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EGYPT'S REVOLUTION: A LONG JOURNEY TO DEMOCRACY

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JCSP 40

Exercise Solo Flight

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SOLO FLIGHT PAPER

EGYPT'S REVOLUTION: A LONG JOURNEY TO DEMOCRACY

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Word Count: 5444

Compte de mots : 5444

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INTRODUCTION

The January 25th 2011 movement was the first milestone of Egyptian democracy which gave the people power, replacing the authoritarian ruler. The 18 day protest successfully overthrew Egypt's dictatorial regime that had been ruling the nation for nearly 3 decades. Hosni Mubarak had ruled Egypt since 1981. Under his leadership Egypt had a strong influence on the other Arab nations, while maintaining the "cold peace" on the Sinai Peninsula with Israel.¹ However, Mubarak's regime had brought the people to poverty and with joblessness for the youth, as well as legal and political issues that strengthened the regimes power.² This situation led the Egyptian people to enter the streets demanding better conditions.

The resignation of President Mubarak on February 11th, 2011 did not lead to the successful democratization of Egypt. General Omar Suleiman, Egypt's Chief of Intelligence and New Vice President had mandated the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to take over the government in order to stabilize the situation, commenting that "Mubarak had stepped down and handed power to the military."³ Hence, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi the 77 years old general who had been occupying the Ministry of Defense for more than a decade and chaired the SCAF, had

¹ Laurel E. Miller et al., *Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and Lessons from Around the Globe* (Santa Monica: the Rand Corporation, 2012).79-103.

² *Ibid.*

³ Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, *The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making of the New Era* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012)., 98.

promised to “lead the country into election and hand over power to a civilian government within six months.”⁴

Yet, the military suspended the election and kept controlling the state beyond the six months. It had proven that the political transition was not easy to implement. After sacrifice, bloodshed and tears, the Egyptian people had their first democratic election in June 2012, which had never been conducted under the previous authoritarian regime. Mohamed Morsi won the presidential election supported by the Muslim brotherhood and the Salafi in the parliament. However, in mid-2013 the military led by General Abdul Fatah el Sisi dissolved the parliament and launched a coup d'état against the Morsi government. He had temporarily taken over the government and appointed Adly Mansour, Chief of the Constitutional Court as an interim president while waiting for the next election.

The goal of this essay is to analyze Egypt's revolution post Mubarak's resignation. The key questions of this essay are has Egypt's revolution ended, is Egypt's democracy successful and how could it be successful? These questions have led the author to contend that Egypt's revolution has not yet ended; it is just the start and will take years to achieve democracy. The military's neutrality and disengagement from the political and economic affairs of Egypt will endorse the democracy. Moreover, the Muslims, who are the majority, should have the maturity in the political consensus as well as the unity of the Egyptians, are the key for success for the glorious revolution in developing democratic system. This essay will be divided into four parts to discuss Egypt's revolution. The inception part will be the background of the revolution,

⁴ *Ibid.*

continued by the key actors of the regime change, followed by the democracy and the challenges and factors that can hamper the revolution. Lastly, this essay will elaborate the light of the revolution.

BACKGROUND OF EGYPT'S REVOLUTION

January 25th was the beginning of the uprising when hundreds of thousands of Egyptians marched in the streets and occupied the plazas. There were riots, non-violent civil resistance and acts of civil disobedience. Also, labor strikes encompassed the capital of Egypt and several cities. Egypt's revolution did not occur on that day because of a simple matter. It was due to a people exhausted of authoritarian rule. The Egyptians were united, involving different socio, economic, religious and political backgrounds. The amalgamated crowds made up of Islamic, liberalists, anti-capitalists, nationalists, secularists and feminists, all had come up to the street, side by side. They were taking part in diverse protest actions in a large mass demonstration. They demanded that the authoritarian ruler resign from the throne as an impact of political injustice, legal and economic issues during their rule.⁵

Firstly, Egypt's political system after promulgation of the 1923 Constitution and the 1952 Free Officer which ended the monarchy. It did not portray the ideal modern democratic system which allowed personal freedoms such as freedom of speech, the creation of civic organization and multiparty politics; yet it had been the beginning of the Egypt's democratic system.⁶ However, post the 1952 revolution, Egypt's politics had been operated under military domination, and for almost sixty years controlled by the

⁵ Miller et al., *Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and Lessons from Around the Globe* . . . , 79-103.

⁶ *Ibid.*

president who came from the officer corps⁷ particularly, the Mubarak regime effectively used state emergency law, against any opposition who resisted the government. There was no freedom of speech or multiparty system at all. The only party that existed was the National Democratic Party which had been backed up by the ruler. That situation turned out to be one of the main causes of the revolts.

Secondly, the economic grievances obviously contributed as another reason which generated the January 25th revolution. During the Egyptian upheaval, the people had demanded “bread, social justice and freedom”. This had initiated the establishment of a proper minimum wage.⁸ The economic aspect was the fundamental reason for the Egyptians to come up into the streets. Together they desired a better quality of life. Even though the Egyptian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the ten year period of 2000-2009 had shown good results compared to the other developing countries within the region, many Egyptians felt insecure of the economic situation.⁹ Miller and colleagues demonstrated some data which portrayed that “it is clear many Egyptian perceive a society that is increasingly rife with inequalities.”¹⁰ Many other economic aspects had driven the Egyptian’s to protest, for instances the government action to stop the price subsidies of some goods e.g. gasoline and cigarette; the bread shortage in 2008, and some banking scandals as well as labor confrontations with the police.¹¹

The issues described above were factors that led the Egyptians to demand equality of political and legal as well as economic grievances to the authoritarian regime.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

Moreover, the economic demands were the fundamental reason which brought the resignation of the regime from their twenty nine year throne. Their demands could be summarized as “the downfall of the Hosni Mubarak regime and his minister, cessation of emergency law, freedom, justice, formation of a new, non-military government with the interest of the Egyptian, the construction of all Egyptian’s resources.”¹² As a result it signified that the core issues of the January 25th revolution were politic, legal and economic issues.

KEY ACTORS IN EGYPT’S POLITICAL SYSTEM

Post President Hosni Mubarak, it was predicted that the revolutionary process would be smooth. However, the opposite, far from the desired condition as was expected took place. The increasing conflicts within the groups in the country had exacerbated the stability of the nation post revolution. There were several groups that had played as key actors after the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. The following paragraph will further discuss those key actors that had, in the end, bolstered Egypt’s instability.

Military

Since 1952, after the Free Officer Revolution, Egypt’s military was involved in many aspects of life in the Egyptian state system, specifically in politics and economics. Egypt was ruled by a civilian government but all four Egypt’s presidents came from the Officer Corp, hence many of the strategic positions such as ministries and public companies were occupied by the appointed former military generals and even active military generals in order for the president to ensure the military’s control over the

¹² L. de Voogd-el Mhamdi, "Serving in Uniform during the Spring: A Case Study of the Role of the Egyptian Military in Transition" (Bachelor thesis, Leiden University), .

state.¹³ The military under the Mubarak regime conducted a lot of economic activities without any government oversight such as, free tax and duties as well as accountability. There was no checking of the military's operational budget.¹⁴

Moreover, Egypt military has been receiving 1.3 billion dollars in aid and training from the US annually.¹⁵ Sahar F. Aziz argued “that the military will give significant influence in Egypt politics” because the US interest in the Middle East would be disturbed if Egypt was ruled by the Islamist group.¹⁶ Furthermore, in his article Aziz wrote that the Military during the revolution had built a good image to the protester by refusing the order of President Mubarak to shoot the protestors and they took a side to oppose the regime.¹⁷ During the SCAF's fourteen month administration, many of the public and civilian position were controlled by former military general officers¹⁸ and international pressure with regards to the political scene influenced the SCAF decisions.¹⁹ As a result the situation became unstable post the downfall of the Mubarak regime. In addition, the SCAF had made political contracts with the Muslim brotherhood which kept the military influence in the state.²⁰ However, in June 2013, the military launched a coup d'état and took over the government as well as dissolved the parliament. Therefore, the military role in Egypt's political and economic systems also gave strong influence to the state system post revolution.

¹³ Sahar F. Aziz, "Egypt's Protracted Revolution," Human Right's Brief 19, no. 3 (August 8, 2012), 2-9.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Congressional Research Service, *Egypt: Transition Under Military Rule* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), 15.

¹⁶ Aziz, *Egypt's Protracted Revolution*, 2-9.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Zeinab Abdul-Magd, "Morsi's Egypt: The Egyptian Republic of Retired General," *POMPEPS Briefings* 5, no. 8 (May 8, 2012).

¹⁹ Marc Lynch, "Morsi's Egypt: Egypt's Second Chance," *POMPEPS Briefings* 6, no. 26 (June 26, 2012).

²⁰ *Ibid.*

Religious and Political Groups

The sectarian groups in Egypt are based on a religious pattern divided into three components. Those are the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafi and the Christians which form around ten percent of the population.²¹

The schoolteacher and imam named Hassan al-Banna established the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 and it became one of the oldest Islamic organizations around the world²² and had been Egypt's strongest political movement.²³ Originally it promoted Islamic purity through the mosques and schools, such as Islam showing extensive understanding of ways of life. Furthermore, it widely increased its activities towards "teaching, prayer, political activism and social welfare, offering healthcare and aid to the needy".²⁴ Therefore, the organization became popular, headquartered in Cairo. However, in 1930 there was internal conflict within the organization towards the ideas regarding use of violence to achieve the aims of the organization and brought the organization responsible for killing Egypt's prime minister in 1948. Later Banna was assassinated in the following year.²⁵ After the 1952 revolution, this organization was banned from politics and many of them were arrested and even executed. Hence, the situation has led the organization to move underground and was responsible for many acts of violence to achieve their goal. Yet the past few decades the Muslim Brotherhood has raised their popularity among the Egyptian people because the rise of religiosity and Islamic politics

²¹ Farhad Khosrokhavar, *The New Arab Revolutions that Shook the World* (Boulder.London: Paradigm Publisher, 2012), 131.

²² Noueihed and Warren, *The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making of the New Era . . .*, 120-121.

²³ Congressional Research Service, *Egypt: Transition Under Military Rule . . .*, 3.

²⁴ Noueihed and Warren, *The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making of the New Era . . .*, 120-121.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

that encompasses the Middle East²⁶ as well as the new generation of the Muslim Brotherhood that had different thinking than the old generation in achieving their goals. However, they still kept the thinking of jihadi ways.²⁷ The organization gained their supporter mostly in poor rural and urban areas by giving social services while the government had neglected most people's needs. Some of the Egyptian believed that the Muslim Brotherhood was the architect of the 2011 revolution. Hence, during the 2012 election, the Muslim Brotherhood formed the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) which supported Mohamed Morsi for the presidency by defeating the National Democratic Party (NDP), the old regime party which was banned politically after the election. However, the Muslim Brotherhood almost lost the public support in the first round of the presidential election because they broke the commitment to not run the presidential election post the Mubarak resignation and almost lost the election.²⁸ Morsi had taken quick response to handle the situation by making political negotiation with "the martyrs of the revolution and signaling that he would appoint Christian, women, independents and technocrats to be the key positions in the government."²⁹ Therefore, his efforts in building political consensus with other groups led him to win the presidential election.

The other Muslim group in Egypt is the Salafi which *Sunni puritans*³⁰ that demand strictly the implementation of Quran in the whole aspects of life as guidance and law.³¹ The Salafi has spread over the world particularly in the Middle East which became

²⁶ Aziz, *Egypt's Protracted Revolution*, 2-9.

²⁷ Noueihed and Warren, *The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making of the New Era* . . . , 121.

²⁸ Lynch, *Morsi's Egypt: Egypt's Second Chance* . . . , 24.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Will McCants, "Arab Uprising: The New Salafi Politics," *POMPEPS Briefings* 14, no. 01 (October 16, 2012), 6.

³¹ Congressional Research Service, *Egypt: Transition Under Military Rule* . . . , 3.

the center of the movement. Post the 2011 revolution, Egypt's Salafi started to begin their movement politically. The Al- Nour is the supported party of Salafi and gains popularity of Egyptian by securing the parliament seat up to twenty one percent in the last election.³² However, many Salafis in Egypt stay out of politics because they do not like its entanglements that want to change the society by changing the mind.³³ It does not show that their effort for nothing to the political influence. The supporters could easily mobilize to change their supports and oppose policy they do not like.³⁴ The Mosques and charity organization are controlled by the Salafi and provide many public goods when the nation fails. Therefore, even though they stay out of politics they still get supports from the people to anticipate the political movement whenever they are involved.³⁵ In addition, this group was supported by Saudi Arabia which has been using significant investment in the Egyptian economy.³⁶

The Coptic Christians are the non-Muslim group in Egypt. It comprises approximately ten percent of Egypt's population.³⁷ They are mostly not involved in the high level government and military, though their main role is mainly in the private sector. Socially the group has to face some discrimination and is also the main subject of the sectarian attacks.³⁸ Hence, with respect to the matter of the government the Church has launched, in return, the quick response to eliminate the tension. However, there is no

³² *Ibid.*

³³ McCants, *Arab Uprising: The New Salafi Politics* . . . , 6.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Aziz, *Egypt's Protracted Revolution* . . .

³⁷ Congressional Research Service, *Egypt: Transition Under Military Rule* . . . , 3.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

solution to the communal conflict that occurs in the state.³⁹ In the political perspective they could be transforming to a secularist group.

Egypt secularist

The Egypt secularist could be categorized as the people who are Muslim, Christian, or others who believe that religion should not be involved in the government of the state, and that they could comprise various political perspectives such as nationalists, liberalists, or even socialists. Particularly, looking at the parliamentary election in 2012 the groups seems to be unpopular compared to the religious parties because the secular party attempted to avoid the secular label.⁴⁰ The secular was not successful in gaining the support of Egyptians because it was not organized well and prepared for politic involvement. However, historically the secularist was popular in the 1920s while Egypt was under control by the British colonials with the vision of national liberalist. Also, it had sought the freedom from colonialism to establish secular democracy in the state.⁴¹ Many believe that secularist has had a big influence on the young generation that supports the protest against the Mubarak regime and they almost defeated Morsi in the presidential election by supporting Ahmed Shafiq who had become Mubarak's acting prime minister.⁴² As a result, they still have political influence in Egypt. In addition, there was another group, the liberal democrats, which only part of this group was strongly demanding the disengagement of the military in the politic and economic affair in the Egypt state system. This group had opposed the huge military role in the aspect of life in

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Andrew Clark, "The Successes and Failure of Egyptian Secularism," *Dahrendorft Scholars* (2012), 1-17.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² David J. Sarquís, "Democratization After the Arab Spring: The Case of Egypt's Political Transition," *Politics & Policy* 40, no. 5 (October, 2012), 871-903.

the state by looking at the Turkish democratic system which lacked a military role in the government. However, the Turkish system had evolved after long years before the present system. Their idea to adopt the Turkish system was challenging the military interest in the state. As consequence, they had to confront the military in the post revolution environment

All those key actors were involved in 2011 revolution and flavored the political situation post Mubarak's resignation which had determined the future of the Egypt's democracy. This would be transformed into three big categories of groups which were the Muslim, Secularist and Military, which had become the main political actors in the state. Those will generate the analysis in the following section.

DEMOCRACY AND THE FACTORS WHICH CHALLENGED AND HAMPERED THE REVOLUTION

The results of Egypt's revolution have not yet appeared and the democracy in the state that the majority of their populations that are Muslims tend to be hardly implemented. The aims of the protest generally demanded the good and clean government; the equality and freedom politically and economically; also, the hope for prosperity in the socio- economic life as well as social justice of the Egyptians in which signifies the glorious of 2011 revolution. In the contemporary situation democracy is not only replacing and electing the government in the political system by free and fair election, but also it needs people involvement in the public affairs.⁴³ The Egyptians have not achieved and felt the political stability and the aims of the revolution yet. It translates that the revolution for a democracy has not ended as well.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

Arguably, those goals can only be achieved if democracy has become the fundamental aspect of Egypt political system. Some might argue that the proper fundamental aspect of Egypt's political system should be based on the narrow minded implementation of the Islamic rules of Sharia law. Furthermore, those aspects have been disputed by many groups in Egypt. However, democracy is inherently part of Islam. Thus, the perspective of implementation of the Islamic rule and law in the Egypt political system without democracy is the misinterpretation of Islam as a religion. Moderate Muslim scientist, Ahmed Moussalli, contended that Islam had been acknowledging democracy i.e. political philosophy the shura (consultation) and ijmá (consensus), since the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him (PBUH), who introduced Islam to the people in the Arabian region by developing his political organization in Medina thousands of years ago.⁴⁴

Moreover, in his book, the implementation of democracy is based on the historical context. It has stated that

. . . In that sense, ijmá and shura has clearly been the cornerstone and root for developing a free and representative of Islamic government or democracy. While classical and medieval Islamic thought did not use the term "democracy" the theoretical power that was vested in the people and the community for making of society and government as well as religious doctrine which is the highest order and comes very close to democracy.⁴⁵

With respect to the notion of democratic implementation in the Islamic way, it is supposed to be fair and friendlier execution of the political system without any conflict in terms of various political agenda of each group which has included in the system. Rahil Yasin mentioned in his article that there are three things that fundamentally thought in

⁴⁴ Yasin Rahil, "Are Islam and Democracy Compatible?" *Counter Currents* (March 21, 2009).

⁴⁵ Ahmed Moussalli, *The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Right* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2013).

Islam. First, that all persons in any given society are equal. Second, public issues are best decided by the majority of view. Third, principle of justice, equality and human dignity which constitute Islam's moral core, as well as public life under governance of a shura.⁴⁶ Therefore, it has portrayed that shura governance accepts the various perspective and public interest to become the decisive point for taking decision. It is clear that the shura governance is not based on the ruler decision point a view or a particular group that holds the power.

Islam is a religion that may be misinterpreted in various ways by certain organizations such as Al-Qaida and also other radical Muslims.⁴⁷ The misinterpretations by some Islamists have led the western world has been contending that Islam politics tend to be autocracy and violence. In his article, Daniel Pipes wrote that Sharia is the core reason to reject democracy.⁴⁸ However, this perspective tends to discredit Islam from an insignificant point a view. The western perspective would become one of the obstacles which could hamper the democratization in the Arab world, particularly in Egypt. The following paragraph will elaborate the obstacles that challenge democracy in Egypt.

First, democratization in the Arab world particularly in Egypt was always inherently coming along with various interpretations to implement democracy in the state. Arguably, the western thoughts of Islam are not supporting the democracy that will become the fundamental factor for democratic reinforcement in the Middle East specifically in Egypt. Some might argue that Islam is the main aspect that challenges the democratization especially Sharia. However, Yasin argued that "sharia applies to all

⁴⁶ Rahil, *Are Islam and Democracy Compatible?* . . .

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Daniel Pipes, "A Democratic Islam?" *Jerusalem Post* (April 17, 2008).

aspects of religious, political, social and private life. Therefore, political Islam has all democratic norms.”⁴⁹ Moreover, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey are examples that democracy could also be implemented in countries which have Muslims as the majority of the population. Hence, the western thoughts concerning Islam in politics is going to be a future obstacle to democracy are unfounded and there is no need to have westerners impede the Islamists in leading the country. For instance, the military launched a coup d'état to the official Egyptian government, led by General Abdul Fatah el Sisi in mid-2013 to dissolve the incumbent Morsi's government and the parliament which was occupied by a majority of Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis. Obviously, Egypt has a close relation with the US Government since 1979. Since that period, Egypt's government was fully supported by the US.⁵⁰ Therefore, this occasion tends to signify only the fear of western interests when Islam takes control of the state. The westerners are thinking that the newly formed Egyptian government will use the Sharia against them. The case has become worse since some of the Muslim groups have narrowed their interpretation of Sharia.

Second, western interest in Egypt particularly the US was inevitable as one part of the many influencing factors that was believed could challenge the democratization of Egypt. The western interest has become the predominant aspect of conflict management in Egypt, because Egypt's military has obviously been utilized in support of US interests in the Middle East. The reason for this is predominately based on the US aim to maintain stability on the Sinai Peninsula in support of a cold peace with Israel. The Egyptian military gained support from the US since 1987.⁵¹ The involvement of the

⁴⁹ Rahil, *Are Islam and Democracy Compatible?* . . .

⁵⁰ Congressional Research Service, *Egypt: Transition Under Military Rule* . . . , 15.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

military in the political and economic state systems of Egypt have never gained critics from the biggest democratic countries in the world that very often promote democracy. Moreover, the regime was supported by the military that, in return had strengthened the power of the authoritarian government. Therefore, the US fosters the undemocratic government to protect their interest while keeping the Islamist out of government because it would hamper their interests in the region. However, at the end of Mubarak's presidency the military had changed sides to become part of the revolution which refused to take coercive actions against protestors. They saw the big picture of the unrest that would influence the peace with Israel, so they realized that they must end the unrest quickly by supporting the revolution. Hence, it clearly depicted that the military role had not been only as defender of the nation but also had been as protector of US interests in Egypt. The US had previously previewed that Egypt's military might become an obstacle to democracy in Egypt.

In that revolution, Egypt's political transition did not result in better conditions, particularly from SCAF to the civil authority post Mubarak resignation. Each group had tried to gain influence in the political system to push their own interests and agenda. Arguably, the SCAF, Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist specifically Salafi as well as the secularist had tried to set up a strategy to occupy the power gap. Some might have a different view that the military wanted to keep the power under their control. However, the military had given the power to the civilian authorities when the civil authorities seemed to be ready to conduct a proper election. Miller and group wrote that "the SCAF making clear that the military would not seek to govern" and they also mentioned that

“Egypt would remain a secular civilian-led state”.⁵² This notion has asserted that the military would give the power to a civilian government. However, the second notion creates conflict of interest as the Islamists want to implement the Sharia within Egypt’s political system. The result would mean that Egypt would not be a secular state but an Islamic state. The Islamic state is the political agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood somehow was influenced by the Salafis which have been opposed by the military and secularist. In fact, during the Morsi’s administration he tried to set up dictatorial power by replacing key positions of power with trusted persons in the government, specifically in the military, and also by rearranging Egypt’s media in order to create and gain public opinion through their influence.⁵³ As a result, the conflict produced had the worst possible conditions.

Meanwhile, at the beginning of Morsi presidency, the military apparently sought supports from the Muslim Brotherhood by responding to demands from the group rather than the other group although historically the military did not have the trust of the Islamist.⁵⁴ Yet, the Islamist did not want the support of the military which had influence on the political system particularly within the parliament.⁵⁵ The Muslim Brotherhood had occupied the parliament and the government as well as having tried to build a new regime under Mohammad Morsi’s presidency. By June 2012 the SCAF took over and dissolved the parliament. As a matter of fact, the atmosphere of mistrust in Egyptian political

⁵² Miller et al., *Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and Lessons from Around the Globe* . . . , 97.

⁵³ Marc Lynch, "Morsi's Egypt: Lamborghini Morsi," *POMPEPS Briefings* 8, no. 13 (August 13, 2012).

⁵⁴ Noueihed and Warren, *The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making of the New Era* . . . , 116-117.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

circles and political immaturity hurt Egypt post revolution. In the end, it also had challenged the implementation of democracy in Egypt.

THE LIGHT OF THE REVOLUTION

The success of Egypt's revolution will be achieved if the demands of the Egyptian people could be fulfilled by the existing government and it is expected that a better quality of life is possible for all of Egypt. Democracy is not about changing the government with free and fair elections through voting. Democracy is the concern of building appropriate systems to connect the variety of differences with others; to seek the same perception in common good among the different groups that form a society.⁵⁶ By that notion, it could be argued that the end product of democracy is the respect of the variety of perceptions. The goal is to take advantage of the many perceptions in order to create the best solution which accommodates all peoples' aspirations to achieve a good life. Some might argue that the best way to get a good decision is by only considering the majority interest for achieving a better condition. In fact, it cannot easily correspond to how a democratic system works. The following paragraph will try to discuss several efforts to accomplish the goals of revolution in order to create a good political transition and perform democracy in Egypt.

First, the atmosphere of mistrust and immaturity in politics among all the key actors of the revolution apparently could be seen by the difficulty of political transition post the 2011 revolution. As previously mentioned, each group had tried to build and execute their agenda. The Muslim Brotherhood seemed to retaliate after holding power.

⁵⁶ Sarquís, *Democratization After the Arab Spring: The Case of Egypt's Political Transition*, 871-903

They wanted to build a new regime meanwhile the military as the guardians needed to build a coalition with them, to protect their interest in dealing with politics and economics. This was in order to safe guard the peace agreement with Israel. The Salafis had influenced the Muslim Brotherhood to achieve their interests while the secularists had no opportunity to argue their vision due to lack of support. These political situations would exacerbate the conditions of Egyptian society and not improve the stability of the state. The conflict of interest and lack of political consensus would lead Egypt to even worse conditions. As a result, democracy would not be achieved and the ordinary people would remain stagnant due to the key actor's negative impacts. To do so, all key actors must consider how they should approach the problem in order to build a well satisfied society that most Egyptians always demanded. The people may not be concerned about their own political interests and the majorities may not care about the minority. They must demonstrate political maturity by building consensus and maintaining the trust of each group and among groups.

The other major effort should be performed by the military in order to maintain their neutrality in the political system. The military must show their professionalism by being uninvolved in political and economic affairs. For instance in a modern and democratic society, the people rely on the professionalism of the military to guard the nation. People do not demand that the military encompass all aspects of life in their civil affairs. The Egyptian military must believe their society and let them run the state. In facing the Egyptian circumstances, it is obvious that the military still contributes and is taking a part in the both areas (politics and economics). In fact, most people in Egypt had refused the military's roles in those areas at the time they demanded the resignation of

Hosni Mubarak.⁵⁷ For example as Freedman and Tiburzi mentioned in their article that the Indonesian military had shrunk the politics and economics role since the resignation of Suharto, although it needed time to withdraw from the role. Indonesia's military had been practicing political and economic activities since independence in 1945.⁵⁸ It is true that in order to turn the Egyptian military neutral would not be an easy task, because the military has been actively involved in those areas for more than 3 decades. It needs time and great leadership to reverse and change this situation. However, it will be the goal of modern democratic societies both domestically and internationally to demand a democratic system free of military intervention.

The final effort which could become the method to build a democratic society in Egypt is to build trust among the political actors. In doing so, the new Egyptian government must guarantee human rights, dignity and social justice for the prosperity of all Egyptians. When the government cannot maintain peace and stability as the people want, the people will always turn to demonstration and protest. This is because they have learned that the power of people is a powerful and effective way to sink a regime, although there is no cheap price to pay in the revolution. The media will always become the tool to mobilize people to come to the streets to protest. Globalization will teach the people to contest the opinion of their government. Moreover, people become much more disparaging to sensitive issues when the government cannot show that they are trustworthy. As a result, in order to obtain democracy in Egypt, a genuine trust building between people and the government is compulsory. The government and the society

⁵⁷ Voogd-el Mhamdi, *Serving in Uniform during the Spring: A Case Study of the Role of the Egyptian Military in Transition* . . . 23.

⁵⁸ Amy Freedman and Robert Tiburzi, "Progress and Caution: Indonesia's Democracy," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 39, no. 3 (07, 2012), 131-156.

should work together, side by side in synergy in order to accomplish the national goal as if they were a solid team when they conducted the revolution. Furthermore they must be fair and committed to what they had promised to the entire Egyptian population. In addition, Egypt, as the center of Islamic culture and science should show the credibility of Islam since it represents the majority of the state. They must build Islam as the religion which love peace instead of radical perception of faith which confront to the others or the west. As a result it would change the western perspective of Islam.

All in all, in order to form a democracy in the Egyptian state as an achievement of the 2011 revolution the key actors must realize that the common good and the public interest are bigger than the group interest and agenda. Shura and Ijma should become the fundamental aspects of the political system if democracy would be implemented. Furthermore, the military should become professional and maintain neutrality in the area of politics and economic affairs. The military should also trust that civil society can run the state and vice versa. In the end, the government must gain the trust of their people and guarantee that social justice will be upheld. Also, the maintenance and enforcement of human rights must be respected in all aspects of the Egyptian state system. Finally, they must show that Egypt and Islam are not a threat to others or the west.

CONCLUSION

The 2011 Egyptian revolution was the starting point of democracy within the state. Egypt demanded a better quality of life after more than two decades under Mubarak's authoritarian government. All the ethnic groups which constituted the Egyptian nation came together in the streets to demand the removal of Hosni Mubarak's

regime, also demanded were the cessation of emergency law, freedom, justice and the formation of a new non-military government with the interest of Egyptians. Finally they demanded all Egypt's resources be used for the prosperity of the Egyptian people.

The political situation post Mubarak resignation was exacerbated by the conflict of interest and mistrust among the key actors in the Egyptian political system. The military had built a political contract with the Muslim Brotherhood while they also committed to being neutral. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood wanted to reduce the military's role in the state while they needed the supports from the military. Moreover, the secularists who recognized the liberal democracy wanted to take part in politics but lacked support. Meanwhile, the Salafis had their own agenda in Egypt which was to lead Egyptian politics to a theocracy. It was a multifaceted situation, yet it was the reality that Egypt's people faced during and post the revolution. The process is still underway and it cannot be determined whether it is successful or disastrous ever since Hosni Mubarak's downfall.

All in all, in order to successfully lead Egypt to democracy and to fulfill the aims of the revolution, all parties must stand side by side and reinforce the wide application of democratic principles. Democracy cannot solely be based on the majority, but should concern the minority aspirations to achieve social justice, human dignity and prosperity in Egypt. People in Egypt can accomplish the goals of democracy only if there is good government as well as well-maintained power sharing by the key actors.

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