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THE NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO EXTERNAL WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS: A WORK IN PROGRESS

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Exercise Solo Flight

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EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT*

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Introduction

New Zealand (NZ) is a country with a small population of less than five million. tucked away in the South Pacific. NZ relies on trade and the NZ Government (NZG) utilizes its proactive foreign policy to offset its relative lack of economic power. Part of NZ's foreign policy is to contribute to both regional and international stability operations to establish and consolidate links and partnerships with other trading nations as well as secure NZ's reputation as a stable and contributing nation to the global world order¹.

Due to the small size of NZ's military and public service NZ's ability to operate independently and in isolation is severely restricted especially in the international context. Consequently the NZG has adopted a Whole of Government² (WoG) approach to both its internal and external national security priorities³. Over a 10 year period ending in 2013 NZ's main contribution to the securing and rebuilding of Afghanistan was the NZ Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) which in its final few years arguably became the role model of a successful WoG approach to running a PRT⁴. In part, as a result of

¹ New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *Statement of Intent 2014–2018*. Wellington, New Zealand, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013.

² The Canadian Government integrated approach to crisis situations that incorporates instruments of national power: diplomacy (e.g. DFAIT), military (DND/CF), and economic (e.g. CIDA). CFJP 01, p. GL -8. In the New Zealand context the New Zealand Government applies a similar approach to the Canadian model with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade responsible for diplomacy, the Ministry of Defence for military and the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment responsible for economic.

³ New Zealand Ministry of Prime Minister and Cabinet. *New Zealand's National Security System*. Wellington, New Zealand, New Zealand Ministry of Prime Minister and Cabinet, May 2011. P 3.

⁴ Sholto Stephens. "Lessons of a Coalition Partner in Afghanistan 2002-2013" *Military Review*, (Jan-Feb 2014). p 68.

lessons learned from the PRT, the NZG has directed that the WoG approach be embedded throughout the NZ public service⁵.

This paper will argue that the NZG is now better prepared to conduct another PRT type international operation as a result of imbedding a WoG perspective. This paper will lay the foundation for the argument by describing the PRT's successful development into a WoG organization in Afghanistan. The paper will then describe the development of the NZG's WoG approach across the NZ public service followed by a more detailed analysis of the New Zealand Defence Force's (NZDF) transition to becoming a leader and WoG champion in NZ. This paper will conclude by describing NZ's transition from successful WoG operations at the national and regional level to NZ's potential to conduct another successful WoG PRT type operation at the international level.

The New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team

The NZ PRT was established in the Bamyan Province in Afghanistan in 2003. It was NZDF led and continued for 10 years until early 2013⁶. From early 2010 the PRT command transitioned from a NZDF military commander to a PRT Director from the NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) which reflected the refocus of the PRT's mission from security and short term development to that of developing governance and sustainable development⁷.

⁵ New Zealand Ministry of Prime Minister and Cabinet. *New Zealand's National Security System*. Wellington, New Zealand, New Zealand Ministry of Prime Minister and Cabinet, May 2011. p 3.

⁶ Sholto Stephens. "Lessons of a Coalition Partner in Afghanistan 2002-2013" *Military Review*, (Jan-Feb 2014). p 68.

⁷ New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *New Zealand's Achievements from 10 Years of Development Assistance in Bamyan, Afghanistan*. Wellington, New Zealand, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, March 2013.

Due to NZDF military commitments in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands over the same period the NZDF was stretched to maintain three simultaneous deployments. Both Singapore and Malaysia supplied personnel as did the United States military to the PRT to either supplement or enhance the PRT's mission⁸. Also other government agencies (OGA) like MFAT, the NZ Aid Programme (NZAID), NZ Police, US Department of State and US Agency for International Development became part of the PRT as it grew in size so that better coordination across governance and development with the PRT was achieved⁹. Consequently the PRT developed from an ad hoc organization to in its last few years displaying the foundations of a fully functioning WoG PRT through the development of longer term and more comprehensive planning and coordination across the OGAs and military units involved¹⁰.

The NZDF already had a recent history of incorporating other countries militaries into their deployed units which made the transition from a purely NZDF PRT to a multinational composite PRT more seamless. For instance in the Timor Leste deployments from 1999 to 2003 the NZDF deployed battalion group had at various times Singaporean, Nepalese, Fijian and Irish sub units attached to the battalion groups¹¹. Prior to each new PRT rotation Singaporean and Malaysian members joined in the pre-deployment training in NZ which further enhanced the cohesion of each PRT as did the NZ Police contingent.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Paul Sinclair. "After the Missions: Understanding New Zealand's Security Future." *Briefing Paper for a Public Symposium*, Centre for Strategic Studies New Zealand, May 22, 2013.

The attachment of the small NZ Police contingent to the PRT, from 2005, to train and mentor the Afghan National Police (ANP) at the co-located ANP Police training facility further highlighted a WoG approach taken by the NZG¹². NZDF training teams assisted with the weapons and tactics training of the ANP recruits whilst at the same time learning the community oriented policing concepts being taught by the NZ Police and the US and European Union law enforcement trainers at the training facility. The NZ Police contribution to the police capacity building in Afghanistan was part of the European Union's nonmilitary commitment to the nation building of Afghanistan¹³. Coupled with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) being a NATO led operation NZ's profile and reputation in European countries was raised significantly by the NZ led PRT¹⁴.

Having both a multinational and WoG approach to the PRT resulted in Bamyan being one of the first provinces in Afghanistan to be transitioned back to the Afghan National Security Forces and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan control in 2013¹⁵. The PRT was also regarded by ISAF as the role model to which PRTs throughout Afghanistan aspire, resulting in numerous visits by other countries seeking to improve their own PRTs¹⁶. This ensured that the NZG investment in the PRT paid dividends to NZ's international reputation as a country that punches above its weight and

¹² New Zealand Police. International Services Group, last reviewed May 20 2015, <http://www.police.govt.nz/about-us/programmes-initiatives/isg>

¹³ Sholto Stephens. "Lessons of a Coalition Partner in Afghanistan 2002-2013" *Military Review*, (Jan-Feb 2014). p 71.

¹⁴ Paul Sinclair. "After the Missions: Understanding New Zealand's Security Future." *Briefing Paper for a Public Symposium*, Centre for Strategic Studies New Zealand, May 22, 2013.

¹⁵ New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *New Zealand's Achievements from 10 Years of Development Assistance in Bamyan, Afghanistan*. Wellington, New Zealand, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, March 2013.

¹⁶ NATO. Resolute News Afghanistan, last reviewed May 20 2015, <http://www.rs.nato.int/article/news/isaf-officials-visit-bamyan-new-zealand-prt.html>

contributes to international stability by nation building¹⁷. Having Muslim countries like Malaysia working with the PRT served to build NZ's reputation and the legitimacy of the PRT in the Muslim world. In turn, this assisted NZ in developing trade and defence links in South East Asia and other Muslim countries¹⁸.

New Zealand Government's Development of a Whole of Government Approach

The NZ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) leads, supports and coordinates the public sector on behalf of the government of the day¹⁹. One of the DPMC's five outputs is the responsibility to ensure that national security and intelligence coordination priorities are met²⁰. NZ's national security is planned and governed through a system called the Domestic and External Security Coordination (DESC)²¹. DESC has been in place since 1987 and provides the mechanisms for the NZG to deal with major crises or other situations requiring a WoG approach²². At the second level of the NZ national security system is the Official's Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) which is made up of central government departments' chief executives with security responsibilities including the Ministry of Defence (MOD), NZ Police, Ministry of Primary Industries and MFAT²³. ODESC is chaired by the chief executive of the DPMC and takes direction from Cabinet (the first level of NZ's national security system) and implements those directions as they relate to

¹⁷ New Zealand Ministry of Defence. *Defence White Paper 2010*. Wellington, New Zealand, Ministry of Defence, November 2010.

¹⁸ Paul Sinclair. "After the Missions: Understanding New Zealand's Security Future." *Briefing Paper for a Public Symposium*, Centre for Strategic Studies New Zealand, May 22, 2013.

¹⁹ New Zealand Ministry of Prime Minister and Cabinet. *New Zealand's National Security System*. Wellington, New Zealand, New Zealand Ministry of Prime Minister and Cabinet, May 2011.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

national security, intelligence and crisis management from a WoG perspective²⁴.

ODESC, as a forum, then decides which department will take the lead on a national security issue, which departments will support or enable the lead agency, the envisaged time frame to complete the issue and the resources to be allocated²⁵.

It was not until the mid-1990's, after the NZDF's recent 15 month deployment to the former Yugoslavia, that the NZG realized that the DSEC system was not functioning as a WoG approach due to some government departments being compartmentalized and narrowly focused²⁶. The NZDF deployment to the former Yugoslavia had placed a burden on our allies as the NZDF had neither the adequate force protection equipment nor logistics to support the deployment. As a consequence, this degraded NZ's international reputation amongst our allies and at the UN. Subsequent governments decided to improve the integration and alignment of the DSEC system as well as upgrade the NZDF through the procurement of light armoured vehicles, helicopters and ships²⁷. An example of integration was the 1999 merger of the Ministry of Civil Defence and the Ministry of Emergency Management into the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management to better coordinate NZ's response to natural and manmade disasters²⁸.

By the mid-2000's the NZG, based on both fiscal constraints and understanding the rapidly changing and increasingly complex international security environment post 9/11, began to investigate better ways to meet its international commitments as well as increasing the coordination of its government departments that had international

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management. *Business Plan 2014-2015*. Wellington, New Zealand, Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, September 2014.

portfolios. The fiscal constraints, especially, forced the NZG to quicken the pace of change. Also the implications from three simultaneous large scale (in NZ terms) deployments was that the NZDF could not sustain them indefinitely²⁹. Due to the improving security situation in each deployment, there was increased scope for a transition to nation and capacity building delivered by OGAs and partner nations. The transition meant that expensive and overstretched NZDF resources could be replaced by NZ Police and OGAs as well as NZ's Pacific partner nations like Tonga, Papua New Guinea and Western Samoa³⁰.

In 2005 the NZ Police established the International Services Group (ISG) to better coordinate its increasing involvement in international capacity and capability building. To quickly build the ISG into a functioning group a number of ex NZDF personnel were brought in to coordinate the establishment of the organizational structures and pre deployment training³¹. In 2007 the NZG announced the establishment of an organized crime agency to prevent and disrupt organized crime through coordinated multi-agency action. In 2008, the Organised and Financial Crime Agency New Zealand (OFCANZ) was established; the NZ Police served as the host organization for the agency and four taskforces focused on international gangs, drug importation, money laundering and targeted operations³². OFCANZ has members from, and works closely with, the NZ Customs Service, Inland Revenue, the Serious Fraud Office, the Ministry of Justice, NZ

²⁹ New Zealand Ministry of Defence. *Defence White Paper 2010*. Wellington, New Zealand, Ministry of Defence, November 2010.

³⁰ Paul Sinclair. "After the Missions: Understanding New Zealand's Security Future." *Briefing Paper for a Public Symposium*, Centre for Strategic Studies New Zealand, May 22, 2013.

³¹ New Zealand Police. International Services Group, last reviewed May 20 2015, <http://www.police.govt.nz/about-us/programmes-initiatives/isg>

³² New Zealand Police. Organised and Financial Crime Agency New Zealand, last reviewed May 20 2015, <http://www.police.govt.nz/search-results/ofcanz>

Immigration Service and the NZ Intelligence community; it also works closely with Interpol and similar agencies in other countries.

In 2009 major governmental reviews were conducted into NZ's intelligence and security including a defence white paper³³. The reviews reinforced the view that most government departments and agencies were still disparate and not well coordinated³⁴. Consequently the NZG directed that a number of government departments be integrated or be moved under control of other departments and that new multiagency organizations be established to better fulfil NZ's intelligence and security needs³⁵.

In 2010 the External Assessments Bureau, which was charged with making intelligence assessments for the NZG, was renamed the National Assessments Bureau (NAB)³⁶. The NAB, whose parent agency is the DPMC, uses intelligence gathered by the NZ Security Intelligence Service, the Government Communications Security Bureau, and the Directorate of Defence and Intelligence Security; it also uses NZ Police gathered intelligence to inform the NZG³⁷. The NAB previously focused only upon external national security assessments. Its change in name signaled the more holistic intelligence and security focus that the NZG required by including, from 2010, a focus on domestic security as well³⁸.

In 2013, the Ministry of Primary Industry was established from the integration of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Fisheries. The MPI leads enforcement and resource protection of NZ's Exclusive Economic Zone with the

³³ New Zealand Ministry of Prime Minister and Cabinet. *New Zealand's National Security System*. Wellington, New Zealand, New Zealand Ministry of Prime Minister and Cabinet, May 2011.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

assistance of the NZDF, as NZ does not have a Coast Guard³⁹. In 2014 the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management was moved under the control of the DPMC to bring it into the DSEC environment to better coordinate a WoG approach to domestic crisis management⁴⁰. The movement and integration of Ministries with national security and intelligence portfolios reinforced to all NZG departments and agencies that the NZG was determined to ensure efficiencies and better coordination were achieved as they moved to a WoG approach.

Changes to the NZDF to Meet Whole of Government Requirements

In 2009 the NZG directed that the Ministry of Defence conduct a review of the NZDF. This resulted in the Defence White Paper (DWP) of 2010⁴¹. The DWP was the first white paper to be conducted in 13 years, due in part to the significant changes in the global security environment. The DWP matches the capabilities and resources the NZDF will need to protect NZ; it will also help advance NZ's interests over the following 25 years.

The DWP's major recommendations were: the establishment of an Amphibious Task Force (ATF) by 2015; increased intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; enhancement of the NZDF's ability to project and sustain units with increased combat utility, whether independently or as part of a coalition operation, by 2020⁴². As part of the ATF development, the DWP recommended that the NZDF put in

³⁹ Ministry of Primary Industries. Last reviewed 20 May 2015, <http://www.mpi.govt.nz/about-mpi/>

⁴⁰ New Zealand Ministry of Prime Minister and Cabinet. *New Zealand's National Security System*. Wellington, New Zealand, New Zealand Ministry of Prime Minister and Cabinet, May 2011.

⁴¹ New Zealand Ministry of Defence. *Defence White Paper 2010*. Wellington, New Zealand, Ministry of Defence, November 2010.

⁴² *Ibid.*

place structures that increased coordination with OGAs as well as allies in the South Pacific, where it was envisaged the ATF was to conduct most of its operations⁴³. The DWP sought to correct the problems that the NZDF had encountered in previous deployments outside the Pacific region – issues around force protection and sustainability – as well as ensure that the NZDF became a WoG champion and leader for NZ⁴⁴.

The NZDF was already well advanced in establishing of joint and interagency operations with the establishment in 2001 of Joint Force Headquarters New Zealand to coordinate NZ's operational deployments⁴⁵. All three services had extensive experience operating as supporting agencies to OGAs (such as the RNZAF and RNZN), conducting maritime Search and Rescue, and enforcing EEZ resource protection on behalf of and with MPI, MCDEM and their predecessors⁴⁶. The Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) and Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) also had experience working with MFAT and NZAID on EEZ surveillance and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) delivery, in support of South Pacific nations such as Tonga, Niue, Vanuatu and Rarotonga⁴⁷. The NZDF, with its higher level of training and planning abilities – as well as its ability to conduct the restructure recommended by the DWP – was better prepared than other NZ OGAs to lead or support operations.

The NZDF already had in service Her Majesty's New Zealand Ship (HMNZS) Canterbury, a multi role vessel capable of carrying 250 troops, landing craft and helicopters (the ship being crewed with personnel from all three services). Consequently,

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Scott Cordell. 'New Zealand's Next Move: Amphibious Capability.' *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring 2014, Vol. 17 Issue 1, p. 40.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

HMNZS Canterbury became the basis of the ATF development by the NZDF, as directed by the subsequent NZ Defence Capability Plan⁴⁸. The NZ Army underwent the most significant changes recommended by the DWP by adopting a one brigade force structure as well as the step up of a third combat unit in 2011⁴⁹. In 2012, the NZDF established the Deployable Joint Task Force Headquarters, which was tasked with command and control of NZ led operations and possessed the capacity to integrate OGAs into its structure⁵⁰.

The NZDF had previously had integrated courses in specialist areas, such as those for physical training instructors and medics, but the DWP set the conditions for other joint courses to be conducted to increase efficiencies. For instance, the first joint initial officer training course was conducted in early 2014. In late 2014, the NZDF Provost Marshal position and the NZDF Military Police (MP) unit were established, thereby combining all three services' disparate military policing personnel. A NZ Police Inspector was seconded as the inaugural NZDF Provost Marshal to ensure the effective capacity building of the NZDF MP unit, which included the establishment of a criminal investigation capacity. NZDF MP personnel have since commenced attending NZ Police criminal investigation courses. NZDF personnel also now attend the NZ Police Dog Training School, with graduating tracking and explosive detective dog teams increasing the capacity of the NZDF. The above examples highlight increasing cross-training between the NZDF and NZ Police in a WoG environment, as directed by the NZG.

⁴⁸ New Zealand Ministry of Defence. *Defence Capability Plan*. Wellington, New Zealand, Ministry of Defence, September 2011.

⁴⁹ Scott Cordell. 'New Zealand's Next Move: Amphibious Capability.' *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring 2014, Vol. 17 Issue 1, p. 40.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

Transition to a Whole of Government Approach in an International Context

In February 2011 the devastating Christchurch earthquake occurred in NZ and NZDF units and OGAs rushed to assist with HADR, security, planning and coordination. The multi-agency disaster victim investigation teams, both foreign and NZ urban search and rescue teams, emergency services and Australian and NZ Police were all coordinated through a WoG command centre that was established. Lessons learned about coordination of the WoG approach taken in Christchurch were incorporated into the September 2011 Rugby World Cup (hosted in NZ). This international sporting event again took a WoG approach to coordinating and conducting operations, ultimately demonstrating another successful WoG operation run by the NZG.

NZ's recent experience in applying the WoG approach to disasters and crises in both New Zealand and the South Pacific has demonstrated that NZ is becoming adept at applying effective WoG solutions to such invariably short term incidents. NZ is also heavily involved in the development and capacity building of small South Pacific nations like Tonga, Western Samoa, Kiribati and Tokelau, where it is utilizing a WoG approach led by MFAT⁵¹. What NZ has not had the opportunity to demonstrate is the transference of its recently acquired WoG skills and experience to another long term, nation building, PRT type operation, outside of the South Pacific.

In 2013, NZ was ranked 92nd in the United Nations list of countries contributing to UN peacekeeping missions⁵². In 2014, NZ gained a seat on the prestigious UN

⁵¹ New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *Statement of Intent 2014–2018*. Wellington, New Zealand, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013.

⁵² Paul Sinclair. "After the Missions: Understanding New Zealand's Security Future." *Briefing Paper for a Public Symposium*, Centre for Strategic Studies New Zealand, May 22, 2013.

Security Council. The NZG has, in early 2015, deployed a NZDF company group sized training team to Iraq to train Iraq forces to fight the Islamic Caliphate. This deployment is only for two years and has no OGAs attached. To sustain NZ's international reputation NZ needs to commit to a long term UN capacity and nation building WoG PRT type operation. NZ is better prepared to conduct another WoG PRT operation. Should it not conduct another PRT type international, NZ would risk losing not only the reputation it has gained in the past decade, but also the skills, relationships and experience at international level that the NZDF and NZ OGAs have developed in a WoG environment.

Conclusion

This paper has shown that the NZG is better prepared to conduct another PRT type international operation as a result of imbedding a WoG perspective. Although NZ has focused on national and regional WoG operations since the Afghanistan PRT was disestablished, the experience, training, skills and relationships built remain transferable to another PRT international operation. Over the 10 year period that the NZ led PRT was in Afghanistan, it grew and changed to become arguably the model of a multinational WoG run PRT. The reputation built and lessons learned from running the PRT set the conditions for NZ to take on increased international responsibilities, such as becoming a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2015.

Due to both increasing fiscal pressures and the changing global security environment, the NZG realized, in the mid-2000s, that it could not rely on the NZDF to sustain multiple international operations as well as meet its commitments to nation building. NZG departments were also compartmentalized and narrowly focused.

Consequently, the NZG directed that a rationalization occur whereby government departments were integrated or moved under more appropriate leadership, in order to embed a WoG approach.

In 2009, the NZG conducted security and intelligence reviews which resulted in a more comprehensive restructuring of government departments to better facilitate a WoG approach. In 2010, DWP directed the NZDF to restructure and become a WoG lead; the NZDF quickly achieved this directive. The NZ Police and OGAs also put in place changes that embedded a WoG approach.

The NZG directive to restructure the NZ public service and take on a WoG perspective has subsequently been tested successfully in national and regional operations. However, NZ has yet to test its WoG approach in another international PRT type operation, or to prove that the WoG approach has been embedded. NZ needs to carry out another such operation as a means to: protect the reputation that it has built up in the past decade; not let the skills, experience and relationships built up in the past decade decline. The embedding of the WoG in OGAs requires further research before it may be confirmed that the approach is indeed “business as usual” for the NZ public service.

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