham and Quinlan, “US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End”..., 200-201.

<sup>81</sup> Drury and Clavin, *Last Men Out* . . . , 258.

## PLANNING ISSUES

There were several issues addressed during FREQUENT WIND that remain important in executing modern NEOs, namely the deconfliction of sea and airspace, processing of non-combatants, the shrinking perimeter, and the security paradox present throughout the planning and execution.

By the morning of 29 April, 14 NVA divisions surrounded Saigon. These units brought a variety of artillery, rocket, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), and surface to air missiles, with reports of at least one SA-2 radar-guided surface to air missile.<sup>82</sup> Marine Air planners from the 9<sup>th</sup> MAB conducted a weaponeering threat analysis<sup>83</sup> and concluded that the most likely threat to American helicopters would be small arms, AAA, and the heat-seeking shoulder-launched SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles.<sup>84</sup> In order to mitigate these threats, MAB planners codenamed ingress route “Michigan” at an altitude of 6,500 feet and egress route “Ohio” at an altitude of 5,500 feet.<sup>85</sup> These altitudes mitigated the enemy weapons threat to helicopters and prevented mishaps from accidental collision between friendly aircraft. What the altitude deconfliction did not mitigate was the impact of weather.

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<sup>82</sup> LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 74.

<sup>83</sup> The term “weaponeering” describes the planning that includes the maximum effective range of friendly and enemy weapons systems and uses that analysis to adjust tactics for maximum effectiveness. This is a common term in American military tactical aviation.

<sup>84</sup> Dunham and Quinlan, “US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End” . . . , 185.

<sup>85</sup> Drury and Clavin, *Last Men Out* . . . , 153.

On 29 April 1975, clouds were scattered at 2,000 feet, with an overcast layer at 20,000 feet. Visibility was fifteen miles except over Saigon, where visibility dropped drastically to one mile with haze.<sup>86</sup> Weather, and the increased danger of mid-air collision that accompanied it, was regarded as the greatest threat to the mission.<sup>87</sup> Weather did not improve as the evacuation progressed. As night fell, aircraft adapted by using their own searchlights, LZ lighting, and fires from the city to guide their way in the darkness.<sup>88</sup>

An unexpected threat to the safety of the helicopter waves was South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) helicopters fleeing Vietnam to the waiting 7<sup>th</sup> fleet. The VNAF helicopters were oblivious to the FREQUENT WIND command and control structure, and flew a desperate one way trip to US Navy ships hoping there would be a clear landing space on the ships.<sup>89</sup> Through constant communication over radio frequencies, the FREQUENT WIND command and control system provided the flexibility for 9<sup>th</sup> MAB helicopters to avoid each other, shift landing zones, navigate the weather challenge, and avoid mishap from the frenzied mob of Vietnamese helicopters.

The establishment of Command and Control relationships was imperative to mission success. Although Marine BGen Carey commanded the 9<sup>th</sup> MAB, he reported to

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<sup>86</sup> Dunham and Quinlan, "US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End" . . . , 188.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 188.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 194.

<sup>89</sup> These helicopters usually contained only the VNAF pilots and their families. The famous pictures of American sailors pushing helicopters into the ocean came from the need to keep the flight deck clear so that more American and Vietnamese helicopters could land and unload their passengers. No American helicopters were thrown in the ocean. Johnston, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE EVACUATION OF SAIGON . . . , 1-2.

different commanders when his force phased from sea to shore. Planners solved this by placing 9<sup>th</sup> MAB helicopters under Navy CJTF-7 command and control until they crossed the shoreline. From the shoreline to the LZs, the helicopters fell under the Air Force USSAG for guidance. Carey also reported to Marine Lieutenant General (LtGen) Louis Wilson at Marine Fleet Force Headquarters Pacific (FMFPAC) in Hawaii, although Wilson did not control the operation. When events caused changes to the mission, such as the shift from the DAO to the Embassy, or President Ford's order of the final evacuation wave, the command and control system allowed the flexibility to shift the mission accordingly. (See Annex C.)

The function of security during a NEO follows a paradox that must be considered during all aspects of planning. The corresponding reduction of personnel at the embassy was countered by the exponential increase of panicked mobs desperate for escape. Extraction meant that fewer Marines were available as the GSF while more security was actually required. As the GSF was extracted, security for the landing zone was reduced and the risk to landing helicopters increased.

A NEO may also necessitate the destruction of sensitive or classified material that may be harmful if acquired by an enemy force. Since 21 April 1975, the Marines at the Embassy had conducted an around-the-clock effort to burn classified material at the Embassy.<sup>90</sup> At 2250 on 29 April, Marine Combat Engineers at the DAO detonated all the

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<sup>90</sup> "U.S. Burned \$5-Million In Evacuation of Saigon." *New York Times*, 14 June 1975, 9.

classified material at the DAO.<sup>91</sup> The Combat Engineers were demolition experts brought by the RLT specifically to destroy classified material and deny it to the NVA.

## UNIQUE FACTORS

The presence of Air America, a CIA-run aviation unit, was a factor unique to the Vietnam War. Largely composed of former military pilots, Air America contributed 24 UH-1s and 31 pilots to begin evacuating CIA operatives and informants on 28 April.<sup>92</sup> While this eased the requirements of the Marines to evacuate people throughout the city of Saigon, Air America has not existed as an organization since the Vietnam War and is unlikely to be available to future NEOs.

Additionally, the issue of air crew fatigue caused friction among the evacuation force. Helicopter pilots manned their aircraft and stood by for evacuation starting on the morning of the 29<sup>th</sup>. Pilots had planned to do the majority of the evacuation during the day, but did not receive a launch order until the afternoon. Since the pilots had exceeded crew day<sup>93</sup>, Admiral Whitmire, Commander of CJTF-76, feared a midair collision and halted flight operations at 2300 so the air crew could rest.<sup>94</sup> Whitmire's order ignored the

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<sup>91</sup> Drury and Clavin, *Last Men Out* . . . , 195.

<sup>92</sup> LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 36-37.

<sup>93</sup> The term "crew day" refers to a limit on twelve hours of flight time for an air crew. Crew day is designed to limit aviation mishaps by ensuring that aircrew fly when they are at their most alert. Dunham and Quinlan, "US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End" . . . , 199.

<sup>94</sup> James H. Kean, "After Action Report: 17 April – 7 May 1975." (Reprinted by *The Fall of Saigon Association*, <http://fallosaigon.org/orig/final/htm>.)



reality of the combat situation on the ground. At this stage in Operation FREQUENT WIND, the risk of mishap due to fatigue was dwarfed by the risk of the embassy being overrun.

Furious at the halt of flights, BGen Carey returned to the USS *Blue Ridge* command ship to demand the resumption of flights, supported by LtGen Wilson at HQ FMFPAC.<sup>95</sup> LtGen Wilson threatened the court martial of any American officer, of any rank<sup>96</sup>, for preventing Marine aviators from withdrawing Marines on the ground.<sup>97</sup> Whitmire relented, and the Marines resumed flying.<sup>98</sup>

Rules of Engagements (ROE) for FREQUENT WIND were designed to protect American forces without violating the Paris Peace Accords and reentering the war. ROE specified that US forces could not shoot “for any purpose other than for the direct defense of the evacuation forces and/or designated evacuees under actual attack.”<sup>99</sup> The only aircraft ordnance expenditure was in response to a surface-to-air missile attack, and ROE was judged to be sufficient for the operation.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Dunham and Quinlan, “US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End” . . . , 198-199.

<sup>96</sup> Drury and Clavin, *Last Men Out* . . . , 233.

<sup>97</sup> Dunham and Quinlan, “US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End” . . . , 199. As head of Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, LtGen Wilson was the senior Marine in the operational chain of command. While he was not in the tactical chain of command, Wilson had the power to influence the direction and completion of the operation. As it turned out, Wilson injected a measure of common sense into the thought processes of officers who were not properly oriented to the severity of the situation.

<sup>98</sup> After exceeding their crew day, the USAF helicopter crews did not fly again during FREQUENT WIND. *Ibid.*, 199.

<sup>99</sup> Johnston, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE EVACUATION OF SAIGON . . . , 96.

<sup>100</sup> The only missile fired at US Forces was fired at a USAF HH-53 departing Tan Son Nhut airfield. *Ibid.*, 50-1.

The screening of passengers was the most time-consuming and important security issue facing the DAO. For processing purposes, American Citizens and TCNs were simple for the DAO and Embassy personnel to process. An initial restriction on the processing of South Vietnamese nationals was the requirement by the South Vietnamese government that all South Vietnamese must have an exit visa.<sup>101</sup> Many Americans had recently married South Vietnamese nationals and demanded that their new extended family be evacuated in addition to the immediate spouse and children dependents. The process was finally sped up by the creation of an affidavit of responsibility whereby an American could accept responsibility for Vietnamese and the evacuees could depart.<sup>102</sup> This allowed the DAO to increase the amount of evacuees processed from 600 to 6,000 per day.<sup>103</sup>

All passengers had to be screened to ensure no weapons or contraband would be smuggled aboard Navy ships. By South Vietnamese law, the DAO could not evacuate RVN military or draft-aged males.<sup>104</sup> Intermingled in the panicked crowds were armed RVN deserters, thieves, and suspected Viet Cong guerillas.<sup>105</sup> Disarming the crowd and maintaining order was of paramount importance. This requirement was eased by the arrival of the GSF, who performed some of these tasks.

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Earlier on the morning of the 29<sup>th</sup>, a VNAF AC-119 gunship was shot down by an SA-7 as it orbited over Tan Son Nhut, providing support to ARVN ground forces engaged in the area. LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 82.

<sup>101</sup> Johnston, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE EVACUATION OF SAIGON . . . , 18.

<sup>102</sup> Smith, "End of Tour Report." US DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE . . . , 16-B-12.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 16-B-15.

<sup>104</sup> LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 66.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 66.

Operation FREQUENT WIND demonstrated the flexibility of the Marine infantry regiment. Self-contained and air-mobile, the RLT provided security for the operation wherever the GSF was needed. RLT Marines augmented the Marine Guards at the embassy and secured the perimeter without distracting the Embassy Marines from their internal security responsibilities.<sup>106</sup> RLT Marines were also broken into reinforced platoons and distributed Marine Security Detachments across eight civilian contracted ships to maintain order and security among the refugees afloat.<sup>107</sup>

The 9<sup>th</sup> MAB helicopter launch plan called for a one-hour alert posture plus thirty minute flight times from the ship to the LZ. To the Marines, the term “L-hour” meant the time the first wave of helicopters would land at the LZ. To the Air Force, the term meant the time the first wave would launch.<sup>108</sup> This confusion combined to delay the actual start of flight operations by three valuable hours of daylight.<sup>109</sup> This issue was quickly addressed by standardizing terminology for future operations.

Given the scope of the operation, American forces suffered relatively few aircraft losses. The USAF lost aircraft to enemy fire on the ground<sup>110</sup>, and a C-5 that crashed at

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<sup>106</sup> At one point, the Embassy landing zone received harassing sniper fire from a nearby building. A platoon of the regiment’s Marines stormed the building and halted the sniper fire. Drury and Clavin, *Last Men Out* . . . , 175-6.

<sup>107</sup> Marine Corps Command Center, Morning Operational Summary, 25 April 1975.

<sup>108</sup> Dunham and Quinlan, “US Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End” . . . , 181.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, 182.

<sup>110</sup> LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 76.

Tan Son Nhut on 4 April.<sup>111</sup> The Navy lost one A-7 and the Marines lost a CH-46 and an AH-1, which both crashed at sea. Two crew members of the CH-46 were lost at sea, but the rest of the air crew were safely recovered.<sup>112</sup>

## NORTH VIETNAMESE COUNTERACTION

Although a major threat, the NVA did not cause heavy American casualties during the evacuation. US helicopters took small arms fire during the entire operation<sup>113</sup>, but never massed an artillery barrage at the LZs. Only one surface to air missile was fired at evacuation helicopters.<sup>114</sup> The NVA simply wanted US forces out, not destroyed.

Under the approval of the North Vietnamese Politburo, NVA General Van Tien Dung allowed the Americans until dawn of April 30 before assaulting the embassy.<sup>115</sup> Had Gen Dung decided to properly array AAA in the vicinity of the embassy, or massed an artillery strike on the embassy, he could have potentially destroyed many of the Marine helicopters and killed many of the thousands of non-combatants desperate to escape the NVA. However, the NVA's strategic goal was unification of the country, not

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<sup>111</sup> This was tragically during the previously mentioned "Operation Babylift." LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 29.

<sup>112</sup> Johnston, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE EVACUATION OF SAIGON . . . , 49.

<sup>113</sup> The embassy Marines boarding the final helicopter noted that the CH-46 windows had been shot out. Drury and Clavin, *Last Men Out* . . . , 247.

This was not seen as unusual for flight operations in Vietnam. On the 28th, ARVN troops positioned outside the perimeter of the DAO also began shooting at the American evacuation helicopters, knowing they would be left behind. LaValle, *Last Flight From Saigon* . . . , 89.

<sup>114</sup> Johnston, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE EVACUATION OF SAIGON . . . , 51.

<sup>115</sup> Drury and Clavin, *Last Men Out* . . . , 178.

destruction of fleeing American forces, so General Dung did not decisively engage the NEO forces.

A determined NVA attempt to halt the embassy evacuation might have resulted in heavy casualties, but would not have negated the requirement to continue the operation until the American flag had been recovered and the last American had departed the embassy. Regardless of the potential casualties to military forces, it is imperative to rescue civilian personnel from hostile territory. The DAO and 9<sup>th</sup> MAB planners had enough flexibility and sufficient forces massed that FREQUENT WIND would still have succeeded even if a forced entry had been required to reach the embassy.

## CONCLUSION

NEO's are challenging, but unavoidable. It is unacceptable for a democracy to abandon their citizens in a hostile country to certain death. Operation FREQUENT WIND benefitted from clarity of purpose throughout the entire chain of command; the evacuation and processing of refugees was the main effort of the entire US Military. Operation FREQUENT WIND demonstrated that Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) can succeed in hostile situations, provided that they involve a detailed yet flexible plan that can quickly adapt to a chaotic and deteriorating situation. The lessons learned from FREQUENT WIND have contributed to successful American helicopterborne raids and evacuations up to the present day.

At 0830 on April 30<sup>th</sup>, President Minh ordered the surrender of RVN forces.<sup>116</sup>

Two hours later, NVA tanks stormed Independence Palace and replaced RVN colors with the flag of the Peoples Republic of Vietnam. NVA officers took President Minh's surrender, ending the war.<sup>117</sup> An estimated 130,000 South Vietnamese escaped from the invading NVA. Although the evacuation of Saigon was an embarrassing end to a long and painful war, the execution of Operation FREQUENT WIND is rightfully a point of pride for the American forces that participated and helped so many Vietnamese escape to freedom.

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<sup>116</sup> Veith, *Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam* . . . , 490.



<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, 493.

Annex A



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ANNEX B





ANNEX C





Figure 29. Evacuation Communication Nets During Final Phases.

**ANNEX D**



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