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## COUNTERING TERRORISM IN A NUCLEAR NEIGHBOURHOOD

Major Ahmed Bajwa

**JCSP 40**

### ***Exercise Solo Flight***

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## SOLO FLIGHT

**COUNTERING TERRORISM IN A NUCLEAR NEIGHBOURHOOD**

By Major Ahmed Bajwa  
Par le major Ahmed Bajwa

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*“The Story of Pakistan, its struggle and its achievement, is the very story of great human ideals, struggling to survive in the face of great odds and difficulties.”*

— (Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 23rd March, 1948.)

The advent of 21st century brought new challenges for mankind. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 shook the world and stirred an urgency to act in support of countering terrorist organizations. Pakistan, a major non-NATO ally in the war against terrorism stood by its Western allies. Unfortunately, Pakistan has consequently faced worst of terrorism in last thirteen years.<sup>1</sup> Simultaneously, we saw much emotive journalism suspecting Pakistan’s commitment to this war or describing Pakistan as a State collapsing to terrorists. A balanced and cognizant view of the situation helps realizing that many of the challenges confronting Pakistan were not of its own creation. However, against all odds, Pakistan has faced these challenges reasonably well and the State never succumbed to absolute chaos or paralysis.<sup>2</sup>

During this critical period, the role of Pakistan Army remained important as Pakistan saw the turn of millennium under a recently established military-led government. Pakistan Army is largely seen by the populace as an important and responsible institution committed to protecting the State’s sovereignty and integrity.<sup>3</sup> Although, elections were held in 2002 and a democratically elected government reinstated, Army remained directly or indirectly involved in the State machinery during

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<sup>1</sup> The News, *Curbing money for Pakistan*. Last accessed 5 May, 2014.  
<http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-235925-Curbing-money-for-Pakistan>.

<sup>2</sup> BBC News, *Pakistan: A failed state or a clever gambler?*. Last accessed 5 May, 2014.  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13318673>.

<sup>3</sup> Adnan Qaiser, *Is Pakistan a Failing State?*. Canadian International Council, December 2013.  
<http://opencanada.org/features/the-think-tank/essays/is-pakistan-a-failing-state/>.

the era of General Pervez Musharraf who concurrently held the offices of the President and Chief of Army Staff. General Musharraf's government generally enjoyed the support of masses until 2007, when a series of domestic events stirred public unrest. The Army displayed restraint and honoured public demands for a complete return to democracy. Elections were held and a peaceful transition to democracy affected in 2008.

The country's ordeal however, was far from over, as the militants took control of Swat in North Western part of Pakistan and challenged the writ of Government in 2009. It was the first extension of an all-out militancy in an area other than the semi-autonomous tribal areas adjacent to Afghanistan. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called it an abdication of the State authorities to militants and a mortal threat to the world security.<sup>4</sup> Pakistan Army responded to the threat aggressively, removing this mortal threat in less than three months of the issuance of Secretary Hillary's statement.<sup>5</sup> The intense combat and casualties inflicted on Pakistan Army in the process could not shake its resolve. The military rooted out terrorism, restored tourism and helped it soar to new heights in Swat.<sup>6</sup> U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates termed Pakistan's counterinsurgency operation in Swat as being an extraordinary effort and considered as a success model by the U.S. military Commander in Afghanistan General David Petraeus.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The Guardian, *Taliban oust Pakistani authorities in Swat Valley sharia zone*. Last accessed 9 May 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/23/taliban-clinton-swat-valley-mingora>.

<sup>5</sup> China View, *Pakistan finishes Swat operation, facing sore challenges*. Last accessed 29 April 2014. [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/09/content\\_11680849.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/09/content_11680849.htm).

<sup>6</sup> Dawn, *Swat Summer Festival from 20th*. Last accessed 24 April 2014. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1016783/swat-summer-festival-from-20th>.

<sup>7</sup> The Christian Science Monitor, *Pakistan counterinsurgency, hailed by US, makes progress in Swat Valley*. Last accessed 9 May 2014. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0325/Pakistan-counterinsurgency-hailed-by-US-makes-progress-in-Swat-Valley>.

However, Swat insurgency intensified concerns in the West over Pakistan's nuclear status, raising questions not only on the efficacy of Pakistan's nuclear safety mechanisms but on the very need of the weapons for Pakistan.<sup>8</sup> Pakistan acquired its nuclear weapons under a discriminatory U.S. policy which aimed at managing the Indian acquisition while preventing Pakistan from acquiring the same. Paul Leventhal, President, nuclear control institute, testified the same in his testimony before the house foreign affairs committee on October 22, 1987.<sup>9</sup> The country thus confronted yet another challenge of safeguarding its nuclear assets.

This paper aims at providing an overview of Pakistan Army's origin, structure and development, its role in war on terrorism, genesis of nuclear deterrence in South Asia and security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Accordingly, the paper would comprise three sections, the first being on Pakistan Army's origin, structure and development, the second on its war on terror and the last on Pakistan's nuclear programme. The paper primarily aims at giving the reader information on Pakistan, its Army, war on terror and Pakistan's nuclear weapons' programme while addressing a few concerns often cited in international media.

Pakistan Army's origin dates back to the creation of State of Pakistan on August 14, 1947. Eight regiments each of Infantry and Artillery with six Armour Regiments was Pakistan's share out of the British Indian Army.<sup>10</sup> It was a modest start under the British

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<sup>8</sup> The Guardian, *Storing up trouble: Pakistan's nuclear bombs*. Last accessed 22 April 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/feb/03/pakistan-nuclear-bombs-editorial>.

<sup>9</sup> Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, D.C. *Testimony by Paul Leventhal, President, nuclear control institute, on Pakistan and U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy before the house foreign affairs committee, October 22, 1987*. Last accessed 21 April 2014. <http://www.nci.org/t/t102287.htm>.

officer Lieutenant General Sir Frank Messervy, the Army's first Commander-in-Chief. A signatory of Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), Pakistan became a major recipient of Western military aid during the 1950s.<sup>11</sup> The subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also resulted in a surge in U.S. military aid for Pakistan, making it the fourth largest recipient after Israel, Egypt and Turkey in 1985.<sup>12</sup> High professional standards coupled with Western military assistance helped develop Pakistan Army into a reliable modern force in the 1980s.

Today, Pakistan Army comprises nine Corps Headquarters incorporating nineteen Infantry Divisions, two Armoured Divisions, one Artillery Division, seventeen Aviation Squadrons, one special Forces Group of three Brigades, three Armoured recce Regiments, six Independent Mechanized Infantry Brigades, nine Artillery Brigades, one Air Defence Command with two AD Groups and eight AD Brigades, and seven Engineer Brigades.<sup>13</sup> The Chief of Army Staff (COAS) commands the Army through the Corps Commanders. The Principal Staff Officers assisting the COAS include a Chief of General Staff (CGS) who supervises the day to day running of the Army. Other important Staff Officers are the Adjutant General (AG), the Quarter Master General (QMG), Inspector General of Training and Evaluation (IGT&E), Military Secretary (MS), Chief of

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<sup>10</sup> Gregory R. Copley and Purvis A. Hussain, *Pakistan: The Global Strategic Lynchpin*, (International Strategic Studies Association, 2008), 151.

<sup>11</sup> Devin T. Hagerty, *The Development of American Defense Policy toward Pakistan, 1947-1954*, The Fletcher Forum, 10:2 – Summer 1986, 217-242.

<sup>12</sup> Murad Ali, *US Foreign Aid to Pakistan and Democracy: An Overview, 1947-1954*, Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS) Vol. 29, No. 2 (December 2009), 247-258.

<sup>13</sup> Gregory R. Copley and Purvis A. Hussain, *Pakistan: The Global Strategic Lynchpin*, (International Strategic Studies Association, 2008), 157.

Logistics Staff (CLS), Inspector General Communications and Information Technology (IG Comms and IT), and Inspector General Arms (IG Arms).<sup>14</sup>

Pakistan was not only a recipient of military aid and assistance but also a victim of several U.S. sanctions. However, given the geo-political developments in the region the sanctions were perhaps often not truly imposed till the end of Cold war. These sanctions can be broadly categorized in three phases i.e. Phase –I (1979 – 1990), Phase-II (1990 – 1998) and Phase – III (1998 – 2001).<sup>15</sup> Despite sanctions, Pakistan has continued to develop and modernize its Armed Forces to maintain the fundamental national security balance against India.

Pakistan Army started taking delivery of 320 Ukrainian T-80UD Main Battle Tanks in 1997. After a considerable delay, 10 new M-198, 155mm Howitzers with 134 TOW II Anti-Tank Guided Weapon Launchers were released by U.S. in 1996. Tank ‘Al-Khalid’ was jointly developed by Pakistan Heavy Industries and PRC, which came into operational service in 2008. An impressive assortment of short, medium and long range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads also came into service. In addition to these developments, future plans include Tank AlKhalid II taking over as the Main Battle Tank, standardizing Artillery capability to 155mm, acquiring new Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) of various ranges and shell sizes, and a meaningful enhancement and modernization of Army Aviation.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 155.

<sup>15</sup> Nazia Malik, *Economic Sanctions Imposed on Pakistan and Their Impact (1979 –2001)*, International Proceedings of Economics Development & Research 2012, Vol. 39, 140-144.

<sup>16</sup> Gregory R. Copley and Purvis A. Hussain, *Pakistan: The Global Strategic Lynchpin*, (International Strategic Studies Association, 2008), 155.

Pakistan Army and its role in war on terrorism have been in the limelight for quite some time now. In the aftermath of September 11 terrorist attacks in United States of America, Pakistan Army moved 50,000 troops to the areas adjacent to Pak-Afghan border to fight the extremist elements.<sup>17</sup> The ensuing war took a heavy toll on Pakistan and its Army, higher than any of its wars before. Leading author and journalist Yaroslav Trofimov covering South Asia as Wall Street Journal's foreign correspondent since 1999, recently published a comparison of Pakistan and U.S. military in terms of human sacrifice. He has given the figure of 4,000 as the number of Pakistani soldiers who lost their lives and some 13,000 injured against some 1,800 U.S. service members killed in combat, following the 2001 invasion in Afghanistan.<sup>18</sup>

As of December 2013, Pakistan has some 158,000 troops deployed along Pak-Afghan border and over 7500 military operations have been conducted since 2001, including two Corps size operations in South Waziristan Agency and Swat. There has been a significant change in the Government's writ in KPK (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – North Western province of Pakistan) over the past six years. Since 2007 there has been an increase of Government control from 37% to 87% today. Apart from a few areas on or adjacent to Pak-Afghan border, the province is under strong governmental control.<sup>19</sup> This has come at a high price in terms of military casualties. Not only has the Army lost over 4000, these figures include a Lieutenant General, three Major Generals and five Brigadier

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<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 153.

<sup>18</sup> The Wall Street Journal, *In Its Own War on Terror, Pakistan Piles Up Heavy Losses*. Last accessed 5 May 2014.  
<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304691904579348820227129270>

<sup>19</sup> Kiran Hassan, *Pakistan Army's operations in the tribal areas*. Last accessed 5 May 2014.  
<http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2014-b4d9/february-72f2/tribal-areas-93b7>



Generals.<sup>20</sup> Of note, two of the three Major Generals lost their lives while leading their respective formations in the operational area. The lives lost however, have not been in vain as there has been an estimated 27,000 terrorists casualties in Pakistan Army's war against terrorism since 2001.<sup>21</sup>

In order to understand Pakistan Army's war on terrorism, one has to understand the purpose of its operations and the guiding concept behind operations. The purpose is to proactively pursue the end state which is eliminate terrorists, deny use of own territory as a sanctuary for operations within Pakistan or across Pak-Afghan border through effective articulation of military, political and development measures, in the enduring pursuit of peace. The concept rests on the basic fundamental – military operations have to be both acceptable to the public at large, and with full political ownership. Another important factor is that adequate regard for the geography, history and culture of the area must be shown during the operations. The operations should focus on using minimum force for minimum time and exploiting terrorists' vulnerabilities while reducing own and enhancing public confidence in the Armed Forces.<sup>22</sup>

Pakistan Army has been frequently blamed for not being able to check terrorist movement across Pak-Afghan border which allows terrorist acts to be committed in Afghanistan.<sup>23</sup> Notwithstanding the difficult and treacherous nature of terrain along Pak-

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> Army and Air Adviser at the High Commission for Pakistan in London, *Pakistan Army's Operations in the Tribal Areas*. The International Institute for Strategic Studies on 19 February, 2014.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> Zubia Ikram, *Special Survey: Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations After 9/11*. Pakistan Horizon Vol. 59, No. 1 (January 2006), 17-21.

Afghan border. Pakistan Army has some 3500 posts in the area with 645 on the very border. This number is approximately three quarters of all posts combined with those of International Security Assistance Force or Afghan National Army on the Afghan side of border.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, there have been 15 major terrorist attacks from Afghan soil into Pakistan since 2010. Average terrorists' strength in these attacks has been 150 – 200. These attacks have been relatively deadlier as terrorist attacked in mass on relatively smaller groups inflicting 283 casualties on the Pakistan Army against their own loss of some 298 terrorists.<sup>25</sup> It leaves the Pakistan Army bewildered as to how such terrorists can be allowed to assemble in such large masses on the afghan side of border.

Although, the aim of ISAF and Pakistan Army coincides but the approach towards tackling the problem may differ, as Pakistan Army is not operating on a foreign territory like ISAF in Afghanistan. As a consequence of its war on terror, people are targeted by terrorists within Pakistan, where 52,671 people have already lost their lives in last 13 years and another 57,344 have been injured.<sup>26</sup> The economy has also taken its toll in the war against terrorism; the losses estimated in 2011 stood at US \$ 67.93 billion, a daunting blow for a developing economy.<sup>27</sup> It is expected that the losses in 2014 would cross the figure of US \$ 100 billion. The Government of Pakistan is therefore, justifiably

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<sup>24</sup> Kiran Hassan, *Pakistan Army's operations in the tribal areas*. Last accessed 5 May 2014. <http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2014-b4d9/february-72f2/tribal-areas-93b7>

<sup>25</sup> Army and Air Adviser at the High Commission for Pakistan in London, *Pakistan Army's Operations in the Tribal Areas*. The International Institute for Strategic Studies on 19 February, 2014.

<sup>26</sup> Nadia Mushtaq Abbasi, *Impact of terrorism on Pakistan*. Last accessed 5 May 2014. [http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1393573242\\_59579987.pdf](http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1393573242_59579987.pdf).

<sup>27</sup> Economic Survey 2010-2011, *Cost of War on Terror for Pakistan Economy*, Last accessed 5 May 2014. [http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter\\_11/Special%20Section\\_1.pdf](http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_11/Special%20Section_1.pdf)

careful in its approach and averse towards allowing any ill ramifications of the war from falling on its people as a result of rashness or miscalculation.

Pakistan Army increasingly works as part of a “whole of government” approach in the federally administered tribal areas (FATA).<sup>28</sup> Although the population of FATA largely supports Pakistan Army, terrorists often blend in with the local population, making it difficult for the Army to strike hostile targets indiscriminately.<sup>29</sup> As part of the comprehensive approach, Army has contributed in the development of 422 km of road infrastructure, building of 52 schools / colleges and four basic hospitals, provision of electricity to 57 villages, completion of 64 water supply projects and five bridges in the recent past.<sup>30</sup> However, it is a challenging task and still far from completion.

Amidst the war on terrorism which has committed a large portion of Pakistan Army, there have been questions on Pakistan’s nuclear assets, extending a deferential treatment to India and denying the same to Pakistan. This has caused significant concern in Pakistan.<sup>31</sup> The importance which the nation accords to its nuclear assets can be understood by developing an understanding of the genesis of South Asian nuclear deterrence. It also adequately explains Pakistan’s perspective and why it responded to the Indian nuclear tests in the same way.

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<sup>28</sup> Gregory R. Copley and Purvis A. Hussain, *Pakistan: The Global Strategic Lynchpin*, (International Strategic Studies Association, 2008), 155.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 154.

<sup>30</sup> Army and Air Adviser at the High Commission for Pakistan in London, *Pakistan Army’s Operations in the Tribal Areas*. The International Institute for Strategic Studies on 19 February, 2014.

<sup>31</sup> Naeem Salik, *The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan’s Perspective*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 8.

The genesis of the issue formally dates back to the establishment of ‘Atomic Energy Commission’ in India in 1948 followed by the establishment of ‘Atomic Energy Research Council’ in Pakistan (now known as the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission - PAEC), eight years after, in 1956.<sup>32</sup> However, Pakistan’s security concerns soared particularly high in the aftermath of Indo-Pak war of 1971, which led to dismemberment of Pakistan. Prior to the outbreak of war, Indians did not merely rest on fostering separatist tendencies in East Pakistan but went as far as training and arming the militant faction of Bengali separatists (Mukti Bahini).<sup>33</sup> It made it evident to Pakistanis that Indians would not refrain from a direct interference in Pakistan’s internal problems.

Indian Defence minister clarified in 1972 that the Atomic Energy Commission of India is focused on merely studying the technology for peaceful purposes.<sup>34</sup> The war and dismemberment of Pakistan still afresh in memory, Indian Defence Minister’s statement was hardly a reliable assurance to Pakistan. The loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) had instilled the fear of a future Indian aggression and urged the political government in Pakistan to consider the beginning of a secret nuclear weapons programme.<sup>35</sup> However, it was the Indian nuclear test in May 1974 which truly aggravated Pakistan’s fears of Indian domination.<sup>36</sup> Following this, Pakistan began in earnest, its nuclear weapons

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<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 73.

<sup>33</sup> Nūruna Nabī, *Bullets of '71: A Freedom Fighter's Story*, (AuthorHouse, 2010), 213.

<sup>34</sup> George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation*, (California: University of California Press, 2001), 170.

<sup>35</sup> Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, *Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*. Congressional Research Service March 2013, 3.

<sup>36</sup> Mario E. Carranza, *South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order: Creating a Robust Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Arms Control Regime*. (Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 51.

programme.<sup>37</sup> Pakistan's response to Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 was thus embedded in Pakistan's security rationale; achieving a nuclear parity and deterring a conventional Indian attack.<sup>38</sup>

Critics who often ignore Pakistan's 'security rationale' and voice concerns on the safety of Pakistan's nuclear assets cite the instance of Dr. A.Q. Khan's network to support the argument. However, it is important to note that most of the illicit proliferation took place before Pakistan had set up its formal Command, Control and oversight mechanism in February, 2000. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any leaks of technology from Pakistan beyond Dr. A.Q. Khan's retirement in April, 2001.<sup>39</sup> Since the revelation of Dr. A.Q. Khan's network, Pakistan has worked hard to implement export controls and keep all associated with the nuclear programme under effective monitoring.<sup>40</sup>

The outside observers find it hard to accept that the proliferation activities of Dr. A.Q. Khan took place without an active connivance of the State or Pakistan Army, as the nuclear programme remained under Army's supervision right from the outset. However, the barriers erected by industrialized countries after Indian nuclear test in 1974 forced

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<sup>37</sup> Naeem Salik, *The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Perspective*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 264.

<sup>38</sup> Mario E. Carranza, *South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order: Creating a Robust Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Arms Control Regime*. (Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 51.

<sup>39</sup> Naeem Salik, *The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Perspective*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 279.

<sup>40</sup> Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*. Congressional Research Service, March 2013, 2.

Pakistan to adopt an unconventional approach for developing its nuclear capability.<sup>41</sup> Dr. A.Q. Khan's network was a consequence of this approach as it gave him access to autonomous import and export privileges unlike any other organization in the country.<sup>42</sup> It was not the State or a terror group but Dr. A.Q. Khan, who turned the secret network he had established to develop Pakistan's nuclear capability into a multi-national business out of motivation for financial benefits.<sup>43</sup>

A high level of secrecy had been maintained with regard to Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme and Dr. A.Q. Khan's activities until May 1998. The secrecy was to support the Government's official stance that negated the pursuit of nuclear weapons in order to deflect any international pressure.<sup>44</sup> However, the overt "nuclearization" was promptly followed by the establishment of Nuclear Command Authority in Pakistan to ensure a robust command and control over the nuclear arsenal.

The National Command Authority (NCA) was formally announced in February, 2000 which specified clear roles and charter of duties for its various components.<sup>45</sup> The NCA comprises a three tiered structure and is chaired by the President with the Prime Minister as its Vice Chairman. The Employment Control committee under NCA is a politico-military committee and the Foreign Minister serves as its Deputy Chairman. The

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<sup>41</sup> Naeem Salik, *The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Perspective*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 261.

<sup>42</sup> International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks - A net assessment*. IISS Strategic Dossier, May 2007, 66.

<sup>43</sup> David E. Sanger, *The Khan Network*. Stanford Institute for International Studies, June 2004.

<sup>44</sup> Naeem Salik, *The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Perspective*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 234.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 284.

employment committee members include Minister for Defence, Minister for Interior, Minister for finance, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff committee and the respective Chiefs of Army, Air Force and Navy. The other committee under NCA is the Development Control committee. It is a military-scientific committee and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff committee is the Deputy Chairman on this committee.<sup>46</sup>

Pakistan's strategic and nuclear posture is framed around its perception of threat from India.<sup>47</sup> India claims that it desires only "credible minimum deterrent" but refuses to define what may be seen as a credible deterrent.<sup>48</sup> New Delhi was granted access to international uranium market in 2008 after the nuclear cooperation agreement with U.S. and its subsequent exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) export guidelines. It allows India to divert greater quantities of indigenous uranium for weapons as it can procure uranium for its newly safeguarded reactors from abroad.<sup>49</sup> It exacerbates Pakistan's problem as it would be compelled to maintain a dynamic strategic deterrence based on its assessment of Indian nuclear weapons.

Pakistan has made several proposals for nuclear arms control including mutual inspections, simultaneously acceding to Nonproliferation treaty, and both India and Pakistan placing nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

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<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 235.

<sup>47</sup> Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*. Congressional Research Service March 2013, 6.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

safeguards. However, all such proposals have been rejected by India.<sup>50</sup> Pakistan has repeatedly proposed at United Nations' General Assembly to create a nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia. It has also been rejected by India either on one plea or the other.<sup>51</sup>

It can be assumed for now that nuclear weapons will stay in South Asia except for an international consensus on disarmament. Global disarmament not so likely in near future, measures taken by Pakistan to safeguard its nuclear assets are quite comforting. The confidence in Pakistan's security mechanisms has been repeatedly expressed by U.S. officials. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte expressed his belief in the effectiveness of Pakistan's technical control of nuclear weapons and succession planning in his testimony to Congress in 2007.<sup>52</sup> In 2008, Donald Kerr, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, considered Pakistan's military a trustworthy and stable organization to be in control of nuclear weapons.<sup>53</sup> U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency's former Director Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples also acknowledged the effectiveness of steps taken by Pakistan to safeguard its nuclear weapons in 2009.<sup>54</sup>

Pakistan faced all crises without compromising on its war against terrorism and is continuously battling its way out. It is threatened but it is fighting well to remove all threats to its stability. It might be divided on petty matters but it is united when it comes

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<sup>50</sup> Mario E. Carranza, *South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order: Creating a Robust Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Arms Control Regime*. (Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 52.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.

<sup>52</sup> Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*. Congressional Research Service March 2013, 16.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*



to integrity and sovereignty. Social justice may still be wanting but the society is moving in the right direction. Today, it is a functioning democracy with a free and independent media. At this critical juncture, when the nation is bleeding in the war against terrorism and is determined to stand against all forms of extremism, it is not criticism but support that it needs from its friends round the globe.

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