


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Air/Land Integration: A Matter of Trust

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JCSP 40

Exercise Solo Flight

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SOLO FLIGHT

Air/Land Integration: A Matter of Trust

By Maj C.S. Coakwell

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The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is structured such that the Canadian Army (CA) does not have its own integral tactical aviation. Aviation support to the CA is provided by the Royal Canadian Air Force's (RCAF) CH146 Griffon utility and CH147 Chinook transport helicopters, belonging to the RCAF's 1 Wing. These aviation assets are responsible for the provision of aerial firepower, reconnaissance, and mobility; supporting CA units in the conduct of full spectrum operations.¹ While these assets are generally intended to support CA training and operations, the placement of the tactical aviation under the RCAF pose some considerable organizational challenges that adversely impact Air/Land Integration (ALI)².

The decision for land force commanders to utilize tactical aviation for the conduct of operational missions involves risk. While aviation provides benefits such as speed of execution, surprise, and the ability to bypass complex terrain, the support relationship involves the relinquishment of control for the land force commander. Missions involving the lift of personnel and supplies require the air movement phase almost under complete control of the aviation unit and its aircrew. As well, once committed to conducting a mission with aviation, unique factors such as the impact of adverse weather, aircraft serviceability and vulnerability to adversarial weapons become key considerations. Land force commanders often have ground manoeuvre options, therefore in order for the benefits of aviation to be capitalized upon, as noted by Stouffer and Mantle, there must be a high level of trust between the organizations to effectively mitigate the associated risk.³

¹ Canada, Department of National Defence, *B-GA-441-001/FP-001 Tactical Level Aviation Doctrine* (Kingston, ON: 1 Wing, 2000), 1-1.

² ALI describes the integration of Air and Land forces and effects into synchronized and coordinated joint operations. While ALI covers the full spectrum of Air and Aviation assets integrating with land forces, this essay will solely focus on the integration of Canadian tactical aviation with CA formations and units.

³ Jeff Stouffer and Craig Mantle, eds., *In Harm's Way: Leveraging Trust - A Force Multiplier for Today* (Winnipeg, MB: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2008), 44.

The United States Army, the British Army and the United States Marine Corps (USMC) all have integral aviation assets to support their land forces. Unlike these organizations, in Canada the RCAF, under a completely separate chain of command, provides aviation support to the CA. However, conflicting priorities for the utilization of the limited number of aviation assets often arise. The separation between the organizations and the conflicting priorities often result in the loss of collective training opportunities between the CA and the tactical aviation community. With this loss of shared experience, the development of trust is difficult to achieve as stereotypes and cultural differences become more predominant.⁴

These factors have resulted subsequently resulted in insufficient trust between the CA and the Tactical Aviation community to properly effect ALI. Efforts must be made at all levels of the CA and RCAF to address this trust deficiency and to reduce the cultural differences between the organizations.⁵ Through the use of trust theory this essay seeks to identify the specific issues that have resulted in trust deficiencies between the CA and the RCAF and to suggest possible solutions which might build the necessary trust.

BACKGROUND

Prior to the Canadian Forces (CF) Unification in 1968, the CA Army operated its own integral transport and reconnaissance helicopters. Following Unification, all air and aviation assets dedicated to the support of the land forces were placed under Mobile Command, which

⁴ Allister MacIntyre, "Stereotypes," in [The Military Leadership Handbook] (Ottawa, ON: Dundurn Press, 2008), 474.

⁵ *Trust in Military Teams* describes the magnitude of cultural differences as "cultural distance". The greater the distance between two organizations the more challenging it is for the trustor to make accurate judgments and develop a favourable opinion of the trustee.

was established as a joint command that included all assets capable of expeditionary deployment. Budgetary constraints and the interest of gaining aerospace power unity resulted in the creation of Air Command in 1975, in which all rotary- and fixed-wing assets in the CF were placed under one organization.⁶ While the single command provided unity of effort and aircrew training efficiencies, it also represented the beginning of the separation of Tactical Aviation from the land force.

In the mid-1990s, the CH136 Kiowa, CH136 Twin Huey, and CH147 Chinook helicopters which comprised the Tactical Aviation fleet were replaced by the CH146 Griffon helicopter. The replacement of three specialized aircraft with a single utility helicopter resulted in a significant loss of capability to the land forces. The Griffon, a capable aircraft, has provided utility support domestically, as well as abroad on peacekeeping missions. However, the lack of a “balanced” helicopter fleet resulted in 1 Wing struggling to meet the aviation requirements of the land force.⁷ Due to a lack of CA appreciation of the Griffon’s capabilities, it earned the reputation for many land force officers of being an “air taxi”, solely used for the movement of high ranking officers. The CA did not see the Griffon as a key manoeuvre, reconnaissance, and fire support asset, which is indicative of the lack of integration and inadequate understanding of its capabilities. When the land force deployed to Afghanistan as part of Op APOLLO in 2001, they did so without tactical aviation.

The 2008 report from the *Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan*⁸ included a recommendation to provide helicopter support in order to mitigate the threat to

⁶ Allan English and John Westrop, *Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command: The Human Dimension of Expeditionary Air Force Operations* (Trenton, ON: Canadian Forces Air Warfare Centre, 2007), 267.

⁷ As indicated in Project LAMINAR STRIKE, the “balanced” term has been utilized to describe the ability to exploit the full range of mission capabilities of helicopters.

⁸ Also known as the “Manley Report”.

Canadian soldiers from improvised explosive devices (IEDs).⁹ The purchase of six CH-47D Chinook helicopters from the United States Army for operations in Afghanistan provided the opportunity to deploy the Griffon as an aerial escort platform. The deployment of the Griffon also allowed the RCAF to display the Griffon's ability to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), as well as fire support tasks. Two years of aviation support in Afghanistan resulted in the reduction of cultural distance between the CA and the RCAF, with the land force gaining a better appreciation of how tactical aviation can support their operations.

While Afghanistan provided excellent inroads to improve ALI, the benefits were temporal and made to a relatively small portion of the CA. Upon the cessation of combat operations, 1 Wing units returned to routine operations where the limited numbers of helicopters were challenged with meeting the aviation requirements of the CA. While those at the line aviation units worked diligently to maintain the integration and support, competing priorities and initiatives from within the RCAF have hampered these efforts.

Recent RCAF initiatives have sought to bring the disparate aircraft communities closer to operate together in the interest of economy of effort and cooperation. Concepts such as "Air-Air Integration" and "Fly in Formation" have become buzzwords that describe the RCAF initiatives.¹⁰ In line with these initiatives was the creation of an RCAF expeditionary support concept¹¹, which would provide common support to any RCAF assets that deploy domestically or internationally. While these initiatives are viable in principle, an adverse effect was that they

⁹ John Manley, *The Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan* (Ottawa, ON: Public Works and Government Services, [2008]).

¹⁰ While "Air-Air Integration" appears to be no longer utilized by senior RCAF leadership, "Fly in Formation" is currently in use by the Commander 1 Canadian Air Division in "3000-2 (DComd 1 CAD) Commander 1 Canadian Air Division Guidance FY 13/14, October 2013".

¹¹ The Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) provides RCAF command and control functions as well as support to deployed aircraft.

were implemented often at the expense of ALI. Tactical aviation units, one of the few RCAF communities capable of operating in austere environments, were often utilized as “training aids” for the development and validation of the Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) during major collective training exercises. At times when tactical aviation units should have been deploying forward into the field to form close working relationships with CA units, they were held back at static airfield locations for the benefit of AEW training objectives.¹² The efforts made to increase cooperation within the RCAF often resulted in an internal focus, with less attention paid to supporting joint training. In many ways this is similar to the approach of the United States Air Force (USAF), whose focus was placed on strategic bombing after World War II. Tactical support to the United States Army was considered to be a low priority, contributing to a large cultural distance and similar lack of trust between the two organizations.¹³

ANALYSIS OF TRUST IN ALI

Many articles focused on the study of trust have been written within the last twenty years to understand the factors in inter- and intra-organizational effectiveness. A social science concept, trust has been studied as a means to improve the effectiveness of communication and collaboration. The trust definition provided by Mayer, Davis and Schoorman is well suited to the ALI scenario as it highlights the vulnerability experienced when CA commanders commit to using aviation to conduct their missions:

¹² Personal experience from the author during Exercise MAPLE RESOLVE 2013. In order to exercise the Air Expeditionary Wing 408 Squadron was directed to remain at Wainwright Airfield 21 rather than basing in proximity to 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1 CMBG) and the High Readiness Battle Group. If 408 Squadron had been able to forward deploy with 1 CMBG it would have provided excellent collective training opportunities that would of provided responsive support to the CA units training in the “near peer” training environment.

¹³ James Bradin, *From Hot Air to Hellfire: The History of Army Attack Aviation* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994), 86.

Trust is the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party.¹⁴

In order for land force units to commit to utilizing tactical aviation, an adequate level of trust between the organizations is required. As stated in *An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust*, “trust is the willingness to assume risk.”¹⁵ When trust is established, the benefits of using aviation can be leveraged as land force commanders deem the integration risk as being manageable. For example, if a commander trusts an aviation unit in the conduct of reconnaissance tasks he may be willing to trust the unit to provide flank security for his forces. The flank reconnaissance task may be critical the commander, but by trusting the aviation unit to conduct the task it may allow the use of unique airborne capabilities and will free up his/her unit assets for other tasks.

Inadequate numbers of helicopters available to conduct force generation activities with all CA units have prevented the opportunity for its officers and NCMs to regularly train with tactical aviation units.¹⁶ This lack of common shared experience impedes the establishment of trust; personal relationships are non-existent or in their infancy and the units have large cultural distances between them. One may consider for the tactical aviation community to be regarded as another manoeuvre element, in the same fashion as the CA views its armoured forces, as the highest order of trust. Armoured forces train regularly with their fellow combat arms units and they are an integral part of the deployed battle group construct in expeditionary operations. If and when this level of trust is ever accomplished between tactical aviation and the CA, the transition

¹⁴ Roger Mayer, James Davis and David Schoorman, "An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust," *The Academy of Management Review* 20, no. 3 (1995), 709.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Tactical aviation support to the three Regular Force Mechanized Brigade Groups in Canada is generally provided by two line tactical aviation squadrons: 408 and 430. Although relatively close relationships are formed between the squadrons and their affiliated brigades, the tactical aviation units are often occupied with national taskings and their own force generation, often precluding the provision of intimate support.

will be complete from an external support element to a well-integrated part of the combined arms team.¹⁷

Stouffer, Sartori, and Thompson provide a framework that describes trust as containing the following dimensions: competence, predictability, integrity, and benevolence.¹⁸ In order for trust to be achieved, either all or some of these dimensions must be satisfied. Each dimension will be described within the context of ALI, with emphasis placed on competence and predictability due to the relevance within an intra-organizational context.

Competence

Competence relates to the “belief in another’s skill, ability and/or knowledge to accomplish a valued or needed task or goal”.¹⁹ In order for trust to be achieved, the trustor must have a favourable belief that the trustee has adequate competence in the performance of a particular task. The most effective means to establish trust would be through shared experience on collective training exercises involving the CA and tactical aviation. Favourable experiences would allow for a better understanding of the benefits of utilizing aviation, which would facilitate the trust required for future consideration. However, given the relatively small number of helicopters available to support CA training and operations and budgetary cutbacks resources to conduct collective exercises have become extremely limited. In order to reduce the cultural distance and increase trust other linkages must be formed.

¹⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Land Force Doctrine and Training Systems, 2008).

¹⁸ Jeff Stouffer, Jessica Sartori and Michael Thompson, *The Military Leadership Handbook*, ed. Bernd Horn (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press/Dundurn Press, 2008), 525.

¹⁹ Jeff Stouffer et al., "Trust," in *The Military Leadership Handbook* (Toronto, ON: Dundurn Press, 2008), 525.

Competence through Aviation Exposure Training

As previously defined, the trustor must *believe* that a task will be accomplished in a particular way. An issue that routinely occurs with CA officers is that as they do not have the opportunity to regularly train with aviation, they often do not even know what types of support can be provided. Exposure through formal training in the use of aviation would provide a detailed and thorough means to ensure CA officers are made aware of the capabilities and intricacies of tactical aviation. Speaking on the topic of ALI and the interaction between the Royal Air Force and the British Army, Brigadier Rob Weighill stated “mutual inter-Service empathy is essential if we want to develop trust and improve integration, in both directions.”²⁰ Wing Commander Graeme Davis described a similar requirement: “With better education and understanding we can recognise the frictions and overcome the frustrations that seduce us beyond the boundaries of healthy inter-service banter.”²¹

In order to prepare a CA junior officer for the utilization of tactical aviation, they must be exposed to the specific capabilities, tactics and mission planning procedures that are utilized. This detail would provide the CA junior officer with the knowledge to be better prepared to utilize aviation as they would have greater knowledge in the capabilities and potential employment options. This increased knowledge would then provide the basis for discussion to occur, after which an additional competence determination could be made of the aviation unit’s capabilities. Prior to promotion to Major, CA officers should be exposed to the following topics:

- Aviation specific planning principles (utilization of CA Battle Procedure, with emphasis on aviation specific factors and products generated);

²⁰ Rob Weighill, "Air/Land Integration - the View from Mars," *Royal United Services Institute Defence Systems* (February 2009, 2009), 53.

²¹ Gaeme Davis, "Air/Land Integration: A Venusian View from Mars," *Royal United Services Institute Defence Systems* (October 2009, 2009), 78.

- Further exposure to aviation characteristics and limitations (with additional detail provided to provide the rationale behind them);
- Exposure to aviation tactics, techniques and procedures (TT&Ps) including airmobile, reconnaissance, overwatch and escort; and
- Exposure to tactical aviation weapons and ISR equipment (i.e. GAU-21, M134, and MX-15).

The Army Tactical Operations Course (ATOC) would provide the best opportunity for tactical aviation exposure for CA junior officers.²² The course is designed to provide participants the knowledge and skills required to operate within or in support of Combat Team sub-unit operations. With a target audience of senior lieutenants and junior Captains and conducted with a combination of distributed learning and practical exercises the course would be a viable venue to increase exposure to tactical aviation operations. Having been exposed to tactical aviation operations, CA officers would be better prepared to seek out tactical aviation support during collective training exercises as uncertainty regarding its effectiveness would be reduced. Promoting tactical aviation with the CA officer cadre would provide a considerable amount of ALI benefit; however more work would need to be done to address stereotypes which contribute to cultural distance at all rank levels.

Competence through RCAF Soldier Skills Training

The concept of “category-based trust” is well suited for ALI discussions as it suggests that trustor opinions are influenced depending on the organization or group to which the trustee belongs.²³ Characteristics of a particular group contribute to pre-conceived opinions that are made of that group. For example, CA personnel may consider RCAF personnel to act or perform

²² Canada, Department of National Defence, *Army Tactical Operations Course (Combat Arms)* (Kingston, ON: Land Force Doctrine and Training System, 2005).

²³ Stouffer et al., *Trust*, 529.

in a certain manner, even in the absence of direct contact with these individuals.²⁴ These category-based expectations contribute to preconceived notions of trustworthiness and pose a challenge to be overcome when attempting to integrate separate organizations, as with ALI. Category-based trust is inversely related to cultural distance; the greater the distance the less likely that trust can be achieved during initial integration opportunities. Basic soldier skills are an area that all land force personnel are expected to have competency. The ability to move, shoot, communicate, and live in an austere, non-permissive environment is considered foundational training and this provides a rubric from which competency levels of others can be assessed. When RCAF tactical aviation personnel operate in an austere field environment, their typical lack of competency in these basic soldier skills contribute to adverse stereotypes and influence category-based trust. Efforts must be taken to address these training deficiencies to aid in the establishment of trust.

All CA officers and non-commissioned members (NCMs) attend the Basic Military Officer Qualification – Land (BMOQ-L)²⁵ and Basic Military Qualification – Land (BMQ-L)²⁶ respectively. These courses provide the common foundational knowledge and skills that are required before the individual specializes for their particular occupation (i.e. infantry, logistics, etc.). Due to differences in priorities for individual training, RCAF tactical aviation personnel often do not receive training of this nature until they are posted to a tactical aviation unit; typically they are expected to learn these skills while in the midst of collective training exercises. This detracts from the exercises' main focus – integration with supported land force units.

²⁴ Barbara Adams and Robert Webb, *Trust Development in Small Teams* (Toronto, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada - Toronto, 2003), 41.

²⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Basic Military Officer Qualification - Land Training Plan* (Kingston, ON: Land Force Doctrine and Training System, 2006).

²⁶ Canada. Department of National Defence, *NCM DP1 Basic Military Qualification Land (BMQ-L)* (Kingston, ON: Land Force Doctrine and Training System, 2014).

During these collective training exercises, the lack of competence in individual soldier skills often contributes to negative opinions, which subsequently increases cultural distance and impedes ALI. As tactical aviation personnel are often expected to integrate with land force units (e.g. Aviation Liaison Officers detached to an infantry company, aircraft technicians conducting a road move with land force escort, etc.), formalized training will increase competency levels, which will aid in the establishment of trust.

In order to address this issue across 1 Wing, standardized training should be conducted for all personnel before they are declared operational. By creating an entry level course it will ensure that a common standard across 1 Wing is established. At a minimum the training should include the following training objectives:

- Field craft (including field hygiene, basic bivouac setup and operations);
- Weapons training (utilizing weapons available within tactical aviation units);
- Navigation (dismounted and vehicular, day and night);
- Convoy drills (basic convoy operations and actions on contact);
- Radio voice procedure and radio operation; and
- Ground tactics (section level patrolling and defensive positions).

The ideal option from a training and integration perspective would be the requirement for personnel to attend a common course along with CA personnel. Options such as BMOC-L and BMQ-L would provide a common standard of training and would allow for personal contacts to be made in the same manner as conducted by the United States Marine Corps (USMC).²⁷ As stated by Colonel Bernd Horn, “The bonds of trust that are forged over time are not built on rank

²⁷ In the USMC all officers (including pilots) attend a six month Basic Infantry Course prior to proceeding on their specific occupation training. This provides USMC pilots an excellent perspective to understand the support requirements of the infantry and allows for relationships to be formed which aid in integration efforts.

or affiliation, but rather developed out of shared experience.”²⁸ However, the long length of these courses would likely result in them not being considered viable.

A compromise in terms of length of training would be to have 1 Wing conduct a separate course that is specifically tailored for those selected for employment within a tactical aviation unit. The BMQ-L course provides a scalable format that additional training objectives could be taught, while focusing on areas more pertinent to tactical aviation personnel. For example, more attention could be paid towards field skills and convoy operations, while time could be saved by eliminating or reducing weapons training that is not applicable to tactical aviation units. The CA training publications could be utilized as the standard in order to allow for a common standard, but the training adjusted to focus in the appropriate areas.

The creation of dedicated soldier skills training would display a clear indication of RCAF commitment in the interest of integration with the CA. As stated in *Trust in Organizational Life*, “commitment is a foundation attribute for trustworthiness.”²⁹ The display of proficiency in field skills would allow tactical aviation personnel to gain respect from their CA counter-parts and reduce the cultural distance at all levels. While demonstration of competence will contribute to ALI, the CA must also be able to expect a particular organizational framework from the RCAF in order to minimize friction.

²⁸ Bernd Horn, "Trust: The Crucible of Success in Command," in *In Harm's Way: Leveraging Trust - A Force Multiplier for Today*, eds. Jeff Stouffer and Craig Mantle (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2008), 87.

²⁹ Gilbert Fairholm, *Leadership and the Culture of Trust* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 236.

Predictability

Predictability, in the context of trust, is defined by the reliable anticipation of the reactions and behaviours of others.³⁰ In this case the trustor assumes that a particular outcome can be achieved and assumes risk accordingly. Shared experience through collective exercises and aviation exposure training for CA officers will increase trust as the supported land force commanders will have a better appreciation of the potential outcomes. It is important to note that the appreciation of potential outcomes is not limited to mission success. Aviation specific risks must also be considered in order to allow for trust to be established and maintained. A thorough understanding of potential issues and contingency plans to mitigate them will reduce potential friction between the organizations and preserve close working relations.

Increased Predictability through RCAF Doctrine Updates

From a macro perspective, the CA must be confident in the quality and nature of the operational output provided by the tactical aviation community. The types of aviation support provided and tactics and equipment employed must be relatively static, with CA stakeholder involvement in the development of any updates or changes. The maintenance of a particular nature of support will minimize surprises, and maximize predictability in training and operations, contributing to the establishment of trust. Predictability in terms of command and control arrangements will also aid in the development of trust. If similar command and control frameworks are utilized when ALI activities occur, it will result in establishment of a known entity into which the land force interacts with. RCAF doctrine exists to provide the over-arching framework for topics such as command and control, however it has been written with a “one-

³⁰ Stouffer, Sartori and Thompson, 525.

size-fits-all” approach and needs to be updated to provide additional detail regarding the employment of tactical aviation. As stated by Air Chief Marshal Sir Clive Loader, “For success and coherence in Joint operations, sound comprehensive doctrine is required.”³¹

The *B-GA-400 Aerospace Doctrine* describes the concept of “centralized control, decentralized execution”, which the RCAF applies in order to ensure air and aviation effects are focused in appropriate areas in order to achieve decisive effects.³² It also states that aerospace forces “are coordinated and directed at the operational level by a single air commander” and that within a joint or combined operation the Canadian Air Component commander will advise the theatre or joint task force commander as the “appropriate air command and control structure.”³³ This command and control framework is far too generic and lends itself to misinterpretation by those not aware of the operational intricacies of unique communities such as tactical aviation. With the potential for misinterpretation there exists the opportunity for unpredictability, with the resultant impact on organizational trust.

Control of aerospace assets at the operational level (i.e. taskings provided by a Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) through an Air Tasking Order (ATO)) is appropriate for many fixed wing assets as their speed and endurance allows them to have an operational influence over a much larger area. It also ensures that limited air assets can be assigned according to operational level priorities. However, rotary wing assets such as tactical aviation are limited to a much smaller geographical area. In addition, the nature of the tasks that they support requires close coordination with the land force component. Those unfamiliar with tactical aviation and the

³¹ Clive Loader, "Is True Air/Land Integration Achievable?" *Royal United Services Institute Defence Systems* (February 2009, 2009).

³² Canada, Department of National Defence, *B-GA-400-000/FP-000 Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine*, 2010), 58.

³³ *Ibid.*

requirement for close ties to the land force may apply the doctrine verbatim and attempt to control tactical aviation at the operational level as part of the RCAF or coalition air component chain of command. Although in line with the RCAF doctrine, this is contrary to how tactical aviation normally operates, as there is often an argument to have the helicopters directly controlled by the land component. *Project LAMINAR STRIKE* provides observations and lessons learned from the employment of RCAF assets in Afghanistan. As noted in its comments regarding command and control, "... tactical aviation must be 100 per cent interoperable and integrated with the land force. This causes a structure that apparently can be at odds with traditional Air Force wing HQs."³⁴ While RCAF or air component oversight of tactical aviation provides economy of effort and logistical efficiency, close relationships with land forces must be fostered to increase responsiveness to support requests. Close liaison and a short "request to task acceptance" process will allow tactical aviation to closely integrate with land force operations, increasing trust and showcasing the unique support that helicopters can provide.

The generic command and control approach in the B-GA-400 requires updates that include mention of the special nature of command and control for tactical aviation. The current doctrine allows for a wide spectrum of interpretation of the proper command and control framework to employ with tactical aviation, which decreases predictability when ALI attempts are made. The unique considerations for tactical aviation need to be included in the RCAF doctrine in order to standardize the command and control frameworks that could be utilized in training or on operations.

³⁴ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Project LAMINAR STRIKE. Canada's Air Force: Post Op ATHENA* (Trenton, ON: CFAWC, 2011), 26.

The B-GA-404-000/FP-001 *Canadian Forces Aerospace Move Doctrine* provides the operational level pertaining to the RCAF Move function and it provides an example of the specific requirements for tactical aviation. In the section discussing Airmobile operations it provides a comment regarding the responsiveness of helicopters to support land forces: “To facilitate achieving the initiative over the enemy and gaining freedom of action, the land force needs to have these assets under their operational control rather than requesting support (which requires time) from another commander.”³⁵ Although this comment is for a specific type of operation, typically of short duration, this represents the type of detail that is required in the B-GA-400 to capture the intricacies of tactical aviation command and control. By stating that is acceptable to delegate control authority to a land force formation or unit, it recognizes the close working relationship and prevents inappropriate control frameworks which may be implemented in the interest of “flying in formation”.

A note should be added to the end of the command and control section of the B-GA-400 to provide a caveat for the unique characteristics of the tactical aviation community. The following proposed addition would provide the opportunity for closer relationships with the land force, and contribute to predictability:

Centralized control of air and aviation assets contributes to their allocation according to priorities at the operational level. However, consideration should be made towards considering the unique working relationship between the tactical aviation community and land forces when designing command and control frameworks. In order to increase tactical aviation responsiveness, consideration should be made to assign command relationships such as operational control or tactical command to land forces. During high tempo operations these command relationships will allow for closer integration and increased effectiveness.

³⁵ Canada. Department of National Defence, *B-GA-404-000/FP-001 Canadian Forces Aerospace Move Doctrine* (Trenton, ON: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 2011), 24.

The establishment of an RCAF-wide acceptance of the assignment of control of tactical aviation assets to land forces will allow for increased predictability. Over time there would be fewer doctrinal misinterpretations and a reduced probability of adverse influence to command and control frameworks that are conducive to ALI. Improved predictability regarding the CA to tactical aviation interface will contribute to forming closer bonds and increased trust.

Integrity

Integrity is described as “flowing from values-based ethical behaviour”.³⁶ For the purposes of this discussion, the impact of ethical behaviour on trust was not considered in detail. Within an ALI context the assumption can be made that as part of a professional military organization both the CA and tactical aviation communities will generally act in an ethical manner. Obviously any non-ethical behaviour by those within either of the organizations would result in the established trust being eroded considerably. As they provide the overarching ethical expectations and norms, pan-CAF ethical programs and publications continue to provide the best venue to promote ethical behaviour.³⁷

Benevolence

Benevolence is described as “showing a genuine concern for the trustor independent of self-interest”.³⁸ Although there is a considerable amount of cultural distance between the organizations there is no evidence of overt animosity. As military professionals the assumption is made that both organizations would generally display a genuine concern regardless of their own interests.

³⁶ Stouffer et al., *Trust*, 531.

³⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, 2003), 24.

³⁸ Stouffer et al., *Trust*, 531

CONCLUSION

As proven in combat in Afghanistan, the potential exists for the Canadian tactical aviation community to achieve integration with the land force. Focused training and an operational imperative set the conditions for close relationships to be forged through shared experience. Over time, and often in precarious situations, tactical aviation provided support to land forces; capabilities were proven and trust established. However, after the cessation of operations in Afghanistan and the prospect of budgetary cutbacks, this momentum is dwindling.

Stouffer, Sartori, and Thompson's trust dimensions of competence and predictability provide two areas where efforts could be focused in order to maximize ALI. The RCAF and CA senior leadership need to devote resources and training time to increase trust levels in these areas in order to allow tactical aviation to contribute as a well-integrated force multiplier. CA officers should be provided the opportunity to learn about the employment of tactical aviation in a formal training environment. Conversely, RCAF personnel should be provided the opportunity to conduct training that sets the condition for their success on deployment to austere locations. Finally, the RCAF needs to recognize the close relationship that needs to be fostered between tactical aviation and the CA. Doctrine needs to be updated to reflect this relationship and to allow for a predictable interface between the organizations.

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