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A Midwife to Peace and Catalyst for Progress? The United Nations in Angola and Namibia

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JCSP 40

Exercise Solo Flight

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EXERCISE SOLO FLIGHT

**A Midwife to Peace and Catalyst for Progress?
The United Nations in Angola and Namibia**

By LCol C. Crosby
Par le lieutenant-colonel C. Crosby

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Compte de mots :

Flying a 747 with only enough fuel for a DC3

-Margaret Anstee, 1992 (UN Special Representative in Angola when referring to the resources for UNAVEM II)

Introduction

Africa has witnessed a great number of brutal conflicts. The conflicts in Angola and Namibia are no exception and their pasts are riddled with violence. The UN was involved attempts at peace for both countries, with mixed results.

Today a tourist can travel throughout Namibia in safety and in awe of its natural beauty. After many long years of colonialism in southwestern Africa, a new country was formed and transition to peace and independence for Namibia was swift, smooth and successful. Today Namibia is considered by many as being one of Africa's most successful democracies.¹

The situation in Angola today is much different. Angola's drive to peace was much more violent and took longer than that of Namibia. Decades of war destroyed Angola's infrastructure and Angola's political elite was not cohesive.² Today Angola has a reputation for severe corruption and is impoverished.

This paper will argue that the gap in progress between Angola and Namibia is a direct result of the degree of effectiveness of UN intervention in those two countries. To

¹ Gretchen Bauer, "Namibia in the First Decade of Independence: How Democratic?" *Journal of Southern African Studies* 27, no.1 (March 2001), 34.

² Kyle Beardsley and Holger Schmidt, "Following the Flag or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002," *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (2012), 40.

support this thesis this paper will be divided into four sections. The first section will “christen the ground” and give the background the two countries, from their earlier colonial days to the time peace was achieved. The second section will give the background behind the UN missions that took place in each country. The next section will present the current political, economic and social conditions in each country. Finally, an analysis will be conducted in the fourth section to discuss how the effects the UN’s presence in both countries had an impact on the current state of progress of each country. In the end it will be suggest that the UN’s positive influence in Namibia’s transition to peace and independence is a significant contributing factor to the nation’s success compared to Angola.

Background: From Colonies to Countries to Peace

Angola (1575-2002)

Portugal began colonizing Angola in 1575.³ Unfortunately, Portugal’s rule of Angola was brutal and marked by intense and protracted violence against the indigenous peoples. Even as late as the 1960’s, Portuguese authorities were accused of massacring Angolans, having over 45,000 Portuguese troops stationed in the country to impose their will.⁴

The situation changed drastically in April 1974 and it was at this time that a coup d’état took place in Lisbon. As a result of the revolution, and after almost 500 years of

³ US Department of State, “Background Note: Angola,” (June 2005), 2.

⁴ Ronald Waring, “Angola: Terrorists on the Run,” *National Review* (11 September 1962): 191.

occupation, Portugal abandoned Angola and its other overseas colonies.⁵ In January 1975, Angolan decolonization negotiations resulted in the Alvor Accords.

The Alvor Accords acknowledged Movimento por Popular Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), Uniao Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), and Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA) as sole representatives of Angolan people.⁶ The accords also provided the legal and administrative framework for Angola's independence that occurred on 11 November 1975. The accords were convenient for a colonial power in a hurry to end its rule.⁷ The results were disastrous.

As the Portuguese withdrew from Angola, civil war broke out between three rival independence movements: the MPLA, whose leader was Holden Roberto; Jonas Savimbi's UNITA; and the FNLA, led by Agostinho Neto.⁸ In the end, intense and extended fighting between these three parties claimed almost 500,000 lives.⁹

Many international actors interfered with Angola's transition to independence, worsening the situation. The MPLA was supplied arms and advisors by the Soviet Union.¹⁰ Both the UNITA and FNLA received arms, military instructors and advisors

⁵ Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present* (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2013), 326.

⁶ Chas Freeman, "The Angola/Namibia Accords," *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 3 (Summer 1989), 127.

⁷ Gilbert Khadiagala, "Negotiating Angola's Independence Transition: The Alvor Accords," *International Negotiation* 10 (2005): 302.

⁸ Country Watch. "Political Overview," *Angola Country Review* 7 (Spring 2008), 8.

⁹ United Nations Development Programme. "New Dimensions in Human Security". In *Human Development Report 1994*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994: 41.

¹⁰ Oye Ogunbadejo, "Angola: Ideology and Pragmatism in Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* 57, no.2 (Spring 1981), 254.

from the US and South Africa.¹¹ In 1974, China began providing arms and instructors to FNLA.¹²

On 14 October 1975, South Africa invaded Angola, transforming the civil war into an international conflict.¹³ In response, Cuba sent as many as 50,000 troops to Angola to assist with the war against the South Africans. By early 1976 MPLA was in control of Angola. UNITA withdrew to the rural areas to wage a guerilla bush war and the FNLA was becoming almost completely irrelevant.

In May 1991, Cuba completed its total troop withdrawal from Angola and in the same month a peace act, referred to as the Bicesse Accord, was signed between the main independence movements.¹⁴ The accord's agreement was the holding of free elections and in 1992, a national election was held. The election was deemed fair by international observers and the MPLA won the election. Savimbi's UNITA did not accept the MPLA's victory and Savimbi again returned to armed rebellion, resuming the civil war.¹⁵

UNITA's failure to recognize the validity of the election results was a major turning point for external intervention in Angola. The UNSC imposed sanctions on UNITA and in May 1993, the US formally recognized the government of Angola headed by President Jose dos Santos, who had succeeded Neto in 1979.¹⁶

¹¹ Alan Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 165.

¹² Gilbert Khadiagala, "Negotiating Angola's Independence Transition: The Alvor Accords," 303.

¹³ Piero Gleijeses, "Cuba and the Independence of Namibia," *Cold War History* 7, no.2 (May 2007): 287.

¹⁴ Chas Freeman, "The Angola/Namibia Accords," 136.

¹⁵ Steven Holmes, "Washington Recognizes Angola Government," *New York Times*, 20 May 1993.

¹⁶ African Outlook, "United Nations Tries Hard Line with Savimbi," *Africa Report* 38, no.5 (Sep/Oct 93): 8.

In the Lusaka Protocol of 1994, signed by both the Angolan government and UNITA, UNITA agreed to accept the 1992 election results, demobilize, disarm and return occupied territory. When UNITA hesitated to meet its obligations, the UN imposed further sanctions on UNITA in 1997 and again in 1998 when it became clear that it was not going to fully implement its part of the Lusaka Protocol.¹⁷

From 2000 onwards the Angolan government waged a counter-insurgency campaign against UNITA.¹⁸ At the height of the war, in February 2002, Jonas Savimbi was killed in combat. Facilitated by the death of their leader, a peace agreement was then signed between UNITA and the Angolan government and on 4 April 2002.¹⁹ After more than 26 years of civil war, Angola was finally at peace.

Namibia (1884-1990)

The historical background of Namibia, like that of Angola, is a tale of colonial exploitation. Namibia became a German colony in 1884 and was named German South-West Africa. Upon colonization, it became a settler dominated society shaped by violent means with strict racial segregation.²⁰ Germany's suppression of the colony's indigenous peoples, mainly the Herero and Nama, was vicious. The Germans launched a campaign

¹⁷ Andrea Lari and Rob Kevlihan, "International Human Rights Protection in Situations of Conflict and Post-Conflict: A Case Study of Angola," *African Security Review* 13, no.4 (2004), 30.

¹⁸ Nicole Winfield, "U.N. Implicates African Presidents," *Associated Press*, 11 March 2000.

¹⁹ Andrea Lari and Rob Kevlihan, "International Human Rights Protection in Situations of Conflict and Post-Conflict: A Case Study of Angola," 29.

²⁰ Henning Melber and Christopher Saunders, "Conflict Mediation in decolonisation: Namibia's Transition to Independence," *Afrika Spectrum* 42, no. 1 (2007): 74.

of genocide against the Herero and much as 80% of their population was killed by the Germans.²¹

After the defeat of Germany in World War 1, the League of Nations established the colony as a British protectorate, to be administered via South Africa. The protectorate was renamed South-West Africa. With the collapse of the League and the concurrent creation of the United Nations, South Africa wanted to remain as the custodian of South-West Africa.²²

In 1968, under UN Resolution 2372, the country was renamed Namibia.²³ In 1971, both the International Court of Justice and the UN Security Council decreed South Africa's occupation of Namibia as illegal and ordered South Africa to withdraw immediately.²⁴ In spite of the UN's demands, South Africa refused to release its hold on Namibia. However, this was deemed unacceptable to an influential group, known as the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), which had been fighting for independence since 1966.

SWAPO agitated for independence through a national liberation movement and there were many violent incidents between SWAPO and South African forces.²⁵ Led by Sam Nujoma, SWAPO had a good relationship with the UN. In 1976 SWAPO was

²¹ Max Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 193.

²² Roger Hearn, *UN Peacekeeping in Action* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1999), 37.

²³ Christof Hartmann, "Democracy as a Fortuitous By-Product of Independence: UN Intervention and Democratization in Namibia," *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 1 (July 2009), 32.

²⁴ United Nations, "Namibia – UNTAG Background," last accessed 21 April 2014.

²⁵ Andre Wessels, "The United Nations Arms Embargo Against South Africa, 1977-1994," *War & Society* 29, no. 2 (October 2010), 140.

acknowledged by the UN General Assembly as the sole representative of Namibian people and was given observer status at the UN.²⁶

In September 1978 UN Security Council Resolution 435 was drafted and became the blueprint for Namibian independence. The resolution stated that Namibian independence was to be achieved mainly through free elections supervised by the UN.²⁷ Unfortunately, although UNSC Resolution 435 was adopted in 1978, it was rejected by the South Africans.

In September 1981, the UN General Assembly sanctioned South Africa for its continued occupation of South-West Africa.²⁸ It was at this time that the war in Angola was also complicating matters. The US began an intense series of negotiations with Angola, Cuba and South Africa and, in 1988, the New York accords were negotiated and UNSC Resolution 435 began to be implemented in April 1989. Namibia would finally be granted its independence²⁹. Elections were held in Namibia in November 1989 and in early 1990, a newly elected Namibian government took power with total independence finally achieved on 21 March 1990.

²⁶ Henning Melber and Christopher Saunders, "Conflict Mediation in decolonisation: Namibia's Transition to Independence," *Afrika Spectrum* 42, no. 1 (2007): 75.

²⁷ Roger Hearn, *UN Peacekeeping in Action* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1999), 42.

²⁸ Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd, "International Consensus and the Changing Legal Authority of the UN Security Council," in *The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority* (London: Routledge, 2008), 185

²⁹ Roger Hearn, *UN Peacekeeping in Action* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1999), 45.

Mind the Gap: A tale of two countries

Angola and Namibia are at very different stages of progress. In short, Namibia has achieved much success, whereas Angola's overall development has been limited. The following section of this paper highlights the current status of the two countries for the purposes of later analysis.

Angola

The situation in Angola is poor and is showing little sign of improvement. The country is led by President dos Santos of the MPLA party who has been in power since 1979. Even though Angola has relatively recently had tenure as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, the country has many problems.³⁰ In fact, in 2007 several human rights groups called on the UN General Assembly to reject Angola's bid to be elected to the U.N. Human Rights Council, citing that it is an authoritarian regime with negative voting records on human rights issues.³¹

Angola is continuously rated as being "Not Free" by Freedom House, citing low civil liberties and political rights.³² Angola ranks 148th on the Human Development Index (HDI), the higher ranking being a better ranking. This categorizes the country in the low human development category.³³ In addition, according to the Failed State Index

³⁰ Peter Stanford, "A Strange Kind of Morality," *New Statesman* (March 2003).

³¹ Edith Lederer, "U.N. to Elect New Members for Council," *Associated Press*, 17 May 2007.

³² Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2013: Angola," last accessed 27 April 2014.

³³ UNDP, "Human Development Report," 2013.

(FSI), Angola also ranks 43rd, the lower ranking being a worse rating.³⁴ As such, this FSI rating warns that Angola is a weak state that has the potential to become a failed state.

Angola has some of the highest quantities of high demand natural resources in Africa. It has extensive petroleum reserves and is on a US watchlist for potential large future crude oil producers.³⁵ The country's mining sector is also very profitable and Angola has some of the most valuable diamond deposits in the world.³⁶

Economically, Angola's situation is slowly improving and its gross domestic product (GDP) is steadily increasing. Angola's growth in GDP can be credited hydrocarbon resources and a major liquefied gas project. Its consumer price index (CPI) has risen 8.6% from the previous year.³⁷

Angola's regulatory weakness and lack of transparency contribute to the bad loans and its negative impacts on the economic outlook for the country. Furthermore, Angola's uneven economic and political development is a problem. Two thirds of the population lives below the poverty line.³⁸ Angola's top export partners are China, US, India and South Africa. China's share of the Angolan export market is 45.8% and remains Angola's primary importer at 47%.³⁹

³⁴ Fund for Peace, "Failed State Index," last accessed 27 April 2014.

³⁵ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Natural Resources in 2020, 2030, and 2040: Implications for the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 25 July 2013), 74.

³⁶ IHS Global Insight, "Country Intelligence Report," *Angola Country Monitor* (March 2014), 14.

³⁷ *Ibid*, 5.

³⁸ United Nations Development Programme. "New Dimensions in Human Security", 41.

³⁹ IHS Global Insight, "Country Intelligence Report," 14.

There are some key statistics that are indicative of Angola's problems and delayed development. The average life expectancy in Angola is 51, one of the lowest in the world. Combined with this, the country has a literacy rate of just over 70% and has a consistently high unemployment rate of 25%.⁴⁰ Moreover, the country is menaced by a corrupt patronage system where 10% of the population lives in prosperity and the remainder live on \$1 a day.⁴¹ Human security in Angola is deplorable. Inadequate access to clean water, a lack of sufficient food combined with a large quantity of landmines spread throughout the country make life for the average citizen extremely harsh.⁴²

Namibia

The situation in Namibia is relatively positive and steadily improving. The country is led by President Pohamba of the SWAPO party, who has been in power since 2005, and the political domination of SWAPO has not been seriously challenged.⁴³ As a result, Namibia's political situation remains stable and it has been rated as "free" by Freedom House continuously since independence.⁴⁴

In regards to good governance, democracy and human rights, Namibia ranks as a top performer in the African continent.⁴⁵ Indeed, Namibia has experienced some impressive growth since its independence, ranking 128th on the HDI. This categorizes the

⁴⁰ IHS Global Insight, "Country Intelligence Report," *Angola Country Monitor* (March 2014), 14.

⁴¹ Peter Stanford, "A Strange Kind of Morality," *New Statesman* (March 2003).

⁴² Alan Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*, 200.

⁴³ R. Kossler, "Images of History and the Nation: Namibia and Zimbabwe Compared," *South African Historical Journal* 62, no.1 (2010), 32.

⁴⁴ Christof Hartmann, "Democracy as a Fortuitous By-Product of Independence," 31.

⁴⁵ Henning Melber, "One Namibia, One Nation? The Caprivi as Contested Territory," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 27, no. 4 (October 2009), 463.

country in the medium human development category.⁴⁶ According to the FSI, Namibia ranks 108th, indicating that the country is stable.⁴⁷

Namibia is blessed with vast mineral resources including diamonds, uranium, copper and gold. Natural gas resources are in their nascent stages of being exploited and the country is suspected to have large oil and coal deposits. It also has the largest fish reserves in southern Africa and has the biggest fishing industry in Africa.⁴⁸ Namibia's export earnings are dominated by commodities such as uranium and diamonds and the mining sector accounts for over 50% of Namibia's GDP.⁴⁹ Namibia's major export market includes the European Union (EU), South Africa, the United Kingdom and the US. The EU has the highest share of the country's export market at 26% whilst Namibia's largest import market is South Africa at 76%.⁵⁰

Namibia's economy is strong with an annual growth rate of approximately 3%.⁵¹ Namibia's unemployment rate remains a topical issue, despite the fact that it has decreased from 37% to 27% in the past few years. The country's mining sector contributes to the growth in the economy, as do a more favourable global environment for doing business with advanced economies such as the US.⁵²

⁴⁶ UNDP, "Human Development Report," 2013.

⁴⁷ Fund for Peace, "Failed State Index," last accessed 27 April 2014.

⁴⁸ IHS Global Insight, "Country Intelligence Report," *Namibia Country Monitor* (March 2014), 17.

⁴⁹ Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, *Rewiring Regional Security in a Fragmented World* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 121.

⁵⁰ IHS Global Insight, "Country Intelligence Report," *Namibia Country Monitor* (March 2014), 14.

⁵¹ Ravinder Rena, "Is Foreign Aid Panacea for African Problems? The Case of Namibia," *Managing Global Transitions* 11, no. 3 (Fall 2003), 233.

⁵² IHS Global Insight, "Country Intelligence Report," *Namibia Country Monitor* (March 2014), 2.

The situation in Namibia is far from perfect and it is not without its share of challenges. Although the literacy rate is just over 76% and the average life expectancy is 64, the Namibian people have many concerns about education opportunity, unemployment, crime and substance abuse.⁵³ Indeed, Namibia has been criticised for having a problem with HIV/AIDs and as of 2007, approximately 15% of the adult population in Namibia have suffered from the effects of HIV/AIDS.⁵⁴

Given the evidence presented in this section, it can be stated that Namibia's current political and economic situation is positive. It can also be stated that Angola's progress lags behind that of Namibia. The following table highlights key statistics of both Angola and Namibia:

⁵³ Wendi Haugh, "A Luta Continua: Coping with Threats to Prosperity and Health in Post-Independence Namibia," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 35, no.1 (March 2009), 106.

⁵⁴ Alan Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*, 337.

	Angola	Namibia
Key Dates	Independence Nov 1975 Peace Apr 2002	Independence Mar 1990 Peace Mar 1990
Population	18.8M	2.3M
GDP	106.7B	12.9B
CPI	8.6%	6.2%
FSI	43	108
HDI	148	128
Literacy	70.4%	76.5%
Life Expectancy	51.5 (41.2 in 1990)	64 (61 in 1990)
HIV Infection	2.3%	13.3%
Unemployment	25%	27.4 %
Resources	Oil, Mining	Fishing, Mining

Figure 1: Country Comparison

The United Nations Missions

The UN-brokered New York peace agreement of 1988 set in motion a series of UN missions in Angola and Namibia.⁵⁵ The following will provide a background on the UN missions in both Angola and Namibia with a view to setting the conditions for further analysis in this paper.

Angola

Although Angola had been ravaged by war since 1975, it was not until late 1988 that the first UN operation was established in the country. The first was United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), later known as UNAVEM I. It was formed on

⁵⁵ Manuel Paulo, "The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process," *The Role of the United Nations* (2004), 28.

3 January 1989 under the authority of UNSC Resolution 626.⁵⁶ The mandate of UNAVEM I was to monitor the withdrawal of Cuban troops and equipment from Angola.

As many as 70 UN observers were deployed to monitor the Cuban withdrawal that was achieved with complete compliance. With the withdrawal of Cuban troops absolute and with the signing of the Bicesse Accord by the Angolan government and UNITA in May 1991, the UN Secretary General reported to the UNSC that UNAVEM I had accomplished its mandate. On 30 May 1991, the mission was terminated.⁵⁷

On that same day the UN adopted Resolution 696, establishing a second UN verification mission in Angola, UNAVEM II. The mandate of UNAVEM II was to verify ceasefire arrangements between the government and UNITA. The ceasefire portion of UNAVEM II's mandate was verified by 350 unarmed military observers. These observers worked with joint monitoring groups comprised of representatives from the Angolan government and UNITA, and provided support in the investigation and resolution of alleged cease-fire violations. The police neutrality portion of the mandate was monitored by 126 police observers. They examined the activities of the Angolan police and investigated alleged violations of political rights.⁵⁸ The budget allocated to UNAVEM II was \$151 million.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ United Nations, "Angola – UNAVEM I," last accessed 7 April 2014.

⁵⁷ Manuel Paulo, "The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process," 28.

⁵⁸ United Nations, "Angola – UNAVEM II," last accessed 7 April 2014.

⁵⁹ Manuel Paulo, "The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process," 29.

Initially there was general compliance by the Angolan government and UNITA. By October 1991, troop assembly, which was to be established and maintained by the government and UNITA, fell seriously behind schedule due to misunderstandings and logistical support. These delays undermined the trust of the two parties and the security atmosphere remained fragile.⁶⁰

In March 1992, UNAVEM II's mandate was expanded to include election observation. The mission's manning was expanded to include an electoral division and various support staff with as many as 400 UNAVEM electoral observers deployed. The election was conducted without incident or any major violence.⁶¹

When Savimbi did not recognize the election results, and the situation began to worsen rapidly. A deteriorating security situation meant that many UNAVEM II personnel were evacuated from their deployed locations and concentrated mainly in Luanda. At this point it was estimated that as many as 1000 Angolans were dying each day as a result of fighting and starvation.⁶²

With its mandate obsolete an outright civil war being waged in Angola, the UNAVEM II mission formally ended on 8 February 1995.

Concurrent with the termination of UNAVEM II, on 8 February 1995, the UNSC authorized the establishment of UNAVEM III. UNAVEM III had a new mandate to assist the Angolan government and UNITA to restore peace and achieve national

⁶⁰ United Nations, "Angola – UNAVEM II," last accessed 7 April 2014.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² African Outlook, "United Nations Tries Hard Line with Savimbi," 8.

reconciliation. The mission was composed of 3,700, 350 military observers, 260 police observers and a variety of other staff.⁶³ Although UNAVEM III established a credible presence in Angola, the implementation of peace fell drastically behind schedule. Once again the Angolan people lost the trust of the UN mission in their country and the mission was terminated on 30 June 1997.⁶⁴

Persevering, the UN established the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) on 30 June 1997 in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1118. The mandate was to take over from UNAVEM III and assist the Angolan government and UNITA in consolidating peace and national reconciliation.⁶⁵ The presence of MONUA in Angola did not curb the violence. Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended in January 1999 the withdrawal of the force in Angola due to the resumption of the civil war and targeting of UN personnel.⁶⁶ As the country found itself in another protracted civil war, and with MONUA proving to be ineffective in restoring peace, the mission's presence continued to draw down. Finally, encouraged by both the Angolan government's and UNITA's request, the mandate was not renewed and on 26 February 1999, the mission was terminated.⁶⁷ This ended the UN's peacekeeping presence in Angola. Three missions had failed to establish peace.

⁶³ United Nations, "Angola – UNAVEM III," last accessed 7 April 2014.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ United Nations, "Angola – MONUA," last accessed 8 April 2014.

⁶⁶ Nicole Winfield, "Annan Urges Withdrawal from Angola," *Associated Press*, 18 January 1999.

⁶⁷ United Nations, "Angola – MONUA," last accessed 8 April 2014.

Namibia

Established in April 1989 under the authority of UNSC Resolution 623, the mission that the UN undertook in Namibia was named the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG).

The foundation for the deployment of UNTAG in April 1989 was the 1988 New York peace agreement between South Africa, Angola and Cuba, and it was UNTAG's job to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement.⁶⁸ Simply stated, the mission's mandate was to keep the peace and monitor the elections and this task would remain unchanged for the duration of the mission.⁶⁹ The mission was comprised of approximately 7,000 military personnel, civil police and monitors. UNTAG's military and civilian personnel were provided from 109 different countries and the mission's budget was \$430 million.⁷⁰

UNTAG was the most ambitious and diverse mandate of any UN mission at the time.⁷¹ UNTAG handled most of the administration of the elections, directly contributing to high election turnout. The mission also established a network of regional offices, daily radio and weekly television programs, which contributed to high profile of UNTAG in

⁶⁸ Paul F. Diehl and Sonia R. Jurado, "United Nations Election Supervision in South Africa: Lessons from the Namibian Peacekeeping Experience," *Terrorism* 16 (1993), 62.

⁶⁹ A. Walter Dorn, Robert Pauk and Emily Cope Burton, "True or False Warning? The United Nations and Threats to Namibia's Independence, 1989," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 26 (2013), 519.

⁷⁰ Manuel Paulo, "The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process," 29.

⁷¹ Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, *The United Nations in the 21st Century* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2012), 127.

Namibia.⁷² They were successful in ensuring the voting was free and fair, and UNTAG was able to observe and verify troop withdrawals and disarmament.

The following table summarizes the UN missions in Angola and Namibia:

	UNAVEM I	UNAVEM II	UNAVEM III	MONUA	UNTAG
Country	Angola				Namibia
Dates	Jan 89 – May 91	May 91 – Feb 95	Feb 95 – Jun 97	Jul 97 – Feb 99	Apr 89 – Mar 90
Mandate*	Monitor withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola	1) Verify ceasefire and monitor Angolan police 2) Election observation	Help parties restore peace and achieve national reconciliation	Help parties restore peace and achieve national reconciliation	Keep the peace and monitor elections
Budget	\$16M	\$151M	\$135M	\$294M	\$430M
Size**	1) 70 military observers	1) 350 military observers 2) 126 police observers 3) 400 electoral observers	1) 3,649 troops 2) 283 military observers 3) 288 civilian police	1) 3,026 troops 2) 253 military observers 3) 289 civilian police	1) 4,493 military personnel 2) 1,500 civilian police 3) 1,000 election support pers
Contributors	10 nations	25 nations	32 nations	36 nations	50 nations***
UN Fatalities	0	5	32	17	19

Figure 2: UN Mission Comparison

*All missions were Chapter VI missions

**Maximum number during the mission

*** Additional 59 countries represented in 2,000 international staff

⁷² Jane Madden, "Namibia: A Lesson for Success." in *Building International Community* (Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1994), 257.

Analyses of the Impact of the United Nations – Two Divergent Trajectories

An analysis of the UN's impact on the state of progression of both Angola and Namibia will now be conducted. A strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis will be used to assess the immediate effect of the UN missions on their respective countries.⁷³ An analysis of the enduring effects of the missions will also be conducted and a comparison between the two countries will be made.




Figure 3: UN Mission & HDI Timelines

⁷³ Terrence Power, *Power's Case Study Analysis and Writer's Handbook* (Toronto: Nelson Education, 2009), 21.

Effectiveness of UN Missions

The missions in Angola will be assessed first. UNAVEM I had many strengths. Its mandate was clear and it had sufficient resources to fulfill its responsibilities. The UN demonstrated impartiality, transparency and restraint enabling the mission to implement a successful peace plan. The only potential weakness of the mission was that it relied on the cooperation of the parties involved and there was a risk that if the situation had deteriorated, the mission lacked the resources to intervene.

UNAVEM I exploited a key opportunity. The parties that were involved in the 1988 New York peace agreement demonstrated political will to adhere to their obligations and UNAVEM I ensured that agreement translated to commitment by these states.

A key threat to UNAVEM I's mission was the adherence of South Africa to its obligation to withdraw from Namibia concurrently as Cuba withdrew from Angola. If South Africa failed to act, the mission could have faced failure.

The strengths of UNAVEM I were such that it was able to successfully exploit the opportunities of the time. The mission's mandate was simple and there was cooperation from all parties involved. The result was that UNAVEM I achieved its mandate and can be declared a success in the first step towards the transition to peace for Angola.

The only real strength of the next mission in Angola, UNAVEM II, was the limited support it had from the UNSC and the contributing nations. As a consequence, the mission was fraught with weaknesses. UNAVEM II had a poorly designed mandate that was limited to overwatch of the joint monitoring groups. The mission was not sufficiently resourced to meet its demands, severely lacking both manpower and budget. Another weakness was the dissatisfaction of the Angolan population with the UN. When Angola returned to war after the elections in 1992, the UNSC reduced the size of UNAVEM II and then withdrew its forces. The Angolan people were not happy and accused the UN of not having the power to intervene.⁷⁴

Although UNAVEM II had the opportunity to build on the success of UNAVEM I, the threats were too many to overcome. First, the peace agreement that UNAVEM II was charged to oversee collapsed. Second, the many UN sanctions against UNITA had little effect on its ability to wage war.⁷⁵

As a result of all of these factors, UNAVEM II failed. UNAVEM II's mandate and resources were inadequate in relation to the complexities of the task at hand. This was especially true in a scenario where the two parties did not demonstrate the will for peace.

The UNAVEM III and MONUA missions were very similar in duration, resources and mandate. For this reason the SWOT analysis of both missions will be

⁷⁴ Manuel Paulo, "The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process," 29.

⁷⁵ United Nations, "Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA," last updated 20 March 2000. http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/angolareport_eng.htm.

conducted concurrently. Notable strengths of these missions included more clear mandates and more resources than UNAVEM II.

The missions both suffered weaknesses that precluded positive outcomes. As with UNAVEM II, the next two missions did not operate in an environment of cooperation. That is, the Angolan government and especially UNITA were unwilling to follow through on prior agreements. Another key weakness of the missions was that some members of UNTAG III and MONUA, were states themselves that did not allow free and fair elections, undermining the credibility and legitimacy of the missions. The lack of credibility as a weakness was especially the case for MONUA, where both the Angolan government and UNITA demanded MONUA's withdrawal.⁷⁶

Unfortunately, the missions had little opportunities to take advantage of. A key threat the perception of a lack of support by the UN and the inability of the mission to inhibit military confrontations meant that both UNAVEM III and MONUA were viewed as being ineffective by Angolans and unable to deal with UNITA's pursuit of power.⁷⁷

As a result of the internal and external factors that both missions faced, UNAVEM III and MONUA were failures. Although both missions were given comprehensive mandates, the lack of resources to meet a rapidly deteriorating security situation in Angola undermined UNAVEM III and MONUA's efforts to prevent open conflict.

⁷⁶ Manuel Paulo, "The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process," 30.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 29.

The UN had a continuous presence in Angola in the 1990's and Angola rates high in regards to the level of UNSC response to an African conflict during that time period, second only to both Rwanda and Ethiopia.⁷⁸ Despite initial success, the UN missions in Angola failed to facilitate a transition to peace. UNAVEM I's success was an example of what can be achieved when the UN receives the full cooperation of all of the parties involved. However, the inability to maintain peace had severely weakened the prospects for a smooth transition to peace.⁷⁹ The final three Angolan missions may have been victims of a saturated the UNSC. During the timeframe of the UN's Angolan missions, the UNSC authorized 17 missions to post-conflict states.⁸⁰ The high op tempo of the UNSC may have severely limited the available number of financial and personnel resources for the Angolan missions.

The UN mission in Namibia will now be analysed. UNTAG had many strengths. Its mandate was clear and was guided by the fundamental principles of consent, impartiality, restraint and the non-use of force except in self-defence. The mission was very well-resourced with a robust budget and cadre of personnel that enhanced the mission's credibility. UNTAG had a firm presence and worked closely with South Africa to implement Namibia's independence plan. The result was an increased confidence amongst the parties and the local population.

⁷⁸ Michele Olivier and Neema Chusi, "Intervention in African Conflicts by the United Nations Security Council," *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 31, no.1 (May 2009), 9.

⁷⁹ Gilbert Khadiagala, "Negotiating Angola's Independence Transition: The Alvor Accords," 304.

⁸⁰ David Malone, *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 73.

Another key strength of UNTAG was that it took key steps to prove its legitimacy and effectiveness. In an effort to showcase impartiality, when investigations into violations were required, UNTAG officials involved SWAPO, South Africa and Angola whenever possible.⁸¹ Also, the civilian presence in UNTAG has been complimented as playing an important role in the success of the mission. UNTAG was UN's first use of UN Civil Police and eventual 1,500 civilian monitors were deployed to assist with the elections. The civilian component is credited with carrying out a variety of key mission tasks with impartiality.⁸²

The UN's presence in Namibia was not without its weaknesses. The UN resolution which provided the foundation for the transition to peace, UNSC Resolution 435, had been enacted 15 years prior and yet nothing had been achieved to date, compromising the UN's credibility in Namibia. The UN mission in Namibia had many opportunities to exploit. All parties were committed to disarmament and demobilization as a crucial component of the peace process. More importantly, the Namibian state inherited a well-functioning bureaucracy that governed the municipal areas and commercial sectors.⁸³ This certainly supported UNTAG's ability to establish peace and administer the elections.

UNTAG's threats were minimal, the main threat being if Cuba did not comply with its obligation to withdraw from Angola. If this has been the case, it is likely that

⁸¹ A. Walter Dorn, Robert Pauk and Emily Cope Burton, "True or False Warning? The United Nations and Threats to Namibia's Independence, 1989," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 26 (2013), 520.

⁸² Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1992/1993), 92.

⁸³ Christof Hartmann, "Democracy as a Fortuitous By-Product of Independence," 30.

South Africa would not have cooperated in Namibia and UNTAG's mission would have been compromised.

The UN's mission in Namibia was a resounding success. Some argue that the success the UN had in Namibia was because the UNSC understood that only deploying troops on the ground was not enough to properly handle the situation.⁸⁴ Sufficient resources and willing participants in the peace process were also critical. UNTAG created and managed the conditions for democratic transition to independence and throughout the UN involvement in Namibia, the legitimacy of international coalitions was not questioned and there were no calls for exit options or protracted missions.⁸⁵

Other Factors for Consideration

To be fair to the UN, there were many other factors which impeded with its ability to facilitate a transition to peace in Angola. Angola witnessed one of the longest running conflicts in Africa and its infrastructure was almost totally destroyed by conflict. The impact during the Angola war was tremendous. At the height of the war in early 2002, over four million Angolans were internally displaced, and a further 450,000 lived in refugee camps in neighbouring countries.⁸⁶

Some have linked the failure of post-Cold War peacekeeping to a variety of factors that are outside of the control of the UN mission in the country. Access to

⁸⁴ Preeti Patel and Paolo Tripodi, "The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Africa," *Contemporary Review* 279, no. 1628 (September 2001), 149.

⁸⁵ Christof Hartmann, "Democracy as a Fortuitous By-Product of Independence," 28.

⁸⁶ Andrea Lari and Rob Kevlihan, "International Human Rights Protection in Situations of Conflict and Post-Conflict: A Case Study of Angola," 29.

lucrative natural resources and nation states whose ethnical polarization has caused violent conflict are two examples of factors that are out of the control of the UN.⁸⁷ Both of these examples apply to the UN's situation in Angola on the 1990s.

Angola could have been, and may still be, suffering from what is described as the “resource curse”, which refers to the potential of instability of a country due to its dependence on the export of natural resources.⁸⁸ Evidence that contributes to this phenomenon is an abnormally low growth rate and a country being less democratic. In Angola's case, its heavy reliance on the export of both oil and diamonds as part of its GDP places the country in this category.

Linking the UN to Current State of Progress

Given the evidence provided, this paper suggests that a key factor in the gap in the current rate of progress of Angola and Namibia is the effectiveness of the UN missions in achieving peace in each of the countries. UNTAG was important for democratic stability in post-war Namibia and because of the UN's success in Namibia, the country was stable for over a decade prior to Angola.⁸⁹ It can be argued that these two factors helped foster an environment for development, democracy and prosperity. The progress of the two countries on the political level can be viewed as supporting evidence and it can be noted that the Namibian political system survived President Nujoma's departure in 2004 whilst Angola has had the same president since 1979.

⁸⁷ Dongsuk Kim, “U.N. Peacekeeping Operations in the post-Cold War Era,” Creighton University. http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/8/2/2/8/pages82280/p82280-1.php.

⁸⁸ Rolan Dannreuther, “The Struggle for Resources: Oil and Water,” In *International Security: The Contemporary Agenda* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 175.

⁸⁹ Christof Hartmann, “Democracy as a Fortuitous By-Product of Independence,” 28.

This paper also highlights that the enduring legacy of UNTAG in Namibia set the conditions for the country's success. The influx of thousands of UN personnel into Namibia from a multitude of countries had a direct and positive impact. Socially, the exposure of Namibians to numerous other nationalities had broadened their perspective. Indeed, UN personnel provide positive role models.⁹⁰ Interestingly, UNTAG was the first UN peacekeeping mission to be universal in terms of membership, being gender-blind in recruiting and distributing staff throughout the country.⁹¹ It can be reasoned that seeing African male and female members of UNTAG in a professional capacity acting in assertive and responsible positions, gave Namibians the confidence to lead and take control of their destiny once the South Africans and UNTAG departed.

Economically, the huge presences of UN personnel relative to the smaller Namibian population provided a boost in the country's economy and forming a base for further growth. The salaries of the UN personnel and the funds from local purchases to support operational and logistics activities provided an economic buffer while the country transitioned to independence.⁹² In addition, after independence Namibia received special treatment from the UN to include increased levels of development assistance for a considerable amount of time.⁹³ This generous financial support from the international community has contributed to the legitimacy of the democratic regime.

⁹⁰ Roger Hearn, *UN Peacekeeping in Action* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1999), 209.

⁹¹ David Malone, *The UN Security Council: From Cold War to the 21st Century*, 421.

⁹² Roger Hearn, *UN Peacekeeping in Action* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1999), 212.

⁹³ Gilles Andreani and Pierre Hassner, *Justifying War? From Humanitarian Intervention to Counterterrorism* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 185.

The trajectories of Namibia and Angola can be broadly linked to their experiences with the UN. The UN mission in Namibia helped establish a strong peace and gave the country a head start to prosperity. Furthermore, the positive impact of UNTAG personnel is an enduring legacy. For Angola, the situation is different. Unfortunately, the success of UNAVEM I did not translate to absolute peace. UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III and MONUA were all inadequately resourced compared to UNTAG and it ultimately led to their failure to enable peace. Without peace, there was no progress.

Conclusion

For Namibia the road to independence led to peace and the UN peacekeeping mission that enabled the transition is considered as having been highly successful. Indeed, UNTAG played a vital role in moving Namibia step by step from war to a cease-fire, full independence, democratic election and political stability. Furthermore, the UN has had an enduring legacy in Namibia and the relatively newly independent country has benefited greatly from it. This stability resulted in the country's ability to develop and progress to its current state.

In the case of Angola, independence resulted in more violence and the journey to peace was long. The Angola missions took place in a country affected by a long civil war, destroyed infrastructure and in the middle of two very strong and mutually suspicious armies. Other than UNAVEM I, the UN missions in Angola failed to secure a peaceful framework. However, there were many factors out of their control.

The UN's intervention in Namibia was successful, its actions in Angola were not. This paper argued that the UN's positive results in Namibia contributed to the country's success as an independent state, resulting in a gap in progress between Namibia and Angola. The UN experience in Namibia demonstrated that a conflict could be peacefully resolved and democratic nation could emerge after a UN peace mission. The result was prosperity. This was not the case with the UN's missions in Angola. That being said, there were many factors in Angola that were out of the control of the missions charged with transitioning the country to peace. In the end, the UN is responsible for Namibia's progress, but it cannot be held responsible for Angola's lack of it.

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