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THE IPHONE AS THE AK-47 OF THE 21ST CENTURY: INFLUENCING OUTCOMES THROUGH THE INDIRECT APPROACH

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

This paper has been written to fulfill the requirements of the Masters of Defence Studies Program at the Canadian Forces College, Toronto.   This paper argues that the Canadian government's ability to effectively influence outcomes in the future will be directly linked to the Canadian Armed Forces capacity to follow an indirect approach to operations. In order to participate in indirect campaigns the Canadian Armed Forces must become a participant in the emerging social information domain, recognize the importance of the narrative in contemporary operations and how to operationalize social media as a tool of warfare. In order to balance the pace and tempo of world events that affect national interest against their willingness to fully engage or intervene, Western governments and militaries must embrace the indirect approach to offer a scalable strategy which expertly utilizes social media as an instrument to reinforce the narrative and to enable campaign success. As Canada is still in the infancy in both the Irregular Warfare and Influence Activities domains, this recommendation will require much more research to ensure feasibility. This paper identifies the need and the capacities that will have to mature before concrete and informed recommendations can be made.

CHAPTER 1 – SETTING THE STAGE

Introduction

> *Technology will make it increasingly difficult for the state to control the information its people receive….The Goliath of totalitarianism will be brought down by the David of the microchip.[1]*
> -Ronald Reagan,1989

The North African and Middle Eastern uprisings of 2011 caught the Western world completely by surprise with their scope, scale of participation and the means by which they were mobilized. The revolts were sparked by the December 17, 2010 self-immolation of a frustrated Tunisian fruit market vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi.[2] The event and resulting protests were followed closely by outraged national and international audiences whose viral messaging through social media outlets contributed momentum to the quick collapse of the ruling government of President Ben Ali. Within months, this catalyst generated regional protests resulting in the displacement of governments in Egypt, Libya and uprisings in Bahrain, Jordan, Yemen, Oman and Algeria. These social revolutions were termed the "Arab Spring" due to the widespread demands of populations for democratization and responsible government. The seeds of these revolutions were not new; widespread economic hardships, national power structures that were perceived to be isolated from the needs of the population and peoples that were

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[1] Ronald Reagan as Quoted in Shanthi Kalatil and Taylor C Boats, *Open Networks ,Closed Regimes.*(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for international Peace,2003),1.
[2] Petit, Brian. " Media and UW". *Special Warfare.* April-June 2012,Volume 25,Issue 2.22.

willing and able to be mobilized. Though termed the "Facebook Revolution" by pundits; social media outlets such as Twitter, Facebook and SMS simply provided a capable organizational and communications tool through which the revolutionaries could both communicate internally and present their message en masse to the outside world. The importance of the study of this technology is not just one of recent history of the "Arab Spring" but is an indicator of all future population mobilizations and how a government may predict or influence the outcomes of the movement. This technological phenomenon is particularly true in the transitioning cultures of the Middle East and Africa. The combination of non-elected governments, the highly educated, tech savvy "youth bulge"[3] of the Middle East and Africa combined with the increased penetration of high speed networks into emerging societies sets the conditions for the use of social media as a mobilizer of disenfranchised populations.   This paper does not presume that the medium is powerful enough to independently broker change. Alternatively, it is a key enabler that propagates revolutionary activity.   The speed at which the 2011 revolutions spread was the detail that was noteworthy and what Western governments must come to terms with when either contemplating diplomatic or military reaction to destabilizing events. Governments around the world were caught unaware because they did not understand how the new media was changing national and global dynamics by empowering citizens to the point they could do something about the circumstances that were making their lives

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[3] Bakke, Amy,Maceyko,Jen, Pomeroy, Elizabeth &Schneider,Margo. " Open Media and Transitioning Societies in the Middle East:Implications for US Security Policy." The Stanley Foundation in Association with the Institute for Near East &Guld Military Analysis. 2005-2006. 17.

intolerable. [4] Presently, events and public opinion is generated at such a pace that traditional diplomatic information efforts are often overwhelmed and have become an anachronism from a time before new media.[5] Influencing the narrative of events to further interests is not a new concept, but the universality of the means by which populations are communicating are inclusive and not the exclusive domain of elites is. Government and military actors are merely participants in this media domain and due to the nature of the technology cannot hope to dominate it. With the present trend toward fiscal restraint and Western disengagement from large ground interventions new strategies will have to be explored to influence outcomes of international crisis. This paper argues that the Canadian government's ability to effectively influence outcomes in the future will be directly linked to the Canadian Armed Forces capacity to follow an indirect approach to operations. In order to participate in indirect campaigns the Canadian Armed Forces must become a participant in the emerging social information domain, recognize the importance of the narrative in contemporary operations and how to operationalize social media as a tool of warfare. In order to balance the pace and tempo of world events that affect national interest against their willingness to fully engage or intervene, Western governments and militaries must embrace the indirect approach to offer a scalable strategy which expertly utilizes social media as an instrument to reinforce the narrative and to enable campaign success.   This capability should focus on

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[4] Seib,Philip. " Real-Time Diplomacy" New York:Palgrave-MacMillan.2012. 6.

[5] Seib, Philip. " Real-Time Diplomacy" New York:Palgrave-MacMillan.2012. 8

how to enable the indirect approach to operations with a view to leveraging target populations' reliance on electronic media in order to *interact* with them through the overt and covert use of social media resulting in influence on operational and strategic outcomes. This paper will set the stage by exploring the present informational plane, the Future Security Environment (FSE), revolutionary theory and the usage of social media to complement population social mobilization. Finally, the paper will explore three case studies where the indirect approach enabled by Social Media have been key to the success of the strategies.   The first case study will compare the US operation *Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A) and Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines(OEF-P).* Set in the same period of time of US counter-terrorism strategy, OEF-A initially utilized an indirect approach followed by a massive conventional deployment, whereas OEF-P has achieved remarkable success through indirect actions and the full engagement of Philippine created solutions. The second case study will investigate the successful utilization of the indirect approach and media manipulation by the Palestinian Liberation Army during the first Intifada in 1988. This movement queued irregular maneouvre to support the media plan instead of the inverse and resulted in the loss of international support for the Israeli forces and the requirement for the Government of Israel to negotiate the Oslo Accords. Finally, the third case study will demonstrate the Israeli comprehension of the media- informational plane and their dominance of the social media medium while conducting operations against Hamas in 2012. Finally, the paper will outline recommendations for the potential for the Canadian Armed Forces to

further pursue the study of this emerging reality and if there is a strategic requirement to build a domestic capability.

The Informational Terrain

> *"Success will be less a matter of imposing one's will and more a function of shaping behavior—of friends, adversaries and, most importantly, the people in between."*

> *-US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates, 2007[6]*

This chapter will investigate the relevance of the evolution within the media environment, the information spectrum and how they affect the methodology of war-fighting in the 21st century. The Canadian Army has identified that conflict occurs from a three dimensional web of actions, structures and beliefs in which each dimension shapes and is shaped by the other.[7] Resolution to this type of interwoven conflict requires an integrated multidimensional approach that addresses actions, structures and beliefs across the moral, physical and informational planes.[8] CF operational objectives are aimed at defeating the adversary by shattering his moral and physical cohesion, and

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[6] UNITED STATES. DOD. JP-3-13 "Information Operations" Novemeber ,2012. Pg43
[7] CANADA. DND. B-GL-310-001/AAG-001. " Land Operations 2021:Adaptive Dispersed Operations." DLCD, 2007. Pg5
[8] *Ibid. Pg. 5.*

its ability to coordinate his actions, rather than by destroying him physically through incremental attrition. More specifically, the actions can be directed to the adversary's moral components: willpower, ability to maneuver, morale, and command and control ability. Conflicts can be conducted on a physical plane with maneouvre and firepower, and/or the moral plane, which is psychological.[9] The addition of dominance on the *informational plane* is an emerging concept that sees the Canadian Armed forces dominate the enemy through an increased operational tempo due to secure networked communications and control systems and the second arm of informational dominance demonstrates the ability of the Canadian Forces to control the narrative of an operation and influence the psychological plane . Figure 1.1[10] demonstrates the interaction between the three planes.

Figure 1.1 The Nature of Conflict in The Future Operating Environment

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[9] Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GG-005-004/AF-033 Canadian Forces Information Operations .Ottawa. 1998
[10] *Ibid. Pg5.*

Since the times of Clauswitz, Western militaries have given great staff and academic effort to the moral, physical and internal informational planes but have yet to fully embrace the necessity of engagement along the external informational plane. Without degrading the established capability to conduct Major Combat Operations (MCO) along the physical and morale planes that Western militaries hold, it is this third plane that must fully be developed with all tools available which will enable continued success through the continuum of conflict and across the range of military operations.[11]

Militaries have historically been a driving force for development and adaption of communications technology. The telegraph, telephone, wireless radio, satellite communications and even the internet were influenced or directly created to support military operations and then were adapted for civilian use.[12] From the radio to the internet, the military envisioned communications technology for *internal* communications and created networks that allowed for the rapid dissemination of information to battlefield nodes while keeping it as secure as possible from enemy interception. For Western militaries, the advent of high speed computer networks, accessible satellite communication, integrated voice and data communication systems, ushered in a new era of highly precise communications infrastructure that guaranteed

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[11] UNITED STATES. Department of the Army. "ADP_ADRP 3.0, Unified Land Operations". 2011.
[12] http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/articles/information-and-communications-technology-ict. Accessed Feb 19 2013.

almost near perfect situational awareness.[13] Experts declared an era of "Network Centric

Warfare" (NCW) that would see information dominance play a commanding role on the

battlefield. There was a belief that as parity was achieved between the weapons

technology of nation-states there would be a shift from platform or weapon-centric

warfare to an information superiority- enabled concept of operations that generated

increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers and shooters to achieve

shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater

lethality increased survivability and a degree of self-synchronization.[14] The new

weapons platform was the communications infrastructure that enabled this precision and

rapidity of decision making. This vision of warfare was introduced in the dismantling of

the Iraqi divisions in Kuwait during the first Gulf War and culminated in the lightning

2003 "Thunder Run" invasion of Iraq, both of which potentially could have been bloody

slug fests if the US led coalition had not been enabled with an asymmetric advantage in

communications technology.[15] The complete and rapid destruction of the Iraqi military

machine displayed the absolute supremacy of the US military when conducting

conventional combat operations against a near peer competitor. The initial stages of

other major US campaign in Afghanistan took on a completely different form but

displayed similar results combining precision with deadly effect, destroying the Taliban

and Al Queda (AQ) elements on both the physical and moral plane. In a 2007 *Foreign*

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[13] Rid& Hecker. " War 2.0, Irregular Warfare in the Information Age." Westport:2009, Praeger Security International. Pg.5
[14] David Alberts,John Garstka &Frederic Stein. " Network Centric Warfare: Developing and leveraging information Superiority." DoD Command and Control Research Program. April 2005. Pg32.
[15] Rod Thorton. " *Asymmetric Warfare*" Polity Press: Cambridge. 2007.Pg54.

Affairs article, Donald Rumsfeld bragged that a "Revolution in Military Affairs" had

become a reality with the low cost, high impact unconventional warfare campaign waged

in Afghanistan, combining the indigenous forces of the Northern Alliance with Special

Forces liaison who utilized overwhelming US air power to crush Taliban resistance and

disperse Al Queda within a month of initiating the campaign.[16] The only plane that these

defeated groups continued to thrive on was the external informational. In Iraq, the

narrative quickly skewed from one of emancipation for the Iraqi people to one that

recognized the US coalition as invaders with a subtext that included international AQ

influence and a Sunni/Shia divide.[17] An Al Qaeda spokesman explained; "Sheikh

Usama [Osama Bin Laden] knows that the media war is not less important than the

military war against America. That is why AQ has many media wars. The Sheikh has

made AQ's media strategy something that all TV stations look for."[18] It is this parity of

effort and focus along both the battle winning line of operations (combat operations) and

the war winning line (narrative) that present adversaries operationalize well and that

Western militaries must buy into institutionally. Frank Kitson a British Officer and

historian captured this in his book *Low Intensity Operations* when he wrote, ""[…] no

campaign of subversion will make headway unless it is based on a cause with a wide

popular appeal. This derives from the fact that […] the instigators of the campaign rely

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[16] Thomas l McNaugher. "The Real Meaning of Military Transformation: Rethinking the Revolution" *Foreign Affairs*. January/February 2007

[17] ChiefWarrant Officer-4 Timothy S.McWilliams,,Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis P.Wheeler "Al-Anbar Awakening Volume I American Perspectives U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009" Marine Corps University Press. Quantico Virginia 2009.

[18] CANADA. Canadian Intelligence and Security Service. " Al Qaeda: Propaganda and Media Strategy." Integrated Threat Assessment. Volume 2007-2. Pg 16

on the people to overthrow the government once they have been properly indoctrinated

and organized."[19] Western militaries have an unmatched ability to defeat enemies

conventionally on the field of battle but due to a requirement to respect politically

mandated end dates and not end states[20] a gap in capacity to effectively dominate the

narrative of the conflict develops. This has been witnessed in Viet Nam, where US

forces never lost a tactical battle but failed to win the conflict, the same can be said of the

Afghan example where the NATO forces have dominated the battlefield but have failed

to make inroads into segregating the Taliban informationally from the population.

Bernard Fall, an advisor to the US during Viet Nam highlighted this gap when he wrote,

"Whether we have the 'body count,' the 'kill count,' the 'structure count,' or the 'weapon

count' – these are almost meaningless considerations in a war that requires popular

support. We can lose weapons and still win the insurgency. On the other hand, we can

win the war and lose the country" [21]It is this fissure that unconventional enemies can

exploit to great effect and is their only lever to bring pressure onto the nation state.

Recognizing the dominance of the American conventional military system, competitors

determined that if they were to survive and succeed on the battlefield, they could not

match strength against strength but would have to identify weaknesses in the "system of

systems" and exploit two critical vulnerabilities. These were identified as the inability to

control or properly influence *external* communications; those which shaped the narrative

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[19] Frank, Kitson. *Low Intensity Operations Subversion,Peacekeeping and Peacekeeping.* Faber&Faber,1971.
[20] LGen Bucknall. Kermit Roosevelt Speech tMarch12 2013 to student body at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
[21] Bernard Fall. *Streets Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina.*Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg,PA. 2005. 75.

of a conflict within a liberal Western democracy and the other was the US militaries'

desire to simultaneously avoid unnecessary civilian collateral damage while minimizing

casualties to their own forces. [22]

Though the irregular enemies of the last decade have been the focus of Western

Militaries, there are legitimate near peer competitors on the horizon that are closing the

military technological gap and are increasingly economically influential that see a

combination of irregular and conventional warfare techniques as the key to defeating

Western forces. The Chinese strategists, Qiao Lang and Wang Xiangsui developed the

theory of "Unrestricted Warfare" to defeat the US system more than a decade ago. It

states that;

> The West has created a trap for themselves by their very dominance of
> conventional warfare. A competitor should not limit themselves to direct
> combat which would indeed be a mistake, but state and non-state actors
> could defeat the superpower through ignoring the Western defined rules
> of war laid out in the Geneva conventions. Instead by applying the
> "Principle of Addition" combining direct conventional combat with
> electronic, diplomatic, cyber, terrorist, proxy, economic, political and
> propaganda tools to overload, deceive and exhaust the Western "system
> of systems". They emphasized computer network attack, "lawfare" that
> exploited legal loopholes, economic warfare, attacking the viability of
> major corporations and financial institutions, media manipulation and
> deception and urban guerrilla warfare. [23]

Four of the eight methods mentioned to overwhelm the US system; diplomatic, legal,

proxy, political and propaganda directly relate to the informational plane. This strategy,

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[22] Linda Robinson. "The Future of Special Operations; Beyond Kill and Capture" *Foreign Afffairs.* November/December 2012. Pg 111
[23] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts PublishingHouse, 1999.

emanating from a near-peer competitor displays the integrated and multi-disciplinary nature of future warfare and the need to create a unified defence along whole of government lines. It is these fractures that both regular and irregular competitors will be looking to exploit to achieve their goals.

 Rid and Hecker reinforce that the strengths of the US military system become weaknesses if applied to external communications. Masters of information management and dissemination internally, Western militaries have struggled to keep pace with information management in the public domain.[24] Until the mid-1990's professional news outlets and registered journalists were the only access the public had to information in a conflict zone. The narrative could be managed through official processes and policy. The narrative belonged to the nation-states involved in combat operations that controlled physical access to the battlefield. The dominance of the coverage of the 1991 Gulf War by a Western Media Channel, CNN, led to two key effects; it opened the eyes of Arab populations to the way real life crisis and conflicts can be covered and created consternation and frustration at the predominance of Western perspectives in the coverage of a regional event.[25] Population's world-wide sought out an alternative discourse that was more inclusive, interactive and represented a balanced reporting style.

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[24] Rid& Hecker. " War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age." Westport:2009, Praeger Security International. Pg.10

[25] The Stanley Foundation.*Open Media and transitioning Societies in the Middle East: Implications for US Security Policy.* The Stanley Foundation in Association with the Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis. 2005-2006. http://reports.stanleyfoundation.org.

[26] The centralization of key messages by national news providers such as the British

Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), who have self-admitted agendas and bias became

known as "old media" as populations shifted to the emerging technology of the internet.

With the broad dissemination of cellular technology, the penetration of the internet

throughout the world and digital cameras made individuals more independent of the

military to get the message to news outlets.[27] This growth of web-based technologies

coupled with the number of non-professionals participating in "new media" broke down

barriers to public participation and fed new avenues of engagement from blogs, image

and video sharing sites, issue specific discussion forums, wikis-social-networking sites,

listservs, message boards and regular web-sites.[28] The movement to "New Media" is

essentially the democratization of the information paradigm by allowing the private

citizen access to mass population through the internet. This dynamic publishing

landscape is the result of both professional journalism and web 2.0[29] popular mass

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[26] The Dubai Press Club. "Arab Media Outlook 2009-2013 Inspiring Local Content Forecasts And Analysis Of Traditional And Digital Media In The Arab World" 2010. https://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/arabmedia.pdf

[27] *Ibid. 6*

[28] Rid& Hecker." War 2.0..".P.25

[29] Web 2.0 is term that was introduced in 2004 and refers to the second generation of the World Wide Web. The term "2.0" comes from the software industry, where new versions of software programs are labeled with an incremental version number. Like software, the new generation of the Web includes new features and functionality that was not available in the past. However, Web 2.0 does not refer to a specific version of the Web, but rather a series of technological improvements. http://www.techterms.com/definition/web20. Accessed Feb 23 2013.

communication, has led to a rapid focus on the social dimension in both the media and at war.

Unfortunately, Western militaries continue to embrace information technology internally for advanced command and control but largely ignore the change in the civilian informational landscape. Commanders often regard the press and in turn the narrative of their campaigns as an annoyance. The media is regarded as a group who do not understand the business of war and who in the pursuit of a story, often released sensitive information and whose transfer of gruesome battle images and civilian casualties have a disproportionate effect on the strategic landscape.[30] The method of attempting to control the narrative on the battlefield through controlled access and monitoring press releases from theatre was effective as long as the battle remained between professional forces that both had an interest in marginalizing the media. It becomes less effective as a communications strategy when one of the forces is irregular in nature and utilizes kinetic activity to support their narrative as opposed to present conventional doctrine that utilizes messaging to support the kinetic action.

The dominant paradigm of warfare in the early twenty first century has been irregular in nature. The battlegrounds of the Middle-East, South West Asia and Africa were not the meeting ground of professional military groups but "wars amongst the people" which necessitated a synchronized narrative that was aligned with the military action. More often than not the irregular foes were able to capitalize on seizing the

[30] Rid& Hecker." War 2.0..".P.4

initiative on the informational plane. The Al Qaeda strategist, Abu-Musab al-suri stated

that, "past Jihads failed because those fighting them did not win popular support."[31] He

provides the following amplification to this statement which establishes a simplistic

template that all forces engaging in conflict may be wise to adhere to; "The Muslim

masses did not understand who the jihadis were, what they wanted to accomplish and

why they used violence to accomplish their goals because the jihadis did not sell

themselves and their movement effectively."[32] Regardless, if a military is conducting

major combat operations (MCO) or counter-insurgency (COIN) they will likely be

operating amongst an urbanized, civilian population.[33] These populations, who are

electronically interconnected and are more able to easily access information than ever

before are likely to be influenced by all actors both within and outside any given theatre.

The importance of competing with the enemy's narrative cannot be disputed, but the

importance of external communication and public affairs must be recognized as just as

important as optimized command and control. It is not that the informational line of

operations must be better planned or synchronized, per se, but it must be aligned along all

lines of operations and be given the same consideration as enablers like fires and

aviation.   In order to influence all actors in the engagement space, all future operations

must be based not only on the operational necessity but must take on an easily

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[31] CANADA. Canadian Intelligence and Security Service. " Al Qaeda: Propaganda and Media Strategy." Integrated Threat Assessment. Volume 2007-2. Pg 4

[32] CANADA. Canadian Intelligence and Security Service. " Al Qaeda: Propaganda and Media Strategy." Integrated Threat Assessment. Volume 2007-2. Pg 5

[33] United States. Department of the Army. " FM 3-06 URBAN Operations". October ,2006. Pg1-1to Pg 1-10.

recognizable and supportive narrative.[34] The 2003 message to all US combatant

commands from the Secretary of Defence headed, "Command Support of Public Affairs

Activities in Future Military Operations" stated;

> Media coverage of potential future military operations will, to a large extent,
> shape public perception of the national security environment now and in the years
> ahead. This holds true for the US public; the allied countries, whose opinion can
> affect the durability of the coalition; and publics in countries where we conduct
> operations, whose perceptions of us can affect the cost and duration of our
> involvement.[35]

 This message transmits the comprehension of the importance of the operational narrative

to mission success at the US strategic level but did not translate into effective measures to

ensure that a comprehensive message was utilized and followed by the forces invading

and then stabilizing Iraq.   In order to understand how to construct this narrative in

support of operations and which tools to utilize we must first, to the extent possible,

establish the environment that Canadian Forces will be operating in.

The Future Security Environment

> *The twenty-first will be another bloody century; war and strategy will continue as ever,*
> *albeit in new guises, characters of warfare, and unique strategies; and the insecurity or*
> *security narrative of the century will be amply explainable with reference to the genius of*
> *Thucydides' "fear, honor, and interest."[36]*

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[34] Thomas Nissen. " Narrative Led Operations: Put the Narrative First." Small Wars Journal. http://smallwarsjournal.com/. Accessed Oct 17 2012.

[35] T. McCreary, " Command Support of Public Affairs Activities in Potential Future Military Operations," SECDEF-CJCS P4. Message,2003.

[36] Colin, Gray. "The 21st Century Security Environment and the Future of War." http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/08winter/gray.pdf. Accessed Feb 24 2013.

-Colin S. Gray, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, U.K.

The broad contours of future conflict will still resemble those of today. This chapter will explore the potential future security environments that the Canadian Forces may be operating in through the next two decades.   Specifically, this chapter will focus on the effect of civilian communications technology on future forces and the future operating environment. There is potential for Canada to shift from the recent policy of direct engagement and conventional military action to a scalable policy of indirect engagement with world players in key areas of national interest. For example, there has been a growing trend of Al Quaeda operations in the Sahel region of Africa. Instead of deploying a large number of combat troops to directly target them, Canada, under the umbrella of the US AFRICOM and with the invitation of regional actors has engaged indirectly through the training of regional security forces. The annual exercise termed "Flintlock" is designed to foster regional cooperation to enable African partners to stabilize regions of North and West Africa, reducing sanctuary and support for violent extremist organizations. Exercise Flintlock provides increased interoperability, counterterrorism, and combat skills training while creating a venue for regional engagement among all the participating nations.[37] These exercises provide the participating Western nations with access to the region, establish relationships and intelligence sources for potential future operations and are nested in an overarching

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[37] United States. Africa Command. "What We Do". http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/flintlock. Accessed March 13 2013.

narrative of support for the people of the region. This type of policy and the potential

requisite capabilities will be absolutely necessary to influence and shape the engagement

space of the next generation. Though there will be a requirement for Western militaries to

maintain a conventional response to the inter-state threat, the growing trend of intra-state

violence and non-state actors must be the paradigm that security forces focus on in the

coming decade. Our adversaries will be "regularly-irregular" and bring to bear a host of

unconventional challenges. Potential adversaries will be more adaptive and the threats

they pose more varied.[38]   Col David Killcullen, a senior advisor to the US military

describes a "conventional" threat as one that follows a set of conventions favoured by the

current establishment, i.e. the West–or outside it and therefore "unconventional".[39]   As

the West continues to increase its dominance of conventional ground, air and littoral

combat, potential enemies will continue to grow their unconventional capabilities.[40]

Small elements with little in the way of actual physical capability will be able to create

high impact incidents both internationally and domestically on which large conventional

forces military forces operating primarily on the physical plane will have little effect.

Whatever adaption must occur, it will be done in an environment of budgetary constraint,

and it will have to do so against the grain of a long standing organizational culture that

still privileges conventional combat capabilities over the rest of the operational

spectrum.[41]   Today's militaries must operate in a context that is uncertain, highly

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[38] Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GL-310-001/AG-001 Land Operations 2021.
*Adaptive Dispersed Operations.*2007
[39] David,KillCullen. " The Accidental Guerrilla". Pg 34
[40] Canada. DND. "The Future Security Environment".
[41] CANDA. B-GL-310-001/AG-001 Land Operations. *2021. Adaptive Dispersed Operations.*2007

volatile and must be prepared to operate across the spectrum of conflict from disaster

relief to Major Combat Operations (MCO).   Due to the present trend of intrastate conflict

Western ground forces are focussing their training and operational design on what has

become known as the "Messy Middle"[42]. To do this Western militaries must create

forces that are scalable and reactive to both present and emerging threats on the

contemporary battlefield.

Figure 1.2 illustrates the linear model for the spectrum of conflict, highlights the "messy

middle" and overlays the idealized conventional campaign plan onto it.[43]

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[42] Bowes, Steve, Brigadier General. " Training the Army of Tomorrow" *Vanguard Magazine* October/November 2012.14

[43] United States. Joint Publications 5-0, *Joint Operational Planning*(December 2006),FM 3-0 *Operations* (February 2008)

Figure 1.2-Spectrum of Conflict,"The Messy Middle" and Linear Campaign Design

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (December 2006) FM 3-0 ,Operations (February 2008)

The Canadian military today must operate in a global context that is uncertain, highly volatile and is unlikely to present peer opponents for which their organizations were designed to combat. The no fail task of preparing national defence forces for intra-state conflict between near peer competitors is the worst case eventuality that every state must plan against. Increasingly, the likelihood of large force on force exchanges will be eclipsed by irregular warfare [44] conducted by highly adaptive, technologically enabled

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[44] Irregular Warfare is defined by the US military as; "A violent struggle between state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the legitimate population. IW favours indirect and asymmetric approaches though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities in order to erode an adversary's power, influence and will. IW comprises of five elements; Unconventional Warfare, Counter-insurgency, Counter-Terrorism, Hostage Rescue and Stability Operations. United States. *Irregular Warfare Joint Operational Concept V2[Draft]* May 10. Hasler, Jeffrey. "Unconventional Warfare Evolution; Policy and Doctrine". (Professional Presentation.Special Forces Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine USAJFKSWCS,27 Sept 2011). With permission.

adversaries, media savvy foes intent less on defeating armed forces than eroding an adversary's will to fight, rogue states bent on challenging the status quo and transnational criminal organizations ready, willing and able to buy sell and trade everything from drugs to armaments for their own gain.[45] The intelligence estimates of the majority of NATO nations have assessed that it is unlikely that inter-state conflict will remain the dominant security paradigm of the future and if current trends continue intra-state conflict amongst civilian populations will be the norm. These wars "amongst the people" result in great human tragedy where the civilian populations suffer the greatest percentage of battle deaths. This trend will require Western nations to assess both their national interest and willingness to provide a compassionate response.

The following figure graphically displays the reality of conflict over the last two centuries where less than 20% of all conflicts have been waged between states. Figure 1.2 illustrates the IW trend that is likely to continue.[46]

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[45] B-GL-310-001/AG-001 Land Operations 2021

[46] Gorka, Sebastien & Killcullen,David." An Actor Centric Approach to War, Understanding the Difference between COIN and CounterInsurgency," JFQ, Issue 60,First Quarter 2011,14.

Figure 1.2 Typology of Conflict
Source: "An Actor Centric Approach to War, Understanding the Difference between COIN and CounterInsurgency," JFQ Issue 60, First Quarter 2011, 14

Influencing the decisions to intervene are the national populations with real-time access to situational information and the political pressure that ethnic diaspora can bring to bear within multi-cultural Western democracies. It is unlikely that there will be a homogenous understanding of how force is to be applied on the international stage. Immigration will change the face of the Canadian voting public. By 2011, almost all labour force growth will be derived from immigration. While roughly 20% of Canadians currently belong to a visible minority and almost 60% of these minorities are from Asia and the Middle East, these levels will probably continue to increase through to 2030.[47] For governments to engage internationally their narrative and the method of engagement will have to take into account non-traditional power groups domestically. The requirement for nuanced

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[47] CANADA. Department of National Defence. Chief of Force Development. " The Future Security Environment 2008-2030: Current and emerging Trends." 27 Jan 2009. P.88.

messaging along domestic special interest suits the medium of social media very well, where participants are actively participants and not just absorbing the information.

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence Report, *Global Strategic Trends—Out to 2040,* published in 2010 believes that future global environment will be defined by physical, social and virtual networks.[48] The world will be more interconnected and interdependent through both physical and virtual infrastructure. The physical system will consist of complex interconnections, including extensive resource pipelines, communication cables, satellites and travel routes.[49] The virtual networks will consist of communications servers linking individuals and objects, many of which will be networked through individual Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.[50] As web 2.0 communications technology becomes ubiquitous the interaction between geographically separated individuals and groups will increase the rapidity of discourse and engagement. Once it has true global reach, the Internet may become the main platform for international contact. It provides a shop window in which a company can display its wares to a world market. It offers a chance for people from different countries to swap information and ideas. It provides the means for people who are cut off from the world by censors and oppressive governments to tell their stories. No other innovation has ever had quite such earth-shrinking potential.[51]

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[48] United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. *Global Strategic Trends—Out to 2040.* 12 January 2012.
[49] *Ibid.*
[50] *Ibid.*
[51] Frances Caircross. "The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution Is Changing Our Lives." Harvard Business School Press. 2007. P17.

Due to multiple online profiles and access to network connections, personal identity will be as closely tied to online profile as it is to the registration with a national government, allowing individuals great freedom of expression through the use of online pseudonyms. Though populations are more interconnected via the web they may actually be more isolated physically as remote working is likely to become the norm with controlled network spaces representing the new work environments.[52] Virtual reality technologies are likely to blur the distinction between real and virtual life, facilitating the formation of ubiquitous groups that will form and disband with considerable rapidity. New ideas, beliefs and fads will be transmitted near instantaneously around the globe which will result in avenues for populations to mobilize protest, and may allow hostile groups to form and rapidly create effect. [53] This will stress the government's ability to assess legitimate threat from non-state actors and opens opportunity for internal 'lone wolf' threats that otherwise would have not had the technical capability to act but have been energized by the access to the free flow of potential threatening information.[54]

Al Queda(AQ) has utilized emerging technologies to promulgate their radical ideology, gain support and even initiate attacks in foreign lands by native populations through the influence of messaging but with no official linkages to the parent AQ organization. An intelligence professional summarized the strategic effect of the

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[52] *Ibid.*

[53] *Ibid.*

[54] Fernando Reinares. "Jihadist Radicalization and the 2004 Madrid Bombing Network". *CTC Sentinel.* Combatting Terrorism at West Point. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/jihadist-radicalization-and-the-2004-madrid-bombing-network. Nov 3 2009. Accessed Feb 26 2012.

communications technology on the AQ effort, " if [Osama] Bin Laden didn't have the internet, he'd just be a cranky guy in a cave." [55]

As the 2011 uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya demonstrated, institutions that are based upon hierarchical, ordered structures, will find themselves increasingly challenged by competitors and potential adversaries who are able to capitalize on the rapidity of communication and group formation enabled by social networking technology. The anonymity of the internet and the volume of population that can be accessed will be able to create critical physical mass for movements that could translate to tactical action on the streets. [56] Developments in social networking technology will continue to facilitate the rise of 'citizen journalism' and make it increasingly difficult for even the most autocratic states to control access to information, especially as globalized connectivity allows local news stories to be broadcast instantaneously across the globe.[57]

In such circumstances tension and instability are likely to occur as autocratic states attempt to address rapid changes in popular opinion through force or censorship. Often authoritarian regimes initially attempt to reject or ignore the internet, they believe the web is frivolous and that it will go away as quickly as it appeared. [58]When it does not disappear the authoritarian governments will experiment with censorship. This largely depends on the political situation within the country and if direct censorship is not

[55] CANADA. Canadian SecurityIntelligence Service (CSIS). "Integrated Threat Assessment Centre Presents: Al Qaeda:Propaganda and Media Strategy." Trends in Terrorism Series. Volume 2007-2
[56] Petit, Brian. " Media and UW". Special Warfare. April-June 2012,Volume 25,Issue 2.22.

[57] United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. *Global Strategic Trends—Out to 2040*. 12 January 2012.
[58] Morozov, Evegny. *The Net Delusion.* New York: Public Affairs Press, 2011.pg 115

possible then they may revert to intimidation or other forms of violence against the media participants.[59] Again, the issue of the retention of power over civilian population by force will require democratic governments to actively decide whether to engage diplomatically or militarily for reasons of ideology and human rights. Due to speed of the mobilization of populations, these decisions will be presented rapidly to governments, which may not allow for established diplomatic and military timelines to be respected.[60]

The Iranian public response to the 2009 national elections, known as the "Green Revolution" highlighted information spread through non traditional networks and protests coordinated through transnational social networks and a notable lack of unified response and support from the international community[61], provide an example of the potential impact of governments being caught flat-footed by rapidly shifting events. Emerging geopolitical, economic and social, environmental and resource, science and technology, and military and security trends all have profound implications for Canada, DND, and the CF. Greater external pressure and increased demands for defence capabilities coupled with future personnel and resource constraints, will require creative leadership and adaptive responses for addressing future challenges.[62] With the costs of expeditionary interventions increasing for Western nations, political choice with regard to costs and international benefit rather than social idealism will have to be the overarching

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[59] *Ibid. 115.*

[60] Philip Sieb. " Real Time Diplomacy: Power and Politics in the Social Media Era."

[61] Keller, Jared. "Evaluating Iran's Twitter Revolution." *The Atlantic.*
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/06/evaluating-irans-twitter-revolution/58337/

[62] CANADA. Department of National Defence. Chief of Force Development. " The Future Security Environment 2008-2030: Current and emerging Trends." 27 Jan 2009. P.89

factor that will have to be considered when considering if the Canadian Forces will be

engaged in stability to combat operations spectrum. The decision to participate in a

mission will have to be balanced with alliance politics, national interests and public

support for the conflict. Casualty aversion and public opinion will be directly linked to

the perception of the legitimacy, the likelihood of success and exit from the mission. It is

highly unlikely that Canada will engage in a conventional war of choice, like the

Afghanistan mission, where there is limited national interest and a great cost to be paid.

With these factors in mind, combined with the trend of violent intra-state conflict, an

effort may be warranted to attempt a strategy of engagement in budding conflict zones

"left of beginning"[63] to head off rising violence at its source instead of potentially

supporting large time and resource intensive stability operations after the conflict has

occurred. The Canadian government will need to engage in a carefully targeted indirect

approach to security through the support and influencing of local actors that have shared

national interest or populations at risk. There will always be a requirement to defend

against the conventional inter-state threat, the indirect approach will also be utilized in

these instances during the shaping phases of campaign design but will be best suited for

the "secondary concerns" of emerging instability, particularly when dealing with messy

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[63] The US has defined five phases that will comprise all major operations. From Phase 0 through Phase 5 these are Ph0SHAPE,Ph1DETER,Ph2SEIZE INITIATIVE, Ph3DOMINATE,Ph4 STABILIZE,&Ph5 ENABLE THE CIVIL AUTHORITY. The term "Left of Beginning" refers to that time through Phase 0 to Phase 1 that Unconventional Warfare(UW) Elements can conduct initial contact, infiltration with Host Nation or indigenous forces to aid the conventional DETER and SEIZE phases of an operation. UW theory stipulates that if HN or indigenous elements are engaged early enough and with success, there may be less of a requirement to employ large conventional forces. Jeffrey Hasler. "Unconventional Policy and Doctrine." Doctrine Analyst and Writer,Special Forces Division,Directorate of Training and Doctrine,USAJFKSWCS. 27 Sept 2011. With Permission.

population based issues. To effectively deal with internal strife that affect Canadian interests we must understand why it occurs, and how we may be able to influence it to achieve our national goals. In the next chapter this paper will investigate traditional revolutionary theory, the criteria for modern social revolution and the thread that social media plays in population mobilization.

CHAPTER 2 REVOLUTIONARY THEORY

The revolutionary war is a war of the masses; only mobilizing the masses and relying on them can wage it.[64]
Mao Tse-Tung, January 27, 1934

The idea of change and the resulting instability is the central theme in modern revolution. Prior to discussing the effect of social media on modern social movements this chapter will detail traditional revolutionary theory and utilize the writings of Mao as a baseline and the writings of James De Fronzo will anchor the discourse on the requirements of modern social revolutionary movements. From this foundation the paper will investigate the use of contemporary cellular phone technology as an enabler to mobilization and an accelerant of revolution.

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[64] Mao Tse Tung. " Selected Works". Quoted from the speech *Be Concerned with the Well Being of the masses,Pay Attention to the Methods of Work.* Jan 27 1934. http://marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_10.htm

The revolutions of the 20th century had their base in the French and American revolutions of the previous century.   The century began with the Russian Marxists revolution rebelling against the ideals of the industrial age. This was followed by the Italian/German fascist revolution and the communist peasant revolution of China. The second half of the century saw revolutions of self-determination throughout Africa, Latin America, Africa and the first defeat of a super power by another communist revolution in Viet Nam. Finally, the world witnessed the rise of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East and the exportation of this revolution against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The effects of the revolutions of the 20th century have bled into the 21st and are continuing to influence security issues to this day. The mass murder of US citizens on September 11, 2001 by followers of Al Qaida and practitioners of "Global Jihad" resulted in a decade of conflict, two large insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and the growth of overt Islamist revolutionary cells throughout South West Asia, Africa and covert cells in Western Europe and North America. As noted earlier in this paper, the most recent Middle Eastern revolutions are in search of increased democratization and population participation in the political process. This has resulted in the replacement of governments in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and an extended civil war in Syria. With the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and a fundamentalist Islamist movement which is still highly effective in the region, what direction these uprisings will take in the immediate future is yet to be seen.

The concept of revolution has evolved over time.   Machiavelli equated change with renewal or renovation.[65] His idea of revolt and rebellion contain no implications of liberation or freedom. This is at odds with modern philosophers who see these as preconditions for revolution. Hannah Arendt argues that, "only when the path of novelty is connected to the idea freedom are we entitled to speak of revolution."[66]   In the 20th century revolutions there has been an acceptance that there must be a social change. It is not enough to overthrow a government in a coup or to have an extended insurrection with no shift in the socio-political structures of the country. Sigmund Neuman reinforces the concept of a social factor, regarding revolution as a sweeping, fundamental change to political organization, the social structure, economic property control and the predominant myth of the social order.[67] Unlike Arendt, freedom is not a necessary result of revolution, a totalitarian result is a possible and still constitutes a revolution.[68] Perhaps the simplest but most accurate model comes from Political Scientist Peter Amann. In his work *Revolution: A Redefinition,* he defines revolution as a "breakdown, momentary or prolonged, of the state's monopoly on power usually accompanied by a lessening of the habit of obedience"[69].   In this model the key component is the power relationship of state and citizen-"revolution prevails when the state's monopoly of power is effectively challenged and persists until a monopoly of power is re-established."[70] Amann's assessment that the break-down of the "habit of obedience" of the population is the

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[65] Carl Lieden & Karl Schmitt. " The Politics of Violence, Revolution in the Modern World."4
[66] Hannah Arendt, "On Revolution" (New York:The Viking Press,Inc,1963), pp.35-36
[67] Carl Lieden & Karl Schmitt. " The Politics of Violence, Revolution in the Modern World."5
[68] *Ibid*.5
[69] Peter Amann, "Revolution: A Redefinition," *Political Science Quarterly* , Vol 77 (1962) p36-53
[70] *Ibid.* 38-39

driving force of a revolution, it is this lack of adherence to established governmental regulation stripping away the key pillar of public support for government authority resulting in a new dispersal of power. This broader definition of revolution allows for incremental change within society and the resulting reengineering of power blocs within the nation.

In terms of contemporary social revolutionary theory, James Defronzo has identified five conditions to initiate a revolution regardless of the level of violence. These are :*mass frustration, the division of elite groups, unifying motivations, crisis and the choice of other outside nations to intervene or support the movement.* [71]

1. Mass Frustration- There is an assumption that revolutionary activities are not created overnight but slowly evolve over time and through a series of less violent activities.[72] Mass frustration occurs amongst urban and rural populations when there is "relative deprivation"[73], when there is an understood gap between the needs of the population and their or the ruling authorities' ability to satisfy those needs.[74] This creates a theme or narrative for the group and can contribute to aggressive behaviour of individuals and groups.

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[71] James Defronzo. *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements.* (Denver:1991, Westview Press)

[72] Zimmerman,Ekkart. "Political Violence, Crises and Revolutions:Theories and Research" Schenkman Pub Co, Cambridge Massachusetts,1983. 413

[73] Berkowitz,Leonard. "Frustration aged Hypothesis:Examination and reformulation" *The American PyschologicalAssociation Inc.* 106,no.1:59-73.1989. http://robertmijas.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/03frustration-aggression.pdf . (Accessed 13 Feb 2013)

[74] James Defronzo. Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements. (Denver:1991, Westview Press)

2. Division of Elite Groups- Elite groups within a population are defined as working outside formal government but holding positions of influence of power and influence due to education, wealth, technological aptitude or leadership characteristics.[75] Due to their position of influence and access in society, these elements, if disenfranchised, have great potential to legitimize revolutionary activity, sew discord within the upper echelons, subverting the power of government institutions and fostering revolutionary ideologies with the population at large.[76]

3. Unifying Motivations-A successful social revolution must have a unifying purpose that brings together members of disparate classes and social groups.[77]

4. Crisis-failed political, economic,and/or social programs may contribute to the success of a revolutionary program. A state may be more susceptible to internal conflict if it is already under pressure from internal and external pressures. De Fronzo defines the crisis as one that, "severely weakens government administration and coercive capabilities in a society in which a revolutionary movement is developing."[78]

5. External Intervention- The final factor of Defronzo's analysis is the willingness of other states or actors to intervene with the revolutionary effort. A state maybe interested to interfere if the potential revolution will either benefit the standing of

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[75] Mayer, Brian. "Modern Social Media and Social Revolutions." Fort Leavenworth 2011-12.US Army Command and General Staff College. 25.

[76] James De Fronzo

[77] *Ibid.*

[78]*Ibid.*

the state or conversely if the revolution could detract from the power of the state.

Additionally, an external state may not become involved if there is a fear of

retaliation from other nations either sympathetic to the revolutionary cause or the

ruling government.[79]

All five conditions of Defronzo's model will be shown to be enabled when combined

with an effective social media campaign. These conditions must already be present in the

resident populations but will be more easily highlighted and manipulated by interested

parties who through modern communications technology aggregate geographically and

socially disparate groups that share similar outlooks and motivations for change.

A revolution is merely a transfer of ideas, but combines physical action to affect this

change. It is in this spectrum that the traditional Leninist theorists that provide the link

between narrative and successful revolutionary activity.

Though there is a spectrum of definition of what constitutes the conditions to initiate a

revolution there are two factors that are immutable; the mobilization of a population to a

common cause and the requirement for the movement to effect change within society.

For a revolution to be initiated the conditions must be set for the population to support

insurrection. Trotsky summarized the essence of revolution by;

> "The most indubitable feature of a revolution is the direct inference of the masses
> on historic events…at those crucial moments when the old order no longer
> becomes no longer endurable to the masses, they break over the barriers
> excluding them from the political arena, sweep aside their traditional

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[79] *Ibid.*

representatives, and create by their own inference the initial groundwork for a new regime."[80]

The revolutionaries must initially consider the use of insurrection and warfare as a legitimate means to take and hold power.[81] In order to achieve this legitimacy they must be able to create, codify and disseminate the cause around which the revolution will be based. Revolutionary warfare is unique in that it is a war amongst and for the people. Because of this fact, the *cause and supporting messaging* are the key components to establishing a base of support amongst the population. The message must quickly address the shortcomings of the present power structures and how the revolutionary intends to remedy them. It must demonstrate the isolation of the ruling political apparatus from the majority of population. When there is a lack or perceived lack of opportunity for the population to influence or legally engage the national power structures the revolutionary model becomes a reality. When the population feels disenfranchised and has the ability to communicate there is a potential for mobilization.[82] In conventional warfare, organization and mission execution is left to professional, specialist soldiers. In revolutionary warfare this is the realm of the civilian population. To reinforce the importance of the human factor Mao stated;

> Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the
> decisive factor, it is the people not the things, that are
> decisive. The contrast of strength is not only a contest of
> military and economic power, but also a contest of human

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[80] Leon Trotsky as quoted in "Revolutionary Theory" by William Friedland. Pg 122.

[81] Friedland, William. " Revoltionary Theory" pg.169.
[82] *Ibid.170*

power and morale. Military and economic power are necessarily wielded by the people.[83]

The revolutionary does not seek the decisive victory in tactical battle, he just needs to not lose the campaign. This is summarized in Mao's "Sixteen Character Formula";

> The enemy advances, we retreat;
> The enemy camps, we harass;
> The enemy tires, we attack;
> The enemy retreats, we pursue.[84]

In order to achieve revolutionary momentum within a country, popular support and mobilization of the population must be achieved.   This popular support allows the revolutionary forces to operate in conditions that conventional government forces find impossible. The revolutionary must have a continual frank and honest dialogue with the people. General Giap of North Viet Nam described the political mobilization of the population as "the people are the army as water is to fish."[85] According to Mao political mobilization consists of four distinct elements;

1. It involves the education of soldiers and civilians in the political aims of the revolutionary war. It is insufficient to merely fight; All of the participants must be brought to a level of consciousness and understanding about the purposes of the war.

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[83] Mao Zedong. From "Revolutionary Theory" Pg170.
[84] *Ibid. Pg 171*

[85] *Ibid.* Pg 173

2. A political program must be formulated and explained by the revolutionary party that sets out what the revolutionary struggle is all about. Thus while the first element explains the reasons for the war, the second sets out a program to deal with the problems creating the war.

3. Mobilization involves a wide range of communications, utilizing every means available and appropriate to the people involved. If they are illiterate, word of mouth; where they are literate, through newspapers, books, pamphlets; through dramatic performances; utilizing the educational system and the organizations that the revolutionaries have created or that have been formed spontaneously by the people. No means of education should remain untouched since each means reinforces the others.

4. Continuity is essential to political mobilization. The setting of a program is not sufficient. Programs must be explained and re-explained and their appropriateness must be reinterpreted with each new event or battle, victorious or defeated. Without continuity, people fail to grasp the meaning of warfare and withdraw to normal pursuits (to personal and private business rather than the public business of revolutionary change).[86]

When investigating Mao's four conditions of mass mobilization, the consistency of the revolutionary message is critical to the mobilization of population. Mao believed the message to the people as the fundamental building block of an efficient communications strategy which must be supported by the overarching framework of an effective revolutionary organization.

In order to achieve its revolutionary intent, the movement must have clear goals to ensure societal transformation. Through common activities and

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[86] Mao Zedong. " Guerrilla Warfare" Translates by Samuel L Griffiths.University of Illinois Press.1961

understanding, the movement can create a shared consciousness with the population and build towards mobilization. The communications strategy for revolutionary mobilization of a population involves four elements. These are;

1. Raising Consciousness of the Movement- This makes awareness exploitative so that the individual person identifies with the cause.

2. Increasing Participation of the Population- Most revolutionary systems are built on expectations that the mass of the population will connect their individual experience to the cause.

3. Undermining the System- It is not about what the state does but how it does it. The communications strategy must continually highlight the divergence between the needs of the people and the inability of the government to provide those needs. Parallel messaging must demonstrate the ability of the revolution to provide those unmet needs. This creates a gap of trust between the ruling government and the population, thus undermining the system.

4. Building and Sustaining the Organization- The final function with regard to mobilizing a population to a cause creating a bridge between those elements that presently believe and are engaged in revolutionary activity and those that could potentially be convinced to be participants. As a movement grows it needs to be refreshed and reenergized by new participants. If the revolution wants to truly be successful it must represent a broad range of the population and continually grow to increase its size and effectiveness. The capacity of the organization to grow is directly proportional to its ability to synergize the other three functions. Through shared consciousness, increased participation and by having recognized victories over the system the movement can hope to expand its base of support and successfully mobilize the population.

Though mobilization of a population is by its nature fluid and dynamic, there are several enduring aspects of mobilization that have remained unchanged. These include who and where to mobilize, the development

of programs and their representation in specific slogans, the use of study groups as an educational and mobilizing device and finally the philosophical questions about the legality, morality and the relationship of ends and means.[87]

In present times the revolutionary is greatly assisted in all the aforementioned areas through the employment of modern cellular enabled web technology. The feedback loop is much more direct than in the past and is greatly assisted by the real time nature of modern communications. The population that can now be mobilized is no longer bounded by geography, but by access to the internet or cellular technology. The question is initially no longer "where" to mobilize in the physical sense but how to engage across the spectrum. This evolution is witnessed in the Free Syrian Army iphone application *Souria Wa Bas* (Just Syria). Created to counter the Assad regimes crackdown on the rebellion and hoping to provide a running record of atrocities. It is the rebellion's alternative to the official line taken by the regime to official media outlets. This the application provides users with news from protesters in the country that they might not be able to get anywhere else, without requiring them to necessarily have access to a

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[87] *Ibid. 131*

computer to check the Internet.[88] The application not only provides

internal messaging but provides a message board for supporters to interact

with messages of support, links to provide financial support to the

movement or hot links to send messages to international community

organizations. The example of the homescreen, above, displays the level

of simplicity of the message, provides three methods of engagement

(Facebook, Twitter and email). Finally it reflects the maturity and

competency of emerging movements to utilize the technology to mobilize

multiple target audiences. Networked messaging also greatly shortens the

time by which slogans can be tested for effect. Additionally, the

interactive nature allows for public feedback and commentary on the

messages and direction of the movement. Quick adaption from something

as simple as being "liked" [89]on Facebook makes revolutionary messaging

easily measurable and adaptable.

Amr Khaled, who trained as an accountant, has an enormous

following as an online Muslim theologian amongst the youth in the Arab

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[88]Phil Hornshaw. "Syrian protesters use iPhone app Souria Wa Bas to fight government." Nov 17 2011. http://www.appolicious.com/articles/10231-syrian-protesters-use-iphone-app-souria-wa-bas-to-fight-government Accessed Feb 09 2013.

[89] An option on the Facebook Web site to provide feedback on the stories that appear in your friend's news feed. The Like option allows to to acknowledge a friend's news feed item in a positive way without needing to add actual commentary. http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/F/Facebook_Like.html Accessed Feb 09 2013.

States and the diaspora.[90] He has taken to utilizing Western business

axioms to describe the Muslim religious state, has spoken of empowering

women and has described the Prophet Mohammed as "the first

manager".[91] His website is one of the most popular in the Middle East, as

of the fall of 2011 he had 3.45 million "likes" and more than 178,000

twitter followers.[92] Khaled exhibited his ability to communicate with large

swaths of the population when, in 2006, he asked his followers to reveal

what they wanted to see in their lives in the next 20 years, the answer

from a reported 1.4 million people was " We want and need Jobs". [93]

Though inherently non-political, Khaleds' interaction displays the ability

of new media to create a discourse amongst a

large component of a population and display

immediate measures of satisfaction that

traditional polling methods would take a much

greater time to accomplish.

In terms of revolutionary response the facebook site, "We are All

Khalid Said" (as seen below), named after a young Egyptian protestor

[90] Philip Seib. "Real Time Diplomacy". Pg25
[91] *Ibid*.25
[92] *Ibid*.25
[93] *Ibid*.26

killed by the Egyptian Police,[94]and developed by Google executive Wael

Ghonim is a contemporary example of a revolutionary slogan that

captured the attention of millions of people worldwide and resulted in the

mobilization of a population. Originally designed to reach 50000 people

to organize for the January 25 2011 Egyptian protests, the Facebook group

reached 1 million people online and 100000 followers flowing into the

streets in protest of the abuses of the Mubarak government.[95]

The ability of the revolutionary movement to translate its key messages,

and objectives to the population will directly correlate to its success. The

linkage between message and mobilization from Mao to De Fronzo

display the vital effect influence operations will play within the context of

revolutionary warfare and the potential that social media holds in enabling

revolutionary efforts.

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[94] Charlie Rose. "Charlie Rose talks to Wael Ghonim" Bloomberg, Businessweek,2/20/2012,Issue 4267

[95] *Ibid.* 3

CHAPTER 3 THE iPHONE IS THE NEW AK-47

Ninety Percent of the war will be fought on the information terrain.[96]

- Ayman al Zawahiri, 2005

For the second half of the twentieth century, the AK-47 was the symbolic implement of

the revolutionary. The AK-47 was introduced into mass production in 1949. For the next

50 years the robust, machined, fully automatic weapon provided 3rd world revolutionary

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[96] Waters, TJ. " Zawahiri and Gaza's Information Terrain." Small Wars Journal.
www.smallwarsjournal.com. Nov 12, 2012. Accessed Dec03 2012.

warriors with a cheap, easily obtainable tool to enable popular revolutions.[97] The weapon

was a leap in weapons technology; it was longer than the sub-machine guns then in

service, but shorter than a sniper rifle. It provided larger ammunition carriage to the user,

enabling the soldier to stay in contact with the enemy longer and had a fully automatic

setting that could fire a 7.62mm cartridge effectively at a medium range causing massive

wounds. It seemed a puzzling embodiment of a firearm compromise, a blend of design

choices no existing Western army was yet willing to make.[98] More than six decades after

its design and initial distribution, more than 50 national armies carry the automatic

Kalashnikov, as do an array of police, intelligence, and security agencies. But its fuller

terrain lies outside the sphere of conventional force. The Kalashnikov marks the guerrilla,

the terrorist, the child soldier, the dictator, and the thug – all of whom have found it to be

a ready equaliser against morally or materially superior foes.[99] Half a century later the

implement of revolution that has similar characteristics, is not a rifle but a phone.[100]

Created in different eras and for vastly different purposes, the cell phone[101] and the

Kalashnikov share commonalities that make them excellent revolutionary tools in their

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[97] Tyler Hicks. "The AK-47: The Gun That Changed the Battlefield". Excerpts from an Interview with CJ Chivers. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130493013. Accessed Feb 13 2013.
    [98] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/how-did-the-ak47-become-the-most-abundant-weapon-on-earth-2124407.html

[99] Ibid.
    [100] The concept of comparing the AK-47 to an iphone is thanks to Major Andrew Vivian, Canadian Forces,July 2012. This concept was developed during a personal conversation between the author and Major Vivian and is used with permission.
    [101] For the purposes of the paper I am using the iphone as the most popular device as an example. In essence it is the mobile phone and access to cellular enabled web technology that is the enabler to revolution.

own right.   Both are favoured by youth, simple to use, portable and ubiquitous.[102] The

AK-47 was designed to be intuitive for the young poorly trained soldiers of a Soviet

conscription army that required minimal training to get the maximum effect out of the

weapon. Its simple design, robust nature and ammunition capacity have made it one of

the most smuggled weapons in the world. [103] A World Bank estimate suggests that 100

million of the 500 million small arms available worldwide are Kalashnikov variants.[104]

The iPhone shares a similar market success. As of June 2011, the iPhone was the

most popular phone in the world, selling approximately 20 million units per quarter. [105]

Along with its widespread popularity the iPhone has been recognized as so simple to

utilize that the average four year old intuitively understands how to navigate the

device.[106]

The iPhone and its competitors have become the immediate portal

to access information and immediate connection the world over. By

pairing the hardware of mobile devices with the flattened access that the

network of modern social media sites such as twitter and Facebook

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[102] Tyler Hicks. "The AK-47: The Gun That Changed the Battlefield". Excerpts from an Interview with CJ Chivers. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130493013. Accessed Feb 13 2013.

[103] *Ibid. 2.*

[104] *Ibid 2*

[105] Anna Leach. "iPhone is the biggest-selling phone in the world: 20 million sold last quarter" http://www.shinyshiny.tv/2011/07/iphone-the-biggest-selling-phone-in-the-world-wow.html. Accessed 14 Feb 2013.

[106] Michael Elgan." Why the ipad is the Children's Toy of the Year." http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9166878/Mike_Elgan_Why_iPad_is_the_Children_s_Toy_of_the_Year_. Accessed 14 Feb 2013.

provide, disparate populations have an unprecedented level of connectivity and interaction. The soldiers of the revolutions of the 20th century were peasants and farmers; the AK-47 was a low technology tool that was easily accessed and utilized by these populations. It was so prevalent that the weapon became the symbol of revolution world wide. Similarly, the cell phone and social networks have become the recognizable symbol for the unchaining of suppressed populations in the first decade of the 21st century. With the continued prevalence of the AK-47 and the dramatic rise of smart phones; these are the tools that will enable revolution action for the foreseeable future. When considered independently they have had historically limited effect but if properly synchronized, and revolutionary conditions exist, there is potential to effect political change at an unprecedented rate. It is the rate of change and the limited window of opportunity to influence this change that Western governments must recognize and seize on, if they are to successfully shape populations of interest. To fully comprehend this reality we must understand how social media was originally operationalized and how we may leverage it in the future.

Social Media as a Mobilizing Agent of Revolution; Catalyst or Barometer?

People call this the "Facebook Revolution" because it gave us a form of expression even when people were too scared to talking to big groups

about political issues. We set up Facebook pages for people who were
tortured to death. We found it was a way to talk without being tracked.[107]
        Nazly Hussein, Egyptian Protestor 7 Feb 2011

I think the social network is the people itself. Things like Facebook,
Twitter,SMS and phones are just social tools. When they[the Mubarak
Government] blocked Facebook and shut down technology, our network
still operated because it's about people.[108]
    Amr Gharberia, Egyptian Protest Organizer, 7 Feb 2011

Media on its own cannot create a revolution; people with courage do.[109] The use of social

media and the internet for population mobilization can be easily traced from handbills of

Mao[110] to the covert radio broadcasts that empowered the liberation movement in El

Salvador in the 1980's.[111]   Fittingly, the call to democratization in the Middle East and

North Africa through engagement of public opinion has its roots in the American

revolution. Similar to the spread of the internet and cellular technologies, the spread of

literacy and printed books allowed US insurgents to appeal for popular support against

the British monarchy, thus elevating the insurgency from hit and run raids to a campaign

supported by a dominating narrative. The term, "public opinion" first appeared in print in

1776, for the rebels first won independence in large part by appealing to the British

electorate with documents such as Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* and the Declaration of

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[107] Nadia Idle Alex Nunns. *TWEETS from TAHRIR.* OR Books: New York 2011. Pg217

[108] *Ibid. Pg 156*

[109] Real-Time Democracy…
[110] Friedland,William;Barton, Amy;Dancis, Bruce;Rotkin,Michael &Spiro,Michael. "
Revolutionary Theory."Allanheld,Osmun&Co:New Jersey.1982
[111] Evegny,Morozov. " The Alternative's alternative". *Open Democracy:Free Thinking for The World.* www.opendemocracy.net/article/email/the-alternatives-alternative Accessed Jan 28 2013.

Independence. [112] These messages were carried by letter carrier across on horseback, across oceans by sail and needed to find grouped populations to transmit the message too. It is possible to imagine the potential to influence the electorate of England if every individual had instant access to the documents, the train of logic and the message were reinforced with streaming video of failed English attempts to battle in the colonies.

This is what the internet brings for the revolutionary-access to the population. The web as a method of mobilizing social movements has been prevalent since the early 1990's when a Mexican rebel group utilized the technology to bypass federalist security forces and connect with international support structures. The Zapatista's initially leveraged the emerging technology of the internet to defeat the physical cordon of the Mexican security services by continually feed eye witness accounts to non-governmental organizations that were monitoring the ceasefire between the governmental forces and the revolutionaries.[113]

This ground breaking development of critical and sensitive information being transmitted to third parties, while seemingly impervious to governmental control ushered in a new era of radical mobilization. The same technology connecting the world in the interests of business and government was now being utilized by those very forces that opposed increased globalization and interconnectedness. Individuals creating networks were able to overwhelm traditional media sources by creating lean, fast- reporting

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[112] Max Boot. " The Evolution of Irregular Warfare: Insurgents and Guerrillas from Akkadia to Afghanistan." *Foreign Affairs.* March April 2013. Pg 105.
[113] Martinez-Torres, Maria-Elena. "Civil Society, the internet, and the Zapatistas." *Peace Review*13:3 (2001),347-355.

networks and push non-traditional messages at will into a global audience grid. The most

successful of these was The Independent Media Center(IMC) or Indymedia.org.[114] IMC

was established in 1999 during the anti-globalization/World Trade Organization (WTO)

protests in Seattle,USA. IMC effectively harnessed and distributed thousands of

independent reports, photos, opinions and videos of police action in Seattle gaining

notoriety with governmental elements and an almost cult like status with the anti-

globalization movement. IMC then evolved from a mere hub of information to an overt

organizer and supplier of equipment, media training and link for their anti-globalization

reporters to publish their stories. This in turn led to increased global organization and

synchronization of anti-WTO activities.

Though successful, this period non-traditional media sources was organized with

a single hub for collection, and organizing body with identified leadership and a

followership that fit into a hierarchal structure. The technology had proved itself useful

but the understanding, practice and application had further potential. Utilizing the

contemporary vernacular; social media based revolutions were still at 'version 1.0'.

Hand-held technologies with "smart technology" had yet to be disseminated and utilized

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[114] Indymedia is the collective effort of hundreds of independent media makers from around the world who are dedicated to providing a forum for independent reporting about important social and political issues. Several hundred media activists, many of whom have been working for years to develop an active independent media through their own organizations, came together in late November, 1999 in Seattle to create an Independent Media Center to cover protests against the World Trade Organization. The Seattle IMC provided coverage of the WTO through both a printed publication called "The Blind Spot" and the first IMC web site. The web site received almost 1.5 million hits during the WTO protests. In February of 2000 a small IMC formed in Boston to cover the Biodevestation Convergence, and a larger one came together in Washington D.C. to cover the A16 protests against the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. After that, requests from local groups interested in forming their own IMCs started to pour in. There are now over one hundred local Independent Media Centers around the world and more are on the way. www.indymedia.org Accessed Jan 29 2013.

on the grand scale that we witness presently and the world population had yet to still fully

embrace the emerging interconnectivity of society. Once these two conditions were met,

one of hardware and the other of social evolution, the groundwork was laid to effectively

utilize this technology to reach large swaths of the population and inform more

traditional media sources of information that might have otherwise be restricted by

totalitarian forces. Both of these preconditions would be met by 2008 where the social

uprisings following would reflect a much more sophisticated and mature usage of social

media.

Pervasiveness of the Technology

To assess the effect of cellular technologies it is first important to recognize the scale of

penetration into emerging economies. From 1990 to 2011, worldwide mobile phone

subscriptions grew from 12.4 million to over 6 billion, penetrating about 87% of the

global population and reaching the bottom of the economic pyramid.[115]   This inescapable

technology allows for unprecedented connection between family, friends or like-minded

activists that may be geographically disjointed. Once requiring face to face engagement

or multiple individual contacts in order to spread a message now only requires a single

group text message. What once required a fixed position from which to operate, it is now

possible from almost anywhere in the world.

The following statistical analysis provides an illustration of the ubiquitous nature

of the technology and the potential held within. Mobile subscribers in the developed

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[115] Saylor, Michael . "The Mobile Wave: How Mobile Intelligence Will Change Everything."
Perseus Books/Vanguard Press,2012. p. 5

world have reached saturation point with at least one cell phone subscription per person. This means market growth is being driven by demand developing world, led by rapid mobile adoption in China and India, the world's most populous nations. At the end of 2011 there were 4.5 billion mobile subscriptions in the developing world (76 percent of global subscriptions). Mobile penetration in the developing world now is 79 percent, with Africa being the lowest region worldwide at 53 percent. Portio Research – in the excellent free Mobile Factbook 2012 predicts that mobile subscribers worldwide will reach 6.5 billion by the end of 2012, 6.9 billion by the end of 2013 and 8 billion by the end of 2016. Portio research estimates that Asia Pacific's share of the mobile subscribers will rise from 50.7 percent in 2011 to 54.9 percent in 2016. By 2016 Africa and Middle East will overtake Europe as the second largest region for mobile subscribers.[116] Figure 1.3 below displays the rate at which cellular technologies have entered the mainstream of world population;

Key Global Telecom Indicators for the World Telecommunication Service Sector in 2011 (all figures are estimates)									
	Global	Developed nations	Developing nations	Africa	Arab States	Asia & Pacific	CIS	Europe	The Americas
Mobile cellular	5,981	1,461	4,520	433	349	2,897	399	741	969

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[116] http://mobithinking.com/mobile-marketing-tools/latest-mobile-stats/a#mobiletablet (Accessed Jan 31 2013

subscriptions (millions)								
Per 100 people	86.7%	117.8%	78.8%	53.0%	96.7%	73.9%	143.0%	119.5%	103.3%
Fixed telephone lines (millions)	1,159	494	665	12	35	511	74	242	268
Per 100 people	16.6%	39.8%	11.6%	1.4%	9.7%	13.0%	26.3%	39.1%	28.5%
Active mobile broadband subscriptions (millions)	1,186	701	484	31	48	421	42	336	286
Per 100 people	17.0%	56.5%	8.5%	3.8%	13.3%	10.7%	14.9%	54.1%	30.5%
Fixed broadband subscriptions (millions)	591	319	272	1	8	243	27	160	145
per 100 people	8.5%	25.7%	4.8%	0.2%	2.2%	6.2%	9.6%	25.8%	15.5%
Source: International Telecommunication Union (November 2011)								

Presently, the cellular technology in emerging economies is mostly limited to simple handset cellular systems that only allow voice and texting messages but "smart technologies" are on the rise. In 2009, 172 million smartphones were sold; in 2011, 468 million; and projected for 2015,631 million.[117] The smart technology allows a user to upload pictures, video directly to the internet, access high speed networks and communicate on a variety of social media mediums. The ability to potentially upload

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[117] Global Mobile Satistics 2011," http://mobithinking.com/mobile-marketing -tools/latest-mobile-stats#mobile-basics (Accessed Jan 31 2013)

explosive images to a world-wide audience in seconds is possibly the most effective

communications tool in the box of the modern revolutionary. Governments that are

tempted to suppress mobilized populations through violent means will have to contend

with their actions being immediately relayed around the world.   Though smart phone

technology is presently a small portion of the worlds' cellular network, it stands to reason

that as it is promulgated and advances, its availability will increase.

The Dynamics of Social Media

Given the pervasiveness of the technology there can be a fair assumption that it has

affected how we as humans investigate issues, the methods that we discuss them and

how we will eventually solve them. The influence of web enabled cellular technology on

business, education and entertainment is undeniable if one simply observes the

contemporary world.   The question then is: has this technology changed humankind's

ability to process information, interact and provide an output? Marc Prensky, a leading

philosopher on childhood education argues that not only has there been a shift in the

human interaction but there has been a fundamental change in how and why humans

process information strictly because of the rapid introductions of digital technologies into

the mainstream consciousness.[118] Prensky argues that as a result of this ubiquitous

environment and sheer volume of interaction with it, today's youth fundamentally think

and process information differently from their predecessors.[119] Prensky breaks down the

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[118] Marc, Prensky. *Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants*. On the Horizon, MCB University Press, Vol 9 No.5, October 2001. 1
[119] Marc, Prensky. *Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants.* On the Horizon, MCB University Press, Vol 9 No.5, October 2001. 1

world's population into two categories; *Digital Natives* and *Digital Immigrants. Digital*

Natives are of that generation that has never known a world without instant access to

information from the world wide web.   This passage and access to information is central

to their existence, they were brought up in a world of belonging to online communities,

Facebook friends and both accessing information but always being able to interact with

the source for further clarity and discussion. The youth of today are "native speakers" of

the digital language of computers, video games and the internet. The majority of the

world Prensky denotes as *Digital Immigrants.*   Those persons who were not born into the

digital age, but have at some point in time become fascinated by and adopted many or

most of the new technologies are and always will be, immigrants, that is *non-native*

speakers of the technological language.[120] These two groups fundamentally differ in their

approaches to problem solving and interaction. Prensky equates the methodologies of the

immigrants as having an accent and like all immigrants they will successful integrate

with the technological society to varying levels of success. Examples of this accent are

printing out of your email, not being able to edit on screen, or bringing people physically

into your office to see an interesting website rather than just sending the URL.[121]

The worlds of the two come into conflict when they are asked to interact together in the

workplace, schools or in society. The two groups have very different understanding of

how to go about solving problems and what information should be received when in

order to solve any issues that arrive. Digital natives are used to and demand to receive

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[120] *Ibid. pg. 2*

[121] *Ibid. Pg 2*

information quickly, they like parallel processes and multi-tasking. They prefer their graphics to come prior to the text in order to visualize the problem being presented and prefer random access to a networked population rather than a stove piped, hierarchal approach where access is granted in line with social or societal standing.[122]

Presently, Digital Immigrants are holding the power broker positions around the world, interestingly it has been the segment of society with the most digital natives that has witnessed the first and strongest examples of social mobilization through new communication technologies.   Almost a third of the Arab population, more than any other segment of the world, is between the ages 15-29 and fall directly into the digital native characterizations.[123] The combination of technological savvy, social outrage and capacity has led to revolution 2.0.[124]

Revolution 2.0

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[122] *Ibid. Pg 3*
[123] Arab Media in the Modern Age.
[124] Revolution 2.0 denotes the evolution of the technology utilized by revolutionary groups to mobilize groups to a cause. Google executive and political activist Wael Ghonim coined the phrase in 2012 and formalized it in his book, " Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People is Greater than the People in Power." First Mariner:Boston&New York. 2013.

In my opinion our real prime minister is called Facebook![125]

        -La Presse political cartoon commenting on the appointment of a new Tunisian
Primeminister after the revolution.March 2011

The first popular usage of the web based, cellular enabled uprising termed a "Twitter

Revolution" was coined during the 2009 social unrest in Moldova. When the

announcement was made that Moldova's communists had won enough votes to form a

government in the elections, Moldova's progressive youth took to the streets in angry

protests. As behooves any political protest by young people today, they also turned to

Facebook and Twitter to raise awareness about the planned protests and flashmobs.[126]

Led by youth NGOs like *HydePark* and *ThinkMoldova***,** the protests began very

peacefully - as a flashmob[127], where young people were simply supposed to hold lit

candles in the vicinity of the square. Within 24 hours the crowds grew upwards of 10000

protestors and twitter posts from the protestors were topping 200 every 20 minutes.[128]

     June and July 2009 were also marked with demonstrations and rallies throughout

Iran. Internet mobilization was particularly important to these efforts, and the opposition

worked quickly and constantly to circumvent restrictions on the internet imposed by the

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[125] Fisk, Robert. "The Tunisian Whose Jihad Was for the People,Not God." *The Independent,* 5
March 2011, http://www.independant.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-the-tunisian-whose-jihad-was-for-the-people-not-god-2232981.html. AccessedFeb 7 2013.

[126] Evgeny,Morozov. "Moldova's Twitter Revolution." *Foreign Policy Magazine:neteffect.* April
27 2009. Accessed Jan 28 2013

[127] A flash mob is a group of people who assemble suddenly in a public place, perform an unusual
and seemingly pointless act for a brief time, then quickly disperse, often for the purposes of entertainment,
satire, and artistic expression. Flash mobs are organized via telecommunications, social media, or viral
emails. http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/flash%2Bmob. Accessed Feb 19 2013.

[128] Evgeny,Morozov. "Moldova's Twitter Revolution." *Foreign Policy Magazine:neteffect.* April
27 2009. Accessed Jan 28 2013

Iranian regime.[129] Twitter added capability to the resistance movement by initially

mobilizing protestors to take to the streets by relaying organizing instructions of time and

place to organize. Social media sites became the main conduit of discussion and

brainstorming of populations eager to effect change. Facebook provided real-time

networking and a potential vehicle for disenfranchised Iranians to correspond.[130]

By 2011 the use of Social media as an organizing enabler was well established

amongst the disenfranchised peoples of the Middle East. During the initial insurrection

in Tunisia two individuals utilizing the pseudonyms 'FOETUS' and 'WATERMAN'

along with their with revolutionary organization *Takriz*, performed a central role by using

social media to organize people from all walks of life in Tunisia which led to the eventual

overthrow of its President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.[131]

It is said that revolutions "come and they are not made" [132] and the Arab Spring

demonstrated that the medium was as important as the message. The usage of social

media as an enabler to the revolutions in the Middle East became as much a topic of

academic interest as the revolutions themselves. Books such as "Revolution 2.0" by

Ghonim and "tweets from Tahrir" demonstrate this reality. Social media allows anyone

to participate without geographic, economic or social limitations. Social Media is

quickly adaptable, accessible and flexible. It immediately "flattens" any network and

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[129] Beth Elsen,Douglas Yeung,Parisa Roshan. "Using Social Media to gauge Iranian Public Opinion and Mood after the 2009 Election." Rand Corporation,National Security research Division.2012.53.

[130] *Ibid. 1*

[131] Paul T. Mitchell & Charles McCoLgan. "Social Media and the Military: Operational Weapon or Tactical Schtick?"Not yet published. With Permission.

[132]

allows for free involvement, exchange of ideas and mass dissemination. The traditional

holders of media power have been usurped by the new capability and ease of use of hand

held devices and have fundamentally changed how people mobilize. With the ability to

communicate in real time about current events and to post their comments and opinions

to various social networks, it allows them more control over what is considered

newsworthy and how they will engage with it.[133]   Keller and Berry have noted that this

medium is very capable to reach the individual and due to the active

paticipatorycomponent is more likely to illicit a response and a sense of trust. They state,

"people have grown increasingly distrustful of news and advertising, they prefer instead

recommendations from friends, family, coworkers and peers."[134] There are valid

arguments that stipulate that social media is a paper tiger and like an individual who has

500 Facebook "friends" but is actually physically alone, social media response is not an

indicator of revolutionary activity until there is actually a physical presence in the streets

opposing those in power. Without that presence physically challenging authority, online

scheming to incite revolution is little more than public argument in a virtual coffee-shop.

Malcolm Gladwell has been one of the most vocal opponents to the idea that there

has been a shift of revolutionary paradigm due to the prevalence of social media.

Gladwell believes that the electronic ties that bind people and organizations via social

media are weak and lack the robustness required to see through social change. He states

[133] Yette, Laila. *A Call to Action: Twitter's Power to Mobilize During the Arab Spring.* Ed. Dr. Pallavi Kumar. Copyright 2012. 14. http://www.american.edu/soc/communication/upload/Laila-Yette.pdf. Accessed Jan 03 2013.

[134] Nisbet,M& Kotcher,J. " A Two Step Flow of Influence? Opinion Leader Campaigns on Climate Change." *Science Communication.* 2009, 30(3):27.

that, "Twitter is a tool to follow or be followed by people you have never met." He goes on to conclude, "Facebook is simply a tool for managing your acquaintances, for keeping up with the people you may not otherwise be able to stay in touch with. That is why you can have a thousand" friends" on Facebook, as you never could in real life.[135]

Gladwell's piece was written before the dramatic events of the 2011 Arab Spring and yet he is unconvinced as late as 2011 that social media is any different than any other method of communication that leads to mobilizing a population, he does state that the ease by which people can become involved indirectly leads to a greater *perception* of mass participation, and in fact the ease by which one can click their acceptance and "like" a movement is the medium's inherent weakness. Those that are involved online share so little risk that they do not form an actual consensus but are simply a virtual population with a virtual platform that offers little in the way of a threat to a power structure that is willing to defend itself physically. He goes on to state that, "People with a grievance will always find ways to communicate with each other. How they choose to do it is less interesting, in the end, than why they were driven to do it in the first place."[136]

Though Gladwell's comments highlight the key weakness of utilizing social media as a mobilizing agent he ignores the momentum and mass that is created by social media and the tempo at which the message can be operationalized. Combining tempo and mass at a critical time and place is an age old tactical methodology to realizing

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[135] Malcolm Gladwell. "Small Change, Why the Revolution Will Not be Tweeted."*The New Yorker.com reporting* October 4 2010.
[136] Malcolm Gladwell. " Does Egypt Need Twitter?" *The New Yorker.com online blogs,* Feb 2 2011.

success against an opponent. The population numbers that are engaged are so vast that

even if a segment of the population engaged online actions their discourse onto the street

in a coordinated fashion, it will present a major control problem to any institution that is

not fully prepared to counter the movement. Before the Arab Spring there were 100,000

Twitter users in Egypt, but as the Revolution reached its climax the number had increased

to 1.1million users.[137] Shirky additionally counters Gladwell's reluctance by studying

three disparate social movements in South America, Asia and South West Asia. He

acknowledges that Social Media is not a stand- alone revolutionary enabler that replaces

real world action but a faster way to coordinate it.[138] Additionally, like the Free Syrian

Army App *Souria Wa Bas;* even if the Social Media medium is not completely

successful in mobilizing complete international and domestic support it will be utilized to

document real world action and abuses by the power that is retaining control. This

electronic and visual record will remain timelessly safeguarded electronically for a time

that the purveyors of violence against civilian populations may be brought to justice or as

a minimum step ensure that major powers must acknowledge the abuses.

There are some that still believe that the social media assistance to revolutions

create "revolutions without revolutionaries" and that any action cannot be directly

attributed to the medium. The conflicting theories are grounded in the fact that it is very

difficult measure the effectiveness of the medium and that there is a preoccupation in the

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[137] Amer, P. "Twitter Nation"*The Watch* .
http://egypttoday.com/news/display/article/artId:316/twitter-nation/secId:3.2011

[138] Shirky, C. "The Political Power of Social Media."*Foreign Affairs.* October/November 2011.

West with Social Media's role in the 2011 uprisings. Defence analyst Guy Harris believes that the social media outlets were merely barometers of pre-existing social conditions rather than catalysts to revolution.[139] He points out that though they had an effect in organization, mobilization and mass movement, the drive for freedom and democracy in the Middle East are long seated desires of the populations and that Social Media is merely a lens that is easily accessed and understood by media and political elements in the West.[140] The Middle East has time honoured traditions of the power of al sha'ab: the people. Organizations such as the Egyptian Mulsim Brotherhood, Hamas in Gaza and the Sadr movement in Iraq are all cognizant of Social Media but have regularly demonstrated their ability to march hundreds of thousands of people through the streets and to polling booths.[141] This success is due to the pre-existing human social networks that have been entrenched in the region and not *virtual networks* which only have the ability to amplify the effect of these foundational structures. According to critics, what occurs online will be valuable to provide supplementary commentary and as a tracking tool but the real outcome will be decided in the street. Without linking online activity directly to street action and mobilization the effect of social media is negated as a major driver of change in revolutionary activity.

In order to study the connection between social media and action, academics have been working to develop measures to prove or disprove its effectiveness. One of these was

[139] Guy Harris. "The Arab Spring: Revolution without Revolutionaries?". *Arab Spring: Analysis. Defence IQ Review.* Issue 1Q3 2012. Pg 14.
[140] *Ibid. 14*
[141] *Ibid.15*

developed specifically in reaction to the revolution in Tunisia and as reflection of the

relationship between action in the streets and Facebook was aptly named "StreetBook".

"Streetbook" is the transfer of the interaction from social networks to manifestation in

the real world on the street. In a paper published for the *North African Journal, Tunisian*

Samir Garbaya, Paris Institute of Technology tested the interaction of social media and

the events on the street by developing a script using semantic search techniques based on

keyword searches that related to ongoing protests that measured how long it took for

Facebook posts to provoke responses.[142] On the day that Bouzizi burned himself: eight

hours. On January 1: two hours and on the day Tunisia's president left office, it took just

three minutes. [143] This demonstrates the connection between online engagement and

action on the street and highlighted the ability for online mobilization to generate mass

and momentum for a revolutionary population. The critics'analysis is based on the

historical precedence that in the past social media was not needed to generate a

movement. It may not have been necessary in the past, but it is necessary now and if you

do not embrace the new technology and its generated effects, you will be at a distinct

disadvantage to your enemies that have understood the technology and can use it in an

offensive manner.

To properly estimate the threat that social media poses to states one only has to

look at how non-democratic governments or governments under pressure have attempted

[142] Pollock, John. "Streetbook. How Egyptian and Tunisian Youth Hacked the Arab Spring." *MIT Technology Review.* http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/425137/streetbook/. Accessed March 08 2013.

[143] Pontin, Jason. " What Actually Happened: did Social Media Matter During the Arab Spring?"*MIT Technology Review*. Sept/Oct2011.p12

to deny the medium to their populations. The power of the intermediate of social media is reflected in the way that national governments react to their perception of threat. Often at the risk to their own economies and messaging countries will close down their populations' access to the internet. The Chinese and Iranian government have invested millions of dollars to restrict access to the internet and restrict the ability of social movements to mobilize populations or react to social catalysts which may threaten the established power structures[144]. Recognizing the threat posed to the government by access to social media sites, after the "Green Revolution" of 2009 and the Middle Eastern revolutions of 2011, Iran created the "Halal Internet". Announced at the Feb. 2012 Cyber security conference in Tehran by government officials, Iran would use the new internal internet to prevent Iranian communication with foreign websites and social media outlets. Iran's internet has become a national intranet, basically a walled garden for the information of the nation.[145] The investment by Iran and China in national intranet technology is much more sophisticated and shows an understanding of the power of the medium to destabilize governments. This sophistication is in direct response to the clumsy actions of the Egyptian government's complete shut-down of the internet when it was felt that it was a threat to the regime. Fearing the tools of Twitter and Facebook, and the uncensored visual media of yFrog, Flickr and YouTube, the regime chose to pay the price of millions of lost dollars to the economy in order to deprive the protestors of a key

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[144] Ungerleider,Neil. "Iran's "Second Internet" Rivals Censorship of China's "Great Firewall"." *FastCompany.* Feb 23, 2012. http://www.fastcompany.com/1819375/irans-second-internet-rivals-censorship-chinas-great-firewall. Accessed March 11 2013.

[145] Ibid.

weapon-the means of communication.[146]   This act had the secondary effect of cutting off

foreign commerce exchange, communications, travel and resulted in little more than a

four day reprieve for the government from the protestors ability to communicate with

each other and the outside world. Many activists managed to get online or tweeted their

reports to foreign journalists and supporters via landlines.[147] By cutting off Egypt's

Internet and wireless service on 27 January 2011 …in the face of massive street protests,

President Mubarak of betrayed his fear-that Facebook, Twitter, laptops and smartphones

could empower his opponents, expose his weaknesses to the world and topple his

regime.[148]

Ultimately, the censorship techniques failed to prevent the new social media from

playing a mobilizing, triggering and momentum maintaining role in the 2011 popular

uprisings.[149] The internet and social media may not have provided the muscle that

eventually overthrew the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, but it definitely provided the

brain and connective tissue that allowed the physical actions to take place. Wael Ghonim,

the Egyptian, Google executive, activist and author of Revolution 2.0 reflected, " If there

were no social networks, the revolution never would have been sparked…Without

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[146] Nunns, Alex& Idle, Nadia. "Tweets from Tahrir." OR Books,New York,2011. 59
[147] *Ibid. 65*
[148] Shane, S. *Spotlight Again Falls on Web Tools of Change.* From
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/weekinreview/30shane.html?_r=1&hp. Accessed December 2012.

[149] Brynen, Rex,Moore,Pete,Salloukh,Bassel&Zahar,Marie-Joelle. *Beyond the Arab Spring :
Authoritarianism and Democratization in the Arab World.* Lynee Reinner Publishers:London 2012. 239.

Facebook, without Twitter, Without Google, Without YouTube, this never would have happened."[150]

The mobilization potential of population through the use of social media is undeniable. With the dissemination of handheld technologies enabled by high speed cellular networks, the ability to join thousands of like-minded individuals across the web and freely exchange revolutionary ideas can potentially lead to multiple acts against the ruling authority. This information conduit has the potential to create military *mass*[151] of the revolutionary population if they are mobilized along a unifying line of effort. Using the above mentioned 1.1 million Egyptian Twitter users, if only ten percent of these participants engage in physical revolutionary actions they will present a significant operational problem for any government. By realizing the power of this medium, Western governments could leverage populations of interest through surrogate actors by ensuring that groups whose belief systems are in line with national interest are enabled to win the electronic "race for the truth". In any competition there are multiple "truths", it should be the goal of the government to get their chosen "truth" out as quickly and to as wide an audience as possible. This has been exhibited in the Israeli willingness to utilize blogs, Twitter, and Facebook to track ongoing military operations and even announce the killing of high profile enemy leadership. This is not done to inform, it demonstrates Israel's willingness to participate in this medium and attempt to own the "truth" about any given

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[150] Interview with Ghonim, 60 Minutes, 13 Februaury 2011, http://www.cbsnews.comstories/2011/02/13/60minutes/main20031701.shtml. Accessed March 10, 2013.

[151] Mass is defined as the ability to concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time. "US Army Field Manual FM-3 Military Operations".

situation.[152] In theatres that have the prospective to threaten Canadian national interest, there is the potential to indirectly generate decisive action from either supporting friendly governments or revolutionary indigenous populations in the fight by defining the narrative of the conflict. In order to accomplish this, the governments' military must have a mature, technologically savvy, Influence Activities enabled Irregular Warfare capability.

CHAPTER 4 -The Indirect Approach and Future Operations

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesmen and commander have to make is to establish....the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something alien in nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.

-Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*[153]

Having defined the future security environment, the information terrain and the impact of new media, it is the purpose of this chapter to explore the role of irregular warfare in the modern strategic toolbox and the necessary focus on an overarching campaign narrative to enable these operations. When considering "wars of choice", that is interventions in those conflicts that may affect national interest but do not present a clear threat to the

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[152] www.idfblog.com accessed May 02 2013

[153] Carl Von Clauswitz.*On War,* ed and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1976),88.

domestic population, Western governments are under increasing pressure from their constituency to influence world events, while simultaneously reducing the cost in blood and treasure to the nation. This chapter will explore the contemporary historical roots of the indirect approach, present US irregular warfare doctrine and will utilize the irregular warfare case studies with a focus on information operations of both adversary and friendly forces to showcase the potential of this type strategy.

It would seem that these two requirements are diametrically opposed, and that governments will have to utilize a staged engagement strategy in order to build the necessary domestic support for an intervention. If the current trend to avoid ground force intervention continues, this will be achieved primarily through stand-off. The traditional weapons platforms of air and sea allow governments to utilize military force while reducing political risk. If there is international will to pursue kinetic effect, as during recent operations in Libya have demonstrated, then this form of intervention is plausible.

Often, kinetic action as an option is taken away from governments to influence world events due to the threat of collateral damage or the unwillingness of the international community to assume the risks of escalating the conflict. In this case, the other option for governments is to attempt to negate the effect of potential destabilizing international catalysts through an indirect approach. By following an early engagement strategy where regions of strategic value are at risk, combined with the effects of diplomacy, economic engagement, military technical assistance underpinned by a

unifying narrative to domestic and foreign populations, governments can potentially

avoid large scale ground deployments and extended military commitments.[154]

Presently, the US is the only nation who actively pursues a stated irregular

approach to operations which has its roots in the National Security Strategy which

explains the President's interest and goals within a policy framework.   Although not

mentioned in this document by name, irregular warfare is a viable national option for

achieving the stated national objectives of "collective action" by "engaging foreign

partners," and "building cooperation with other 21st century centers of influence"

generally, and to "disrupting" terrorist network supporters specifically. [155]   This reality

is reinforced in the US National Military Strategy. The National Military Strategy – along

with the Quadrennial Defense Review – provides focus for military activities by defining

a set of interrelated military objectives. Military objectives include countering violent

extremism, deterring and defeating aggression, and strengthening international and

regional security. The National Military Strategy states that , "the US, [our] allies, and

our partners will often compete with others for influence in an environment where

persistent tension is the norm, [and] in conjunction with U.S. diplomatic efforts, we [will]

seek to prevent this tension from escalating into conflict." Irregular warfare provides a

relatively discreet and sustainable option to achieve persistent influence; especially where

the Strategy acknowledges that "forward presence and engagement will take on greater

importance." Furthermore, the Strategy seeks a "whole-of-nation deterrence approaches

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[154] The utility of this strategy will be demonstrated in the case study section of the paper. The comparison between OEF-P and OEF-A are of particular interest to this theory.

[155] http://6dollarshirts.com/product.php?productid=12258

that blend economic, diplomatic, and military tools to influence adversary behavior.'
Irregular warfare is a national-level military option to meet these objectives. There are
three categories that governments utilizing the indirect approach will demonstrate
strategic effect. These are –economy of force, expansion of choice and shaping the
future.[156]

On the military line of engagement small special operations units enabled with
Influence Activity capability are able to achieve all three of the above mentioned criteria.
Economy of force is achieved when the outcomes of the forces deployed are greater than
the size and force itself. This paradigm is ideally suited to the irregular warfare that
generates combat power through proxy or through population mobilization. The small
commitment of personnel and materiel compared to the potential result can be conducted
at a fraction of the cost and deliver an asymmetric return on investment when compared
to large conventional deployments.[157]   Expansion of choice falls naturally from the
economy of effort of these actions. Expansion of choice refers to the increased choice
provided to governments when they follow an irregular warfare strategy early in the
campaign. With an economy of force achieved in the initial stages of a campaign, and
intelligence gathering capability embedded in the target nation's networks, governments
can make informed decisions of whether to escalate to a full conventional deployments
which the forces on the ground can facilitate or maintain the lighter footprint on the

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[156] Hy S Rothstein. *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare.* Annapolis,
Maryland:2006,Naval Institute Press. P43.
[157] Paul Carrell. "Brandenburgers in Action Behind the Front."*From Troy to Entebbe,*ed. John
Arquilla(New York:University Press of America, Inc1996),234-38.

ground and support the indigenous revolutionary forces or Host Nation government with

higher enablers. By providing both an economy of force and choice to strategic planners

the future is more capably shaped. If we deconstruct the engagement of US Special

Forces in Africa conducting capacity building, it is easy to recognize the benefits of the

strategy. The small commitment of several hundred trainers has a disproportionate effect

strategically. By engaging early, the US government builds trust with the host nations it

is supporting, it is capable of assessing the security situation first hand and it begins to

influence the narrative of the region.[158] There are four target audiences that are engaged

with this strategy: the Host Nation Domestic population, the indigenous Force being

trained, the enemy and the US domestic population.   Well trained indigenous security

forces send a message to their domestic populations that they are professional, capable

and offer an option to the AQ threat. The indigenous force has increased confidence

becomes part of the US network. The enemy forces in the area are aware there is a threat

to their survival and freedom of action and may be deterred from bold activity. Finally,

the US domestic population is engaged that the US military is working towards their

security but is not engaging in large scale wars that threaten stability and economic

prosperity.   Small, early deployments to potential zones of conflict can prepare the

political ground for power struggles to be resolved in ways that supports national

interests in a way that large scale deployments cannot. The importance of a persistent

and early engagement in the region of interest to sustain effects with this type of

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[158] Beuprere, Guillame. ” Waging Special Warfare in Africa” *Special Warfare Magazine.* Jan-March 2013. 33-45.

capability cannot be overstated. To ensure the best chance of success and to avoid large

scale conventional deployments elements, time is required to lay the ground work for

effective shaping. It must be understood that this type of action "left of the beginning" is

designed to change mindsets and attitudes of a certain target population and will be

difficult to measure along traditional standards.   Figure 1.3[159] below demonstrates the

cycle of preparation and decision that must occur between the strategic and tactical level.


Fig 1.3   Early Engagement Left of The Beginning.
United States. Irregular Warfare Joint Operational Concept V2[Draft] May 10

 Special Forces can display an ongoing political commitment to a host nation or

indigenous force without appearing as an occupier. Elements specifically trained in the

art of engagement, language, culture and information can be designed and deployed to

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[159] United States. Irregular Warfare Joint Operational Concept V2[Draft] May 10. Hasler, Jeffrey. "Unconventional Warfare Evolution; Policy and Doctrine". (Professional Presentation.Special Forces Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine USAJFKSWCS,27 Sept 2011). With permission.

achieve military or political-psychological objectives that ultimately lead to strategic effects.[160] These specific operations can lead to shaping future horizons, but only if political will to support them is present. This chapter will utilize the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, a comparison of the Israeli campaigns of 2006/ 2008 and ongoing operations in Africa and the Middle East as potential models of engagement for the Government of Canada and the Canadian Forces.

The Indirect Approach Defined

> *Throughout the ages decisive results in war have only been reached when the approach has been indirect.*
> *-Sir Basil Liddell Hart[161]*

The past decade has seen the major engagement of conventional forces of most Western nations too either the Iraqi or Afghan theatre of operations. This commitment has come at a huge cost in national blood and treasure. Figures have yet to be totalled, but present estimates of 333,000 total war dead from direct action and over 4 trillion US dollars spent and obligated to the two conflicts.[162] The Afghan and Iraq examples have demonstrated that the unilateral and direct application of military power to achieve policy objectives, at the expense of less obtrusive military alternatives, may in fact retard rather than enable

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[160] Hy S Rothstein. *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare.* Annapolis, Maryland:2006,Naval Institute Press. P45.

[161] Lidell-Hart, Basil. Strategy: The Indirect Approach, 3rd revised Ed.(London: Faber&Faber,1954). 27

[162] Neta C Crawford PhD&Catherine Lutz PhD "The Cost of War Project." Directors. www.costsofwar.org. (Accessed March 15, 2013.)

the realization of those objectives. [163] This huge investment, with little in the way of

satisfactory return, over the past decade has caused many Western nations to take stock

of their policies on direct intervention. In the 2012 Defence Strategic Guidance, the

document which lays the blueprint for the US Joint Force 2020, the DoD recognized it

would have to recalibrate its capabilities and make selective investments to make

irregular warfare and counterterrorism a primary mission.[164] The Strategic Guidance

states;

> Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world also remains
> important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership.
> Across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice,
> pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations -including
> those in Africa and Latin America – whose interests and viewpoints are
> merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity.
> Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-
> footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on
> exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.[165]

Marine Corp General John Allen, most recently commander of all Joint Forces in

Afghanistan, reinforces the political trend of Western disengagement from intervention

when he commented at a RAND/ Foreign Policy Magazine round table, "Clearly a 50

nation coalition in Afghanistan (has) been important to us, but my guess is…that it will be

20 years before we undertake something like this again. It will be 20 years before NATO

is going to be interested in putting boots on the ground and conducting something of this

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[163] Homiak, Travis. "Expanding the American Way of War: Working "Through,With,or By" Non-US Actors." *Joint Special Operations Report 09-3. Contemporary Security Challenges: Irregular Warfare and Indirect approaches.*Feb 2009. Pg19.

[164] United States. Department of Defence. " Sustaining US Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century." The White House Press. January 2012. Pg 10

[165] *Ibid. Pg 4.*

scale."[166] Like the US, the realities of economic constraint and war fatigue have many

nations considering an indirect approach to achieving national intent. There is a reduced

appetite for the niceties of nation building and human security and a return to the ideals

of the *realpolitik*. Essentially, nations must do enough to achieve the minimum effect

required to realize national interest with minimum cost.   Presently, this is achieved

kinetically through standoff from naval and air weapons platforms and specifically

targeted raids by Special Operations Forces conducting Direct Actions (DA). Lasting

non-kinetic effects are achieved through governmental economic and diplomatic

engagement combined with a strategic communications plan overlaid onto limited ground

force elements which are specifically tasked to act through surrogates and enable the

capacity of either host-nation governments or indigenous forces to achieve an acceptable

end state.   This indirect approach has its roots in the killing fields of WW I and has been

adapted to the contemporary operational environment.

 The indirect approach was first described as such by Sir Basil Liddell Hart in 1929

and was a tactical and operational answer to the slaughter of the direct assault of WW1.

The strategy calls for an army to follow the path of least resistance. From his book

Strategy: The Indirect Approach, Hart best describes the theory, "In strategy, the longest

way around is often the shortest way there. A direct approach to the object exhausts the

attacker and hardens resistance by compression, where an indirect approach loosens the

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[166] Gordon Lubold. General John Allen. As quoted from the *Foreign Policy: National Security Blog*. http://www.foriegnpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/14/steve_hadley_at_fp_i_should_have_asked_that_question_john_allen_no_boots_on_the_ground. Accessed March 15 2013.

defender's hold by upsetting the balance."[167] While Liddell-Hart's methodology related to actual manoeuvre on a linear battlefield, the indirect approach has been adapted by the Western militaries and specifically their Special Operating Forces with regard to their Irregular Warfare (IW) doctrine.

In contemporary terms, the indirect approach relates to the means by which allied networks can influence the operational environments within which Irregular Warfare campaigns are conducted.. Irregular Warfare comprises of five elements; Unconventional Warfare(UW), Counter-insurgency(COIN), Counter-Terrorism(CT), Hostage Rescue(HR) and Stability Operations(SO).[168] It typically includes actions to enable partners to conduct operations against enemy organizations as well as actions to shape and stabilize their operational environments as a means to erode support and sanctuary for enemy elements. The indirect approach includes the use of core Special Operations activities such as Foreign Internal Defence (FID), Security Force Assistance (SFA), Intelligence Operations (IO), Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). These activities are combined with stability operations, counterintelligence and strategic communication to produce synergies to indirectly enable partners to achieve governmental operational and strategic intent. In the case of Special Forces (SF) elements, by compounding Western technology and expertise with indigenous forces that support US strategic goals, the US can achieve minimal military

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[167] Hart, Lidell. *Strategy: The Indirect Approach,* 3rd revised Ed.(London: Faber&Faber,1954). 27
[168] United States. *Irregular Warfare Joint Operational Concept V2[Draft]* May 10. Hasler, Jeffrey. "Unconventional Warfare Evolution; Policy and Doctrine". (Professional Presentation.Special Forces Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine USAJFKSWCS,27 Sept 2011).

engagement while still attaining its war aims. This approach is known as *Unconventional Warfare*.[169]

Within COIN doctrine, Western forces aim to build host nation capacity, and through both direct military engagement in the form of stabilization forces and the building of democratic institutions simultaneously, a friendly state will be established.[170] Both of these engagements commonly utilize the "indirect approach" in literature and training manuals. In order to support this form of engagement it is imperative that the forces utilized are enabled with an asymmetric advantage of technology over their opponents, are supported by the indigenous populations they are influencing and have the power of a unifying political narrative directed towards enemy, host nation, domestic and foreign populations.

The two standing definitions of Unconventional Warfare from the US Strategic Level and the primary Combatant Commander US Special Operations Command (USSOCCOM) do not differ radically and reflect the shifting priorities between the strategic and operational level. The United States Department of Defense defines Unconventional Warfare as a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source.[171] Similar but more focussed at the tactical and operational

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[169] United States. Unconventional Warfare. Joint Publication 3-05, 15 Aug 2011.3.
[170] CANADA. DND. *Counter-Insurgency Operations*.B-GL-323-004/FP-003(Ottawa:DND Canada,2008) Para 103.
[171] United States. " Unconventional Warfare".

level the latest approved definition by the US Special Operations Command is as follows: Unconventional Warfare consists of activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area. [172]

Regardless of the nuanced difference between the two, the overarching intent remains the same in the pursuit of US strategic goals through the support of proxy or surrogate forces. The intent of US Unconventional Warfare efforts is to exploit a hostile power's political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives…For the foreseeable future, U.S. forces will predominantly engage in irregular warfare (IW) operations.[173] With this being said there has been a gap between doctrine and reality. Within the last decade Western armies have been poor at pursuing unconventional strategies when facing irregular forces and have pursued conventional attritional responses to operational problems that required a slightly more indirect approach.

These capabilities are best utilized during the shaping phases of an operation or campaign prior to the surge of large conventional forces. The unconventional force can conduct something as innocuous as an overt non-combat training mission to professionalize a friendly government's armed forces to a covert insertion to link up and support indigenous fighters that are rebelling against a government that has been

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[172] United States. Joint Publication 3-05,"Special Operations" Sept 2011.37.
[173] United States. Department of Defence. " Sustaining US Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century." The White House Press. January 2012. Pg 11

identified as unfriendly to national interest.   In order to accomplish this type of operation

the psychological and informational planes are on par with the physical. It is in this

manner that social media could be utilized to leverage target populations.

Prior to discussing how to operationalize the capability in concert with existing

SF structures the next chapter will investigate three case studies; exploring first the most

recent success of traditional unconventional warfare practices in the Operation Enduring

Freedom- Philippines (OEF-P) and then shift explore the evolution of the Israeli

experience with irregular warfare on the informational plane from the first Intifada in

1988 to the 2012 *Op Pillar of Defence.* Finally, the chapter will demonstrate the

potential for the indirect approach and the connection with social media through the

ongoing USSOCOM Military Information Support Operations (MISO) ongoing in the

African theatre of operations.

CHAPTER 5 CASE STUDIES

An Indirect Success Story; the US Engagement in the Philippines

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 the world watched breathlessly as the US

utilized an indirect approach to attack the Al Qaeda stronghold in Afghanistan. The

strategy leveraged special operations teams on horseback advising indigenous anti-

Taliban elements combined with strategic joint fires to first dislocate and then dislodge

the existing Taliban government. This was followed by the public collapse of the Taliban

and the supported Al Qaeda elements fleeing for safe havens in Pakistan. This example

has been held up as the text book solution to achieving strategic effect with tactical

forces. Yet a decade after the action was complete, there is little in the way of lasting effect from that original highly publicized success. Afghanistan has become a theatre in which Western conventional forces have become mired, the Taliban is resurgent and the Afghan government has developed little capacity to manage its own affairs. Paralleling the Afghan action, but having far more lasting success, is the deployment of US Special Forces to the Philippines to battle Muslim extremism. The SF is tasked to aid the indigenous forces in the destruction of the AQ element Abu Sayaaf. This non-combat mission leveraged US technological capability, advisory capacity combined with an over-arching psychological and informational campaign plan. The result has been the enabling of the Philippine government and military to unilaterally render Abu Sayyaf ineffective on their soil.

 Though not widely known, the Philippines once threatened to become a hub of al-Qaeda. In the 1990s, before Osama bin Laden became a household name in America, top al-Qaeda leaders such as 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed were in this Pacific island chain developing ambitious plans to strike at America and the West.[174] Since 9/11, the small U.S. contingent here has given the Philippine military the tools and know-how to decimate Abu Sayyaf on its own and have created what some military experts say is a model for how to stop Islamic insurgencies before they require an invasion force to defeat.[175]

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[174] Jim. Michaels. " The Philippines a Model for CounterInsurgency" USA Today. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-03-30-secretwar30_ST_N.htm. Accessed 01/07/13.

[175] *Ibid.pg1*

Unlike the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq the focus in the Philippines has been one

of engagement and local solutions. There has been an insistence on a minimum footprint

of US forces and a requirement for the Philippino forces to shoulder the majority of the

load. This has resulted in a disproportionate result from the investment. The mission is

executed by the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) with

approximately 600 men and women and a budget of some $52 million a

year;[176] in contrast, the Iraq war cost over $100 billion a year and required more than

180,000 troops at its peak in FY 2008, and the Afghan operations costs about $2 billion a

week and as of December 2011, involved more than 94,000 troops.[177] There have only

been 17 US service members killed on the operation and the majority of those have been

non-combat related.[178] Between 2001 and 2012, most of the key Abu Sayyaaf leaders

have been killed and militant strength has been reduced from about 1,200 to less than

400.[179] Abu Sayyaaf is said to have devolved into a criminal gang with little ideology

remaining and is increasingly isolated because partnered terrorist elements have now

entered into serious peace talks with Manila and publicly denounced terrorist tactics.

Working in unison with the advisory teams to develop the capacity of the indigenous

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[176] Max Boot and Richard Bennet, "Treading Softly in the Philippines: Why a low intensity
counterinsurgency strategy seems to be working there." The Weekly Standard,
January 5-January 12, 2009, Vol 14, No. 16

[177] The Brookings Institution statistical summaries; the Iraq index may be
found at http://www.brookings.edu/search.aspx?doQuery=1&q=iraq%20index and the
Afghanistan index at http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx as
of 19 Mar 2012.

[178] Jim. Michaels. " The Philippines a Model for CounterInsurgency" USA Today.
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-03-30-secretwar30_ST_N.htm.

[179] Diana Dunham Scott. " Understanding and Engaging the Muslims in the Southern Philipinnes"
Rand,Pardee Graduate School. Dissertation. June 2012.Pg10

security forces, US MISO elements assisted the Pilipino forces in developing a unifying

narrative that highlighted the positive effects of the government forces and the negative

attributes of Abu Sayyaf. Utilizing MISO designed social media messaging, radio

broadcasts, government education programs combined with infrastructure improvements,

populations at risk to influence from extremists elements were "brought in from the cold"

and integrated into mainstream Philippine society.   In an interview from March 2013,

the Philippine Defence Secretary Voltaire Gazmin described Abu Sayyaf has having "few

members" and that they have been marginalized from the population through both direct

military action and indirect engagement with the population on the southern islands.[180]

This form of patient engagement has resulted in increased governmental and military

capacity within the Philippines and a lasting commitment to counter Muslim extremism

by both the government and more importantly the local population.   In early 2011, the

Philippine government announced that sufficient progress had been made to begin

implementation of a new 5-year internal security plan which would emphasize economic

development and prepare the Philippine National Police to assume responsibility for

internal security from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.[181] The strategy is designed to

finalize a peace accord and isolate Abu Sayyaf from internal and foreign support and

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[180] Nikko Dizon. Philippine Daily Enquirer. "Defense chief describes Abu Sayyaf as a 'marginalized' group" Read more: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/70381/defense-chief-describes-abu-sayyaf-as-a-marginalized-group#ixzz2PbpTfABb. Accessed March 27 2013.

[181] *Ibid.7.*

defeat them. [182]The United States will remain a key enabler during this next 5-year phase; the emphasis on human rights, governance, security sector reform and economic development will require ever more nuanced engagement and sophisticated understanding of the human terrain.[183]

Requiring strategic patience and persistent national engagement the OEF-P model of enabling indigenous forces and designing an overarching narrative to isolate threat forces has worked well in terms of time, resources and commitment. This model worked exceptionally well in a semi-permissive environment, supported by a Host Nation that has almost a hundred years of history with the US. But what is the importance of the narrative in a conventional war setting in a non-permissive environment? The best example of this presently is the ongoing conflict between Israel and the belligerent groups in Gaza and Lebanon. The narrative is utilized as another manoeuvre element on this battlefield and tactical action supports the overarching narrative. The battles are fought in real time on full-motion video and are posted to social sites, Youtube and twitter to ensure the respective sides have an opportunity to win the race for the truth. In order to demonstrate the evolution of the importance of the narrative in warfare the next case study will investigate its' roots during the First Intifada in 1988, the resultant PLO victory and then the resultant evolution of Israeli capability to use the social networking medium, own the information space and defeat their enemies psychologically as well as physically.

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[182] *Ibid.7*
[183] *Ibid.7.*

The First Intifada

Starting in 1985, Hezbollah developed thirteen principles of war to drive the Israeli

presence from Lebanon. The principles were designed to specifically defeat an enemy

that was technologically advanced, concerned on avoiding casualties For the most part

they read like most other guerrilla armies' principles; themed along the lines of avoiding

decisive action, strike only when success is guaranteed and attack weak not strong

targets.[184] Where the focus of the Hezbollah/PLO leadership differed was the focus on the

narrative of the conflict. Realizing that strategic success would for the

Lebanese/Palestinian elements would ultimately come from defeating the Israeli will

 combined with an International movement to support the cause

there was a decision to invest the principle of the narrative in

their principles war. Namely: there must be always a focus on

the strategic goals and not tactical victories. "the road to final victory passes through

thousands of small victories", "the population is the treasure-nurture it" and most

importantly the realization of the power of the media. " The media has innumerable guns

whose hits are like bullets. Use them in battle!"[185]   In order to drive home key messages

Hezbollah and the Palestinian Liberation Organization employed the "Theory of

Entanglement". This strategy basically dictated no tactical action but that which

supported the narrative of the conflict would be performed. The main thrust of the

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[184] Mathews, Matt. " We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War.|" The Long War Series, Occasional Paper 26. US Army Combined Arms Centre. Combat Studies Institute Press: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 2008. Pg7.
[185] *Ibid.7*

strategy was to paint the Palestinians and their Lebanese allies as victims of Israeli aggression. Wherever possible the disparate nature of the conflict, that is a modern militant state vs peoples seeking freedom, would be highlighted to gain international support and induce revulsion of the conflict from the Israeli left. When on Dec 1988, the PLO declared Independence and stated that Israel had the right to exist. This was a significant departure from previously held positions and placed the PLO in the role of reasonable actor within the context of the conflict. Local leaders then utilized the narrative as the driving force of their campaign and supported their narrative with carefully targeted actions against the Israelis.

> The Palestinians adopted techniques intended to neutralize the conventional might of Israel. They would utilize teenagers to fling stones and prompt a reaction from the IDF, they would interpose women and young children between the Israelis and those men that were to be arrested and would only take action if the international media was in attendance. The presence of TV cameras were the trigger for Palestinian action and the world was inundated by images of unarmed Palestinian "heroes" being fired on by the IDF.[186]

The Palestinians enabled the press with drivers, handlers, passes to get through checkpoints and ensured that the press was present regardless of the Israeli best efforts to stop the points from getting out. This created an environment of David vs Goliath and demonstrated that the Israelis were a colonial occupying force. Even in the most right wing Western media questions were being raised as to the legitimacy of the Israeli

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[186] Thomas Hammes. *The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century.*(Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2006),105.

presence in the territory[187]. This narrative was capitalized on at every opportunity by the

Palestinians. Not satisfied with just traditional media, the Palestinians initiated a pre-

planned campaign along several lines. Highly respected Palestinians in academic and

professional communities around the world presented a coordinated message via

international forums, meetings, emails conferences and interviews.[188] By doing this the

Palestinians influenced international Muslim populations, Western populations and their

own population. Their final line of influence saw the Palestinians leverage a failed

operation in Lebanon and utilized the frustrated front-line Israeli soldier as the vehicle for

the message.

Just prior to the 1988 Intifada, the Palestinians astutely recognized the frustration

on the part of the average Israeli soldier and the Israeli political left with the constant

cycle of violence in Lebanon and the occupied territories. Steeped in the tradition of a

moral army that fights to only protect their nation, the young soldiers had trouble

reconciling that image with the image being beamed around the world of their army

constantly firing rubber bullets towards children and harassing women going about their

daily business.[189] Due to the short lines of communication and the liberal nature of the

Israeli press the soldiers communicated these frustrations to both their families and in

interviews with media, resulting in a disjointed message that appeared to supporting the

Palestinians from the soldiers that were fighting them. The combination of the

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[187] Efaw, Jeremy. "Palestinian Psychological Operations: The First Intifada." American
Diplomacy. http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2006/0103/ca_efaw/efaw_intifada.html

[188] *Ibid.104*
[189] *Ibid.105.*

Palestinians keeping the Inifada largely non-violent ,international pressure and lack of

Israeli national will to continue to prosecute the offensive drove the Israelis to the

bargaining table. The result was the Oslo Accords of 1993.

Although the Palestinians subsequently failed to generate a

formal agreement, the Intifada, utilizing the power of the

narrative supported by non-violent action created an

environment that the Israelis were forced to come to the

negotiating table. The Intifada was the first shot fired in the narrative wars between

Israel and the various belligerents in the region.   Israel has learned from their initial

defeat to become a world leader in shaping the message and has progressed to ensuring

the message doesn't just support kinetic action but that often the kinetic action supports

the message.

Twitter Wars-Operation Pillar of Defence

 In November of 2012, Israel launched an offensive named *Operation Pillar of Defence*

against Hamas in response to mass missile launches into Israeli population centres. The

difference between this offensive and other operations was level of focus that the Israelis

placed on winning the race for the truth and in particular their focus on the usage of

social media to promulgate the message world- wide.   The screen capture left displays

the level of sophistication that the IDF has come to practice when enabling the narrative

of their operations in Gaza.[190]   Realizing the potential of social media the IDF has

embraced the emerging technology and ensures that its followers, both nationally and

internationally are fully informed of all ongoing operations and often provide full motion

video to confirm the narrative that they are

presenting. The opening Israeli salvo of the

operation was a precision missile strike to kill

Hamas military leader Ahmed al-Jabari while he

was driving his car.[191]

Immediately following the strike, the IDF posted

the video from the UAV strike to Youtube for

public consumption and tweeted this message to

Hamas leadership and followers from the hashtag @PillarOfDefense "The first target, hit

minutes ago, was Ahmed Al-Jabari, head of the #Hamas military wing. This was

followed by a direct warning to Hamas operatives, "We recommend that no Hamas

operatives, whether low level or senior leaders, show their faces above ground in the days

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[190] RT News Blog. "Twitter Warfare: How Israel and Hamas Wage War Online". Published time: November 16, 2012 14:35. Accessed Jan 21 2013.

[191] Noah Schatchman. "Israel Kills Hamas Leader, Instantly Posts It to YouTube." DangerRoom, *Wired Magazine. 11.14.12. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/11/idf-hamas-youtube/*. Accessed Dec 16 2012.

ahead." [192] The news about the Jabari assassination went to the 'twittersphere' even before it was announced to the media during a military briefing, which can be arguably called the first declaration of war on a micro-blog.

Not to be outdone Hamas militants reacted by raining over 700 rockets onto Israeli population centres and ensured that they live blogged and tweeted every salvo to record Israeli casualties and display Hamas technical capability.   Hamas also utilized the twittersphere to display civilian casualties and seek public opinion.[193]

As much time as was dedicated to kinetic action the two sides organized to reach populations and offset the others message. Sites such as #IsraelUnderFire and #GazaUnderAttack form the front lines of the information campaign where tactical victories are immediately uploaded and the two sides race to ensure their version of the truth is impressed upon the target populations.

During *Operation Pillar of Defence* the IDF displayed that it had learned from its previous information failures during the first and second Intifada's and have evolved to one of the world leaders in utilizing social media to shape world opinion and instantly communicate with internal, external and enemy populations simultaneously. Op *PoD* is

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[192] CTV News Staff. " Israel Hammers Gaza with Airstrikes, Warns of Ground Operation via Twitter" http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/israel-hammers-gaza-with-airstrikes-warns-of-ground-operation-1.1038058#ixzz2QFvDFoIH

[193] Noah Schatchman and Robert Beckhusen. "Hamas Shoots Rockets at Tel Aviv, Tweeting Every Barrage." http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/11/gaza-social-media-war/. Accessed Dec 16 2012.

perhaps the first example of "war being tweeted live" and opposing forces being able to simultaneously communicate freely in real time through electronic means to present their cases to their respective target populations. This evolution is undeniably the future of all military where the narrative must not only support specific actions and be explained to media during a post operational brief, but potentially the communications strategy will overlay all other lines of operations and at times drive certain aspects. In fact as the world becomes more interconnected and it will matter less to what groups are doing tan to what they are perceived to be doing the physical plane may well be subordinated to the informational and psychological plane.

CHAPTER 6 Conclusions and Research Recommendations

> *"You may not be interested in social media,*
> *but social media is very interested in you."*
>
> *- Col Brian Petit USSOCOM adaption of Leon Trotsky's axiom on war*

The future study, practice and execution of warfare will have to include the new media as a major influence and player on the world stage. The utilization of emerging handheld technologies and the buttonology of messaging in the domain is less important than perhaps a shift a mindset by Western militaries and governments of how war and the role of influence activities needs to be approached moving forward in the twenty-first century. The technology is ever expanding and our allies, enemies and potential competitors are already far more savvy than we are in the utilization of this medium. Canada should investigate the use of Social Media as an enabler in both the direct and indirect approach

to warfare if we as a Canadian Armed Forces are going to provide the widest possible options to the government of Canada.   The medium is not element specific and can be used by Air, Naval, Land and SOF elements to generate effects in support of government of Canada goals. In terms of the next generation of warfare, the use of proxies or surrogates are potential options to integrate with this capability and Canada must tread lightly and delicately investigate both the potential for this type of warfare and the legal and moral implications to the utilization of this powerful technological medium. It must be recognized up front that the narrative and social media is not a silver bullet that will independently be a campaign winning enabler, but a critical piece, like artillery or fast-air that can be brought rapidly to bear to inform, coerce, deceive or mobilize populations in line with the theatre commanders' intent.   Our interest in this medium is not to dominate it, as that is impossibility, but merely to be a player in a game where no one is excluded. It is this fact that operational commanders will have to comprehend and to ignore it will be at our own peril.   The campaign plan will need to have a dedicated narrative, *not as a support to the various lines of operation, but as the glue that will solidify any campaign moving forward across all lines*.   This will need to be supported by dedicated social media resources. The Canadian Armed Forces is just in the fledgling attempts to engage over this medium and will need to continue to increase its experience moving forward.[194] It will be increasingly important to remember that what you do will

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[194] Canada. Communications Policy of the Government of Canada http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=12316

be less important than what you are perceived to be doing. Campaigns will be reported in

real time with FMV and the "race for the truth" will determine the victor in all but the

most obvious conventional campaigns.

As we move forward into the next century and through a period of fiscal restraint and

casualty aversion we seek out solutions to the volatile world in which we live and they

may be more in line with the precepts of indirect approach and irregular warfare than the

large deployments of the 20th and early 21st centuries.

      The lessons of the Arab Spring and the influence of Social Media are still being

analysed at this time, what is easily recognizable is that without a stability program and

overt support after a time of crisis populations that mobilized themselves to pursue

freedom and democracy can easily fall prey to hostile elements that will fill the vacuum if

Western Democracies refuse to engage. Two years after the revolutions of hope swept

across the Middle East instability and violence reign again. Egypt populations are

unhappy with the present Muslim Brotherhood government that is seen to be extremist[195],

the Tunisian government is teetering under the weight of a failed economy, Libya and

Syria are under siege from AQ affiliates that are attempting to fill vacuums of power.[196]

The "Facebook Revolution" had the power to mobilize the populations to revolution but

does not have the power to make concrete change without a synchronization of effort

across population, domestic governments and foreign actors.

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[195] The Economist Intelligence Unit. " Briefing Egypt, To The Barricades Again". *The Economist* Feb 2 2013. *P17*

[196] Seth, Jones. " The Mirage of the Arab Spring." *Foreign Affairs.* January/Feb 2013.pg57

The technology is pervasive, important to understand and important to use, but to have true effect on population it will have to be combined with effect on the ground. We as a military must comprehend the borderless nature of information and the influences that our target populations have access too. We may need to commit resources to data – mining social media sites for open source intelligence and develop social media battle drills as trends and triggers are realized and the effect on target populations are recognized.

The Canadian Armed Forces and the Government of Canada should further investigate how to specifically operationalize social media as a capability, where it should be held, how to integrate it into campaign design and finally establish formal parameters by which social media will utilized as a tool of expeditionary operations.

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