

Canadian  
Forces  
College

Collège  
des  
Forces  
Canadiennes



## COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FORCE PROTECTION IN THE ASYMMETRIC BATTLE SPACE: WHO SHOULD OWN THE TASK?

Maj P.J. Crow

**JCSP 40**

***Exercise Solo Flight***

**Disclaimer**

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2016.

**PCEMI 40**

***Exercice Solo Flight***

**Avertissement**

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2016.

EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT*

**COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FORCE PROTECTION IN THE  
ASYMMETRIC BATTLE SPACE: WHO SHOULD OWN THE TASK?**

Maj P.J. Crow

*“This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”*

Word Count: 3749

*“La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.”*

Compte de mots: 3749

## **COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FORCE PROTECTION IN THE ASYMMETRIC BATTLE SPACE: WHO SHOULD OWN THE TASK?**

*“Convoys are the soldiers’ lifeline. They must be recognized as combat operations, and drivers must be trained as mounted riflemen. Success on the battlefield rides on the back of convoy trucks” - Staff Sergeant Edward M. Stepp*

The war in Afghanistan represented one which was contested in what will no doubt become known as the predominant modern battle space. Asymmetrical warfare is here to stay and responding to this new reality will be one of the primary challenges facing military forces such as Canada’s in the foreseeable future. During this conflict the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in general and the Canadian Army (CA) in particular learned a myriad of lessons as the conflict evolved and developed. One of the areas in which much was learned was that of Combat Service Support (CSS) to land operations. In this paper I shall examine one of the critical aspects of CSS operations, that being Force Protection (FP) for support elements, convoys in particular. I shall look at how convoy FP was conducted during the conflict and offer my opinion as to whether or not the CSS community should continue to use the construct employed in Afghanistan. I believe that the system of FP employed in Afghanistan was largely Ad Hoc in nature. However, I also believe that this Ad Hoc system became institutionalized over time and eventually became accepted as the norm. I believe that was an error which must be corrected lest we set ourselves up for failure in future conflicts. The thesis of this paper is quite simply that the responsibility for FP of CSS elements in the asymmetrical battle space should reside within the CSS community itself, and should not be a task given to combat arms units attached to the supporting arms. I shall examine this issue through the lens of CAF publications, through a review of writings pertaining to the conflict and most

importantly through interviews conducted with those who were actually in Afghanistan conducting support operations.

Prior to stating my case in support of the CSS community taking ownership of FP in support of its operations I shall first set the stage by considering and defining the asymmetrical battle space, examining how CSS FP was conducted in Afghanistan, and reviewing some of the various CAF publications geared towards CSS operations. Having done this I will examine the experiences of those who fought the fight and in conclusion I will offer my thoughts as to the way ahead.

The asymmetrical battle space is no doubt one of the most complex and challenging environments in which an armed force may be tasked to conduct operations.

A good definition of asymmetrical warfare (AW) is as follows:

Asymmetric warfare is population-centric nontraditional warfare waged between a militarily superior power and one or more inferior powers which encompasses all the following aspects: evaluating and defeating asymmetric threat, conducting asymmetric operations, understanding cultural asymmetry and evaluating asymmetric cost.<sup>1</sup>

While this may seem a complex definition, I feel that is exactly what is needed for such a complex operating environment. AW is inherently complex and challenging. Further to the stated definition it is critical to note that most asymmetric conflicts are nonlinear and do not feature anything really resembling a front line. Due to this fact CSS forces were often caught in the line of fire and regularly targeted by the enemy.<sup>2</sup> In Afghanistan this was the reality and as such support elements were forced to ensure that a culture of learning existed and that they were able to adapt to an ever changing threat.

---

<sup>1</sup> Buffaloe, David, *Defining Asymmetric Warfare*, (The Land Warfare Papers, 2006), 17

<sup>2</sup> Ziv, Eyal, *Logistics in Asymmetric Conflicts* (Army Sustainment Journal, 2012), 1

During the Canadian participation in the Afghan conflict there were in essence four main phases, the first being the deployment of forces in support of OPERATION APOLLO, the US led effort against the Taliban in early 2002. This was followed by the deployment of a Battle Group (BG) to Kabul in 2003. This phase was known as OPERATION ATHENA. In 2006 the Canadian contingent moved south to Kandahar and began a period of intense kinetic activity against the Taliban led insurgency. Finally in 2011 Canada moved north again to close out its Afghan commitment through the auspices of OPERATION ATTENTION which drew to a close in 2014. This paper will focus on the Kandahar phase of Op ATHENA.

During Op ATHENA the Canadian BG conducted operations over a vast amount of territory. The area of operations into which the BG deployed was over 225,000 square kilometres in size with the Canadians responsible for some 54,000 square kilometres of this hugely challenging battle space.<sup>3</sup> Throughout this area of responsibility was a network of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). These FOBs were the home of the BG elements taking the fight to the Taliban. As such they had to be resupplied on a regular and ongoing basis by the CSS component of the BG known as the National Support Element (NSE). In order to provide the necessary support, a system of convoy replenishment was put into place. During the early days of the Canadian operations in Kandahar Province, the CAF had no air assets to call its own; therefore ground resupply bore the brunt of the logistics function. It is critical to note, however, that even when the most robust and aggressive aerial resupply capability exists, not all classes of supply required to sustain a force in combat operations can be delivered via this means and, as

---

<sup>3</sup> Conrad, John, "We Three Hundred: Logistics Success In The New Security Environment". In Harm's Way. The Buck Stops Here: Senior Leaders on Operations. (Canadian Defence Academy Press 2007), 260

such, a system of tactical convoys will always be required.<sup>4</sup> The nature of the battle space demanded that the convoys being sent out to the FOBs had to have a robust ability to protect themselves from several distinct threats. The most common threat facing the convoys was that of ambush by Taliban fighters and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's) placed along the convoy routes. The convoys sent out by the NSE came to be known as Combat Logistics Patrols (CLPs). These CLPs were typically comprised of a vehicle column and an escort column.<sup>5</sup> The escort element was comprised of reserve combat arms soldiers who had been integrated into the NSE order of battle. There were typically two platoons of these soldiers who were under command of the NSE and came to be known as Force Protection Company.<sup>6</sup>

In this section of this paper I shall examine FP Company and illustrate some of the challenges that arose due to using this type of construct to provide FP to the NSE. It is my contention that the task of convoy FP should not reside within a combat arms unit attached to an NSE type organization; rather the supporting arms should in fact be able to provide FP as an inherent aspect of conducting CSS Ops. For each rotation of Op ATHENA, the FP Company was force generated from a wide range of Primary Reserve (PRes) combat arms units. Once the soldiers who would comprise the FP Company had been identified, they came together to complete individual training geared at bringing them to the level required to deploy into theatre. There would then be follow on collective training completed at the platoon level. Only once this had been completed

---

<sup>4</sup> Stepp, Staff Sergeant Edward, "Preparing for Convoy Operations in a Combat Zone" in Army Logistician (February, 2008), 1

<sup>5</sup> Army Lessons Learned Synopsis Report – NSE TF 3-07 (March 2008) pg 1

<sup>6</sup> Interview with Col. Chuck Mathe, (CO NSE, JTF Afghanistan 1-07) Conducted in May 2015

were the FP troops married up with the NSE soldiers with whom they would deploy.<sup>7</sup> In most cases this did not occur until well after the NSE soldiers had begun the collective training phase of the road to high readiness. This led to an organization that was in some instances not fully integrated and ready to conduct operations upon deployment, forcing the NSE to continue training once actually in Afghanistan.<sup>8</sup> This is far less than ideal. The individual soldiers generated for the FP Company were typically very motivated and eager to get on with the task. There were some issues with soldiers perhaps not having the same abilities of a regular force soldier of the same rank; however, this in all honesty should be expected.<sup>9</sup> This could be mitigated by the chain of command through reassigning soldiers to other tasks within the organization; however, this adds an administrative burden during a time of intense activity as the unit gears up to go to war. I would argue that if the CSS unit was in fact responsible for its own FP activities, it would be much easier on the chain of command to “get it right” in terms of team building and ensuring that the right soldier is in the right job to successfully complete the tasks at hand. I feel it is important to note that all of the officers with whom I spoke were emphatic that once the FP soldiers were deployed and conducting full up operations that their performance was stellar. In no way do I mean to question the abilities of the soldiers to do their jobs in a completely exemplary fashion. I simply do not think that the CSS community should have to rely on combat arms soldiers to do their fighting for them. The construct that existed in Afghanistan most likely made sense for the time, particularly during the early stages of operating in Kandahar Province. Force generating a

---

<sup>7</sup> Interview with Major Tony McDonald, (Officer in Command Transport Platoon, Task Force Afghanistan 3-08) Conducted in May 2015

<sup>8</sup> Ibid

<sup>9</sup> Ibid

FP capability from the PRes Combat Arms to bolt on to the NSE filled a gap that existed once Canada became involved in kinetic actions in the South. The CSS units that existed within the Regular Force component of the CA were not really trained or – equally important – not equipped for operating in a high threat non-contiguous battle space. I am of the opinion that as the war went on, the concept of having CSS FP become combat arms responsivity became viewed as the norm for a number of reasons. Many saw the FP role as it existed at the time as an ideal task for the reserves.<sup>10</sup> Given the scope of the operation and the relatively small size of the CAF it made sense to involve the reserves to a large degree. The long term benefits of having PRes soldiers who had combat experience would be tangible within the realm of the combat arms units. The quality of the reserve would/could only increase as a result. One can also easily extrapolate a large reserve contribution to the war into helping both retention and recruiting, but that is a topic for another discussion. I am also of the belief that the ad hoc force structure as it evolved became “institutionalized” within the Army, particularly the combat arms. Using reserves to fill an existing capability gap was viewed as a good thing and therefore this particular task should migrate from the CSS community. I wholeheartedly disagree. The CSS community came to recognize what was in fact happening was an absolution of part of their integral responsibilities as soldiers. To be sure there were a host of reasons for this, among them the sheer workload involved in supporting a BG in dispersed operations, lack of proper equipment, particularly hardened, heavily armed vehicles and most importantly training. In a nutshell, soldier skills amongst CSS troops had started to erode to a degree. While I believe that this trend has been recognized and steps are now

---

<sup>10</sup> Interview with Col Chuck Mathe



being taken to reverse the process the Army must accept and remain committed to a vision of combat capable CSS soldiers.

For the remainder of this paper I shall speak to what I feel needs to occur in order for the CSS community to develop and evolve a capability that should be resident within its own organic structure rather than outsourced in an ad hoc fashion. Ironically, the CAF doctrine regarding convoy operations and force protection has long existed. I would argue that the Army and the CSS component within the Army should take the time to reacquaint itself with existing doctrine, tactics techniques and procedures and the published vision of the way ahead in order to redefine and operationalize CSS FP.

The fact that CSS soldier skills had started to decline was pointed out in a letter penned by the Chief of the Land Staff in 2004. Writing in a report titled “Training and Development of Support Personnel”, Major General Caron stated: “One of the more troubling challenges I face is making up for the lack of baseline competencies among support personnel sent to me.”<sup>11</sup> MGen Caron went on to comment “It is insufficient to rely on ECS pre-deployment training, we must establish and maintain a base of common individual competencies upon which collective pre-deployment training can be founded.”<sup>12</sup> This report was written in 2004, some two years prior to Canada entering into protracted combat operations in Afghanistan. The writing in essence was on the wall. The Logistic branch of the Army was to a degree being called on the carpet in this very pointed letter. MGen Caron further commented that in his view he was in very strong agreement with the US Marine Corp dictum concerning its logistic personnel: “We are

---

<sup>11</sup> Caron, MGen J.H.P.M Letter “Training and Development of Support Personnel”, dated 04 March 2004

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

Marines who happen to be logisticians, not logisticians who happen to be Marines.”<sup>13</sup>

This statement overwhelmingly supports what I have always believed to be one of the core truths of Army service no matter the branch: we are always, always soldiers first and tradesmen second. I think that perhaps this truism had been somewhat forgotten or for the sake of convenience, set aside. The example of the US Marine logistics soldier being capable of much more than carrying out a trade function is also the construct followed by the US Army. I believe that the system used by the US ground based logisticians is the example upon which Canadian CSS organizations should be modelled. The US army view is that drivers must train as riflemen and convoy drivers must know how to protect themselves while on the move.<sup>14</sup> Further, it is firmly embedded in the US concept that training on crew served weapons is tremendously important; soldiers must be competent on weapons such as the .50 caliber heavy machine gun and the Mark 19 grenade launcher.<sup>15</sup> Troops with these competencies and the proper equipment will be able to defend themselves while on the move. An escort of combat arms soldiers is rarely if ever used, and such troops would not be part of the CSS order of battle.

In order to get to where I think we should be there are several key issues that must be addressed. The main issues include: doctrine, training, and equipment. Interestingly, doctrine, which would support my contention, already exists. In order to adhere to this doctrine it will be absolutely critical for the Logistics branch to become adamant with the combat arms elements that equipping and training the CSS community to allow itself to conduct its own FP tasks is the correct approach. Notably, B-GL-005-000/FP-001 states:

---

<sup>13</sup> Ibid

<sup>14</sup> Stepp, Preparing for Convoy Operations in a Combat Zone.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

Asymmetric threats have become a high profile concern within the Canadian Forces (CF) as a result of recent terrorist incidents inflicted upon our allies and credible intelligence of potential attacks against Canadian interests. Our personnel, materiel, installations, information and activities are all at risk. Armed forces of many nations have felt the severe impact of this shift in warfare, particularly as it relates to the delivery of combat service support (CSS) and the movement of personnel and supplies via convoy. Convoys have become the targets of choice, but they have not been trained nor equipped to fight the battle. Sustainment convoys, in particular, are primarily composed of soft-skinned vehicles and, coupled with the value of their cargo, are an inviting target for hostile forces around the world.<sup>16</sup>

Further to this, there are other documents that clearly open the door for the CSS community to take ownership of FP. BG-L-310-001/AF-001 is crystal clear when it states:

Combat skills training and adequate equipment will also be a high priority for combat service support elements, as the enemy forces will continue to focus attacks on what they perceive as important, yet “soft” targets. Combat service support vehicle must be hardened – armoured and armed appropriately – and forces must be prepared to adopt the proper defensive posture for the future security environment in which they will operate. A widely dispersed force will demand that combat service support elements be self-protecting to a much higher degree than they are presently and given additional protection forces when required.<sup>17</sup>

The publication “Land Operations 2021 – Adaptive Dispersed Operations” goes on to say exactly the same thing.<sup>18</sup> The capstone documents which provide the very guidance required exist. The hard part will be moving towards a major shift in how the CSS mission is carried out in times of financial and personnel constraints.

The next major item to consider is that of training the force. Quite simply, if the task of FP is going to reside within the CSS units, then we must train as we are going to fight. Each officer that I interviewed echoed this thought. Developing a training plan

---

<sup>16</sup> Department of National Defence, B-GL-005-000/FP-001 “Land Force Convoy Operations – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures”, NDHQ, 2007. pg 1-1

<sup>17</sup> Department of National Defence, B-GL-310-001/AF-001 “Towards Land Operations 2021: Studies in Support of the Army of Tomorrow Force Employment Concept”. NDHQ, 2009. 9-3

<sup>18</sup> Ibid pg 32

geared towards FP activities would greatly enhance team building, would allow for development and refinement of SOPs and confirmation of TTPs.<sup>19</sup> In order to conduct FP activities and train for them there is of course a bill in terms of equipment. CSS organizations, particularly Army Service Battalions will have to be equipped with the proper fighting vehicles.<sup>20</sup> I shall speak to equipment further in the last part of this section. Training opportunities continue to evolve and indeed the lessons learned in Afghanistan have not been ignored. In a recent exercise 2 Service Battalion from CFB Petawawa ensured that CSS battle task standards in a non-linear battle space were exercised and confirmed.<sup>21</sup> Ongoing training in all aspects of warfighting must continue. I would posit that the Army in particular continue to develop and provide training that is geared towards the asymmetrical environment. In order to do this cooperation with the Canadian Forces Logistics Training Centre will be critical if we are to institutionalize this type of training understanding that the CAF is entirely likely to find itself in this type of battle space at some point in the future. A critical aspect of training that must be considered is that of weapons competencies. CSS personnel must be able to fight and win. This will require a dedicated programme which will include a significant amount of range time. These ranges must include learning to shoot on the move and applying decisive firepower towards an ambushing force. Currently the Service Battalions would be challenged to provide this type of training due to lack of qualified personnel. An idea that I think would be of huge benefit would be to post one or two combat arms senior

---

<sup>19</sup> Interview with Major Tony McDonald

<sup>20</sup> Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Adam McCabe (Officer Commanding Supply and Transport Company, Task Force Afghanistan 3-08)

<sup>21</sup> Harding, Lieutenant-Colonel Carla, 2 Svc Bn After Action Report, Exercise Maple Resolve, 08 June 2014, 9

NCO's into each regular force Service Battalion and task them with training the battalion to carry out the required FP tasks. This would be a huge force enabler.<sup>22</sup>

Lastly, I will discuss equipment. Currently, the Service Battalions do not have the equipment required to conduct the FP task. It is quite simply impossible to train as we fight if the proper equipment is not provided. Providing proper equipment will come at a significant financial cost, however, to not do so is essentially sowing the seeds of failure. During operations in Afghanistan, the CSS soldiers showed tremendous confidence in two vehicles in particular that were provided to them, the RG-31 and the Armoured Heavy Support Vehicle System (AHSVS).<sup>23</sup> In a move that seems almost incomprehensible to me, the entire RG-31 fleet was scrapped in theatre at the end of the Afghanistan mission. I truly feel that this was a mistake and that despite the cost of maintaining this fleet, it should have been brought back to Canada and made available to the Service Battalions. The Army now finds itself needing to procure another armoured fighting vehicle to replace the RG's. Without this platform available, troops cannot conduct realistic FP training nor can they expect to be properly equipped if a short notice operation occurs. It is imperative that the Army, through the Director of Land Requirements, find a suitable fighting vehicle for the support elements.<sup>24</sup> As for the AHSVS, the fleet currently is parked and not being used in Canada.<sup>25</sup> There is talk that some 6 – 8 of these vehicles may be made available for use but this is nowhere near enough to train properly. The CAF must find a way to make the proper equipment

---

<sup>22</sup> Interview with LCol McCabe

<sup>23</sup> Honour, Lieutenant-Colonel T.W. Final report – Formation Operations Lessons Learned – Combat Service Support Issues, dated 17 April 2009. 3.

<sup>24</sup> Interview with LCol McCabe

<sup>25</sup> Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Bryan Davidson (CO Designate, 1 Service Battalion) Conducted in May 2015

platforms available for training. To not do so will leave the Army unprepared to operate in a complex asymmetric environment. It is also worth noting at this point that there is no FP element being force generated for the next ready BG.<sup>26</sup> This being the case, the ability of the CSS elements to provide their own protection becomes a given.

In this paper, I have examined how FP was provided to CSS elements in the Afghanistan conflict and why I feel that this function should reside within the CSS organization itself. I believe that the type of warfare conducted in Afghanistan is going to be, for the most part, the type of conflict in which Canada is likely to participate for the foreseeable future. I firmly believe that the FP construct that evolved was largely Ad Hoc in nature and over time came to be seen as the correct approach. As stated, I truly believe that this was a mistake and steps must be taken to build an FP construct that is robust, enduring, well trained and deployable with a minimum of friction. The FP function must reside with the CSS elements going forward. The Canada First Defence Strategy clearly outlines what the Government of Canada expects its military to be able to do.<sup>27</sup> Should the CAF be called upon for a rapid reaction to a situation similar to that which was faced in Afghanistan, the luxury of time to build a force capable of fighting and winning will not exist. The force that will be required must therefore exist. In order to avoid Ad Hoc solutions, the CAF must ensure that it is postured correctly and ready to respond to Government direction. From a CSS perspective this means being ready to deploy and fight along with the combat arms without having to build an organization that relies on external resources and soldiers. The ability to conduct operations in a non-permissive environment must be resident within the CSS community. In order to achieve this, the

---

<sup>26</sup> Interview with LCol McCabe

<sup>27</sup> Government of Canada. Canada First Defence Strategy. Ottawa 2008. 4

CAF must accept that this is the reality. The doctrine exists. The lessons about fighting in a non-linear battle space have been learned. Now it is imperative that the CSS community be empowered through training, equipment and mandate to carry out its duties in support of the fighting troops.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Conrad, John. *What the Thunder Said: Reflections of a Canadian Officer in Kandahar*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009.
- Conrad, John, Lieutenant-Colonel. “We Three Hundred: Logistics Success in the New Security Environment.” Chap. 13 in *Harm’s Way – The Buck Stops Here: Senior Commanders on Operations*. Ed. Colonel Bernd Horn. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007.
- Hope, LCol Ian. “Reflections on Afghanistan: Commanding Task Force Orion,” Chapter 11 in *In Harm’s Way The Buck Stops Here: Senior Commanders on Operations*, edited by Col Bernd Horn. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007.
- Mann, David Scott. “Every Soldier a Rifleman.” *Army Logistician* Vol. 36, Issue 1 (January/February 2004): 46-48.
- Stepp, Staff Sergeant Edward. “Preparing for Convoy Operations in a Combat Zone.” In *Army Logistician – Professional Bulletin of United States Army Logistics*. <http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/NovDec04/convoy.html>;
- Army Lessons Learned Centre. *Lessons Learned Synopsis Report 08-003 Combat Logistics Patrol – NSE TF 3-07*. Kingston, ALLC, March 2008.
- Buffaloe, David. “Defining Asymmetric Warfare” in *The Land Warfare Papers No 58*. Arlington, The Institute of Land Warfare, 2006.
- Clair, Major Carol. *Lessons in Combat Service Tactical Mobility: The Afghanistan Conflict, Falklands War and Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm*. School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1993.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GL-005-000/FP-001 “Land Force Convoy Operations - Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP).” Ottawa: 2007
- Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GL-310-001/AF-001 “Towards Land Operations 2021: Studies in Support of the Army of Tomorrow Force Employment Concept”. Ottawa: 2009.
- Canada. Department of National Defence, B-GL-323-004/FP-003 “Counter-Insurgency Operations”. Ottawa: 2008.
- Ziv, Eyal. “Logistics in Asymmetric Conflicts” in *Army Sustainment Journal* Volume 44, Issue 1, 2012.



Caron, MGen J.H.P.M, Letter; “Training and Development of Support Personnel”, Dated 04 March 2004.

Harding, Lieutenant-Colonel Carla. (CO 2 Svc Bn) 2 Service Battalion After Action Report, Exercise Maple Resolve 2014, Dated 08 June 2014.

Government of Canada. Canada First Defence Strategy. Ottawa, 2008.

Honour, Lieutenant-Colonel T.W. (DAD Sustain) Final Report – Formation Lessons Learned Liaison Officer Combat Service Support Issues, Dated 17 April 2009.

Mathe, Colonel Chuck. (Commanding Officer, National Support Elements, Task Force Afghanistan 1-07). Interview conducted May of 2015.

McCabe, Lieutenant-Colonel Adam. (Officer Commanding Supply and Transport Company, Task Force Afghanistan 3-08). Interview Conducted May of 2015.

Davidson, Lieutenant-Colonel Bryan. (Commanding Officer Designate 1 Service Battalion). Interview conducted in May of 2015.

McDonald, Major Tony. (Officer in Command, Transport Platoon, Task Force Afghanistan 3-08). Interview conducted in May of 2015.

Gottfried, Major Dave. (Second in Command, Armoured Squadron, Task Force Afghanistan 1-09). Interview conducted in May of 2015.