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**THE MORE THINGS CHANGE...:
TRENDS IN CANADIAN MILITARY PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
1964-2001**

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JCSP 39

Master of Defence Studies

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By Major R.D. Tesselaar
Par le major R.D. Tesselaar

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Abstract

There have been numerous studies and reports written on the Canadian Forces officer professional development system since unification was proposed in 1964. These reports include two seminal reports, the Rowley Report of 1967 and the Morton Report of 1995. This paper examines the conclusions and recommendations of these and other reports to identify common themes. In reviewing these studies three trends have emerged. The first trend to emerge is that there is a resistance to change in the professional development system. Another key trend to emerge is that the expectations of military officers have evolved throughout time, generally increasing the standards and requirements to deal with more complex problems in a rapidly changing geo-political environment. The third key trend to emerge is that there is a general consensus that the professional development system does a satisfactory job of developing lower level officers, but does not provide senior officers with the training, experience and education required to prepare them for the challenges at the highest levels.

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
1964-1970: Unification and the Rowley Report.....	8
1970-1993: The End of the Cold War.....	27
1994-2001: Post Cold War and Somalia.....	47
The Present and the Future	61
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	69

Chapter 1

Introduction

It matters little whether the Forces have their present manpower strength and financial budget, or half of them, or double them; without a properly educated, effectively trained, professional officer corps the Forces would, in the future, be doomed to, at the best, mediocrity; at the worst, disaster.

- General J.V. Allard, Chief of the Defense Staff¹

General Jean Victor Allard was Chief of the Defense Staff from 1966 to 1969, during the period when the Canadian Forces underwent the process of unification. Since unification in 1968, the Canadian Forces professional military education system has been formally and informally reviewed numerous times. General Allard made the above statement regarding the importance of the education and development of military officers in the foreword to the 1969 *Report of the Officer Development Board*. This report, also known as the Rowley Report after the chair of the board, Major-General Roger Rowley, was a comprehensive review of the officer development program from recruiting through to service at the highest levels in all elements of the Canadian Forces. It has served as a baseline reference for most studies that followed it due to the breadth and depth of its study. There are several commonalities in the conclusions and recommendations of these reports and studies. The contexts of each explain the genesis of the reports and studies and shape the recommendations made and subsequently implemented.

¹ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report of the Officer Development Board, Volumes I, II and III* (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, March 1969), 1. Hereafter referred to as the Rowley Report.

This paper seeks to study the commonalities in the contexts, conclusions and recommendations of the professional military education reports and studies to identify any trends or themes. Identifying trends in the conclusions and recommendations in the various studies of the Canadian Forces professional military education system will offer insights into the evolution of that system and the demands upon it by the Canadian Forces and the Government of Canada. Trends in the evolution of the professional education system illustrate potential changes for the future and highlight any systematic shortfalls.

To conduct this analysis, three periods of Canadian Forces history from unification to present will be examined, each based upon a key report or study. The first will be 1964 to 1970, covering the period of unification and initial restructuring. The main report during this period was the 1969 *Report of the Officer Development Board* (the Rowley Report). This report was written to define the professional development requirements of a unified Canadian Forces and set a baseline for the review of the officer professional development system. The second period to be examined will be 1970 to 1993, covering the latter half of the Cold War and reinvestment in the Canadian Forces. While there were no significant events or reports in 1970, it is a natural break point between the baseline established with the delivery of the Rowley Report and the subsequent studies of the officer professional development system as the next study began in the fall of 1970. The 1986 *Senior Officer Professional Development* report was the primary paper during this period. Finally, the period 1993-2001 will be examined, covering the fallout of the Somalia Affair and the post-cold war demands upon the Canadian Forces. As a result of the Somalia Affair, the Canadian Forces came under

intense scrutiny. This scrutiny included an examination of the professional development system and the 1995 *Report of the Officer Development Review Board* was the defining report of this period. This report provided a broad review and updated the baseline established by the Rowley Report.

A number of primary and secondary sources were used to develop the concepts and ideas presented in this paper. The professional development system of the Canadian Forces has been studied and commented on numerous times over the past fifty years. Some of the studies have been formal studies directed from within the Department and several were conducted for academic purposes. These studies made up the primary sources and their findings, conclusions and recommendations, as well as comments on previous studies where applicable, were used to identify trends in the requirements and evolution of the Canadian Forces officer professional development system.

The primary documents were made available in either copy or electronic format (and often both) through the Information Resource Centre at the Canadian Forces College. The 1969 *Report of the Officer Development Board* (Rowley Report) and the 1995 *Report of the Officer Development Review Board* (Morton Report) are the two seminal studies because of the breadth of their review of the officer professional development system. Each can be linked to a significant event in Canadian Forces history, unification in the case of the Rowley Report and the Somalia Affair in the case of the Morton report. They both provide an overview of an officer's professional development throughout his career from recruitment to retirement, but the Rowley Report

also provides an assessment of the ongoing changes in Canadian society and the role of the military and the military professional in the 1960s projected forward to the 1980s. The Morton Report provided comparison of the officer professional development system to other elements of the public service and foreign officer professional development systems, as well as detail on the assessment of officer abilities, traits and characteristics.

The other studies used as primary sources were generally focused on single aspects of the officer professional development system or when having a broad scope, did not have the depth of analysis as that provided by the Rowley and Morton reports. Several were written about how to implement the recommendations of the Rowley and Morton Reports, such as the 1996 *Officer Professional Development Working Group Final Report*. Some were written to meet post-graduate academic requirements and were later circulated within the Canadian Forces, such as the 1988 *General and Senior Officer Development in the Canadian Forces* report written by Major-General R.J. Evraire for his Master's Degree in Public Administration. This report became known as the Evraire Report.

The secondary documents consisted largely of articles and other commentary accessed through on-line journals or records. These sources generally focused on the history of officer training in the Canadian Forces, the impact of changes to the officer professional development system or discussed how the officer professional development system prepared, or failed to prepare, an officer for a certain situation. There have been a number of Canadian scholars who have focused their writing on the Canadian system.

Two notable authors are Colonel (Retired) Randall Wakelam and Doctor Howard Coombs, each have written several articles related to Canadian Forces professional development and together they edited and re-released the Rowley Report (Volume I) in 2010. The *Canadian Military Journal* provides a forum for articles relevant to the Canadian military and frequently features articles on aspects of professional development from both serving members and academics.

Often secondary sources described the professional development systems of the militaries of our allies. There is a significant amount of information available on the American professional development system in particular. These sources did not contribute directly to the examination of Canadian Forces professional development studies, but did provide a perspective from Allies who faced similar challenges. They would be a beneficial comparison to any study of the current professional development system and informative in any recommendations for future changes.

Chapter 2 will examine the period of 1964 to 1970. The Defence White Paper of March 1964 revealed the Government's intent to unify the three military services under a single Chief of the Defence Staff and Defence Staff, an intent that later became law effective as of 1 February 1968. Unification provided the impetus for review of officer professional development. This review was conducted first in a smaller study to determine the interim approach and then in a more comprehensive study known as the Rowley Report. The Rowley Report in particular provided a baseline of data and

recommendations that would continue to be referred to in reports and studies for the next three decades.

Chapter 3 will examine the period of 1970 to 1993. There were significant geo-political changes during this period. The Canadian Forces conducted operations around the world, primarily in support of the United Nations. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and North American Air Defense (NORAD) commitments shaped the role of the Canadian Forces in the Cold War. During this period four defence white papers were published by the Government of Canada, providing guidance on the role of the Canadian Forces in meeting the aims of the Government. A number of studies were conducted to examine how to best prepare Canadian Forces officers to operate in the evolving and increasing complex geo-political environment. The 1986 *Senior Officer Professional Development* report summarized many of these findings.

Chapter 4 will examine the period of 1994 to 2001. The actions of Canadian soldiers deployed in Somalia on a United Nations peacekeeping mission which led to the deaths of local civilians became known as the Somalia Affair. In the aftermath of this incident there was close scrutiny of many aspects of the Canadian Forces including the education and training of leaders. As well during this time frame, the Canadian Forces had a number of institutions cut as part of government-wide budget cutbacks. The 1995 *Report of the Officer Development Review Board* was one of the reports generated during this period. It reviewed the Canadian Forces professional development system broadly and made recommendations for an updated officer professional development system.

There have been a number of studies and reports subsequent that have examined specific aspects of the officer professional development system, this paper will examine key studies through to 2001. Since 2001, there have not been any significant examinations of the professional development system.

Chapter 5 will discuss the themes found and provide a summary of the conclusions. The key trends identified will be examined to determine their relevance today and how they may continue to shape the future evolution of the Canadian Forces officer professional development system. Recommendations will be made for future areas of research.

These chapters show that the Canadian Forces officer professional development system has undergone frequent review and study. The evolution of the professional development system from the unification of the Canadian military under a single Chief of Defence to the present day can be traced by examining the reports and studies pertaining to professional military education. It is a key aspect of maintaining the credibility of the military as a profession in Canada. To remain relevant it must continue to evolve in response to the changing military and political environment around the globe to meet the expectations of that the Canadian populace and Canadian government have of a professional Canadian Forces. Understanding the factors that have influenced the professional development system to this point will inform future changes in the system.

Chapter 2

1964-1970: Unification and the Rowley Report

It is the opinion of your Commissioners that effective consolidation cannot be based on joint control by the three Services with the object of preserving the traditional responsibility of the three Chiefs of Staff for the control and administration of all the Armed Forces.

- Royal Commission on Government Organization²

This observation from the Royal Commission on Government Organization tabled in 1962-1963 set in motion a change of events that would largely shape the Canadian Forces during the period of 1964-1970. This was the forced unification of the three services. With respect to professional military education the key report of this period was the *Report of the Officer Development Board* dated March 1969. This board was chaired by Major-General Roger Rowley, thus the report is commonly referred to as the Rowley Report.

In the Defence White Paper of March 1964 the government of the day stated that the integration of the military services “under a single Chief of Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff” was the only adequate solution to effectively exercising operational control of the military.³ This integration would also provide the added benefit of reducing duplication and unnecessary overhead. This policy statement would eventually lead to the *Canadian Forces Reorganization Act* amending the *National Defence Act* to create one

² Canada, *Royal Commission on Government Organization, Volume 4*, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1963), 71. Accessed 6 January 2013. <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco-bcp/commissions-ef/glassco1962-eng/glassco1962-vol4-eng/glassco1962-vol4-part1-eng.pdf>

³ Canada, Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence*, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1964) 19.

unified military force. The *Canadian Forces Reorganization Act* officially came into effect on 1 February 1968.

Even before the government's policy became law and unification was implemented, the military began to take actions to set the conditions for success. One of those actions was to begin a review of the military education of officers to prepare them to work on integrated staffs. To do this, a working group on integrated staff training was established in February 1965 with the purpose of determining "the staff officer training requirements for the services with the object of introducing an integrated staff course in September of 1966."⁴ This working group had a broad requirement to examine the parameters for advanced education for military officers.⁵ Given only three months to produce their report the working group determined the time available was insufficient to meet the requirements. Instead, feeling it best not to "waste the limited time available before ... an integrated course must commence"⁶ after six weeks they submitted a report which identified the key characteristics of a professional military education system and made recommendations for the initial steps in amalgamating the service colleges.

Operating under the assumption that officers on integrated staffs would need a wider knowledge of all services the working group accepted the need for continuing education throughout an officer's career. They acknowledged a tension between the requirements of the individual services and those needed to support integration. The

⁴ Canada, Department of National Defence, "A Program For Professional Military Education For The Canadian Defence Force - A Report By The Working Group 19 March 1965" (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, 19 March 1965), Appendix A, 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

working group described this professional education as providing the skills required to handle the increasing responsibilities of higher rank and focused on the formal development of officers through staff courses, executive management training and professional military education. It is this report which provides a definition of professional military education as “instruction aimed at developing the knowledge, judgement [sic], breadth of understanding and executive capacity needed by the officer in control and direction of military forces.”⁷ Based upon this definition, the working group identified three general characteristics of a professional military education system.

The first characteristic described in the report was a close relationship between education and career policies. The professional military education system exists to meet the needs of the military force. To that end, education is not the sole factor in an officer’s development, career policies must exist to provide the education required at the appropriate times in balance with the trade and service experience required. The working group described education and career policies being integrated into a “comprehensive personnel development policy.”⁸

The second characteristic described was a devoted curriculum development staff to provide control and coordination. “The curriculum development staff is the heart of the professional education system.”⁹ The curriculum development staff is to look at the needs of the military in terms of both the role and employment of officers, and the subject matter required to prepare the officer to meet those demands. Those needs are ever

⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

changing and the curriculum development staff must prevent school curricula from being “frozen by tradition or swayed by passing enthusiasm.”¹⁰ To assist the staff in meeting that objective, the report describes the need for outside review by a Board of Governors consisting of very senior officers, representatives from other government departments and academics. This oversight and scrutiny was to be offset by a corresponding reporting relationship directly to Canadian Forces Headquarters and influence over the comprehensive personnel development policy.

The nature of support to the professional military education system was the third characteristic identified. Having argued the importance of the professional military education system, the working group suggested that all components of the system should be in one location and that the instructional staff be of the highest quality. Co-location of the various components would allow for close interaction between curriculum development and instructional staffs, as well as for economies in manning and facility requirements. In justifying the need for high quality instructional staff, the working group argued “all curriculum planning and the whole organizational structure amounts to very little unless the staff is of high enough quality to impress the student forcibly with its professional capacity.”¹¹

The working group provided some recommendations for changes to be made to the training system as an interim solution while a more complete review was conducted. In his doctoral thesis, historian Howard Coombs identifies these recommendations as

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

marking “the demise of single service staff colleges.”¹² He goes on to describe the impact of these changes on the Army professional development system in terms that may be described as devolutionary in that specific requirements of one of the services were lost to more generic intellectual pursuits with the shift in focus.¹³ The staff training provided after unification was shorter, yet broader in scope in order to meet the needs of all three services. The working group was only providing an interim solution and before their recommendations could be fully implemented a more comprehensive study was commissioned.

With the recommendations of the working group on integrated staff training in place as an interim measure and unification about to become law the Chief of the Defense Staff, General Allard, gave Major-General Rowley the task of conducting a comprehensive study of officer development. Based upon Major-General Rowley’s approach the Officer Development Board was stood up under his chairmanship in October of 1967 and began its work. The result was a three volume report issued in 1969, the *Report of the Officer Development Board*, also known as the Rowley Report after the board chairman.

Volume One of the report consisted of a review of the officer development system from recruitment to retirement. This review identified sixteen requirements for a system to meet the needs of a unified force within a changing Canadian society. The system in place at the time of the report was then compared to the requirements. Volume Two of

¹² Howard Gerard Coombs, “In Search of Minerva’s Owl: Canada’s Army and Staff Education (1946-1995),” (Ph.D. thesis, Queen’s University, 2010), 212.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 213.

the report made recommendations on how to modify the officer development system to meet the requirements identified in Volume One. Volume Three of the report consisted of a detailed implementation plan to overhaul the officer professional development system of the now unified Canadian Forces.

The first requirement of an officer professional development system identified by the Officer Development Board was that it must “prepare officers to contribute to a Canadian national strategy.”¹⁴ This requirement came from an examination of post-Second World War defence policy and the role and requirements for a military in a changing world. The conclusion was that “to sustain its world position, Canada must contribute, to the best of its ability, its fair share of ... military obligations.”¹⁵ The Board assessed that future Canadian Forces officers would have a broad range of professional functions to meet within their branch, service and the unified force in order to meet whatever defence policy may be implemented in a changing and increasingly technological world. From these demands upon the officer corps flowed the requirement that the officer development system must generate senior officers capable of providing military advice to the Government and executing national policies. Upon examination of the system of the day, the Board found the system “quite firmly based upon the past and considerable modification will be necessary if it is to produce officers in a methodical way to be equal to this task.”¹⁶

¹⁴ Rowley Report Volume I, 46.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 22.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 87.

The second requirement the Board identified was to “impart the Canadian military ethic.”¹⁷ This requirement came from the analysis of the function of a military officer and the nature of military service. An officer has a duty to the nation, to the military service and other serving members, to subordinates, and a personal responsibility to be equal to the professional responsibilities.¹⁸ This was highlighted in the context of evolving societal and cultural mores from generations that served in the Second World War and Korea to anti-war sentiments of the 1960’s. The Board specifically found that the officer development system did not “consciously help to impart to the officer corps a Canadian military ethic.”¹⁹ While the Board does not specify what aspects of the military ethos might be uniquely Canadian, if any, they do identify specific Canadian expectations for officers among the other requirements for the professional development system.

Another requirement identified was that the officer development system “remain in consonance with scientific and technological, sociological, economic, educational, military and strategic changes.”²⁰ This requirement ties directly to the relevance of the officer development system. If the military, the officer corps and the training system do not remain relevant to the changes around them the Canadian Forces will not attract the best recruits, nor will the system retain and produce officers prepared and capable of guiding the military through those changes. Again the Board found the officer development system lacking, only partially keeping up in some areas and barely keeping up in others.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 46.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 29.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 87.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 46.

The study also recommended that the Canadian Forces “accept the baccalaureate as the basic educational level for entry to the officer corps.”²¹ The board drew upon the 1965 study of Canadian post-secondary education, *Financing Higher Education in Canada, Being the Report of a Commission to the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada*, known as the Bladen Report. The Rowley Report described the increasing levels of education in Canada and, using the findings of the Bladen Report and data from the Chief of Personnel, the board determined that a higher educational level was required to continue to attract the “same quality of officer material that we have demanded in the past.”²² Although the Canadian Military Colleges had become degree-granting institutions and more university educated recruits were being sought, the board found that the principle of the requirement for a degree had not been widely accepted.²³

Continuing on their points regarding the military colleges, the Board recommended that the officer development system “ensure that the courses taught at a military college are relevant to the technical and operational requirements of the military profession.”²⁴ The primary benefit of a university education was identified as “the mental discipline of learning and analysis.”²⁵ With this requirement the Board was taking the practical stance that a military college cannot afford to offer the breadth of subjects and freedom of academic pursuit a civilian university might allow, therefore it must maintain a focus on national defence. The Board acknowledged the challenges of remaining

²¹ *Ibid.*, 47.

²² *Ibid.*, 32.

²³ *Ibid.*, 87.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 47.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 35.

accredited while tailoring programs to meet the military requirement, and recommended areas the military colleges should focus on and target ratios of degrees to be sought.²⁶

Notwithstanding the acceptance that a military college cannot provide the full breadth of education required by the officer corps, the Board also recommended that the Canadian Forces “employ the military college as the primary means of entry to the corps.”²⁷ Again the Board was looking at the practical secondary benefits of the military college programme. The military colleges offered greater quality control over the final product of a junior commissioned officer as the education would be relevant to the military requirement and the officer would be indoctrinated in the military ethos and tradition. The military colleges also offered the foundation of a professional network for the officer’s career and the opportunity to address other requirements such as bilingualism and physical fitness. Making the military colleges the primary entry route to the officer corps would be a departure from the practice of the day.²⁸

Examining the subsequent stages of officer development, the Board recommended that a new officer development system “establish harmony between training and education at the pre-commissioning level.”²⁹ The Board opined that an officer should complete training before graduating from military college and receiving a commission, thus allowing the officer to be employed and begin gaining experience right away. It acknowledged this was not possible for all trades. In addition to the practical benefit of

²⁶ Rowley Report Volume II, 25.

²⁷ Rowley Report Volume I, 47.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 87.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 47.

being immediately employable, the Board suggested integration of training and educational goals and standards might address issues of disillusionment as the officer transitions from the educational institute to professional practice.³⁰ In their review of the existing system the Board acknowledged this principle was attempted but indicated that the integration was not yet satisfactorily achieved.³¹

Another requirement identified by the Board was that the officer development system “employ a sequential process of professional education and experience in the post-commission period and recognize professional-development courses as career requirements.”³² The Board compared the military profession to civilian professions in that as professionals there is a requirement to keep abreast of developments in the profession, and this can only be accomplished through continual learning and education. Unlike civilian professions where specialization might be a pre-requisite to advancement, the military requires its senior personnel to have broad experience. To describe this evolution, the Board identified three stages in post-commissioning development. In the first stage, the officer develops expertise within his trade. The second stage occurs when the officer relates his trade to the rest of the military organization. The final stage is when the officer contextualizes the military profession within the national or international arenas. The officer development system must provide the education and experience at the appropriate times for the officer to successfully advance through these stages.³³ The

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 37.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 87.

³² *Ibid.*, 47.

³³ *Ibid.*, 38.

Board recognized the intents of the existing system to meet this requirement but identified uneven results between the services.³⁴

To support the requirement for sequential education throughout an officer's career the officer development system should also "provide the appropriate professional-development course material at the right stage to assist the officer in the orderly development of the qualities demanded of him at succeeding levels."³⁵ The skills and knowledge required vary throughout the length of an officer's employment. As a result the officer development system should be tailored to support this evolution through providing the appropriate training, experience or education. The Board identified several general qualities to categorize these requirements. The importance of these qualities could vary based upon the seniority and responsibility of the officer. For example, expertise within the officer's trade or branch is very important for junior officers, but declines in importance as the officer advances and service knowledge or general military expertise becomes more important. Some qualities remain important regardless of the officer's rank, such as "soldierly virtues" or ethics.³⁶ At the time of the report, the board assessed that the results of the service training systems were uneven and that the aim could be accomplished more effectively.³⁷

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 88.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 47.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 39-44.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 88.

In addition the system should “encourage original research on military matters within the officer corps.”³⁸ The Rowley Report laid out high expectations of officers in the Canadian Forces, one of which was to make original contributions to the military profession through research and study. If the research was of high enough quality it would contribute to the officer earning a post-graduate degree.³⁹ In the detailed proposal for the new officer development system, the board presented the criteria and course structure for a proposed Master’s Degree in Military Science. Opportunity to conduct research as part of an officer’s professional development was found to be lacking.⁴⁰

In what would now seem a statement of the obvious but at the time was not, the Board identified as a requirement that the officer development system “adhere to government policy with respect to bilingualism and biculturalism.”⁴¹ As a national institution, the Canadian Forces has a unifying role and must reflect the linguistic composition of Canada. The Board interpreted this requirement as allowing officers to both receive the required education and training in either language and to become more proficient in their second language.⁴² Bilingualism rates in the officer corps ranged from 5.9% in the Navy to 17% in the Army,⁴³ this was not reflective of the estimated 28% rate of bilingualism in Canada as whole.⁴⁴ The Board felt that more must be done to address the need for greater bilingualism in the officer corps.⁴⁵

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 47.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 88.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 45.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 67.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 88.

In addition to meeting government requirements for bilingualism, the officer development system was also to “promote the realization of unification of the Armed Forces.”⁴⁶ As the Board was stood up in October 1967 three and a half years after the Government announced its intentions for unification in the 1964 Defence White Paper and less than four months before unification would become law on 1 February 1968, it was a key factor in the Board’s considerations. The goals of reducing duplication and overhead while streamlining command are reflected in many of the Boards recommendations and particularly in their proposal for a single Canadian Defence Education Centre with a single campus for all aspects of officer professional education. This recommendation refers more practically to the unique military structure that Canada has after unification, calling for distinctly Canadian military thought and methodology while maintaining the capability to work with Canada’s closest allies.⁴⁷ Coming as the ramifications of unification were still being resolved throughout the military, the Board indicated that work in this area was imperative.⁴⁸

The Board also recommended that the officer development system “offer opportunity for educational upgrading to all officers.”⁴⁹ In this recommendation the Board indicated that all commissioned officers be merited and developed on the same basis. The Board had examined the officer development systems of other countries in their research as well, some of which made distinctions in career limitations based upon entry program. The recommendation clearly explained that not all officers would get the

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 88.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 47.

same professional development due to the structure of the military hierarchy, but the opportunity should be there for all officers to advance based upon their merits.⁵⁰ The Board identified that some entry plans offered advantages over others and noted the military should do more to mitigate this.⁵¹

Another requirement identified was that the officer development system “promote fair regional representation in the officer corps.”⁵² Similarly to their points on bilingualism where as a national institution the Canadian Forces must reflect the whole of Canada, the Board noted disparities in regional representation within the officer corps. This was partly due to the variances in provincial education standards as compared to the entry requirements of the military colleges. While they did not prescribe specific quotas, they indicated that the entry standards should be reflective of university entrance requirements in each province⁵³ and in the second volume of the report some detail was provided on how the proposed officer development system and Canadian Defence Education Centre could mitigate the differences in entrance standards without sacrificing the quality of graduates.⁵⁴

Of the principle requirements identified, the final one was that the officer development system “permit no degradation of operational effectiveness.”⁵⁵ This is another seemingly obvious requirement, that in preparing officers to lead the Canadian

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 46.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 88.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 47.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 46.

⁵⁴ Rowley Report Volume II, 56-65.

⁵⁵ Rowley Report Volume I, 47.

Forces to execute operations to meet national aims and strategies, the effectiveness of the Canadian Forces cannot be reduced. Yet it is worth noting for two reasons, first as a guiding measure in the examination of proposed changes; and secondly in the context of unification. The Rowley Report describes high expectations of the officer corps and calls for raising the standards in order for the military to best meet the needs of the nation. To do this, changes were required as maintaining the status quo would be insufficient, particularly in light of unification. One of the aims of unification was to increase the effective operational control of the military by the Government, again reinforcing that the military exists to meet the needs of the nation and the officer professional development system must prepare the future leaders of the military for those challenges. The Board felt that some training standards were deteriorating.⁵⁶

To meet the fifteen main requirements, the report identified a sixteenth requirement that “the system must, in addition, be efficiently organized, well integrated and effectively commanded.”⁵⁷ Here again the Boards comments reflect the context of unification and the pressures of reducing duplication and overhead. The training systems of the three services which had operated more or less independently were now being merged into a single system, particularly at the mid-grade and senior officer levels. Likewise, training institutions were spread across the country prohibiting the centralization of some support aspects and increasing expenses. The three elements of the professional development system, education, training and experience, were not well synchronized and integrated,

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 88.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 47.

often as a result of falling under different chains of command. These various chains of command hindered communication between elements, making it difficult to guide and coordinate the professional development system. Unsurprisingly given the recommendations and proposals of the Rowley Report, the Board believed the system could be better organized and managed.⁵⁸

The sixteen requirements identified in the Rowley Report further develop the educational and training needs of an integrated staff as identified in the 1965 report by the working group on integrated staff training. On the surface they do not reflect the three characteristics of a professional development system described in the 1965 report; a close relationship between education and career policies; a devoted curriculum development staff; and co-located and high quality support to the system. Although the final Rowley Report recommendation about organization and command overlaps somewhat. It is in the second and third volumes of the Rowley Report where a new professional development system is described and an implementation plan is presented that the characteristics identified in the 1965 report can be seen. The Rowley Report proposed a plan that would have drastically changed the officer development system, the majority of existing institutions would have been phased out as a new Canadian Defence Education Centre was built in Ottawa where all the educational functions could be co-located and mutually supporting.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 88.

This proposed structure of a single Canadian Defence Education Centre would have had responsibility for all officer development in the Canadian Forces. It would have provided pre-commissioning undergraduate education and military indoctrination to officer cadets, and subsequent post graduate education and staff training as officer advanced through their careers. Collocated on a single campus, expertise could be shared and coordinated to support multiple courses, and redundant support services could be eliminated. The importance of continuing and advanced education could be reinforced while providing the resources and opportunity for officers to conduct research in areas of importance to military and national affairs. Established under a single commander, direction could be issued to guide the evolution of the system and ensure it met the evolving requirements of the Canadian Forces and the nation.

The 1965 Working Group report and the Rowley Report provided a review of the officer professional development system which continues to be relevant in examining the contemporary system. The Officer Development Review Board had high expectations of the future officers of the Canadian Forces, they needed to be well-educated, bilingual, physically fit and of good moral character in order to earn their commission. Furthermore, to successfully advance through their career, they would need to continue to pursue professional development both formally through the officer development system and informally through maintaining their professional relevance and networks, and through personal development. Included in the criteria for continuing

development was earning a post-graduate degree and carrying out original research to contribute to the professional body of knowledge.

Despite the support of the Chief of the Defense Staff of the day, General Jean Victor Allard, the plan for a new officer development system as proposed in the Rowley report was not implemented. Over the next thirty years there would be numerous studies on specific aspects of the officer development system, but none as broad in scope until the review conducted following the Somalia Affair, the *1995 Report of the Officer Development Review Board*. Many of the specific requirements identified by the board would continue to be reiterated in these studies. Consequently, although the Rowley Report proposals were not fully put into effect, the requirements would be familiar to Canadian Forces officers forty years later.

The Rowley Report established a baseline against which subsequent studies of the Canadian Forces officer professional development system may be compared. From this comparison, trends emerge in the nature of the findings and recommendations of the reports. Three trends will be focused on in the review of subsequent reports and indicators of them can be found in the 1965 Working Group report and the 1969 Rowley Report. The first is a resistance to change of the officer professional development system, this trend is foreshadowed in the discussion of the tension between the requirements of the individual services and those of the newly unified Canadian Forces. The implementation plan provided in

Volume Three of the Rowley Report was quite ambitious. Later reports would suggest it was simply too ambitious for the resources available and did not account for some of the resistance factors it would face.

The second trend is one of rising expectations of officers, and many of the Rowley Report's conclusions and recommendations illustrate these expectations. Major-General Rowley was a visionary in defining the challenges that leaders of the Canadian Forces would face and the characteristics and development that would be required to ensure their success. The requirements proposed by the Officer Development Board are strikingly similar to the present expectations of individuals in the officer corps in terms of education and bilingualism.

The final trend is a general assessment that officer professional development is well developed for progression for junior and field-grade officer, but less so for senior officers. Indications of this trend can also be found in these two reports, but are less obvious because of the breadth of their scope when compared to the focus of many of the subsequent studies. The Rowley Report does describe how the demands upon senior officers differ from those of junior officers, and the proposed implementation plan provided for more senior officer professional development.

Chapter 3

1970-1993: The End of the Cold War

One must eventually question the intellectual flexibility of a system designed for one mode of existence (operations and war) and living in another (bureaucratic preparations and peace).

- Senior Officer Professional Development⁵⁹

The period 1970-1993 saw significant changes in the world and the Canadian Forces. Geo-political tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact remained generally high throughout the period. Although there were few open clashes, a concern was often that a regional conflict would escalate and pull in the superpowers. The activities the Canadian Forces participated in covered a broad spectrum from protecting national sovereignty and North American security to supporting and building ties to our allies to participating in United Nations peacekeeping missions.

During this period there were further studies conducted on aspects of the professional development system. Five of those studies will be examined in this chapter to compare their findings and recommendations to those of the Rowley Report. Three of them were official studies for the Canadian Forces and the other two were undertaken by officers to meet post-graduate requirements. The three official studies are the *Report of a Study on Professionalism in the Canadian Forces*, from 1972; *Out Service Training for Officers*, from 1985, also known as the Kitchen Report; and *Senior Officer Professional Development*, from 1986, this report was also known as the Lightburn Report. In 1976, Major Bernd A. Goetze conducted a study entitled *Military Professionalism: The*

⁵⁹ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Senior Officer Professional Development*, (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, 30 April 1986), 2.

Canadian Officer Corps for his Master's Degree in Political Studies. In 1988, Major-General R.J. Evraire produced a paper entitled *General and Senior Officer Professional Development in the Canadian Forces* for his Master's Degree in Public Administration. This report was circulated throughout NDHQ and became known as the Evraire Report.

The Rowley Report described a significantly different officer professional development system than was in place at the time, and provided a ten-year implementation plan. Despite the detail in the description of the new system and the implementation plan, and the support of the Chief of the Defense Staff of the day⁶⁰, very few of the recommendations of the report were acted upon. One of the recommendations that was partially instituted was the placing of all educational institutions under one command, the agency that was created was called the Canadian Defence Education Establishments.

In the fall of 1970, only about eighteen months after the Rowley Report was released, the Chief of the Defence Staff directed a study on "the military profession in modern Canadian society."⁶¹ The Commander of the Canadian Defence Education Establishments was designated the Office of Primary Interest for the study. The aim of the study was "to identify changes in the professional development of military personnel which are necessary to enable the Canadian Forces to contribute more effectively to the achievement of national aims."⁶² The study was to build upon the findings of the Rowley

⁶⁰ Rowley Report Volume I, iv.

⁶¹ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report of Study on Professionalism in the Canadian Forces*, (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, April 1972), 2.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 2.

Report to determine whether military professional development required changes to meet the roles of the Canadian Forces foreseen in the next twenty years. The *Report of a Study on Professionalism in the Canadian Forces*, was submitted in April 1972, with seventeen recommendations ranging “from the particular ... to the general.”⁶³

An example of one of the more specific recommendations was to consider new areas of study such as oceanographic studies for possible inclusion in the officer development system.⁶⁴ This recommendation was derived from a conclusion that “some service personnel should be trained in the fields of international, environmental and oceanographic studies,”⁶⁵ identified from a specific operational need that was perceived to be expanding as the Navy provided support to other governmental departments. The fact that a recommendation such as this was included in the findings of a study on professionalism across the whole of the Canadian Forces illustrates the challenges in balancing the needs of the services within a single professional military education system. The needs of the individual services to maintain their tactical and operational effectiveness were sometimes in competition with the needs of the Canadian Forces to develop senior officers capable of leading unified and integrated headquarters in support of national objectives.

The opposite aspect of this tension can be seen in the recommendation to “continue implementation of programmes related to members of national minority groups

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 73.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 70.

within the forces.”⁶⁶ This was undoubtedly an important recommendation given the role of the Canadian Forces as a national institution, but definitely one that aimed to meet government and department goals more than developing officers to lead within their services. There was also an element of warning to this recommendation. The military was still adjusting to the changes imposed by unification, and the unstated implication in the assessment of changes in society and government policies was that if the Canadian Forces were not proactive about these programs, there may again be changes imposed upon them. This study did not specifically comment or make recommendations on the requirement for bilingualism, but there was discussion on Canadian Forces policies assisting the aims of national unity and development.⁶⁷ This discussion carried on the theme established by the Rowley Report in reminding readers that the military exists within the context of the nation and must be reflective of society of it is to be relevant.

The *Report of a Study on Professionalism in the Canadian Forces* did not state that there is a resistance to change within the Canadian Forces. Unification clearly demonstrated that the Canadian Forces were capable of change, but it could be argued at this point that it was too early to know which changes had been for the better. Some of the recommendations did indicate that the organization could improve how it deals with change. One statement began “enhance the Canadian Forces capability to cope with change by...”⁶⁸ and went on to offer four recommendations. In needing to repeat the concepts of some of the Rowley Report recommendations one can interpret that there had been resistance to the implementation of those changes. The recommendation to “further

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 73.

the coherence of the officer education system”⁶⁹ could be attributed to the fact that in an organization as large as the Canadian Forces changes take time to implement and the effects are not immediately felt. This study was reporting only three years after the Rowley Report was submitted. However, some recommendations implied that very little action had been taken. The call for “statements of Canadian Armed Forces’ objectives, related to national goals”⁷⁰ could be linked to the Rowley Report recommendations on promoting unification and the government policy on bilingualism.

The recommendations of this study also reinforced the trends on rising expectations of officers and senior leaders. The report described in some detail the requirement for the military and military leaders to adapt to changes in society as well as national and international demands. There were several facets to this capability: one facet was to understand the societal trends that were impacting the military, government and industry alike; another was to be capable of cooperating with political leaders, other government departments and industry; and a third was being able to effectively communicate ideas and concepts. To develop this capability it recommended three approaches: the addition of relevant professional material, for example government operations or systems analysis, to education and staff courses at all levels; the development of a strategic studies group; and the use of secondments to other government departments and agencies and to industry.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 72.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 72.

The findings of the study also reflected the trend that the professional development system was meeting the needs of the services and lower level officer positions quite well, but was not as successful at meeting the professional development requirements of senior officers. This can be seen in the limited changes recommended for the military colleges and their focus on recognizing and seeking certification for training and education rather than structural or content changes. Similar to the comments above regarding particular and specific recommendations, the success at the lower levels allowed for clear and concrete recommendations. Higher level professional development was more challenging, the recommendations were to maintain a type of course, try a new approach to broadening officer development and encourage more studies. That senior officer professional development was still a concern at the time of this study is not really surprising, as any actions taken after the Rowley Report would not have been felt throughout the system yet. No students of modified courses would have been promoted to senior levels within the three years that have passed between the two reports.

The next study generated during this period was Major Bernd A. Goetze's Master's in Political Studies thesis entitled "Military Professionalism: The Canadian Officer Corps". The aim of this study was a critical assessment of the Canadian Forces professional development system.⁷¹ Goetze focused on the educational aspects of the system, both academic and military education, to examine whether the right material was being taught at the appropriate points in an officer's career. While the earlier *Report of a Study on Professionalism in the Canadian Forces* might be assumed to have covered the

⁷¹ Bernd A. Goetze, "Military Professionalism: The Canadian Officer Corps," (Master's Thesis, Queen's University, 1976), 2.

same topic, it did not define and examine the components of a profession and professionalism. In his review Goetze described the concept of professionalism as having four elements: expertise, responsibility, corporateness and public recognition as a profession. He examined how the professional development system meets each of these elements and argued that very few Canadian officers meet a high standard of professionalism.

His conclusion was based upon his assessment of the attitude of many serving officers, how they perceived their role and influence as officers and their perceptions of what a further career in the Canadian Forces offered them. One of the key factors used to assess whether the system was working was how long officers stayed in the military. Goetze argued that the Canadian Forces was not developing appropriate levels of professionalism in the officer as demonstrated by the high degree of attrition before compulsory retirement age. He tied this to the elements of responsibility and corporateness, postulating that the “apathetic view”⁷² of their influence leads officers to consider leaving the military. In his assessment this lack of devotion to the military could not be described as professional.

These arguments seem to counter the Rowley Report examination of attrition in the Canadian officer corps. The board was concerned that there was not enough turnover in the officer ranks to allow progression and foster the development of new approaches. They went so far as to conduct a preliminary examination of an early retirement plan along the lines of the American “up or out” concept. Despite this apparent contradiction,

⁷² *Ibid.*, 18.

the conclusions and recommendations Goetze reached parallel those of the Officer Development Board. This is because the arguments, coming from different perspectives were actually complimentary. If there was not enough change in the ranks of the senior officers, junior officers would not see the potential for career development and promotion. If the officers who left military service early were the well-educated and ambitious officers, what was the impact on the health of the senior officer corps?

The indications of a resistance to change are again seen by Goetze's descriptions of the professional development system in place and the challenges it continued to face. These descriptions are very close to those of the Rowley Report from six years earlier, the organizations providing the education and the content of the courses had evolved little to address the recommendations of previous reports. The Government's intent for unification had been announced in the 1964 Defence White Paper, and almost immediately an examination of the impact on the professional development system had been conducted. Yet in 1975, after several official studies, Goetze was still reporting unification as a challenge faced by the professional development system.

Both reports placed academic education at the base of military professionalism. The Rowley Report recommended raising the standard such that all officers would need an undergraduate degree. It also recommended developing a Master's level degree to be awarded through the Canadian Forces educational system. Goetze was not as strict on the entry level requirements, but did recommend a system wherein all lieutenant-colonels and above would have a degree and 90% of brigadier-generals and above would have a post-

graduate degree. He also advocated for increased rigour in the military education system to better meet the greater needs of the Canadian Forces and develop the officer's capability to research and analyse problems. These recommendations carried on the trend of raising expectations of officers and senior leaders.

Following on those aspects of the findings and recommendations in Goetze's research, it is clear that he had few concerns about the effectiveness of the professional development of the junior officers, but more about senior officer professional development. If anything Goetze was concerned that the initial education offered was of too high a quality and set officers up for disappointment with high expectations of the military professional development system. Conversely, the National Defence College course was seen to offer potential, as well as a personally broadening experience, but was lacking in rigour. Not being a career requirement, it was only offered to a small number of senior officers (primarily at the Colonel/Captain (N) rank level) every year.

Where the *Report of a Study on Professionalism in the Canadian Forces* and Goetze's thesis maintained a broad scope and review of the professional development system, subsequent reports and studies were more narrowly focused on certain aspects of the system. In 1985, Major-General C. Gordon Kitchen submitted a report to the Assistant Deputy Minister for Personnel (ADM(Per)) entitled *Out Service Training for Officers*. The aim of his report was to determine how out service training impacted upon the professional development system and to recommend changes in the use of out service training. Throughout its' history the Canadian military had sent officers to foreign

institutions for professional development. Initially this was the only way of obtaining certain qualifications such as staff education because the Canadian Forces did not run those courses. As the Canadian military grew it began to create and run national versions of many of the courses. However, where there was not the critical mass of students to make it cost effective, the Canadian military continued to rely on allied training institutions. As well, even when a Canadian equivalent was available a small number of officers continued to attend foreign courses to maintain alliance ties and obtain different perspectives on issues. These courses could be costly and Kitchen's report was inspired by a need to confirm scarce professional development resources were being allocated appropriately.⁷³

Kitchen referred to the recommendations of the Officer Development Board and provided a summary of their conclusions. He described them as still providing a relevant basis for the professional development system. He went on to indicate that while progress had been made in the area of out service training since the report of the Officer Development Board aspects of senior officer professional development had been set aside.⁷⁴ The system worked well to provide advanced education in preparation for specific positions, generally in technical areas. Where it lacked was in the more generic broadening of senior officers. Kitchen described this as the "liberal education side of the coin – a more open-ended choice of [post-graduate] work for qualified officers."⁷⁵ Some of the resistance to do more may be attributed to a perception that the problem was taking

⁷³ C. Gordon Kitchen, *Out Service Training for Officers: A Special Project for ADM(Per)*, (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, March 1985), 1.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 15.

care of itself. Kitchen found that societal influences had raised the general levels of education of the officer corps more than the Rowley Report could have anticipated. He projected this influence forward to suggest that the levels of education would continue to rise and concluded “there is no need to aggravate the system in the [Canadian Forces] by recommending as the [Officer Development Board] did that baccalaureate be the entry level.”⁷⁶

This is not to say that Kitchen did not continue to describe elevated expectations of the officers and senior leaders of the Canadian Forces. In examining the requirements of Ministers and senior officials (both uniformed and not), he alluded to a much broader understanding of defence and national aims than a narrow perception of the role of the military professional might imply. However, to support this rise, he called for an emphasis on post-graduate education, but not necessarily credentials. He repeatedly stated that the aim of the professional development system must be to meet the needs of the military, the department and the government, not academic pursuits or preparation for second careers. To this end he recommended the creation of a defence fellowship program wherein the most senior leaders in the department would undertake to personally mentor and sponsor a subordinate undertaking post-graduate education.⁷⁷ The implementation of this recommendation would not raise the expectations about an individual officer’s capability, unless that officer was selected as one of the ‘fellows’, but it would enhance the capability of the officer corps and reinforce the requirement for continued education and thought as a member of the military profession.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 33.

By virtue of his study's focus on out service training, Kitchen examined senior officer professional development much more than the lower level aspects of the professional development system. His scrutiny of the professional development system at the Captain and Major level was generally to determine if there were earlier opportunities in an officer's career to provide the training. He found that the system did well at the lower levels, but did not demonstrate foresight. Kitchen pointed out the timeless truth that the senior leaders of the future are the junior officers of today. In his examination, he found that those future senior leaders were not receiving or even pursuing advanced education. In fact, there were few senior leaders who had post-graduate degrees to set an example. Additionally, commanders and career managers were discouraging the idea as it could "de-rail a promising individual from reaching his potential."⁷⁸ This advice was dispensed, oblivious of the contradiction that having obtained those higher ranks and senior positions the officer would not be adequately prepared to carry out their duties and provide advice to the fullest potential. The recommended changes were to the post-graduate aspect of the development system, that it become less linked to specific positions and be regarded more in the long term benefit of professional development.⁷⁹

The next study conducted was entitled *Senior Officer Professional Development* and was submitted to the Officer Professional Development Council 30 April 1986. As suggested in the title, its aim was "to articulate an appropriate senior officer professional

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 35.

development system for the Canadian Forces.”⁸⁰ The introductory remarks indicated that this study continued the discussion on “the somewhat emotional issue of [Post-Graduate] requirements of senior officers”⁸¹ that had its roots in the Rowley Report. The author mentioned discussions held by the Officer Professional Development Council and Major-General Kitchen’s contribution to the debate the year before. Having provided that background, this study examined a broader concept of senior officer professional development than just post-graduate education, defining the requirement and existing system in order to recommend an expansion of the professional development policy framework to incorporate senior officer professional development. The study concluded that there was a requirement for some emphasis on senior officer professional development, but that the system in place was generally sufficient and simply needed more structure. Recommendations included a focus on National Security Studies, the development of a continuous officer professional development program and encouraged officers to pursue a personal senior officer professional development program.⁸²

These recommendations continued to reinforce the identified trends. In reviewing the preceding studies, the *Senior Officer Professional Development* study accepted their findings but concluded that recommendations had not been implemented “due to difficulties with either cost, practicality or, in some cases, currency or relevancy”⁸³ in the case of the Rowley Report. Or in the case of Kitchen’s recommendations, this study concluded they were “somewhat idealistic solutions ... and in a relative vacuum in the

⁸⁰ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Senior Officer Professional Development*, (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, 30 April 1986), 3. Also known as the Lightburn Study.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 102.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 1.

sense of overall senior officer development.”⁸⁴ These factors contribute to the continued resistance to change within the professional development system. These conclusions about why earlier recommendations had not been adopted no doubt shaped the nature of the recommendations of this report, describing them as an enhancement of the current system.

The Senior Officer Professional Development study, like those before it, found that the professional development system worked well for officers within their services and operational roles, but after the Command and Staff Course there was nothing to prepare officers for employment in senior positions. It described a system which is quite structured for the first fifteen years of an officer’s career but in the remaining twenty only offered a single formal course, the National Defence College course, which not every officer attended. In accordance with the aim of the study, a framework consisting of three aspects of professional development was recommended to address this shortcoming. The first was a focus on National Security Studies, leveraging existing Canadian Forces and Allied courses as well as civilian institutions. While not demanding a post-graduate degree as the outcome, this recommendation was the most structured and complimentary to the recommendations of earlier studies on post-graduate education of officers.⁸⁵ The second aspect was a continuous senior officer professional development program to address environmental and functional needs.⁸⁶ The final aspect of the recommended framework was a personal professional development program that each individual would

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 68.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 88.

undertake to meet the objectives of continuing education, second language proficiency, leadership and management skills, and currency in national security studies.⁸⁷

It is this last aspect of the proposed framework which carried on the trend of elevating the expectations of officers. While there may have been an implied responsibility for officers to pursue continuous self-improvement prior to this report, this report was the first to explicitly place that onus on individuals. This self-improvement was to be incorporated as part of the institutional professional development framework, yet undertaken on the member's own time. In addition, while there was an indication of what it might cost to fund some of these professional development activities, the implication was that the personal professional development program would also be at the member's cost. This expectation of a commitment of time and money on the part of the individual was and is contrary to the premise that the officer professional development system is fully responsible for preparing officers as best as possible for employment throughout their career that was implicit in earlier reports. Yet it is also entirely in accordance with the questions Major Goetze raises about the professionalism of the Canadian Forces officer corps and the commitment of individuals towards the military as a profession. Earlier reports may have focused on the institutional obligations, but even the Rowley Report described a similar onus upon the individual officer when discussing an officer's personal responsibility for constant study,⁸⁸ but the concept was not as fully developed. Where this report most significantly varied from its predecessors was that

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 88.

⁸⁸ Rowley Report Volume I, 30.

while it identified a requirement for broadening the capabilities and skills of senior officers, it did not call for certification or academic credentials.

The final report during the period 1970 to 1993 was *General and Senior Officer Development in the Canadian Forces*. This report was written in 1988 by Major-General Richard J. Evraire for his Master's Degree in Public Administration. This report became known as the Evraire report after being circulated at National Defence Headquarters. The aim of the report was to propose a new general and senior officer professional development program for the Canadian Forces.⁸⁹ Evraire analyzed the make-up of the general and senior officer group, their work environments and the expectations of those positions. He then reviewed the existing professional development system before concluding with policy and structure recommendations for a new program.⁹⁰ Evraire drew upon the previous studies on officer professional development updated with more current geo-political events to identify the requirement for general and senior officer professional development. He disagreed strongly with the 1986 *Senior Officer Professional Development* report that only minor adjustments to general and senior officer professional development were required, arguing that to truly develop the proper level of professionalism more significant changes were required. He concluded there was no clear definition of the skills and knowledge required by general and senior officers, the training and development opportunities were inadequate and there was insufficient guidance for the personal pursuit of professional development.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Richard Evraire, "General and Senior Officer Professional Development in the Canadian Forces," (MPA thesis, Queen's University, 1988), 13. Also known as the Evraire Report.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 89.

Although he disagreed with some of the conclusions made in the *Senior Officer Professional Development* study, Evraire's report did align with the trends previously discerned. When reviewing the earlier reports, he showed how they influenced and shaped the system, but he also noted that many of the recommendations had not been implemented. With respect to the Rowley report, he suggested "No doubt financial and manpower constraints were largely to blame,"⁹² and for the more recent *Senior Officer Professional Development* report he indicated that the recommendations "are actively being studied by NDHQ."⁹³ This last comment captures how resistance to change within the institution may manifest, by studying the recommendations of a study rather than implementing them.

Like the majority of the reports during this period, Evraire did not examine elevating the requirements for entry in to the military profession. However, he did continue the trend of describing increasing expectations of the members of the profession. He did this through his examination of the work environment of the officer. A cursory review of the study might conclude that the higher expectations described were simply a reflection of the increased responsibilities of senior officers. This is clearly at the foundation of the recommended policy and structure for senior officer professional development. In addition to the factor of an increased scope of responsibility, Evraire also described an increasingly complex environment where senior officers were expected to be more versed than previous generations in a number of areas including technology,

⁹² *Ibid.*, 6.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 11.

defence policy and resource management. To meet these demands, he continued to place an onus of continuing personal study on the individual, but his recommended framework would assist in focusing those efforts through the provision of reading packages and other support. Evraire also argued that the military as a profession was missing the critical element of having an intellectual centre, a recommendation that could be traced back to the Rowley Report.

The focus of the Evraire Report, the conclusions reached and the nature of the recommendations indicated that the senior officer professional development system needed significant improvement. His discussion on the earlier stages in the officer professional development system was mainly to provide a context in describing the requirement for professional development policies and structures specifically for senior officer professional development. He concluded his review of the earlier stages of the Canadian Forces officer professional development system by saying it is “one of the best officer professional training and development systems in existence today for officers up to and including the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel/Commander.”⁹⁴ He then went on to state that “the same cannot be said”⁹⁵ for general and senior officer professional development.

The period 1970-1993 saw significant changes in the operational context of the Canadian Forces. The five studies on aspects of the professional development system from this period that were examined in this chapter reinforced the trends perceived throughout all the reports and studies on Canadian professional military education. There

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 54.

is clear evidence that few changes were made during this period, suggesting a resistance to make changes in the professional development system. The reports identified that despite the ten-year implementation plan the Rowley Report had provided for its recommended changes to the structure of the professional development system, very few of the recommendations of the report were acted upon. Successive reports illustrated where this resistance to change applied not just to the Rowley Report, but to other reports as well. Some reports offered suggestions of where the resistance may have been encountered and what factors may not have been considered. In some cases the recommendations of earlier reports were described as idealistic or having failed to properly account for manpower and resource requirements. Yet, these reports reached similar conclusions and made similar recommendations as their predecessors.

The conclusions and recommendations of the five reports examined in this chapter carried on the trend of elevating the expectations of the officer corps of the Canadian Forces. The studies all concurred on the academic requirement of a baccalaureate degree and further post-graduate education for senior officers, although there was not consensus on the requirement for a post-graduate degree. The reports identified the expectation for officers to undertake a personal and continuing professional development program in accordance with their role as a member of a profession. The skills and characteristics expected of a senior officer were defined through the reports and evolved with the increasingly complex geo-political situation of the 1970s and 1980s, especially as the Canadian Forces became more resource constrained. Officers were expected to be knowledgeable about the latest technological advances, management

practices, and policy issues as well as being experts in the employment of military forces to meet the government aims and objectives.

Understanding the expectations of senior officers contributed to the third trend, that the Canadian Forces officer professional development system was very good at developing officers to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel/Commander, but did not satisfactorily prepare senior officers for their roles and responsibilities. This concern was central to the Lightburn and Evraire Reports as well as being highlighted in the Kitchen Report. There was only one formal course offered for senior officers, at the National Defence College, and not every officer received it. Upon reaching senior levels, most officers were expected to build upon their career experience and learn through on-the-job experiences, a risky approach in an institution as distributed and complex as the Canadian Forces. The consequences of assuming those risks would be seen in the Somali Affair and set the stage for the next major review of the Canadian Forces officer professional development system.

Chapter 4

1994-2001: Post Cold War and Somalia

It was in the 1990s – in the post Cold War era – that the Canadian Forces and the Canadian governments sought to deal with a number of crises and challenges to the officer corps.

- Colonel (Retired) Randall Wakelam⁹⁶

The period 1994 to 2001 brought numerous challenges to the Canadian Forces. Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union the Canadian economy suffered a downturn. As the Canadian Government sought to find savings and reduce the budget the Canadian Forces were still defining their role in the post Cold War world. Paradoxically, while the popular impression was that with the threat of Soviet aggression removed there was less need for a military, demand upon the Canadian Forces actually increased with United Nations commitments in Africa and the former-Yugoslavia. At the same time the credibility of the Canadian Forces and confidence in senior military leaders suffered a blow through the mishandling of what became known as “the Somalia Affair”. The actions of Canadian soldiers deployed in Somalia on a United Nations peacekeeping mission had directly led to the deaths of local civilians. In the aftermath of this incident there was close scrutiny of many aspects of the Canadian Forces including the education and training of leaders. The Government directed the closure of a number of institutions as cost saving measures and imposed professional requirements on the normally self-governing Canadian Forces, such as mandated ethics training and an overhaul of the military justice system. This period of being called upon

⁹⁶ Randall Wakelam, “Military Education in Canada and the Officer Development Board, March 1969,” in *The Report of the Officer Development Board: Maj-Gen Roger Rowley and the Education of the Canadian Forces*, (Waterloo, ON: LCMSDS Press, 2010), xxi.

to accomplish more operational tasks with fewer resources while trying to restore the confidence of the Canadian Government and public in the Canadian Forces was described as the “decade of darkness” by a later Chief of Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier.

The officer professional development system had to adjust to significant changes during this period. In 1994, the Government announced the closure of the National Defence College in Kingston and two of the military colleges, Royal Roads Military College in Victoria, British Columbia and College Militaire Royal du St-Jean in St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec. These and other changes led to the broadest review of the officer development system since the Rowley Report of 1969. The 1995 *Report of the Officer Development Review Board* reviewed the Canadian Forces professional development system and made recommendations for changes to the officer professional development system. Similar to the pattern of reports and studies following the Rowley Report, there have also been a few reports and studies subsequent to 1995 which have examined specific aspects of the officer professional development system. This chapter will examine the key reports through to 1998, the latest available at the time of writing.

There was one academic study completed between the closure of the National Defence College and the release of the *Report of the Officer Development Review Board*. In April of 1995, Major Lloyd Gilmore submitted a paper to fulfill one of the requirements of the Canadian Forces Command and Staff course, *Senior Officer Professional Development in the Canadian Forces: Opportunity for Change*. In a relatively short paper, Gilmore identified the gap created with the closure of the National

Defence College and, in comparison with the senior officer professional development programs of some allies, provided recommendations for a new Canadian Forces senior officer education program.⁹⁷

Despite its limited size and scope, Gilmore's findings and recommendations did support two of the three trends being examined. The trend that is not reinforced by the study is that of resistance to change within the professional military development system. The very circumstances addressed, the directed closure of the National Defence College made any discussion of resistance to change a moot point. It is important to note in this context that the change had been imposed from outside the institution and was not the result of internal analysis and decision.

Gilmore's paper drew upon the earlier reports and studies of senior officer professional development to describe the increased expectations and responsibility of those individuals in senior positions. He reinforced this through comparison to an Australian review of senior officer requirements and through his review of the United States and Australian senior officer professional development systems. Gilmore's focus did not lead to commentary on the expectations of the officer corps in general, but in advocating for a formal program for senior officer professional education he argued that "no system can be seen to be needed if it is not actually required for the majority of senior officers who advance."⁹⁸ This built upon the conclusions of earlier examinations of senior officer professional development that a wider audience had to be captured as it was

⁹⁷ Lloyd J. Gilmore, "Senior Officer Professional Development in the Canadian Forces: Opportunity for change," (Command and Staff Course Paper, Canadian Forces College, 1995), 1.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 14.

not just a select few who would work in the strategic environment, but rather the majority of senior officers who, in turn, needed professional development and education.

In focusing on senior officer professional development, Gilmore implicitly reinforced the third trend, that lower level officer professional development was satisfactory and senior officer professional development was lacking. He drew upon the earlier studies to describe the shift in responsibility when an individual became a senior officer. He argued that the conclusion to be drawn from the earlier reports was that the professional development did not prepare senior officers for this shift so some form of senior officer professional education was required.⁹⁹ Implicit in this argument regarding the need for a senior officer professional development program was that the lower level professional development programs were satisfactory.

Six months later in the fall of 1995, the Officer Development Review Board, chaired by Lieutenant-General Robert W. Morton, delivered the *Report of the Officer Development Review Board*. This report was also known as the Morton Report after the chair of the board. The board had been established to “review the education and professional development required by Canadian Forces officers during their careers and recommend a programme that meets requirements of the future.”¹⁰⁰ This was the first full review of the officer professional development system since the Rowley Report of 1969. After reviewing the Rowley Report and other Canadian Forces studies the board took an approach similar to that of the 1969 Officer Development Board in starting from basic

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁰⁰ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report of the Officer Development Review Board*, (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, 1995), 4. Also known as the Morton Report.

principles to design the “ideal system”. Where the approach differed was in adding a greater degree of pragmatism in their recommendations.¹⁰¹ To reach their conclusions, the board examined the professional development systems of the United Kingdom, Australia, France and the United States in search of lessons learned and best practices. The Rowley Report provided an implementation plan that involved investment in new infrastructure and the relocation of many elements of the professional development system, such recommendations would not have been realistic in the political and fiscal environment of 1995. This was not a limitation on the work of the board though as they instead focused on two key aspects of the professional development system, the content of the system and the processes and structure to best deliver the content.¹⁰² Their findings in these two areas were then compared to the existing infrastructure and institutions in developing the recommendations in the report. In its’ conclusion, the *Report of the Officer Development Review Board* did include fourteen recommendations for changes to the officer professional development system as a whole and twenty-three recommendations specific to existing programmes and institutions.¹⁰³ However throughout the whole report and background material there were 282 explicit and implicit recommendations.¹⁰⁴

These recommendations link back to those of the Rowley Report quite strongly and the board acknowledged the Rowley Report as a “frequent source of reference and

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 157.

¹⁰⁴ Canada, Department of National Defence, *The Officer Professional Development Working Group Final Report*, (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, 31 July 1996), 2.

reflection.”¹⁰⁵ It is not surprising then that the three trends identified continue in the work of the Officer Development Review Board. After describing the previous reports on officer professional military education, the Morton Report went on to describe the Canadian Forces officer professional development regime as “marked by inertia, static curricula, and an inability to respond to change.”¹⁰⁶ Examples where recommendations regarding course content and format made in the Rowley Report had not been implemented were provided. The board found that the history of officer professional development in the Canadian Forces demonstrated “rigidity and stagnation.”¹⁰⁷ Later in the report, a chapter was dedicated to the discussion of opinion gathered during the work of the board. The examples of input from Armed Forces Council and the Officer Professional Development council illustrated the influence of senior decision makers within the system and the challenges of making changes in a system run by a committee.

Some of the input received by the Officer Development Review Board did not support elevated expectations of the officer corps, including one opinion that there was no need to educate those whose role in a future conflict would likely be as “cannon fodder.”¹⁰⁸ Despite receiving comments of this nature, the Morton Report argued for higher standards and expectations of the officer corps. Recommendations were made regarding rigorous selection standards, education and bilingualism requirements, and the ethos of the officer corps. The responsibility to achieve these aims was placed on both the individual and the institution. Assigning accountability to the individual was in

¹⁰⁵ Morton Report, 15.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 80.

accordance with the trend identified in the earlier studies, but the Morton Report only reiterated previously identified expectations. In pointing out that many recommendations had not been implemented, the Morton Report did not argue for higher standards than the earlier studies had proposed. In examining the links between career progression and officer professional development, the Morton Report found that there was little incentive to fully engage in the officer professional development system, nor were there many penalties for non-participation. Higher standards could not be achieved if they were not supported by the profession and the institution. To set the right conditions, recommendations were made regarding many officer career management policies, including posting, promotion and re-engagement policies.

In conducting a broad review as the Rowley Report had, the recommendations of the Morton Report touched on many aspects of the officer professional development system and the interwoven career management system. It could be argued that the emphasis of the Morton Report was on the professional development system at the lower levels. There were numerous and specific recommendations focused at that level and one conclusion was that “professional development must be concentrated on younger officers.”¹⁰⁹ That this aspect of the professional development system received more attention can be explained by the findings that there was no senior officer professional development in place. In this sense, the Morton report continued the trend that the greater concern was in senior officer professional development.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 80

The pattern established with the Rowley Report as a wide reaching report that made many recommendations, followed by studies on how to implement those recommendations and providing more detailed examination of specific elements of the officer professional development system was again repeated after the Morton Report. The next study conducted was by a working group established to “develop a disposition plan for the [Officer Development Review Board] recommendations, a policy framework and an implementation plan for a revised [Officer Professional Development] system.”¹¹⁰ The *Officer Professional Development Working Group Final Report* was submitted 31 July 1996 and described the steps that had been taken to assess and implement the recommendations of the Morton Report.

Like the Rowley Report, the breadth of the Morton Report and the range of recommendations made it difficult for all of the recommendations to be incorporated into the professional development and career management systems. However, unlike the Rowley report, the institutional environment in which the recommendations were made was one that was more receptive. The Rowley Report was submitted while the Canadian Forces were adjusting to the imposition of unification, an unpopular and widely resisted decision. The Morton Report was submitted while the Canadian Forces were still dealing with the aftermath of the Somalia Affair and attempting to resolve identified shortcomings in the professional conduct of military personnel at all levels.

The progress in implementing the Morton Report recommendations described by the working group might seem a break from the trend of resistance to change. But not all

¹¹⁰*The Officer Professional Development Working Group Final Report, 2*

recommendations were implemented equally. The report described how the number and breadth of the Morton Report recommendations were overwhelming and needed to be rationalized to a manageable level. To this end, “each was assessed against the criteria of affordability, credibility, achievability, essentiality, and acceptability” and key officer professional development documents.¹¹¹ The process followed by the working group offers insight in to why recommendations from earlier reports and studies may not have been implemented. Some changes were easy to make, others, such as the development of a senior officer professional development programme needed more definition. In this regard, it can be argued that the resistance to change within the officer professional development system was still quite strong. The recommendations that were implemented were minor adjustments, like enforcing policies already in place, rather than more fundamental changes to the structure and policies of the officer professional development system such as implementation of a degree requirement or mandating a continuing individual studies programme for ongoing professional development.

As the work of the Officer Professional Development Working Group was based upon the Morton Report, it continued the trends of raising the standards expected of individual officers and focusing on senior officer professional development. The final report of the working group reinforced the need for rigorous selection standards for professional development courses and more emphasis on self-development as key characteristics of a revised officer professional development system. The report also described the process required to address the shortcomings in senior officer professional

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

development. It anticipated the first delivery of a new curriculum would happen twelve months later in academic year 1997/98.¹¹²

In 1997 two reports that discussed leadership in the Canadian Forces were submitted to Parliament. On 25 March 1997, the Minister of National Defence submitted the *Report on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*. In July of 1997 the report of the Somalia Commission was delivered. The scope of these reports was much broader than the Canadian Forces professional development system so they will not be reviewed as part of this paper. However, as a result of recommendations in these two reports, some changes were imposed upon the Canadian Forces and its officer professional development system. A key change was that all officers would be required to have a baccalaureate degree.¹¹³ Thirty years after first being recommended in the Rowley Report, this change was not made by the military but was imposed upon it. Other changes included increased bilingualism requirements and a greater emphasis on leadership and ethics training.

The next report produced was also not in line with the trends established by the earlier reports. In 1998, Blanix Consulting was contracted to review the Canadian Forces Officer Professional Development Program. The Officer Professional Development Program was a self-study programme aimed at the professional development of junior officers. After the closure of the Canadian Forces Staff School in the early 1990s, it was the only junior officer professional development program that was not service specific

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 14.

¹¹³ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, 25 March 1997), 17.

and had a common curriculum across the Canadian Forces. The Blanix review was the first critical review in the twenty -five year history of the Officer Professional Development Program.¹¹⁴

The description of the history of the Officer Professional Development Program continued the trend of resistance to change. There was no record of major change throughout the history of the program, including following the Morton Report which was generally supportive of the program. Staff within Officer Professional Development Program stated “attempts to maintain rigour in the examination process were not supported by senior leaders.”¹¹⁵ This was symptomatic of the whole professional development system. The report concluded that “there are significant constrains [sic] on anyone who attempts to reform complex policies by pushing from the bottom of the bureaucracy.”¹¹⁶ To overcome any resistance to change, the report recommended reorganizing the reporting structure and the engagement of senior officers, including the Chief of Defence Staff, in directing the desired changes.

Following the recommendations of the Morton Report and the changes imposed by the government in 1997, the Blanix review recommended raising the Officer Professional Development Program to consist of university-level courses.¹¹⁷ This recommendation continued the trend of elevating expectations of the officer corps. In reviewing the history of the Officer Professional Development Program, the Blanix report

¹¹⁴ Ernest Beno and Douglas Bland, “New Directions: An Analytical Review of the Canadian Armed Forces Officer Professional Development Program,” (Blanix Consulting, May 1998), 5.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

described how the program was intended to be complimentary to the formal career courses offered in the professional development system and evolved to become pre-requisites for promotion and selection for career courses. This evolution aligned with the changing expectations described in earlier reports and studies. The changes recommended in the Blenix report were a continuation of this evolution by making the program compulsory and more rigorous.

The focus of the Blenix report on a junior officer professional development program is counter to the earlier satisfaction with junior officer professional development and concern over a lack of senior officer professional development. Although the elevated expectations described in the report were of all officers and not just junior officers, the report did not discuss the relationship to senior officer professional development. The lack of a description of how the Officer Professional Development Program related to the rest of the professional development system was a weakness of the Blenix report. This weakness was alluded to in the report, as the authors agreed that a systematic review was “far beyond the scope of this brief study.”¹¹⁸

The reports reviewed in this chapter continued the trends that emerged with the Rowley Report and the subsequent studies of the Canadian Forces officer professional development system. Change was an underlying theme in all four reports. Gilmore identified an opportunity for change in decisions made by the government to close the National Defence College. The Morton Report was inspired by the need to change a system that failed the Canadian Forces during the Somalia Affair. The Officer

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

Professional Development Working Group studied how to best implement recommended changes. Finally, the Blenix report examined how the Officer Professional Development Program in the context of changes to the professional education requirements imposed by the government. Each report confirmed that there was a resistance to change through discussion of the minimal changes that had resulted from previous reports. The most significant changes to the professional development system were in content and elevated standards, not in structure or integration with other career policies.

Throughout this period, the expectations of Canadian Forces Officers to meet a higher standard continued to increase. This was highlighted quite publicly during the Somalia Affair as the senior leadership of the Canadian Forces failed to meet the expectations of the government and public. Recommendations were made in several reports to restructure the officer professional development system to establish quality control and accountability to mitigate these failings. But the common factor that was discussed was increasing the amount, quality and rigour of the education provided to officers. Almost thirty years after first being suggested in the Rowley Report, officers were required to have a degree. Greater emphasis was placed on self-study and continuing study programs for officers to pursue higher education and lifelong learning.

Concerns about senior officer professional development remained high throughout this period. The closure of the National Defence College may have created an opportunity for change, but it also created a significant gap in the professional development system of the Canadian Forces. While not every senior officer attended the

National Defence College, there was no longer any formal education provided at that level within the Canadian system, a gap that was not filled until the 1997/98 academic year. With the exception of the Blenix report, the relative weakness of senior officer professional development as compared to the structured system through to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel/Commander was a concern identified in the reports. The Blenix report did not argue otherwise, but its focus on the Officer Professional Development Program and lack of discussion about the relation to the remainder of the professional development system did not support the ongoing trend.

Chapter 5

The Present and the Future

To meet these challenges will require selection and development of an officer corps dedicated to Service and country and committed to lifelong learning in the arts, sciences, and the profession of arms. The nation can accept no less.

- Report of the Officer Development Review Board 1995¹¹⁹

The professional development system in the Canadian Forces has often been studied and commented on. The Rowley Report was the starting point for this review of the reports and studies of professional military education within the Canadian Forces. But professional development did not begin with the Rowley Report. The Canadian military has long invested in the education and training of its' leaders. The history of Canadian professional military education has been captured by others such as historians Ronald Haycock, who wrote about the conditions that led to the upheaval of the system in the 1990s, or Howard Coombs, who wrote a history of staff education in the Canadian Army.¹²⁰ The Rowley Report captured the status of the professional development system as it existed as the Canadian military went through the process of unification. The findings and conclusions contained within that report provided a foundation for subsequent study of the professional development system and established a baseline for comparison of those reports and studies.

¹¹⁹ Morton Report, iv.

¹²⁰ See Ronald Haycock, "Getting Here from There': Trauma and Transformation in Canadian Military Education," *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*, (Volume 32, Number 1, 2004), or Howard Coombs, "In Search of Minerva's Owl: Canada's Army and Staff Education (1946-1995)," (Ph.D. thesis, Queen's University, 2010) respectively.

In reviewing these professional military education reports and studies some trends have emerged. The first trend to emerge is that there is a resistance to change in the professional development system. This is shown by the studies repeatedly reaching the same conclusions, some explicitly describing earlier recommendations that have not been put in place. Another key trend to emerge is that the expectations of military officers with regards to the quality of military education have evolved throughout time, generally increasing the standards and requirements to deal with more complex problems in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment. The third key trend to emerge is that there is a general consensus that the professional development system does a satisfactory job of developing lower level officers, but does not provide senior officers with the training, experience and education required to prepare them for the challenges at the highest levels.

That there is a resistance to change in the professional development system should not be surprising given the conservative nature and the role of militaries. In reviewing the reports, there is one aspect that has been consistent throughout, not really a trend, but a reiteration of one of the realities of the military profession. That is the principle that fighting skills must be maintained throughout any changes to the professional development system. A frequent refrain in the reports was that academic accreditation was important, but should not have primacy over military competency. With this in mind, the resistance to change is clearly not of a malicious nature, but rather one of risk aversion. Several factors were identified as determining what recommendations might be

implemented, these included achievability, acceptability and the manpower and resource requirements.

Resistance to raising the academic requirements for officers in the Canadian Forces has been a consistent component of the resistance to change within the professional development system. In 1969 the Rowley Report first discussed making a baccalaureate degree a requirement for becoming a commissioned officer and justified this change through comparison to civilian occupations. The report concluded that if the Canadian Forces wanted to continue to attract the best candidates it had to raise its standards as the private sector competition for recruiting those same individuals did. Later reports touched on this point but suggested that the problem was resolving itself as Canadian society became better educated in general. Even the 1995 Morton Report only recommended that a baccalaureate degree remains desirable, explaining that some of the feedback from senior decision making bodies, such as Armed Forces Council, led to softening the recommendation from being a mandatory requirement. In fact it was almost thirty years after the Rowley Report that the decision to have a “degreed” officer corps was made, and it was not made by the Canadian Forces, but imposed upon the military by the Minister of National Defence. Even with the decision taken from the military and made by the Minister, there continues to be an element of resistance to formal academic accreditation, if not outright anti-intellectualism. A recent quote by Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Steve Nash in the *Globe and Mail* captures these tensions quite well, “Part of me wants to say, okay, I jump out of airplanes and play with guns, swear and pee outside. Why do I need a master’s degree? But in another sense, if I’m going to command at a certain level, on behalf of a lawfully elected government

in another place in the world, it is not unreasonable to expect that I can elevate my intellectual game.”¹²¹

The counter-point to the resistance of academic pre-requisites is the continued trend of increasing expectations of Canadian Forces officers. With respect to education requirements, the Canadian Forces College, in cooperation with the Royal Military College, now offers Masters degrees in conjunction with the Joint Command and Staff Program and the National Security Programme. The existence of these options in addition to the numerous post-graduate programs of study offered at civilian institutions has made having a graduate degree a *de facto* requirement for promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel in many classifications. The weighting of the education factor at merit boards places those without a degree at a significant disadvantage. In fact, in some classifications the majority of officers have a Master’s degree, such that even further post-graduate study and certification is required for an individual to stand out from the competition. In addition, there is the argument for more stringent requirements. Colonel Bernd Horne and Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Bill Bentley, staff at the Canadian Defence Academy, have written that it is desirable for general and flag officers to have a doctoral degree.¹²²

These elevated expectations of Canadian Forces officers are driven by the increasingly complex operating environment. The Rowley Report described some of the international and domestic geo-political complexities of the 1960s. Successive reports and defence policy statements continued to refine the understanding of the complex

¹²¹ James Bradshaw, “University for soldiers caught in the crossfire,” *Globe and Mail*, 9 April 2013.

¹²² Bill Bentley and Bernd Horn, “Higher Education and the Profession of Arms: Explaining the Logic,” *Canadian Military Journal*, Volume 12, Number 3, Summer 2012, 68-71.

nature and effects of military operations. These operations continue to become more complex as technological advances introduce new domains, such as space and cyber, to the military. The role of the military has expanded to include peace support and counter-insurgency operations. Compounding those changes are increasing constraints in terms of resources and the impact of a globally connected mass media. There is very little room for error, yet senior officers still do not receive much formal preparation for the roles and responsibilities they assume.

Most reports have supported the trend that the officer professional development system serves officers well up to the rank of Commander/Lieutenant-Colonel, but does not have a robust senior officer professional development component. The notable exception to this trend is the Blatrix study of the Officer Professional Development Program. One element of this trend which is not discussed in many reports, although it was hinted at several times, is that those junior officers are the same officers who will later be senior officers. The professional development they receive as junior officers is the foundation of their professional development later in their careers. A factor in this is that the earlier professional development is often service specific and delivered by the individual services. Yet, most senior officers do not work in a single service environment, rather they find themselves in positions in joint or integrated headquarters addressing operational, strategic or even political issues. That service specific factor is undoubtedly one of the reasons emphasis is put on addressing senior officer requirements with ‘just-in-time’ broadening senior officer professional development. Supporting this idea of concentrating on single service foundation training is a warning against an academic

focus mentioned in the Morton report, that the early periods of an officers' career "are critical periods for development of military skills."¹²³ This is a valid point and reinforces the premise that the one unacceptable risk is a decrease of war-fighting capabilities. On the other hand, there has been very little review of whether the right military skills are being developed during this period or whether the academics being referred to set-up the foundation for the advanced military skills of senior officers.

One of the key conclusions that can be reached from reviewing the studies of the officer professional developments system is that there is no 'one size fits all' solution. This is acknowledged in most of the reports, especially those discussing the senior officer professional development options. While most junior officers will face similar professional challenges and are well served by the existing officer professional development system, this becomes less true as they progress through their careers. The pyramidal hierarchy of the military leads to having fewer senior officers, each having broad responsibilities within a specific context. Given the ever changing and increasingly complex environment as discussed in many of the reports, few senior officers will have followed the same career path to a specific position and even while in that position they will not necessarily face similar challenges. As has been identified in the reports, to best prepare officers for senior positions the professional development system needs to have many components, including formal education, self-study and continuing study programs. The individual commitment of time and effort is reflective of their acceptance of the role of a professional officer.

¹²³ Morton Report, 78.

Examining the current challenges facing the Canadian Forces, conditions are being set that are quite similar to those that led to the 1969 Rowley Report and 1995 Morton Report. The government is under pressure to address budget shortfalls. While cuts will be spread across the public service, the Department of National Defence is a prime source of savings given the size of the department and the ongoing reduction in operational commitments. Operations in Afghanistan and Libya have bolstered the public perception of the Canadian Forces as a professional war-fighting institution, but issues surrounding major equipment procurements have eroded the credibility of senior leadership as policy advisors and resource managers. This would indicate that there continue to be challenges in how the Canadian Forces prepares its officers, and particularly the senior leaders, for their roles and responsibilities beyond individual service requirements. The content and structure of the professional development system must continue to evolve to meet these challenges.

There are numerous aspects of the Canadian Forces professional development system that merit further investigation and study. It has been almost twenty years since the last broad and holistic review of the officer professional development system. In the past decade there have been numerous articles in academic and professional forums on the professional military education of Canadian Forces officers and those of our allies. Policy documents have been issued, such as *Officership 2020*, the strategic guidance on the vision for the officer corps in the twenty-first century, issued in 2001. The *Canadian Forces Officer General Specification*, the document which defines the basic requirements of a Canadian Forces officer in each service and at each rank level, was updated in 2009.

But there have been no in-depth examinations of aspects of the officer professional development system itself in the nature of the reports and studies reviewed in this paper. These areas provide opportunity for research that can meaningfully contribute to the profession of arms in the Canadian context.

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