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TRYING TO MOVE MOUNTAINS: HAITI AND ITS FUTURE TRANSITION TO LIFE WITHOUT MINUSTAH

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Master of Defence Studies

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**TRYING TO MOVE MOUNTAINS: HAITI AND ITS FUTURE TRANSITION
TO LIFE WITHOUT MINUSTAH**

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ABSTRACT

Haiti was once a very prosperous colony, however, it has been plundered ever since it was discovered and Haiti's formerly prominent standing has since dramatically plummeted to the point that it has become for some time the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere. The United States (US) military occupied Haiti from 1915-1934 which was the first and longest major military intervention to the country since its independence in 1804. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, or MINUSTAH by its French acronym, has been ongoing since 2004. These foreign military interventions were launched in order to stabilize the country after the Haitian government could not contain the challenges they faced. This research paper analyzes these two foreign interventions in order to demonstrate that the Americans left a country in 1934 that was *in extremis* and the MINUSTAH mission finds itself at a similar point today. This paper will identify and demonstrate using a historical analysis that MINUSTAH can only withdraw from Haiti once conditions on the ground permit Haitians to exercise their full sovereignty. If not, Haiti will return to what it has always been: a violently divided, deprived and vulnerable country with its people extremely distrustful of one another. All of the recent difficult gains made in Haiti cannot again be short-lived to the point where the international community finds itself returning to assist the country again with its recovery in the near future. The comparison will demonstrate that a transition to post-MINUSTAH Haiti is not feasible in the short-term and should only occur in the long-term based on that comparison.

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INTRODUCTION

Born from a slave revolt and once boastfully dubbed *The Pearl of the Antilles*, in 1804 Haiti proudly became the first modern black republic and the second independent nation in the Western Hemisphere after the US. Haiti was once a very prosperous colony, however, it has been plundered ever since it was discovered and Haiti's formerly prominent standing has since dramatically plummeted to the point that it has become for some time the poorest nation in the hemisphere. When Haitians were celebrating the bi-centennial anniversary of their independence in 2004, foreign military forces conducted the third major intervention in the country during the past century. That year, the United Nations (UN) established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, or MINUSTAH by its French acronym, when considerable violent incidents erupted making some parts of the country ungovernable. Yet in 2012, debate intensified regarding the progress of the UN mission and international attention was beginning to turn elsewhere.¹ The UN Security Council nonetheless decided to initiate the process of drawing the mission down with a view to eventually returning full sovereignty back to the Haitian people within four to five years.

Haiti has principally suffered from five major challenges since its independence which include rampant insecurity, political strife, inept governance, abject poverty and incessant vulnerability. Because of this, successive foreign military interventions have been conducted in order to stabilize the country after the effects of these challenges surpassed the capacity of the Haitian government to contain them. The US' military occupation of Haiti from 1915-1934, the

¹International Crisis Group, "Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti: Making an Effective Transition," last accessed 8 February 2013, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/044-towards-a-post-minustah-haiti-making-an-effective-transition.aspx>, 3.

first and longest major military intervention to the country since its independence, was considered a failure when it ended,² and the current MINUSTAH mission in Haiti has only managed to obtain mixed results to date.

The purpose of this research paper is to analyze these two foreign interventions to Haiti in order to demonstrate that the conditions present when US Marines departed Haiti in 1934 are similar to those that MINUSTAH currently faces in Haiti today. Although this paper is by its nature rather historical, it will identify and demonstrate using a historical analysis that MINUSTAH can only withdraw from Haiti once conditions on the ground permit Haitians to exercise their full sovereignty. If not, Haiti will return to what it has always been: a violently divided, deprived and vulnerable country with its people extremely distrustful of one another. It is therefore argued that the current UN involvement in Haiti must be long-term as the withdrawal of the UN force under current timelines will mean renewed anarchy in Haiti. Should the international community's involvement end before suitable conditions are achieved, Haiti's fragility will continue to impose a destabilizing effect throughout the Caribbean region. The costs of any future intervention will also be much higher; not only to the organizations and countries who again participate in another stabilization mission to Haiti, but especially to the Haitian people themselves. If MINUSTAH is to be the last foreign intervention in Haiti, and if the international community is ready to allow Haiti to stand on its own to assure its lasting peace, stability and development, then the conditions on the ground must reflect this reality. All of the recent difficult gains made in Haiti cannot again be short-lived to the point where the

²Georges A. Fauriol, *Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. policy: A Report of the CSIS Americas Program* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 46.

international community finds itself returning to assist the country again with its recovery in the near future.

This research paper is not a comprehensive analysis and in no way proposes a solution to the breadth of Haiti's difficulties. Many scholars and organizations have offered solutions to the Haitian dilemma, but this paper focuses solely on the two major military interventions in Haiti and compares them in order to provide a prediction for the future. This research paper is intended to be useful for the Government of Haiti, the UN, MINUSTAH, Non-Governmental Organizations, or anyone who expresses a vested interest in Haiti's future.

Literature review

The notions of foreign intervention, state building and exit strategies play an important role in the many peacekeeping and stabilization missions launched by multilateral organizations during the past two decades. Caplan (2012) noted that policy in this field has been more improvised than carefully thought out. This has been evident in the UN's unsuccessful attempts since 1990 to solve the Haitian predicament through the numerous consecutive short-term missions it has sent to the Caribbean nation. In 2012, the UN formulated an exit strategy for the MINUSTAH mission it initiated in 2004, but ostensibly failed to fully account for any of its previous attempts, and possibly succumbed to the pressures that have seemingly made its continued presence in Haiti unbearable. It is therefore hypothesized that the current trend for defining exit strategies for Haiti does not fully account for its complex history. The following thematic literature reviews, focusing on historical precedents, external interventions, and state building attempt to demonstrate and support this hypothesis.

Heinl and Heinl (2005) wrote perhaps the most complete historical record of Haiti in English entitled *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People 1492-1995*. The final sentence of their book ended with the following rhetorical question: “Are the Haitian people, living endlessly in a perverse continuum, oblivious of their past, doomed always to repeat a history that is written in blood?”³ For the most part scholars and political scientists do not take Haiti’s history into account when proposing solutions that could allow for the country to finally emerge from its persistent crises. The International Crisis Group (ICG) (2012) offered recommendations to effect an orderly transition and handover of the mission, but only conducted an analysis of MINUSTAH’s past performance, without considering previous UN, unilateral and multilateral endeavors sent to Haiti. The ICG did however base some of its recommendations on other UN-assisted state transitions and external interventions, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, two nations that faced comparable challenges to Haiti, however both countries did not face the same violent colonial oppression and class distinction that Haiti had suffered. Pezzullo (2006) stressed the importance of not turning a blind eye to Haiti’s history and further recounted that this was one of the primary mistakes that the US made when trying to solve Haiti’s refugee problem and political crisis in the 1990’s in one quick and bold stroke. This is important to note as many historians and social critics have concluded the first US intervention in Haiti as a failure (Pezzullo, 2006), yet the current UN mission has not satisfactorily resolved the fundamental problems in Haiti that cause its instability (ICG, 2012).

Zartman (2005) proposes that in today’s world, which he qualifies as filled with widespread conflict and weak states, is a world in which external actors can no longer sit idly

³Robert Debs Heinl and Nancy Gordon Heinl, *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People 1492-1995* (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc, 2005), 724.

and ignore the suffering by populations in need of protection, whether from their own rulers or from each other. He further advocates that foreign interventions are required and justified “for humanitarian reasons, and for preventive security purposes.”⁴ The length of time that a foreign force remains in the country that it seeks to set right must also be taken into consideration. The time required by an external intervention to solve a nation’s crisis is of concern not only the nation that gives up its sovereignty to foreign actors, but also to the nation(s) and organization(s) that send their personnel to resolve it. Paris and Sisk (2009) offered that state building is necessarily a long-term enterprise. Pezzullo (2006) concluded that “there are no easy foreign policy victories. Foreign crises are by their nature complex and difficult. [They cannot] be solved quickly and easily.”⁵ Zartman (2005) supports this notion of long-term involvement and the requirement to attain a complete solution to the conflict that the foreign intervention seeks to correct, which will likely reduce the need for a costlier involvement in the future.

Notwithstanding this, Di Razza (2010) proclaimed that the current MINUSTAH mission has been given a state building mission that is too large for it to successfully accomplish. Heine and Thompson (2011), who provided the most up to date and arguably the most sophisticated thinking about the challenges posed by Haiti and the International Community’s response in their book *Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and beyond*, find Di Razza’s view plausible, and expect Haiti not to re-emerge from its current predicament by not being able to affect any real substantive changes should MINUSTAH be withdrawn before the country can rectify its fragile nature.

⁴I. William Zartman, *Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State Collapse* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 1.

⁵Ralph Pezzullo, *Plunging into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Diplomacy* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2006), 279.

Methodology

The first chapter of this research paper will provide a brief introduction into Haiti's beleaguered history since its discovery by Christopher Columbus in 1492 until 1915. The second chapter will focus on the US occupation of Haiti from 1915 until the departure of US Marines from the country in 1934. Chapter Three will examine MINUSTAH's nine year performance and the progress made in the country since its deployment. Serious debate increased in 2012 on whether the mission has been successful to date at tackling Haiti's ongoing challenges, despite the UN Security Council deciding that year to initiate the mission's eventual termination. Chapter Four will close this paper by carrying out a comparison of both Haitian interventions in order to demonstrate that a transition to post-MINUSTAH Haiti is not feasible in the short-term and should only occur in the long-term based on that comparison.

CHAPTER ONE – HAITI’S TURBULENT HISTORY

Dye mon, gen mon.

- Haitian Creole proverb

Introduction

The epigraph above is an old Haitian proverb that states ‘Beyond the mountains, more mountains.’ While the majority of Haiti’s landmass consists of mountainous terrain, the proverb reflects the Haitian thinking that beyond current problems lie others.⁶ Simply put, as you solve one problem in Haiti, another problem lays waiting behind it.

In order to understand why Haiti as a nation is so fragile today, one must study its profoundly cacophonous history to gain an insight on how Haitians view themselves, how they govern their behavior, and the significant reasons for their distrust of authority. Haiti’s history of violence, oppression, and exploitation has forged a divided society where the peasant culture is always in the shadow of their urban superiors. Unfortunately, history inclines to repeat itself in Haiti; memories do not fade, nor do they die. Many scholars believe Haiti’s culture is in fact the reason for its persistent troubles while some even argue that Haiti is imprisoned by its past.⁷ This first chapter aims to specifically demonstrate just how the burden of Haiti’s past has had a lingering effect on future generations and on present day life. Examining Haiti’s colonial and post-colonial history will allow for the identification of trends which help account for the Haitian state’s fragility in its post-independence period, most notably from the nature of its colonial governance, the development of Haitian society and its dominant societal cleavages.

⁶State University of New York, “Tip sheet on Haitian Culture,” last accessed 12 January 2013, http://www.state.in.us/isdh/files/Haitian_Culture_tip_sheet-IDMH.pdf.

⁷Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood...*, 6.

Columbus' discovery and Hispaniola's evolution

On 5 December 1492, Christopher Columbus, during his first journey to discover the New World, landed and claimed the island that would eventually be named *Hispaniola*. On Christmas day that year, Columbus founded *La Navidad*, the first European settlement at the site of present-day Môle-Saint-Nicolas, Haiti. At the time of Columbus' arrival, the island was occupied by the indigenous Taíno Indians. The island's natives, after being mistreated and their villages pillaged for gold by the Spaniards,⁸ killed off Columbus' men who had been left behind to defend the new colony. The Spanish Conquistadors who followed were "ambitious nobles and merchants who looked down on manual labor and dreamed of conquering a strange civilization, killing its leaders, enslaving its natives, and exploiting a quick windfall of gold and spices."⁹ Within a short period of time, the Spanish had fully exploited the natural resources on the island, most notably its gold, and turned their attention to discovering new riches in Mexico and other parts of the Americas. The Spaniards had also introduced infectious diseases for which the Taínos had no immunity to ward off and soon the indigenous people of the island disappeared. By the seventeenth century, only a small Spanish presence remained in the eastern parts of the island (called Santo Domingo), where present day Santo-Domingo, in the Dominican Republic, is located. The first two hundred years of Haiti were therefore marked by "the reckless search for quick riches, with its complete disregard for individual human suffering."¹⁰ This short-term

⁸Harriet Marshall, *The Story of Haiti: From the Discovery of the Island by Christopher Columbus to the Present Day* (Boston: The Christopher Publishing House, 1930), 21.

⁹Philippe R. Girard, *Paradise Lost: Haiti's Tumultuous Journey from Pearl of the Caribbean to Third World Hot Spot 1st ed* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 16.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 17.

creation of wealth without long-term development would eventually be repeated numerous times throughout its coming history.¹¹

French Buccaneers often landed on the western part of Hispaniola to prepare for further adventures throughout the Caribbean. Eventually new French colonial families settled there as well, most notably due to the absence of the Spaniards, the abundant availability of fresh meat for feeding, and the sugar crop from the large sugarcane plantations. Upon seeing Spanish galleons returning from the Caribbean with vast amounts of gold and silver, the English and the Dutch were also very much fascinated in obtaining these prized treasures. The rivalries for control of the region were greatly contested but ended with the signing of the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697. The treaty called for the Spaniards to cede control of the western third of Hispaniola to the French. The French then renamed their portion of the island *Saint-Domingue*. France's territory now encompassed the western third of the island of Hispaniola, while the Spanish occupied the eastern two-thirds.

1791-1803 Slave Rebellion for Independence

Sugar, the most valuable commodity at the time, made Saint-Domingue very profitable, more than any of the sugar islands that France managed to keep after losing the Seven Years' War in 1763. The French later conducted a mass importation of African slaves to cultivate the sugar, as well as coffee, indigo, tobacco, and hides from their wealthiest colony in the New World. Ralph Pezzulo wrote in his book *Plunging into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide and the Defeat of Diplomacy*, that the "colony generated two-thirds of France's overseas trade – a productivity that

¹¹Girard, *Paradise Lost...*, 17.

easily surpassed that of the newly formed US.”¹² The overwhelming prosperity generated by these valuable goods depended entirely on the brutal exploitation of slave laborers,¹³ who worked through the stifling heat, painstaking fieldwork conditions, and perpetual cruel handling by their white masters. By 1791, the total slave population in Saint-Domingue had reached half a million people.¹⁴ Fearful slaves acquiesced to their French master’s brutality, however, eventually a growing number of runaway slaves fled the plantations to take refuge, either temporarily or permanently, to the relative safety of the inner portions of the island. Paul Farmer, an American anthropologist, physician and globally renowned humanitarian, once wrote that “the Africans of Saint-Domingue had nothing in common but their bondage and their hatred of their oppressors.”¹⁵

The black slaves from northern Saint-Domingue began a revolt against their white French masters on the night of 14 August 1791.¹⁶ The slaves were stirred by the French revolution of 1789, the inspirational words ‘All men are created free and equal’ from the new Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and the rousing voodoo ceremony held earlier that night.¹⁷ At least a thousand white French planters were killed in the uprising and well over 10,000 slaves were killed.¹⁸ 180 sugar plantations and 900 coffee plantations were also destroyed.¹⁹ In 1792, the French Government sent troops to quell the rebellion and attempted to re-establish its control over the colony. Upon seeing the infighting that was occurring in Saint-Domingue, however,

¹²Pezzullo, *Plunging into Haiti...*, 28-29.

¹³Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood...*, 34.

¹⁴Christopher Leslie Brown, *Arming Slaves: From Classical Times to the Modern Age* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 209.

¹⁵Paul Farmer, *The Uses of Haiti* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2006), 57.

¹⁶Démosthènes Pétrus Calixte, *Haiti: The Cavalry of a Soldier* (New York: Wendell Malliet & Company, 1939), 18.

¹⁷Blackpast.org, “Haitian Revolution (1791-1804),” last accessed 12 January 2013, <http://www.blackpast.org/?q=gah/haitian-revolution-1791-1804>.

¹⁸Farmer, *The Uses of Haiti*, 60.

¹⁹Pezzullo, *Plunging into Haiti...*, 34.

both the British and Spanish invaded the French colony in 1793. These invasions were not with the aim to free the black slaves, but instead to take over the profitable colony for themselves.

Toussaint L'Ouverture, a prominent and tactically gifted leader in the black slave rebellion, entered into service with the Spanish in the spring of 1793 to fight against the French and British.²⁰ "The Spanish essentially won this contest," due to this alliance they had contracted with the armies of the principal rebel leaders, such as L'Ouverture.²¹ On 29 August 1793, Léger-Félicité Sonthonax, the French Civil Commissioner of Saint-Domingue at the time, locally declared the abolition of slavery in the colony in a desperate attempt to gain the support of the black population in the fight against the English and Spaniards.²² It was for a good reason he did this as by the first months of 1794, the "insurgent leaders had occupied most of the northern half of Saint-Domingue in the name of the King of Spain."²³ It was not until early May 1794 that L'Ouverture changed his allegiance and joined the French Army, which ended any further chances of Spanish success.²⁴ L'Ouverture's main motive for conversion was when the French revolutionary government finally officially ratified the order for the emancipation of slavery. Sonthonax had in fact made his earlier declaration prematurely and without the authority to do so.

Following the emancipation ratification, L'Ouverture then helped the French expel the British and Spanish from Saint-Domingue. He was so revered for his military prowess that he became a general in the French Army by 1796 and was the most important military figure on the

²⁰Harriet Marshall, *The Story of Haiti: From the Discovery of the Island by Christopher Columbus to the Present Day* (Boston: The Christopher Publishing House, 1930), 46.

²¹Brown, *Arming Slaves...*, 221.

²²Girard, *Paradise Lost...*, 39.

²³Brown, *Arming Slaves...*, 221.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 222.

island when the last British troops left in 1798.²⁵ L'Ouverture put down many subsequent rebellions on the island and later captured it in its entirety with his 40,000 man veteran black army. In 1801, he appointed himself as Governor General for life, some calling him a military dictator,²⁶ through the unilateral implementation of his constitution. L'Ouverture, governing as best he could, enacted laws to have the economy pick up from where it had left its prosperous past as he needed revenues to pay for and equip his army.²⁷ The actions and enterprise of Toussaint L'Ouverture created Haiti's winner-take-all political culture.²⁸ This further established for future generations that in order to obtain political gains, force and the use of violence was the only way to establish them.

Deciding that L'Ouverture had to be removed, France's ruler, Napoleon Bonaparte, sent another large force from mainland France which landed in Saint-Domingue in October 1801 to recapture the colony and restore slavery. L'Ouverture called on his people to resist but the French initially appeared to emerge victorious. The French invited him to attend a meeting under parley (safe passage conditions) to discuss a proposed negotiation, but they betrayed this truce and arrested L'Ouverture, placed him on a ship headed for France, where he died in prison in 1803.²⁹ General Jean-Jacques Dessalines, L'Ouverture's principal lieutenant during the slave rebellion, took up and successfully led the resistance against the French. On 4 December 1803, the toll on the French Expeditionary force was too much for Napoleon and he surrendered the colony to Dessalines. Gearóid Ó. Colmáin, a geopolitical columnist, summarized the legacy of

²⁵Girard, *Paradise Lost*..., 41.

²⁶Adam Hochschild, "Birth of a Nation / Has the bloody 200-year history of Haiti doomed it to more violence?" last accessed 12 January 2013, <http://www.sfgate.com/magazine/article/Birth-of-a-Nation-Has-the-bloody-200-year-2771248.php#ixzz2HmCh0cP7>.

²⁷Girard, *Paradise Lost*..., 43.

²⁸Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (London: Routledge, 2009), 180.

²⁹Calixte, *Haiti: The Cavalry of a Soldier*, 18.

the Haitian slave rebellion as: “A slave nation had defeated a great imperial power. It was from Haiti that the fire of the French revolution would spread throughout the colonies of the tyrannical empires.”³⁰ On 1 January 1804, Dessalines officially declared the newly formed independent republic free from slavery and concluded the ceremony of the birth of the new nation with “Swear to fight until the last breath, for the independence of our country.”³¹ This famous pledge proudly became the rallying call for all future Haitian generations.

Haiti’s post-Independence turmoil

The first one hundred and eleven years of Haiti’s independence did not precede peacefully either. Its legacy of violence continued unabated and the country remained politically isolated for much of the nineteenth century. Hatred for the French was paramount and the new leaders quickly renamed Saint-Domingue *Ayiti* (land of high mountains), the indigenous Taíno name for the island. A new flag was also created for the state by tearing out the white center portion of the French tri-colored flag and sewing together the blue and red portions. This was symbolic of cutting the ‘white people’ from the country. Dessalines’ hatred of the French was so great that he ordered the barbaric elimination of the estimated 5,000 French whites remaining on Haitian territory, explaining that it was “every Haitians duty to avenge the many relatives they had lost to French exploitation.”³² This savage act of retaliation sealed the fate for future generations of Haitians. Phillippe Girard, a historian who has written three books on Haiti’s history, summarized the importance of this action on Haiti’s future development when he wrote:

³⁰Gearóid Ó. Colmáin, “France and the History of Haiti,” last accessed 13 January 2013, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/france-and-the-history-of-haiti/17130>.

³¹Marshall, *The Story of Haiti...*, 73.

³²Girard, *Paradise Lost...*, 56.

For all their faults, Saint-Domingue's whites had been the most educated faction in the colony. White planters organized labor on plantations. White engineers designed irrigation projects. White bureaucrats and lawyers administered the colony. White officers manned the top echelons of the army. Even L'Ouverture's secretaries were white. In one blind act of revenge, Dessalines wiped out his country's cadres. For decades thereafter, the vast majority of Haiti's population (Dessalines included) remained illiterate and unskilled, substantially hindering Haitian economic development. Securing one's freedom in an orgy of white blood also set a violent tone for future political discourse. Following Dessalines' example, ambitious generals gained, kept, then lost power through violent means.³³

In 1805, Dessalines himself drafted Haiti's first constitution which included a clause that prohibited foreigners from owning land in Haiti. Haiti's nature of political violence continued its reoccurrence and a year later Dessalines was himself lynched by his own officers in Port-au-Prince during a general uprising. A civil war emerged in 1807 and soon the country was more or less divided between the north, led by King Henri Christophe, and the south, led by Alexandre Pétion. Jean-Pierre Boyer managed to reunify the country in 1820 and lasted 25 years as the country's President from 1818 until 1843.

Haiti's plantation-oriented economy had collapsed through the destruction of many sugarcane plantations during the slave revolution and the country had lost much of its wealth. Pezzullo wrote that this "marked the end of the government's ability to control the types of crops planted. Sugar exports, which had totaled 163 million pounds at the height of the colony, shrunk to only two thousand pounds by 1825."³⁴ The French imposed a trade embargo on Haiti shortly after they claimed their independence, further preventing the recovery of its economy. In July 1825, France offered to lift the embargo and to formally recognize the independence of Haiti in exchange for a restitution payment in the amount of 150 million francs, later reduced to 90

³³Girard, *Paradise Lost*..., 57.

³⁴Pezzullo, *Plunging into Haiti*..., 55.

million francs, to compensate for property lost through the Haitian Revolution. Boyer, after hesitating for several days, agreed to pay the sum by signing the proposed French agreement.³⁵ He had essentially payed for Haiti's hard-earned freedom and independence. However, "Haiti...found itself incapable of paying the hefty sum and had to resort to external financing provided on ruinous terms."³⁶ Many historians have concluded that "the massive toll that France exacted on Haiti played a large part in the Caribbean country's subsequent descent into stark poverty and under-development,"³⁷ and can account for the poverty trend that remains in Haiti today.

Race has always been a major factor of contention in Haitian society. Heintz and Heintz, two American historians, explained the influence that race plays in Haiti:

About 90 percent of all Haitians are pure ebony black and are known as *noirs* (blacks). The remaining 10 percent have varying traces of Caucasian blood and are known as *jaunes* (yellow) or *mulâtres* (mulattos). This racial division – Haitians call it exactly that and speak of "the two races" – is the most important fact of life in Haiti. It dominates the country's whole existence. It is also, in the words of one of Haiti's ablest thinkers, Alcide Charpentier, "...the supreme evil of our Republic, the virus that ravages it, and the road to its ruin."³⁸

The relationship between the races is undeniably strained. The blacks, whose numbers clearly make them the majority, "resent the more intelligent mulattoes who for the most part rule, or have a large voice in the conduct of the country's affairs. The mulattoes have nothing but contempt in their hearts for the blacks."³⁹ France played a significant role in influencing Haitian society throughout its history and the actions of the French during the pre-independence period

³⁵Comité indépendant de réflexion et de propositions sur les relations Franco-Haitiennes, *Rapport au Ministre des affaires étrangères M. Dominique de Villepin*, Janvier 2004, 90-91.

³⁶Girard, *Paradise Lost...*, 67.

³⁷Dionne Jackson Miller, "Aristide's Call for Reparations From France Unlikely to Die," last accessed 12 January 2013, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2004/03/haiti-aristides-call-for-reparations-from-france-unlikely-to-die/>.

³⁸Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood...*, 4.

³⁹James H. McCrocklin, *Garde d'Haiti, 1915-1934: Twenty Years of Organization and Training by the United States Marine Corps* (Menasha: George Banta Company, 1956), 18.

explains the disdain that many Haitians today have for the *blancs* (whites). The situation was similar to the Belgian colonialism of Rwanda during the twentieth century. Considerable anti-colonial sentiment emerged against the white Belgian rulers and subsequently the Belgian government granted independence to the country after being repeatedly attacked by indigenous Rwandans for an extended period of time.

The Haitian local government system continues to resemble the French system today,⁴⁰ and many mulattoes, predominantly recognized as the Haitian elites, retained much of their white French cultural orientation.⁴¹ Similarly, there are two languages in Haiti, “the official French used by the literate elite and Haitian Creole, a distinct language of obscure origin, ... spoken by the [less educated] masses.”⁴²

Haitian politics were relentlessly chaotic in the years between 1859 and 1915. Fighting for power centered on the spoils, rather than any deeply held ideals.⁴³ The overthrows of one President after another, mostly through armed intimidation or outright brutal violence and murder, became a regular occurrence in the capital. The competitions for the Haitian presidency, the ultimate seat of power and privileges, were therefore marked by a “lack of a concept of power-sharing for the betterment of society,”⁴⁴ another trend that would be repeated numerous times throughout Haiti’s coming history. Famous Haitian historian Michel-Rolph Trouillot wrote that “first attempts were not always successful, and second and third tries were common. The forces of arms, preferably turned against Port-au-Prince, remained the principal asset in the race

⁴⁰McCrocklin, *Garde d’Haiti, 1915-1934...*, 56.

⁴¹Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1971), 21.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 22.

⁴³Girard, *Paradise Lost...*, 72.

⁴⁴John T. Fishel, *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case of Haiti 1st ed* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press, 2007), 28.

for the presidency.”⁴⁵ Philippe Girard offered that Haiti needed a “ruling class of immense political skill”⁴⁶ to govern over such a racially polarized society. Since its independence, however, Haiti has only managed to have “a few enlightened despots who hoped to foster prosperity, if not democracy,...[and] used their dictatorial powers to develop their country’s infrastructures.”⁴⁷ It wasn’t long before all state infrastructures became neglected and no long-term projects were actively implemented. In the end, any foundations previously established crumbled due to the brief terms of those in power. Progress in Haiti was never long-term as solutions were repeatedly not brought up by the people themselves, but imposed by the oppressive ruling class. The first 200 plus years of Haiti’s history were “the most vivid and extraordinary of any colonized or enslaved people, [and] has some aspects that make it unique.”⁴⁸

⁴⁵Pezzullo, *Plunging into Haiti...*, 57.

⁴⁶Girard, *Paradise Lost...*, 7.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 8.

⁴⁸P. Chin, *et al.*, *Haiti: A Slave Revolution: 200 years after 2004* (New York: International Action Center, 2004), 97.

CHAPTER TWO – THE US OCCUPATION OF HAITI 1915-1934

Introduction

This chapter will focus on the 19-year occupation of Haiti by the US. While many Americans have forgotten about this ill-fated expedition in nation building, its memory “still lingers in the Haitian collective memory.”⁴⁹ What started as a promising mission to assist Haiti in its recovery from political turmoil, concluded itself as a failed intervention in which the Americans couldn’t have left the country fast enough.

The first United States occupation of Haiti

Instability continued to flourish in Haiti in the period up until 1915. Seven Haitian Presidents alone were assassinated or overthrown in the seven tumultuous years between 1908 and 1915.⁵⁰ Jean Vilbrun Guillaume Sam declared himself the latest President of Haiti on 25 February 1915. That day he led an armed revolutionary group that entered Port-au-Prince and coerced his predecessor to resign. Afraid that he may suffer the same doomed fate as those before him, Sam immediately proceeded to have nearly 200 of his closest political opponents rounded up and jailed as a measure to ensure that he retain power.⁵¹ He gave the order that should a revolt occur, that these political prisoners were to be immediately executed. Less than five months later his regime faced a coup attempt led by Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, an influential mulatto from northern Haiti. As Sam’s hold on power became more untenable and when Bobo’s

⁴⁹Fauriol, *Haitian Frustrations...*, 36.

⁵⁰Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 157.

⁵¹Fauriol, *Haitian Frustrations...*, 38.

revolutionaries marched into the Presidential Palace on the evening of 27 July 1915, Guillaume Sam's orders for the killing of all of his jailed political rivals were carried out by the jail warden and guards. When news broke in Port-au-Prince that 167 rivals had been viciously murdered in their jail cells, a vengeance-filled mob went looking for Guillaume Sam and found him hiding at the French Legation. He was dragged into the street by the enraged crowd and his body was literally torn to pieces.⁵² Sadly, this extremely violent scene ended the tenure of yet another Haitian President. Many foreign missions were shocked to see Haitians achieve these new heights of violence; however they were more concerned with the violation of the French Legation's sovereignty, which made them feel even less secure.⁵³

In response to these barbaric acts, US President Woodrow Wilson decided to intervene in Haiti under the authority of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (an interventionist policy), which had been established earlier in the twentieth century by then President Theodore Roosevelt.⁵⁴ One objective of the intervention was to restore order to prevent Haiti from falling into further anarchy.⁵⁵ The US Secretary of State at the time, Robert Lansing, explained that the intervention was "to terminate the appalling conditions of anarchy, savagery, and oppression which had been prevalent in Haiti for decades."⁵⁶ Another goal was to establish a democratic government after the staging of fair elections.⁵⁷ As it turned out, these were not the sole aims for the Americans who had also intervened to secure and protect their monetary assets and interests

⁵²Girard, *Paradise Lost...*, 76-77.

⁵³David Healy, *Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era: The U.S. Navy in Haiti, 1915-1916* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 59.

⁵⁴Department of State, "U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915-34," last accessed 12 January 2013, <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/Haiti>.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*

⁵⁶Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace...*, 160.

⁵⁷Keith B. Bickel, *Mars Learning: The Marine Corps development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 69.

in the country. Haiti's finances too had collapsed and foreign banks wanted their money back⁵⁸ as Haiti was pledging 80% of its government revenues to service its debt at the time.⁵⁹

Notwithstanding the above, the real purpose for the United States' intervention was purely geopolitical.⁶⁰ The US was growing suspicious and wanted to counter the potential threat that Germany and France posed if they established their presence in the Caribbean, considered by the American's to be within their sphere of influence.⁶¹ A State Department historian summarized the US view of the threat posed by Germany as follows:

Although unhappy about Haiti's close connection to France, policymakers in the United States were more concerned about increased German activity and influence in the country. In the beginning of the 20th century German presence in Haiti increased as German merchants began establishing trading branches in Haiti, quickly dominating commercial business in the area. German men married Haitian women to get around laws denying foreigners land ownership and established roots in the Haitian community. The United States considered Germany its chief rival in the Caribbean, and feared German control of Haiti would give them a powerful advantage in the area.⁶²

More importantly, the US was predominantly interested in maintaining security and control in the Caribbean area near the recently constructed Panama Canal.⁶³ The Windward Passage, the body of water separating Haiti from Cuba, was in the direct path of shipping between the Eastern seaboard of the US and the Canal. Heintz and Heintz described that "in geopolitical terms, the Caribbean's Atlantic gateway, the Windward Passage, [was] in effect the Gibraltar Strait."⁶⁴ The US' intervention in Haiti was therefore more geared towards denying

⁵⁸Edwin H. Simmons, *The United States Marines, 1775-1975* (New York: Viking Press, 1976), 100.

⁵⁹Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti...*, 43.

⁶⁰Anthony P. Maingot, *The United States and the Caribbean: Transforming Hegemony and Sovereignty* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 55.

⁶¹Allan Reed Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 181.

⁶²Department of State, "U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915-34."

⁶³Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti...*, 43.

⁶⁴Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood...*, 262.

any foreign military interference which could influence control over the strategic lines of communication in the region.

The US occupation of Haiti commenced in the late afternoon of 28 July 1915. Approximately 330 US Marines from the battleship *USS Washington* came ashore to establish order and protect foreigners.⁶⁵ It wasn't until later that evening that the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington sent a cablegram with direction for the operation. It stated: "State Department desires American forces be landed Port-au-Prince and American and Foreign Interests be protected."⁶⁶ Marines had already landed and were patrolling within Port-au-Prince itself. They later expanded their presence to other major cities once immediate reinforcements began to arrive.⁶⁷ The operation was commanded by Rear Admiral William B. Caperton, who exercised his initiative in the earliest days of the operation to gain the advantage of the situation when supplementary direction from Washington was slow to come his way. He ordered his Marines to occupy the forts and barracks throughout the country and disarm their garrisons.⁶⁸

In order to establish a democratic government as soon as possible to reduce further violence, Caperton, again without guidance from his superiors, began to vet for potential Haitian presidential candidates. He selected Phillipe Sudre Dartiguenave, the then president of the Haitian Senate, as a likely nominee for the position of Head of State.⁶⁹ He had also considered Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, but dismissed him as he was the latest revolutionary leader and believed he "would not govern in either Haiti's or America's best interests."⁷⁰ Direction finally came from the US State Department to Caperton, ordering him to organize Presidential elections with his

⁶⁵Fauriol, *Haitian Frustrations...*, 38.

⁶⁶Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace...*, 158.

⁶⁷Bickel, *Mars Learning...*, 70.

⁶⁸Fauriol, *Haitian Frustrations...*, 38.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 39.

⁷⁰Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace...*, 161.

choice of Dartiguenave as a candidate.⁷¹ The US believed this choice would alleviate political instability, but in fact its actions proved highly un-democratic. Dartiguenave was elected President by the Haitian legislature on 12 August 1915.⁷² Max Boot, in his book *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, described the election as “no more a brazen usurpation than that of any previous Haitian president, but neither was it quite the democratic election that the U.S. pretended at the time.”⁷³

Admiral Caperton also received a draft US-Haiti treaty from the State Department that once agreed upon would allow for Haiti “to [keep] a president, but the United States unilaterally designated the officials in charge of five key sectors: the *Gendarmerie*, customs, finances, public health, and infrastructures.”⁷⁴ It further required Haiti to put in force the treaty for 10 years, after which it could be renewed for another 10 years at the option of *either* party. “The treaty was, in fact, a call for the erection of a US protectorate in Haiti,”⁷⁵ opined a 1995 Center for Strategic and International Studies report on the matter. It was additionally a financial protectorate as the treaty also stipulated that Haiti could not incur any further foreign debt without the approval of the US.⁷⁶ Facing mounting pressure from the US Administration, the newly appointed Haitian government, after its attempts to water down the provisions of the US-Haiti treaty failed, finally signed the agreement in September 1915. That same month, Admiral Caperton declared martial law and banned “false or incendiary propaganda against the Government of the United States or Government of Haiti.”⁷⁷ John J. Tierney, an expert in international relations and security studies,

⁷¹Fauriol, *Haitian Frustrations...*, 39.

⁷²Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti...*, 74.

⁷³Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace...*, 161.

⁷⁴Girard, *Paradise Lost...*, 81.

⁷⁵Fauriol, *Haitian Frustrations...*, 39.

⁷⁶Farmer, *The Uses of Haiti*, 81.

⁷⁷Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace...*, 161.

wrote that “Haitian papers had been frequently attacking the United States openly in their editorials... This imposition of martial law effectively ended the public disclosures of internal political opposition.”⁷⁸ With just over 2,000 US Marines in country, the Americans now had a solid hold on Haiti and its two million inhabitants.

First Caco War

The US Marines faced very limited security threats during the first months of their occupation; however resistance to their presence began to grow as the occupation continued. Peasant soldiers of fortune and part-time bandits known as *Cacos* initiated revolts outside several major cities. John J. Tierney defined a ‘caco’ as:

A large band of warlike ex-slaves that had established their own brand of ‘tribal’ authority in the rugged and mountainous interior. Like the bird-of-prey with its red plume (wherein they derived their name) the Cacos lived off the peasants and were recognized by a patch of red cloth worn on their sleeves.⁷⁹

Marines replied by occupying those towns where the majority of violence occurred.⁸⁰ The cacos initiated and engaged the Marines through guerrilla warfare when attacking US outposts, patrols and coastal towns. The cacos had no military organization, no uniforms, no modern arms or supplies of their own and therefore the highly disciplined and skilled Marine force easily dispersed this insurgent threat.⁸¹ The conflict was persistent enough though and consequently became known as the First Caco War.

⁷⁸John J. Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2006), 177.

⁷⁹John J. Tierney, “America’s ‘Black Vietnam’: Haiti’s Cacos vs. The Marine Corps, 1915-22”, The Institute of World Politics, September 1, 1981, http://www.iwp.edu/news_publications/detail/americas-black-vietnam-haitis-cacos-vs-the-marine-corps-1915-22.

⁸⁰Bickel, *Mars Learning...*, 70.

⁸¹Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts...*, 170.

The US Marine leadership decided that they could pacify the undisciplined cacos through “a full-scale campaign against the insurgents...[through] a combination of arms buying, amnesty-granting, and selective attacks against only the most militant leaders and their bands.”⁸² Through their constant pursuit and killing of the cacos, the First Caco War ended when US Marines attacked and captured the last caco bastion at Fort-Rivière on the night of 17 November 1915. Marines stormed the fort and killed the 50 cacos defending it. After the fort was blown up, the caco resistance ceased to exist and a gradual state of peace emerged throughout Haiti. The experience of the First Caco War revealed that a superior armed foreign military force was in fact the only force capable of establishing and providing a safe and secure environment in the country.

Second Caco War

US Marine Colonel L.W.T. Waller took over command of the 2,029 Marines ashore in Haiti on 15 August 1915.⁸³ In accordance with the US-Haiti treaty, he began to establish the American-led constabulary named the Gendarmerie. The first challenge was to create a police and military force from native Haitians who at the beginning were described as “warped, partly corrupted, and extremely ignorant.”⁸⁴ Major Smedley Butler, the first US Marine officer appointed as Commandant of the Gendarmerie, recognized this challenge and, along with 114 other marines, quickly succeeded in building an effective law-enforcement agency of 2,553 Haitians through rigorous training and discipline.⁸⁵ Soon after, “Gendarmerie officers became

⁸²Millett, *Semper Fidelis...*, 186.

⁸³Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood...*, 384.

⁸⁴McCrocklin, *Garde d'Haiti...*, 59.

⁸⁵Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace...*, 165.

virtual district bosses throughout the countryside, while Waller's marine regulars continued to garrison the cities and serve as a reserve."⁸⁶

A second caco revolt reemerged during the years 1918-19 under new leadership as disdain for the occupying US forces grew even stronger. A rallying call for the cacos came about when the marines reintroduced *la corvée*, or forced labour. In regard to the corvée, Max Boot wrote:

An ancient practice going back to prerevolutionary France, the corvée was a system whereby poor peasants could be forced to work on road gangs in lieu of paying taxes. A Haitian law of 1863 allowed the corvée in Haiti, but it had fallen into disuse – along with the roads – until revived by the marines in 1916...Gendarmerie Commander Smedley Butler made large-scale use of the corvée to create a modern transportation system for Haiti...Despite its obvious success, the corvée also caused equally obvious resentment. It was, after all, forced labour – and under the guns of the *blancs* no less.⁸⁷

The new caco leader, a nationalist named Charlemagne Péralte, led a stronger caco force estimated at over 5,000 men. Admiral Caperton wanted the rebellion eliminated as he reported that “stable government not possible in Haiti until Cacos are disbanded and power broken.”⁸⁸ The newly formed Gendarmerie, supported by the Marines, embarked upon a vigorous year-long campaign to subdue the uprising and, at its end, some 2,000 Haitians had been killed and the cacos were defeated for a second time.⁸⁹

Despite this, resentment of the US occupation continued to mount as it became evident that Marines had committed abuses on Haitians during their intervention. The American's deep-seated racism towards blacks was also prevalent, and in other instances, US Marines did nothing to prevent abuses committed by the Haitian Gendramerie, which included the “execution and

⁸⁶Healy, *Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era...*, 210.

⁸⁷Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace...*, 171-172.

⁸⁸Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood...*, 383.

⁸⁹Healy, *Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era...*, 212.

brutalization of caco prisoners and corvée laborers.”⁹⁰ Public disparagement towards the occupation grew and civil rights groups sought reparation for the harms caused by the occupation forces.⁹¹

Americans also took control over Haiti’s customhouses, finances, health services and infrastructures in order to develop and modernize their systems. Control of all ten customhouses was an essential element of the occupation as there was no other source of governmental revenue in Haiti. The revenues collected could then be used to pay for the Gendarmerie, public works, famine relief, demobilization of soldiers and government services. An American-appointed financial adviser and general receiver of customs maintained extensive control over the finances of the Haitian government,⁹² and a US-directed campaign against malaria and yaws was launched to improve public health.

Louis Borno, a mulatto lawyer and Dartiguenave’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs, was elected President by the Council of State of the Republic in April 1922.⁹³ Borno was fully cooperative with the US occupation and remained head of state until he resigned in 1930. His successor, Louis Eugène Roy, was appointed provisional President by the US High Commissioner to Haiti, General John H. Russell. Haitians selected a National Assembly for the first time since it had been dissolved in 1918 and chose Sténio Vincent, a mulatto, as President in November 1930. The strikes and uprisings that erupted in 1929 against American control, however, were beginning to make the US occupation untenable. The most infamous protest occurred in Les Cayes when Marines fired on and killed a dozen protesters after a large gathering

⁹⁰Millett, *Semper Fidelis...*, 202.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, 202.

⁹²Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti...*, 77.

⁹³Marshall, *The Story of Haiti...*, 121.

of Haitians had hostilely been marching towards the Marines and refused to heed their warning shots. This incident became known as the ‘Cayes Massacre’ and greatly intensified Haitian resentment of the occupation. The incident also caught the attention of US President Herbert Hoover who dispatched a Commission, led by William Cameron Forbes, to evaluate the continuation of the occupation. In the end, Forbes recommended that the US withdraw from Haiti.⁹⁴ Despite all the progress made during the first fifteen years of the occupation, the Commission felt that the US could not stomach an American presence in Haiti “for several generations” as they foresaw this as the time it would take to lift “Haiti up from early colonial times into the 20th century and beyond.”⁹⁵ The 1929 depression had also put a strain on the US’ financial situation and the American people did not want to put further tension upon it. This allowed President Vincent to negotiate an agreement for the withdrawal of American forces, less some American fiscal representatives, by October 1934. This was well before the original 1936 departure date agreed upon in the initial US-Haiti treaty. On 15 August 1934, the last of the US Marines departed Haiti. Hans Schmitt wrote of the departure: “A ‘Festival of the Second Independence’ took place on August 21, and President Vincent styled himself as the ‘Second Liberator’ in the tradition of Toussaint L’Ouverture and Jean Jacques Dessalines.”⁹⁶

⁹⁴Robert M. Spector, *W. Cameron Forbes and the Hoover Commissions to Haiti (1930)* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985), ix.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*

⁹⁶Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti...*, 230.

The occupation's achievements

The greatest benefits of the occupation, which Schmitt argues was largely “materialistic,” were the modernization of Haitian infrastructure and technology, and the improvement in organizational efficiency.⁹⁷ The enhancement of the capabilities of the Gendarmerie d’Haiti (renamed the *Garde d’Haiti* in 1928) was perhaps the most positive indicator that some portions of the US occupation were successful, at least for the short-term. The Garde was professionalized and was able to carry out its functions of maintaining order and peace after their US Marine leaders and mentors left the country. A number of small revolts sprang up throughout the country in 1936 and 1937, mostly due to socioeconomic difficulties such as hunger and mistreatment. Colonel Démosthènes Pétrus Calixte, the former Commandant of the Garde d’Haiti from 1934-1938, explained that the Garde was “faithful to its duties of maintaining order and peace, suppressed these uprisings without unnecessary bloodshed or publicity.”⁹⁸

There were other improvements achieved in Haiti which allowed the country to be “at least stable and reasonably prosperous,”⁹⁹ wrote Tierney. The only reason this happened was that American officials occupied and controlled the head positions in the five key sectors in the Haitian Government. Haiti’s infrastructure improved dramatically and by the end of the occupation, more than “1600 miles of road were built, plus 15 steel, 68 concrete, and 127 wooden bridges.”¹⁰⁰ The telephone system was repaired, several towns managed to gain access to clean water, and wharves, lighthouses, schools, and hospitals were refurbished.

⁹⁷Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti...*, 13.

⁹⁸Calixte, *Haiti: The Cavalry of a Soldier*, 26.

⁹⁹Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts...*, 178.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*

German and French influence in the country did not emerge but rather “waned after the US Marines invaded Port-au-Prince July 28, 1915 and began their 19-year occupation...[which] stop[ed] any attempt by Germany to set up a base in Haiti and [allowed the US] to protect the Panama Canal.”¹⁰¹ The occupation also ended “the close financial and commercial ties between Haiti and France, though not the cultural ones.”¹⁰²

The occupation’s setbacks and legacy

The Forbes Commission’s report of the US occupation in Haiti made it clear that “it was a tragedy for us [US] to remain there [Haiti], and it was a tragedy to leave.”¹⁰³ The Commission’s report also noted that “haste was the common denominator” in determining how to “rapidly liquidat[e]” the occupation.¹⁰⁴ Admittedly confusion reigns whether this meant the commission did not have or did not take the appropriate amount of time to deliberate and study the issue, or that the US withdrawal was initiated due to unwarranted pressure, either mounting US financial or Haitian resentment itself. In the end, the Americans left before a stable democracy could take hold, and Forbes knew “that to withdraw from Haiti meant a return to the corruption and evils of the pre-Occupation period.”¹⁰⁵

The US occupation was primarily characterized as unsuccessful simply because Haiti’s violent history repeated itself. Once Haiti was free from white outsider interference, the first president they elected in 1941, a mulatto named Elie Lescot, could not quell growing protests over his efforts to censure the opposition press and his reputation of being “anti-black.” Despite

¹⁰¹Chin, *et al.*, *Haiti: A Slave Revolution...*, 56.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*

¹⁰³Spector, *W. Cameron Forbes and the Hoover Commissions to Haiti (1930)*, ix.

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*, viii.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, x.

ruling the country with an iron fist, Lescot's government fell under the pressure of unprecedented discontent from the masses. He was convinced to flee in exile by a triumvirate of senior Army officers who eventually took over control of the country, and facilitated the next president into office. Marie-Josée Mont-Reynaud, a Stanford graduate, wrote an opinion paper in 2002 on the American Occupation of Haiti and summarized the outcomes in the after-occupation years as follows:

Subsequent presidents came and went by a series of such coup d'états, culminating in the Duvalier's dictatorial reign in the 1950s. The Gendarmerie, the American-trained Haitian police force, facilitated these years of bloody coups and dictatorship. While hailed as one of the great achievements of the Occupation, the Gendarmerie became a tool in the hands of politicians who bought their support to overthrow governments and bring new presidents into power. Indeed, the rulers who succeeded each other violently from 1951 to 1958 (Paul Magloire, Leon Cantave and Antonio Kebreau) had been trained by American Marines in politics and crowd control and graduated from the American Military School in Haiti in 1931. This presidential parade illustrates that the Occupation failed to teach Haitians the tools to maintain a democracy. Instead of fostering democracy, the Occupation championed military might, schooled dictators and trained Haitians to respond to force: "We are teaching them to accept military control as supreme law, and to acquiesce in the arbitrary use of superior power." The Occupation failed to transform the underlying political system in Haiti. Rather, it perpetuated the way power changes hands by force, and reinforced "the tradition that power comes out of the hand holding a gun." A Haitian Creole proverb "Konstitisyon se papye, bayonèt se fê" (A constitution is paper, a bayonet is steel) speaks to this legacy of Haiti's history. The ideology of the American Occupation that "might makes right" ultimately failed to set government right in Haiti.¹⁰⁶

The occupation did not succeed in helping the Haitian people establish a stable government or maintain sustainable peace throughout the Republic. No foundations for democracy were laid by the Americans and Haitians were basically taught to rule themselves by returning to their old methods.¹⁰⁷ It wasn't long after the Americans left that Haitians,

¹⁰⁶Marie-Josée Mont-Reynaud, "The Failure of the American Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934," last accessed 13 January 2013, http://haitiforever.com/windowsonhaiti/am-occup.htm#_edn22.

¹⁰⁷Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood...*, 458.

reinvigorated by their new, Nationalistic president Sténio Vincent, “went on a wild binge of destruction, tearing up bridges and badly needed telephone lines. Vincent responded by declaring martial law and suspending the constitution, thus becoming the first post-occupation authoritarian.”¹⁰⁸ The occupation had occasioned “the genesis of the fundamental principle of Haitian politics: whoever can control the army in the city controls uncontested state power. Only splits in the army, not degrees of popular support, bring down governments in Haiti.”¹⁰⁹ In the opinion of David Healy, who wrote in his book *Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era: The U.S. Navy in Haiti, 1915-1916*, there was no progress made towards the “Wilsonian aims of teaching democracy and constitutionalism, or improving the lot of the people.”¹¹⁰ Many in Washington incorrectly assumed that Haitians could be coerced into orderly elective democracy. Healy further wrote on the setbacks of the occupation:

The occupation witnessed the mutual disillusionment of occupied and occupiers, the progressive abandonment of the more constructive occupation goals, the decline of real Haitian participation in government, and the emergence of a military autocracy as a central mechanism of power.¹¹¹

“American authority...had been established, *de jure* by treaty, *de facto* by the Marines.”¹¹² The US did not attempt to hide the fact that its intervention had failed either. The US State Department Historian described the principal political failures during the intervention:

Following the successful manipulation of the 1915 elections, the Wilson Administration attempted to strong-arm the Haitian legislature into adopting a new constitution in 1917. This constitution allowed foreign land ownership, which had been outlawed since the Haitian Revolution as a way to prevent foreign control of the country. The legislature was extremely reluctant to change the long-standing law and rejected the new constitution. Lawmakers began drafting a new

¹⁰⁸Pezzullo, *Plunging into Haiti...*, 80.

¹⁰⁹Maingot, *The United States and the Caribbean...*, 55.

¹¹⁰Healy, *Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era...*, 223.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, 224.

¹¹²Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood...*, 401.

anti-American constitution, but the United States forced President Dartiguenave to dissolve the legislature, which did not meet again until 1929.¹¹³

America had invoked the Monroe Doctrine and humanitarianism to justify their occupation.¹¹⁴ The reason for their invasion, however, was purely geopolitical and the US was content to have successfully repulsed any German or French influence in the Caribbean. Many Haitians have insisted that the bloody events that “surrounded the fall of Guillaume Sam were not the real reason for the occupation, but merely the occasion for it.”¹¹⁵

“The American occupation of Haiti was a classic case in failed nation building,”¹¹⁶ was the conclusive summary that John J. Tierney offered of the 19-year US operation as the American occupation did not solve the issue of poverty in Haiti either. Rather, it extended Haiti’s misery and when the occupation ended, “Haiti was as poor as ever and deep in debt.”¹¹⁷ By 1937, it was clear that Haiti had been “weakened by nearly two decades of foreign occupation and subjugation.”¹¹⁸ In 1939, Colonel Calixte wrote in his book, *Haiti: The Cavalry of a Soldier*, that in 1934, when the US left the country, “there was a balance of over a million dollars in the treasury.” He further added:

Immediately bills for expenditures to celebrate the “Second Independence,” Presidential “inspection trips,” elections, votes of the last constitution or referendum, and “public works,” were decreed by the Government. By September 1937, there was not a penny left. The revenue had decreased one-third and the country was nearly bankrupt.¹¹⁹

Comparatively, the US had also occupied several other crisis-plagued Caribbean nations during the approximate same period: Nicaragua (1912-1925, 1927-1933), the Dominican

¹¹³Department of State. “U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915–34.”

¹¹⁴Chin, *et al.*, *Haiti: A Slave Revolution...*, 7.

¹¹⁵Healy, *Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era...*, 215.

¹¹⁶Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts...*, 177.

¹¹⁷Chin, *et al.*, *Haiti: A Slave Revolution...*, 8.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹¹⁹Calixte, *Haiti: The Cavalry of a Soldier*, 22.

Republic (1916-1924), and Cuba (1917-1922). The US occupations in these three countries cultivated to some extent more favorable results than the ones reached in Haiti as each intervention succeeded to the point where the conditions on the ground were deemed stable enough to allow US forces to leave and in generally less time than the 19-year Haitian occupation. The causes of these crises were fundamentally similar to Haiti's, and could be predominantly blamed on the failure of the government to preserve internal order instigated by political violence and revolutions. Order was reinstated after several years of US military pacification efforts.¹²⁰ Haiti was simply the worst-case scenario as none of these interventions possessed the socio-economic challenges and deeply-rooted political instability that troubled Haiti.

Many educated Haitians were opposed to the loss of their sovereignty to foreigners and resented the presence of American troops in their country.¹²¹ Prominent Haitians were deprived of the opportunity to direct and manage government institutions as American officials occupied and held the head positions in the five key sectors in the Haitian Government. Tierney concluded that these actions were “undoubtedly a factor in this general hostility.”¹²² He further wrote:

But the instinctive magnet of patriotism was a formidable barrier between occupier and occupied. “Disorganization and slowness of American action,” one expert on the intervention has maintained, “continuance of military rule and domination of the United States, fear of exploitation and loss of independence – these were wither causes of hostility or provoked subject matter for propaganda.”¹²³

¹²⁰Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts...*, 161.

¹²¹*Ibid.*, 176.

¹²²*Ibid.*, 177.

¹²³*Ibid.*

The political turmoil that emerged in the after-occupation period was unyielding. Ernest H. Preeg, in his book *The Haitian Dilemma: A Case Study in Demographics, Development and U.S. Foreign Policy*, described the period from 1934 to 1957 as follows:

Following the departure of U.S. forces, the traditional elite renewed their efforts to control the country's political structure, particularly under President Elie Lescot (1940-1946). A ground-swell of support from several populist and nationalist movements carried the day for the election of President Dumarsais Estimé in 1946, but Estimé was unable to implement much of his reform program in the face of opposition from the Haitian senate and military. He was succeeded in 1950 by Paul Magloire, a charismatic black colonel who drew upon a broad base of political support and personal popularity. Opposition to Magliore steadily grew, however, and he was forced out of office in 1956. After 10 months of turbulence and violence, François "Papa Doc" Duvalier was elected president by a large majority vote on September 22, 1957.¹²⁴

In 1971, François Duvalier died and left control to his 19-year old son Jean-Claude, nicknamed "Baby Doc", who remained in power until 1986. The Duvalier family dictatorship would last a total of 29 years. US President John F. Kennedy's administration put forth vast efforts to bring François Duvalier down, but stopped short of a military intervention, which seemed to be the only method that could have achieved it. Instead, the US opted for a policy of coexistence as the Duvalier regime was neither a threat to US security nor an ally of Cuban leader Fidel Castro.¹²⁵

¹²⁴Ernest H. Preeg, *The Haitian Dilemma: A Case Study in Demographics, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1996), 14.

¹²⁵Maingot, *The United States and the Caribbean...*, 55.

CHAPTER THREE – THE UN INTERVENTION IN HAITI SINCE 2004

Introduction

The plight of the Haitian people recaptured the attention of the international community at the end of the consecutive Duvalier dictatorships. Now refocused on Haiti, six UN missions were launched to alleviate suffering and improve the conditions in the country. In posteriori, however, every mission was generally considered a failure despite having attained their mandates.¹²⁶ Each of these short-term attempts was deemed a failure as violence re-emerged soon after the missions departed and previous gains never held their roots. The country merely went from one crisis to another and successive governments could not implement clear strategies to overcome political, social and economic challenges. Violence and impasses could only be staved off through loose agreements.¹²⁷ The UN recognized that a long-term commitment and a robust multi-dimensional mission were needed and, in April 2004, launched the MINUSTAH mission.

This third chapter will examine the events leading up to the deployment of MINUSTAH, its nine year performance to date, and the progress made in the country since its arrival. A deeper study will be conducted of the Haitian government and MINUSTAH's abilities during this period to tackle Haiti's five major challenges: insecurity, political strife, governance, poverty and vulnerability. This section will argue that MINUSTAH has only managed to attain mixed results in support of the Haitian government, and it will be further demonstrated that no national

¹²⁶Namie Di Razza, *L'ONU en Haïti depuis 2004: Ambitions et déconvenues des opérations de paix multidimensionnelles* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2010), 14.

¹²⁷International Crisis Group, *Governing Haiti: Time for a National Consensus*, last accessed 8 February 2013, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/046-governing-haiti-time-for-national-consensus.aspx>, 1.

dialogue on the roots of the Haitian crisis have been advanced and no solutions to end them have so far been reached.¹²⁸ The imminent departure of MINUSTAH will place the nation at another critical juncture in its history: Will the departure of MINUSTAH mean a return to anarchy in Haiti?

The debacle in Haiti from 1986-2004

The Duvalier dynasty began to collapse in 1985 as Haitians grew impatient and revolted against the dictatorship. On 7 February 1986, President Jean-Claude Duvalier departed the country amid increasing discontent from the Haitian population and mounting international pressure, mostly from the Reagan Administration. The ensuing period from 1986 to 1990 was marked by a succession of “short-lived authoritarian regimes.”¹²⁹ The five different regimes that ruled during this time provided unrelenting political instability for the country.

Under the watchful eye of the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH), Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a black Catholic priest and political populist, was elected President of Haiti on 16 January 1990. Aristide managed to obtain 67.5% of the votes in the Presidential election, which were the first democratic elections ever held in the country’s history. Aristide had campaigned on the promise to fight the country’s corruption and to improve the lives of its poor.

Aristide’s hold on power, however, was short-lived and eight months later he was deposed by a military coup led by Army General Raoul Cedras. Aristide was forced into exile on 30 September 1991 and took up residence in the US. Reasons for the coup were numerous,

¹²⁸International Crisis Group, *Governing Haiti...*, 1.

¹²⁹Richard Haass, *Economic sanctions and American diplomacy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 57.

ranging from discontented senior officers who were losing their lavish lifestyles under President Aristide's clamp down on smuggling and drug running, to which they were heavily involved, to disagreement with Aristides's decision to make senior military appointments non-permanent.¹³⁰

The coup was one of the bloodiest in the history of Haiti and reportedly "1,500 people died, 40,000 fled the country and 200,000 to 300,000 left the capital for the safer countryside."¹³¹

International missions were sent to Haiti in order to observe and monitor the human rights situation following the coup. The first was a joint mission between the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) and was known as MICIVIH, from the French acronym for *Mission Civile Internationale en Haiti*. The volatile security situation forced the nearly 200 MICIVIH observers and staff to leave the country in October 1993, but the mission resumed in January 1994, only to be expelled again by the junta in July 1994. In the end, MICIVIH managed to effect small advances in human rights education and institution building, with special emphasis on the judiciary, prisons, and the new police force.

By early June 1993, negotiations with the junta for the return to constitutional order were not advancing well. On 16 June 1993, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted UN Security Council Resolution 841 which imposed an oil and arms embargo against Haiti in an attempt to restore constitutional rule. The embargo had limited effects and did not prove effective.¹³² Instead, it negatively affected a majority of Haitians who saw fuel prices rise dramatically and food staples became scarce, leading to malnutrition and eventually loss of life. It caused unnecessary degradation to the Haitian environment as more

¹³⁰Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood...*, 700.

¹³¹United Nations Development Program, *Case Study Haiti. Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-afflicted Countries* (New York: UN, 2006), 1.1.

¹³²Haass, *Economic sanctions and American diplomacy*, 71.

people were forced to use wood for fuel. The embargo did not occasion the desired uprising within the Haitian people or cause the opposition parties to overthrow the military regime. As a result, it only served to tighten the military regime's rule, causing a further deterioration of the humanitarian situation. An outward migration of Haitians propagated itself, causing tens of thousands to flee the island, mostly by boat towards the US, though the vast majority were forcibly repatriated.

As non-military options to solve the crisis began to dry up, the US eventually lost patience with the seemingly inadequate progress. On 19 September 1994, after three years of military rule, the US led a multinational military operation that ultimately precipitated the departure of the de facto military regime from Haiti. The UN Chapter VII operation had been previously sanctioned by UN Security Council in Resolution 940 of 31 July 1994. Fortunately military force was not required to remove the junta as a small diplomatic team, led by former US President Jimmy Carter, managed to convince a previously defiant General Cedras at the 11th hour to leave Haiti before an eventual Multinational Force (MNF) of 21,000 Americans landed in the country and alongside its coasts.¹³³ Known as *Operation Uphold Democracy*, its goals were to restore the legitimate constitutional government authorities of Haiti, establish and maintain a secure and stable environment, and prepare the ground for the eventual replacement by a UN mission known as the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).¹³⁴

The MNF and UNMIH interventions had limited success. President Aristide was rightly reinstated on 15 October 1994 and completed the remaining year of his term as President.

¹³³Robert B. Oakley, *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security* (Washington: National Defence University, 1998), 219.

¹³⁴United Nations Security Council, *United Nations Security Council Resolution 940* (New York: UN, 1994), 2.

UNMIH assumed full military control of the country on 31 March 1995 from the MNF and when the UNMIH mission was terminated in June 1996, it had succeeded in assisting the Haitian Government in conducting general elections in 1995. René Préval, a former agronomist and close associate of Aristide, won those elections and was sworn in as President on 7 February 1996. The UN mission also had some success in developing the fledgling Haitian National Police (HNP) as the sole force responsible for the country's internal security. This training was necessary as Aristide had previously disbanded the Haitian Armed Forces (FAd'H) by decree in 1995 due to the FAd'Hs relentless interference in Haitian politics and its responsibility in conducting incessant coups.

The MNF and UNMIH interventions also had several setbacks. The MNF occupation was not empowered to disarm Haitians nor was it permitted to intervene in Haitian-on-Haitian violence.¹³⁵ US soldiers essentially stood helpless as Haitian police continued to commit human rights abuses.¹³⁶ The envisioned end-state of each mission, no further international intervention required, could never be realized. "The multinational force[s] did little to bring permanent change to Haitian society,"¹³⁷ concluded a Center for Hemispheric Defence Studies (CHDS) research project that studied capacity building through Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti. The study further added that the various missions had focused their efforts in capacity building, but made "little headway in stopping political violence...[as these] missions did not seek to directly educate the Haitian people that political violence is not a legitimate means for change."¹³⁸

¹³⁵Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood...*, 717.

¹³⁶*Ibid.*

¹³⁷Fishel, *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping...*, 29.

¹³⁸*Ibid.*

Its mission concluded, UNMIH was succeeded by the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), which was followed by other UN operations - the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) and the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH). On 9 November 2000, the UN Secretary-General recommended the withdrawal of the last UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding presence in Haiti due to the lack of success.¹³⁹ Jean-Bertrand Aristide was re-elected to his second and last term as President in February 2001 after winning the December 2000 elections. International organizations and foreign diplomats, despite not having election observers present, considered these elections highly undemocratic as the main opposition party had boycotted them in protest, allowing Aristide's party to claim victory with over 91% of the votes, however with less than 10% voter turnout.¹⁴⁰

In just three years after being sworn into office, the violence instigated by Aristide supporters and the considerable corruption within his government, coupled with the murders of a number of Aristide opponents led to a large-scale uprising against President Aristide. The government eventually lost control over the northern portions of Haiti to rebel groups. Haiti's security situation from 2002 until 2004 was best described as:

...that of a frontier, not a nation-state, with numerous cases of murder, intimidation, bombings, and the fleeing of refugees. While many of the incidents were related to criminal activity, political violence was also prevalent. The police were either unwilling or unable to handle such situations; for example, on November 14, 2003, a number of law enforcement officials were swept away by a crowd of rock-throwing protesters at an anti-Aristide demonstration.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹Laura Zanotti, *Governing Disorder: UN Peace Operations, International Security, and Democratization in the post-Cold War Era* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), 100-101.

¹⁴⁰Canadian Foundation for the Americas, "Haiti After the 2000 Elections: Searching for Solutions to a Political Crisis," last accessed 23 February 2013, http://www.focal.ca/pdf/Haiti_post-election_Zaragoza_June%202001%20FPP-01-09.pdf, 6.

¹⁴¹Fishel, *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping...*, 28.

Despite most missions undertaken in Haiti having promising starts, “the Haitian security situation continued to worsen even with the numerous multinational military and civilian missions that had attempted to alter police practices since 1994.”¹⁴² The period from 1994 until 2004 was therefore marked by successive, yet unsuccessful military interventions. In the end, “it was only in 2004, after six UN missions that were generally considered to be failures, that the UN and the international community recognized that a long-term commitment and a robust multi-dimensional Security Council mandate were required”¹⁴³ to stabilize Haiti.

MINUSTAH 2004-2013

In early February 2004, violent skirmishes erupted in Gonaïves, the fourth-largest city in Haiti. Armed groups opposed to President Aristide rose up and fought against pro-government forces in order to extend their control throughout the northern departments of Haiti. Violence continued to escalate and by mid-February 2004, the rebels, bolstered with additional resources and former soldiers of the disbanded Haitian army, pressed forward with their campaign to dispose of Aristide. Several weeks later, Cap-Haïtien, Haiti’s second largest city, fell to anti-government rebels, as did much of the Central Plateau. By end February 2004, the rebels began to threaten the capital Port-au-Prince and the state was on the verge of collapse.¹⁴⁴

On 28 February 2004, President Aristide was flown out of the country by a US-leased aircraft, although the circumstances of Aristide’s departure remain disputed. Aristide himself maintained that he had been removed by a ‘coup’ perpetrated by the American, French and

¹⁴²Fishel, *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping...*, 28.

¹⁴³United Nations Development Program, *Case Study Haiti. Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-afflicted Countries* (New York: UN, 2006), Executive Summary.

¹⁴⁴Amélie Gauthier and Madalena Moita, “Vulnerability and causes of fragility in Haiti,” last accessed 22 February 2013, www.fride.org/download/IP_Haiti_final_ENG_Mar10.pdf, 2.

Canadian governments, subsequently compelled to resign, and eventually forced into exile in South Africa. The UN claims Aristide resigned¹⁴⁵ in order to prevent massive bloodshed and casualties,¹⁴⁶ while the US claimed Aristide's "failure to adhere to democratic principles...contributed to the deep polarization and violent unrest."¹⁴⁷

Seeing the potential for a massive outbreak of violence, the UN Security Council, on 29 February 2004, through UN Security Council Resolution 1529, authorized the three month deployment of a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to Haiti. The primary mission for the MIF was to contribute to a secure and stable environment throughout Haiti, facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and prepare for the establishment of a follow-on UN stabilization force.¹⁴⁸ Canada, Chile, France and the US initially provided 3,000 troops to the mission, which peaked at 3,700 troops.¹⁴⁹ After initially securing the capital, MIF forces began to secure the northern cities previously held by rebel groups. The MIF was able to calm the security situation but due to its "restricted resources and geographic areas of operation, limited disarmament activities...constrained its ability to address aspects of the insecurity...The MIF and the HNP coexist[ed] with the insurgents. Armed groups still control[ed] parts of some regions."¹⁵⁰ Despite this, the MIF, having reached the end of its 90-day mandate, prepared to transfer control to MINUSTAH on 1 June 2004.

Adopting Resolution 1542 on 30 April 2004, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council mandated MINUSTAH to contribute to a secure and stable environment in Haiti, to facilitate the provision of relief aid to those in need, and to help the Haitian police and

¹⁴⁵United Nations, *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1529* (New York: UN, 2004), 1.

¹⁴⁶Fishel, *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping*..., 41.

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 40.

¹⁴⁸United Nations, *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1529*, 2.

¹⁴⁹Fishel, *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping*..., 41.

¹⁵⁰United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti* (New York: UN, 16 April 2004), 7.

the Haitian Coast Guard maintain law and order and protect human rights.¹⁵¹ MINUSTAH's initial troop level was set at up to 6,700 military troops and a maximum of 1,622 Civilian Police (CIVPOL). It wasn't until 25 June 2004 that the MINUSTAH military component, now under Brazilian leadership, had built up its minimum military force strength in order to assume full command from the MIF. By the end of August 2004, approximately 3,000 MINUSTAH troops were operational throughout the country, with the majority coming from Latin American countries.

Security

Security is commonly considered the most predominant condition required in any peacekeeping mission. Security is defined as the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment, either through the implementation of a ceasefire, the separation of belligerent parties or the establishment of a buffer zone. By definition, the absence of violence, its avoidance or the maximum reduction of it has always been the focal point of peacekeeping.¹⁵²

From the outset of the mission, MINUSTAH and the HNP established a credible presence by initiating joint patrolling, which allowed for the security situation to improve slightly. While UN troop buildup continued through the fall of 2004, the security situation deteriorated when armed groups continued to confront and oppose the Transitional Government, which had assumed office by mid-March 2004. The month of October 2004 was particularly deadly in the capital when, during the course of numerous violent demonstrations and incidents, more than 60

¹⁵¹United Nations, *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1542* (New York: UN, 2004), 2-4.

¹⁵²Di Razza, *L'ONU en Haïti depuis 2004...*, 27.

people were killed, including 13 HNP officers, three of whom were beheaded.¹⁵³ Stability was only improved in the capital when the increased military and civilian police manpower allowed MINUSTAH, in cooperation with the HNP, to conduct successful security operations following the previous increase in violence.¹⁵⁴

Gang violence soon emerged as the predominant threat to security forces in late 2004 and in the early months of 2005. The security situation in the Port-au-Prince slums of Cité Soleil and Bel-Air was of particular concern. In response, MINUSTAH military battalions, CIVPOL and the HNP launched numerous operations to round up gang members, former Haitian soldiers, and criminals who had taken up refuge there.¹⁵⁵ These actions forced these groups to form alliances with one another and in order to finance their efforts, they undertook a systemic kidnapping for ransom campaign, an unfortunate secondary effect of the security crackdown. Despite robust efforts to curb violence and gang activity by MINUSTAH military units, CIVPOL and the HNP, four MINUSTAH soldiers were killed, several taken hostage but later released, and many had now become directly targeted by the armed groups themselves.

Another setback in the establishment of a safe and secure environment occurred in 2005 when a significant rise in kidnappings for ransom occurred, with over 160 reported between the months of June and September alone. In order to reduce this destabilizing development, MINUSTAH launched a massive operation on 6 July 2005 to apprehend a prominent gang leader, Emmanuel ‘Dread’ Wilmer, and his associates, who were holed up in the shantytown of Cité Soleil. Wilmer was killed in the ensuing operation, which was led by the Jordanian

¹⁵³United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 18 November 2004), 3.

¹⁵⁴United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 25 February 2005), 1.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 2-3.

contingent. A number of civilians were killed in the crossfire, however, the gangs themselves tried to make it appear that the UN had done so. Despite numerous investigations, no evidence to support either side has ever been produced; only the resentment by the occupants of Cité Soleil increased towards the UN.

Kidnappings peaked at 241 for the month of December 2005.¹⁵⁶ It was only when the MINUSTAH military force finally attained its maximum authorized strength that same month and with its force now fully operational throughout the country, that it managed to instill a relatively stable level of security throughout. Combined operations conducted between MINUSTAH and the HNP managed to rescue some of the kidnapping victims and apprehend more gang members, but MINUSTAH suffered another five fatalities in their conduct. Security further deteriorated in July 2006, with the killing of 22 civilians, including women and children, through inter-gang rivalry.¹⁵⁷

The overall security environment in Haiti during the period between 2006 and 2010 remained relatively stable. Much of the violence continued to be centered in the capital, with isolated incidents in various cities throughout the country caused by destabilizing forces. Areas that were previously under gang control were now being restored under state authority. Anti-government demonstrations began to increase by mid-2007 and were prominently focused on the rising cost of living.¹⁵⁸ Increasingly violent protests sprang out throughout the entire country in

¹⁵⁶United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 2 February 2006), 5.

¹⁵⁷United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 28 July 2006), 3-4.

¹⁵⁸United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 26 March 2008), 4.

April 2008 as economic conditions deteriorated, and could only be quelled with a full-scale mobilization of all security forces to quell them, the largest predominantly in Port-au-Prince.¹⁵⁹

MINUSTAH forces were often accused of committing abuses during their deployment to Haiti. The incident which was the most detrimental to the mission's credibility occurred in September 2011 when a number of MINUSTAH soldiers within the Uruguayan Naval Contingent were discharged from the mission when it was revealed that they abused and used degrading behavior against a young Haitian.¹⁶⁰ Brazilian Peacekeepers, the largest and arguably the most robust contingent in Haiti, have routinely been accused by Haitians of abuse and excessive use of force in the conduct of their operations.¹⁶¹ Haitians often complain of being pepper-sprayed and their identification confiscated, in complete violation of Haitian's human rights.¹⁶² These instances have caused a significant amount of resentment of the mission by everyday Haitians.

Politics and Governance

On 29 February 2004, as President Aristide had departed Haiti, an interim President had to be confirmed in accordance with the constitutional rules of succession. Boniface Alexandre, then the President of the Supreme Court, was selected to form a transitional government. On 17 March 2004, Gérard Latortue was selected to be the Prime Minister who formed a 13-member cabinet. In it he chose members for their professional competence, essentially 'technocrats,'

¹⁵⁹ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 27 August 2008), 4.

¹⁶⁰ MINUSTAH, "United Nations Zero Tolerance policy on abuse," last accessed 24 February 2013, <http://minustah.org/?p=31805>.

¹⁶¹ Canada Haiti Action Network, "New Case of Abuse, Torture by MINUSTAH Soldiers (Brazil)," last accessed 24 February 2013, <http://www.canadahaitiaction.ca/content/new-case-abuse-torture-minustah-soldiers-brazil>.

¹⁶² Haiti Liberté, "Reflections Following a Delegation: How MINUSTAH Hurts Haiti," last accessed 24 February 2013, <http://www.haiti-liberte.com/archives/volume5-14/Reflections.asp>.

rather than by any party affiliation. Despite this, there were some political parties, namely Arisitide's former party *Fanmi Lavalas*, who questioned the legitimacy of this transitional government. There was a level of general agreement, however, on future political transition and it was decided that municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections would be held in 2005, culminating in the peaceful installment of a new President in February 2006. The transitional government managed to appoint a Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to organize these elections, but nonetheless sought the assistance of MINUSTAH to conduct them. These initial steps by the government were of limited success.

On the anniversary of their first year in office, the transitional government continued to receive criticism by leading political and civil society groups for their perceived failure to deliver demonstrable results.¹⁶³ They argued that the government had yet to address any substantive concerns facing the country and failed to offer a clear vision for the future beyond the upcoming 2005 elections. As such, the political class remained polarized.¹⁶⁴

Before the fall elections in 2005, the UN had assessed that Haiti's state institutions remained characteristically weak. Although the transition government was putting forth its best efforts, a lack of resources at the local level was preventing those authorities from exercising their functions.¹⁶⁵ Canadian Colonel Jacques Morneau, former military Chief of Staff of the MINUSTAH mission in 2005, offered that "consequently, basic services such as road maintenance, electricity, running water, water purification, health and education are not available

¹⁶³United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 13 May 2005), 1.

¹⁶⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 6 October 2005), 2.

to many Haitians.”¹⁶⁶ Due to unpreparedness and technical reasons, the transitional authorities had to postpone the scheduled elections. Presidential and first-round legislative elections were finally held on 7 February 2006, and voters went to the polls that day amid a fragile security environment. MINUSTAH troops largely provided security and logistical support, chiefly through the delivery of all sensitive electoral material to and from voting centres in order to prevent ballot fraud. On 14 February 2006, the CEP still had not proclaimed a winner and was perplexed with the unusually high proportion of blank ballots received. The CEP decided to distribute them pro rata among all the candidates, which essentially gave René Préal his second presidency with a 51.21% majority. This result was criticized politically but never legally challenged and Préal was sworn in as President on 14 May 2006.¹⁶⁷

Préal’s second term as President did not produce many noteworthy achievements, despite being engaged intensively by successive UN Special Representative’s to Haiti. Préal continued to try to reach out to political groups and to strengthen state institutions, however the UN Secretary-General reported in 2008 that “the political situation remain[ed] fragile given the continued political divisions and weak State institutions, as well as the absence of any significant improvement in the difficult living conditions of much of the population.”¹⁶⁸ There were visible tensions between the Government and Parliament, none more prevalent than in April 2008 when the Haitian Senate voted to censure the Government of Jacques-Edouard Alexis, whom Préal had designated as Prime Minister in 2006. While it took four months of negotiations to find a replacement for Alexis, this political infighting allowed for no functioning government to run the

¹⁶⁶Yasmine Shamsie and Andrew S. Thompson, editors, *Haiti: Hope for a Fragile State* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006), 71.

¹⁶⁷United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 28 July 2006), 2.

¹⁶⁸United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 26 March 2008), 1.

country during that time. Violent demonstrations soon broke out over rising food prices which the UN described as:

...an expression of public frustration sparked by the rapid escalation in the global prices of basic commodities, which imposed severe hardship on the country's poor. However, as events unfolded, it became apparent from the level and scale of the demonstrations that they were being deliberately manipulated to serve a variety of political, criminal or financial objectives.¹⁶⁹

The protests only subsided when President Préval appealed for calm and announced a short-term program to subsidize the cost of rice and an emergency plan to cut food prices. Préval, however, was largely seen as lacking the political will to improve government structures, such as the justice sector. Préval was always fearful of being removed from office, and after five years as President, he never appointed a President of the Court of Appeal, which according to the constitution, was the first official in line to succeed the President. By refusing to appoint a new President of the Appeal Court, this ensured that no one could replace him. This sort of indecision paralyzed the justice system, which as a whole continued to deteriorate. Arbitrary preventive detentions, whereby Haitians could be detained for minor offences for months or even years, continued to plague the system further. The chronically overcrowded Haitian prison system as well continued to worsen and petty criminals could usually be found locked up alongside hardened ones and murderers. Corrupt judges also continuously freed criminals days after the police arrested them. Corruption in Haiti remains endemic to the country which was ranked 165th of 174 countries in the 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index.¹⁷⁰ “The Government of Haiti has made incremental progress in enforcing public accountability and transparency, but substantive

¹⁶⁹United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 27 August 2008), 1.

¹⁷⁰Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2012,” last accessed 23 February 2013, <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results>.

institutional reforms are still needed.”¹⁷¹ One of the biggest problems is with the Haitian laws that combat corruption. “The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; however, the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity,”¹⁷² opined GlobalSecurity.org, a leading source for reliable news and security information.

The effect of these actions only served to demoralize the rank and file of the HNP, whose mission as a supportive force to the government is to help enforce the rule of law.¹⁷³ The HNP had approximately 6,300 officers in 2004 and through the implementation of several development plans under MINUSTAH’s direct supervision and CIVPOL mentoring, HNP ranks surpassed 10,000 officers by December 2011. Arguably the ablest of Haiti’s institutions, the performance of the HNP continued to improve yet it is still not in a position to assume full responsibility for the provision of internal security throughout the country.¹⁷⁴ The quality of Haitian police personnel is continually scrutinized by MINUSTAH CIVPOL personnel in order to ensure international standards for the enforcement of laws is met. The latest HNP Development Plan aims to achieve a minimum of 15,000 serving police officers by 2016, which will serve as a benchmark for MINUSTAH’s eventual withdrawal from Haiti.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹GlobalSecurity.org, “Haiti: Corruption,” last accessed 28 February 2013, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/haiti/corruption.htm>.

¹⁷²*Ibid.*

¹⁷³Office of the Prime Minister, *Haitian National Police Development Plan 2012-2016* (Port-au-Prince, 31 August 2012), 10.

¹⁷⁴United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 31 August 2012), 3.

¹⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 3, 17.

Poverty

Poverty affects a large majority of Haitians and the country has for some time been labeled the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. In 2004, 56% of its population lived on less than \$1 per day making it not only the poorest country in Latin America, but also the most unequal in a region that is already the most unequal in the world.¹⁷⁶ The proportion of Haitians living in poverty significantly increased since the end of the Duvalier era as the socio-economic and political situation in Haiti deteriorated.¹⁷⁷ The Human Development Index (HDI), as a summary measure of human development, measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life (health), access to knowledge (education) and a decent standard of living (income).¹⁷⁸ In 2004, Haiti was ranked 153rd of 177 countries on the HDI which placed it in the category of ‘Low Human Development.’¹⁷⁹ At the outset of MINUSTAH’s mandate in 2004, the UN described the humanitarian situation in Haiti as follows:

Haiti’s socio-economic indicators are particularly bleak, with an extreme division between rich and poor and a small middle class...Chronic malnutrition affects some 51 per cent of the population, with two thirds of children under five suffering from anemia...There has been a sharp decline in food security due to the disruption of distribution mechanisms...The provision of health services, including emergency hospital services, has been disrupted due to the lack of security.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁶Pal Sletten and Willy Egset, “Poverty in Haiti,” last accessed 21 February 2013, <http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/755/755.pdf>, 9.

¹⁷⁷Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, *Haiti Poverty Map. 2004 version* (Port-au-Prince, 2004), 6.

¹⁷⁸United Nations Development Program, “Human Development Index,” last accessed 21 February 2013, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/>.

¹⁷⁹United Nations Development Program, “Human Development Report 2004: Cultural liberty in today’s diverse world,” last accessed 21 February 2013, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr04_complete.pdf, 142.

¹⁸⁰United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti* (New York: UN, 16 April 2004), 13.

MINUSTAH responded immediately to this crisis by attempting to address its roots with a short-term humanitarian response and long-term development effort.¹⁸¹ It sought international assistance to support its programs and activities in order to ensure the availability of food and restore public health. The Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) supported MINUSTAH on humanitarian matters and fulfilled the role of humanitarian and civil-military coordinator.¹⁸²

Despite these noble efforts and the passing of nine years, a significant humanitarian crisis continues to afflict Haiti today. In 2011, Haiti ranked 158th of 179 countries on the HDI with only sub-Saharan African nations lagging behind it,¹⁸³ less Afghanistan, which placed 172nd.¹⁸⁴ In 2012 MINUSTAH reported that 21% of Haiti's population continued to live in food insecurity and 500,000 of the most vulnerable people required immediate assistance to survive. These dire needs are beyond the capacities of the government to address¹⁸⁵ and international donor assistance is beginning to dry up. MINUSTAH reported that shortfalls in humanitarian funding throughout 2011 and 2012 "have reduced response capacities to the extent that there are insufficient means under current conditions to meet existing humanitarian needs."¹⁸⁶ It is believed that close to 3 million of Haiti's population of 9.8 million (estimate July 2012),¹⁸⁷ will continue to live in need in 2013.

¹⁸¹United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti* (New York: UN, 16 April 2004), 14.

¹⁸²United Nations, *Interim report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 30 August 2004), 11.

¹⁸³Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty* (New York: Crown Business, 2012), 45.

¹⁸⁴United Nations Development Program, "Human Development Report 2011. Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All," last accessed 22 February 2013, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2011_EN_Complete.pdf, 129.

¹⁸⁵United Nations, "Fact Sheet: Haiti Moving Forward Step by Step – Humanitarian Action," last accessed 10 February 2013, http://minustah.org/pdfs/fact_sheet/factsheet2012-humanitarian-en.pdf, 1-2.

¹⁸⁶*Ibid.*, 2.

The Haitian economy has gone down in a tailspin over the past few decades.¹⁸⁷ The World Bank characterized that “in addition to facing high poverty levels, Haiti's development has historically been hampered by fragility and characterized by social fracture.”¹⁸⁸ An increase in investment confidence and a feeling of hope emerged in 2009 as the country seemed to begin to see some growth. All efforts, however, were soon dashed by the devastating earthquake that struck Haiti on 12 January 2010. This catastrophic natural disaster left Haiti's economy at a critical point. The World Bank's International Development Association and International Finance Corporation Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Haiti for FY13-FY14 concluded that for Haiti's economic future:

...much remains to be done to achieve rapid growth, see a significant improvement in the daily lives of Haitians, address vulnerability, achieve better human development outcomes, especially for women, and reduce very high poverty rates. Although growth prospects look positive, improved policies are needed for Haiti to begin achieving its economic potential and increase private sector investment. Resources and public private partnerships are required to rebuild important infrastructure and provide significantly expanded access to basic services. The generation of larger domestic revenues is also urgent to help prepare for the expected post-crisis drop in international financing over the coming years.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Haiti,” last accessed 22 February 2013, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html>.

¹⁸⁸British Broadcasting Corporation, “Haiti: An economic basket-case,” last modified 1 March 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3522155.stm>.

¹⁸⁹World Bank, “International Development Association and International Finance Corporation Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Haiti for FY13-FY14 September 27, 2012,” last accessed 23 February 2013, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/09/14/000333037_20120914004408/Rendored/PDF/718850ISNOP1310Official0Use0Only090.pdf, 8.

¹⁹⁰*Ibid.*, 6.

Vulnerability

Many academics and experts have primarily categorized Haiti as a fragile state.¹⁹¹ In 2012, Foreign Policy ranked Haiti as the seventh highest failed state in the world.¹⁹² Discussion aside on whether it is a failed or fragile state, Haiti is “a highly vulnerable country. Only a few countries are both vulnerable and fragile, but Haiti is a clear example where both have aggravated human conditions and weakened the state for many decades.”¹⁹³ Gauthier and Moita, in their March 2010 FRIDE Project Report entitled *Vulnerability and causes of fragility in Haiti*, further wrote that “vulnerability is usually based on economic and environmental exposure to outside forces.” They additionally wrote that “each individual state is vulnerable to phenomena beyond its control...[and] not only do they demonstrate the country’s vulnerability, they also simultaneously expose the state’s inability to respond to them.”

Global climate change has increased the frequency and the power of the natural disasters as seen in those that have recently struck Haiti. Since 2004, Haitians have suffered tremendously and the devastating effects caused by these disasters have claimed countless lives. Flooding in the southern parts of Haiti in May 2004 killed some 1,261 people, although a final death toll was likely twice as high.¹⁹⁴ Haiti’s location in the Caribbean makes it vulnerable to hurricanes whose tracks have a tendency to run across its southern peninsula and out to sea between the months of August to October every year.¹⁹⁵ Tropical Storm Jeanne hit the north-western portions of the island in September 2004 claiming more than 3,000 lives, affecting 300,000, and destroying

¹⁹¹Gauthier and Moita, “Vulnerability and causes of fragility in Haiti,” 2.

¹⁹²Foreign Policy, “Failed State Index 2012,” last accessed 23 February 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive.

¹⁹³Gauthier and Moita, “Vulnerability and causes of fragility in Haiti,” 2.

¹⁹⁴United Nations, *Interim report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 30 August 2004), 11.

¹⁹⁵Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood...*, 4.

4,628 homes, especially in the city of Gonaives.¹⁹⁶ Tropical Storm Isaac and Hurricane Sandy, which passed over Haiti in the fall of 2012, induced a nutritional crisis as the storms caused a worsening of the food security situation. Every time a natural disaster occurred, MINUSTAH troops were needed to support relief operations by providing security and logistical support to humanitarian relief activities. This also meant that MINUSTAH troops were not conducting their primary security function while assisting those in need.

Late in the afternoon of 12 January 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck the area west of Port-au-Prince. According to the Haitian government, the official toll of the quake was estimated at 316,000 dead.¹⁹⁷ Up to one third of Haiti's civil servants perished, many government buildings, including the Presidential Palace, were destroyed or damaged, 77 HNP officers died, and over 4,000 inmates escaped from the National Penitentiary.¹⁹⁸ 102 members of MINUSTAH also died, including the UN Head of Mission. Most UN staff were killed in the collapse of their headquarters building in Port-au-Prince. Scientists blamed a previously undiscovered fault line for the tremor,¹⁹⁹ yet this was not the first major earthquake to hit Haiti. Earthquakes in 1751 and 1770 were reported by historians to have completely leveled almost every building in Port-au-Prince. In 1842, an estimated 8.1 magnitude earthquake struck near Cap-Haitien, killing approximately 5,000 people and severely damaging King Henri Christophe's palace. The 2010 earthquake displaced approximately 1.5 million who required resettlement in over 1,500 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps throughout the country.

¹⁹⁶Mark Schuller and Pablo Morales, *Tectonic Shifts: Haiti since the Earthquake 1st ed* (Sterling: Kumarian Press, 2012), 13.

¹⁹⁷Columbia Journalism Review, "Two Years Later, Haitian Earthquake Death Toll in Dispute," last modified 12 January 2012, http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/one_year_later_haitian_earthqu.php?page=all.

¹⁹⁸United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 22 February 2010), 1-2.

¹⁹⁹The Huffington Post, "Haiti Earthquake Fault: Previously Undetected Fault Line Responsible," last modified 14 August 2010. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/15/haiti-earthquake-fault-pr_n_682781.html.

The impact of the earthquake easily overwhelmed the response capacity of the Haitian government and MINUSTAH. A massive international rescue and relief operation mobilized itself immediately afterwards, and the rebuilding efforts to date have been progressing ever so slowly. Of the original 1.5 million people displaced and living in IDP camps, as of December 2012, 358,000 remain in camps and continue to face deteriorating living conditions.²⁰⁰ Mark Schuller and Pablo Morales, authors of the book *Tectonic Shifts: Haiti since the Earthquake*, described the full impact of the 2010 earthquake when they wrote:

Haiti will never be the same. The changes wrought by the disaster – social, political, economic – do indeed amount to shifts of a tectonic scale. It is no exaggeration to say that the earthquake permanently changed Haiti... Particularly, the quake exposed centuries of underdevelopment and recent economic policies, and their impact on social inequality and exclusion within Haiti.²⁰¹

The disaster forced President Préval to postpone the February 2010 legislative, presidential and municipal elections. This triggered a political dilemma as the mandates for all Deputies and one third of Senators were to expire, according to the constitution, after 10 May 2010.²⁰² Presidential and legislative elections were eventually held in late November 2010 with a significant amount of support and organization provided by MINUSTAH, international donors and observers. A second round of voting was required in March 2011 to determine the Presidential outcome as the OAS, who had monitored the elections, reviewed the first round results and forced the second place candidate to withdraw due to alleged fraud. This is indicative that democratic traditions are still not respected by the Haitian people and engrained within its institutions. Michel Martelly, a popular musician and businessman with no political background

²⁰⁰United Nations, “Fact Sheet: Haiti Moving Forward Step by Step – Humanitarian Action,” 2.

²⁰¹Schuller and Morales, *Tectonic Shifts*..., 1-2.

²⁰²United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 22 February 2010), 5.

had come in third in the first round of the election, until the OAS intervention. Martelly won the runoff election and was sworn into office on 14 May 2011. This marked the first time in Haiti's history that a peaceful transfer of power occurred from one president to another from a party in opposition.

The latest tragedy to hit Haiti occurred in October 2010, when the first confirmed case of cholera re-emerged after being absent from the country for nearly a century. As of 19 February 2013, over 645,000 cumulative cholera cases have been recorded and 8,020 deaths have occurred due to the epidemic.²⁰³ The cause of the outbreak is fiercely disputed: most Haitians believe the South Asian strain of the virus was introduced to the country by Nepalese peacekeepers when the fecal matter from their camp in Mirebalais was dumped into a tributary of the Artibonite River. A UN independent panel of experts investigated the circumstances and reported their findings in a report concluding that “the Haiti cholera outbreak was caused by a confluence of circumstances..., and was not the fault of, or deliberate action of, a group or individual.”²⁰⁴ Despite this verdict, many Haitians are extremely resentful and appalled by this gross act of negligence. Adding fuel to their already growing distrust of MINUSTAH, the UN Secretary-General announced in February 2013 that claims against the UN on the matter are “not receivable,” essentially citing diplomatic immunity.²⁰⁵

²⁰³Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Haiti: Cholera snapshot,” last modified 19 February 2013, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/hti_cholera_Snapshot_Feb2013.pdf.

²⁰⁴Independent Panel of Experts on the Cholera Outbreak in Haiti, “Final Report of the Independent Panel of Experts on the Cholera Outbreak in Haiti,” last accessed 23 February 2013, <http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/haiti/UN-cholera-report-final.pdf>, 29.

²⁰⁵UN News Centre, “Haiti: fight against cholera continues, but claims against UN ‘not receivable’,” last accessed 24 February 2013, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44197&Cr=haiti&Cr1=>.

An assessment of MINUSTAH's and the Haitian government's performance

Security in Haiti has improved since MINUSTAH's deployment as it is today not the state on the verge of collapse that it once was in February 2004, nor is it a perfectly peaceful nation, none of which exist. The three main and related challenges to reform Haiti's security sector, however, appear to have been overcome. They included "the volatile security situation and the limited ability of the state to assert its authority, the lack of consistent government commitment to police reform, and the low level of institutional development within the HNP."²⁰⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 2070 (2012), the resolution which extended MINUSTAH's mandate until 15 October 2013, described the overall security situation "while fragile has improved...and remained relatively stable," yet "not[ed] with concern an increase of homicides, particularly in major urban areas, and the continuing threat of criminal gangs."²⁰⁷ This same UN resolution also recognized the 'critical' role that MINUSTAH played in ensuring stability and security in Haiti, and further commended MINUSTAH for continuing to assist the Government of Haiti to ensure that secure and stable environment. Comparatively, of the 22 countries within the Caribbean sub region, Haiti reported the 4th highest amount of homicides committed on its territory with 689 in 2011, well behind the Dominican Republic with 2,472, Jamaica second at 1,428, and Puerto Rico third with 983.²⁰⁸

The reform and growth of the HNP has been seen as one of the major improvements during MINUSTAH's deployment. The Global Observatory was of the opinion that "the HNP may be the best functioning state institution in Haiti and can therefore arguably be considered

²⁰⁶K. Crane, et al., *Building a more Resilient Haitian State* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010), xvi-xvii.

²⁰⁷United Nations, *United Nations Security Council Resolution 2070* (New York: UN, 2012), 1.

²⁰⁸Office on Drugs and Crime, *2011 Global Study on Homicide: Trends, Contexts, Data* (Vienna: UN, 2011),

one of the few post-2004 crisis success stories.”²⁰⁹ President Martelly and his government fully committed themselves in June 2012 to police reform and to the development of the institution by pledging over \$1.3 billion, with international donor assistance, to the 2012-2016 HNP Development Plan.²¹⁰ MINUSTAH has worked almost hand-in-hand with the HNP to enhance its professionalism, develop institutional capacity and facilitate the establishment of necessary infrastructure.²¹¹ “The HNP is now both visible and active, day and night, including in former gang strongholds of the capital’s slums, and its reputation has also improved with its capacities and professionalism.”²¹²

In terms of growth, the HNP reported that in 2006 it possessed a police to population ratio of 0.76. At the end of June 2012, with just over 10,000 police officers in its ranks, it reported that it achieved a ratio of 1.05 police officers for every 1,000 Haitians. The HNP is striving for the end goal to attain at least 15,000 officers by 2016, possibly giving it a ratio of 1.36 officers to every 1,000 members of the population.²¹³ If all further recruitment and promotion can be achieved based on merit and not on the basis of political loyalty, then these goals could be reached.²¹⁴

MINUSTAH has also experienced a fair amount of setbacks throughout its deployment. The length of time it took MINUSTAH troops to deploy into the country following the MIF was

²⁰⁹The Global Observatory, “Where is the Haitian National Police Headed?” last accessed 24 February 2013, <http://www.theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/356-where-is-the-haitian-national-police-headed.html>.

²¹⁰Defend Haiti, “\$1.3 Billion Disposed to Reform Haitian National Police Force,” last accessed 24 February 2013, <http://www.defend.ht/politics/articles/presidential/3160-1-3-billion-disposed-to-reform-haitian-national-police-force>.

²¹¹United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 1 September 2009), 7.

²¹²The Global Observatory, “Where is the Haitian National Police Headed?”

²¹³Office of the Prime Minister, *Haitian National Police Development Plan 2012-2016* (Port-au-Prince, 31 August 2012), 9, 13.

²¹⁴Isabelle Fortin and Yves-François Pierre, “Haiti et la reforme de la Police Nationale d’Haiti,” last accessed 24 February 2013, <http://www.nsi-ins.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/2008-Haiti-et-la-reforme-de-la-PNH.pdf>, 26.

perhaps the reason for the spike in violence at the beginning of the mission and allowed for the worsening of the security situation.²¹⁵ Despite robust actions to counter gang violence and illegally armed groups, real progress to address the security situation could never be realized until a suitable disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme was established.²¹⁶ For this reason, an abundant amount of weapons remain in the possession of destabilizing forces such as ex-FAd'H members, criminals, and gang members to name a few.

In March 2012, former FAd'H members with some of their new recruits emerged from hiding and illegally occupied former military sites throughout the country. They appeared prepared to collect on President Martelly's campaign promise that he would re-create the Haitian Army once elected. They also demanded the disbursement of severance payments since the 1995 disbandment of the FAd'H under President Aristide. The UN and many foreign diplomats were manifestly against Martelly's mention of re-creating the Army, having never forgotten the former Haitian military's history for violence, corruption and abuse of human rights.²¹⁷ They also forewarned President Martelly that they would not provide monetary assistance if he ever decided to re-create the Haitian Army. Visibly armed while conducting their military exercises at these former military outposts, the Martelly Government decided to negotiate with these ex-FAd'H members rather than forcibly intervene to evict them. In April 2012, another visibly armed group assembled in front of the Parliament to request an audience with legislators to discuss their demands.²¹⁸ In May 2012, the HNP, with MINUSTAH's support vacated the ten

²¹⁵Fishel, *Capacity Building for Peacekeeping*..., 47.

²¹⁶United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 13 May 2005), 14.

²¹⁷Foreign Policy in Focus, "Don't Recreate Haiti's Army," last accessed 24 February 2013, http://www.fpif.org/articles/dont_recreate_haitis_army.

²¹⁸United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 31 August 2012), 1.

main sites occupied by former soldiers throughout the country without incident.²¹⁹ This latest problem for the Haitian government, however, does not seem to have been resolved. In November 2012, the Haitian government was preoccupied again with the expectation of the re-emergence of the group and issued a formal warning to demonstrate its resolve to keep the peace in the streets of the major cities within Haiti.²²⁰

Haiti has unfortunately not been able to overcome its deep rooted political cleavages during MINUSTAH's deployment. In fact, Haiti's habit of zero-sum politics continues to severely impact the country's fragile security and stability to this day.²²¹ The UN Secretary-General, in his last report on Haiti before this paper was completed, declared that the "continued disagreements between the executive branch and opposition parliamentarians contributed to quasi-paralysis at the political level."²²² With just under two years into President Martelly's term, continued political stalemates and standoffs have hindered the desperately needed changes deemed so necessary when Martelly took office. Martelly initially hit a major snag in the appointment of his first ever Prime Minister and "the government stalled for over four months as parliament failed to ratify two consecutive nominees for prime minister, before confirming Martelly's third pick, Garry Conille, on October 4, 2011."²²³ Conille later resigned after only

²¹⁹United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 31 August 2012), 2.

²²⁰Military.com, "Haiti's Government Issues Warning to Ex-Soldiers," last accessed 24 February 2013, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/11/24/haitis-government-issues-warning-to-ex-soldiers.html>.

²²¹International Crisis Group, *Governing Haiti...*, i.

²²²United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 8 March 2013), 1.

²²³Human Rights Watch, *Haiti: Country Summary January 2012*, last accessed 8 April 2013, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/haiti_2012.pdf.

four months in post, after weeks of mounting tension between himself and President Martelly, and the loss of confidence by the ministers in his cabinet.²²⁴

There has been little progress as well “in the strengthening of rule of law institutions, the adoption of key legislation and the establishment of the Permanent Electoral Council mandated to organize long-overdue elections,”²²⁵ the latest UN report also explained. The stalemates that persisted and the strained relations between the executive branch and the parliament fuelled allegations that the current Martelly government was conducting itself in an un-democratic manner, notably those Haitian state institutions, such as the judiciary and the HNP, were becoming politicized.²²⁶ These allegations arose from the seemingly questionable and repetitive dismissals of senior and mid-level managers within in these organizations. Until a consensus can be reached, which appears unlikely as Martelly continues to struggle to develop a stable political base, there will be no accord on the setting of priorities nor a strategy for achieving them.²²⁷

The earthquake which affected Haiti on 12 January 2010 was not simply a natural disaster, but also unearthed flaws on a human level. The majority of the structures that fell during the earthquake were those that were not built with proper framing. This leads to one of Haiti’s fundamental problems, that of governance.²²⁸ Since 2004, Haiti has been challenged to improve its governance capacity and the state has largely remained ineffective due to “limited financial resources, the lack of skilled, trained, and properly organized government personnel and the lack

²²⁴The New York Times, “Haiti’s Prime Minister Quits After 4 Months,” last accessed 9 April 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/world/americas/garry-conille-resigns-as-haitis-prime-minister.html?_r=0.

²²⁵United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* (New York: UN, 8 March 2013), 1.

²²⁶*Ibid.*, 2.

²²⁷International Crisis Group, *Governing Haiti...*, i.

²²⁸Crane, *et al.*, *Building a more Resilient Haitian State*, 1.

of management systems within ministries and other government bodies.”²²⁹ In 2012, MINUSTAH recounted in its end-of-year report that “State revenues barely cover the operational needs of ministries and only allow for limited investment. Access to state services generally remains highly insufficient and varies greatly from one region to another.”²³⁰ The primary reason for this is that Haiti’s government has remained centralized in Port-au-Prince, and the civil service remains disorganized.²³¹ There is no doubt that the 2010 earthquake severely affected government operations and this weakened institutional governance remains in place today. For example, the municipal elections that were to have been held in February 2010 have not yet been organized as the Permanent Electoral Council (CEP) has still not yet been formed. Laura Zanotti, a former political officer working for the UN, in her book *Governing Disorder: UN Peace Operations, International Security, and Democratization in the post-Cold War Era*, summarized the UN efforts to reform Haiti as follows:

Notwithstanding its ambitions, the UN program of reform did not achieve what it promised. Contrary to democratic peace predictions, promoting peace, democracy, and development through processes of state building patterned on Western Europe’s political imaginary faced defeat in Haiti. The establishment of costly institutions combined with the lack of international financial support to the government strained the economy, fostered internal disorder and political turmoil, reinforced international conditionality, contribute to the leverage of nonstate actors with economic powers (such as drug dealers), created trade-offs with alternative uses of resources, and stifled instead of promoting the creation of a viable local economy.²³²

²²⁹Crane, *et al.*, *Building a more Resilient Haitian State*, xv.

²³⁰MINUSTAH, “Haiti Moving Forward Step By Step 2012,” last accessed 24 February 2013, http://minustah.org/pdfs/fact_sheet/factsheet2012-haiti-moving-forward.pdf, 8.

²³¹Crane, *et al.*, *Building a more Resilient Haitian State*, 30-34.

²³²Zanotti, *Governing Disorder...*, 104.

CHAPTER FOUR – HAITI POST-MINUSTAH

Introduction

In February 2013, the International Crisis Group, an esteemed political think tank, summarized the situation that Haiti now faces as “a race against time to convince its own people, donors and potential investors that progress and stability are achievable.”²³³ Many in the press and politicians have concluded that Haiti’s poverty and political instability has been caused by its ‘poor leadership,’ and lack of ‘democratic traditions’ and isolation due to geography and language.²³⁴ In the early 1930’s US politicians grew frustrated with the country and instead adopted a stance that it was a broken country yet managed to accomplish many of their self-serving needs in the nineteen years that they occupied it.

This chapter will close this paper by carrying out a comparison of both Haitian interventions in order to demonstrate that a transition to post-MINUSTAH Haiti is not feasible in the short-term and should only occur in the long-term based on that comparison. As the UN has decided to initiate plans for the eventual withdrawal from the country, will the difficult nine-year gains made by MINUSTAH and the Haitian government be quickly swept away once MINUSTAH leaves the country?

²³³International Crisis Group, *Governing Haiti...*, i.

²³⁴Chin, *et al.*, *Haiti: A Slave Revolution...*, v.

Comparing Interventions

Several days after the resignation of President Aristide in 2004, Secretary-General of the UN Kofi Annan stressed the need for a long-term mission to get things right in Haiti. Annan wrote an article published in the *Wall Street Journal* that “the most important lesson [coming out of Haiti] is that there can be no quick exit. Haiti will need our resources and our support for a long time.” He further added that “a long-term effort – ten years or more – is needed.”²³⁵ Similarly, the US, when it first occupied Haiti, put in place a treaty with the Haitian government with an initial term that lasted ten years. When the conditions of the agreement were not met during the first term, the treaty was renewed for another ten years.²³⁶ Although no reason for the choice of ten years was given, one can interpret the US’ decision to insert a clause to have the occupation extended for they were convinced that the terms of the agreement could never be accomplished during the first term. The Americans had correctly concluded that Haiti needed a long period of supervision.²³⁷ They recognized the immense nature of the task before them and immediately applied to have the terms of the agreement reflect this condition. Their evaluation of the need for a long-term commitment was accurate, as was Annan’s.

As one can expect, the former UN Secretary-General and US authorities in Haiti were cognizant of the country’s history and its inability to manage short-term results. The first US occupation of Haiti lasted nineteen years. The MINUSTAH mission has now go on for nine. The UN had originally intended for MINUSTAH to depart in 2011 at the end of President Préval’s

²³⁵Kofi Annan, “Haiti needs long term international help,” *Wall Street Journal*, March 16, 2004.

²³⁶United States Senate, *Treaty with Haiti. Treaty between the United States and Haiti. Finances, Economic Development and Tranquility of Haiti* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1922), 9.

²³⁷Millett, *Semper Fidelis...*, 203.

second term,²³⁸ however the devastating earthquake of 2010 reset the countdown clock on MINUSTAH's mission termination. Despite this, the UN seems to have now selected 2016 as its departure date as evidenced by the press statement made on 17 October 2012 by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Haiti at the time, Chilean diplomat Mariano Fernández Amunátegui, who stated:

...in the Secretary General's report, which was approved by the Security Council, it was said that if the conditions continues to be stable as it is now, we will try to redefine the functions of the MINUSTAH within 3 to 4 years to transform it into a political mission, perhaps depending on the circumstances.²³⁹

A political mission is a departure from what the two interventions had intended from the beginning as both involvements were multi-dimensional in nature. The US occupiers had taken control of the five key sectors in Haiti: the Gendarmerie, customs, finances, public health, and infrastructures. MINUSTAH has also operated with this much broader emphasis. It attempted to “address many of the systemic issues that plague the country while also protecting the dignity of the Haitian people and promoting human rights.”²⁴⁰ The one-dimensional political mission that Mr. Fernández proposed, while a likely course of action for the UN post-MINUSTAH, will not provide a deterrent against domestic insurrections or coups. Used mostly as a cost saving measure, the UN is conducting thirteen of these political missions around the world as of 31 December 2012.²⁴¹ Simply put, these missions aim to oversee longer term peace-building activities,²⁴² but will depend on state security forces to provide for its security.

²³⁸Richard Caplan, *Exit Strategies and State Building* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 130.

²³⁹Haitilibre.com, “Haiti - Security : The Minustah in Haiti for another few years,” last accessed 26 February 2013, <http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-6914-haiti-security-the-minustah-in-haiti-for-another-few-years.html>.

²⁴⁰Jorge Heine and Andrew S. Thompson, *Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and beyond* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2011), 250.

²⁴¹United Nations, “UN Political and Peacebuilding Missions Fact Sheet – 31 December 2012,” last accessed 27 February 2013,

Events in Haiti have historically been violent and this was the strongest similarity and greatest motive for both interventions. US Marines were called to deploy in order to quell the violence that had gripped the nation in 1915. The revolution led by Dr. Bobo from the northern cities had moved southward and ventured into the capital. The caco rebellion that erupted in the years after the US occupation had likewise originated in the north. In 2004, anti-government rebels took control of the northern parts of the country and began to move onto the capital as well. These three revolutions and insurrections predominantly had grown in the northern departments of Haiti. It marked a resemblance to the divide that had occurred during the post-independence period when the country was more or less divided along north-south lines governed by Henri Christophe and Alexandre Pétion. The 1915 and 2004 revolutions grew from the discord that existed towards the centralized government in Port-au-Prince. Many Haitians in the outlying regions have a particular hatred for the elite who govern from the capital. They distrust the authorities in power and react negatively to what they view as government corruption, a lack of provision of basic services, and the continuous political turmoil which allows for very little progress. Although it resembled the north-south divide this time, demonstrations and protests often arise throughout the country. The protests that caused the 1929 ‘Cayes Massacre’ occurred in Les Cayes, one of the largest cities in the south. Similarly, daily protests occur in Port-au-Prince and are often aimed at the extractive government, which often gives very little back to its people. The separation between Haiti’s elite and peasant class had simply come to a critical juncture. This divide needs to be addressed and corrected as revolts and

http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/Pol_miss_Fact%20Sheet%20December%20012%20E.pdf.

²⁴²Department of Political Affairs, “Field Operations and Good Offices Missions,” last accessed 27 February 2013, http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/about/field_operations.

protests of this kind will likely continue in the future. They will only become more violent if the more capable MINUSTAH forces leave the country. The Haitian masses will continue to rise up, like they did in the past, against their government if it continues to misgovern the country and cannot address the political, economic, vulnerability, security and poverty issues that it will face. This was clearly evident during the period immediately after the first US occupation until the Duvalier era commenced.

Namie Di Razza, a specialist in peacekeeping issues, correctly proclaimed in 2010 that “Haiti is neither in a situation of open conflict, nor in a situation of deeply entrenched peace, but in a grey zone, where the balance is susceptible to lean to one side or the other, and where this precarious balance is held by the presence of regulating peacekeepers.”²⁴³ This situation bears a striking resemblance to the security situation which reigned over Haiti during the US occupation. US Marines had also, after an initial period of counter-insurgency operations, managed to deter destabilizing forces and evoked public order. MINUSTAH has been able to project itself as a dissuasive force which prevents the country from falling back into chaos, by guaranteeing, through the potential use of force, an installment of a minimal state of rights and public order.²⁴⁴ Likewise during both interventions, “both reduced the security dilemma by putting an end to the anarchy. Both interventions installed a new viable State. Both interventions raised the cost of using violence as an option, and deterred those who rationally thought about its consequences before using it.”²⁴⁵

Future investment and growth in Haiti require a solid foundation if they are to occur. Paul Collier wrote in the book *Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and beyond*, that “the necessary foundation

²⁴³Di Razza, *L'ONU en Haïti depuis 2004...*, 167.

²⁴⁴*Ibid.*

²⁴⁵*Ibid.*

for such investment is security; this is what MINUSTAH has provided.”²⁴⁶ Likewise, the US Marines in Haiti stabilized the security situation to permit a semblance of government productivity. This is the basis for the argument that a continued deployment of UN forces are needed to maintain the peace throughout Haiti. A complete withdrawal of UN troops and CIVPOL will send a signal to those destabilizing forces in Haiti who will return to their old methods of ruling themselves. If UN peacekeepers leave Haiti, the security situation will likely plummet as the balance of power will be extended towards armed groups that will prospectively use this opportunity to impose their will. Revolts will likely gather renewed momentum as deep socio-economic divides continue to fester as a prominent problem. This will lead to a worsening of the security situation which will eventually delve the country into further chaos. The HNP, despite all the mentoring and logistic support provided by MINUSTAH and international donors, will not be able to provide the necessary security that it envisions in its latest development plan. Arthur Boutellis, a Research Fellow at the International Peace Institute, wrote an article in September 2012 for the Global Observatory entitled *Where is the Haitian National Police Headed?* In it he described the future prospects for the HNP as follows:

While the HNP may be the best functioning state institution in Haiti, it is still relatively small and is not yet in a position to assume full responsibility for the provision of internal security over the whole Haitian territory. (As a basis of comparison—although not necessarily a model—neighboring Dominican Republic’s national police force is 32,000 strong supported by an army of 65,000, for a population roughly the same size). But numbers are not everything, and the HNP may still be lacking the strong middle and senior managers needed to resist inevitable attempts of manipulation and politicization of the institution. It may be time to revisit the lessons from the first UN-supported attempt to build a professional Haitian police, following the 1994 intervention. Despite promising early efforts to recruit, vet, and train a police force, these did not take hold, and

²⁴⁶Heine and Thompson, *Fixing Haiti...*, xvi.

the police became politicized and corrupt by the time the UN mission withdrew in 2000.²⁴⁷

If external investment is the key to Haiti's future and security is the foundation for that investment, it is argued that outside investors will begin to lose confidence if the security situation were to deteriorate after the departure of MINUSTAH. If the Government of Haiti and the HNP cannot control the security situation adequately by themselves, then it becomes less plausible that outside investors will continue to devote their resources, and their commitment towards the country will fade. As well, the effects of future natural disasters will quickly surpass the capacity of the Government of Haiti and their national police force to respond.

MINUSTAH's capacities, especially its engineering, medical and logistical specialties will not be replicated by the HNP. MINUSTAH's manpower and logistic capacities will be at the forefront when Haiti returns to the polls in 2016 to select a new president. During the 2010 first round and 2011 runoff elections, the majority of MINUSTAH troops and CIVPOL, plus the full complement of the HNP force were required to provide the minimal level of security at 1,500 voting centers located throughout the country. Security is an absolute requirement if the Haitian government wants to provide transparent elections in the future.

The US intervened for geopolitical reasons in Haiti and so did the UN. MINUSTAH was sent to reduce the spread of instability caused by the political crisis in Haiti to other nations in the Caribbean. It is commonly known that Haiti's greatest threat is when it is weak, not when it is strong. Haiti's fragility has been and continues to be a cause for alarm as it can easily influence the region (boat people, drugs smuggling, disease, etc). Haiti was in need stabilization and that is why both interventions occurred. Both occupations were conducted, however, in a

²⁴⁷The Global Observatory, "Where is the Haitian National Police Headed?"

country that was not at war. This created a vast amount of resentment on the part of Haitians who have felt that their sovereignty was violated. Haitians are profoundly proud of their heritage and history, for which they fought for their independence. Yet, the UN Security Council continues to proclaim in its resolutions on Haiti that the country's current situation continues to be a threat to international peace and security. Haitian resentment towards the Americans at the end of their occupation was prevalent. Today, everyday Haitians have grown tired of MINUSTAH and blame the recent introduction of cholera to the country by Nepalese peacekeepers, abuses by UN soldiers, their excessive use of force, and violation of Haitian's human rights as the reason for this resentment.²⁴⁸

Many historians argue that Haiti is “wrenchingly poor because the enslaved Africans killed all their white masters to gain independence and liberty.”²⁴⁹ This left Haiti without an ‘educated’ class, especially after Haitians massacred the remaining white French on the island during the first months of 1804. Similarly, today at least 80% of university level educated Haitians live outside the country.²⁵⁰ Haiti's economy was stagnant during the first US occupation and remains the same today. In their book *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*, authors Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that Haiti as a nation has failed as its “extractive economic institutions do not create the incentives needed for people to save, invest, and innovate.” During both occupations, the work was often done for Haitians or solutions imposed upon them from outsiders. During the periods when US Marines imposed the

²⁴⁸Axis of Logic, “Bye-Bye MINUSTAH!” last accessed 27 February 2013, http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_63556.shtml.

²⁴⁹Chin, *et al.*, *Haiti: A Slave Revolution...*, 42.

²⁵⁰United Nations General Assembly, “Rapport de l'Expert indépendant sur la situation des droits de l'homme en Haiti, Michel Forst,” 7 February 2013, 4.

corvée, they forced Haitian peasants to work without pay.²⁵¹ As it did in 1934, the weakness of institutional governance remains a key challenge in Haiti today. Americans ran the government during the first occupation and did not train their Haitian replacements before they left.

MINUSTAH is therefore needed to continue to provide the critical support so desperately needed by the Haitian government and its people.

Will Haiti's history repeat itself?

This paper sought to answer the rhetorical question that Robert and Nancy Heinl ended their book *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People 1492-1995* with: “Are the Haitian people, living endlessly in a perverse continuum, oblivious of their past, doomed always to repeat a history that is written in blood?”²⁵² This paper has argued that Haiti's history will repeat itself if the withdrawal of MINUSTAH forces occurs under current envisioned timelines. Simply put, Haiti will again plunge into renewed anarchy if the current robust UN involvement is not long-term. Richard Caplan, a Professor of International Relations and Director of the Centre for International Studies at Oxford University, wrote in his 2012 book *Exit Strategies and State Building*, that “this time the UN cannot fail [Haiti].” This rightly brings forth the point that success in complex situations requires capable forces for an extended duration. The Haitian crisis, by its nature, is complex and will be difficult to resolve quickly. It is therefore best to adopt a long-term approach and be heavily dependent on a continuous UN presence for an extended period of time. When the US left Haiti in 1934 after its nineteen year occupation, Haitians had the opportunity to choose whether to continue on the path towards the recovery laid

²⁵¹Acemoglu and Robinson, *Why Nations Fail...*, 372-373.

²⁵²Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood...*, 724.

down by the Americans or return to its troubled past. The latter option was chosen. Today Haiti finds itself at the same point. If MINUSTAH were to leave the country in the four to five in currently envisions and only leave a small political mission, Haitians too will have to choose their path carefully. Unfortunately from “the colony that produced the Americas’ greatest slave insurrection,”²⁵³ Haiti is by far one of only a “few countries [that] have regressed so far or been so misused by man.”²⁵⁴ This paper argued that Haiti will return to its previous ways if its current foreign-enforced stability were to leave. Haiti will not be ready for stable and lasting peace in four to five years. The country’s future is therefore comparable to moving a mountain and as you solve one problem, another lies waiting behind it. It is a tragedy that MINUSTAH is there today and it will be a tragedy if MINUSTAH were to leave before conditions are favorable. As Forbes wrote in his commission report in 1930, “that to withdraw from Haiti meant a return to the corruption and evils of the pre-Occupation period.” The Americans left a country in 1934 that was *in extremis* and the MINUSTAH mission finds itself at a similar point today. Political reconciliation to date has been insufficient and democratic traditions are not widely accepted nor enforced. Economic stability is still a long way from being attained and is inexorably linked to the security situation which is still of deep concern. Corruption is heavily prevalent at all levels and the Haitian population remains distrustful of the government’s authority. The island of Hispaniola is incessantly vulnerable to natural calamities and disasters. It is therefore important to learn from Haiti’s history and not repeat the failures from the past. The world and Haitians simply cannot afford it.

²⁵³Brown, *Arming Slaves...*, 211.

²⁵⁴Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood...*, 3.

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