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WICKED MYTH

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JCSP 40

Exercise Solo Flight

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EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT*

WICKED MYTH

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WICKED MYTH

I am also convinced that in every situation, nothing is as fast as the speed of trust. And contrary to popular belief, trust is something you can do something about. In fact, you can get good at creating it!

- Stephen M.R. Covey, *The Speed of Trust – The One Thing That Changes Everything*

Canadian defence procurement is a wicked process. With average project delivery times of 17.6 years,¹ billions of taxpayer dollars (nearly \$3 billion earmarked just for Fiscal Year 2013-2015),² partisan politics, paralytic bureaucratic processes, numerous stakeholders and a changing threat environment, providing Canada's next fleet of fighter aircraft or warships seems like an impossible dream. For a number of reasons, "Canadian governments generally prefer to avoid making hard choices on defence."³ This is further exacerbated by a "legal and policy procurement framework [that] is more complex than that of any other nation."⁴ The primary reason may be due to the government's policy process happening "in an environment that is as much a chaotic marketplace as a planned system."⁵ Author Douglas Bland has even suggested that the unsolvable issues with Canadian defence procurement were due to bureaucracy: "Canadian defence procurement cannot be fixed because it is complicated but it is only complicated because of the

¹ Canada: Department of National Defence. *Project Approval Directive*. Section A. <http://vcds.mil.ca/sites/intranet-eng.aspx?page=17964>

² Canada: Departmental Performance Report. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, represented by the Minister of National Defence Canada, 2014. Catalogue Number D3-32/2014E-PDF ISSN 2292-9576 http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/dnd-dpr_2013-14.pdf, 21.

³ David S. McDonough in Alan S. Williams, *Canada, Democracy and the F-35*. Kingston: The Claxton papers, Defence Management Studies Program, 2012.

⁴ Aaron Plamondon, *The Politics of Procurement: Military Acquisition in Canada and the Sea King Helicopter* (Vancouver : UBC Press. 2010), 3.

⁵ Glen Milne, *Making Policy: A Guide to the Federal Government's Policy Process* (Ottawa: Cognitus Associates, 2014), 1.

unnecessary bureaucratic complexity that manages the process day-by-day.”⁶ Contrarily, the Department of National Defence’s former Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) Alan S. Williams bluntly states: “The government has not been honest with Canadians. If we cannot trust the government on this [Next Generation Fighter] file, how can we trust it on other files? Canadians need to be able to trust our politicians.”⁷

Whether the root causes of Canada’s procurement woes are people, policies or processes, the “particularly complex, persistent and resistant”⁸ characteristics of acquiring military hardware, arguably present the appearance of a classic *wicked problem*. American writer Andrew Cranston would agree:

In addressing wicked problems, it becomes evident that the solutions required hold similar characteristics to the problems themselves: there are no predetermined bounded data sets, no decisive methodologies and all solutions are linked to other solutions. For the procurement process to be successful in addressing these problems, the existing commercial structures will clearly have to undergo radical changes.⁹

Although *wicked problems* are normally associated with complex social policies and issues such as healthcare, the environment and poverty, they may also “include nearly all public policy issues—whether the question concerns the location of a freeway, the adjustment of a tax rate, the modification of school curricula, or the confrontation of crime.”¹⁰ *Wicked problems* also exist in the geopolitical sphere, such as in the Asia Pacific region, where “regional countries are not in agreement on a definition of maritime

⁶ Alan S. Williams, *Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement-A View From the Inside* (Kingston: Breakout Educational Network, 2006), xvi.

⁷ Alan S. Williams, “Canada, Democracy and The F-35” (Kingston: The Claxton papers, Defence Management Studies Program, 2012), Forward.

⁸ Val Morrison, “Wicked Problems and Public Policy.” *National Collaborating Centre for Healthy Public Policy* (June 2013), 1.

⁹ Andrew Cranfield, “Some Further Thoughts on Addressing ‘Wicked Problems’”, *The RUSI Journal*, (152:6, 2007), 5.

¹⁰ Horst W.J. Rittel, and Melvin M. Webber. “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning.” *Policy Sciences* 4, no. 2 (June 1973), 160.

security.”¹¹ Defence procurement, at its core, is public policy and therefore becomes a candidate for *wicked problem* status. Hence, a detailed understanding of the origins and nature of wicked problems is necessary in order to consider whether or not defence procurement meets the same criteria.

First introduced by Horst Rittel and Marvin Webber¹² in the early 1970s and based on their studies regarding urban planning and solutions, *wicked problems* were described as problems with “definitive formulation and therefore cannot be treated like the classic problems of engineering or mathematics, for example.”¹³ “Wicked”, meaning malignant, vicious, tricky or aggressive,¹⁴ related to problems possessing ten basic characteristics, summarized as follows: they are unique, unstable, difficult to define, have no end state, are often interconnected with other problems and each solution usually triggers unintended consequences. Moreover, “wicked problems involve fundamental differences between stakeholders, who typically have deeply held convictions about the correctness of their own position.”¹⁵ Regardless of the complexities inherent in defence procurement and their striking similarities with *wicked problems*, which at times creates an illusion, this essay aims to demonstrate that Canadian military acquisitions are categorically not *wicked problems* and can be easily overcome by elected officials. While “planning problems are inherently wicked,”¹⁶ defence procurement is rather a thinly

¹¹ Sam Bateman, "Solving the 'Wicked Problems' of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to the Task?" *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs* 33, no. 1 (2011), 2.

¹² Jeff Conklin, *Wicked Problems and Social Complexity* (2001-2010 CogNexus Institute), 7.

¹³ Morrison, "Wicked Problems and Public Policy" . . . , 1.1.

¹⁴ Rittel and Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning" . . . , 160.

¹⁵ Bateman, "Solving the 'Wicked Problems' of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to the Task?" . . . , 2.

¹⁶ Rittel and Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning" . . . , 160.

disguised, inflexible process model, designed to substitute trust and openness between political, bureaucratic and military actors, with an artificial accountability framework.

Despite being overwhelmingly complex, the face of defence procurement has remained largely unchanged since the First World War:

Although the steps have been given different names over time, the procurement process has essentially included a definition of military requirement; validation of the requirement; government approval of the project, including funding; creation of an official Statement of Requirement (SOR); selection of a procurement strategy; bid solicitation and source selection; negotiation and award of contract, with the possible inclusion of another for long term In-Service Support (ISS); administration of the contract to purchase the piece of equipment decided on; and finally delivery of the product.¹⁷

Consequently, while appearing relatively straightforward, defence procurement is far from simple. Moreover, the sheer costs and complexity of military equipment necessitates important government policy decisions *before* any commitments are made and this permission may be required again at each procurement gate, in the form of lengthy Memoranda to Cabinet. “Defence procurement is conducted in a unique environment with some very distinguishing features.”¹⁸ These features include parallel military, bureaucratic and political activities, which are often very disjointed and may often conflict. The military is focused on understanding government policy and determining “what [military effects] will need to be achieved in the future and the choices available to achieve it.”¹⁹ As well, “members of the military, many of whom understandably do not completely trust civilians to deliver what they need, are motivated

¹⁷ Plamondon, *The Politics of Procurement: Military Acquisition in Canada and the Sea King Helicopter* . . . , 3.

¹⁸ Craig Stone, “Defence Procurement and the Need For Disciplined Capital Investment.” In *The Public Management of Defence*, edited by J.C. Stone. (Toronto: Breakout Education, 2009), 95.

¹⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Capability-Based Planning Handbook*. (Ottawa: Chief of Force Development, 2014), 10.

to get as much of the best equipment possible as fast as they can.”²⁰ Bureaucrats are preoccupied with the machinery of procurement, financial management and “providing value for money and demonstrating sound stewardship in program delivery.”²¹ Politicians exercise power as ministers of the Crown and have legislated responsibility for the security and economic prosperity of the country. This entails responding to the demands of the electorate, making hard choices regarding discretionary spending and ensuring a viable and sustainable future for all Canadians. Defence procurement is constrained by acts, treaties and agreements, such as the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT), and these each have very specific impacts on the freedom by which Canadian governments can build or acquire military hardware. As an example, foreign-owned companies only need to have a “place of business”²² in Canada, in order to compete for contracts. Finally, “Canada is unique among its western allies in requiring, through legislation, that defence related goods and services be acquired through a competitive process.”²³ This does not connote a simple process.

Conflicting process accountabilities between the military, bureaucrats and politicians will often result in “declining trust levels in government by citizens.”²⁴ Subsequently, “this lack of trust leads to multiple policy implementation problems for governments . . . especially those facing complex sustainability issues – wicked

²⁰ Williams, *Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement-A View From the Inside* . . . , 102.

²¹ Canada: Treasury Board Secretariat, “Policy on the Management of Projects”, December, 2009. <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=18229>

²² Williams, *Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement-A View From the Inside* . . . , 8.

²³ *Ibid.*, 5.

²⁴ Robert Weymouth, and Janette Hartz-Karp, "Deliberative Collaborative Governance as a Democratic Reform to Resolve Wicked Problems and Improve Trust," *Journal of Economic and Social Policy*: Vol. 17: Iss. 1, Article 4 (2015), 1.

problems.”²⁵ In order to restore voter confidence that has been shaken by distrust caused by perceived procedural oversights, the government will normally add more process. New governance steps, such as the Defence Procurement Strategy and Defence Acquisition Guide, were purely aimed at restoring that trust. However, “we must also realize that perfecting an institution can make it much harder and more expensive to change in the future”²⁶ and “would-be solutions are confounded by a still further set of dilemmas posed by the growing pluralism of the contemporary publics.”²⁷ Treating procurement processes as symptoms of a *wicked problem*, as opposed to a matter of trust and communication, unnecessarily forces the procurement process into *wicked problem* territory; it fails to identify the real tension points and settles for “good enough”²⁸ outcomes. Major projects fall victim to wicked processes but this does not mean that procurement is a *wicked problem*. Furthermore, “Every project is different, and the process itself is detailed and complex.”²⁹ This is true for any land, sea and air procurement with several major systems having significant, wicked challenges. There are five recurring themes as to why the military procurement process in Canada is “experiencing so many problems: the pursuit of ambitious developmental projects, in-house preferences, changing requirements, fixed rough order estimates, and no single point of accountability.”³⁰ Through the lens of three specific capital projects, Close Combat Vehicle, Joint Support Ship and the Next Generation Fighter, it can be seen that complex acquisition can give the appearance of a *wicked problem*.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Andrejs Skaburskis, "The Origin of 'Wicked Problems'." *Planning Theory & Practice* 9, no. 2 (June 2008), 279.

²⁷ Rittel and Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning" . . . , 167.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 163.

²⁹ Elinor Sloan, *Something Has to Give: Why Delays Are the New Reality of Canada's Defence Procurement Strategy* (Calgary: CDFAI, Oct 2014), 8.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

“The \$2-billion CCV project has had a troubled history since it was announced with great fanfare by the Conservatives in 2009.”³¹ As part of the Family of Land Combat Vehicles introduced in the 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy* and modeled “similar to that of the Future Combat System, a large U.S. military program launched by the Pentagon around 2000,”³² the Close Combat Vehicle was intended to bridge the gap between tanks and light reconnaissance vehicles. The case received preliminary project approval in June 2009 and formally entered the *Definition Phase* of project development, intended to narrow down designs to one, and prepare the government to enter into a contract with the winning bidder. “But less than six months later, with no release of a solicitation of interest to the industry, the program ground to a standstill out of concern about whether the capability it would have provided should be a priority, and therefore about the timing for its entry into service.”³³ The *Definition Phase* was restarted; however, all potential bidders were ruled noncompliant because their test vehicles were below the protective standard. The Close Combat Vehicle specifications were redrawn; again, all new proposals were rejected.

In the spring of 2013, the government was finally poised to announce the winning bidder by the fall of 2013 – when the project was suddenly cancelled, costing “taxpayers \$37 million and defence companies additional millions.”³⁴ On one hand, the failed procurement of the Close Combat Vehicle would appear to be a *wicked problem* as the implementation of the project was “difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete

³¹ David Pugliese, “No Compensation for Defence Firms Involved in Close Combat Vehicle Project”, *Ottawa Citizen*, June 19, 2014.

³² Sloan, *Something Has to Give: Why Delays Are the New Reality of Canada’s Defence Procurement Strategy* . . . , 23.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ David Pugliese, “No Compensation for Defence Firms Involved in Close Combat Vehicle Project”, *Ottawa Citizen*, June 19, 2014.

and or contradictory information, and changes in conditions that are not easy to recognize.”³⁵ On the other hand, whether it was due to affordability or a changing combat requirement, the only obstacles to the successful implementation of the Close Combat Vehicle were human decisions. “A major procurement could and did — in the case of . . . the close- combat vehicle (CCV), for example — go through all 12 steps [of project approval] described in Annex A and still be cancelled by the government, with no one held ‘responsible’ for the project going off track.”³⁶ The act of procuring the Close Combat Vehicle did not represent a *wicked problem*.

The complexity, cost and regional economic impact of acquiring modern warships create numerous opportunities for *wicked problems* to arise. The *Canada First Defence Strategy* and the *National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy* both confirmed that “The Canadian government is set to launch the largest shipbuilding program the country has seen since World War II, an undertaking that will include the replacement of most of the Royal Canadian Navy’s surface fleet over the next 20-plus years.”³⁷ The three main ship types: the Joint Support Ship, the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship and the Canadian Surface Combatant, will be built in Canada and the overall shipbuilding program is currently estimated at over \$30 billion. In particular, the Joint Support Ship project exhibited a number of *wicked problem* qualities, with the most prominent being the aspect of time: “wicked problems have no stopping rule.”³⁸ As well, “the passage of time between the

³⁵ Joseph J Schieie and Clifford P. McCue, “Lean Thinking and Its Implications For Public Procurement: Moving Forward With Assessment and Implementation”, *Journal of Public Procurement*, Volume 11, Issue 2, 206-239,(Summer 2011, Copyright © 2011 by PrAcademics Press), 208.

³⁶ Sloan, *Something Has to Give: Why Delays Are the New Reality of Canada’s Defence Procurement Strategy* . . . , 5.

³⁷ David Pugliese, “Canada Recapitalizes-National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy Will Provide 28 New Surface Vessels For Its Navy and Coast Guard”. *Sea Power*. Dec 2011, Vol. 54 Issue 12.

³⁸ Rittel and Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning" . . . , 162.

first glimmers of the ALSC and JSS programs in the early-1990s, and the delivery of the second Canadian ship from Vancouver Shipyards means that we will have taken almost *30 years* to replace two AORs with two AORs.”³⁹ The delays were largely due to the military’s insistence on procuring a supply, oiler *and* amphibious support capability, within a highly restricted budget. The costs for this level of capability across three new sealift ships was poorly understood resulting in the bid evaluation process failing “due largely to the fact that both [industry] proposals significantly exceeded the established budget. As a consequence, procurement activity was halted.”⁴⁰ In simple terms, ambition exceeded resources; however, procuring a Joint Support Ship was not a *wicked problem*. “The difficulty with mapping plans to resources lies in the details: the explicit connections between planning and budgeting to ensure that defense allocates resources according to the choices and preferences made in the planning stage.”⁴¹ The Joint Support Ship was a case of naivety, poor planning and indecision, as opposed to a *wicked problem*. Procuring developmental equipment, such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, however, can bring “unique risks and challenges.”⁴²

Since 1997, Canada has been a member of the United States led Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program. “Through the *Canada First Defence Strategy*, the federal government announced its intent to replace the CF-18 fleet with 65 ‘next generation’

³⁹ Martin Shadwick, “Procurement and the Perfect Storm”. Canadian Military Journal, vol. 14, no. 1, Winter 2013, 66.

⁴⁰ Canada: Joint Support Ship Project Brief, 16 October, 2014, 5. [http://otg-vcd-webs018.ottawa-hull.mil.ca/Cid/Data/Documents/2248/DND%20Project%20Brief%20\(ENG-FINAL%20March%202014\).pdf](http://otg-vcd-webs018.ottawa-hull.mil.ca/Cid/Data/Documents/2248/DND%20Project%20Brief%20(ENG-FINAL%20March%202014).pdf)

⁴¹ Natalie J. Webb, Anke Richter, and Donald Bonsper. "Linking Defense Planning and Resource Decisions: A Return to Systems Thinking." *Defense and Security Analysis* 26, no. 4 (December 2010), 388.

⁴² Canada: Office of the Auditor General of Canada. “Replacing Canada’s Fighter Jets.” *2012 Spring Report of the Auditor General of Canada*. http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201204_02_e_36466.html

fighter aircraft. Then, in July 2010, the government announced its decision to buy the F-35 Lightning II, without following a competitive process, as the CF-18 replacement.”⁴³ Undoubtedly, replacing Canada’s CF-18 fighter aircraft has presented complexities, which are as near to a *wicked problem* as any other procurement effort. The F-35 procurement storyline is wicked, in that it demonstrates over half of Rittel and Webber’s criteria for *wicked problems*. The F-35 project is “unique, shows no end in sight, will result in a good-bad outcome, there is no test for the solution, it will be a one-shot opportunity, there are no exhaustive sets of alternatives and the planner has no right to be wrong.”⁴⁴ The Office of the Auditor General of Canada concluded that the problems were self-inflicted and due mainly to a lack of communication and due diligence between the Department of National Defence and Public Works and Government Services Canada, insufficient risk mitigation, unreliable cost estimates and “key decision-making steps and documents were of little consequence.”⁴⁵ The F-35 difficulties may perhaps be summarized as the interference of political actors⁴⁶ and “the procurement (F-35) process [being] clearly undermined and manipulated to achieve a predetermined outcome.”⁴⁷ In essence, it was through the motives of various stakeholders, which created the wicked F-35 situation, and these same stakeholders were and continue to be, both the protagonists and antagonists of defence procurement – military members, bureaucrats, industry and

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Rittel and Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning" . . . , 164-167.

⁴⁵ Canada: Office of the Auditor General of Canada. “Replacing Canada’s Fighter Jets.” 2012 *Spring Report of the Auditor General of Canada*. http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201204_02_e_36466.html

⁴⁶ Williams, *Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement-A View From the Inside* . . . , 9.

⁴⁷ Williams, “Canada, Democracy and The F-35” . . . , 27.

politicians. “Each must count on the other to fulfill their respective roles and accountabilities.”⁴⁸

In relation to public policy, “one of the biggest challenges with wicked problems is the need to involve many actors, sometimes with wildly different viewpoints on the nature of both the solutions and the problem.”⁴⁹ Stakeholders are unmistakably the core of both defence procurement and *wicked problems*. The military has an unwavering duty and obligation to respond to the will of government at the same time as ensuring that the lives of its men and women are safeguarded by “getting the right equipment to the right place at the right time. Putting politics or bureaucracy ahead of their interests is unconscionable.”⁵⁰ The civilian bureaucracy has legal accountabilities to parliament and is the sole caretaker of governance and program management: “the oversight provided by Treasury Board compels DND and the Canadian Forces to be more efficient and effective in their spending and more mindful of political and economic considerations that elected leaders attach to costly procurements.”⁵¹ In addition, bureaucrats are the experts in the making government work and “spend years learning how the system works and cultivating the relationships necessary for success. The military, for all its strengths and capabilities is on unfamiliar territory with minimum experience in this area.”⁵²

Furthermore, the civilian bureaucracy:

[is] also charged with a number of other functions, including the provision of specific policy advice and expertise to elected officials concerning the saliency, substantive components and the plausible solutions to particular policy issues and problems, the definition of government policy goals, the

⁴⁸ Williams, *Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement-A View From the Inside* . . . , 86.

⁴⁹ Morrison, "Wicked Problems and Public Policy". . . , 2.

⁵⁰ Williams, “Canada, Democracy and The F-35” . . . , 41.

⁵¹ Peter Jones and Philippe Lagassé. "Rhetoric versus reality: Canadian Defence Planning In A Time Of Austerity." *Defense and Security Analysis* 28, no. 2 (June 2012), 53.

⁵² Williams, *Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement-A View From the Inside* . . . , 50.

representation of privileged and non-privileged communities, and the adjudication of policy disputes.⁵³

Industry also plays a key role in defence procurement “because these large expenditures significantly affect government operations and the lives of many Canadians.”⁵⁴ The cornerstone of the Defence Procurement Strategy is Key Industrial Competencies, which are designed to leverage Canadian private sector innovation and production. Simply put, job creation helps strengthen the economy and therefore positively affects the prosperity and security of the country. Lastly, in a Westminster parliamentary system, “every act of government is carried out in the name of the Crown, but the authority for those acts flows from the Canadian people.”⁵⁵ Elected officials have the right to be wrong when it comes to defence procurement “the problems of governmental planning—and especially those of social or policy planning—are ill-defined; and they rely upon elusive political judgment for resolution.”⁵⁶

“Most projects today have a significant wicked component”⁵⁷ and accountability for defence procurement is “muddled.”⁵⁸ This results in an enormous amount of public scrutiny and criticism, leading to a “Loss of faith in a dysfunctional defence procurement system.”⁵⁹ Moreover, the hierarchical and siloed nature of government, bureaucracy and the military has made them collectively “incapable of effectively addressing *wicked*

⁵³ Greg Flynn, "Rethinking Policy Capacity In Canada: The Role of Parties and Election Platforms In Government Policy-Making." *Canadian Public Administration* 54, no. 2 (Jun 2011), 238.

⁵⁴ Douglas Bland in Alan S. Williams, *Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement-A View From the Inside* . . . , xvii.

⁵⁵ Canada: “Parliamentary Institutions - The Canadian System of Government”, Parliament of Canada, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/marleaumontpetit/DocumentViewer.aspx?Sec=Ch01&Seq=2&Language=E>

⁵⁶ Rittel and Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning" . . . , 160.

⁵⁷ Conklin, *Wicked Problems and Social Complexity* (2001-2010 CogNexus Institute) . . . , 3.

⁵⁸ Williams, *Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement-A View From the Inside* . . . , 6.

⁵⁹ Shadwick, “Procurement and the Perfect Storm”. . . , 65.

*problems . . . and this apparent lack of capability further erodes public trust.*⁶⁰ While the people, processes and policy create unnecessarily wicked circumstances; there is normally agreement on the nature of the problem and generally the best solution, such as the need to defend Canadian airspace and the acquisition of a fighter capability. Despite the procurement process somewhat evolving over time, “Canadian equipment procurement has been composed of key elements and has followed a general pattern for major equipment projects.”⁶¹ Any effort to streamline procurement processes is juxtaposed against the “need to address concurrently issues related to accountability, transparency, and fairness.”⁶² Most major capital projects have implementation troubles, caused by a number of factors, with each having their own story. Fighting vehicles are plagued by the speed in which warfare environments and enemy tactics can change, aircraft are normally tied to the risks of developmental technology and ships are also affected by the above factors in addition to being complicated simply due to size, complexity and cost. Nevertheless, in every case, the solution to the problem can be identified “and this in turn requires a different mind-set, and different habits, amongst the interlocutors than hitherto.”⁶³

In conclusion, one of the most compelling reasons to consider defence procurement as a *wicked problem* is the interaction of stakeholders who tolerate “split or shared authorities and responsibilities between ministers and between their departmental

⁶⁰ Weymouth and Hartz-Karp, "Deliberative Collaborative Governance as a Democratic Reform to Resolve Wicked Problems and Improve Trust," . . . , 1.

⁶¹ Plamondon, *The Politics of Procurement: Military Acquisition in Canada and the Sea King Helicopter* . . . , 7.

⁶² Schieie and McCue, “Lean Thinking and Its Implications For Public Procurement: Moving Forward With Assessment and Implementation” . . . , 208.

⁶³ Jeremy Blackham, “Dealing with ‘Wicked Problems’”, *The RUSI Journal*, (152:4, 2007), 38.

officials, and an erosion in the military-civilian lines of authority within DND”⁶⁴ In this regard, the military, bureaucrats and politicians have a shared responsibility to avoid “ignorance of, or total disregard for, their specific roles and accountabilities in the procurement process.”⁶⁵ Unfortunately, “politics [will] interfere”⁶⁶ and what should be a relatively straightforward process of identifying a capability and providing adequate resources, has become a wicked process for the defence procurement problem that is anything but wicked, in the purest sense. There could be “right or wrong” procurement solutions; however, National Defence is constrained by a number of policies and interests, which normally force a “better or worse” outcome. Moreover, while *wicked problems* are labelled as unique and specific to their content, each major procurement shares similar challenges. Attempts to treat defence procurement, in general, as a *wicked problem* (as opposed to a leadership problem), also mean that each direct solution will likely fail, or set into motion other problems. Finally, the “instability and resistance to policy solutions”⁶⁷ qualities a *wicked problem* possesses, are most certainly *not* true in defence acquisitions. Stakeholders need to respect and foster “our [Canadian] sense of identity, values, and trust (the essential lubricant of all relationships and transactions)”⁶⁸ or “[project] response times will never get anywhere near the optimal.”⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Williams, *Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement-A View From the Inside* . . . , 71.

⁶⁵ Williams, “Canada, Democracy and The F-35” . . . , 42.

⁶⁶ Williams, *Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement-A View From the Inside* . . . , 9.

⁶⁷ Morrison, “Wicked Problems and Public Policy” . . . , 1.

⁶⁸ Milne, *Making Policy: A Guide to the Federal Government’s Policy Process* . . . , 19.

⁶⁹ Cranfield, “Some Further Thoughts on Addressing ‘Wicked Problems’” . . . , 4.

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