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THAT OTHERS MAY LIVE: A PLEA FOR A CANADIAN FORCES EXPEDITIONARY PERSONNEL RECOVERY STRATEGY

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Master of Defence Studies

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**THAT OTHERS MAY LIVE: A PLEA FOR A CANADIAN FORCES EXPEDITIONARY
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ABSTRACT

This research paper contends that despite not having any national direction or Canadian Forces (CF) doctrine on personnel recovery, the umbrella term used by allies to address the sum of diplomatic, military, and civil efforts to recover isolated and/or captured persons, the CF already possess an expeditionary capability. What is missing is a comprehensive strategy that governs personnel recovery prevention, preparedness, and operations to progress the CF from utilizing an ad-hoc approach to adopting a formalized deliberately planned response. This paper begins by analyzing the factors that increase the threat to both Canadians and deployed CF members in becoming isolated or captured, which creates the need for a personnel recovery strategy. It then proves that the CF already possesses the necessary specially trained personnel, equipment, and organizational structure to conduct expeditionary personnel recovery operations. Additionally, it proves that the CF has the legal authorities to conduct personnel recoveries and more importantly, has a moral obligation to do so. Finally, it proposes a comprehensive strategy for an expeditionary CF policy on personnel recovery. As any development of a departmental approach requires input from the various stakeholders involved in force generation and employment of CF resources, the proposal provided here within ought to form the basis of future discussions on the creation of a CF personnel recovery strategy.

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I would also like to acknowledge the support of my wife. Throughout this process and the many days I spent behind the computer screen typing, she took care of all aspects of our home life. Without her assistance and understanding, I doubt even the title page would have been possible.

THAT OTHERS MAY LIVE: A PLEA FOR A CANADIAN FORCES EXPEDITIONARY PERSONNEL RECOVERY STRATEGY

...so long as there are fundamental differences over the shape of the world and the principles on which all or parts of it should be governed there will always be political and religious activists who are willing to resort to violence in an attempt to bring their conceptions to fruition.

- Dr. Phil Williams, US Professor in International Studies and Expert¹

In the past decade, 17 Canadians found themselves as hostages in 14 different personnel recovery events around the globe.² Within the same period, the Government of Canada conducted only one expeditionary Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) from Lebanon in 2006.³ Interestingly, the CF has a NEO policy and doctrine, a standing operational level contingency plan, and regularly trains the tactical and operational level headquarters that supports other government departments in NEO.⁴ Yet, it has nothing for the recovery of captured or isolated personnel, except for a single overview of the activities and operations that form *Personnel Recovery* according to the Canadian Forces (CF) *Aerospace Moves Doctrine*.

CF doctrine describes personnel recovery as “an umbrella capability that addresses the summation of diplomatic, military, and civil efforts to recover and reintegrate isolated personnel

¹ Phil Williams, “Strategy for a New World: Combating Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime,” Chapter 9 from *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, ed. John Baylis et al., 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 205.

² The Globe and Mail, “Canadians Taken Hostage Abroad in the Past Decade,” Accessed on 12 December 2012, <http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canadians-taken-hostage-abroad-in-the-past-decade/article564834/?service=mobile>.

³ Department of National Defence, “Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation *LION*,” Accessed on 12 December 2012, <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=335&CdnOpId=408>.

⁴ Department of National Defence, “CF Trains for Non-Combatant Evacuations,” Accessed on 12 December 2012, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/tml/article-eng.asp?id=14&y=2012&m=11>.

and/or recover persons in distress.”⁵ In essence, the term conceptually that describes how all efforts are synchronized to recover isolated or captured personnel. This research paper contend that despite not having any national direction or Canadian Forces (CF) doctrine on personnel recovery, less domestic search-and-rescue, the CF already possess an expeditionary capability and what is missing is the comprehensive strategy that governs personnel recovery prevention, preparedness, and operations to advance the CF from an ad-hoc approach to a formalized, deliberately planned response.

To prove this, four chapters will subdivide the research paper to analyse the various issues required for a CF personnel recovery strategy. The first chapter analyses the threat to Canadians. It will prove why global intelligence assessments repeatedly state that the risk of capture or isolation is increasing for both Canadians that travel abroad and for military personnel deployed on operations. With an understanding of the threat and what is driving the requirement for a CF recovery strategy, the second chapter will use personnel recovery doctrine to prove that the CF already possess an expeditionary personnel recovery capability. It will prove that what is missing is the higher strategy to prevent, prepare, and formalize personnel recovery operations within the CF. The third chapter will analyze the legal and moral aspects of personnel recovery to determine if the CF has the authorities to conduct a recovery. Finally, with the need for a strategy clearly defined, the fourth chapter will address how the CF can achieve a comprehensive CF approach to prevent, prepare, and conduct recovery operations with the intention of moving the CF from an ad-hoc approach to a formalized and deliberately planned response. Prior to describing the

⁵ Department of National Defence, B-GA-404-000/FP-001, *Aerospace Move Doctrine* (Winnipeg: DND Canada, 2011), 37.

complexities of personnel recovery doctrine, it is important to understand what the threat is to our personnel. Therefore, the first aspect of why the CF needs to develop a personnel recovery strategy is to understand why terrorists and criminals take hostages.

CHAPTER 1

HOSTAGE-TAKINGS AND KIDNAPPING: WHY DOES IT OCCUR?

There are three ways that men get what they want: by planning, by working, and by praying. Any great military operation takes careful planning or thinking. Then you must have well trained troops to carry it out: that's working. But between the plan and the operation there is always an unknown. That unknown spells defeat or victory; success or failure. It is the reaction of the actors to the ordeal when it actually comes. Some people call that getting the breaks. I call it God. God has His part or margin in everything. That's where prayer comes in.

— General George S. Patton, United States Army⁶

As General Patton states in the epigraph to this chapter, every operation has unknown factors that can lead to success or failure. It is through the comprehensive approach to planning that the CF reduces the unknown factors and starts to understand what motivates and influences its adversaries. By understanding their motives, planners reduce the unknown factors and can start to target their adversary's vulnerabilities. The CF uses the Operational Planning Process (OPP) to plan joint operations because it “[enhances] the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation.”⁷ The first step within the CF approach is the initiation stage.⁸ During this stage, staffs commence gathering the pertinent information to assist the commander in understanding the operating environment, their adversaries' capabilities, and to make educated deductions on how the CF should operate.⁹ As the initiation stage of OPP focuses on gaining a detailed understanding of the situation, this first chapter will follow a similar approach to understand why there is a need for an expeditionary personnel recovery strategy. By

⁶ Goodreads.com, “George S. Patton Jr. Quotes,” Accessed on 14 December 2012, http://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/370054.George_S_Patton_Jr.

⁷ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, *Canadian Forces Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, August 15, 2005), GL-3.

⁸ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, *CFJP 5.0 The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (OPP)* (Ottawa: DND Canada, April 2008), 4-1.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 2-9.

examining the adversaries' tactics and the reasons why they are used, this chapter will prove why western global intelligence assessments repeatedly declare that the risk to both civilians and military personnel in becoming isolated or captured abroad is escalating, which contributes to justifying the urgent need for an expeditionary CF personnel recovery strategy.

While the majority of the Canadian academic research in this area has highlighted the factors needed to justify a robust domestic search-and-rescue capability,¹⁰ a few researchers argued for a low to medium threat expeditionary combat search and rescue capability; albeit limited to only CF aircrew deployed on operations in established military theatres.¹¹ The existing Canadian academic work limited its findings to primarily domestic factors and pressures thereby neglecting the international causes contributing to the heightened risk to all Canadians; not just military personnel. As such, this chapter examined allied research studies, military publications, and numerous media articles related to why personnel have become isolated or captured to understand the international factors that have justified the creation of similar personnel recovery strategies by our allied partners, primarily the United States, Great Britain, and Australia.¹² To answer this requirement, this chapter takes a broader look at the root causes that underpin the need for recovery operations beyond the domestic factors and explores the increasing threats that

¹⁰ Brian Newman, "Personnel Recovery for Low and Medium Threat Operations: A Required Capability for The Canadian Forces," Canadian Forces Command and Staff College New Horizon's Paper, Canadian Forces College, 2007.

¹¹ M Williams, "Canadian Air Search and Rescue: At the Crossroads," Canadian Forces Command and Staff College New Horizon's Paper, Canadian Forces College, 1991.

¹² Michael Wormley, "Combat Search and Rescue: Searching the History; Rescuing the Doctrine," Master's Thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, 2003; United States. Director of National Intelligence. *US Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat Assessment*. Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 31, 2012, 1:31. <http://intelligence.senate.gov/120131/clapper.pdf>.

all Canadians, not just military personnel, are exposing themselves to when traveling or working abroad.

To prove the need for an expeditionary recovery capability and strategy, this chapter will analyze three characteristics regarding why personnel become isolated. In addition, it will assess an emerging trend that contributes to the increased risk of capture for Canadians that travel or work abroad. The three characteristics considered are terrorist hostage takings, criminal kidnappings for ransom or human trafficking, and that soldiers are not immune to either in any type of warfare. Additionally, this chapter will assess the impact of globalization and affects it has had on both terrorists and criminal organizations that make attempts at recovery operations more complex and difficult. By evaluating each aspect and the emerging trend as sections, the urgent need for a comprehensive personnel recovery strategy will become apparent. As the most complex and risky personnel recovery method is hostage rescue, analysis of why terrorists take hostages is required to introduce the subject.

The Triple Threat: Terrorist Hostage Taking

The US Defence Department describes terrorism as the “use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”¹³ The terrorist act itself is

¹³ Department of Defence, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 8, 2010), 311.

not important. Rather, what is of significance is the message that the act sends to the world.¹⁴ Terrorist hostage taking of Westerners has proven a successful terrorist tactic in pressuring Western governments, securing operational financing, garnering publicity to their cause, and recruiting new personnel. Successful terrorists rely on the interaction between these critical elements. Academic hostage takings theorists commonly refer to the interrelationships between labour, wealth, and publicity as the *Magic Triangle* (Figure 1.1).¹⁵ The premise of the triangle is that the use of hostage tactics can achieve success in any or all three elements. By analyzing the three elements of the *Magic Triangle*, this section will prove why terrorists will continue to take hostages for the foreseeable future, and will emphasise the urgency for a CF personnel recovery strategy.




Figure 1.1 – Magic Triangle of Terrorist Hostage Takings

Source: Frank Bolz, *The Counterterrorism Handbook...*, Chap 4.

¹⁴ Maurice Arthur and John Tugwell, “Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter-Measures” (PhD. Dissertation, University of London, 1979), 22.

¹⁵ Frank Bolz, Kenneth Dudonis, and David Shulzm, *The Counterterrorism Handbook: Tactics, Procedures, and Techniques* (New York: CFC Press, 2002), 61-88.

In 2010, there were approximately 6050 people reportedly held by terrorists as hostages around the world.¹⁶ As their ultimate objective is political, terrorists leverage the media to pressure governments, spread their ideology, obtain financial support, and recruit others to their cause. A prime example of this occurred in 1972 at the Munich Olympic Games. Members of the terrorist organization known as Black September took nine Israeli athletes hostage.¹⁷ By conducting this operation during the Olympics, which had approximately “3000 international newspaper, magazine, radio, and television reporters,” Black September was able to ensure that their actions and ideologies reached an international audience.¹⁸ The media attention garnered led to a significant increase in Arab recruits to the organization.¹⁹ With increased ranks, Black September was able to pressure legitimate government to pay a “tribute” to them and therefore, was able to extort money to pay for future operations.²⁰ As a direct result of taking hostages and ensuring the media followed the story, terrorists were able to pressure governments to finance their upcoming objectives and garner increased support from the Arab world to their cause.

Although some journalists have stated, “publicity makes terrorism worse, and the clear counterterrorism implication [is] to starve them of publicity,”²¹ research has found no empirical proof that supports this notion. Rather, recent academic studies suggest the opposite. Academics argue that by depriving terrorists of publicity, things become worse because the terrorists escalate

¹⁶ Statista, “Number of Hostages Taken by Terrorists in 2010 by Region,” Accessed on 14 December 2012, <http://www.statista.com/statistics/202607/number-of-hostages-taken-by-terrorists-by-region/>.

¹⁷ BBC News. “1972: Olympic Hostages Killed in Gun Battle.” Accessed on 14 December 2012. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/6/newsid_2500000/2500769.stm

¹⁸ Bolz, *The Counterterrorism Handbook*..., 61-88.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Austin Peay State University, “Terrorism and the Media,” Accessed on 14 December 2012, <http://www.drtoconnor.com/3400/3400lect07.htm>.

the size and scope of their act until the media reports the situation.²² As the *Magic Triangle* of hostage tactics indicates, the use of media is required to leverage both labour and wealth. The use of the media in a hostage taking is not about the act or the media. Rather, it is a means to leverage support for their cause, recruit new personnel, and acquire funds to support their ideological operations. In other words, terrorist operations are not unlike businesses. Both need labour and money to achieve their objectives. Without it, they cannot continue their work.

As the *Magic Triangle* indicates, the second point is just as important in understanding why terrorists take hostages; money. Many academics have stated that multiple terrorist organizations continue to use the hostage-taking tactic because the risk is low and the reward is high, a single ransom can finance multiple months of operating costs.²³ Between 2005 and 2011, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a North African terrorist organization, collected \$65 million (USD) from hostage takings, which was 72% of their total operating budget for the period.²⁴ Unlike a business, terrorists cannot operate on credit; therefore, hostage ransoms provide hard currency and are an effective means to generate the required income to support their cause.

While Western governments have made a concerted effort to freeze financial assets of suspected terrorists and use the electronic money processing to track organizations for eventual

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Gretchen Peters, *Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry* (CTC at West Point, Harmony Program, July 2012); Zia Ur Rehman, "Taliban Recruiting and Fundraising in Karachi," *CTC Sentinel*, CTC at West Point, Vol. 5, Iss. 7 (July 2012): 9-12.; Financial Action Task Force, *Organised Maritime Piracy and Related Kidnapping for Ransom*, July 2011; Department of the Treasury, "Remarks of Under Secretary David Cohen at Chatham house on 'Kidnapping for Ransom: The Growing Terrorist Financing Challenge,'" October 5, 2012.

²⁴ Financial Action Task Force, *Organised Maritime Piracy and Related Kidnapping for Ransom*, July 2011.

counterterrorist operations,²⁵ hostage taking remains a primary source of terrorist income. The Western approach in denying terrorists organizations their funds through the formal banking system are ineffective. Most ransoms involve an intermediary who negotiates payment without government or law enforcement's knowledge. More importantly, they tend to use "difficult-to-track ransom payment transactions that involve [an] alternative remittance mechanism," like the use of the hawala.²⁶

Hawala is commonly defined as an underground banking system whereby money is accessed anywhere in the world without it actually moving or leaving a transaction record. The hawala underground banking systems works through a network of operators. A person in need of transferring funds visits a hawala dealer at their location. To transfer the funds, the hawala dealer calls a counterpart in the destination country or city and vouches for the intended recipient to pick up the funds. As it is a trust-based system, hawala dealers and operators at the transfer-location provide the money to the intended recipient out of their holdings. The transaction is similar to individuals exchanging hard currency between one another but instead of doing so face-to-face, a trusted intermediary facilitates the exchange. The entire process occurs without a single electronic banking record. As a hostage taking is typically low risk and there is an effective mechanism to circumvent the tracking of funds across international borders, hostage takings for building financial capital to support future ideological operation will remain a critical

²⁵ The Economist. "Follow the Money." Accessed on 14 December 2012. <http://www.economist.com/node/1157691>.

²⁶ John Rollins and Liana Sun Wyler, *Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress* (Congressional Research Service, October 19, 2012), 11. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf>.

factor in why they will continue to occur. Like any organization or business, their success is reliant on people, the final component to the *Magic Triangle*.

Although hostage tactics routinely draws out publicity and financial reward, it is used to garner other concessions that support the manpower aspect of the *Magic Triangle*. From time-to-time, terrorist organizations use a hostage event to pressure a government to release detained or imprisoned members of the organization. In June 2011, the Afghanistan government released an undisclosed number of jailed Taliban commanders in exchange for two French hostages.²⁷ The very next month, General Gilbert Diendere, a close security aid to the Burkina Faso President and principle mediator, confirmed that in addition to the payment of a ransom, his government released two AQIM prisoners in exchange for three European aid workers in Northern Africa.²⁸ With enough pressure and public outcry, governments sometimes concede to terrorist demands, releasing legitimately detained or imprisoned members to recover their citizens.

While many Western governments state they will not negotiate with terrorists, what often occurs is the use of an intermediary that negotiates on their behalf to achieve the release. This process allows Western countries to maintain public credibility of not negotiating with a terrorist organization while doing so behind closed doors. The Canadian government has denied paying for the release of Robert Fowler, the UN special envoy to Niger, and Louis Guay, Mr. Fowler's Canadian assistant, when taken hostage in Northern Africa and subsequently released after 180

²⁷ The Telegraph, "Taliban Say Prisoners Swapped for French Hostages," Accessed on 14 December 2012, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8608889/Taliban-says-prisoners-swapped-for-French-hostages.html>.

²⁸ BBC News, "Mali Hostages Were Release in Exchange for Prisoners," Accessed on 14 December 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18917078>.

days of captivity in 2009. Interestingly, a US State Department cable suggests otherwise.²⁹ It noted that Canada did not pay the ransom directly but rather, payment occurred through a third party.³⁰ Journalists have speculated that Germany, Switzerland, or even the son of the former Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, whom was involved with the negotiations for their release, may have paid for their release on behalf of Canada.³¹ Regardless of who paid the ransom, the US diplomatic cable proves that Canada used intermediaries to assist not only in negotiating for the release of its citizens but also to pay their ransoms. Whether it is to negotiate a prisoner release or to avoid paying a ransom directly between Western countries that publicly state that they do not negotiate with terrorists, the use of third parties to achieve the safe release of isolated personnel is a method that has been used to great success.

By analyzing the three main facets of the *Magic Triangle* of hostage takings, this section proved why terrorists continue to use the tactic. It proved that hostage takings are a low risk, low cost, but a highly rewarding tactic that is widely used to fund terrorist activities, gain publicity for their beliefs, and recruit new members to their cause. As we have seen with the 17 Canadian hostages that have been taken in the past decade, it is simply a matter of time before terrorists use another Canadian to gain more money, publicity, or recruits. Regrettably, due to the success of this tactic, criminal elements have also adopted it as a standard operating procedure.

²⁹ The Globe and Mail, "Ransom Paid for Canadian Diplomats, Leaked Cable Suggest," Accessed on 14 December 2012, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ransom-paid-for-canadian-diplomats-leaked-cable-suggests/article1893847/>.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ MacLean's Magazine, "Source: Germany and Switzerland paid ransom for kidnapped Canadian diplomats," Accessed on 14 December 2012, <http://www2.macleans.ca/2009/04/29/germany-and-switzerland-paid-ransom-for-kidnapped-canadian-diplomats/>; The Globe and Mail, "Ransom Paid for Canadian Diplomats, Leaked Cable Suggest," Accessed on 14 December 2012, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ransom-paid-for-canadian-diplomats-leaked-cable-suggests/article1893847/>.

Sex and Money: Criminals Use of Kidnapping Tactics

Any attempt to unlawfully detain or take a person by force against their will is kidnapping.³² Generally, it occurs when a person, without lawful authority, physically controls another without their consent.³³ This section will prove why criminals use kidnapping as a tactic for the sole purpose of gaining more wealth and why its use is increasing. It will consider two aspects of criminal involvement in Canadians becoming isolated and requiring recovery; kidnapping for ransom and for human trafficking. As renowned Irish playwright George Bernard Shaw said and eloquently describes the root cause of kidnappings for ransom, the “lack of money is the root of all evil.”³⁴

Kidnappings for ransom by criminal organizations will continue to pose a threat to Canadians because it is simply a financially rewarding tactic. In 2006, the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control completed a statistical report on kidnapping for the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. Applying their 2006 rates to Canada’s current population, 4700 citizens may be kidnapped this year.³⁵ Although most kidnapping will likely occur because of failings in an initial and unrelated crime as an attempt to escape capture by law enforcement agencies, an unreported number transpire for the sole purpose of a cash ransom. In November 2009, after receiving the ransom payment, Somalia criminals released Amanda Lindhout, a

³² Department of Justice, *Criminal Code* (Ottawa, Canada: Queens Printing Press, November 12, 2012), 323. <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-46.pdf>.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ The Quotations Page, “George Bernard Shaw Quotations,” Accessed on 19 December 2012. http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/George_Bernard_Shaw/.

³⁵ United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime, “International Statistics on Crime and Justice,” Report prepared by the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control (Helsinki, 2010), 47.

Canadian journalist, and Nigel Brennan, an Australian photographer that accompanied Lindhout, who had spent 460 days in captivity North of Mogadishu.³⁶ Like terrorists hostage takings, kidnapping for ransom is low risk, low cost, but an extremely effective and highly rewarding tactic. More importantly, the conservative statistical estimate proves that it occurs on a regular basis both domestically within Canada and internationally, as described in the Lindhout case. Although police and militaries have been successful in conducting rescue operations to secure victims from their criminal captors,³⁷ threat assessments continue to indicate that the risk is increasing because the tactic is so highly effective. In January 2012, the US Director of National Intelligence stated, “kidnapping for ransom is increasing worldwide and generates new and deep income streams for transnational criminal organizations.”³⁸ As such, Canadians are at risk of kidnapping and the CF must be able to assist the Government of Canada in conducting or supporting a personnel recovery operation.

What is even more disconcerting than the rise in ransom kidnappings is the increase in kidnapping for the purposes of human trafficking, specifically for the sex trade. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police describe human trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation or harbouring of persons for the purpose of exploitation” for either forced labour, or for use in the

³⁶ The Globe and Mail, “Amanda Lindhout was held captive in Somalia – but went back to help others,” Accessed on 14 December 2012, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/giving/amanda-lindhout-was-held-captive-in-somalia---but-went-back-to-help-others/article4107183/>.

³⁷ The National Post, “Canadian Aid Workers Kidnapped from Kenyan Refugee Camp Rescued by Militia in Somalia,” Accessed on 14 December 2012, <http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/07/02/canadian-aid-workers-kidnapped-from-kenyan-refugee-camp-rescued-by-militia-in-somalia/>.

³⁸ Director of National Intelligence, *US Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat Assessment*, Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 31, 2012, 27. <http://intelligence.senate.gov/120131/clapper.pdf>.

sex industry.³⁹ Although criminals use a number of different methods to gain control of a person for the purposes of human trafficking, kidnapping continues to be an effective tactic. Since the global fiscal crisis of 2008, there has been an increase in human trafficking kidnappings, specifically for the purposes of sexual exploitation. While most people believe it occurs in South America or Africa, the largest area of concern in the world is Europe, with an estimated 270 000 victims, although not all were kidnapped.⁴⁰ The US estimates that human trafficking for sexual exploitation is a “\$20 billion business.”⁴¹ Like any good business model, as long as there is a demand for the product, in this case the people for sexual exploitation, criminals will use kidnapping to meet the requirement. Despite the fact that various governments, including Canada, have outlined how they plan to combat human trafficking,⁴² legal jurisdiction remains a problem. The globalization of criminal organizations and the fact that they operate largely with impunity, given the lengthy bureaucracy involved to coordinate multistate criminal prosecutions, it has allowed kidnapping for human trafficking to continue. As such, Canadians must take precaution when traveling abroad. In essence, all Canadians are a target of opportunity for kidnapping not only for ransom but also for the purposes of human trafficking.

This section analyzed why terrorists and criminals use hostage taking and kidnapping as a tactic. It proved that based on their success; there is an increased risk to Canadians traveling

³⁹ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “Frequently Asked Questions on Human Trafficking,” Accessed on 14 December 2012, <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ht-tp/q-a-trafficking-traite-eng.htm#q1>.

⁴⁰ International News Services, “Kidnapping and human trafficking – the seamy side of globalisation,” Accessed on 12 December 2012, <http://www.internationalnewsservices.com/articles/1-latest-news/12449-kidnapping-and-human-trafficking-the-seamy-side-of-globalisation>.

⁴¹ Director of National Intelligence, *US Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat Assessment*, Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 31, 2012, 27. <http://intelligence.senate.gov/120131/clapper.pdf>.

⁴² Public Safety, *National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking* (Ottawa: Canada, 2012). <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/le/fl/cmbt-trffkng-eng.pdf>.

abroad. Where terrorists use hostage taking as “the continuation of politics through the use of indiscriminate violence,” it proved that criminals use kidnapping simply as a “continuation of business by criminal means.”⁴³ It is therefore not unthinkable that a Canadian will become a terrorist hostage or victim of a criminal organization requiring government assistance in the form of a personnel recovery operation. A departmental strategy that acknowledges the threat to Canadians and directs the creation of contingency plans is required given the increasing likelihood that Canadians will be taken hostage by terrorists or kidnapped by criminals.

The Military is Not Immune

In 1940, following the Battle of Britain, the Royal Air Force (RAF) possessed a shortage of experienced pilots and aircrew. The RAF was hesitant to employ junior pilots in the war effort because they “not only produced limited fighting capabilities but often resulted in the loss of the aircraft through enemy fire.”⁴⁴ Therefore, when experienced pilots ditched aircraft due to enemy fire, the RAF saw their recovery as a “cost effective way of increasing fighting power.”⁴⁵ The result was the establishment of multiple recovery methods, which ultimately led to the US development of personnel recovery concepts, theories, and doctrine. Today, the requirement for personnel recovery is very different. It is no longer only about airmen or woman. Rather, all deployed personnel are potential targets. Thus, this section will analyse why ground soldiers in operational theatres have become isolated. It will prove that even in today’s military where every

⁴³ Williams, *Strategy for a New World...* 195.

⁴⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Personnel Recovery: That Others May Live to Return With Honour: A Primer,” (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Joint Air Power Competence Centre, 2011), 5.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

transport platform has both navigation and communications equipment, soldiers become isolated and require recovery. While this aspect alone is a research project in its own right, it focuses on two examples to prove that the CF requires an inclusive personnel recovery strategy for civilians and CF members, not just aircrew. With the CF's recent experience in fighting the counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, the analysis of irregular warfare will occur first.

In the past century alone, “nearly 200 irregular warfare events” transpired.⁴⁶ As such, academics and military analysts have defined the future operating environment as an “era of persistent irregular conflict.”⁴⁷ Regrettably, with any conflict comes risk. It is abundantly more dangerous within irregular warfare given the asymmetry on the battlefield. Within this type of warfare, a forward line of friendly forces does not secure rear echelons or administrative areas. For that reason, all personnel are at risk of capture or isolation and may require recovery. In December 2012, Taliban fighters in Kabul kidnapped Dr. Dilip Joseph, a US citizen who went to Afghanistan to assist its fledgling medical program.⁴⁸ The US military mounted a hostage-rescue personnel recovery operation, freeing the doctor five days later. Unfortunately, the operation came at the cost of a US Navy Seal from their elite Naval Special Warfare Development Group, the US Navy counter-terrorism unit formerly known as Seal Team 6.⁴⁹ Although Dr. Joseph was not part of the US government mission in theatre, his rescue highlights that within asymmetric warfare, even unexpected citizens that travel to the theatre and are non-combatants are at risk.

⁴⁶ Joint Force Quarterly, “Executive Summary,” Issue 60, 1st Quarter 2011, accessed on 02 December 2012, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/executive-summary-60.html>.

⁴⁷ Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Future of U.S. Ground Forces: Testimony before the U.S. Senate* (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009), 2.

⁴⁸ CBS News, “Seal Team 6 Member Killed in Afghan Rescue Identified; Obama Lauds Special Ops Forces,” Accessed on 14 December 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57558162/seal-team-6-member-killed-in-afghan-rescue-identified-obama-lauds-special-ops-forces/.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

More importantly, it demonstrates that the military may be tasked to attempt a recovery. Regardless of the operational theatre, the threat that someone will become isolated or captured and need recovery will persist. Without strategy, that directs how the CF prepares and postures itself to conduct a personnel recovery operations, a unilateral military response like that executed by the US is impossible. Recovery operations require specially trained personnel, unique equipment, and stream lined command and control structure to bring to bear the required operational and strategic effects necessary to launch a mission. Despite the belief that area behind the forward troops is secure, the same need exists within a conventional battle space where asymmetry is not a concern.

Although conventional warfare normally has secured rear echelons and administrative areas, it is not always the case. Even in modern conventional warfare, soldiers become prisoners of war and sometimes find themselves in need of recovery. On 23 March 2003, a US support convoy, operating behind friendly forces in Iraq, made a wrong turn and became lost.⁵⁰ Although they were equipped with the latest satellite navigation and communications equipment, they drove into an unsecure area where Iraqi forces ambushed them 200 miles West of Basra.⁵¹ The ambush killed eleven US soldiers and resulted in the capture of six US service members, including Private Jessica Lynch.⁵² A month later, the US conducted a hostage-rescue operation, successfully rescuing Lynch.⁵³ Her capture demonstrated how easy it is for ordinary soldiers to become lost and captured, despite having some of the world's best navigation and

⁵⁰ NATO, *Personnel Recovery: That Others May Live to Return With Honour: A Primer...*, 7.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ The Guardian, "The Truth About Jessica," Accessed on 14 December 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/may/15/iraq.usa2>.

communications equipment. This example both emphasizes that no one is immune to the threat and that all deployed personnel, whether military or civilian, are at risk of capture even when operating in a supposedly secure area.

Prior to the recovery of Private Lynch, the US trained only aircrew, Special Forces, and personnel “considered prone to capture” in personnel recovery techniques.⁵⁴ After her capture, while the US population was in an uproar over a female taken as a prisoner of war, it became clear to US policy makers that they had a moral duty “to recover isolated personnel regardless of their role or position.”⁵⁵ Until that time, only a select few service members received the necessary training needed to increase the likelihood of survival and recovery. Since then, all US personnel deploying to an active theatre of operations receive personnel recovery training prior to departure.

This section analysed cases where soldiers and civilians working in operational theatres became isolated. It proved that even in today’s world where almost everyone has a cell phone or vehicle with satellite navigation capability, soldiers and ordinary citizens are captured and taken hostage. While the two examples provide only a glimpse of the causes of how adversaries capture Westerners, it proves that no one is immune and that it can happen at any time. Due to the implications of leaving someone behind, Western militaries and governments expend significant time and resources on the recovery of its citizens, not just those in positions of authority. Therefore, there is an urgent need for the CF to develop a personnel recovery strategy

⁵⁴ NATO, *Personnel Recovery: That Others May Live to Return With Honour: A Primer...*, 7.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

that not only outlines how a recovery will be conducted but also directs that all deploying personnel be trained in the various techniques that will increase their chance of recovery. As the previous three sections have examined why personnel have become isolated in today's operating environment and highlighted that the military is not immune, the final section will analyse the impact that globalization has on shaping the requirement for a CF personnel recovery strategy.

Globalization: Making Recovery Operations Difficult

Globalization is a process that “embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and power.”⁵⁶ The fall of the Berlin Wall and breakup of the Soviet Union initiated the modern concept of the globalization of crime and terrorism.⁵⁷ It was then that both criminal and terrorist organizations began to mirror business, adopting an international networked approach to their operations. This section will analyse the aspects of globalization that facilitate the operation of terrorists and criminal organizations. Specifically, the exploitation of modern transportation and the elimination of trade barriers, as well the use of technology to coordinate both criminal and terrorist operations. By doing so, this section will prove that the recovery of personnel is becoming more difficult and that the CF crisis response approach to unplanned events that require military action is inadequate due to the additional complexities that globalization adds to hostage-takings and kidnappings. As both terrorist and criminal

⁵⁶ David Held, et al., “Global Transformations,” Accessed on 12 December 2012, <http://www.polity.co.uk/global/whatisglobalization.asp#whatis>

⁵⁷ Stephen Aguilar-Milan, et al., “The Globalization of Crime,” *The Futurist* (November-December 2008), 42.

organizations operate primarily as networked systems, the first aspect analysed is their freedom of movement between nodes in their networks, which often results in movement between states.

Borders delineate the political and legal jurisdictions of federal states. The elimination of trade barriers and the relative ease of people moving between countries is an increased concern. As business has become borderless, so have criminal and terrorist organizations.⁵⁸ In 2008, Robert Fowler, a Canadian ex-diplomat and UN special envoy to Niger, and Louis Guay, his personal assistant, were taken hostage by terrorists just outside of the Niger capital of Niamey.⁵⁹ Interestingly, the terrorists did not stay in Niger. Rather, in an attempt to avoid capture by Niger authorities and to disrupt any attempts by Western forces to launch a recovery operation, their captors repeatedly moved Fowler and Guay around the Sahara desert in and out of multiple countries to avoid detection.⁶⁰ The transnational approach used by criminals and terrorists makes their detection difficult. More importantly, attempts at coordinating personnel recovery operation where the captors are moving between countries, the legal jurisdictions and sovereignty issues have complicated a military resolution. As mentioned previously, the bureaucratic authorization to pursue terrorists and criminals between sovereign states is time consuming and routinely results in them avoiding arrest.

⁵⁸ Jerome P. Bjelopera and Krisin M. Finklea, *Organized Crime: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Law Enforcement* (Congressional Research Service, January 6, 2012), 3. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41547.pdf>.

⁵⁹ The Globe and Mail, "Niger Officials Likely Set Him Up for Kidnapping, Fowler Believes," Accessed on 14 December 2012, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/niger-officials-likely-set-him-up-for-kidnapping-fowler-believes/article4182681/>

⁶⁰ iPolitics, "Harper's ransom payment to the devil," Accessed on 14 December 2012, <http://www.ipolitics.ca/2011/09/25/fen-hampson-harper%E2%80%99s-ransom-payment-to-the-devil/>.

Although there has been tremendous change in security legislation in various countries to counter transnational criminal and terrorist organizations,⁶¹ laws remain applicable only within the borders of the states that created it or those that signed and ratified a treaty. Therefore, law enforcement agencies are “hamstrung by national jurisdiction” and governments’ efforts to control illicit activity, like the movement of kidnapped people across borders, are ineffective. With the globalization of both criminal and terrorist networks and the elimination of trade barriers that previously provided a level of security, both types of organizations are experiencing an increased freedom of movement between countries. As globalization led to the elimination of trade barriers and the ease of travel between countries, the borderless technological communication advances have allowed both criminal organizations and terrorist networks to make comprehensive plans to mitigate any attempt at a military recovery operation.

The incredible advances in technology, specifically in the area of communication technologies, have led to novel ways of coordinating traditional criminal activity. Criminals and terrorists use the internet as an intelligence network to combat Western forces attempting to disrupt their operations. The internet “offers about a billion pages of information, much of it free and of considerable use to terrorist organizations.”⁶² With a simple internet search, terrorists have access to Western doctrine, policies, laws, and other useful information that they can then use to counter attempts to disrupt their operations. A recovered al-Qaeda training handbook found in Afghanistan states that “using public internet sources openly and without resorting to illegal

⁶¹ Steve Maich, “How globalization caused a cross-border crime wave,” *MacLean's*, Vol 118. No 48, (November 28, 2005), 2. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/218546883?accountid=9867>.

⁶² Gabriel Weimann, “How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet,” *The Journal of International Security Affairs*. No 8. (Spring, 2005), <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2005/08/weimann.php>.

means, it is possible to gather at least 80 percent of all information required about the enemy.”⁶³

A captured terrorist computer from Afghanistan had downloaded structural engineering information from the internet about a dam that the organization wanted to target, allowing them to allocate the right proportion of explosives to achieve its aims without wasting resources.⁶⁴ A simple search for US personnel recovery doctrine on the internet reveals the entire US military publication catalogue. These publications provide the complete understanding of how a personnel recovery operation is coordinated and executed from the strategic level planning considerations to the tactical level tactics, techniques, and procedures used by recovery forces. Western nations’ obsession with uploading nearly every piece of security related policy and doctrine to the world-wide-web, made the internet an intelligence network for adversaries. More importantly, it has increased the risk to Western forces attempting to conduct a recovery operation.

Although analysts can follow computer internet protocol addresses to track terrorists using the internet,⁶⁵ it is not solely terrorists that search for sensitive information. More often than not, a supporter, with no criminal past or ties to the organization, provides the information they downloaded from the internet to terrorist operators by floppy disk or universal serial bus (USB) drives. The air-gap transfer of information negates the internet protocol tracking of the end user of the information. This allows terrorist supporters to use the same search tools that many academics and researchers use to extract enormous amounts of information on any given

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ CNet, “FBI, DEA warn IPv6 could shield criminals from police,” Accessed on 14 December 2014, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57453738-83/fbi-dea-warn-ipv6-could-shield-criminals-from-police/.

area of interest. In essence, the information downloaded from the internet has allowed criminals and terrorist organizations to adjust their tactics to remain undetected from Western forces. Ironically, the very same nations that target terrorist and criminal organizations for prosecution are the ones uploading the methods they use to do so.

By analysing the aspects of globalization that facilitate terrorist and criminal organizations, this section proved that the recovery of captured personnel is becoming more complex and risky. Western adversaries are not affected by the various legal jurisdictions and the lengthy bureaucratic processes required to coordinate a multistate response. As such, Western adversaries have freedom of movement. In addition, this section showed how adversaries use the internet against the very states that upload military and police doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Therefore, a departmental strategy is needed to direct how the CF ought to prevent and prepare its forces for potential capture. By educating soldiers on personnel recovery doctrine and tactics, plans staff can commence work in developing a comprehensive recovery strategy.

Chapter Summary

This chapter proved not only the reason why personnel are becoming isolated and are in need of recovery but also that there is an increasing risk to Canadians of becoming isolated in the future; regardless, if they are members of the CF or not. By analyzing terrorist hostage-takings, criminal kidnappings, how soldiers are not immune to capture, and the affect of globalization in increasing the risk of capture to Canadians that travel abroad, this chapter proved that hostage taking and kidnappings will continue because they are a low risk, low cost, but extremely

lucrative tactics. As the risk of capture is increasing to all Canadians, there is an even greater requirement for the development of a comprehensive personnel recovery strategy given that it is only a matter of time before the government requests the CFs assistance in recovering a citizen. As General Patton stated in the opening epigraph to this chapter, unknown factors lead to success or failure. By developing a comprehensive approach to personnel recovery planning, through the establishment of a departmental strategy, the CF reduces these unknown factors and develops a viable recovery plan to support a governmental initiative. With an appreciation for personnel recovery doctrine, the leadership and plans staffs within the CF will be able to understand what is motivating and influence its adversaries and would be able to position themselves to support a military, diplomatic, or civilian recovery option of a Canadian citizen.

CHAPTER 2

NOW IS THE TIME: AN ASSESSMENT OF CF PERSONNEL RECOVERY CAPABILITIES

In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.

- President Dwight D. Eisenhower, United States of America.⁶⁶

Although the best-laid plans rarely unfold as originally conceived, as President Eisenhower's epigram states, the exercise of preparing for the operation is indispensable. Having a detailed understanding of the issues and ensuring contingencies are in place to mitigate various threats allows for flexibility when the situation changes during mission execution. As the previous chapter used the elements of the initiation stage to CF OPP to explain the threat, this chapter will centre on the second step, the orientation stage, where commanders and staff examine the relationships between tasks, available forces, and resources to determine the needed capabilities and tactical groupings for an operation.⁶⁷ In addition to determining the force capabilities and groupings, this stage also examines the command and control structure needed for the operation.⁶⁸ As the orientation stage focuses upon the capabilities, resources, and control mechanisms needed to execute a mission, this chapter will use the same aspects to prove that the CF already has the necessary specially trained personnel, resources, and organizational structure to conduct expeditionary personnel recovery operations.

⁶⁶ Department of Defence, Joint Publication 3-50, *Personnel Recovery* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 5, 2007), V-1.

⁶⁷ Department of National Defence, *CFJP 5.0 Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process...*, 4-6.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

In conducting the literary survey for this chapter, both allied and CF doctrine have defined personnel recovery as “an umbrella capability that addresses the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to recover and reintegrate isolated personnel and/or recover persons in distress.”⁶⁹ Both state that personnel recovery activities encompass Search-and-Rescue (SAR), “whether it is domestic or deployed, or urban.”⁷⁰ Whereas, personnel recovery operations are “associated with the umbrella term combat rescue, and include the roles of Combat Rescue (CR), Combat Search-and-Rescue (CSAR), and Hostage Rescue (HR).”⁷¹ As depicted by Figure 2.1, both domestic and international SAR activities occur in low threat environments, whereas, personnel recovery operations occurs in medium to high threat situations. Regardless of the method used, every piece of literature surveyed had the same end state, the safe recovery and reintegration of personnel.

⁶⁹ Department of National Defence, *B-GA-404-000/FP-001 Aerospace Move...*, 37.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*




Figure 2.1 – CF Personnel Recovery Spectrum of Operations – Based on Threat

Source: Department of National Defence, *B-GA-404-000/FP-001 Aerospace Move...*, 41

While the literary survey confirmed that the CF has well developed doctrine, policy, and a strategy for domestic search-and-rescue, a subset task of personnel recovery activities,⁷² the only expeditionary aspects it addressed was the definitions of what personnel recovery operations entail.⁷³ As described in Chapter 1 and is a theme in surveying the available research on this topic, Canadian academics have limited their work to primarily the domestic factors related to search-and-rescue or towards a low threat expeditionary combat search-and-rescue for *only*

⁷² Department of National Defence, “CF Overview of SAR in Canada,” Canada Command Brief, January 31, 2012; Department of National Defence, B-GA-209-001/FP-001, *National Search And Rescue Manual* (Ottawa: DND Canada, May, 2001); Department of National Defence. B-GA-404-000/FP-001, *Aerospace Move Doctrine* (Winnipeg: DND Canada, 2011); Department of National Defence. *Canadian Forces Search and Rescue: 50 Years of Service to Canadians* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997).

⁷³ Department of National Defence, *B-GA-404-000/FP-001 Aerospace Move...*, 37.

downed military aircrew on operations. By limiting their research to those two narrow aspects of personnel recovery, the literary survey exposed a critical gap within CF doctrine concerning its ability to conduct full spectrum expeditionary personnel recovery activities and operations.

By examining allied personnel recovery publications⁷⁴ and cross-referencing the key doctrinal aspects of recovery missions to current CF equipment holdings, organizational structures, and the availability of specially trained personnel, it become apparent that the CF is capable of conducting expeditionary personnel recoveries. To prove this, this chapter will show that the CF is able to support all three lines of operation within a personnel recovery, conduct all of the military options available to planners, and that the recent CF transformation has positioned it to undertake the command and control of expeditionary personnel recovery operations. As a contrast, it will examine previous failed attempts by the CF to expand beyond the domestic search-and-rescue capability. By doing so, this chapter will prove that the CF has conducted expeditionary recovery operations and that a departmental strategy is needed to move the CF from an ad-hoc crisis response approach, which our allies have demonstrated results in mission failure, to an informed deliberate process that significantly increases the probability of success.

⁷⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Personnel Recovery: That Others May Live to Return With Honour: A Primer” (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Joint Air Power Competence Centre, 2011); North Atlantic Treaty Organization, AJP-3.3.9 (draft), *Allied Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery* (Brussels, Belgium: NATO, August 20, 2007); Department of Defence, Army Field Manual 3-50.1, *Army Personnel Recovery*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 21, 2011); Department of Defence. Joint Publication 3-50, *Personnel Recovery* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 5, 2007); Department of Defence. Joint Publication 3-50.2, *Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 26, 1996).

The Three Lines of Operation: Military, Diplomatic, Civil

Every nation and department has a different approach, philosophy, understanding of priorities, and varying degrees of resources to draw upon to assist in recovery operations.⁷⁵ As the CF is no different, the departmental strategy must consider not only the military response but also how to support any diplomatic or civil initiatives. A situation may require a multinational capability amongst the three lines of operations or it may be more focused and rely upon only one.⁷⁶ Regardless, any development of a CF strategy ought to consider that the conduct of a personnel recovery operation may proceed along simultaneous diplomatic, civil, and military lines of operation. As the government is responsible for all its citizens, the diplomatic line of operation is usually the primary option.

In every Canadian case, the CF will need to support the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the senior diplomatic arm of the government, whom is responsible for all missing and captured citizens outside of the geographical boundaries of Canada.⁷⁷ In this capacity, DFAIT is resourced to request support from various nations to support a recovery and can conduct diplomatic negotiations.⁷⁸ The diplomatic line of operation includes negotiating for the release of personnel and/or the inclusion of an armistice or treaty.⁷⁹ In 2001, the Chinese government detained the crew of a US Navy EP-3 that conducted an emergency

⁷⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, AJP-3.3.9 (draft), *Allied Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery* (Brussels, Belgium: NATO, August 20, 2007), 3.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Emergency Services," Accessed on 09 December 2012. http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/infosource.aspx?lang=eng&view=d#sect4_1c.

⁷⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, AJP-3.4.2 (draft), *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations* (Brussels, Belgium: NATO, 2010), 2-1.

⁷⁹ Department of Defence, *JP 3-50 Personnel Recovery...*, I-3.

landing in China.⁸⁰ The US State Department successfully negotiated the release of their captured citizens, coordinating for the recovery of the EP-3.⁸¹ The CF will need to position itself to assist DFAIT in providing resources not only to support its line of operation but also to suggest the various options available to DFAIT, as they do not train their staffs in personnel recovery.

As both Non-Governmental Organizations and private citizens have played an “important role in securing the release of captured and detained personnel” in the past,⁸² consideration is needed on how the CF could be requested or used to support its initiatives. Over the last 25 years, the Reverend Jesse Jackson, a private citizen of the US, negotiated a civilian solution on four different occasions for captured and imprisoned US citizens.⁸³ In 1984, he negotiated and secured the release of a US Navy Officer from Syria.⁸⁴ Three months later, he negotiated the release of 26 Cuban-American prisoners from Cuba.⁸⁵ In 1991, he was the first US citizen to negotiate the release of 500 “international guests” from Iraq.⁸⁶ Finally, in 1999, Jackson negotiated the release of three US service men held in Yugoslavia by President Slobodan Milosevic, the former President of Serbia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.⁸⁷ While the CF does not like to work with non-government organizations or directly with a lone civilian, when a Canadian is

⁸⁰ BBC News, “China Holds US Spy Plane Crew,” Accessed on 09 December 2012, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1255343.stm>.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² NATO, *AJP-3.3.9 (draft) Allied Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery...*, 7.

⁸³ BBC News, “World: Europe Yugoslavia to free PoWs,” Accessed on 09 December 2012, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/333359.stm>.

⁸⁴ The Eighties Club, “Jesse Jackson's Mission to Damascus,” Accessed on 09 December 2012, <http://eightiesclub.tripod.com/id407.htm>.

⁸⁵ New York Times, “Jackson Back in U.S. From Cuba With Prisoners Set Free By Castro,” Accessed on 09 December 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/29/world/jackson-back-in-us-from-cuba-with-prisoners-set-free-by-castro.html>.

⁸⁶ CNN World, “Jesse Jackson Willing to Negotiate For Hostages,” Accessed on 09 December 2012, http://articles.cnn.com/2004-04-18/world/jackson.iraq_1_free-hostages-religious-leaders-thomas-hamill?s=PM:WORLD.

⁸⁷ BBC News, World: Europe Yugoslavia to free PoWs., <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/333359.stm>.

isolated and becomes detained, civil organizations are a viable course of action to negotiate their release. A CF strategy must ensure that the military commander is aware of this option and that they have the latitude to support them through the provision of transport, security, and/or communications equipment, if supported by the lead department.

The military line of operation encompasses six specific personnel recovery tasks: “report, locate, support, recover, reintegrate, and adaptation.”⁸⁸ *US Joint Publication 3-50 Personnel Recovery* describes each task as follows:⁸⁹

- The report task consists of actions required to provide notification that personnel are or may have become isolated or captured and begins when the appropriate authorities are informed of the isolated event.⁹⁰ This is a critical step in the recovery process as this is when the Chief of Defence Staff will provide be notified and will provide direction to commence contingency planning for a recovery option or potential pre-position forces to support other governmental departments in developing options for their lines of operation.
- The locate task comprises all actions conducted to find and verify that it is the isolated or captured personnel.⁹¹ Prior to committing any personnel recovery forces, normally the military component requires the location and positive identification of the isolated

⁸⁸ Department of Defence, *JP 3-50 Personnel Recovery...*, I-3.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, I-7 to I-8.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ NATO, *AJP-3.3.9 (draft) Allied Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery...*, 26.

or captured person. As a personnel recovery operation may be conducted without the pre-authorization of the host country where the isolated or captured person is being detained, it could be considered an act of war or at the very least a breach of their sovereign rights. Although customary international law allows personnel recovery operation to occur, given that every nation has the inherent right to protect its citizens,⁹² a breach of a country's sovereignty may bring Canada before the international courts. Therefore, confirmation of both the location and that it is indeed the right person(s), is critical to a military option given the potential political implications involved in conducting a personnel recovery operation.

- Within a military context, the support task is all the actions conducted to not only assist the isolated or captured personnel, such as airdropping equipment if they are evading, but also supporting the isolated members' families and assisting with their needs, such as timely information on their family member.⁹³ Support is a critical task throughout a recovery. As such, the CF needs to be positioned to provide both equipment and personnel to external organizations and departments. As the passage of accurate and timely information is critical within a personnel recovery operation, the use of liaison officers is vital.

⁹² Canadian Forces College, "Command: The International Law Context" (Joint Command and Staff Program 39 Activity DS542/PDM/LE-3, 2012), 5.

⁹³ Department of Defence, *JP 3-50 Personnel Recovery...*, I-7 to I-8.

- The recover task involves all actions and coordination to “bring [the] isolated personnel under the physical custody of a friendly organization.”⁹⁴ The task of recovery commences when the government tasks the CF or when the government tasks diplomatic and civil organizations. Once the isolated or captured person is secure within friendly forces hands for reintegration, that task is complete.
- Reintegration is a critical task that allows the Government of Canada intelligence community to gather the necessary intelligence and SERE information while coordinating multiple activities and protecting the health and well-being of returned isolated, missing, or detained personnel.⁹⁵
- Finally, Adaptation is the “ongoing function that assures continuous improvements to the personnel recovery system through lessons learned... and enables forces to adapt to new ideas and concepts in order to better accomplish the mission.”⁹⁶

When placed graphically, the figure on the next page (Figure 2.2) depicts the interrelationships between the theories, concepts, and doctrine described above for the planning, execution, and adaptation phases of a personnel recovery an event and a recovery.

⁹⁴ NATO, *AJP-3.3.9 (draft) Allied Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery...*, 28.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ Department of Defence, *JP 3-50 Personnel Recovery...*, I-7 to I-8.



Figure 2.2 – Personnel Recovery Theory, Concepts, and Doctrinal Interrelationships

Source: Bart Holewijn, "Developments in NATO PR," IQPC JPR Conference, London, November 30, 2009.

In 2003, the US exercised a military option to recovery seven prisoners of war during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, directing the forcible recovery of an eighth using Special Operations Forces (SOF).⁹⁷ Using a similar model to that described in Figure 2.2, they were successful given that they completed and tracked all of the interrelated aspects of personnel recovery. A CF strategy must do the same and be flexible enough to support all three lines of operations of personnel recovery, not just a military option. The success of a recovery is dependent on the proper preparation through the provision of guidance and direction found within an overarching CF strategy, a strategy that does not yet exist.

⁹⁷ Global Security.Org, "Marines rescue seven POW(s)," Accessed on 09 December 2012, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030414-usmc01.htm>.

This section examined the three lines of operation of personnel recovery. Examples were provided to understand how they could be used to achieve a successful recovery. It proved that the military commander must be able to engage counterparts outside of the CF, with prior approval from both the lead departments and the CF chain of command, to offer support and/or planning expertise to the diplomatic and civil lines of operation to maximize the potential for a successful recovery. In addition, it demonstrated that personnel recovery operations are complex and that staffs planning a recovery operation need a detailed understanding of the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures to prepare military options. Finally, when placed graphically, Figure 2.2 provided an easy to understand model that depicts the interrelationships between the various aspects of personnel recovery doctrine needed to successfully recover isolated or captured personnel. With an understanding of what personnel recovery is, the next question is what military methods can the CF reasonable be expected to provide during the execution phase?

Military Methods to Personnel Recovery Activities and Operations

Within CF doctrine, the spectrum of personnel recovery methods comprises two components: activities and operations.⁹⁸ Although the *Aerospace Move Doctrine* suggests that the CF does not perform full spectrum PRO, the recent employment of CF resources indicates otherwise. Figure 2.3 depicts the CF vision of the personnel recovery spectrum of operations. This section of the paper will examine both activities and operations. By comparing the definitions to recent CF deployments, this section will prove that the CF has already conducted full spectrum personnel recovery operations, albeit on an impromptu basis.

⁹⁸ Department of National Defence, *B-GA-404-000/FP-001 Aerospace Move...*, 38.




Figure 2.3 – Military Personnel Recovery Spectrum of Operations

Source: Department of National Defence, *B-GA-404-000/FP-001 Aerospace Move...*, 38

CF Aerospace Move Doctrine defines personnel recovery activities as a “response to an event involving persons in distress.”⁹⁹ Search-and-rescue (SAR) is the single personnel recovery method that recovers personnel in distress. SAR is “the use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea, in an environment where there is no risk of hostile interference.”¹⁰⁰ In 2011, the CF responded to 9,183 SAR requests.¹⁰¹ Given the extensive amount of policy, doctrine, and publications that govern its actions, it is not surprising that when a call occurs, the average

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 44.

¹⁰¹ Department of National Defence, *CF Overview of SAR in Canada...*, 13/27.

response time for a domestic recovery activity is 18 to 50 minutes.¹⁰² As such, the CF has demonstrated a robust domestic SAR capability and although there is no doctrine or policy for an expeditionary capability, it has shown that it is capable of conducting deployed SAR.

Interestingly, concerning deployed SAR, there is no policy or direction. Even though higher direction is lacking, in 2010, when an earthquake destroyed much of the infrastructure of Haiti and thousands of people were declared missing, the CF deployed the Disaster Assistance Response Team.¹⁰³ For the first time in CF history, SAR Technicians deployed to search for survivors, provide medical care in hospitals, and evacuate seriously injured Haitians from remote locations to various medical facilities.¹⁰⁴ Although there was no overarching expeditionary CF policy, strategy, doctrine, or a contingency plan in place for an international SAR deployment, Canadian SAR technicians found themselves in Haiti. They were deployed because the threat was deemed low and there was not only the political will to employ them but also for the first time the strategic lift necessary to deploy their equipment to Haiti in a timely fashion. The CF has a robust domestic SAR capability and despite no overarching policy directing them to be capable of expeditionary tasks, they have deployed. The question that remains is if the CF would employ an element when the threat increases into combat recovery operations?

¹⁰² Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "Military rescue times need study, N.L. premier says," Accessed on 09 December 2012, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2011/10/04/nl-dunderdale-sartimes-104.html>.

¹⁰³ Department of National Defence, "Firefighters and SAR techs prove their value to DART," Accessed on 09 December 2012, <http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/v2/nr-sp/index-eng.asp?id=10368>.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

Personnel recovery operations are a “deliberate response to an event involving isolated personnel.”¹⁰⁵ It is composed of three methods: “Combat Recovery (CR), Combat Search-and-Rescue (CSAR), and Hostage Rescue (HR).”¹⁰⁶ Although the CF lacks an expeditionary personnel recovery strategy, it does have the means to perform all three methods in a recovery operation. *Aerospace Move Doctrine* defines the differences between the three options as follows:¹⁰⁷

Combat recovery (CR) is the recovery of isolated personnel from a situation where the risk of hostile interference is expected to be medium to high. “In combat recovery, either the recovery force, or the isolated personnel, or both, have not been trained in CSAR tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

Combat search and rescue (CSAR) is “the application of specific TTPs by dedicated forces to recover isolated personnel, who themselves are trained and appropriately equipped to receive this support, from a situation where hostile interference may be expected.

Hostage rescue (HR) is the recovery by SOF of isolated personnel who have been taken hostage by hostile adversaries. Recovery situations may need the assistance of SOF when conventional means are not suitable.

Within the Canadian context, an expeditionary hostage-rescue option had arguably already occurred. During a raid in Baghdad in 2006 by “multinational forces,” two Canadians were rescued, James Loney and Harmeet Singh Sooden.¹⁰⁸ Although there are no confirmed reports from the Government of Canada or the CF, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw stated that the rescue was the result of a “team effort between military and civilian personnel, including

¹⁰⁵ Department of National Defence, *B-GA-404-000/FP-001 Aerospace Move...*, 38.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 50.

¹⁰⁸ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “Ottawa's JTF2 commandos part of Iraq hostages rescue: reports,” Accessed on 09 December 2012, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/story/2006/03/23/ot-jtf2-rescue20060323.html>.

Canadian personnel.”¹⁰⁹ More importantly, Sergeant Martin Blais of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) confirmed that his police force was working in Iraq in “collaboration with DND, foreign affairs and our international partners.”¹¹⁰ As both the British Foreign Secretary and the RCMP confirmed members from National Defence as being present and participating in the recovery, a reasonable assumption is that the CF deployed personnel from the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM), as they are the only element in the CF trained in hostage rescue tactics.¹¹¹ Given Canada’s geographical size, a domestic hostage rescue response in Canada to either coast is similar to an international deployment. It involves the movement of enormous amounts of equipment and personnel to position themselves to conduct a recovery. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that they were used in Iraq, as the British Foreign Secretary and RCMP suggest.

As many Canadian military personnel recovery enthusiasts have rightly pointed out, Canada does not have a CSAR or CR capability.¹¹² Although it is not the focus of this paper, options do exist if the CF deployed into a theatre and needed to perform one of these methods. As both CF and allied doctrine suggests, traditionally if one of the methods is required by a nation that is lacking in capability, multinational support is sought to fulfill this requirement.¹¹³ The risk is too great to employ forces that have not been specially trained and equipped to perform these types of methods. Therefore, a CF strategy must include a mechanism to request allied support when no other option is available.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ Department of National Defence, “Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) Core Tasks,” Accessed on 09 December 2012, <http://www.cansofcom.forces.gc.ca/gi-ig/ct-tp-eng.asp>.

¹¹² Department of National Defence, *B-GA-404-000/FP-001 Aerospace Move...*, 51.

¹¹³ Department of Defence, *JP 3-50 Personnel Recovery...*, I-5.

This section examined personnel recovery activities and operations. It proved that despite the lack of a national or departmental strategy, the CF has supported expeditionary PRO requests on at least two occasions in the past six years. Although it seems that they were successful in both examples, without the necessary strategy and doctrine upon which to base their operations, they were crisis operations.¹¹⁴ As allied doctrine recommends that all commanders and staff have prior training in recovery operations to mitigate the increase political and strategic risks associated with failed operations,¹¹⁵ crisis response approach is not suitable in the CF given that there is no strategy to direct the training of staff officers. Therefore, the CF is fortunate that both events were successful and avoided the strategic failures that our allies experienced when untrained staff used a crisis response approach.¹¹⁶ As such, there is a requirement to formalize the CF expeditionary approach to recovery operations and to ensure that the necessary feedback mechanisms are in place to learn the valuable lessons from each deployment and to ensure the training of key staffs in personnel recovery. Without it, the CF is bound to repeat the same mistakes as our allies, which not only had political and strategic consequences but also resulted in the loss of service lives, due to the lack of a governing strategy directing the preparedness of CF personnel in personnel recovery doctrine, training, and exercises.

¹¹⁴ Department of National Defence, *B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 Canadian Forces...*, 4-3.

¹¹⁵ NATO, *AJP-3.3.9 (draft) Allied Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery...*, 31.

¹¹⁶ Richard A. Radvanyi, "Operation Eagle Claw – Lessons Learned" (master's thesis, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2001).

Personnel Recovery Operational Structures

As *CF Operations* suggests, having the necessary framework that allows different organizations to effectively operate together to accomplish a mission is critical to the success of the institution.¹¹⁷ Using the personnel recovery doctrinal organizational structures of a Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC), Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC), and a Personal Recovery Task Force (PRTF), this section will analyze the current CF organizational construct to prove that the recent transformation of the CF command and control structure is appropriate to oversee an expeditionary personnel recovery operation. In the past, any consideration to employ CF SAR assets in wartime or in support of low-intensity conflicts required authorization from Commander Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF).¹¹⁸ With the recent transformation of the CF, that is no longer the case. The Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) now makes those decisions.

A JPRC is the operational headquarters that oversees the planning, coordination, and monitoring of personnel recovery missions.¹¹⁹ With the recent transformation of the CF to a single operational level headquarters, the CF for the first time has the proper command and control structure to act as a JPRC and oversee an expeditionary recovery operation. During the past decade, the CF has undergone a significant transformation. The first phase occurred in 2006 with the creation of the four operational commands: Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, Canada Command, Canadian Operational Support Command, and Canadian Special Operations

¹¹⁷ Department of National Defence, *B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 Canadian Forces...*, 2-1.

¹¹⁸ Department of National Defence, *B-GA-404-000/FP-001 Aerospace Move...*, 48.

¹¹⁹ Department of Defence, *JP 3-50 Personnel Recovery...*, II-2 to II-6.

Command. The emerging asymmetric threats of the past decade were a critical component to the decision to create a new command structure within the CF; these commands made the force less bureaucratic and “the military more relevant, responsive, and effective.”¹²⁰ Prior to this transformation, the respective commanders coordinated the force employment of the Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air Force. This meant that joint operations required a tremendous amount of coordination between environmental commanders to obtain approvals. The change to a command-centric force that was capable of joint operations became the first step towards a CF capable of conducting expeditionary personnel recovery operations.

In October 2012, the CF commenced another transformation. Building upon the lessons learned from the previous iteration, the CF amalgamated three of the conventional commands to provide the necessary structure to support both “domestic and international operations in a timely, uninterrupted manner.”¹²¹ The result was the creation of CJOC, which has eliminated the administrative duplication between the former construct allowing the quick “allocation of resources to new and emerging demands.”¹²² The creation of a single operational command headquarters that commands and controls both domestic and international assets has changed the Canadian personnel recovery operating environment. For the first time in the CF’s history, the necessary authorities to redirect assets to support a personnel recovery operation or any crisis response reside within a single commander, one with direct access to the Chief of Defence Staff

¹²⁰ Department of National Defence, “Canadian Forces Transformation: New Operational Command and Control Structure,” Accessed on 09 December 2012, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/mobil/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=4195>.

¹²¹ Department of National Defence, “Canadian Joint Operations Command stood-up in Ottawa,” Accessed on 09 December 2012, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/mobil/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=4440>.

¹²² *Ibid.*

(CDS) for approval. As a secondary task of the CJOC is to “work closely with other government departments, the armed forces of traditional allies . . . and multinational organizations,” with the capacity to operate along the military, diplomatic, and civil lines of operations for potential recovery operations.¹²³ As personnel recovery operations often require streamlined approval processes to execute recoveries, the change to a single operational command with the necessary authorities to react to rapid changes to the situation, the CF can execute a personnel recovery operation without having to wait on multiple approvals from various environments or supporting commands.

Even though the CF was arguably able to respond to two personnel recovery operations’ in the last six years, all force generators and at least two of the operational commands had to be consulted within the previous force structure to coordinate the forces and equipment needed for a recovery deployment, unnecessarily delaying the recovery response. The previous organizational model was too large and cumbersome for the rapid reaction that is required for a recovery operation, although CANSOFCOM postures its limited reaction forces at the highest levels for immediate deployment. The recent transformation of the CF to a single operational level headquarters resulted in the formation of a joint operational command that can easily perform the duties associated with a JPRC. More importantly, it has the appropriate command and control structure in place to manage and oversee military options, and to advise other departments or organizations in the diplomatic and civil lines of operations the military can support regarding personnel recovery. With an understanding that the CJOC is able to conduct the duties of a

¹²³ *Ibid.*

JPRC, does the CF possess the capability to coordinate the tactical aspects of a recovery on the ground?

A PRCC is an element that resides within the tactical level operations headquarters responsible for the synchronization of any personnel recovery event.¹²⁴ Even though the CF does not practice employing a dedicated crisis response team to coordinate unforeseen situations, the inclusion of a PRCC element to all future deployed CF headquarters is manageable. Although allied personnel recovery doctrine recommends a dedicated team of trained personnel in personnel recovery functions operate the PRCC,¹²⁵ their personnel recovery duties need not be their primary function. Given the limited size of the CF and the reluctance to add personnel to what is perceived as an already inflated headquarters, the inclusion of a PRCC could be achieved by training a select number of staff amongst each of the deployed tactical level headquarters branches in personnel recovery. When a recovery event occurs, they could be grouped together to achieve their stated aims. Like any unforeseen requirement, the remainder of the headquarters would be able to continue managing the daily operations while the PRCC team manages and supports the recovery at the tactical level and provides the critical information needed by decision makers at the JPRC. While additional training to the existing pre-deployment exercise plans seems difficult, given the limited time available,¹²⁶ it is not insurmountable and it needs not occur in the pre-deployment phase. With an overarching strategy that directs the inclusion of personnel recovery doctrine and training into multiple levels of both Officer and Non-

¹²⁴ Department of Defence, *JP 3-50 Personnel Recovery...*, II-8.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ Department of National Defence, *Army Operation Plan FY 2012/2013v3* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2008), Chap 3.

Commissioned Member's career professional development, the CF would force generate the needed tactical and operational level staff officers capable of managing and supporting a recovery.

A PRTF is the force package that assembles to find, locate, and recover isolated personnel.¹²⁷ Although the CF does not have a dedicated CSAR capability, it is able to complete the full spectrum of personnel recovery. The CF already possesses a robust SAR capability that performs the complete spectrum of personnel recovery activities throughout Canada,¹²⁸ concern resides along the combat rescue portion of the spectrum. CANSOFCOM possess the Immediate Response Task Force (IRTF). CANSOFCOM's IRTF is the "highest readiness task force available to the Government of Canada."¹²⁹ They maintain a high readiness capability for short to no notice deployments that "could affect national interests."¹³⁰ While its primary focus is domestic and international counter-terrorism operations, its forces are capable of conducting the complete spectrum of personnel recovery methods, and they are experts in hostage rescue.¹³¹ The concern is whether to employ the CANSOFCOM IRTF for a CR or CSAR event that is neither high risk nor complex. If the personnel recovery situation is high risk and complex, they are ideally suited for the task. However, if it is low to medium risk and other forces are available, like the US Pararescue Jumpers that supported all Allied forces in Afghanistan,¹³² the CF could request multinational support to achieve the recovery. Thankfully, the new CJOC is able to

¹²⁷ NATO, *AJP-3.3.9 (draft) Allied Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery...*, 13.

¹²⁸ Department of National Defence, *CF Overview of SAR in Canada...*, 09/27.

¹²⁹ Department of National Defence, "Integrated Operating Concept," Accessed on 09 December 2012, <http://www.cansofcom.forces.gc.ca/gi-ig/ioc-coi-eng.asp>.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² United States Air Force, "Pararescue jumpers train 'that others may live,'" Accessed on 09 December 2012, <http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123037507>.

conduct such operational level coordination through their relationships with likeminded nations for such purposes.

This section analysed the doctrinally suitable organizational structures required to both command and control personnel recovery operations. It proved that the recent transformation to a single operational level headquarters has positioned the CF to be capable of conducting expeditionary recovery operations given that it holds all the necessary authorities to do so. Additionally, it proved that any CF strategy must direct the education and training of staffs and recovery forces. As the CF is rather small, a concerted effort must be made to ensure that all staff tasked to support or manage a recovery are trained in the doctrinal personnel recovery functions. Finally, it proved that the CF possesses the forces available to achieve the full spectrum of personnel recovery methods. As a personnel recovery capability has existed for over 70 years within the CF,¹³³ it is important to understand why it has not expanded beyond domestic SAR and include all expeditionary methods like the CF's allies.

Full Spectrum Failure: Previous CF Attempts to Expand the Capability

Personnel recovery within Canada has always focused on domestic SAR. Since its inception in 1942, there have been at least five strategic reviews.¹³⁴ Unfortunately, none of them resulted in the broadening of the capability to include an expeditionary personnel recovery option. By analyzing the most recent strategic review of 1994 and comparing it to today's

¹³³ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Search and Rescue: 50 Years of Service to Canadians* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997), 12.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

operating environment, this section will prove that the time is right for the development of an expeditionary strategy. It will show that all former attempts were limited due to financial and material equipment constraints. However, due to the CF's recent transformation and equipment acquisitions over the past decade to support the war in Afghanistan, the necessary organizational structure, specially trained forces, and equipment now exist to formalize a CF expeditionary strategy.

Over the course of the 1990s, the Government reduced the CF budget by \$14 billion, which resulted in base closures and a reduction in forces.¹³⁵ Indeed, how could the CF have developed a new capability when it was lacking the funding to simply maintain the status quo? Although finances were a concern in former attempts to expand the CF personnel recovery capability beyond domestic SAR, it is no longer the case. In 1994, the Minister of National Defence (MND), David Collonette, stated that the cuts were to be achieved by "eliminating activities that are not essential to the maintenance of the operational capabilities of the [CF]" and that efforts needed to be made in exploring the use of the private sector to deliver "services at a lower cost."¹³⁶ CF domestic SAR was one of those areas under review. After much scrutiny, the CF managed to retain the domestic capability, although reduced from five to only three regions and coordination centers.¹³⁷ Additionally, the CF lacked the strategic airlift to deploy forces globally on a moment's notice. With bases closing, many personnel requested retirement early, further limiting any attempts to expand rescue capabilities. Therefore, any thought of developing

¹³⁵ Paul Hudson, "The Future of Search and Rescue in the Canadian Forces" (Canadian Forces Command and Staff College New Horizon's Paper, Canadian Forces College, 1994), 2.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ Department of National Defence, *CF SAR: 50 Years of Service to Canadians...*, 12.

an expeditionary capability, was impractical due to the budget cuts. Due to these limitations, the CF simply struggled to retain what it had.

The financial climate of 1994 is not much different from that of the early 2010s. Like 1994, the CF underwent significant budget cuts in 2013.¹³⁸ However, in the intervening period, the CF organizationally transformed, receiving strategic resources that permit the department to project forces around the globe at a moment's notice. With the creation of Joint Task Force 2, the CF counter-terrorism and hostage rescue unit, in 1993, and the subsequent creation of CANSOFCOM in 2006,¹³⁹ the CF developed both personnel to perform the spectrum of high-risk combat related recovery methods and has the organizational structure and resources to deliver to conduct operations worldwide. While the CF is under immense pressure to cut expenses, unlike 1994, the government directed the Department of National Defence not to cut areas of operational capability or to look for civilian solutions.¹⁴⁰ As previously discussed, given that the CF has already conducted both deployed search-and-rescue and arguably a hostage rescue in the last decade, the personnel, equipment, training, and force employment structures are already in place. The only component that is missing is the overarching strategy needed to formalize them, direct the creation of expeditionary doctrine, and establish a feedback mechanism for personnel recovery.

¹³⁸ The Globe and Mail, "Deep Cuts to Military Mark Reversal for Harper," Accessed on 09 December 2012, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/budget/deep-cuts-to-military-mark-reversal-for-harper/article2386038/>.

¹³⁹ Department of National Defence, "JTF 2 Background Information," Accessed on 09 December 2012, <http://www.jtf2-foi2.forces.gc.ca/ajt-sfo/index-eng.asp>.

¹⁴⁰ The Globe and Mail, "Harper Letter to MacKay: Your Defence Budget Cuts Aren't Deep Enough," Accessed on 09 December 2012, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harper-letter-to-mackay-your-defence-budget-cuts-arent-deep-enough/article4651375/>.

By analyzing the historical strategic reviews of search-and-rescue and comparing the justification for maintaining the status quo in 1994 to the present operating environment, this section proved that now is the time to develop an expeditionary strategy. All former attempts were limited due to financial and equipment constraints. However, due to the CF's recent transformation and acquisition of strategic resources to support the war in Afghanistan, the CF now possesses the necessary organizational structure, specially trained personnel, and equipment to formalize a CF expeditionary strategy. By employing the CF on recent expeditionary personnel recovery operations, it has proven that it is capable of responding to Government of Canada requests to support a recovery, what is missing, is an approved departmental strategy to formalize the CF's approach.

Chapter Summary

This chapter examined personnel recovery doctrine, and compared it to recent CF expeditionary recovery operations to not only prove that the CF already possess an expeditionary capability but also to identify that a formalized strategy is lacking. Additionally, it provided the necessary foundation in personnel recovery doctrine to understand the complexities involved in personnel recovery. By defining personnel recovery, describing the three lines of operation, and explaining the military options available for a recovery, this chapter made four major conclusions.

First, when necessary, military commanders must engage counterparts outside of the CF to support or provide planning expertise to the diplomatic and civil lines of operation. Second,

despite the lack of a national or departmental strategy, the CF conducted and supported expeditionary recoveries on at least two occasions. Although it seems that they were successful in both cases, without the necessary strategy and doctrine upon which to base their operations, they were ad-hoc crisis response operations. As such, there is a requirement to formalize the CF expeditionary approach to ensure that the necessary feedback mechanisms are in place to learn the valuable lessons from each recovery operation. Without it, the CF's recovery operations are inefficient and the organization is bound to repeat mistakes or worse, fail to recover an isolated person due to the ad-hoc nature of the current approach. Third, it proved that the recent transformation to a single operational level headquarters positioned the CF as capable of conducting expeditionary recoveries, and that any strategy requires a preparation section on education and training to ensure staffs are trained to manage the complexities involved in a recovery operation. Finally, by analyzing the historical strategic reviews of search-and-rescue and comparing their results to today's operating environment, it proved that now is the time to develop an expeditionary strategy given that the necessary forces, organizational structure, and equipment resources needed to project forces is available. As President Eisenhower stated in the opening epigram, planning is indispensable and now is the time to do so. With an understanding of both what personnel recovery is and the methods used for a military option, understanding what authorities, if any, the CF possess to conduct recovery operations is the next topic of concern.

CHAPTER 3

POTENTIAL IMPEDIMENTS TO A CF PERSONNEL RECOVERY STRATEGY? EXAMINING THE LEGAL AND MORAL AUTHORITIES

About morals, I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you feel bad after.

- Ernest Hemingway, a prominent US author and journalist.¹⁴¹

An individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for the law.

- Martin Luther King Jr, Leader of the African-American Civil Rights Movement.¹⁴²

Legal and moral considerations are a constant factor in planning. As Ernest Hemingway and Martin Luther King Jr. suggest in the opening epigrams, sometimes governments and their militaries need to do what is right, and if a law does not exist to authorize it; there are other avenues that can be pursued to rectify an injustice. Throughout the initiation and orientation stages of the CF operational planning process, key advisors meet with higher authorities to determine the legal basis by which to conduct an operation.¹⁴³ During this process, legal advisors review “Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), Host Nation Support (HNS) agreements, inter-theatre civil law,” the UN Charter, Geneva Conventions, International Customary Law, and any other legal aspect that may support or inhibit the

¹⁴¹ Brainy Quote, “Moral Quotes,” Accessed on 30 December 2012, <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/keywords/moral.html>.

¹⁴² Inspirational Quotes Zone, “Law Quotes,” Accessed on 30 December 2012, <http://www.quotes-zone.com/quotes/16/law.php>.

¹⁴³ Department of National Defence, *CFJP 5.0 Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process...*, 3-3.

execution of a military option.¹⁴⁴ As CF leaders have a moral responsibility for the care of its members, in a case where there is no clear legal authority to conduct a recovery, the circumstances may force the CF to seek authorization from the Government of Canada to make a moral decision that could have long-term strategic ramifications.¹⁴⁵ As the operational planning process requires a continuous examination of the required authorities to execute an operation, this chapter will prove that the required moral and legal rights already exist to conduct an expeditionary personnel recovery operation, permitting and supporting the creation of a CF personnel recovery strategy.

While the mention of legalities and/or moral obligations has been limited within the previous Canadian academic research in this subject area,¹⁴⁶ the aspects fair prominently in allied personnel recovery academic papers.¹⁴⁷ By limiting the legal and moral focus to only the domestic aspects or not addressing them in even their CSAR arguments, the previous CF members' research missed a critical component to any operation; the legal authority to execute a recovery. By examining the legal and moral aspects of other types of operations along the spectrum of conflict,¹⁴⁸ this chapter will identify that the legal framework is already in place for the Government of Canada to conduct an expeditionary recovery operation and that it has a moral

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/PA-004 *Leadership in the CF: Conceptual Foundations* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 20.

¹⁴⁶ Brian Newman, "Personnel Recovery for Low and Medium Threat Operations: A Required Capability for The Canadian Forces" (Canadian Forces Command and Staff College New Horizon's Paper, Canadian Forces College, 2007); M Williams, "Canadian Air Search and Rescue: At the Crossroads" (Canadian Forces Command and Staff College New Horizon's Paper, Canadian Forces College, 1991).

¹⁴⁷ Paul A. Fortunato, "Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel: A Relevant Capability for a Moral Obligation" (Master's thesis, Marine Corps University, 2002); Richard A. Radvanyi, "Operation Eagle Claw – Lessons Learned" (master's thesis, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2001);

¹⁴⁸ Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2008), 3-11 to 3-13.

obligation to do so. In addition, this chapter will show the need to include legal and moral arguments in national policy, departmental policies, military publication, and throughout all academic work to form the legal basis required under customary law to justify a recovery, a practice used by our allies to great success.

To prove that the CF already has the necessary authorities, the first section will examine the moral aspects described within allied personnel recovery strategies to determine if the same considerations apply to Canadians. The second section examines the legalities of an expeditionary recovery to prove that the same internationally recognized multilateral institutions that provide the legitimate authority to conduct all other types of warfare on the spectrum of conflict,¹⁴⁹ authorize the Government of Canada to affect a military recovery option. As the government needs public support to consider a military recovery option a viable course of action, this chapter will examine the government's moral obligation to affect a recovery of a citizen first.

Moral Authority: The Critical Domestic Requirement

As Canada's allies have stated in numerous doctrine publications and through their national level policies, "personnel recovery is an issue of national importance."¹⁵⁰ The moral aspects are a powerful factor in rallying the public to support a recovery operation or to justify one after the fact. This section will prove that the same moral obligations that apply to our

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ Fortunato, *Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel...*, 35.

western allies, apply to Canada and the CF. Specifically, this section will analyse the value of life and that military members are a valuable resource that the CF cannot afford to lose.¹⁵¹

Canada's allies have placed a significant value on the "sanctity of human life,"¹⁵² so much so that they declare in their national strategies a moral obligation to do everything within their power to recover all citizens and bring them home.¹⁵³ Canadians are no different. In 1979, six members of the US embassy staff in Tehran escaped the student occupation of the embassy, later sheltered by the Canadian ambassador, Ken Taylor, until the US government orchestrated an unconventional recovery.¹⁵⁴ By assisting the US embassy members, Mr. Taylor, could have legally been given a death sentence by the Iranian courts, if caught. He demonstrated that Canadians have the same value of the sanctity of life as our allies and as such, Canadian diplomats have placed their own lives on the line to assist in the recovery of isolated personnel.

While some relatives of Canadians held hostage believe that the Government is selective on whom they assist and therefore, do not place a high value on all captured persons lives,¹⁵⁵ this fact is simply not true. In Beverly Giesbrecht's case, a Vancouver business executive the Taliban took hostage in Pakistan in 2008, whom later died in captivity, the Canadian government pursued

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ MacLean's Magazine, "Gary Doer on U.S. Elections, the Fiscal Cliff, and the after-effects of Argo," Accessed on 30 December 2012, <http://www2.macleans.ca/tag/argo/>.

¹⁵⁵ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "B.C. Woman Abducted in Pakistan Believed Dead," Accessed on 30 December 2012, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/05/05/bc-woman-pakistan-giesbrecht.html>.

only diplomatic and civil initiatives due to the risk of attempting a military option.¹⁵⁶

Unfortunately, there is a limit to how much risk a government can assume to recover a citizen. Internal and external factors must align and states must adopt prudent mitigation measures to justify a risky military option. In the case of Beverly Giesbrecht, the risk associated with a military option was too high given that she was held in a volatile area of Pakistan under Taliban control. Thus, the government attempted to do everything reasonably possible to affect her recovery and unfortunately, a military option was ruled out due to the risk associated.¹⁵⁷

As the risk of capture to the CF's soldiers, sailors, special operators, airmen and airwomen is increasing, like Canada's allies they are a "valuable and limited resource, which [the CF] cannot afford to lose."¹⁵⁸ In 1995, a US pilot, Captain Scott O'Grady, was shot down in Yugoslavia and later recovered by US CSAR forces.¹⁵⁹ In an interview he gave after his release, he stated that personnel recovery "...preserves a valuable asset for future use and prevents exploitation by the enemy."¹⁶⁰ He further stated that his only motivation while evading the enemy was the "knowledge that [he] would be rescued."¹⁶¹ The training and development that CF members undergo to become proficient in their area of expertise occurs over numerous years. Personnel that are more senior typically receive more professional development and are privy to more sensitive information making them a richer target for exploitation by the enemy. The

¹⁵⁶ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "RCMP Secretly Ended Probe into Canadian held by Taliban," Accessed on 30 December 2012, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/story/2012/04/17/bc-giesbrecht-kidnap-investigation-closed-rcmp.html>.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ Fortunato, *Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel...*, 35.

¹⁵⁹ The New York Times, "O'Grady Back in the U.S.A., to Family's Joy and Delight," Accessed on 30 December 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/12/world/o-grady-back-in-the-usa-to-family-s-joy-and-delight.html>.

¹⁶⁰ Fortunato, *Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel...*, 48.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

knowledge that they possess can place a large number of forces in jeopardy. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the CF to attempt to recover any of its personnel as soon as possible after capture. In addition, CF members are not an expendable resource. The government and the CF must make every reasonable attempt to prevent their capture and to recover them if they are. The CF cannot easily force generate personnel the necessary replacements in a short period to mitigate the loss of experience. Therefore, the CF needs to take the appropriate steps to keep them safe or to secure them if they become isolated or captured.

By analysing the moral aspects of personnel recovery, this section showed that the same moral obligations apply to Canada and the CF. Specifically, this section analysed the value of life and the lengths to which the government will attempt to facilitate a recovery along the spectrum of personnel recovery operations. In addition, it proved that military members are a finite and precious resource that the CF cannot afford to lose given their importance to current and future operations. As all commanders must have the means to act on their moral obligations, they require a detailed understanding of their legal rights to execute a recovery operation.¹⁶² Therefore, the final aspects considered are the legal authorities that authorize the CF to conduct recovery missions.

¹⁶² Department of National Defence, *B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 Canadian Forces...*, 1-8.

Legal Authority: The Need for International Approval

Since government officials and CF leadership must act in accordance with the applicable laws that govern their response,¹⁶³ this section will examine three aspects of international laws and treaties that support the conduct of a military personnel recovery operation: the UN Charter, treaties, and international customary law. By analyzing these three legal aspects, this section will prove that the same international laws that allow the CF to conduct other expeditionary operations, such as major combat or NEO, allows them to recover isolated or captured Canadians. As Canada was a founding member of the UN,¹⁶⁴ the first aspect considered is Article 51 under Chapter VII of the UN, the right to self-defence.

Article 51 states that nothing “shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the [UN].”¹⁶⁵ This article also authorizes the Government of Canada and the CF to conduct personnel recovery operations. Article 51 authorizes recovery operations because an attack on a citizen, regardless of where they are in the world, is an attack on the state.¹⁶⁶ In 1980, the US invoked the right to self-defence for Operation EAGLE CLAW, the failed military rescue attempt of 60 US citizens from its embassy

¹⁶³ Department of National Defence, A-LG-007-000/AF-010 *Military Administrative Law Manual* (Ottawa: DND Canada, October 01, 2008), 1-2.

¹⁶⁴ United Nations Association in Canada, “Canada and UN Peacekeeping,” Accessed on 30 December 2012, <http://www.unac.org/peacekeeping/en/un-peacekeeping/fact-sheets/canada-and-un-peacekeeping/>.

¹⁶⁵ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations. Chapter VII: Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” Accessed on 30 December 2012, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>.

¹⁶⁶ Nicholas Tsagourias, “Necessity and the Use of Force: A Special Regime.” in *Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Volume 41, 2010*, edited by I.F. Dekker and E.Hey, 11-42. (The Hague: Stichting T.M.C. Asser Instituut, 2011), 22.

in Tehran, Iran.¹⁶⁷ On 15 July 2000, the UN itself used self-defence to justify a rescue of 233 captured peacekeepers held in Sierra Leone.¹⁶⁸ UN Secretary-General Koffi Annan stated, “the use of force in a [UN] mission to extract its personnel from the area had become inevitable;” he made the decision to conduct the operation only after “intensive diplomatic and political efforts at all levels” failed, which increased the threat to the hostages.¹⁶⁹ Finally, the use of force is confirmed in allied doctrine for the protection of its citizens while abroad, stating that intervention is authorized based on self-defence, specifically referencing Article 51 of the UN Charter for recovery of citizens.¹⁷⁰ More importantly, in 1979 the UN enacted the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, authorizing states under article 3 of the resolution to take “all measures it considers appropriate to ease the situation of the hostages, in particular, to secure [their] release.”¹⁷¹ This resolution and Article 51 allows member states to take appropriate action to effect a recovery, even if the state within which the hostages are being held are non-compliant or an adversary.

Even though members of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council have questioned recovery operations, their comments and concerns do not question the legality of invoking the right to self-defence but rather, they argue for proportional force to execute the

¹⁶⁷ Radvanyi, *Operation Eagle Claw – Lessons Learned...*, 1.

¹⁶⁸ CNN Transcripts, “U.N. Military Mission Rescues Captive Peacekeepers in Sierra Leone,” Accessed on 30 December 2012, <http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0007/15/smn.09.html>.

¹⁶⁹ Los Angeles Times, “Daring U.N. Raid Frees Sierra Leone Peacekeepers,” Accessed on 30 December 2012, <http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jul/16/news/mn-53766>.

¹⁷⁰ Ministry of Defence, Joint Warfare Publication 3-51, *Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations* (Shrivenham: U.K. Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2000), 1-1.

¹⁷¹ University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, “International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,” Accessed on 30 December 2012, <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/takinghostages.html>.

recovery.¹⁷² The right to self-defence under the UN Charter not only authorizes the Government of Canada and the CF to conduct peacekeeping or major combat operations but also authorizes them to conduct personnel recovery operations to rescue a Canadian citizen. Besides the UN, the use of treaties and other interstate agreements form the legal basis for international military operations.

The Government of Canada follows the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which defines treaties as “an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law.”¹⁷³ Numerous treaties bind Canada and the CF, authorizing them to take military action to recover citizens. The most commonly referenced treaty for recovery operations is the Geneva Convention: specifically, the Fourth Geneva Convention and Common Article 3, which both prohibit the taking of hostages.¹⁷⁴ As such, the International Criminal Court recognizes hostage takings as “a war crime in both international and non-international armed conflicts.”¹⁷⁵ In 1995, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia charged Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic with war crimes for taking UN peacekeepers hostage.¹⁷⁶ The Tribunal found them guilty and in “violation of the laws and customs of war.”¹⁷⁷ These same conventions authorize states to take appropriate action to affect a

¹⁷² Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia Report (vol. II, 2009), 285-289. http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_II.pdf.

¹⁷³ Government of Canada, “Canada Treaty Information,” Accessed on 30 December 2012, <http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/procedures.aspx>.

¹⁷⁴ Geneva Conventions, common Article 3 (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 32, p 2046); Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 34 (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 32, p 2047) and Article 147 (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 32, p 2048).

¹⁷⁵ ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(a)(viii) and (c)(iii) (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 32, p 2054).

¹⁷⁶ International Committee of the Red Cross, “Rule 96. Hostage-Taking,” Accessed on 30 December 2012, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter32_rule96.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

release, and combined with the support of the UN under Chapter VII Article 51, the right to self-defence, the military action is acceptable and deemed consistent with treaty law.

Although treaties apply only to those states that ratify them, their use to legally justify military action for a recovery is recognized by the majority of the world.¹⁷⁸ In fact, 192 nations have signed onto the Geneva Conventions. As such, the Geneva Conventions and other routinely used treaties that the Government of Canada is a party to and form the basis of all legal arguments to deploy forces. Treaties are used not only with the UN to argue a case for self-defence and support for an Article 51 operation, but also for the International Criminal Court (ICC) should another country file for a judicial review of CF actions in attempting a recovery in their sovereign state.

As the ICC may request Canada justify a military recovery option that could impinge upon the sovereign rights of another state, the third legal aspect that states often use to argue support for a CF recovery operation is that of international customary law. International customary law provides Canada and the CF “the independent legal bases to deploy and use force” to affect a recovery for the rescue of Canadian nationals.¹⁷⁹ Therefore, even without UN approval, Canada and the CF can still conduct a military personnel recovery option. More importantly, an international court would support the action, if the CF met five conditions:¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ Jean-Marie Henckaerts, “Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law,” *American Society of International Law* (Proceedings of the Annual Meeting; 2005), 423.

¹⁷⁹ Canadian Forces College, *Command: The International Law Context...*, 3 -5.

¹⁸⁰ Christopher Waters, “Command: The International Law Context” (lecture, Canadian Forces College, Toronto, Ontario, November 26, 2012), with permission.

- the CF would need to act independently;
- was able to justify that the mission was only for the rescue of Canadians nationals;
- the mission was limited in size and scope to just the recovery;
- CF forces did not occupy any terrain for longer than is needed to secure the release and were not present to partake in assisting with any regime change; and
- a proportional use of force was applied to keep it under the threshold for aggression.

Although for Canada and the CF to exercise a recovery option using only international customary law is questionable, given the uncertainties in establishing a recognized legal custom,¹⁸¹ precedence and/or customs can form the foundation for the legal authority to conduct a recovery. Therefore, international customary law does provide Canada and the CF with a third option to pursue the legal bases to deploy forces to affect a recovery of isolated or captured Canadians.

By examining the three aspects of international law, which support the conduct of a military personnel recovery operation, this section proved that the same laws that allow the CF to conduct everything from humanitarian assistance to major combat operations, allows it to recover isolated or captured Canadians in another state. More importantly, it suggested that the combined use of international customary law, treaty law, and gaining support from the UN under either

¹⁸¹ Brian D. Lepard, *Customary International Law: A New Theory with Practical Applications* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010), 531.

Article 51 of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, is the best means to gain international support and legal justification to conduct a recovery.

Chapter Summary

This chapter proved that the CF already possesses the required moral and legal authorities to conduct an expeditionary personnel recovery operation. There is no legal or moral impediment to the creation of a CF strategy; rather, existing standards justify such a construct. By examining various multilateral legal organizations and considering allied strategic direction that emphasizes the need for a personnel recovery strategy, this chapter identified that the international legal framework is already in place for the Government of Canada to conduct a recovery; indeed, the government has a moral obligation to do so. As Ernest Hemingway and Martin Luther King's epigrams indicate at the opening of this chapter, personnel recoveries are morally right because the country feels good after they are done and that if need be; Canada can claim customary law to affect a recovery to correct an injustice. With an understanding that the CF has the same legal and moral authorities to conduct a recovery as it does with any other operations, the final personnel recovery piece determines how the CF should create a robust strategy.

CHAPTER 4

THE PROPOSAL: THE THREE PILLARS OF A CF EXPEDITIONARY PERSONNEL RECOVERY STRATEGY

Strategy is a style of thinking, a conscious and deliberate process, an intensive implementation system, the science of insuring future success.

- Pete Johnson, an internationally acclaimed strategy expert.¹⁸²

The CF has conducting personnel recovery for over 70 years.¹⁸³ During that period, it developed only domestic SAR policy and doctrine, the least complex and politically sensitive recovery method of the six available. As such, anything beyond domestic SAR training and preparedness has required an ad-hoc approach due to the lack of policy and doctrine in this area.¹⁸⁴ As the CF has both a legal and moral obligation to protect its members and Canadian citizens, not only in Canada but also while deployed on operations, a strategy for an expeditionary CF personnel recovery framework is required to commence discussions regarding the development of a departmental strategy. This chapter will propose an initial approach for an expeditionary CF policy on personnel recovery. As any development of a departmental strategy will require input from all stakeholders involved with force generation and employment of CF resources, the proposal is recommended as the basis for future discussion on the creation of a strategy and is provided to create discussion in the various areas of concern with this issue.

¹⁸² Decision Innovation, "Strategy Quotes Related to Decision Making," Accessed on 18 December 2012, http://www.decision-making-solutions.com/strategy_quotes.html.

¹⁸³ Para Rescue Association of Canada, *That Others May Live: 50 Years of Para Rescue in Canada, 1944-1994* (Ottawa: Tri-Graphic Printing, 1994), 9.

¹⁸⁴ Dave MacIver, et al. *Canadian Force Personnel Recovery Policy* (Draft Briefing Note Prepared for Minister of National Defence, June 2009), 1.

In 2008, representatives from across the CF met to establish a draft proposal for a CF personnel recovery policy.¹⁸⁵ Unfortunately, due to a number of postings, all work stopped on this initiative. Using the concepts discussed over the course of the year in the personnel recovery working group, allied research in this area,¹⁸⁶ and the findings from the previous sections of this paper, this chapter will propose a strategy based on three pillars: prevention, preparation, and the conduct of a personnel recovery operation (Figure 4.1).¹⁸⁷




Figure 4.1 – CF Personnel Recovery Strategy

Source: MacIver, *Canadian Force Personnel Recovery Policy...*, 2

¹⁸⁵ Author was the CANSOFCOM representative and major contributor to the draft policy and sole author of the draft CONPLAN.

¹⁸⁶ Michael Wormley, “Combat Search and Rescue: Searching the History; Rescuing the Doctrine,” Master’s Thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, 2003; Ministry of Defence, Joint Warfare Publication 3-51, *Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations* (Shrivenham: U.K. Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2000); Department of Defence, Army Field Manual 3-50.1, *Army Personnel Recovery* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 21, 2011). Department of Defence, Joint Publication 3-50, *Personnel Recovery* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 5, 2007); Department of Defence, Joint Publication 3-50.2, *Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 26, 1996); Department of Defence, Joint Publication 3-50.21, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat Search and Rescue* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 23, 1998); Department of Defence, Joint Publication 3-50.3, *Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 06, 1996); Department of Defence. United States Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 14, 2012).

¹⁸⁷ MacIver, *Canadian Force Personnel Recovery Policy...*, 2.

The objective is a proposal that addresses the following:¹⁸⁸

- Protection and maintenance of operational security and morale of CF personnel by providing for their recovery and reintegration;
- Appropriateness of personnel recovery education and training conducted throughout the CF to prepare members if they become isolated or captured;
- Direct the establishment of a personnel recovery feedback mechanism to capture the lessons learned from personnel recovery training and operations; and
- How the CF can prepare designated forces to plan, coordinate, and execute a recovery through the establishment of doctrine, contingency plans, and training readiness exercises.

By adopting a broader perspective of personnel recovery prevention, preparedness, and the strategic direction required for an operation, this chapter will provide a Canadian solution to recovery operations. As the preservation of life is of the utmost importance to governments and described as the main objective within allied personnel recovery doctrine,¹⁸⁹ the first aspect considered of the proposed strategy is prevention.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁹ Department of Defence, Army Field Manual 3-50.1, *Army Personnel Recovery* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 21, 2011), 1-1.

Prevention: Mitigate the Need for Recovery

Prevention for personnel recovery is the “leveraging of educational and training resources to prepare personnel” if they become isolated or captured.¹⁹⁰ There are two key subcomponents to prevention: force protection and personal security (Figure 4.1).¹⁹¹ It is through individual education, training, and the sharing of lessons learned that the CF mitigates the risks associated with both force protection and personal security.¹⁹² By analyzing these requirements, this section will prove how the CF can prevent both military and civilian personnel that deploy from becoming isolated or captured. The CF has a responsibility to prepare all individuals deploying for the possibility,¹⁹³ and therefore, they need to educate those at risk in the various tactics, techniques, and procedures, not only to avoid capture but also to prepare them for what to expect and how to respond if they are captured.

Isolated and captured personnel education and training consists of various types and degrees of Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training.¹⁹⁴ As the CF finds itself deployed in more asymmetrical environments, there is a greater need for a formal strategy that directs all deploying forces, including any civilians from other government departments or from within DND that support the CF, to complete necessary training prior to deployment. The majority of personnel deploying from outside of Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI), and CANSOFCOM do not receive the training unless they attend the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in

¹⁹⁰ MacIver, *Canadian Force Personnel Recovery Policy...*, 2.

¹⁹¹ Department of National Defence, *DRAFT Canadian Forces Personnel Recovery Policy* (Prepared for Personnel Recovery Working Group, June 2009), 3.

¹⁹² Department of Defence, *FM 3-50.1 Army Personnel Recovery...*, 4-8.

¹⁹³ Department of Defence, *JP 3-50 Personnel Recovery...*, IV-4.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, IV-1.

Kingston.¹⁹⁵ Regrettably, the majority of civilian contractors, reservists, and last minute personnel added to deployments do not attend PSTC.

A CF personnel recovery strategy must address the lack of preparatory personnel recovery training and direct that the force generators complete an assessment for all people deploying to determine the risk of isolation or capture. The factors in the assessment are not limited and must analysis all position assignments to determine the likelihood of the person filling that role could be vulnerable to hostile forces.¹⁹⁶ In addition, it must assess the risk to national interests of each position if terrorists or criminals were to capture them.¹⁹⁷ Prior to any deployment, those personnel determined to be at potential risk must complete the required level of conduct-after-capture and resistance-to-interrogation training. The only way to ensure that all environments enforce this requirement is through the establishment of a departmental strategy that emphasises prevention. Without it, the CF will continue to deploy medium to high-risk personnel, without the necessary foundation, which makes them a liability once deployed. When educated, personnel need to conduct regular continuation training not only prior to deployment but also in theatre.

To achieve prevention, personnel must incorporate the potential of isolation or capture as a possibility into every plan or operation. Therefore, on-the-job training (OJT) and in unit training needs to persist as part of pre-deployment preparations and in theatre as continuation

¹⁹⁵ Department of National Defence, *Army Operation Plan FY 2012/2013v3* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2008), 3-H-2/3.

¹⁹⁶ Department of National Defence, *DRAFT CF Personnel Recovery Policy...*, 3.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

training. A CF strategy must direct CJOC as the force employer to include individual continuation training during the pre-deployment phase and execution phase of any deployment. As US personnel recovery doctrine states, OJT needs to occur on a routine basis for all personnel, and it cannot be substituted for other combat readiness or pre-deployment training when time is lacking.¹⁹⁸ To do so would negate the affects education and training have on keeping personnel from isolation or capture. In addition, commanders and staff at all levels must include continuation-training programs within their deployed units to ensure that their personnel remain skilled in the applicable personnel recovery tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

Unfortunately, without strategic direction from CJOC and the environmental headquarters to ensure personnel recovery training occurs, Commanding Officers' will continue to allow personnel to deploy without the necessary training.¹⁹⁹ Regular classes, self-study material, and even the inclusion of actions-on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) into mission briefs is necessary to prevent at risk personnel. This training would be similar to the existing Rules-of-Engagement (RoE) and Law-of-Armed-Conflict (LOAC) continuation training that CJOC directs all deployed personnel to conduct routinely while deployed. By ensuring that the potential threat to soldiers is widely understood and that they practice TTPs that make them a more difficult target for capture, it assists in preventing an event from occurring. With this training, individuals and units will need a mechanism to draw on the experience of members who have used these lessons on both exercises and operations to enhance future force generation.

¹⁹⁸ Department of Defence, *JP 3-50 Personnel Recovery...*, IV-2.

¹⁹⁹ Based off authors experience as the Chief of Staff at the Consolidated Fielding Center on Op ATTENTION Roto 0 after receiving nearly 40% of augmentees who did not receive any personnel recovery training.

Studying military history is important to ensure that CF members do not repeat the same mistakes; lessons learned organizations provide a means to achieve this. To capitalize on the education and training that will occur, the strategy needs to ensure that the various training centres and units preparing soldiers for deployment share the lessons learned from the practical application of personnel recovery doctrine. The more complex and politically sensitive, “the greater the importance of the lessons learned or mislearned.”²⁰⁰ The CF already possesses an excellent network to disseminate lessons learned. The CF Warfare Centre, the institution that is responsible to conceive, design, and deliver joint capabilities within the military to enhance operational effectiveness and readiness, already possesses a robust joint lessons learned capability that can provide “centralized governance and coordination” in distributing personnel recovery lessons learned. As personnel recovery is a joint initiative, the strategy must direct all force generators to share the various lessons learned that pertain to their element and retain them not only in their applicable centres of excellence but also have them promulgated at the CF Warfare Centre joint lesson learned branch.

While the CF personnel recovery capability originated in the RCAF,²⁰¹ each element needs to retain their after-action-reports and have access to the other elements because it is a joint initiative. By adding a mechanism to reference each force generators lessons learned archives, such as hyperlinks in each environmental online document repositories directing them to the CF Warfare Centre joint lessons learned page, the CF can achieve a joint approach to capture critical lessons for personnel recovery that all personnel and units preparing for operational

²⁰⁰ Milan Vego, “On Military Theory.” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 62, (3rd Quarter, 2011): 64, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-62/JFQ62_59-67_Vego.pdf.

²⁰¹ Para Rescue Association of Canada, *That Others May Live: 50 Years of Para Rescue in Canada...*, 8.

deployments can access. A feedback mechanism is critical to any strategy; therefore, there is a need for a policy that directs the establishment of a joint lessons learned mechanism within the CF.

By analyzing the individual education, training, and requirement to share lessons learned throughout all four CF services, this section proposes that a personnel recovery strategy outlines how the CF can assist in the prevention of personnel becoming isolated or captured. First, it showed that formal risk assessments are the catalyst determining who within a deployment needs basic, moderate, or enhanced conduct-after-capture and resistance to interrogation training. Secondly, it proposed that the strategy direct continuation training prior to and during all deployments. Finally, it proposed that the strategy direct the establishment of a joint lessons-learned process to capture all training and operations concerns to ensure that forces are prepared for any personnel recovery eventualities. The CF has a responsibility to prepare all deploying individuals for the possibility of isolation or capture. The key to prevention is preparedness and a CF PR strategy must include both.

Preparation: Providing the Necessary Training

Preparation involves “individuals, forces, staffs, and organisations being ready and structured for the potential isolation event involving personnel overseas.”²⁰² Proper preparation allows commanders, and staff to respond. By analysing collective training, and the need for contingency plans, this section will propose how a CF personnel recovery strategy will address

²⁰² MacIver, *Canadian Force Personnel Recovery Policy...*, 2.

preparedness. As the CJOC will act as the JPRC to coordinate and execute an operation, the first subcomponent of preparedness will provide the transition from a crisis response approach to deliberate planning.

The deliberate approach to personnel recovery planning must start with the development of an operational level contingency plan, preferably resting with CJOC. At first glance, the frequency at which personnel become isolated and require recovery is low. Due to the infrequency of the requirement, some military planners have argued that PRO should remain as a crisis response.²⁰³ However, much like Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), recovery operations requires a detailed deliberate contingency plan with an overarching strategy due to the complexities involved.²⁰⁴ During the past decade, 17 Canadians found themselves as hostages in 14 different personnel recovery events around the globe.²⁰⁵ Within that same period, the Canadian government conducted only one expeditionary NEO out of Lebanon in 2006.²⁰⁶ Interestingly, the CF has a NEO policy, a doctrine with detailed TTPs, a standing operational level contingency plan, and a regular training program for the tactical and operational level

²⁰³ Comments made to author between 2008-2009 when he was the CANSOFCOM Personnel recovery OPI in the development of a draft policy and CONPLAN that were never approved due to a lack of an overarching departmental strategy.

²⁰⁴ A. Joelekar, *et al.*, *Interim Report on Interagency National Personnel Recovery Architecture* (Alexandria, Virginia: Institute for defence Analyses, 2003), 21.

²⁰⁵ The Globe and Mail, "Canadians Taken Hostage Abroad in the Past Decade," Accessed on 12 December 2012, <http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canadians-taken-hostage-abroad-in-the-past-decade/article564834/?service=mobile>.

²⁰⁶ Department of National Defence, "Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation LION," Accessed on 12 December 2012, <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=335&CdnOpId=408>.

headquarters that supports other government departments in a NEO.²⁰⁷ Yet, the CF has nothing in place for personnel recovery beyond the *Aerospace Move* publication definitions.

Although the 2006 NEO out of Lebanon involved the evacuation of 14,370 Canadians,²⁰⁸ it was a solitary event. How does NEO have the required strategy, doctrine, contingency plans, and force generation training when it has been used only once and yet, Personnel recovery is considered a crisis response when there were at least 13 more events? The crisis response approach is insufficient. The establishment of a CJOC operational level contingency plan is the first step in preparing the CF for an isolated or captured person event. Once the operational level is prepared with the appropriate plans in place to guide staff in preparing for a PRO, exercises and rehearsal need to occur on a routine basis to ensure readiness.

A critical aspect to preparedness is the requirement to exercise and rehearse all aspects of the various deploying units and higher headquarters. The CF strategy must direct the inclusion of rehearsals of all headquarters and deploying forces in at least one personnel recovery event during pre-deployment training. Without the necessary exercises and rehearsals, the CF is at risk of the same fate that occurred with the US forces during Operation EAGLE CLAW, a failed hostage rescue to recover US personnel in Iran. In November 1979, 500 Iranians overtook the US Embassy in Tehran capturing 60 US hostages.²⁰⁹ Two days later, the pentagon began planning their rescue. Unfortunately, due to the staff's failure to understand personnel recovery doctrine

²⁰⁷ Department of National Defence, "CF Trains for Non-Combatant Evacuations," Accessed on 12 December 2012, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/tml/article-eng.asp?id=14&y=2012&m=11>.

²⁰⁸ Consiglio Di Nino and Peter Stollery, *The Evacuation Of Canadians From Lebanon in July 2006: Implications For The Government Of Canada* (Ottawa: Queen Printing Press, May 2007), 1.

²⁰⁹ Radvanyi, *Operation Eagle Claw – Lessons Learned...*, 1.

and the lack of a coordinated joint rehearsal between the supporting elements, the US president approved a failed recovery plan.²¹⁰ On 24 April 1980, the US attempted the recovery operation but the commander aborted the mission due to a shortage of aircraft.²¹¹ It was then that a helicopter crashed into a C-130, resulting in the death of 8 US service men.²¹² The force had not rehearsed the potential for mission abort and therefore, when it occurred they were not prepared.²¹³ The failings of the US recovery force on Operation EAGLE CLAW led to the inclusion of joint training exercises and rehearsals within Allied personnel recovery doctrine. The proposed CF strategy must do the same, directing that all headquarters and units deploying complete a personnel recovery event as part of their pre-deployment exercises.

CF task forces already conduct pre-deployment training at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC), which provides soldiers with the foundation training required for deployments.²¹⁴ The CF ought to incorporate personnel recovery training into the existing exercises at CMTC. The institution should also leverage existing NEO exercises, which validate the proficiency of the operational level headquarters,²¹⁵ to include a personnel recovery event to ensure that the CJOC is prepared to act as the JPRC. Regardless of how it is accomplished, the proposed CF strategy must direct the inclusion of rehearsals of all headquarters, exercising all

²¹⁰ William M. Steele, "The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission: A Case Study" (master's thesis, National War College, 1984), 45.

²¹¹ Radvanyi, *Operation Eagle Claw – Lessons Learned...*, 6.

²¹² *Ibid.*

²¹³ *Ibid.*

²¹⁴ Lena Angell, "Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre Redesigns Training for Future Ops," *The Maple Leaf*, Vol. 14, No. 11, (March 16, 2011): 11.

²¹⁵ Department of National Defence, "CF Trains for Non-Combatant Evacuations," Accessed on 12 December 2012, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/tml/article-eng.asp?id=14&y=2012&m=11>.

deploying forces in at least one personnel recovery event prior to deployment. Otherwise, the CF risks the same fate that the US experienced during Operation EAGLE CLAW.

By analysing the need to exercise and rehearse all potential forces that may support a PRO request and the need for a contingency plan, this section proposed that a CF personnel recovery strategy must direct that these aspects be included into an overall CF strategy. As preparation for expeditionary personnel recovery involves individual, force, staff, and organisational readiness and proper force structure, implementation of the direction above in a comprehensive CF strategy, will permit commanders, staffs, and forces to respond deliberately to such an event.

Personnel Recovery Operations: The Initial Proposal for a CF Solution

The final section on personnel recovery will propose specific changes to personnel recovery doctrine for the CF and suggest the necessary commander's guidance required from the strategic and operational levels to conduct a recovery. First, a Canadian specific definition will be proposed to meet the unique challenges that affect Canadian deployments. Then, internal CF strategic and operational direction will be suggested to frame how the CF would conduct an operation. By doing so, initial discussion can commence on formalizing the CF personnel recovery strategy. By understanding how the CF will conduct an expeditionary recovery, policy advisors can reverse engineer the overarching strategy to ensure that all factors required for a successful recovery are considered. As the most difficult aspect is defining the problem, an agreed upon definition of a CF specific definition for PRO is paramount.

The key to success is a common understanding of what CF personnel recovery is or will be. It is recommended that personnel recovery operations and its methods be defined within the CF as follows²¹⁶:

- *Personnel Recovery Operations (PRO): the aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to obtain the release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether they are captured, missing, or isolated. That includes Canadian Entitled Persons (CEPs), allies, coalition, friendly military, or paramilitary, and others as who may be Personnel Designated Special Status (PDSS) by the CF.*
- *CF PRO Methods: PRO is the umbrella term for operations that are focused on the task of recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnel from harm's way. PRO within the Canadian context includes, but is not limited to, search and rescue (SAR), combat search and rescue (CSAR), combat rescue (CR) and the coordination of negotiated as well as forcible recovery options – Hostage Rescue (HR).*

As the Canadian government bears the responsibility for the safety and security of all Canadians, any Government department or a diplomatic Head-of-Mission (HOM) must be empowered to request assistance from the CF to contribute forces and assets to support a recovery. To do so, an understanding of personnel recovery is essential and therefore, a common definition needs to be accepted and incorporated into future policy and doctrine. Although allied definitions provide a workable definition,²¹⁷ they do not account for the unique aspects of CF deployments, which routinely include personnel from multiple departments.

²¹⁶ Jay A. MacKeen, *Proposed Canadian Forces Personnel Recovery Contingency Plan* (Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command: file 3350-1, Prepared for Personnel Recovery Working Group Discussions and Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command J3, April 2009), 1; the definitions are an adaptation of US PR definitions and CF CONPLAN ANGLE definition for NEO, a similar concept to personnel recovery.

²¹⁷ Department of Defence, *JP 3-50 Personnel Recovery...*, ix.

Once the CF receives a request, it must complete the applicable risk and impact assessments to determine the appropriate force structure to support a recovery. If distinct national interests exist, a scalable task-tailored force may be deployed, able to operate autonomously or in-conjunction with Trusted International Partners (TIPs).²¹⁸ By redefining CF personnel recovery to include the ability to direct anyone to serve as PDSS or a CEP, it gives the Government of Canada and the CF the legal flexibility required to recover all civilians or attached forces deployed in support of a CF operation. With a common definition, the CJOC can commence the development of a draft contingency plan.

As Canada is committed to ensuring the safety of all its citizens, and with both military and civilian personnel deployed in a number of forms throughout the world, it is critical that the CF have a developed and coordinated contingency plan for the recovery of CEP(s) and/or PDSS, who fall victim to a hostage taking, kidnapping, become isolated or missing in a threat environment. It is imperative that the forces tasked to conduct such an operation be postured to react on very short notice and once committed, act decisively to resolve the situation. The need for strategic guidance in the creation of an operational level contingency plan is vital.

The CDS concept of operations is the strategic vision required for the development of an operational level contingency plan.²¹⁹ It is required to draft the plan and establish the conceptual framework needed by staff and subordinate commanders.²²⁰ The inclusion of the strategic intent, desired end state, and description of CF objectives is essential to any strategy. It ensures that

²¹⁸ MacKeen, *Proposed CF Personnel Recovery Contingency Plan...*, 1.

²¹⁹ Department of National Defence, *B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 Canadian Forces...*, 5-1.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

subordinate commanders understand the higher level and frames their actions. Given that in today's operating environment, "tactical level decision can have a strategic outcome, achieving the right balance is essential."²²¹ Therefore, it is proposed that the CF personnel recovery strategic guidance be as follows:

- Strategic Intent. Support the designated lead department and trusted international partners in conducting a rapid and timely personnel recovery through flexible force options that provide an early response to crisis-situations and a capability to expand should the operational environment become more complex.
- CF Strategic End State. CEP(s)/PDSS have been recovered, repatriated to a safe location, whether that be Canada or allied nation(s). Reintegration efforts have commenced. CF resources are no longer required to support and are re-deployed or re-tasked.
- CF Strategic Objectives:
 - To conduct scalable operations to support the recovery, repatriation, and reintegration of CEP(s)/PDSS.
 - Align the CF force posture to act decisively in a timely manner.

²²¹ Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-500/FP-001, *CFJP 01 Canadian Military Doctrine* (Ottawa: DND Canada, September 2011), 5-1.

- Prepare designated forces for the conduct of personnel recovery through appropriate doctrine, training, and equipping.
- Prepare designated forces that are postured with associated levels of readiness and the appropriate mechanism/procedures to execute a recovery operation.
- Maintain the operational effectiveness and morale of CF personnel by providing for their recovery and reintegration.

With an appreciation for the strategic intent, end state, and the potential objectives, staffs and subordinate commanders can not only prepare contingency recovery plans but also direct specific training of their forces in personnel recovery TTPs.

The strategic level definition of force employment within the CF context is the “application of allocated military means to achieve specified objectives or effects through activities such as operations, defence diplomacy, and unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral defence activities.”²²² Within the CF, the primary expeditionary force employer is the responsibility of Commander CJOC. However, from time-to-time, CANSOFCOM can be the lead in operations that are politically sensitive or require compartmentalization. Therefore, it is recommended that within the CF personnel recovery strategy, the CJOC be identified as the CF lead JPRC for non-compartmentalized expeditionary recovery operations. Should there be a need to conduct a

²²² *Ibid.*, 5-7.

compartmentalized operation, regardless of the level of risk or scope of task, CANSOFCOM is suggested to act as the JPRC. Additionally, any option that requires Special Operations Forces support is a compartmentalized operation to safeguard TTPs, personnel, and equipment. The need to conduct a compartmentalized operation is determined by the initial strategic and political risks, and impact assessments. The decision on who will serve the lead JPRC will need to be described in the CDS Initiating Directive (CID), or Tasking Order, under the applicable command & control structure.²²³ Regardless of who is in the lead, the other command must assist to ensure mission success through the provision of subject matter expertise that may not be resident within the other command.

To remain flexible, a scalable response plan is required. It is proposed that the personnel recovery strategy direct that it commence with the deployment of a Strategic Advisory Team (SAT), evolve into a Crisis Response Contingency Planning Team (CRCPT), and then into a Personnel Recovery Task Force (PRTF) to achieve the mission assigned by the designated lead department in support of the government approved option. The proposed primary role of each component and their key tasks are:

²²³ *Ibid.*, 1-13.

Table 4.1 – Proposed Scalability of a Personnel Recovery within a CF Context

TITLE	SAT	CRCPT	PRTF
PRIMARY ROLE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The SATs primary role is to assist the HoM and Canadian Defence Attaché (CDA) to provide additional situational awareness to the GoC on the developing situation, focussing on the threat environment as it applies to the CEPs/PDSS and to facilitate a military option. The CRCPT's primary role is in planning for a military option and to support the HoM/CDA contingency planning efforts for other GoC options. The CRCPT provides a more robust planning capability than a SAT. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The CRCPT's primary role is in planning for a military option and to support the HoM/CDA contingency planning efforts for other GoC options. The CRCPT provides a more robust planning capability than a SAT. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The term PRTF is an overarching term used to describe the units, resources, and enablers tasked to affect a military resolution. Their primary role is to plan and execute the PRO method for an approved military option.
KEY TASKS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Providing guaranteed strategic secure communications to the lead department. - Leveraging relationships with allied military to maximize situational awareness. - For CANSOFCOM participants, to leverage relationships with allied SOF to maximize situational awareness and/or get personnel/enabler support. - Being prepared to conduct reconnaissance tasks in both permissive and non-permissive environments. - Provide planning support to designated lead department and OGDs based on the GoC priority of effort. - Be prepared to support follow-on missions to include CRCPT(s) and/or PRTF(s). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provide a team capable of operating in both permissive and non-permissive environments. - Conduct reconnaissance of routes, Forward Mounting Bases (FMB) and/or Forward Staging Areas (FSA), and other areas of interest as designated by the JPRC, HoM, and CDA. - Conduct liaison with allied forces and provide situational awareness on their activities, contingency plans for PRO in the Joint Operation Area, and to determine available resources to support the GoC option. - Assist the JPRC in the development of concepts of operations for a military option or CF support to another GoC approved option. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - BPT to conduct the PRC function at the tactical level. - Contribute to the whole-of-government common operating picture. - Support the designated lead department in contingency planning for all GoC options. - Develop and execute, on order, the tactical plan to the military option in support of the GoC recovery effort. - Facilitate the reintegration efforts of the designated lead department.

Source: MacKeen, *Proposed CF Personnel Recovery Contingency Plan...*, 9.

By conducting a phased approach to the operation, it can commence as a compartmentalized operation, not placing the government in a public quandary of ignoring questions by the opposition about potential recovery operation details. More importantly, it is a way to organize the dispersed activities involved with a recovery operation into more manageable parts.²²⁴ It is important to note that the deployment of the SAT may be coordinated

²²⁴ Department of National Defence, *CFJP 5.0 Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process...*, 2-2.

in great-detail but the follow-on CRCPT or PRTF will be less clear. Depending on how the situation unfolds, it may progress linearly or move directly to a PRTF without the requirement for the establishment of the CRCPT.

This section proposed specific changes to personnel recovery doctrine for the CF and suggested the necessary strategic guidance required to conduct a recovery. It redefined personnel recovery operations to meet the unique challenges of Canadian deployments and provided the necessary guidance required to start a discussion on a CF solution. These recommendations are only a precursor to follow-on discussions. Therefore, subsequent debate with all stakeholders in personnel recovery of the information provided in this section is required to formalize a comprehensive CF strategy.

Chapter Summary

This chapter outlined an initial strategy for an expeditionary CF personnel recovery strategy and recommended that any solution address the need to prevent, prepare, and execute a recovery operation. More importantly, it determined that follow-on discussion with myriad inputs from all potential organizations that could be involved is required to provide the CF with a robust and comprehensive approach. It proposed how appropriate personnel recovery education and training can be conducted throughout the CF to prepare members if they become isolated or captured. As well, it argued how the CF can establish feedback mechanisms to capture the lessons learned from personnel recovery training and operations. Finally, it proposed how the CF can plan, coordinate, and execute a recovery by redefining the key definitions to be applicable

within a CF context and provided a recommendation for discussions on the strategic guidance for an operational contingency plan. By adopting a broader look at personnel recovery prevention, preparedness, and how the CF should execute a recovery, this chapter offered initial points of discussion required to open a departmental dialogue for the development of a CF personnel recovery strategy. As Pete Johnson suggested in the epigraph of this chapter, the development of a CF strategy is critical to ensuring future success in CF recovery operations.

CONCLUSION

Despite not having any national direction on personnel recovery that directs the CF to conduct and/or assist with recovery operations, this research paper proved that the CF already possesses an expeditionary recovery capability. All that is missing is a comprehensive strategy to govern personnel recovery prevention, preparedness, and operations so that the CF does not repeat the same strategic failures that our allies experienced when using an ad-hoc or crisis response approach.

The paper began by analyzing the factors that increase the threat to both Canadian civilians and deployed CF members in becoming isolated or captured, emphasizing the need for a personnel recovery strategy that addresses prevention. By analyzing terrorist hostage-takings, criminal kidnappings, how soldiers are not immune to capture, and the effect of globalization is increasing the risk of capture to Canadians that travel abroad, they will continue because they are a low risk, low cost, but extremely lucrative tactics. It then argued and demonstrated that the CF already possesses the necessary specially trained personnel, equipment, and due to recent transformation initiatives, that the CF has organizational structure to conduct expeditionary personnel recovery operations. As such, there is a requirement to formalize the CF expeditionary approach to ensure that both CF members and the institution are prepared to conduct or support a Government of Canada personnel recovery operation. The paper then affirmed that the international legal framework is already in place for the CF to conduct personnel recoveries and more importantly, that it has a moral obligation to do so. Finally, it proposed a comprehensive strategy for an expeditionary CF policy on personnel recovery.

By taking a broader look at personnel recovery prevention, preparedness, and how the CF can execute recovery operations; the paper offered a concise solution for a CF personnel recovery strategy. It proposed how personnel recovery education and training can be implemented throughout the CF to prepare not only its members that become isolated or captured but also the various headquarters staff and commanders that would assist in coordinating and controlling recovery assets. As well, it argued how the CF can establish feedback mechanisms to capture the needed lessons learned from personnel recovery training and operations. Finally, it proposed how the CF can plan, coordinate, and execute a recovery by redefining the key definitions to be applicable within a CF context and provided a recommendation for discussions on the strategic guidance for an operational contingency plan.

Unfortunately, as Dr. Williams' states at the commencement of this research paper, as long as there are ideological differences, terrorists and criminals will use violent methods to garner media attention to not only pressure governments to meet their concessions but also to spread their beliefs, get financial support, and recruit others to their cause. The CF must take the appropriate steps to position itself through the formalization of a personnel recovery strategy to assist isolated or captured Canadians and its own members, whom are at risk on every deployment. As the proposed CF personnel recovery strategy relies on multinational partners or Canadian Special Operations Forces to perform CSAR recoveries, future research should consider the feasibility of the CF developing a dedicated CSAR force, with the associated equipment and resources, to address the conventional capability gap required to cover the entire spectrum of personnel recovery methods.

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