

Canadian  
Forces  
College

Collège  
des  
Forces  
Canadiennes



## UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO DEVELOPMENT OF A TERRORIST

Major J. Smith

**JCSP 39**

**Master of Defence Studies**

### **Disclaimer**

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the  
Minister of National Defence, 2013

**PCEMI 39**

**Maîtrise en études de la défense**

### **Avertissement**

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le  
ministre de la Défense nationale, 2013.

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
JCSP 39 – PCEMI 39  
2012 – 2013

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE

**UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO  
DEVELOPMENT OF A TERRORIST**

By Major J. Smith  
Par le major J. Smith

*“This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”*

Word Count: 16 009

*“La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.”*

Compte de mots : 16 009

## **ABSTRACT**

Understanding the nature and manifestation of terrorism is essential in beginning to truly understand the phenomenon known as terrorism. By examining the challenges associated with defining terrorism, allied nations and Canada's interpretation of terrorism, the different classifications of terrorism, the current terrorist threat to Canada, Canada's Counter-terrorism strategy and the tactics employed by terrorist organizations to recruit future terrorists, a strong foundation will be established to further diagnose and treat the root causes of terrorism rather than its symptoms. The belief that terrorists are all psychotic is fundamentally flawed and potentially dangerous as it can lead to the belief that there is no real way of taking a pro-active approach to the prevention of a terrorist. Studies have been conducted which have helped narrow down psychological and sociological theories and factors that contribute to the development of terrorists and the process of radicalization. Through the development of specific typologies and the membership within the organizations which make up each typology further research within these fields can be conducted providing greater insight into how to develop and employ more effective counter measures.

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Abstract.....	1
Introduction.....	3
Chapter 1. Nature and Manifestation of Terrorism.....	8
Chapter 2. Psychology of Terrorism.....	42
Chapter 3. Sociology of Terrorism.....	64
Conclusion.....	76
Bibliography.....	79

*If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.*

*The Art of War by Sun Tzu*

## INTRODUCTION

Terrorism has been in existence at least since ancient times as a part of mankind.<sup>1</sup> The official documented beginning depends upon which historian or scholar you follow, as some believe it first occurred with the killing of Hipparchus, a member of the Greek ruling class, by Aristogiteion and Harmodius in 514 BC.<sup>2</sup> Others believe it was during the 1<sup>st</sup> Century when the Zealots Sicarii, Jewish terrorists, committed to overthrowing Roman rule in Judea.<sup>3</sup> Also known as dagger men, they would slay their victims during the day in crowded areas for all to see which created great fear among the population and eventually resulted in a heavily supported rebellion against the Romans.<sup>4</sup> Terrorism was prevalent throughout history with such known groups as the Hindu Thugs which were in existence for six hundred years from 700-1300, as were the long-time phenomenon Muslim Assassins which lasted almost two hundred years from 1090-1275.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>An International Security Reader, *Contending with Terrorism: Roots, Strategies, and Responses* ed. Michael E. Brown, et al., (London: The MIT Press, 2010), 32.

<sup>2</sup>Gus Martin, *Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies* (USA: Sage Publication, Inc., 2011), 27.

<sup>3</sup>An International Security Reader, *Contending with Terrorism: Roots, Strategies, and Responses...*, 32.

<sup>4</sup>David C. Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 78, No. 3 (September, 1984): 669.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 661.

The French, British, and American governments encountered terrorists periodically throughout the 1800 and 1900s. The French battled terrorists during their colonial wars.<sup>6</sup> In particular, Napoleon's Forces fought Spanish terrorists during the Peninsular War supported by the British which occurred from 1808 to 1814.<sup>7</sup> British forces fought terrorists during the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars which occurred 1878-90 and 1878-1890 and again shortly after the Second Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902.<sup>8</sup> The Americans battled terrorists during the Philippine-American War from 1899-1902 and during the Banana Wars between 1901-1934.<sup>9</sup> Canada was not without its experience as they battled the Fenians during the Fenian Raids between 1866-1871, Louis Riel's Metis Red River Rebels in 1870, the terrorists that sparked the disaffected Metis North-West Rebellion in 1885 as well as terrorists of the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) between 1963 to 1970.<sup>10</sup>

Terrorism and the people who conduct terrorist actions are far from new; terrorism is an old phenomenon that societies have encountered throughout history. It is important to note that the history presented above may to some appear not to be terrorist actions and more in line with irregular warfare, or that the terrorists presented thus far, should actually be reversed, it is truly dependent upon one's definition of terrorism.

Although terrorist attacks continued around the world with airplane hijackings, hostage takings and bombings, the perception by many North Americans and in particular

---

<sup>6</sup>General Sir Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force, The Art of War In The Modern World* ( London: Allen Lane, 2005), 156.

<sup>7</sup> Michael Hennessy and John N. Rickard, *Wars Without Fronts: A Primer On Counterinsurgency* (Ottawa: Magic Light Publishing, 2012), 32.

<sup>8</sup>General Sir Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force, The Art of War In The Modern World...*, 162.

<sup>9</sup>Michael Hennessy and John N. Rickard, *Wars Without Fronts: A Primer On Counterinsurgency...*, 33.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 34.

Canadians, was one of indifference as there appeared to be little threat to Canadians.<sup>11</sup> Even after the Air India bombing in 1985 which originated in Vancouver and killed 329 people, most of whom were Canadian, little changed.<sup>12</sup> Canadian terrorists have been involved in terrorist acts around the world. They have been linked to the New York World Trade Center bombing in 1993, bombings in Israel, Egypt, Sri Lanka, and Bali which are responsible for over three hundred deaths, as well as politically motivated killings in India and Egypt.<sup>13</sup> Over the last two decades, Canada has become a safe haven for terrorists to recruit, plan, fund, and launch violent terrorist actions around the world.<sup>14</sup> Not until the tragic events of September 11, 2001 did Canadians and the Canadian government recognize the reality of global terrorism and the fact that Canada could no longer be indifferent to the growing global threat.

Understanding the nature and manifestation of terrorism highlights key factors in the continuation and proliferation of terrorism. This paper argues that terrorists are developed through complex psychological and sociological factors which are the root causes of its existence. These factors can only be fully understood and countered through the establishment of internationally accepted typologies which require further analysis to determine specific psychological and sociological factors which allow for the existence of specific organizations within a typology. Through the recognition of how a terrorist is developed for each typology and more specifically the different leadership positions within these organizations, international and national social programs can be more

---

<sup>11</sup>Stewart Bell, *Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Around the World* (Canada: John Wiley & Sons Canada Ltd, 2004), xii-xiv.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, xiii.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, xii.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, xii.

effectively employed to help prevent the spread of international terrorism and the development of domestic terrorists. A key impediment in this process is the international community's unwillingness to achieve a basic definition of terrorism. This lack of commitment in establishing the most fundamental of concepts impairs further progress by the international community in addressing the root causes of terrorism. As a result, terrorist organizations are able to capitalize on these shortcomings in order to continue the proliferation of terrorism.

Sun Tzu's teachings on intelligence and information awareness of knowing your enemy and knowing one's self are critical to combating not only domestic terrorism but global terrorism. Absolutely knowing one's potential enemy to its core is fundamental to eradicating and preventing future terrorists and their actions. Canadian government agencies have foiled a number of planned terrorist acts since 9/11, including a plot to blow up London nightclubs and a number of London's utility stations in 2004 by Momin Khawaja, a computer programmer at the Department of Foreign Affairs,<sup>15</sup> the bombing plot to blow up Parliament buildings and Montreal's Subway system by the "Ottawa 3" in 2010,<sup>16</sup> and the bombing plot to blow up a number of government facilities such as Canada's largest military air base CFB Trenton and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service headquarters in Toronto by the group dubbed "Toronto 18".<sup>17</sup> Although successes in preventing violent terrorist action have been made, much understanding is

---

<sup>15</sup>Joanne Smith, "Khawaja Guilty of Terrorism," last accessed 19 January 2013, <http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/527222>

<sup>16</sup>CBC News, "Alleged Terrorism Plot Targeted Canada," last accessed 19 January 2013, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/story/2010/08/26/ottawa-rcmp-arrest-fole.html>

<sup>17</sup>CBC News, "Toronto 18: Key Events in the case," last accessed 19 January 2013, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2008/06/02/f-toronto-timeline.html>

still required not only of the potential enemy but of ourselves in order to further reduce the growing risk of the development of future terrorists and current terrorist actions within Canada and abroad.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup>Michael Zekulin, "Terrorism in Canada," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* Vol 13, Issue 3 (Spring 2011): 8-10.

## NATURE and MANIFESTATION of TERRORISM

Effective counter measures in the struggle against terrorism require a fundamental understanding of what the phenomenon actually comprises. Understanding is at the basis of solving any problem or challenge particularly pertaining to the complexity in defining what terrorism or terrorist actions are. Most scholars of terrorism agree that a universal definition of terrorism is required; however, achieving this definition has not been possible to date. Establishing an internationally accepted definition of terrorism which clearly defines what terrorism is and who it pertains to, in particular, whether it applies to both non-state actors as well as states is a fundamental element in truly combating terrorism.<sup>19</sup> Over one hundred definitions have been put forth and scrutinized by analysts and scholars alike.<sup>20</sup> The United Nations has spent the last four decades trying to achieve a common understanding of the definition of terrorism to no avail.<sup>21</sup> Terrorist organizations as well as certain states which are against western values have recognized this weakness and have utilized it in order to give or receive state sponsorship whenever possible with little consequence.<sup>22</sup> Terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah are funded, trained, and equipped by countries like Iran.<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup>Boaz Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers* (USA: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 1.

<sup>20</sup>Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 5.

<sup>21</sup>Thomas J. Badey, "Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 10, (1998): 90.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, 1.

Effectively and efficiently addressing states that encourage, protect and support terrorist organizations cannot be achieved without first achieving an internationally accepted definition of terrorism and the further on establishment of an international law dealing with state sponsored terrorism.<sup>24</sup> As long as the nations within the United Nations are unable to achieve a commonly accepted and legal definition of terrorism, it greatly impacts allied nations' ability to hold effectively those parties accountable in the proliferation of global terrorism.<sup>25</sup> One aspect of the issue entails extradition. Although, many countries have established legal agreements to address inter-related criminal activities, they do not directly address terrorism which impacts and complicates the extradition process.<sup>26</sup> Without an international definition there is no international law that can be directly applied in relation to the action committed. This deficiency complicates the legal prosecution and extradition of individuals from possible states that do not have existing inter- state agreements or are not fully in agreement with allied nations domestic policies in relation to what terrorism is and how suspects will be persecuted.

The international communities work towards an internationally accepted definition of terrorism is essential as it impacts many areas necessary in dealing with combating terrorism.<sup>27</sup> In particular, judicial prosecution as touched on above, global collaboration in establishing international counter-terrorism accords, and achieving a pro-

---

<sup>23</sup>Idfnadesk, "Axis of Terrorism: Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas," last accessed 20 January 2013, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kp8e9Zb2isU>

<sup>24</sup>Boaz Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers...* , 2.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>26</sup>Kirk Makin, "Supreme Court Upholds Ant-Terrorism Laws." last modified 14 December 2012, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/supreme-court-upholds-anti-terrorism-laws/article6354739/>

<sup>27</sup> Boaz Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers...* , 3.

active international posture as it pertains to offensive operations and the education of humanity in the prevention of terrorism.<sup>28</sup>

Why is such a basic common understanding so difficult to achieve when so many highly influential experts and political leaders agree on its importance? Even though political leaders do agree on its importance they are not willing to compromise their political positions by fully committing to a universal definition as many feel such a definition could negatively affect their nations ability to address terrorists as they deem necessary. The politics associated with terrorism is a global phenomenon and hardly new. Nations and their agencies have designed their domestic and international anti-terrorism objectives based upon prevailing fiscal and national interests.<sup>29</sup> Governments such as the United States have multiple definitions which have been criticized for being too ambiguous.<sup>30</sup> Others have chosen not to define it at all for fear that an official delineation may impact their international legitimacy as they pursue military actions in support of self-interests.<sup>31</sup>

There are two basic types of definitions for terrorism: those created by academic scholars and those created for political environments. Political definitions are generally designed to be vague which allows the governments that have defined the term to fittingly manipulate the definition to justify or explain a given situation.<sup>32</sup> They are designed in this manner arguably to allow for flexibility in order to meet the needs of

---

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, 4-5.

<sup>29</sup>Graeme C.S. Steven and Rohan Gunaratna, *Counterterrorism* (California: ABC-CLIO Inc, 2004), 7.

<sup>30</sup>Secretary of State for the Home Department, *The Definition of Terrorism: Independent Review of Terrorism Legislation*, last accessed 24 January 2013, <http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm70/7052/7052.pdf>

<sup>31</sup>Thomas J. Badey, "Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach," ...92.

<sup>32</sup>Thomas J. Badey, "Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach," ...105.

governments at any given time for a variety of situations. Academic definitions tend to be based upon previous events and are intended to be utilized with a pre-established statistical model. Academic definitions are traditionally interminable, convoluted and not practical.<sup>33</sup> As a result, there is often a disconnect between scholars and policy makers. This disconnect creates an inefficiency in the concentration of resources in establishing fundamental understandings of principles such as a common definition of terrorism. This in turn directly affects allied nations abilities to concentrate their forces in establishing common policies and practices necessary to combat terrorism.

As mentioned, the United States and its different agencies have many definitions. This can be attributed to their Federal statutes or legislation enacted by Congress and signed by the President and then compiled into their United States Codes.<sup>34</sup> For example, the Secretary of State is required to provide an annual report on Terrorism to the speaker of the House of Representatives. The requirements for this report are established under the United States Code, Title 22, Chapter 38, Section 2656.<sup>35</sup> Within this code there are two definitions, one specifically for international terrorism and another for the word terrorism. International terrorism is described as terrorism which pertains to citizens or a region which consists of two or more countries.<sup>36</sup> Terrorism has to be calculated, governmentally provoked violence, committed against noncombatant objectives by subnational parties or concealed proxies.<sup>37</sup> What is interesting is that there is no definition

---

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, 90.

<sup>34</sup>Cornell University Law School, "United States Codes," last accessed 23 January 2013, [http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/united\\_states\\_code](http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/united_states_code)

<sup>35</sup>Cornell University Law School, "USC, Title 22, Chapter 38, Section 2656, Annual Country Reports on Terrorism," last accessed 23 January 13, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2656f>

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*

for domestic terrorism which suggests that international terrorism is a higher priority for the United States Congress.<sup>38</sup> The definitions in section 2656 are utilized even though the definition of international terrorism as well as domestic terrorism are well defined Under the United States Code Title 18, Chapter 113B, section 2331 (1) and (5) which are utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigations.<sup>39</sup> Under section 2331 (1), international terrorism is described as violent or dangerous actions directed toward human life regardless if committed within the United States jurisdiction which would be considered to violate United States or any State criminal laws.<sup>40</sup> In addition, any actions which seem to be designed to threaten or pressure the civilian population, sway governmental policy through threats or pressure or to disrupt the actions of a government through mass devastation, assassination or abduction, fall under the rubric of international terrorism. They must be committed primarily outside the regional authority of the United States or exceed regional authority by the resources used to accomplish the actions, the people they seem to have targeted, or the criminals operating location or refuge.<sup>41</sup> Section 2331 (5), describes domestic terrorism as dangerous actions to human life which violate the Federal or State criminal laws established within the United States. In addition, any actions which appear to be designed to threaten or pressure the civilian population, sway governmental policy through intimidation or pressure or to disrupt the actions of government through mass devastation, assassination or abduction, also fall under the

---

<sup>38</sup>The International Library of Essays in Terrorism, *Dimensions of Terrorism*, ed. Alan O'Day (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004) xii.

<sup>39</sup>The FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigations, "Reports and Publications," Last accessed 24 January 2013, [http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005/terror02\\_05#terror\\_0205](http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005/terror02_05#terror_0205)

<sup>40</sup>Cornell University Law School, "USC, Title 18, Chapter 113B, Section 2331, Definitions," last accessed 23 January 13, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2331>

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*,

definition of domestic terrorism provided they are committed primarily inside the regional authority of the United States.<sup>42</sup> The US Army Command and General Staff College, as well as such states as Iowa and New York all have similar yet different definitions.<sup>43</sup> It is argued that the most notable reason for so many definitions within the United States is their governmental structure and the amount of political power each State has. As a result, the effort necessary within the United States to create a unified definition of terrorism maybe viewed as a waste of effort as most of the definitions are similar enough to have little impact in the overall objective. What this does demonstrate is the inefficiencies within just one country let alone within the international community in achieving a unified definition which is argued to be a fundamental concept in the war against terrorism.

The United Kingdom does not have an explicitly different definition for domestic or international terrorism. They utilize one definition which encompasses both. The British describe terrorism as actions or the warning of actions within or outside the United Kingdom which involve severe violence or damage to people or property, jeopardize human life other than the perpetrator, and gravely jeopardize public safety or health. In addition, the actions or threat of action was created specifically to impede a government, threaten the public or a section of the public, or promote racial, political, ideological or religious objectives.<sup>44</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*,

<sup>43</sup>The International Library of Essays in Terrorism, *Dimensions of Terrorism...*, xiii.

<sup>44</sup>United Kingdom Government Legislation, "Terrorism Act 2000," last accessed 24 January 2013, <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1>

Canada's definition of terrorism is defined in Canada's *Anti-terrorism Act*. It too utilizes one definition to encompass domestic as well as international terrorism and falls under section 83.01 of the Canadian *Criminal Code*.<sup>45</sup> It has two sections with the first section designed to solidify Canada's commitment to 10 counter-terrorism resolutions and proprieties by incorporating several offences established by the United Nations into its definition of terrorist activity.<sup>46</sup> The second part describes terrorist activity to be actions committed domestically or internationally, partially or entirely for political, ideological, or religious reasons, with the intention of partially or entirely threatening the public or a section of the public as it pertains to its security and economic security, or coercing a person, government, or organization to act or not act deliberately which results in the endangerment, death or grave impairment of a person by the use of violence, resulting in a grave risk to public health and safety and/or considerable public or private property damage.<sup>47</sup> Canada's definition although similar to the United States more closely linked to the United Kingdom's and more than likely is a result of the close political ties and similar governmental structure.

All three countries have gone to war together to fight against terrorism, have similar domestic as well as international terrorism threats but still have very close but distinct definitions of terrorism. Defining terrorism on an international level is politically charged, complex and one not without consequence. By defining terrorism internationally, allied nations might restrict themselves against taking the necessary actions required to prevent terrorist activities and potentially be found liable for

---

<sup>45</sup>Department of Justice, "The Anti-Terrorism Act, Section 83," last modified 01 April 2008, <http://www.justice.gc.ca/antiter/sheetfiche/terrordefp1-terreurdefp1-eng.asp>

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*

committing terrorist acts in the process. The same can be said for non-western nations that have been accused of supporting terrorist activities. Much depends upon perspective. It is extremely challenging to establish accountability without a common international understanding. This gray area is intimately associated with the inability or lack of will by the international community to develop an internationally accepted definition of terrorism. For this reason, a legal universal definition of terrorism may never be possible because no nation will be willing to jeopardize the actions they believe are necessary to protect their interest.<sup>48</sup> This is seen today with the drone strikes being conducted in Pakistan by the United States.<sup>49</sup> For example the drone strikes conducted in Pakistan by the United States. Although Pakistan opposes unauthorized drone strikes within its territory against United States high valued terrorist targets, the United States continues to do so as they deem necessary.<sup>50</sup> These strikes have not just been limited to Pakistan. The US has also conducted drone strikes against high value terrorist targets in Yemen as well as Somalia and has utilized its interpretation of international law to justify its right to self-defense and the utilization of drone strikes.<sup>51</sup> Lack of an international definition of terrorism and an international law to enforce infractions against it enables the United States as well as potential other countries to do the same around the world with little

---

<sup>48</sup>Noam Chomsky, "The New War Against Terror," last accessed 21 January 2013, <http://www.chomsky.info/talks/20011018.htm>

<sup>49</sup>PressTV, "US Drone Strike Amount to War Crime Political Analyst," last accessed 22 January 2013, <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/01/21/284764/us-drone-strikes-amounts-to-war-crime/>

<sup>50</sup>PressTV, "US Drone Strikes in Pakistan Counterproductive: Foreign Minister," last accessed 22 January 2013, <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/01/22/284983/us-drones-in-pakistan-counterproductive/>

<sup>51</sup>ProPublica, "Everything We Know So Far About Drone Strikes," Last modified 22 January 2013, <http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-so-far-about-drone-strikes>

consequence. This in turn could create increased global hostilities and instability which may be help terrorist organizations objectives.

Much like the definition of terrorism, academics and analysts have spent much time examining the different forms of terrorism. They have narrowed down three basic forms: domestic terrorism, international terrorism and transnational terrorism.<sup>52</sup> Domestic and international terrorism are better known though transnational terrorism falls between domestic and international terrorism.<sup>53</sup> Initially, such terms as international and transnational were typically used interchangeably to describe international terrorism however with further understanding of the Al-Qaida network and their brand of terrorism the term transnational terrorism has attracted greater attention and become its own form of terrorism.<sup>54</sup> This form of terrorism can be committed domestically; however, the terrorists have affiliation with many different international parties which are not constrained by national bonds.<sup>55</sup> This form can often be misinterpreted as falling under either domestic or international terrorism. The challenge associated with this form of terrorism is that at certain times it can closely resemble domestic or international terrorism and as a result if nations are not capable of recognizing this third area of terrorism they will struggle in their ability to counter it, resulting in increased risk to their populations. Nations will continually be treating the symptom as opposed to the actual cause and never really be able to eliminate or significantly reduce the threat. Traditional

---

<sup>52</sup>Professor Mike Hough, "Domestic, International and Transnational Terror after 2001: Towards a New Typology?" *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 29 (2007): 39. Last assessed 24 January 2013, [www.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/2263/4018/1/Hough\\_Domestic%282007%29.pdf](http://www.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/2263/4018/1/Hough_Domestic%282007%29.pdf)

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.* 39.

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.* 42.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.* 43.

counter-terrorism techniques such as governmental change, sanctions, negotiations and decreasing poverty, which have not always been effective in preventing or decreasing terrorist actions, are even less effective when utilized against transnational terrorism given the nature of their objectives and utilization of multiple states.<sup>56</sup> What this demonstrates is the complexity of terrorism and the ability of terrorist organizations to adapt in order to achieve their objectives on a global scale. With the evolution of globalization and in particular the advancements in media technology the world is a much smaller place. Peoples ability to educate themselves and be influenced by messaging whether factual or not is becoming unlimited as a result of advancements in technology. Terrorist organizations can be anywhere in the world and still be able to manipulate and influence any nations population in

order to fulfill their objectives provided the right sociological conditions exists and the access individuals that are psychologically susceptible.

Although internationally speaking there seems to be a consensus on the three distinct forms of terrorism, there has been a struggle to agree on the different types of terrorism. There are many books and research papers written to help make this phenomenon of terrorism more understandable and therefore easier to explain and defend. The challenge that has evolved stems from the lack of a universally excepted definition of terrorism and the many factors that are available to describe the players involved in generating or conducting terrorist actions.<sup>57</sup> In addition, a number of different academics from differing

---

<sup>56</sup>Jeremy Pressman, "Rethinking Transnational Counterterrorism: Beyond a National Framework," *The Washington Quarterly* 30:4 (Autumn 2007): 67.

fields that have developed different theories and typologies of terrorism. At first glance one would think this would be extremely advantageous; however, when these highly intelligent analysts work independently the results can lead to more confusion, complexity and inefficiency.

Boaz Ganor, the deputy dean of the Lauder School of Government and Diplomacy at the Interdisciplinary Centre, founder and the Executive Director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, member of Israel's National Committee for Homeland Security Technologies, the International Advisory Board of Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS) in Singapore, and the International Advisory team of the Manhattan Institute (CTCT) to the New-York Police Department (NYPD) has reviewed the many typologies presented since 1970. He has established a model as shown in Figure 1 which demonstrates the complexity of the typology situation. By utilizing the factors below, his model combines a number of the key categories employed in dissimilar typologies as well as a few additional categories to further differentiate between terrorist organizations.<sup>58</sup> This model is the only one of its kind.

Ganor utilizes fifteen factors, to differentiate between the different typologies of terrorism. The first factor is terrorist organizations' target objectives. This is the fundamental principle that is utilized to categorize terrorist organizations.<sup>59</sup> By doing this, the analyzer has the ability to study those who target military objectives and those who

---

<sup>57</sup>Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorists- A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (1) (February 2005): 4-5.

<sup>58</sup>Boaz Ganor, "Terrorist Organization Typologies and the Probability of a Boomerang Effect," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34:4 (2008): 271.

<sup>59</sup>*Ibid.*, 217

target civilian objectives. In his model Ganor has labeled these as Guerilla and Terror.<sup>60</sup> It is important to note that although it would appear that this specifically separates the two targets, it is meant to differentiate by the frequency particular organization targets military or civilian objectives, as it is well known most organizations target both.<sup>61</sup> This starting point is key in analyzing, understanding and differentiating between possible terrorist organizations. As has often been stated one man's terrorist is another man's freedom or Guerilla fighter.

The second factor utilized is terrorist organizations' motives. This is a broadly used characteristic by most researchers to establish different organizational categories. There are many motives, however, upon closer examination they can largely be broken down into six categorical organizations:

revolutionary, national liberation, social, separatist, radical ideological and religious.

Revolutionary organizations are those which are motivated to induce governmental change. National liberation organizations strive to establish national independence from an occupying force. Social organizations desire socioeconomic change. Separatist organizations covet regional separation from a multicultural state. Radical ideological organizations strive to proliferate extremist ideologies while religious organizations pursue religious objectives through violent means.<sup>62</sup> Understanding what motivates an organization is absolutely critical in further understanding how to counter it, but, it does not stop there. Researchers and analysts must build upon this to further understand individual's motives for becoming members of specific organizations.

---

<sup>60</sup>Boaz Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle, A Guide for Decision Makers...*, 18

<sup>61</sup>Boaz Ganor, *Terrorist Organization Typologies and the Probability of a Boomerang Effect...*, 217.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*, 272.

The third factor applied was organizational scope. Generally, a terrorist organization's abilities are directly correlated to its physiognomies and configuration. Those organizations that have strong support as well as numerous direct members are more easily distinguishable and capable than those that do not or have not.<sup>63</sup> The breath of support from the public for a terrorist organization was also a factor encompassed. Members within terrorist organizations commonly view their membership as one which embodies the genuine desire of a population that far exceeds the actual size of the organization. The population the terrorist organization feels they represent does not necessarily represent the majority of the public which surrounds the organization, and therefore could be an ethnic minority group, oppressed social class, an exploited state, or even a religious community who believes they are being discriminated against. There are many examples.<sup>64</sup> Organizational scope is also an important factor. If allied nations can understand why and to what extent terrorist organizations have a specific populous, culture or regions support they can work towards establish the appropriate messaging and action plan to erode terrorist support.

Understanding if and how an organization uses a rational decision-making process is fundamental in establishing successful counter measures. If analysts can determine an organization's decision making process then they can hypothesize the potential organizational policies and its methods of operation. Unfortunately, this has not been the case in the past as analysts have failed to comprehend the costs and benefits a particular

---

<sup>63</sup>*Ibid.*, 273.

<sup>64</sup>Vallis Rhyll, Yang Yubin, and A. Abbass Hussein, "Disciplinary Approaches to Terrorism: A Survey," Defence and Security Applications Research Center (DSA), (University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, Australia, 2006): 10-11, quoted in Boaz Ganor, *Terrorist Organization Typologies and the Probability of a Boomerang Effect...*, 273.

organization may regard when making decisions.<sup>65</sup> Contrary to an organization having a rational decision making process, it is exceptionally difficult to establish counter-measure when an organization's behavioral characteristics are believed to be irrational.

The next factor applied was whether an organization was independent or subordinate to another organization or state and to what degree. As briefly mentioned above many terrorist organizations originate or are supported by states. This is not to suggest that just because one organization was independently established it will remain independent from state support indefinitely or vice versa for an organization that originated through a state. Terrorist organizations move back and forth between the independence and subordination as required or as the opportunity presents itself.<sup>66</sup> This has been seen with such groups as Hamas which was independently established but in recent times has been sponsored by Iran. This is an important concept to understand because if a nation or the international community is able to implement strategies that begin to restrict and impede a terrorist organizations ability to function, understanding where they may turn for additional support in advance will allow allied nations to proactively develop successful follow on strategies.

An organization's operations and training area have also been utilized as factors in order to classify organizations. Different organizations utilize different terrorist tactics. They take advantage of rural and urban areas, targeting civilians as well as military targets. Some organizations are specifically geographically bound or they conduct their training in one region well conducting their terrorist actions in another. These

---

<sup>65</sup> Boaz Ganor, *Terrorist Organization Typologies and the Probability of a Boomerang Effect...*, 273.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 274.

characteristics can determine whether the organization is strictly a domestic organization or international or transnational.<sup>67</sup> This factor can be a difficult one to determine given globalization, however, if it can be determined it is an additional factor that will aid in establishing counter measures.

Other fundamental factors which contribute to distinguishing between organizations are an organization's stage of development, its seniority and the characteristics associated with its demands. Different organizations have unique political mandates. Some are stricter with their demands while others are more practical and willing to compromise.<sup>68</sup> An organization's tenure and experience level affect its overall operability, from training and development to its physical acts of terrorism.<sup>69</sup> Understanding the advancement and development stages of an organization allows nations to further research potential reasons for the existence of the organizations, its origins and potential follow on networks. These all allow for further development of effective and efficient counter measures.

Finally, an organization's structure and the characteristics associated with their actions round out the factors utilized in Ganor's model. A particularly noticeable trait among terrorist organizations is their level of violence. At one point or another, terrorist organizations become violent to some degree; however, some organizations conduct simultaneous non-violent actions in support of their cause, such as establishing diplomatic discussions or entering the political arena in order to establish legitimacy. Many academic researchers have identified distinct structural traits associated with

---

<sup>67</sup>*Ibid.*, 274.

<sup>68</sup>*Ibid.*, 275.

<sup>69</sup>*Ibid.*, 276.

terrorist organizations which were utilized to separate organizations based upon the strength of their command and control as well as their support functions.<sup>70</sup> Understanding the command structure of a terrorist organization is argued to be absolutely critical in order to establish long preventative counter measures. Not all terrorists are the same as demonstrated by Ganor's model. Not all terrorist have the same motives or reasons for becoming radicalized. To fully reduce the risks associated with terrorism researchers must understand on a psychological level why existing terrorists at all levels of a terrorist command structure became radicalized in order to prevent additional individuals from becoming supporters of terrorism or radicalized.


After reviewing Gonar's model it is evident that the typology field of terrorism is complex and challenging as there are many different types of terrorism which have different characteristics which have allowed terrorists and their organizations to develop and grow, resulting in terrorist actions around the world.<sup>71</sup> After reviewing the characteristics and factors as outlined above, it is clear that there are many sociological and psychological variables that have contributed to the proliferation of terrorism and are encompassed within terrorist typologies and their organizations. Analysis of each typology provides greater insight and understanding into the psychological and sociological factors associated with each classification and can provide tremendous awareness into how to combat against such organizations and their membership, reducing the potential for physical military intervention.

---

<sup>70</sup>*Ibid.*, 276.

<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*, 277.

It is argued that although complex, this model which collaborates and organizes numerous theories and typologies is a tremendous foundational beginning which analysts can build upon to establish internationally recognized typologies of terrorism. This model or a more advanced one like Ganor's can be used to more effectively and efficiently analyze terrorist organizations and their members to further determine potential psychological as well as sociological factors that are aiding in the proliferation and development of terrorism. Unfortunately, to date many researchers have worked independently using a broad brush approach to try and classify and determine unified characteristics which apply to all terrorists. This approach will never achieve the necessary understanding of terrorists or the necessary long term preventative action plans.



**Figure 1. Classifying Terror Organizations by their Characteristics.**

Source: Ganor, *Terrorist Organization Typologies and the Probability of a Boomerang effect*, 272.

As it can be seen, simply defining the word terrorism or distinguishing typologies of terrorism remains challenging and complex. Many sociological and psychological factors are intertwined within these concepts which challenge and impede allied nations' abilities to counter the root causes of terrorism.

A fundamental principle in defeating terrorism is obtaining a sound understanding of the recruitment process within terrorist organizations. It is an organization's membership which allows it to function and exist. By impeding recruitment as well as continuing additional counter-terrorism measures to eliminate existing membership, terrorism could be drastically minimized.<sup>72</sup> The challenge associated with this concept as eluded to above, is the fact that similar to the challenges associated with the definition and typologies of terrorism, the understanding of how organizations recruit and why an individual becomes recruited to engage in terrorism is also multifaceted and not fully understood.<sup>73</sup> There are many academic papers and theories regarding this subject matter however there is still no universally excepted terrorist recruitment theory and it is even argued that there has been no real conceptual effort into attempting to further analyze the subject matter in a more analytical manner.<sup>74</sup> This could be a result of traditional research which has continued to try and generalize all terrorist. As a result of there not being a universally accepted organizational chart outlining typologies of terrorism, how are researchers then to apply or build research on the recruitment practices of each typology

---

<sup>72</sup>Rand Corporation, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," last modified 15 September 2010, [www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1214.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1214.html)

<sup>73</sup>Peter R. Neumann, "Introduction," *The Adelphi Papers*, 48:399 (2010):5.

<sup>74</sup>*Ibid.*, 5.

or group of terrorism? If there is no foundation it is impossible to build a structurally sound frame work of knowledge to expand upon.

Just as was demonstrated above regarding the number of typologies, the same is true regarding the recruitment process. There is no one form of recruitment. For every terrorist organization and their target area for recruitment, there is a separate and specific strategy that can change dependent upon the resources available to conduct recruiting and their current strategic objectives.<sup>75</sup> Until further analysis is conducted, basic concepts in this area of terrorism will remain.<sup>76</sup> Regardless, this is a fundamental area of terrorism which impacts and is affected by psychological and sociological factors which aid in the development and proliferation of terrorism.

Terrorist organizations design their recruitment strategies based upon their target audiences. This target audience includes cultural and societal norms.<sup>77</sup> If the culture or society generally supports or is sympathetic towards the terrorist organization then such tactics as patriotism maybe utilize, or establish membership as an opportunity to advance one's family's social class or even utilized as a rite of passage into self-discovery. Depending on the country or region targeted for recruitment, terror organizations may target the entire population through different forms of media. They may use pamphlets, radio, television, news releases, and/or the internet which is inexpensive and can reach possible recruits on a global scale.<sup>78</sup> Again, dependent upon the target audience and its

---

<sup>75</sup>Rand Corporation, *Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment...*, 73.

<sup>76</sup>Peter R. Neumann, "Introduction," *The Adelphi Papers...*, 5.

<sup>77</sup>Rand Corporation, *Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment...*, 74.

receptiveness to the recruiting organization, they will often utilize agents who will choose targets of opportunity within the social fabric to raise awareness of their cause and stimulate interest in potential recruits. An organization with strong political contacts may even incorporate reading materials into school curriculums.<sup>79</sup> Terrorist organizations and their leaders have the advantage over allied forces around the world. If a terrorist organization has governmental support they have easy access to social media to manipulate and influence a nation's population. If this is not the case they still have access to the Internet which can reach millions of people around the world. It only takes a few to become radicalized in order for terrorist organization's objectives to be met. The cost to terrorist organizations is exceptionally low while national security budgets for allied nations are continually increasing into the millions of dollars.

Looking more closely at this issue and in particular at Muslim extremist organizations, two areas heavily utilized for recruitment have been identified by researchers. Meeting or assembling areas where non-radicalized Muslims may congregate have been identified as a primary source for recruiters. A prime example is the Mosque. Originally, mosques were heavily utilized by recruiters who openly recruited; however, this practice has changed as many congregations no longer tolerate radical members. A second area of recruitment involves Muslims vulnerable to isolation, estrangement, or social stress.<sup>80</sup> Examples would be penitentiaries, post-secondary institutions, or athletic organizations. This area of recruitment works for any terrorist organization. Recruiters

---

<sup>78</sup>*Ibid.*, 76.

<sup>79</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup>Peter R. Neumann, "Recruitment Grounds," *The Adelphi Papers*, 48:399 (2010):21.

from all terrorist organizations continue to prey on the young who are extremely vulnerable and more naive to manipulation.<sup>81</sup> Terrorist organizations are extremely flexible and efficient to change. As allied nations learn of one particular recruiting pattern terrorist organizations are quick to adapt. This relates to a fundamental lack of understanding by allied nations of the terrorist organization they are trying to deter or eliminate. Western understanding of terrorist organizations' recruiting processes is fundamental in order to identify psychological and sociological factors involved in the radicalization of individuals. Once this has occurred allied nations can develop and establish long term preventative counter-terrorism measures in order to address these root causes.

What is the significance for Canada and its society? Where is Canada situated on the global scale as it pertains to terrorism? The top threat to Canada and its citizen is Islamist extremism.<sup>82</sup> A number of Islamist extremist organizations have targeted Canada and its interests explicitly. Such groups include Al-Qaida, homegrown Sunni Islamists, Hezbollah and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. A number of terrorist groups reside within Canada, which participate in terrorist activities domestically, internationally and transnationally and fundraise among ethnic communities.<sup>83</sup> They recruit members from Canadian society to aid in their cause which can jeopardize peace and stability in both Canada and the outside World. The latest example of this trend is the two young

---

<sup>81</sup>Peter R. Neumann, "Conclusion," *The Adelphi Papers*, 48:399 (2010):59.

<sup>82</sup>Government of Canada, "Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy," last accessed 02 February 2013, [http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/\\_fl/2012-cts-eng.pdf](http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/_fl/2012-cts-eng.pdf)

<sup>83</sup>CSIS, "A Study of Radicalization: The Making of Islamist Extremists in Canada Today," last accessed 12 February 2013, [http://www.theglobeandmail.com/incoming/article8151644.ece/BINARY/csisradicals\\_001.pdf](http://www.theglobeandmail.com/incoming/article8151644.ece/BINARY/csisradicals_001.pdf)

Canadians who became radicalized and participated in the January 2013 Al-Qaeda attack on an Algerian gas refinery.

The Canadian government has evaluated the terrorist threat to Canada and has broken it down into three broad groups: Global Sunni Islamic extremists, other international terrorist organizations, and extremist domestic groups and individuals.<sup>84</sup> These classifications are broad and encompass most terror organizations and individuals. Although allied nations have been tenaciously pursuing Sunni Islamic extremist since 9/11, they are exceedingly adaptive and resilient. Although Osama bin Laden has been killed, Ayman al Zawahiri has moved forward and is the current leader of Al Qaida. He continues to foster worldwide proliferation of Sunni Islamist extremism and is inspiration for global terrorism. While allied nations have made great gains in disrupting and hampering Al Qaida operations, other associated Sunni Islamist organizations have emerged posing a significant threat to not only Canada but to all nations worldwide.

Canada has traditionally taken a passive approach to terrorism. Canada's passive approach has allowed terrorists organizations around the world to use Canada to support their operations not only financially but with membership of Canadian citizens. Lack of coordinated anti-terrorism legislation prior to the *Anti-Terrorism Act* allowed the establishment of charities which were used to fund terrorist activities.<sup>85</sup> Canada's Anti-Terrorism Act made the above practice illegal in December 2001, which represented a

---

<sup>84</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup>*Ibid.*, xxiii.

fundamental step forward; however, it had a limited effect. In 2003, \$22 million was recorded as being transferred to terrorist organizations from Canada.<sup>86</sup> Since then, FINTRAC, a Canadian agency mandated to track, detect, prevent and deter money laundering and the financing of terrorist organizations, has not produced a financial number associated with terrorist financing. It has continued to produce and track case files associated with terrorist financing.<sup>87</sup> What is unclear is whether calculating a monetary amount for the financing of terrorism from Canada has become more difficult to achieve or whether it is conveniently more advantageous to not place a monetary amount to prevent international scrutiny and backlash for terrorist support within Canada.

In 2007, Canadian politicians played politics as the Conservative government urged opposition parties to vote in support of renewing sections of the anti-terrorism act such as the preventative detention and investigative hearings, however to no avail.<sup>88</sup> Once again, in December 2012, a new Bill known as S-7 was put forth to regain the powers lost as described above as well as additional legislation to address Canadians going abroad to commit terrorist actions. Bill S-7, currently being debated in Parliament faces the same lack of support by the opposition parties.<sup>89</sup> It has taken the Canadian Government over a decade since 9/11 to produce an official strategy against terrorism. It was not until February 9<sup>th</sup> 2012 when the Ministry of Public Safety released the official document

---

<sup>86</sup>*Ibid.*, xxiii.

<sup>87</sup>Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, "FINTRAC Annual Report Highlights Sharply Increased Output of Financial Intelligence," last modified 2 November 2011, <http://www.fintrac-canafe.gc.ca/new-neuf/nr/2011-11-02-eng.asp>

<sup>88</sup>Jane Taber, "Tories disinclined to subject anti-terror measure to sunset clause," *Globe and Mail*, 13 September 2011, last modified 14 September 2011, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-notebook/tories-disinclined-to-subject-anti-terror-measures-to-sunset-clause/article617345/>

<sup>89</sup>Leslie MacKinnon, "Bill to restore expired ant-terrorism laws debated," *CBC News*, 15 October 2012, last modified 15 October 2012, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/10/15/pol-anti-terrorism-bill-senate.html>

called *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-terrorism Strategy*. The document outlines the terrorist threat domestically as well as internationally, and explains that the Canadian Government's strategy is based upon a whole of government approach with support from Canadian communities and its citizens. This strategy is designed to utilize a four pillar approach: Prevent, Detect, Deny and Respond.

Detection of supporters of terrorism as well as those who pose a terrorist threat to Canadians within Canada has been effective for the Canadian Government through such organizations as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. One fundamental challenge as it pertains to detection has been inter-agency information flow. The effective and efficient passing of information between governmental agencies corresponding to terrorism can be non-existent or extremely slow depending upon the classification of the information and the governmental organizations involved.<sup>90</sup> This in turn can greatly affect the effectiveness of counter-terrorism actions. The Canadian Government needs to establish more effective lines of communication in particular relating to security risks such as terrorism and those agencies that maybe involved in the event an act of terrorism occurs.

Denying terrorist organizations and their membership the resources required to conduct terrorist activities continues to be a challenge. This is significantly impacted by insufficient government policy designed to deny terrorist organizations and their membership the means necessary to operate. This is evident with the example presented above ref the lack of political support pertaining to the anti-terrorism act and bill S-7.

---

<sup>90</sup>G.P. Meissner, Inspector 178, Division 51, Toronto Police Service, conversation, 24 September 2012.

Responding to a terrorist action in an efficient and effective manner to this point has not been tested other than to thwart terrorist actions just prior to their occurrence.<sup>91</sup> There are those that may argue that because of this success the current ability is therefore sufficient however this would not be the case.<sup>92</sup> Currently, anything other than small incidences would be a significant challenge for governmental organizations to efficiently and effectively manage as a result of current resource limitations<sup>93</sup> and the lack of critical information flow between inter-agencies pertaining to elevated security risks.

Prevention is the strategy to stop Canadians and others around the world from becoming radicalized and engaging in terrorism. This pillar in particular is argued to be the most fundamental pillar within this strategy in the long term fight against the proliferation of terrorism. Without a sound commitment to prevention the other three pillars will continue to require extensive resources which are financially costly and will only continue to become more expensive if the root cause is not addressed. This strategy as stated is designed to pursue and reduce the root causes and factors associated with individuals engaging in terrorism by actively connecting with citizens, their communities and international colleagues as well as conducting research to further comprehend

---

<sup>91</sup>Public Safety Canada, "Building Resilience Against Terrorism," last modified 04 December 2012, <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/2012-cts-eng.aspx>

<sup>92</sup>G.P. Meissner, Inspector 178, Division 51, Toronto Police Service, conversation, 24 September 2012.

<sup>93</sup>Allison J. Stuart, Assistant Deputy Minister & Chief for Emergency Management Ontario, conversation, 24 September 2012.

contributing factors of terrorism in order to counter them.<sup>94</sup> This research is identified as a critical and fundamental aspect in the prevention of terrorism.<sup>95</sup>

There are a few preventative initiatives which the Canadian Government has decided to invest in. The first was the Kanishka Project which was a memorial fund for the Air India bombing which occurred on 23 June 1985. The Project is designed to provide funding for a number of educational initiatives to combat terrorism which include conferences, large scale research endeavors and publications intended to aid Canada in constructing a sufficient data base to effectively combat the complex challenges associated with terrorism.<sup>96</sup> The project will provide \$10 million over 5 years, \$2.5 million of which will be available over the 5 year life of the project for research projects.<sup>97</sup> Although stated as a \$10 million project it would appear to be a sizable investment it is actually not when you really break down the numbers. Over the 5 year life of the project only half a million a year has been allocated to research. This is not nearly enough time or funding to truly challenge this fundamental aspect. In addition to this research endeavor the Centre for Security Science within Defense Research and Development Canada is the lead agency for the Canadian Safety and Security Program, which is responsible for support research pertaining to the psychological and sociological factors associated with terrorism.<sup>98</sup> Unfortunately,

---

<sup>94</sup>Public Safety Canada, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism...*

<sup>95</sup>Public Safety Canada, "Countering Violent Extremism," last modified 26 February 2013, <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/ctrng-xtms/index-eng.aspx>

<sup>96</sup>Prime Minister of Canada, "PM Marks National Day of Remembrance for Victims of Terrorism," last modified 23 June 2011, <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=4172>

<sup>97</sup>Public Safety Canada, "Funding Opportunities," last modified 01 March 2013, <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/ai182/kpcp/fndop-eng.aspx>

<sup>98</sup>Public Safety Canada, "Research on Countering Violent Extremism," last modified 26 February 2013, <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/ctrng-xtms/ctrng-rsrch-eng.aspx#a02>

although this research has been identified as a critical aspect in prevention and the root causes of terrorism, the research pertaining to this subject matter has only been identified as a future area of study and research.

Further government initiatives include community outreach as well as domestic and international engagements. Community outreach as well as domestic engagement encompasses the RCMP National Security Awareness and Community Outreach program, Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security as well as Multiculturalism initiatives.<sup>99</sup> The RCMP has been given the responsibility as being the primary organization accountable for the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorism activities within Canadian boundaries.<sup>100</sup> As a result of this mandate the RCMP has established the RCMP National Security Community Outreach program which is designed to connect with all Canadians and their communities to ensure a secure and peaceful society. This encompasses a solid law enforcement methodology designed to work with other governmental agencies and communities challenged with potential radicalization of its members.<sup>101</sup> The prevention aspect of this program has been addressed through the implantation of additional information associated with the prevention of terrorism to the RCMP's drug education Program which visits schools throughout the country designed to raise awareness associated with the dangers of drug use.<sup>102</sup> The challenge associated with the RCMP being the primary organization

---

<sup>99</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup>Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "National Security Community Outreach," last accessed 06 March 2013, <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/nsci-ecsn/nsco-scn-eng.htm>

<sup>101</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>102</sup>Lise S.Crouch, RCMP Inspector for the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team, conversation, 07 March 2013.

responsible for prevention of terrorism is the lack of information and research associated with the root causes of terrorism and radicalization such as the sociological and psychological factors.<sup>103</sup> Without this information it is impossible to design an effective and efficient prevention program; however, the RCMP has neither resources nor capacity to conduct this research and relies upon other governmental agencies such as the Centre for Security Science within Defense Research and Development Canada for this information which has yet to provide or even begin the necessary analysis and research in order to provide this critical information.

The Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security is an advisory board made up of 12 members from diverse communities within in Canada. The board meets 3 times a year to discuss and advise the Minister of Public Safety as well as the Minister of Justice on concerns pertaining to national security. The challenge with this board is that it was designed to have up to 15 members from across Canada; however, it is currently made up of only 12, 7 of which are from Ontario, 2 from Quebec, 2 from British Columbia and 1 from Alberta.<sup>104</sup> Although the largest diverse populations come from these provinces, all provinces and territories should have representation to ensure the knowledge is transferred to all provinces and communities in order to prevent similar challenges from occurring in areas of Canada that were otherwise considered unlikely. The program has established a solid foundation; however, it requires further updating and development in

---

<sup>103</sup>Lise S.Crouch, RCMP Inspector for the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team, conversation, 07 March 2013.

<sup>104</sup>Public Safety Canada, "Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security," last modified 07 February 2012, <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/ccrs/index-eng.aspx>

order to be more effective in countering the growing proliferation of terrorism within Canada.

Internationally the government participates in many assemblies designed to analyse terrorism. However, the majority of these meetings are in support of the other three strategic pillars associated with Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy.<sup>105</sup> The Global Counterterrorism Forum which was established in September 2011 was designed to further analyses and foster international strategies to counter terrorism and in particular nation's citizen's ability to counter terrorism. The Canadian Government's involvement in this forum is led by the International Crime and Terrorism Division within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.<sup>106</sup> When contacted in reference to potential progress made pertaining to developments in the prevention of terrorism, the department chose not to comment. As a result, it is unclear what if anything has been achieved as a result of Canada's participation within this forum. This may be as a result of how new it is; however, these forums are important so long as the information received is then communicated efficiently and effectively to the appropriate government agencies to then be evaluated to update or initiate effective policy and action plans designed to aid in the prevention of terrorism.

Although Canada has just recently established an official action plan designed to counter terrorism, it is currently paper thin with little accountability. It must be continually monitored and developed if it is to be effective. It has established a sound

---

<sup>105</sup>Public Safety Canada, "Countering Violent Extremism," last modified 26 February 2013, <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/ctrng-xtms/index-eng.aspx>

<sup>106</sup>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Global Counter Terrorism Forum," last modified last accessed 06 March 2013, <http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/forum.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>

foundation for the three later aspects however, although the government recognizes the criticality in researching and addressing the root causes associated with terrorism in order to prevent it, the government has yet to fully commit to achieving this goal.

The challenges facing nations and the international community are complex and require continuous, extensive and cooperative analysis in order to understand fully terrorism and the individuals and organizations that continue its proliferation. Nations need to apply national and international security policies which directly address the root causes associated with terrorism. However, at the very foundation of these challenges is the lack of an internationally accepted definition and typology frame work of terrorism. These challenges drastically impact nations' abilities to design and adapt policies and appropriate social programs to combat against specific terrorist organizations' recruitment strategies. Terrorist organizations are not all the same. Some are extremely robust as the result of decades of state support while others are still developing. They are extremely adaptive and manipulate the short comings of governments such as Canada in order to gain support for their causes as well as new membership. Such challenges contribute to psychological and sociological factors which aid in the continuation and proliferation of terrorism. Once allied nations understand fully these factors they can eliminate or drastically reduce recruitment from within their nations by establishing the appropriate counter measures which directly impact these factors.

This strategy combined with additional security measures can further ensure a nation's overall security and prosperity. This task is not easy and in fact remains exceptionally difficult given the different economic situations between nations and different security policies and abilities. Although challenging, it is a strategy worthwhile

as it will directly address the causes of terrorism rather than treating its symptoms. This approach will not only serve Canada well but all nations in the fight against domestic, international and transnational terrorism.

Another fundamental challenge in the fight against terrorism is the psychological factors associated with why individuals become radicalized and turn to terrorism. Determining these factors has not been well analyzed even though it is recognized as a critical component in combating terrorism. It is argued that the reason for this is a result of the complexity of the many different types of terrorism which have failed to be officially organized and categorized for further research and analysis. Even though this has been the case there is a sound foundation established demonstrating the potential of this field that once applied against specific typologies can provide further understanding into how to apply preventative measures to combat against individuals from becoming radicalized.

The pathway to becoming a terrorist follows a process called radicalization. Radicalization is a complex process where by an individual's views and perceptions towards the conduct of violent acts to further political change escalates to the point of the individual being able to commit violent acts or directly or indirectly support others in their pursuit of carrying out violent acts.<sup>107</sup> This process is heavily based upon an individual's beliefs and feelings which are then manifested into a particular behavior. How extreme the individual's beliefs and feelings are often determine the extremeness of the individual's actions or behavior.<sup>108</sup> Social Psychologist Clark McCauley utilizes a

---

<sup>107</sup>Donatella Della Porta and Gary LaFree, "Processes of Radicalization and De-Radicalization," *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, Vol 6:1, (2012):6.

<sup>108</sup>Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 20, (2008): 416.

pyramid model in describing this concept. At the very top of the pyramid, there are those radicalized terrorists with the extreme views and feelings who have or are willing to commit violent acts. They are at the top because they are a minority. At the bottom of the pyramid are those that are sympathetic to terrorists; however, their feelings and beliefs have not yet developed to the same extent as those at the top of the pyramid and therefore they have not escalated their behaviors to violent actions.<sup>109</sup> In the middle are those advancing up the pyramid as their beliefs and feelings become more radicalized, leading to the potential of terrorist violent actions. This pyramid model is a critical concept for terrorist organizations. In this framework, terrorist and terrorist organizations rely upon this pyramid in order to survive. They use the bottom members as their support network. They are able to not only receive financial and technical support but are able to easily recruit from these members as they have already begun their advancement toward the top of the pyramid.<sup>110</sup> Who is most likely to become radicalized and what are the psychological and sociological factors that trigger an individual's beliefs and feelings to the extent necessary to have them journey to the base of the radicalization pyramid and then choose to climb to its summit?

After reviewing Ganor's typology model, striving to achieve a single terrorist profile which is compatible for all types of terrorism would be impractical and ineffective in achieving sufficient information to evaluate psychological and sociological factors which lead to their radicalization. Each typology of terrorism and the terrorist which fosters its

---

<sup>109</sup>Clark McCauley, "Tragic Iterations: Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism," *Searle Centre on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth*, last accessed 08 February 2013, [http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/McCauley\\_terrorism.pdf](http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/McCauley_terrorism.pdf)

<sup>110</sup>*Ibid.*

development possess idiosyncratic and inimitable traits.<sup>111</sup> This claim does not imply that all terrorists are uniquely different as some characteristics do overlap between typologies but each typology does hold characteristics that will be different, and after further analysis will have specific psychological factors which apply to its membership. Additionally within each typology there are different levels of membership which after further evaluation will provide specific psychological characteristic traits pertaining to each typologies command structure. It is this extensive research and the follow on application of action plans which is necessary in order to truly challenge and significantly reduce the threat of terrorism.

Psychological research on terrorism has been criticized for its inability to achieve large controlled sample sizes for research analysis. What is astonishing is that rather than recognizing that there are not large sample sizes to study but rather small groups which could be classified into typologies, academics and researchers utilize this factor to discredit and minimize results found, essentially achieving little. This is argued to be one of the factors that have resulted in limited interest and developments in this field of study. Other factors

include the violent and dangerous nature of terrorism and the fact that achieving in-depth and highly valuable organizational and membership information is extremely dangerous and challenging given the secretive nature of terrorism and terrorists.<sup>112</sup> To date, research

---

<sup>111</sup>Reuben Vaisman-Tzachor, "Profiling Terrorists," *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations*..., 32.

has typically involved small, abnormal groups which have made it challenging to ensure the information gathered has been accurate enough to determine reliable concepts and theories to be applied to all terrorists.<sup>113</sup> Although the sample groups utilized for research have typically been of detained terrorist members who are arguably more likely to provide inaccurate information to those that have detained them and those that wish to defeat their cause, researchers have been able to achieve basic psychological theories that can be applied and utilized for further in-depth analysis.<sup>114</sup> It is through this collection of data and the application of this research to specific groups that detailed psychological characteristics can be revealed and then countered.

Psychological theories have been debated since their inception and are still being debated today. Psychology theories may be broken down into two groups, psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic.<sup>115</sup> Psychoanalytic theory has been fundamentally established upon Freudian Theory and is based upon the premise that most of an individual's mental existence is unconscious and that psychological advancement is through developmental periods based upon infant sexual fantasies and that psychological anguish develops as a result of the individual's unsettled psychological processes.<sup>116</sup> This theory has many different variations; however, when analyzed closely the approaches

---

<sup>112</sup>Joshua Sinai, "Can Terrorists Be Psychologically Profiled?," *The Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International*, Vol 17, Issue 2 (2011): 14.

<sup>113</sup>Marc Sageman, "Understanding Terror Networks," *Foreign Policy Institute*, last accessed 10 February 2013, <http://web.archive.org/web/20041110010204/http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20041101.middleeast.sageman.understandingterrornetworks.html>

<sup>114</sup>Reuben Vaisman-Tzachor, "Profiling Terrorists," *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations...*, 42.

<sup>115</sup>Jeff Victoroff and Arie Krulanski, *Psychology of Terrorism*, (New York: Psychology Press, 2009): 70.

<sup>116</sup>Kaplan and Sadock, *Kaplan and Sadock's Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry*, (Lippincott Williams and Wilkins, 2009):190-200.

have three common concepts: parenthood is a factor in an individual's psychological disposition and well-being, dynamic subconscious powers reject disagreeable thoughts from an individual's consciousness, and subconscious powers such as attitudes displayed control relationships with others.<sup>117</sup> Terrorist conduct, when viewed upon from the psychoanalytic approach can be further separated into identity theory, narcissism theory, paranoia theory and absolutist theory.<sup>118</sup> These theories provide a good foundational overview of the potential in this field; however, they could provide great insight if further analysis were to be conducted on specific typologies of terrorism.

Identity theory is associated with individuals lacking a sense of who they are or what they should be doing in life. They turn to a terrorist organization as a way of finding self-identity and fulfillment. Psychologists Ethel Quayle and Maxwell Taylor in their book *Terrorists Lives* explained that a number of individuals of Irish and European terrorist organizations became involved with terrorism to fulfill their desire to find their reason for being and self-worth.<sup>119</sup> Additionally, Dr. James Jones, author of *Blood That Cries Out From the Earth*, a book on the psychology of religious terrorism, deems that many young individuals join terrorist organizations as a result of a profound desire to belong to something great.<sup>120</sup> Unfortunately, very little research has been conducted directly linking this theory to individuals joining terrorist organizations.<sup>121</sup> As has been discussed youth can be very

---

<sup>117</sup>Ibid., 190-200.

<sup>118</sup>Jeff Victoroff and Arie Krulanski, *Psychology of Terrorism...* 71.

<sup>119</sup>Maxwell Taylor and Ethel Quayle, *Terrorist Lives*, (London: Brassey's Ltd, 1995).

<sup>120</sup>John Blake, "Experts: Many young Muslim terrorists spurred by humiliation," *CNN*, last accessed 15 February 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/08/13/generation.islam.violence/index.html>

<sup>121</sup>Jeff Victoroff and Arie Krulanski, *Psychology of Terrorism...* 71.

impressionable and if not mentored appropriately can find themselves looking for something more. Terrorist organizations recognize this and target youth specifically through social Medias such as the internet. The argument could be made that there are close ties between youth membership in gangs and why Canadian youth are turning toward terrorist organizations. Through the cross examination of these two subject matters greater clarity could be provided.

Narcissism theory much like identity theory encompasses the youth and their development. It too incorporates mentorship; however, with narcissism theory it is the mentorship of the parent figure. Narcissism is based upon the need of a child to have an appropriate upbringing based on caring and affection in order to mentally develop normally.<sup>122</sup> Failure to provide such affection leads an individual to develop self-image challenges. These challenges are classified one of two ways: continuing infantile elaborate unrealities or the inability to adopt the faultless persona of the parents. These challenges inhibit the advancement of the individual adult character and morality. It has been suggested by Psychologist John Crayton, that a degrading experience during adulthood that attacks an individual's ego could actually cause a narcissistic injury during adulthood which might cause resurfacing of a psychological characteristic of infantile narcissism. If this were to occur, the beginning of an extreme psychological transformation of the individual could occur into that of a leader, follower, or even an amalgamation of the two. This situation is theorized to then form the desire to eliminate the cause of the injury otherwise known as narcissistic rage. In turn, it is believed the rage

---

<sup>122</sup>Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs, *Encyclopedia of Social Psychology*, last accessed 13 February, <http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/socialpsychology/n361.xml?rskey=EzZSUI&row=5>

is actually rage against the individuals injured self,<sup>123</sup> which is launched onto a terrorist objective which is a result of the terrorist's hostility and animosity they have towards themselves.<sup>124</sup> Although studies support the narcissism theory such as the work completed by psychologist Gustave Morf on the members of the National Liberation Front (FLQ)<sup>125</sup> as well as the research and writings of psychologist Jerrold Post,<sup>126</sup> there are also studies expressing doubt over this theory such as the work by Marc Sageman.<sup>127</sup> These writings and studies use small sample sizes in their analysis which leaves much room for debate to whether the characteristics associated with the theory narcissism are really suitable; however, through the determinant of specific typologies and the further analysis of this theory against them would provide further support for this theory and back up the sample sizes utilized by Morf and Post.

Post provides support for narcissism theory as well as the paranoia theory. A paranoid personality suffers from inescapable and enduring uneasiness and lack of trust of humanity. These individuals regularly believe that humanity is plotting against them and them alone. As a result, they believe it is better to trust oneself and no one else. As a result of lack of trust, they are easily affronted and once they believe they have been slighted, they anticipate clues to confirm their suspicion and quickly discard any information to the contrary. These individuals see others that they believe have slighted

---

<sup>123</sup>John Crayton, "Terrorism and the Psychology of Self," in *Perspectives on terrorism, edited by L.Z. Freedman and Y. Alexander*, 33-41. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc. (1983).

<sup>124</sup>Jeff Victoroff and Arie Krulanski, *Psychology of Terrorism...* 71.

<sup>125</sup>Gustave Morf, *Terror in Quebec, Case studies of the FLQ*, (Canada: Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited, 1970).

<sup>126</sup>Jerrold M. Post, *Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior*, New York: Cornell University Press (2004):123-161.

<sup>127</sup>Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

them as adversaries and evil. They are viewed as threats to not only them but to their beliefs and or possibly to their nation depending upon their position in society. As a result, they will often strike first, believing this action to be the only way to resolve the situation. Applying this approach to terrorism and terrorist violent actions, if the potential terrorist's paranoia proliferates high enough, it could trigger violent actions against the cause of the paranoia. The violent actions are justified based upon the suspicions of betrayal or the perceived threat of being under siege by the evil enemy. Individuals who are believed to have suffered from paranoia are Joseph Stalin and Saddam Hussein.<sup>128</sup> Today terrorists act out as a result of their belief that the Muslim world is under siege by the western nations.<sup>129</sup> Just like the narcissism theory, the paranoia theory has been challenged by Dr. Sageman's limited study of ten terrorists' memoirs which did not display sufficient characteristics linking terrorists or at least the ten studied to the paranoia theory.<sup>130</sup> Again, this observation demonstrates the limited study within in this field of study and the requirement for additional analysis to be carried out. It further demonstrates the diversity and complexity between terrorist organizations and typologies.

Apocalyptic theory is described as groups or individuals that believe large scale devastation and extermination is the necessary means required in order to commence the cleansing and rejuvenation of an otherwise corrupt and evil world, in a world that is in

---

<sup>128</sup>Jerrold M. Post, *Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior...*, 111-112.

<sup>129</sup>Tom Parry, "Al-Qaeda affiliates attracting Canadians," CBC News, Last Updated 11 February 2013, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2013/02/11parry-fadden-senate.html>

<sup>130</sup>Jeff Victoroff and Arie Krulanski, *Psychology of Terrorism...* 73.

desperate need of new social leadership and stability.<sup>131</sup> These individuals and/or groups are described as displaying characteristics of absolutist moral polarization, idealization of messianic objects, and having compromised actualities described as illusions of extensive conspiracy plots and theories of evil campaigns.<sup>132</sup> Psychologist and respected author Robert Lifton believes the values and beliefs projected by such individuals and organizations are very luring and attractive to individuals questioning their identities. These individuals attracted through seductive organizational propaganda conduct terrorist actions which they then separate themselves from through denial or other psychological measures in order to suppress emotional responses of guilt and/or remorse.<sup>133</sup> An example of such an organization is the Aum Shinrikyo cult which is consumed with the apocalypse. Aum Shinrikyo is the terrorist organization responsible for the 1995 Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system which killed twelve people and required an additional six thousand people to be medically treated.<sup>134</sup> Lifton's theory, much like the others discussed, has fallen to the same fate. His theory has been challenged as a result of his small sample size which he used to develop his theory; however, just like all the other sample sizes studied they are specific groups within typologies which when further studied will provide key information into psychological factors associated with their

---

<sup>131</sup>Robert J. Lifton, *Destroying The World To Save It*, New York: Metropolitan Books Henry Holt and Company (1999):200-204.

<sup>132</sup>Jeff Victoroff and Arie Krulanski, *Psychology of Terrorism...* 74.

<sup>133</sup>Robert J. Lifton, *Destroying The World To Save It...*,

<sup>134</sup>Council on Foreign Relations, "Aum Shinrikyo," last accessed 17 February 2013, [www.cfr.org/japan/aum-shinrikyo/p9238](http://www.cfr.org/japan/aum-shinrikyo/p9238)

membership. Once again it is clear that more collaborative research is needed if terrorism is to ever be truly understood and eradicated.

The psychoanalytic theories of terrorism provide great insight into the possibility of early childhood development being a key contributor to adult behavioral tendencies and in particular committing violent acts of terrorism. In addition, they highlight the tremendous potential of the unconscious mind to impact the conscious mind and the great ability of groups to manipulate individuals into conducting terrorist actions as a result of the complex psychodynamic powers at play within organizations.

Non-psychoanalytic psychological theories of terrorism are broken down into Cognitive theory, Novelty-Seeking theory and Humiliation-Revenge theory. Cognitive theory encompasses the functioning and ability of the brain. Cognition is an individual's mental ability to process information. It involves analyzing information, problem solving, learning, decision making and the ability to concentrate.<sup>135</sup> It can be further explained through cognitive capacity and style. Cognitive capacity is the amount of information an individual's brain can mentally process and retain at a given time.<sup>136</sup> Cognitive style pertains to an individual's ability to process information or the way they think. Although there has been little study directly related to the cognitive factors associated with terrorist actions,<sup>137</sup> there has been research which has resulted in findings indicating that violent actions and conduct as well as other behavioral disorders are swayed by cognitive style

---

<sup>135</sup>Dr. Pascale Michelin, "Cognitive Abilities and Skills," last accessed 19 February 2013, <http://www.sharpbrains.com/blog/2006/12/18/what-are-cognitive-abilities/>

<sup>136</sup>Dr. Olenka Bilash, "Cognitive Capacity and Cognitive Load," last accessed 19 February 2013, <http://www2.education.ualberta.ca/staff/olenka.bilash/Best%20of%20Bilash/cognitive%20capacity.html>

<sup>137</sup>Jason Satterfield, "Cognitive-affective states predict military and political aggression and risk taking: A content analysis of Churchill, Hitler, Roosevelt, and Stalin," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Issue 42-6, (1998): 667.

and capacity.<sup>138</sup> Dr. Satterfield in his article on military and political aggression suggests that cognitive style is linked to the aggressiveness of political leaders.<sup>139</sup> With such behavioral research conducted, it is plausible to assume the same could be completed for terrorist behavior and their reasons for becoming radicalized.

Unfortunately, this area of study as it pertains to terrorism has yet to be fully exploited.<sup>140</sup> In order to achieve effective and suitable results to counter terrorism, this area of study would need to be conducted for each typology of terrorism. This would first entail categorizing terrorism typologies as Ganor has, along with further research into the membership of each typology and the positions within each organization. This is the only precise way of getting to the root of the problem.

Novelty-seeking theory refers to an individual's turning to terrorist actions or terrorist organizations because of the individual's desire for action, and unique dangerous experiences as a result of inherent and inborn natural desires.<sup>141</sup> It has been raised that an individual's brain development or more specifically neural development may be linked to an individual's participation in terrorism.<sup>142</sup> Being part of a secretive organization which plans and organizes covert operations in support of political violence may appear thrilling and daring to some who require excessive amounts of stimulation. This impulse may also be linked to what the individual has been exposed to regarding beliefs. At a young

---

<sup>138</sup>Monique Ernst et al., "Decision Making in Adolescents With Behavior Disorders and Adults With Substance Abuse," *Am J Psychiatry*, Issue 160, (2003):33-40.

<sup>139</sup>Jason Satterfield, *Cognitive-affective states predict military and political aggression and risk taking: A content analysis of Churchill, Hitler, Roosevelt, and Stalin...*,667.

<sup>140</sup>Jeff Victoroff and Arie Krulanski, *Psychology of Terrorism...* 74.

<sup>141</sup>Saul Levine, "Youth in Terroristic Groups, Gangs, and Cults: The Allure, the Animus, and the Alienation," *Psychiatric Annals*, Issue 29-6 (1999):343-344.

<sup>142</sup>Ronald Dahl, "Adolescent brain development: A period of vulnerabilities and opportunities," *Annals of the New York Academy of Science*, Issue 1021 (2004)

age, an individual's beliefs are developing. As the individual matures, if these beliefs are further instilled they become locked into the individual and are more difficult to change until later on in life when the individual begins to mellow. The desire to support those beliefs are at their greatest during the period those beliefs become solidified. It is this in between period where individuals are most vulnerable and susceptible to terrorist activities.<sup>143</sup> This subject matter holds great potential unfortunately there has not been a great deal of research in this area.<sup>144</sup> This theory like all the others has just touched the surface pertaining to the psychological aspects associated with individuals becoming radicalized. The further challenge is analyzing each typology of terrorism and the organizations associated with each. By doing this, research can then be conducted into each organizations belief structures and how it is fostered to then develop the necessary long-term counter measures.

Humiliation-revenge theory is based upon an individual being embarrassed or degraded to the point whereby the individual vows revenge. Evidence for this theory can be seen in everyday life. You can see this in young children who will quickly strike back at another when they feel as though they have been tricked or embarrassed. Examples demonstrating extreme violent action can be seen by the many school shootings where many have been as a result of individuals feeling picked on or bullied by other school members.<sup>145</sup> Additional evidence to this theory pertains to terrorism as well. Assistant economics professor at Radford University in Virginia, Basel Saleh, conducted a study

---

<sup>143</sup>*Ibid.*,

<sup>144</sup> Jeff Victoroff and Arie Krulanski, *Psychology of Terrorism...*, 75.

<sup>145</sup> Stephen Thompson and Ken Kyle, "Understanding Mass School Shootings: Links between Personhood and Power in the Competitive School Environment," *Journal of Primary Prevention*, Issue 26-5 (2005):424-426.

involving 82 Palestinian suicide bombers. His study involved analyzing the socioeconomic factors which lead these individuals to become suicide bombers. His findings determined that many were driven by revenge as a result of being previously shot, arrested or having their family members mistreated. In the Middle East, family is of great value. The honor of the family is extremely important and therefore defending a family's honor can lead to extreme measures such as terrorism.<sup>146</sup> Not all societies lend themselves to this psychological extremeness however through further research into which cultures may be prone as well as to the typologies and organizations that may try and exploit them; nations can implement appropriate countermeasures reducing the proliferation of terrorism.

Saleh's study could be disputed or discredited based upon his sample size which as mentioned has been done to many others; however, the few studies conducted, have involved specific groups. The results have had different findings which have caused many analysts to discredit individual researchers' work. As a result, many analysts conclude that profiling terrorists is not possible. As stated earlier, if typologies of terrorism were defined, the groups studied may be determined to be their own typology and therefore the findings quite valuable for that particular typology.

Dr. Reuben Vaisman-Tzachor, Clinical and Forensic Psychologist and adjunct professor at the Chicago School of Professional Psychology and Argosy University in Los Angeles, has compiled much of the research conducted by Psychologist and Terrorist experts in order to provide a basic framework corresponding to the psychological factors

---

<sup>146</sup>John Blake, "Experts: Many young Muslim terrorists spurred by humiliation," *CNN*, last accessed 15 February 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/08/13/generation.islam.violence/index.html>

associated with terrorists.<sup>147</sup> Dr. Vaisman-Tzachor has determined that although not psychotic, terrorists do display character traits associated with what the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders classifies as Cluster B personality disorders.<sup>148</sup> Dr. Vaisman-Tzachor's psychological characteristics most likely associated with a potential terrorist are surrounded by the cluster B personality disorders which he calls The Narcissistic Character Organization. The psychological progression of this disorder is from the beginning of an individual's life as they learn to become fully emotionally self-reliant out of necessity as the result of life experiences. The personality growth is prefigured at a young age as the individual realizes their parent or parents will not convey the individual's emotional needs. Upon this realization, the individual goes through a time period of discovering how to meet their emotional needs. Through this journey, the individual develops independence and self-fulfillment through alternative means. Examples of such individuals are Yasir Arafat, former Palestinian leader and labeled by many as a terrorist, and Richard Reid known as the shoe bomber. Yasir Arafat lived with his uncle after the age of four as a result of his mother's death and began a path to terrorism through weapons trafficking.<sup>149</sup> Richard Reid's father was a career criminal who spent most of Reid's adolescent life behind bars. Reid followed in his father's footsteps committing petty crimes and serving time in youth

---

<sup>147</sup>Reuben Vaisman-Tzachor, "Profiling Terrorists," *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations...*, 42.

<sup>148</sup>Reuben Vaisman-Tzachor, "Profiling Terrorists," *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations...*, 43.

<sup>149</sup>Isabel Kershner, "Palestinian May Exhume Arafat After Report of Poisoning," *The New York Times*, last accessed 11 February 2013, [http://travel.nytimes.com/2012/07/05/world/middleeast/palestinians-may-exhume-arafat-after-report-of-poisoning.html?\\_r=0](http://travel.nytimes.com/2012/07/05/world/middleeast/palestinians-may-exhume-arafat-after-report-of-poisoning.html?_r=0)

and adult facilities where at the age of twenty two while in prison he converted to Islam and shortly thereafter became radicalized.<sup>150</sup>

During this journey, the individual cultivates a complex and elaborate intellect of self. This defense is psychological as a result of idiosyncratic feelings of being inconsequential and unloved by the individual's parents who are viewed as deficient, unsatisfactory or inaccessible. This defense mechanism manifests itself into a feeling of superiority to others and validates the reasons for why the individual's parents are inadequate in their ability to love the individual.<sup>151</sup> What can be deduced from this is the fact that an individual's environment, society or culture plays a key part in the psychological development of the individual. The more negative an individual's environment the more susceptible an individual can be to developing negative psychological characteristics that may leave them prone to becoming radicalized. Terrorist organizations know this as well and target these individuals for recruitment around the world.

During the 1990s a number of violent terrorist actions were conducted and organized by creative, self-proclaimed parties who viewed themselves as individuals with higher callings responsible for significant historically changes. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin's assassination in 1995 by Yigal Amir, The World Trade Centre bombing in 1993 by Ramzi Yousef , the Tokyo subway poisonous gas attack in 1995 lead by Aum Shinrikyo, and the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh are all such examples of individuals who fall

---

<sup>150</sup>Michael Elliot, "The Shoe Bomber's World," *Time World*, last accessed 11 February 2013, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,203478,00.html>

<sup>151</sup>Reuben Vaisman-Tzachor, "Profiling Terrorists," *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations...*, 44.

within Dr. Vaisman-Tzachor's Narcissistic Character Organization.<sup>152</sup>

As any individual develops, a critical pattern emerges as they move toward a grandiose view of themselves while developing a vain sense of entitlement. The individual fosters deep philosophical, patriotic, and/or spiritual beliefs. Although an individual develops a number of defense mechanisms to deal with their emotional inefficiencies, often times they are not enough, leading to the individual desiring additional compensation. This path leads to the commitment to social organizations and the requirement of these groups to provide approval to fill the void caused by the lack of parental nurturing.<sup>153</sup> A challenge associated with this is preventing these vulnerable individuals from being recruited by terrorist organizations and leading to their membership within the wrong social organizations that will manipulate them and lead them to a path of radicalization.

An additional challenge associated with individuals who fall into the narcissistic character organization are the adversities associated with adult interpersonal relationships. These individuals have established self-sufficient defense mechanism and are now placed into a situation where they find themselves having to rely upon others who are viewed as less superior to nurture an emotional need for love. This phenomenon further complicates things on a psychological level for the individual particularly regarding intimacy which leads to isolation. Individuals in this situation will often

---

<sup>152</sup>Ehud Sprinzak, "The Lone Gunmen: The global war on terrorism faces a new brand of enemy," *Foreign Policy*, November (2001), last accessed 10 February 2013, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2001/11/01/the\\_lone\\_gunmen?wp\\_login\\_redirect=0](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2001/11/01/the_lone_gunmen?wp_login_redirect=0)

<sup>153</sup>Reuben Vaisman-Tzachor, "Profiling Terrorists," *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations...*, 44.

separate themselves from their original family and/or develop intimate relationships with an individual who is viewed as inferior.<sup>154</sup> Examples are Marwan Abu Ubeida, a suicide bomber in Iraq who moved away from his family to live with his affiliated terrorist organization<sup>155</sup> or Mohamed Atta, the leader of the Al Qaida terrorist cell in Germany who flew American Airline Flight 11 into the World Trade Center on 9/11. He too lived apart from his family of origin and struggled with interpersonal relationships.<sup>156</sup> As a result of these character traits which make up the narcissistic character organization, individuals that fall into this category are more susceptible to recruiting by terrorist organizations and very good candidates to become martyrs.<sup>157</sup> These psychological characteristics aid terrorist organizations in their recruitment and manipulation potential members. The more isolated individuals are from external factors which are negative to the messaging a terrorist organization is trying to instill, the greater the risk and challenge for terrorist organizations to radicalize individuals.

There are many different psychological traits associated with the radicalization of individuals. Not all psychological character traits affect all individuals that turn to terrorism. For every typology of terrorism and every organization and their command structure within each typology there are specific psychological as well as sociological factors which trigger individuals' journey towards becoming radicalized. As a result, it is critical nations understand all typologies of terrorism and their membership structure

---

<sup>154</sup>*Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>155</sup>Bobby Gosh, "Inside the Mind of an Iraqi Suicide Bomber," *Time Magazine*, last accessed 10 February 2013, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1077288,00.html>

<sup>156</sup>Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers* (New York: HarperCollinsPublishers, 2005), 22-33.

<sup>157</sup>Reuben Vaisman-Tzachor, "Profiling Terrorists," *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations...*, 45.

which allow them to function. There are the leaders as well as followers who carry out the actions created by the masterminds.

The Mastermind makes a career out of terrorism. This individual remains behind the scenes planning operations. Given their position, duration, and commitment to their cause they tend to have deeper ideological beliefs; however, they do not have a need to be known. As the name suggests, these individuals are strategic thinkers. They understand the outcomes of their organization's actions on all levels.<sup>158</sup> A great example of this is Sami Al-Arian, the University Professor at Southern Florida University who established one of the largest financing and recruiting networks for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad organization.<sup>159</sup> Every organization requires great leadership in order to continue its existence. Understanding terrorism leadership from a psychological stand point as well as other aspects is fundamental in order to be able to effectively counter it.

The next level of leadership within terrorist organizations is the middle management also described as the Ring Leader. Although this individual does try to make terrorism his/her career, it is usually not as long as the Mastermind. This individual has robust needs for being known and respected. This individual is typically a good mentor and leader with intense ideological beliefs. Additionally, this individual is most accurately signified by the traditional narcissistic character

---

<sup>158</sup>*Ibid.*, 48.

<sup>159</sup>William Fisher, "The Never Ending Prosecution and Vendetta: The Kafkaesque Story of Sami Al-Arian," *Prism*, last accessed 10 February 2013, <http://prism-magazine.com/2012/05/never-ending-prosecution-and-vendetta-the-kafkaesque-story-of-sami-al-arian/>

organization.<sup>160</sup> An example of this individual is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian militant Islamist who ran a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and later became the leader of al-Tawhid wal-Jihad the terrorist group in Iraq which eventually became known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq.<sup>161</sup>

The suicide bomber can be described as the individual who has the greatest ideological and religious beliefs and desire for notoriety. The terrorist organization also ensures these individuals receive the greatest isolation from outside society, allowing the individual to be easily manipulated to give his or her life for the cause. These individuals are best represented by the pathological cast of narcissism and may even be represented by the antisocial construct of the Cluster B frame work.<sup>162</sup> Such examples are all those who flew aircraft for the attacks which occurred on 9/11.

The foot soldier is not far off from the suicide bomber. This individual also has an intense need to be known and intense ideological and spiritual beliefs. He or she is easily manipulated by a terrorist organization into conducting terrorist acts which may include being recruited to conduct suicide bombings. These individuals have a tendency to have character traits associated with the borderline character organization. There are many examples of these individuals such as Richard Reid as explained above or John Walker Lynd, the American born twenty year old who was captured by American Forces after fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001.<sup>163</sup>

---

<sup>160</sup>Reuben Vaisman-Tzachor, "Profiling Terrorists," *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations*..., 48.

<sup>161</sup>Craig Whitlock, "Amman Bombings Reflect Zarqawi's Growing Reach," *Washington Post*, 13 November 2005, last accessed 11 February 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/12/AR2005111201201.html>

<sup>162</sup>Reuben Vaisman-Tzachor, "Profiling Terrorists," *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations*..., 48.

<sup>163</sup>Time, *The Making of John Walker Lynd*, Time Magazine, Vol 160, Issue 15 (2002):44.

Senior leadership of terrorist organizations or figure heads have a clear desire to be known and known by all. They have a desire for celebrity status and have character traits associate with the histrionic aspect of the character organization explained above. They have very little concern for those they are leading or claim to represent and are more concerned with continuation of the conflict they are promoting.<sup>164</sup> They provide videos demonstrating their commitment to their cause and encouraging others to continue the fight and or join. Osama Bin-Laden is the best example of such an individual. What is important to recognize is the fact that within terrorist organizations there are different levels of membership which have distinctively different psychological profiles. Terrorist organizations are very similar in construct to any successful corporation. Many in depth case studies have been conducted on corporations analyzing their construct to determine why they failed or why have achieved so much success in order for others to avoid or adopt the same practices. This same principle applies in combating terrorism which has yet to be conducted.

Although Dr. Vaisman-Tzachor's research provides psychological characteristics associated with terrorists it uses a broad brush approach which will never be successful in truly combating terrorism given the complexity of the subject matter and the need to address its root causes. His research does encompass many of the psychoanalytical and non- psychoanalytic theories described above and is a tremendous start in demonstrating that there is great potential in the ability to profile terrorists. What is still required is for the same process to be completed for each typology of terrorism which is yet to be determined. Additionally, once the typologies have been

---

<sup>164</sup>Reuben Vaisman-Tzachor, "Profiling Terrorists," *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations...*, 49.

determined then the psychological characteristics associated with each level or position within each specific typology must be established. This process has already been somewhat

initiated by the research conducted by Dr. Marc Sageman, Dr. Jerald Post, and Dr. Jessica Stern and many others who have singled out different groups to study however, they are all working independently which generates armchair critiques by many others discrediting their work with no real productive outcome. There is no question there are psychological factors associated with people who become radicalized terrorists however to truly counter this process the world subject matter experts need to establish a cohesive working team supported and funded by the international community in order to fully solve this ongoing challenge.

## **SOCIOLOGY of TERRORISM**

Psychological factors associated with development of a terrorist and the proliferations of terrorism are often interconnected with sociological factors. The majority of terrorists are not psychotic; psychological as well as sociological factors when combined together are the characteristics necessary for the triggering of an individual and the groups they are associated with becoming radicalized and committing terrorist violent actions.

Much like the psychology of terrorism, the sociology of terrorism can be broken down into four broad theories: social learning theory, frustration-aggression theory, relative deprivation theory, and national cultural theory.<sup>165</sup> Social learning theory which was developed by Dr. Albert Bandura, a highly respected Psychologist and professor at Stanford University, is based upon what an individual learns and accepts as appropriate

---

<sup>165</sup>Jeff Victoroff and Arie Krulanski, *Psychology of Terrorism...*, 67-69.

behavior as a result of what they have witnessed or observed. Individuals replicate their behavior, actions, thoughts, opinions and feelings based upon what they have grown up learning from their social environment. This theory has been broadened to further explain aggressive behavior which can be linked to the actions of terrorists.<sup>166</sup> Individuals growing up in an environment of violence such as many areas in the Middle East, observing many acts of terrorism or violent protests may seek to mirror their actions. This behavior can be further fostered by the individual's learning of how their social environment honors these acts and those that conduct them. Different societies, such as Palestine, celebrate terrorist martyrs with songs and martyr posters publicly displayed for all to see and study.<sup>167</sup> This theory of social learning as it pertains to terrorism is further supported by the growing number of young suicide bombers in Palestine which was traditionally young men in their twenties to now teenagers and preteens. Palestinian society has been accused by western journalists of abusing their children and teaching them to hate and martyr themselves. In Hamas-run kindergartens, the walls are lined with messaging that the children of today are tomorrow's martyrs.<sup>168</sup> The theory of social learning which is being heavily utilized by terrorist organizations is exceptionally powerful. Their ability to control messaging is fundamental to this strategy. In Palestine brain washing is common place. Aside from the kindergartens there is television messaging as well. The State of Palestine previously known as the Palestinian Authority, controls media broadcasting within its region. They utilize this asset as a messaging

---

<sup>166</sup>Albert Bandura, *Aggression: A social learning analysis*, (New York: Prentice Hall,1973).

<sup>167</sup>Khaled Abu Toameh, "Palestinian Authority to honor suicide bombers, terrorists" *The Jerusalem Post*, 30 May 2012.

<sup>168</sup>Jack Kelley, "Devotion, desire drive youths to martyrdom," last modified 07 May 2001, <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/june01/2001-06-26-suicide-usat.htm>

board and learning tool for the children of Palestine. They broadcast adolescent programming reinforcing and glorifying martyrdom. There are music videos for teenagers<sup>169</sup> and even a children's program known as "The Children's Club" which depicts a Palestinian child wanting to go into Israel and be a suicide bomber.<sup>170</sup> There are state-run summer camps, school sporting events, and textbooks all furthering terrorism messaging and practical skills such as bomb making.<sup>171</sup> For parents to allow their children to become martyrs is astounding by western standards. The ability of terrorist organizations to not only manipulate an individual's learning environment, but the majority of a society is astounding. Innumerable Palestinian parents support, foster and compliment the terrorist actions of their martyr children. An independent survey conducted by the Arab-polling institute Jerusalem Media and Communications Center in 2002, determined that only 32 percent of Palestinian adults were not in support of suicide bombings. Almost three quarters of the adult population was in support.<sup>172</sup> One of the astounding consequences of this societal norm is the challenge associated with re-teaching generations which are steeped in the ways of terrorism.

---

<sup>169</sup>Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Palestinian TV glorification of martyrdom on upswing" *Insite Magazine*, last modified 31 December 2011, <http://likud.nl/2002/12/palestinian-tv-glorification-of-martyrdom-on-upswing/>

<sup>170</sup>Eli E. Hertz, "Children Dying to Kill: A Society that Consciously Sacrifices its Own Youth," last accessed 28 February 2013, <http://www.mythsandfacts.org/Conflict/9/childrendyingtokill1.htm>

<sup>171</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>172</sup>Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre, "JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 45 - May 29- 31, June 1-2 , 2002 On The Palestinian Attitudes Towards The Palestinian Situation in General," last accessed 28 February 2013, <http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2002/no45.htm>

Not all Palestinians support suicide bombings or even terrorist actions. In many societies, political violence is not the norm or widely supported. It is for this reason many analysts argue that although this theory does support some who turn to terrorism it does not explain why many others although exposed to the same environment do not follow the same path.<sup>173</sup> This is an accurate assessment from a narrow perspective and to a large extent it provides evidence and support for the necessity for additional in depth research into the different typologies and the contributing factors associated with their membership. Many factors and theories support the development of terrorists. There is no single factor or theory that explains all terrorists and their motivations. The Palestinian example is further evidence that there are many typologies of terrorism which are triggered by many different factors.

The frustration-aggression theory was developed by Psychologists John Dollard, Neal Miller, Leonard Doob and Orval Mowrer in 1939. Their theory was developed on the basis that if an individual is unable to obtain a desired end state then this inability is then transformed into aggressive conduct and frustration. This frustration is further manifested when the individual is unable to address the irritant. This frustration is then further turned into violence either directed at the irritant or other unrelated objectives.<sup>174</sup> This theory has been used to explain certain family violence situations. For example, an individual may be frustrated with their work environment; however, they may have been warned by their employer that the environment will not change and any involvement by employees will result in dismissal. The individual or individuals then return home

---

<sup>173</sup>Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks...*,

<sup>174</sup>J. Dollard, *et al.*, *Frustration and aggression* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939).

frustrated with their work environment and take their frustration out on their families.<sup>175</sup> This same principle may be applied to terrorism. The example provided above regarding the Palestinians is just one of many examples of this theory, as many Palestinians are frustrated with their land being taken from them and given to Jews to form their own country known as Israel. Another such example which is felt around the world is Al-Qaeda and their frustration with western nation's interference and manipulation of Muslim nations and their people.<sup>176</sup>

This theory has also been challenged and scrutinized for its application to terrorism. Many analysts challenge that there are millions and millions of individuals that are faced with frustrating situations everyday however they do not become radicalized and revert to violent actions.<sup>177</sup> Again, no single factor contributes to individuals becoming terrorists. This theory may not be the cause for all terrorists; however, it can be viewed as another factor that does contribute to the development of a portion of terrorists that have become radicalized.

Dr. Ted Gurr, a former professor at Princeton and Northwestern Universities and well known for his work in the field of social psychology, developed the theory of relative deprivation which has also been used to explain political violence and terrorism. Relative deprivation theory is related to the negative feelings and emotions an individual experiences as a result of not having what others may have. These negative feelings are based on the individual believing they are equal to those that they envy and therefore are

---

<sup>175</sup>Robert Nielson, "Cause of Violence," last modified 21 May 2012, <http://robertnielsen21.wordpress.com/2012/05/21/cause-of-violence/>

<sup>176</sup>Fareed Zakaria, "The Politics of Rage: Why do they hate us?" last accessed 28 February 2013, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2001/10/14/the-politics-of-rage-why-do-they-hate-us.html>

<sup>177</sup>Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks...*,95-96.

entitled to all the same perceived welfares. When the individual does not have the same welfares the individual takes action in order to achieve their desired perceptions. This action may come in the form of political violence and terrorism depending upon the level of discontentment within the individual. The greater the discontentment, which may be the result of the individual's inability to address efficiently the situation, the greater the potential for the individual's frustration level as well as their aggression to grow resulting in violence.<sup>178</sup> This theory is very closely linked to the frustration-aggression theory. Examples of this theory which have not reached the same violence levels as terrorism are the women's movement which commenced in the early sixties and has become global and the gay rights movement. More violent examples supporting this theory are the French and Russian revolutions which were spurred by the inequalities between the poor and rich.

Poverty is among the key characteristics associated with this theory. Many researchers have argued that although it was originally thought that poverty was a major cause of terrorism it is actually not, as many terrorists have been found to be well educated and from wealthy families.<sup>179</sup> Although there are many terrorists that are not from impoverished backgrounds, it can also be argued that there are just as many that are.<sup>180</sup> There are many types of terrorism and within each type there are different levels of membership, each potentially influenced by different psychological as well as sociological factors.

---

<sup>178</sup>Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), 25-58.

<sup>179</sup>James Piazza, "Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development and Social Cleavages," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Issue 18(2006):159-177.

Although there has been a great deal of research conducted by governments and academics on the potential of poverty as well as the ability of a nation's population to influence political change as being major contributing factors to terrorism, there is still much more research to be done.<sup>181</sup> As shown above there is evidence supporting the relative deprivation theory and terrorism; however, like all the other theories presented, it does not explain why all individuals become radicalized. It is however one of many factors associated with the proliferation of terrorism.

The National Cultural Theory of terrorism is derived from the research conducted by Psychologists Leonard Weinberg and William Eubank, who explained that just like cultural difference have been used to explain many singularities between nations it can also be used to help explain differences in terrorism. In particular, they explained that there are differences between terrorists dependent upon their cultures. National Cultural theory, much like all other theories, has not gone without its share of criticism. It has been criticized for its inability to explain the challenges associated with boundaries and the lack of clarification as it pertains to the specific identification of specific cultures.<sup>182</sup> Dr. Martha Crenshaw, a world leader in terrorism research, explains that traditionally cultures are viewed as being national or country specific; however, she raises the question of collectivist subcultures within individualist cultures. Canada provides one such

---

<sup>180</sup>Jerrold M. Post, *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda* (New York: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2007), 149-158.

<sup>181</sup>Jeff Victoroff and Arie Krulanski, *Psychology of Terrorism...*, 69.

<sup>182</sup>Martha Crenshaw, "Comments (1) on 'cultural differences in the behavior of terrorists'," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 6:1 (1994): 19-20.

example with its experience associated with the Front de libération du Québec, the Toronto 18 and Sunni Islamic extremists.

Much like the other theories presented there is much criticism regarding its limited sample size and the fact it does not explain the full spectrum of terrorism.<sup>183</sup> It does, however, demonstrate one more factor contributing to the proliferation of terrorism and with further research can contribute to greater understanding and countering of terrorism.

Aside from the broad-based theories provided above there has been much research and debate concerning more specific social characteristics considered to be key factors associated with the proliferation and continuation of terrorism. Many of the factors that will be presented are combined within the broad based theories already discussed however it is important to break through the broader based theory in order to clearly identify and demonstrate that there are specific aspects associated with sociology and the proliferation of terrorism which need to be considered in order to combat terrorism's root causes.

Poverty and educational background are considered to be two of many fundamental contributing factors of terrorism. Although many studies conducted on such organizations as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah as well as other terrorist groups in Europe have determined that members of their organizations have been well educated and from average or above average economic backgrounds, there are membership positions within these organizations and others around the world where this trend is not the case. There are many levels within terrorist organizations. The higher levels such as masterminds, supreme leaders and middle managers tend to come from non-

---

<sup>183</sup>Joseba Zulaika, *Comments (2) on 'cultural differences in the behavior of terrorists'...*

impoverished backgrounds. These levels require strong human resource and high-technical skills; however, terrorist organizations need lower positions filled such as the foot soldier, which is often recruited from the impoverished class. Such an example is the Sunni extremist group Lashkar-I-Janfvi in Pakistan.<sup>184</sup> Terrorist organizations outside of the Middle East such as in South America, Asia and Africa which are known for challenging social and economic environments utilize these conditions to fill their ranks with individuals desperate to improve living standards. These organizations, as well as others such as drug cartels, use the impoverishment of others to foster individual and societal resentment which is further utilized to gain organizational support on a broader scale.<sup>185</sup> Examples of such organizations are the Revolutionary United Front formed in Sierra Leone, the Lord's Resistance Army in South Sudan, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia.<sup>186</sup> Without these foot soldiers such organizations would fail to operate. They need these individuals to conduct the fundamental aspects of the organizations objectives. This is no different than the basic infantry soldier of conventional armies today. Foot soldiers are easily manipulated and controlled as a result of their desperate personal situations.

Although poverty often fosters individual and societal support for political violence, it also traditionally corresponds with nations that are underdeveloped, with unstable or

---

<sup>184</sup>Howard French, "For Militant, No Glorified End, but Death in the Dust," *New York Times*, last accessed 28 February 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/19/world/for-militant-no-glorified-end-but-death-in-the-dust.html?src=pm>

<sup>185</sup>William O'Neill, "Concept Paper Beyond the Slogans: How Can the UN Respond to Terrorism?" in *Responding to Terrorism: What Role for the United Nations?*, *International Peace Institute*, New York: Chadbourne & Parke, (October 2002): 7-10.

<sup>186</sup>*Ibid.*

inexperienced national leadership. As a result, the inability to prevent the development of extremist organizations, their activities and recruitment prevails. In addition, impoverished states traditionally lack the ability to develop and instill the necessary educational systems necessary to help prevent support for terrorism.<sup>187</sup> The consequence of impoverished states is an increase in global instability and a rich recruiting environment for terrorist organizations.

Demographics, urbanization and social inequalities have also been determined to be contributing factors for terrorism and are closely linked to poverty. Such demographic circumstances include a prompt rise in birth rates leading to an elevated ratio of young males to females all of whom are seeking employment.<sup>188</sup> Further complicating the situations are conditions where there is an imbalance between ethnic groups within a society all competing for

employment and one group being perceived by the other as receiving favoritism.

If these sociological conditions become severe enough they can all trigger psychological factors leading to individuals becoming radicalized in order to invoke political change and improve their situations.

Urbanization is claimed to have caused increased separation between the rich and the poor as well as intensification in status segregation on a global scale. This in turn has generated a profound augmentation in the geographic foundation of humanity.<sup>189</sup>

---

<sup>187</sup>Edward Newman, "Exploring the 'Root Causes' of Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29:8, 751.

<sup>188</sup>Paul Ehrlich and Jianguo Liu, "Some Roots of Terrorism," *Population and Environment*, 24:2, 183-192.

Urbanization when combined with poverty and high rates of unemployment is an excellent facilitator for terrorism. These combining factors provide prime conditions for development of a frustrated and desperate populous which can be easily manipulated in joining terrorist organizations.<sup>190</sup> When social inequality and segregation are combined with poverty and impact a specific group of a society such as an ethnic or religious group, conditions for violent conflict and the formation of and recruitment for terrorist organizations are extremely high.<sup>191</sup> There are many psychological and sociological factors associated with terrorism and although any one factor does not apply to all terrorist, the more negative sociological factors within a nation will increase the potential of its citizens becoming susceptible to terrorism.

The final social factor contributing to terrorism comprises values. Globalization, although it has facilitated and fostered some countries' economies through more effective communication and relationship building, it has also generated tensions with regards to different cultural values.<sup>192</sup> Western ways or rather western values are being globally projected and perceived by Muslim extremists as impacting and jeopardizing their culture.<sup>193</sup> This impression is particularly the case as it pertains to the United States and as a result, political violence in the way of terrorist actions being projected toward

---

<sup>189</sup>Douglas Massey, "The Age of Extremes: Concentrated Affluence and Poverty in the Twenty-First Century," *Demography*, 33:4, 395.

<sup>190</sup>Ellen Brennan-Galvin, "Crime and violence in an urbanizing world," *Journal of International Affairs*, 56:1, 123-145.

<sup>191</sup>Jeni Klugman, "Social and Economic Policies to Prevent Complex Humanitarian Emergencies," *Policy Brief*, Washington, DC: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economic Research (1999): 1-39.

<sup>192</sup>Dr. Muqtedar Khan, "GlocalEye Muqtedar Khan's Column on Global Affairs," last accessed 01 March 2013, <http://www.glocaleye.org/terglo.htm>

<sup>193</sup>Benjamin Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), xii-xiv.

western nations.<sup>194</sup> These sociological perceptions need to be more effectively managed by the international community. One nation such as the United States does not have the reputation or capabilities necessary to take on such a challenge.

Populous grievances such as social inequalities and segregation as a result of demographic imbalances, subcultural differences and poverty which are further spurred by globalization and urbanization foster fertile environments for terrorist organizations to develop and prosper.<sup>195</sup> It is important to note that these factors like all the others mentioned throughout this paper are fundamental components which in specific conditions may contribute to why individuals become radicalized and turn to terrorism.

## **Conclusion**

Terrorism has been a part of humanity since ancient times and has been surrounded in controversy since its beginning. Being called or labeled a terrorist is all dependent upon one's perspective. This has led to the common phrase that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Terrorism is an extremely complex subject and although it has dominated the western world's attention and focus for more than a decade, little has been achieved in truly discovering and combating the root causes of it. Western Governments have been very effective in combating its symptoms through fighting the War on Terror and thwarting many terrorist plots; however, these achievements have been costly both financially and in human life. Trillions of dollars have been spent in this endeavor; however, little has been done to establish long term prevention.

---

<sup>194</sup>Robert A. Hinde, "Root causes of terrorism," *Conference on Science and World Affairs*, last accessed 01 March 2013, <http://www.pugwash.org/september11/hinde.htm>

<sup>195</sup>Edward Newman, *Exploring the 'Root Causes' of Terrorism...*, 752-755.

The terrorist threat has become a global challenge as a result of globalization and urbanization and cannot be met by just any one nation. Although many United Nation members do work together in combating terrorism they are still struggling to truly commit to concurring it as is evident in the United Nation's inability to achieve a globally accepted definition of terrorism. This fundamental building block still needs to be addressed. Further adding to this challenge is the inability of the global scholarly community as well as other subject matter experts to work concurrently and cohesively to build upon current research to form not only universally accepted typologies of terrorism but the components, positions and levels of leadership within each typology. Through an ongoing working group of experts in the field of terrorism, they would be able to not only establish typologies of terrorism but further build upon the psychological and sociological factors that contribute to their membership as it applies to the different positions within each typology. This task is not easy, it will require a tenacious commitment in order to achieve effective results. The common counter argument that terrorists cannot be profiled is based upon assuming that all terrorists have become radicalized in the same manner and for the same cause. This belief, however, is a narrow perspective and one if compared to the profiling of criminals seems rather ridiculous. The common thief does not have the same psychological profile as a serial killer; however, both have psychological aspects that can be identified and are different. To date, research to this extent has not been completed for terrorists.

The theories presented throughout this paper are sound although as explained do not apply to every terrorist and as a result have been criticized by analysts. It is the acceptance of the research already conducted and the furthering of it which is lacking.

Governments have spent extensive amounts of money in the fight against terrorism treating its symptoms; however, they have only spent token amounts to address its root causes. Canada has been no exception. The Canadian Government has only recently come to the realization that it is not immune to terrorism. It has taken the Canadian Government over a decade since 9/11 to produce an official strategic approach to countering terrorism. The Canadian Government's strategy has great potential however is currently in its infancy. It requires a strong cohesive commitment by all government agencies and in particular towards the aspect of prevention if it is to be successful.

To truly combat terrorism the international community through the United Nations needs to financially support a continuous full time working group of the world's leading experts in the field of research and development of terrorism. Through a long-term commitment this organization would be able to conduct further research to identify the specific psychological and sociological factors associated with each type of terrorist. This in turn would allow nations to further establish the necessary global and national preventative measures to combat terrorism at its lowest level.

This paper has shown that the fundamental elements of an internationally accepted definition and typologies of terrorism, as well as the psychological and sociological factors which contribute to terrorism typology membership require an extensive and long-term commitment by the international community in order to develop the necessary preventative measures to counter terrorism on a global scale. If nations continue to ignore these fundamental aspects, terrorism will continue to flourish as the international community will never fully understand the root causes of terrorism and how to counter it.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abu Toameh, Khaled. "Palestinian Authority to honor suicide bombers, terrorists." *The Jerusalem Post*, 30 May 2012.
- Abadie, Alberto. *Poverty, Political Freedom, and The Roots of Terrorism*. NBER Working papers Series 10859. Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004.
- American Psychiatric Association. *Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders: Fourth Edition*. Washington DC, 1994.
- An International Security Reader, *Contending with Terrorism: Roots, Strategies, and Responses*. Edited by Michael E. Brown, et al. London: The MIT Press, 2010.
- Badley, Thomas J. "Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 10, (1998): 90-107.
- Barber, Benjamin. *Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy*. New York: Ballentine Books, 1996.
- Baumeister, Roy F. & Kathleen D. Vohs, *Encyclopedia of Social Psychology*, Last accessed 13 February.  
<http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/socialpsychology/n361.xml?rskey=EzZSUI&row=5>
- Bell, Stewart. *Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Around the World*. Canada: John Wiley & Sons Canada Ltd, 2004.
- Bilash, Dr. Olenka. "Cognitive Capacity and Cognitive Load." Last accessed 19 February 2013.  
<http://www2.education.ualberta.ca/staff/olenka.bilash/Best%20of%20Bilash/cognitive%20capacity.html>
- Bandura, Albert. *Aggression: A social learning analysis*. New York: Prentice Hall, 1973.
- Brennan-Galvin, Ellen. "Crime and violence in an urbanizing world." *Journal of International Affairs*, 56:1, 123-145.

CBC News, “Alleged Terrorism Plot Targeted Canada.” Last accessed 19 January 2013.  
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/story/2010/08/26/ottawa-rcmp-arrest-folo.html>

CBC News, “Toronto 18: Key Events in the case.” Last accessed 19 January 2013.  
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2008/06/02/f-toronto-timeline.html>

Chomsky, Noam. “The New War Against Terror.” Last accessed 21 January 2013.  
<http://www.chomsky.info/talks/20011018.htm>

Cornell University Law School. “USC, Title 18, Chapter 113B, Section 2331, Definitions.” Last accessed 23 January 13.  
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2331>

Cornell University Law School. “USC, Title 22, Chapter 38, Section 2656 f, Annual Country Reports on Terrorism.” Last accessed 23 January 13.  
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2656f>

Council on Foreign Relations. “Aum Shinrikyo.” Last accessed 17 February 2013.  
[www.cfr.org/japan/aum-shinrikyo/p9238](http://www.cfr.org/japan/aum-shinrikyo/p9238)

Crayton, John. “Terrorism and the Psychology of Self.” In *Perspectives on terrorism*, edited by L.Z. Freedman and Y. Alexander, 33-41. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc. (1983).

Crenshaw, Martha. “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.” *Political Psychology*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2000): 405-420.

Crenshaw, Martha. “Comments (1) on ‘cultural differences in the behavior of terrorists’.” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 6:1 (1994): 19-20.

CSIS. “A Study of Radicalization: The Making of Islamist Extremists in Canada Today.” Last accessed 12 February 2013.  
[http://www.theglobeandmail.com/incoming/article8151644.ece/BINARY/csisradicals\\_001.pdf](http://www.theglobeandmail.com/incoming/article8151644.ece/BINARY/csisradicals_001.pdf)

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. “Global Counter Terrorism Forum.” Last accessed 06 March 2013.  
<http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/forum.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>

Department of Justice. “The Anti-Terrorism Act, Section 83.” Last modified 01 April 2008.  
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/antiter/sheetfiche/terrordefp1-terreurdefp1-eng.asp>

- Dollard J., L. W. Doob, N. E. Miller, O. H. Mowrer, and R. R. Sears. *Frustration and aggression*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939.
- Ehrlich, Paul and Jianguo Liu. "Some Roots of Terrorism." *Population and Environment*, 24:2, 183-192.
- Elliot, Michael. "The Shoe Bomber's World." *Time World*. Last accessed 11 February 2013.  
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,203478,00.html>
- Ernst, Monique, Steven Grant, Edythe London, Carlo Contoreggi, Alane Kimes and Loretta Spurgeon "Decision Making in Adolescents With Behavior Disorders and Adults With Substance Abuse." *Am J Psychiatry*, Issue 160, (2003):33-40.
- Fair, Christine and Bryan Shephard. "Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29:1, (2006): 51-74.
- Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada. "FINTRAC Annual Report Highlights Sharply Increased Output of Financial Intelligence." Last modified 2 November 2011.  
<http://www.fintrac-canafe.gc.ca/new-neuf/nr/2011-11-02-eng.asp>
- Fisher, William. "The Never Ending Prosecution and Vendetta: The Kafkaesque Story of Sami Al-Arian." *Prism*. Last accessed 10 February 2013.  
<http://prism-magazine.com/2012/05/never-ending-prosecution-and-vendetta-the-kafkaesque-story-of-sami-al-arian/>
- French, Howard. "For Militant, No Glorified End, but Death in the Dust." *New York Times*, last accessed 28 February 2013.  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/19/world/for-militant-no-glorified-end-but-death-in-the-dust.html?src=pm>
- Frey, Bruno S. and Simon Luechinger. "How To Fight Terrorism: Alternatives To Deterrence." *Defence and Peace Economics*, 14 :4 (2003):238-249.
- Ganor, Boaz. "Terrorist Organization Typologies and the Probability of a Boomerang Effect." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 34:4 (2008): 269-283.
- Ganor, Boaz. *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers*. USA: Transaction Publishers, 2007.
- Gosh, Bobby. "Inside the Mind of an Iraqi Suicide Bomber," *Time Magazine*, last accessed 10 February 2013.  
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1077288,00.html>

- Government of Canada. "Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy." Last accessed 02 February 2013.  
<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/fl/2012-cts-eng.pdf>
- Gurr, T. *Why Men Rebel*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Hennessy, Michael A. and John N. Rickard. *Wars Without Fronts: A Primer On Counterinsurgency*. Ottawa: Magic Light Publishing, 2012.
- Hertz, Eli E. "Children Dying to Kill: A Society that Consciously Sacrifices its Own Youth." Last accessed 28 February 2013.  
<http://www.mythsandfacts.org/Conflict/9/childrendyingtokill1.htm>
- Hinde, Robert A. "Root causes of terrorism." *Conference on Science and World Affairs*, Last accessed 01 March 2013.  
<http://www.pugwash.org/september11/hinde.htm>
- Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
- Hough, Professor Mike. "Domestic, International and Transnational Terror after 2001: Towards a New Typology?" *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 29 (2007): 39-49. Last assessed 24 January 2013.  
[www.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/2263/4018/1/Hough\\_Domestic%282007%29.pdf](http://www.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/2263/4018/1/Hough_Domestic%282007%29.pdf)
- Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre, "JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 45 - May 29- 31, June 1-2 , 2002 On The Palestinian Attitudes Towards The Palestinian Situation in General," last accessed 28 February 2013.  
<http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2002/no45.htm>
- Kandel, Elizabeth, Sarnoff A. Medick, Lis Kirkegaard-Sorensen, Barry Hutchings, and Joachim Knop. "IQ as a protective factor for subjects at high risk for antisocial behavior." *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, Issue 56-2, (1988): 224-226.
- Kaplan and Sadock. *Kaplan and Sadock's Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry*. Lippincott Williams and Wilkins, 2009.
- Kelley, Jack. "Devotion, desire drive youths to martyrdom." Last modified 07 May 2001.  
<http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/june01/2001-06-26-suicide-usat.htm>
- Kershner, Isabel. "Palestinian May Exhume Arafat After Report of Poisoning." *The New York Times*. Last accessed 11 February 2013.  
[http://travel.nytimes.com/2012/07/05/world/middleeast/palestinians-may-exhume-arafat-after-report-of-poisoning.html?\\_r=0](http://travel.nytimes.com/2012/07/05/world/middleeast/palestinians-may-exhume-arafat-after-report-of-poisoning.html?_r=0)

- Khan, Dr. Muqtedar. "GlocalEye Muqtedar Khan's Column on Global Affairs." Last accessed 01 March 2013.  
<http://www.glocaleye.org/terglo.htm>
- Klugman, Jeni. "Social and Economic Policies to Prevent Complex Humanitarian Emergencies." *Policy Brief*, Washington, DC: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economic Research (1999): 1-39.
- Krueger, Alan B. and Jitka Malekova. "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Casual Connection?" *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Issue 17-4 (2003): 119-144.
- Laqueur, Walter. *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Levine, Saul. "Youth in Terroristic Groups, Gangs, and Cults: The Allure, the Animus, and the Alienation." *Psychiatric Annals*, Issue 29-6 (1999):342-349.
- Lifton, Robert J. *Destroying The World To Save It*. New York: Metropolitan Books Henry Holt and Company 1999.
- MacKinnon, Leslie. "Bill to restore expired ant-terrorism laws debated." *CBC News*, 15 October 2012, Last modified 15 October 2012.  
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/10/15/pol-anti-terrorism-bill-senate.html>
- Makin, Kirk . "Supreme Court Upholds Ant-Terrorism Laws." Last modified 14 December 2012.  
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/supreme-court-upholds-anti-terrorism-laws/article6354739/>
- Martin, Gus. *Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies*. USA: Sage Publication, Inc., 2011.
- Massey, Douglas. "The Age of Extremes: Concentrated Affluence and Poverty in the Twenty-First Century," *Demography*, 33:4, 395-412.
- McCauley, Clark and Sophia Moskalenko. "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence*,20, (2008): 415-433.
- McCauley, Clark . "Tragic Iterations: Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism." *Searle Centre on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth*. Last accessed 08 February 2013.  
[http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/McCauley\\_terrorism.pdf](http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/McCauley_terrorism.pdf)
- McDermott, Terry. *Perfect Soldiers*. New York: HarperCollinsPublishers, 2005.

- Michelon, Dr. Pascale. "Cognitive Abilities and Skills." Last accessed 19 February 2013.  
<http://www.sharpbrains.com/blog/2006/12/18/what-are-cognitive-abilities/>
- Moeller, Susan D. *Packaging Terrorism*. United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
- Moghaddam, Fathali M. "The Staircase to Terrorism," *American Psychologist* 60, no. 2 (2005): 161-169.
- Morf, Gustave. *Terror in Quebec, Case studies of the FLQ*. Canada: Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited, 1970.
- Neumann, Peter R. "Introduction." *The Adelphi Papers*, 48:399 (2010):5-10.
- Neumann, Peter R. "Introduction." *The Adelphi Papers*, 48:399 (2010):21-30.
- Neumann, Peter R. "Introduction." *The Adelphi Papers*, 48:399 (2010):59-62.
- Newman, Edward. "Exploring the 'Root Causes' of Terrorism." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29:8, 749-772.
- Nielson, Robert. "Cause of Violence." Last modified 21 May 2012.  
<http://robertnielsen21.wordpress.com/2012/05/21/cause-of-violence/>
- O'Neill, William. "Concept Paper Beyond the Slogans: How Can the UN Respond to Terrorism?" in *Responding to Terrorism: What Role for the United Nations?*, *International Peace Institute*, New York: Chadbourne & Parke, (October 2002): 1-60.
- Parry, Tom. "Al-Qaeda affiliates attracting Canadians." CBC News. Last Updated 11 February 2013.  
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2013/02/11parry-fadden-senate.html>
- Piazza, James. "Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development and Social Cleavages," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18:159-177, 2006.
- Porta, Donatella Della and Gary LaFree. "Processes of Radicalization and De-Radicalization" *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, Vol 6:1, (2012):4-10.
- Post, Jerrold M. *Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004.
- Post, Jerrold M. *The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.

PressTV. "US Drone Strike Amount to War Crime: Political Analyst." Last accessed 22 January 2013.  
<http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/01/21/284764/us-drone-strikes-amounts-to-war-crime/>

PressTV. "US Drone Strikes in Pakistan Counterproductive: Foreign Minister." Last accessed 22 January 2013.  
<http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/01/22/284983/us-drones-in-pakistan-counterproductive/>

Pressman, Jeremy. "Rethinking Transnational Counterterrorism: Beyond a National Framework." *The Washington Quarterly* 30:4 (Autumn 2007): 63-73.

Prime Minister of Canada. "PM Marks National Day of Remembrance for Victims of Terrorism." Last modified 23 June 2011.  
<http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=4172>

ProPublica. "Everything We Know So Far About Drone Strikes." Last modified 22 January 2013.  
<http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-so-far-about-drone-strikes>

Public Safety Canada. "Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counterterrorism Strategy." Last modified 04 December 2012.  
<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/2012-cts-eng.aspx>

Public Safety Canada. "Community Outreach and Engagement to Counter Violent Extremism." Last modified 26 February 2013.  
<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/ctrng-xtms/cmnt-eng.aspx>

Public Safety Canada, "Countering Violent Extremism," last modified 26 February 2013,  
<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/ctrng-xtms/index-eng.aspx>

Public Safety Canada. "Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security." Last modified 07 February 2012. <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/ccrs/index-eng.aspx>

Public Safety Canada. "Research on Countering Violent Extremism." Last modified 26 February 2013.  
<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/ctrng-xtms/cntrng-rsrch-eng.aspx#a02>

Rand Corporation. "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment." Last modified 15 September 2010.  
[www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1214.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1214.html)

Rapoport, David C. "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 78, No. 3 (September, 1984): 658-677.

- Rhyll, Vallis Yang Yubin, and A. Abbass Hussein. "Disciplinary Approaches to Terrorism: A Survey." Defence and Security Applications Research Center (DSA), (University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, Australia, 2006): 10-11. Quoted in Boaz Ganor, "Terrorist Organization Typologies and the Probability of a Boomerang Effect." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 34:4 (2008): 269-283.
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police. "National Security Community Outreach." Last accessed 06 March 2013.  
<http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/nsci-ecsn/nsco-scen-eng.htm>
- Sageman, Marc. "National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States." last accessed 09 February 2013.  
[http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/9-11\\_commission/030709-sageman.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/9-11_commission/030709-sageman.htm)
- Sageman, Marc. *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.
- Sageman, Marc. "Understanding Terror Networks." *Foreign Policy Institute*. Last accessed 10 February 2013.  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20041110010204/http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20041101.middleeast.sageman.understandingterrornetworks.html>
- Satterfield, Jason. "Cognitive-affective states predict military and political aggression and risk taking: A content analysis of Churchill, Hitler, Roosevelt, and Stalin." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Issue 42-6, (1998): 667-690.
- Secretary of State for the Home Department. *The Definition of Terrorism: Independent Review of Terrorism Legislation*. Last accessed 24 January 2013.  
<http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm70/7052/7052.pdf>
- Shultz, Richard. "Conceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Typology." *Journal of International Affairs* 32(1) (1978): 7-15.
- Silke, Andrew. "Courage in Dark Places: Reflections on Terrorist Psychology." *Social Search*, Vol 71:1 (2004):177-198.
- Sinai, Joshua. "Can Terrorists Be Psychologically Profiled?" *The Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International* Vol 17, Issue 2 (2011): 14-18.
- Smith, General Sir Rupert. *The Utility of Force, The Art of War In The Modern World*. London: Allen Lane, 2005.

- Smith, Joanne “Khawaja Guilty of Terrorism.” Last accessed 19 January 2013.  
<http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/527222>
- Spencer, Robert. “Left Works to Make Jihadist Al-Arian A Martyr.” *Human Events*. Vol 64, Issue 15, (2008): 14-22.
- Sprinzak, Ehud. “The Lone Gunmen: The global war on terrorism faces a new brand of enemy.” *Foreign Policy*, November (2001). Last accessed 10 February 2013.  
[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2001/11/01/the\\_lone\\_gunmen?wp\\_login\\_redirect=0](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2001/11/01/the_lone_gunmen?wp_login_redirect=0)
- Stern, Jessica. *Terror in The Name of God*. New York: HarperCollins Publisher Inc., 2004.
- Steven Graeme C.S., and Rohan Gunaratna. *Counterterrorism*. California: ABC-CLIO, Inc, 2004.
- Taber, Jane. “Tories disinclined to subject anti-terror measure to sunset clause.” *Globe and Mail*, 13 September 2011. Last modified 14 September 2011.  
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-notebook/tories-disinclined-to-subject-anti-terror-measures-to-sunset-clause/article617345/>
- Taylor, Maxwell, and Ethel Quayle, *Terrorist Lives*. London: Brassey’s Ltd, 1995.
- The FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigations. “Reports and Publications.” Last accessed 24 January 2013.  
[http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005/terror02\\_05#terror\\_0205](http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005/terror02_05#terror_0205)
- The International Library of Essays in Terrorism. *Dimensions of Terrorism*. ed. Alan O’Day. England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004.
- Time. *The Making of John Walker Lynd*. Time Magazine, Vol 160, Issue 15 (2002):44-54.
- Timmerman, Kenneth R. “Palestinian TV glorification of martyrdom on upswing.” Last modified 31 December 2011.  
<http://likud.nl/2002/12/palestinian-tv-glorification-of-martyrdom-on-upswing/>
- Thompson, Stephen and Ken Kyle. “Understanding Mass School Shootings: Links between Personhood and Power in the Competitive School Environment.” *Journal of Primary Prevention*, Issue 26-5 (2005):419-438.
- Triandis, Harry, Robert Bontempo, and Marcelo Villareal. “Individualism and Collectivism: Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Self-Ingroup Relationships.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol 54-2 (1988): 323-338.

- United Kingdom Government Legislation. "Terrorism Act 2000." Last accessed 24 January 2013.  
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1>
- Vaisman-Tzachor, Reuben. "Profiling Terrorists." *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations* Vol. 7:1 (2007):28-61.
- Victoroff, Jeff . "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49:3 (2005):3-42.
- Victoroff, Jeff, and Arie Krulanski. *Psychology of Terrorism*. New York: Psychology Press, 2009.
- Weinberg, Leonard and William Lee Eubank. "Cultural Differences in the Behavior of Terrorists." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 6-1, (1994): 2-4.
- Whitlock, Craig. "Amman Bombings Reflect Zarqawi's Growing Reach." *Washington Post* , 13 November 2005. Last accessed 11February 2013.  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/12/AR2005111201201.html>
- Zekulin, Michael. "Terrorism in Canada," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* Vol 13, Issue 3 (Spring 2011): 1-19.