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THE READINESS DILEMMA: BEING READY FOR TOMORROW TODAY

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THE READINESS DILEMMA: BEING READY FOR TOMORROW TODAY

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the concept of military readiness, including the theories and factors that influence readiness. It explores what readiness means in the CF and how being ready achieves the government's strategic objectives. The focus then turns to discussing how readiness and training are linked in the Army, and reviews the readiness system from a domestic, regional and international context. After that, the concept of readiness to training and highlights the means used to validate forces in training (live-fire) against their assigned level of readiness. The paper then discusses the future security environment and what the CF can and should expect to confront in future missions. This is then used as the platform to outline how this impacts the Army of today and the Army of tomorrow to shape the structure and posture the Army must achieve and maintain. This study asserts that in order to achieve the readiness expected by the government, the CF and Army must direct and enable the infantry as the baseline building block of the Task Force (TF) of the future to train to sub-unit live-fire as the minimum required standard.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADF	Australian Defense Force
BG	Battle Group
BTS	Battle Task Standards
CA	Canadian Army
CCA	Commander Canadian Army
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CF	Canadian Forces
CFDS	Canada First Defence Strategy
CMTC	Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre
CT	Collective Training
DND	Department of National Defence
FSE	Future Security Environment
HR	High Readiness
IT	Individual Training
IRU	Immediate Reaction Unit
LGen	Lieutenant-General
LOC	Level of Capability
LOO	Line of Operation
MLOC	Minimum Level of Capability
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MRP	Managed Readiness Plan
NEO	Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defence Command
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
RTHR	Road to High Readiness
SORTS	Status of Resources and Training
TF	Task Force
TMST	Theatre Mission Specific Training
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
UN	United Nations
WWI	World War One

INTRODUCTION

This Government took office with a firm commitment to stand up for Canada. Fulfilling this obligation means keeping our citizens safe and secure, defending our sovereignty, and ensuring that Canada can return to the international stage as a credible and influential country, ready to do its part. Rebuilding the Canadian Forces into a first-class, modern military is a fundamental requirement if we are to deliver on these goals.

– Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Canada First Defence Strategy[1]

Canadian Forces Strategic Framework

In 2008, the federal government released the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS), to define the framework for the Canadian Forces (CF) since the CF serves as "the strategic and decisive element of national power."[2] As per the epigraph above, the CFDS clearly outlines what the federal government expects of the CF: the tasks, missions, priorities and focus for the future. This framework provides the basis in which the CF operates and guides all planning and operations as represented pictorially in Figure 1 below:

[1] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2008), 1.

[2] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-000/FP-000 Canada's Army – We Stand on Guard for Thee* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 1998), 2.



Figure 1: Canada First Defence Strategy Framework[3]

This framework describes three main roles for the military: providing security domestically within Canadian sovereign territory, regionally in North America in partnership with the US and thirdly by providing international leadership through the commitment of forces as part of an international operation anywhere in the world.[4] These three roles are supported by the six general missions the government expects the CF to conduct: daily domestic and continental operations, supporting a major international event in Canada, responding to a major terrorist attack, supporting civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada like a natural disaster, leading or participating in a major international operation for an extended period and deploying forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods.[5] In order to achieve this, the framework is established on the four pillars of: personnel, equipment, readiness and infrastructure. Each pillar has a unique role to play in achieving the government's intent of

[3] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2008), 14.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., 10.

enabling the CF to be "fully integrated, flexible, multi-role and combat-capable."[6] While the pillars of personnel, equipment and infrastructure have important roles to play in the quality of the CF, the readiness pillar occupies the majority of military planners' time and will be the focus of this paper.

In its simplest form, readiness is defined as "the ability of a military unit to accomplish its assigned missions."[7] Accordingly, the goal for the CF is to achieve readiness in the missions and roles of the strategic framework to ensure the CF is both strategically relevant and tactically decisive. This is not an easy task given that it is something that must be achieved regardless of the mission, through a spectrum of conflict that represents all possible military tasks from peace-time operations to all out war.[8] This spectrum is best represented by Figure 2 below:

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[6] Ibid., 14.

[7] Jack Spencer, "The Facts about Military Readiness," *The Heritage Foundation Executive Summary*, no. 1394 (2000): 1.

[8] Department of National Defence, *Land Operations 2021 – Adaptive Dispersed Operations – The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, edited by Andrew B. Godefroy (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2007), 7.



Figure 2: The Spectrum of Conflict[9]

Presently, the CF is in an interesting time. With changes to the Afghanistan commitment, including the end of the combat mission and the drawdown of the training mission, coupled with the government imposed restrictions to military expenditures in response to the fiscal crisis, the intricate balance across the four capability pillars has never been so precarious. This has lead to a current round of transformation designed to "develop ideas to increase efficiency and effectiveness, and to act as the driving force behind organizational changes needed to reposition the DND/CF for the future."[10] This transformation assesses the spending associated with achieving a credible military deterrence as efficiently as possible across the four CFDS strategic pillars with the least expenditure possible in order for the government to be responsive and

[9] Ibid., 7.

[10] Andrew Leslie, *Report on Transformation 2011* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2011), iv.

accountable.[11] The strategic framework and the transformation plan are precipitated down in subsequent directives and orders to the three elements (Navy, Army and Air Force) to streamline processes and goals.

Army's Strategic Framework

Armed with the CFDS framework, the Army sets its priorities and objectives through its own strategic framework, depicted in Figure 3.



Figure 3: The Army's Strategic Framework[12]

In order to accomplish the roles assigned by the CFDS, the Army's mission of "[generating] combat-effective, multi-purpose land forces to meet Canada's defence objectives"[13] is at the

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[11] Ibid., vi.

[12] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 7.

[13] Department of National Defence, *Army Operating Plan FY 13/14 V2* (Ottawa, ON: DLS 2-2, 2013), 1-1/13.

apex of the framework. This mission is achieved through the definition and adherence to the Army's campaign plan, which is founded on the same four capability pillars as the CFDS but includes commander's guidance as a fifth pillar.[14] As a foundation, this framework rests on the foundation of cornerstone Army document titled *Advancing With Purpose*, the CFDS and Canadian values and cultures. Achieving success in the overall framework relies on a number of factors, similar to the capability factors in the CFDS framework. It is important to note that in the Army framework, the capability pillar of readiness has been relabelled as training since "[t]raining is one of the critical pillars of the Army's Strategic Framework that guides readiness for current and foreseeable operations. [Army] training is undertaken to ensure the Army is ready to meet Government-assigned tasks."[15] Given its importance, it is imperative that this training/readiness, above all other capability pillars, is given the resources, funding and time needed to achieve the mission of the Army and the CF. This paper will focus on the training and readiness requirements of the infantry for two reasons. First, "no major conflict has been won without boots on the ground"[16] and secondly for the last fifteen years, the main manoeuvre element of deployed CF contingents has been the infantry sub-unit.[17]

Readiness

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[14] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 7.

[15] Ibid., 6.

[16] Department of the Army, *2012 Army Posture: The Nation's Force of Decisive Action* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2012), 5.

[17] David Pentney, "Managed Readiness – Flawed Assumptions, Poor Deductions and Unintended Consequences," *The Canadian Army Journal*, 10, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 27.

Despite its importance, the actual meaning of the term readiness is not widely understood. At its most basic level, the Army defines readiness as "the military ability to make a timely and appropriate response to any threat."[18] Any threat speaks to the myriad types of operations across the spectrum of conflict, including current and future threats.[19] With respect to the threat of tomorrow, considerable research and study has gone into defining the Future Security Environment (FSE) by both Canada and our allies. Understanding the FSE is important since "even when not at war, professional volunteer armies continue to think about future conflict"[20] in order to adjust and adapt for future possibilities. This is not easy: "many analysts now claim that today's world is more chaotic and unpredictable than at any other period in history."[21] This does not restrict the amount of readiness that the CF must possess, rather it forces the CF to choose where to focus, and how much focus it must invest.

Training and the Managed Readiness Plan

Thinking about the future and deciding on where to focus is only part of the problem. As indicated in the Army's strategic framework, the Army must train to established standards in order to enable readiness to possess the capacity to deter and counter threats.

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[18] André Harvey, "Directorate of Army Training Update: Brigade Training Event: Managed Readiness Versus Operational Readiness," *The Canadian Army Journal,* 7, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 12.

[19] Douglas A. Furst, "Readiness – A Commander's Responsibility," *Air Force Journal of Logistics,* 26, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 15.

[20] Department of National Defence, *Land Operations 2021 – Adaptive Dispersed Operations – The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, edited by Andrew B. Godefroy (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2007), 10.

[21] Department of National Defence, *Toward Land Operations 2021 – Studies in Support of the Army of Tomorrow Force Employment Concept*, edited by Andrew B. Godefroy and Peter Gizewski (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2009), 1-1.

Training is thus critical and its primacy is second only to conducting deployed operations.[22] This has lead to the Army centrally controlling and directing annual training standards in the Army Operating Plan and the Army's Managed Readiness Plan (MRP). The MRP breaks the Army into three separate parts and assigns each part a phase of training: high readiness, training for high readiness or re-constitution. Resources are assigned according to those levels with high readiness being the culmination that receives the highest level of resources.[23] Because having all units train annually to the highest level of readiness was not only unachievable, but fiscally irresponsible[24], this system was adopted to ensure that the entire Army achieved the readiness level needed by the government while centrally controlling precious resources. One of the resources controlled by the MRP is the amount of ammunition units are allotted to conduct training. High readiness units get the bulk of the allocation since live-fire training is used as the metric for validating degrees of readiness.[25] According to the Army Operating Plan for 2013/2014, the baseline competency for high readiness forces is sub-unit live-fire, which applies to the one-third of the Army. The remaining two-thirds of the Army are mandated only to train to sub-sub-unit live-fire (i.e. platoon live for the infantry) as the highest level of training they are to conduct for the year.[26] While this will ensure readiness for expeditionary forces (those forces committed to

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[22] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), iii.

[23] Department of National Defence, *Army Operating Plan FY 13/14 V2* (Ottawa, ON: DLS 2-2, 2013), 3-B-3-1/4.

[24] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), 1-8.

[25] Maynard L. Burkett, William J. Mullen, and Larry L. Meliza, *Live Fire Futures* (Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioural Sciences, 2000), viii.

[26] Department of National Defence, *Army Operating Plan FY 13/14 V2* (Ottawa, ON: DLS 2-2, 2013), 1-2/13.

deployed operations), this means that two-thirds of the Army will be left achieving only a fraction of the skills required of their high readiness counterparts in a live-fire setting.

As the core of the deployed element, the only way for the infantry sub-unit to be deemed ready, given the uncertainty associated with the FSE, is to have successfully culminated in a live-fire iteration of the training activity. Finding the right balance between preserving present and future military capabilities with the requisite resources has been a persistent problem.[27] While it is a constant battle, it is one the Army must get right because history has shown that when Army's neglects it, the cost is extremely high.[28]

Thesis

Currently there is conflicting direction in the Army on what should be the training priority. Since the Army will completely withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014, there will not be a deployed mission to focus its training efforts like in the past. There will only be missions assigned in defence of Canada's sovereignty and North America. Therefore, the justification that has been used for the last eight years to determine where resources are allocated will not exist and a different metric will have to be used in order to determine the baseline training level the Army must sustain. The past system resulted in great disparity in the baseline ability of the Army to achieve its most simple war-fighting task in a live-fire scenario since only one-third of the Army was been authorized and resourced to train above the sub-sub-unit level. Despite the

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[27] Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Shelby Cullom Davis, *The Marine Corps – America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: The Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis Inc., 2011), v.

[28] Ibid., 91.

drawdown in Afghanistan and current fiscal constraints, infantry sub-units must be afforded the time, money and ammunition to train to and be validated at the sub-unit in a live-fire context in order to remain strategically relevant and tactically decisive. Anything less than this will mean a lack in readiness and a risk of mission failure.

Methodology

In order to support the above opinion, this paper will use a systematic argument. Chapter 1 will focus on defining the concepts of military readiness, what it means to be ready and how it is measured/reported. Chapter 2 will then apply these concepts to the CF and the Army. Due to the large role training has in the Army's readiness process, Chapter 3 will focus on explaining the organization of the Army's training system and the varied mechanisms an organization must endure to go from a state of low-readiness (i.e. reconstitution) to a high state of readiness. In order to bridge the gap between current readiness levels and what is required in the future, Chapter 4 will discuss the FSE and the environment of the future. Chapter 5 will then highlight the changes and reorientation that must occur in order for the Army to be strategically relevant and tactically decisive for future operations.

Assumptions

In writing this paper, a number of assumptions have been made since there was either not enough material available to justify points of view, or the explanation for the assumption was lengthy and outside the scope of this paper. The first assumption considers the timescale this paper addresses. Since this paper draws on resources that use the timeframe up to and including 2040, the assumption is that there will not be a major shift in the global power balance or

emergence of an unexpected global threat that will void the current power balance and trends. Such an event could lead to changes in force structures and would be outside the scope of this paper.

The second assumption that was used in this paper is with respect to training of junior leadership and their development of agility and flexibility. While there is a correlation between education and training with flexibility and adaptability of junior leaders, that correlation is outside the scope of this paper. Instead, the development of flexibility and adaptability will be considered as a direct function of training.

The final assumption that was made in this paper is with respect to the composition of deployed TFs in the CF. This paper will view future TFs being founded on the infantry sub-unit as the basic building block and not of another manoeuvre arm since it is assumed that this will remain extant for the timeframe this paper focuses on, from the present until 2040. The validity of this assumption will be touched on later in the paper to provide justification through historical examples.

CHAPTER 1 – READINESS DEFINED

There is one controlling truth from all past wars which applies with equal weight to any war of tomorrow. No nation on earth possesses such limitless resources that it can maintain itself in a state of perfect readiness to engage in war immediately and decisively and win a total victory soon after the outbreak without destroying its own economy, pauperizing its own people and promoting interior disorder.

– S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire[29]

The concept of military readiness is something that most people believe is a necessary requirement but something that is not fully understood.[30] Despite this, governments – including Canada – continue to view readiness of their respective militaries as the primary means of supporting their broader national security and foreign policy objectives.[31] This *ready* military is both reliable and credible, backing up the nation's interests for two purposes. First to deter other nations from employing force and secondly, to be ready to fight or conduct operations should deterrence fail.[32] This concept is nothing new as nations have been taking advantage of this since the exploits of the Roman Empire where their capacity to defend the Empire gained them a reputation for excellence and competence.[33] History is wrought with examples where militaries who lacked a degree of readiness where preyed upon by other nations. As indicated by S.L.A. Marshall in the epigraph to this chapter, despite history being a good teacher of the strategic

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[29] S. L. A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 19 – 20.

[30] Richard K. Betts, *Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), ix.

[31] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2008), 2.

[32] Melvin R. Laird and Lawrence J. Korb, *The Problem of Military Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), 1.

[33] Scott Klima, "Combat Focus: A Commander's Responsibility in the Formation, Development and Training of Today's Combat Team," *Australian Army Journal* IX, no. 2 (Winter 2012, 2012): 101.

impacts of readiness, times of fiscal constraint often leave readiness to be viewed as simply a function of economic consumption, which is at the mercy of ebbs and flows in government funding.[34] It is important to first fully understand what readiness means and those factors that influence this understanding, in order to set the stage for how readiness impacts training in the Army and infantry, and ultimately how it impacts the ability of the CF to achieve the government's strategic objectives. This chapter will serve to define what nations and militaries mean when they speak of readiness. It will initially review the prominent literature that defines readiness as well as explain how the terms effectiveness, preparedness and capability influence and confuse the definition. The paper will then go on to discuss how readiness is measured and reported, concluding with the impacts of economy, operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and training on a military's level of readiness.

Readiness Theories

A quick search of any library will show that the topic of military readiness has not been studied in great detail. While readiness has been attributable to many victories and defeats, it often appears as a sub-set of a greater topic and not worthy of being the sole focus of literary works. There are two notable exceptions that serve to provide the foundation for exploring military readiness. The first is the work of Richard Betts titled M*ilitary Readiness,* published in 1995, and Harinder Singh's *Establishing India's Military Readiness Concerns and Strategy,* published in 2011. While Singh's work draws largely from Betts, both works serve in their own right to provide the platform to understand what readiness really means for a military.

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[34] Cliff Sobel and Loren Thompson, "The Readiness Trap: The U.S. Military is Failing to Prepare for the Next Big War," *Policy Review* 72, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 2.

Betts's Military Readiness

At the end of the Cold War, Betts attempts to demystify the term readiness into something that the layman could understand and use to affect change. His principal work, *Military Readiness*, documented the need for readiness, what constitutes readiness and what a military must possess in order to be deemed ready. Betts states that readiness is an ever-changing thing, not fixed like an end-state, and a function of blood, treasure and time. He argues that military readiness has a natural tendency to surge proportional to emerging conflicts (like the build up with the Cold War) and be reduced after any major conflict like the cutbacks experienced after both World Wars.[35] Therefore, readiness cannot be defined as a single, stand-alone item as it relies on many things like threat, funding and requirements. Given that "a country seldom knows exactly when a crisis will occur and how much time they have available to prepare"[36] the concept of readiness needs to be defined in terms a military can translate into a tangible quantity so militaries can minimize waste during long period of peace. While not a useful definition, it does emphasize the trouble of defining readiness and sets the stage for further examination.

Betts, much like many scholars, draws from previous readiness definitions in his work, such as readiness being "the ability of forces, units, weapons systems or equipment's to deliver

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[35] Richard K. Betts, *Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 18 – 20.

[36] M. R. Voith, "Military Readiness," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, 4, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 47.

the outputs for which they were designed"[37] or as "the ability of a military unit to accomplish its assigned missions."[38] Betts uses these to breakdown his definition, which he structures around three questions: readiness for when – pertaining to the time a unit has available to convert to the required capability or structure in relation to the perceived threat; readiness for what – relating to the threat the unit will face; and finally the readiness of what – focused on what unit or parts thereof, which will be used to counter the threat.[39] Using these three questions or criteria, Betts's idea of readiness as a function of time, threat and capability gain traction as a comprehensive way to view readiness. Unfortunately, his definition is not without critics. Doug Furst, a United States (US) Air Force officer, points out that one of the limitations of Betts's definition is that it relies heavily on knowing what the threat is and where it comes from.[40] Furst's indicates that in cases where the threat is unknown (applicable to peacetime or steady state conditions), you cannot assign resources and forces to be a function of readiness levels.[41] While Furst's idea is well taken, it would mean that readiness levels could only be assigned in times of conflict, neglecting that Betts's point was to create a basis for common understanding of readiness in

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[37] Craig S. Moore, J. A. Stockfisch, Matthew S. Golberg, Suzanne M. Holroyd, and Gregory G. Hildebrandt, *Measuring Military Readiness and Sustainability* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1991), 1.

[38] Jack Spencer, "The Facts about Military Readiness," *The Heritage Foundation Executive Summary* no. 1394 (2000): 1.

[39] Richard K. Betts, *Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 33.

[40] Douglas A. Furst, "Readiness – A Commander's Responsibility," *Air Force Journal of Logistics*, 26, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 20.

[41] Craig S. Moore, J. A. Stockfisch, Matthew S. Golberg, Suzanne M. Holroyd, and Gregory G. Hildebrandt, *Measuring Military Readiness and Sustainability* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1991), 4.

order to prepare forces for potential conflicts.[42] As a general definition, Betts's work continues to serve as the most comprehensive work available on the subject and the best document available to highlight the complex and dynamic realm of military readiness.

Singh's Readiness Theory

The second author to focus on military readiness is Harinder Singh. Writing largely in the last three years, he is an academic who uses Betts's work as a springboard into the readiness discussion with particular focus on the readiness of India's military. Using Betts's three questions/criteria, Singh takes the concept of readiness and divides it into three slightly different sub-components. His first partition speaks to the aspect of operations readiness, which he describes as "the *inward looking* standard for determining the efficiency of a military unit or field formation."[43] His second sub-component is structural readiness focused on the number of units, formations and weapons systems available for a threat or how much time is needed to put both men and material into action.[44] His final part of readiness is mobilization readiness, defined as a "function of the national strategic infrastructure such as the railroads, sea ports, air ports and the industrial capacity to produce and supply the war fighting material."[45] Singh's emphasis on these three aspects gives an assessment of a country's military readiness writ large. This yields the streamlined definition of readiness as "the timely availability of combat forces, and for how

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[42] M. R. Voith, "Military Readiness," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, 4, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 44.

[43] Harinder Singh, *Establishing India's Military Readiness: Concerns and Strategy* (New Delhi, India: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2011), 53 – 54.

[44] Ibid., 54.

[45] Ibid.

long it can fight on the battlefield."[46] To give context to his definition, Singh uses the example of the US military and its efforts to cut down the time required to deploy a military element in an expeditionary capacity and the procurement of adequate sustainability for that element once mobilization begins and throughout its deployment.[47] Although the nomenclature and labelling in Singh's definition is different from Betts's, readiness is again seen as a function of quantity, time and capability.

Since Singh's was only published in 2011, it has not had the time like Betts's to be reviewed, assessed and criticized. Regardless, it is important to note that the concept of threat creates a subtle effect on the two definitions. The two authors/countries view military threat from two different perspectives; Betts and the US with an expeditionary force ready to intervene in global crisis[48], while Singh and India possesses a more domestic and regionally focused military.[49] While only a subtle difference, the idea of deploying forces to counter a threat across a country and half way around the world have different implications and planning factors. For the purposes of this paper, the idea of readiness will stick with Betts's concepts since it is more akin to what Canada needs as a readiness definition, something that will be further explained in the next chapter.

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[46] Ibid., 53.

[47] Ibid., 62 – 63.

[48] *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Defense, 2012), i.

[49] Harinder Singh, *Establishing India's Military Readiness: Concerns and Strategy* (New Delhi, India: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2011), 119 – 120.

Functions of Readiness

Throughout the study of military readiness, common themes emerge which cause confusion towards the understanding of readiness. This confusion stems from mixing terminology, ambiguous definitions and a general lack of appreciating what it means in military terms, ultimately plaguing the application in tangible terms. Specifically, military readiness is often associated with the terms preparedness, capability and effectiveness. While each term influences readiness in different ways, they do not define it. To better appreciate this, each term will now be reviewed as well as their impacts on the definition.

Preparedness

In most readiness discussions, the term preparedness tends to emerge. Unfortunately, this term has also been used interchangeably with readiness, which has lead to confusion. The confusion has emerged with Australian doctrine and the work the Australian Defence Force (ADF) since it directly links readiness and preparedness, defining preparedness as "the measure of the state of the force-in-being to undertake military operations to achieve the required effects"[50] preparedness as "the combined outcomes of readiness and sustainability."[51] Although the ADF definition of preparedness sounds very similar to Betts's readiness, there are differences in the application of the two. Singh amplifies the difference when he introduces preparedness in his work and delineates it from readiness by stating that readiness focuses on being ready and relevant while preparedness reflects an attitude of being satisfied with whatever national

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[50] Australian Department of Defence, *Army Modernisation Handbook 2011* (Canberra, AU: Defence Publishing Service, 2011), xv.

[51] Ibid.

resources are available in terms of money, manpower and material to respond to a situation.[52] Given the nuances identified by Singh and the ADF, it shows that although preparedness is related to readiness, preparedness focuses more on the feeling of the nation on how ready they are for a threat without comparing it to a quantifiable metric. For the purpose of this paper, the concept of preparedness will not be discussed further to avoid confusion.

Capability

A second source of confusion stems from the idea of capability. The term capability is often used when referring to the effect that a unit wants to achieve for certain objectives and/or the ability to undertake certain missions.[53] Capability cannot be used to define readiness since there is no singularly understood definition of capability. As identified by Singh, "there can be no single concept of military capability that can be applied universally to all countries."[54] Melvin Laird, former Secretary of Defence, stated that being capable does not mean being ready and vice-versa. He stated that "the armed forces can be ready but not capable for a variety of reasons: for example, because the force structure is too small, the amount of ammunition on hand is inadequate, or the pace of modernizations is too slow."[55] Finally, Betts distinguishes capability from readiness by likening the two concepts to *supply* and *demand*. When there is a threat present, there is a *demand* for an ability to deter/counter the threat in the form of readiness. The

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[52] Harinder Singh, *Establishing India's Military Readiness: Concerns and Strategy* (New Delhi, India: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2011), 13 – 14.

[53] Melvin R. Laird and Lawrence J. Korb, *The Problem of Military Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), 2.

[54] Harinder Singh, *Establishing India's Military Readiness: Concerns and Strategy* (New Delhi, India: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2011), 37.

[55] Melvin R. Laird and Lawrence J. Korb, *The Problem of Military Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), 3.

supply is the capability required which is directly proportional to the how imminent the threat is; the sooner the demand is required, the sooner the capability (*supply*) is needed.[56] As such, the term capability cannot be used to explain readiness since it focuses on resources more then the actual ability to perform.

Effectiveness

Finally, influence of effectiveness must be understood. Effectiveness arises in the discussion on readiness when focused on achievement orientation, specifically the ability to achieve assigned tasks and missions.[57] Betts perceives effectiveness as a product of mass – "the basic organized stock, human and technical, of a military force"[58] – and efficiency – "the degree to which units can realize their maximum potential performance."[59] He then stated that effectiveness alone does not define readiness since readiness is the product of speed (of action/reaction) and effectiveness.[60] As Singh comments, the issue with using effectiveness as a metric of readiness is that it leads to "an absence of clarity of military readiness and in translating [it] into successful battle outcomes."[61] Furst adds to this by commenting that a level

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[56] Richard K. Betts, *Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 36 – 37.

[57] Douglas A. Furst, "Readiness – A Commander's Responsibility," *Air Force Journal of Logistics*, 26, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 15.

[58] Richard K. Betts, *Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 39.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Harinder Singh, *Establishing India's Military Readiness: Concerns and Strategy* (New Delhi, India: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2011), 42.

of effectiveness has a "limited shelf life"[62] and that it is subjective from one commander to another.[63] In addition, from a military perspective effectiveness is defined as "achieving the mission while minimizing the loss of people and equipment."[64] Although the term effectiveness explains one component of readiness it is subjective and by itself does not provide a valuable means of interpreting readiness. Therefore, much like the terms preparedness and capability, effectiveness only serves to confuse the assessment of readiness.

Assessing Readiness

In addition to the issues with defining the impact of the terms that influence readiness, formulating a common means to measure and report levels of readiness in forces has also been a source of friction. In order for a military force to be a credible and relevant deterrent, there must be an associated level of readiness or perceived readiness.[65] Therefore, it must be assessed in a manner in which others can see and understand. As Laird indicates, "readiness, unlike force structure or modernization, is difficult to measure. By its very nature readiness can only be known once the real battle starts."[66] With respect to measuring it, the difficulty stems from the fact that "within military circles, there is no common agreement on what [readiness] is or how it

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[62] Douglas A. Furst, "Readiness – A Commander's Responsibility," *Air Force Journal of Logistics,* 26, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 15.

[63] Ibid., 14.

[64] Ibid., 16.

[65] Melvin R. Laird and Lawrence J. Korb, *The Problem of Military Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), 1.

[66] Ibid., 17.

should be measured."[67] The problem with reporting it is due to the fact that the fluidity of the ratings tends to change almost daily.[68] In order to better appreciate the impact with measuring and reporting, this section will go into greater detail on these issues.

Many systems to measure readiness have been developed over time. The system in the United Kingdom reports readiness as a function of manning levels, equipment support and collective training for individual units and larger formations.[69] The US has a similar system called the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), which measures readiness as a function of personnel readiness and training.[70] Reporting on elements of manning, equipment support and personnel readiness is relatively tangible as it involves achieving gateways with concrete objectives. Training, common to both systems, is not as clear. Training speaks to functional testing which assesses an actual unit output or ability to conduct missions and tasks.[71] This functional testing measures "the abilities of individual and units to perform (proxies of) their wartime tasks and operation."[72] While some would offer that practical tests could not replicate events and conditions experienced in wartime, it goes to safely reason that units and

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[67] M. R. Voith, "Military Readiness," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, 4, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 41.

[68] Melvin R. Laird and Lawrence J. Korb, *The Problem of Military Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), 20.

[69] Harinder Singh, *Establishing India's Military Readiness: Concerns and Strategy* (New Delhi, India: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2011), 63.

[70] Mark E. Gebicke, *Military Readiness – Improvements Still Needed in Assessing Military Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, 1997), 1.

[71] Craig S. Moore, J. A. Stockfisch, Matthew S. Golberg, Suzanne M. Holroyd, and Gregory G. Hildebrandt, *Measuring Military Readiness and Sustainability* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1991), 38.

[72] Ibid., viii.

individuals who do not perform well on conducted and organized tests are likely to not perform well in wartime.[73] As such, functional tests serve as a highly reliable means to objectively determine a unit's readiness to perform tasks. There are two drawbacks from these functional tests that must be stated. The first concerns the natural aversion units have to external, objective evaluation. The issue here is the belief that a "commanding officer's promotion opportunity [may] be compromised if the unit's performance on any test is less than outstanding."[74] This aversion translates into overemphasis on the process, and is not a natural, realistic demonstration of the unit's performance. The second drawback is the relatively arbitrary nature of the assessment criteria, the subjectivity associated with varying degrees of interpretation[75] and that different organizations use the same criteria for different sized organizations.[76] Without a standard means of assessing military formations, the assessment process becomes influenced by the subjectivity, which then renders the entire process void. While the influence of training on readiness is an important feature, it is one that will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper. The requirement to quantify readiness has been an ongoing subject of debate and one of great importance in promoting the credible deterrence.

Reporting Readiness

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[73] Ibid., 44.

[74] Ibid., 43.

[75] Melvin R. Laird and Lawrence J. Korb, *The Problem of Military Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), 20.

[76] Douglas A. Furst, "Readiness – A Commander's Responsibility," *Air Force Journal of Logistics,* 26, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 17.

While the means used to assess readiness is vital, the manner in how that information is transmitted and reported is equally critical. Despite the best efforts by militaries to develop a comprehensive system, there are numerous instances where the criteria and mechanisms used have been manipulated and deliberately altered by the users. Betts comments that while the criteria for measuring readiness in the US was widely known throughout the Cold War, there was a tendency for commanders to openly criticize, conflate and change the criteria.[77] This caused the reporting mechanisms to paint a rosier picture of readiness levels, which ultimately lead to confusion on the actual state of readiness.[78] The second problem concerns the time it takes to report a problem. Unless there are control mechanisms at each stage in the reporting process, deficiencies in the readiness process have tended to be picked up when it is too late for the problem to be assessed and adequately dealt with.[79] Therefore, problems were either overlooked or ignored. The final problem with reporting of readiness is that some commanders view readiness as a reflection of their leadership and have a tendency to become infatuated with the actual reporting of their readiness rather then fulfilling their respective readiness tasks.[80] By becoming distracted with the reporting process, commanders lose sight of the goal of having a readiness system in the first place, directly manipulating the process to promote their careers and endangering the system designed to protect them.

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[77] Richard K. Betts, *Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 131 – 139.

[78] Mark E. Gebicke, *Military Readiness – Improvements Still Needed in Assessing Military Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, 1997), 2 – 3.

[79] L. Hunt, *Survey of Managed Readiness – Best Practices and Lessons Learned* (n.p.: Defence Research and Development Canada, 2011), 4.

[80] Douglas A. Furst, "Readiness – A Commander's Responsibility," *Air Force Journal of Logistics,* 26, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 14, 18.

Influences on Readiness

While measuring and reporting have been important factors when speaking of readiness, it is also prudent to touch on the factors that impact the readiness process. Most readiness discussions will also speak to the impacts of economy; operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and training. Given the ability of these three things to degrade and augment readiness levels, they will now be discussed in order to better appreciate the intricacies of the process.

Economy

The economic stability of a nation directly impacts the readiness of its military regardless of whether a nation is in a state of peace or war. As Betts points out, militaries operate from a given pot of defense spending, and the readiness of the force must be balanced between procurement, sustainability, maintenance and the speed in supply.[81] This translates into developing a "flexible readiness model that ensures an appropriate and timely response to developing military threats and crisis situations."[82] The danger with this is that money can be viewed as the problem and also the solution to readiness issues. A reduction in the amount of funding can greatly reduce the levels of readiness a military can achieve[83], yet it is normally the first requirement to resolve an immediate augmentation to a force's level of readiness (be it

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[81] Richard K. Betts, *Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 43 – 44.

[82] Harinder Singh, *Establishing India's Military Readiness: Concerns and Strategy* (New Delhi, India: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2011), 51.

[83] Melvin R. Laird and Lawrence J. Korb, *The Problem of Military Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), 28 – 29.

increasing the numbers of personnel, weapons, equipment, etc.).[84] The cyclical nature of funding directly impacts readiness levels and must be constantly assessed and balanced with risk acceptance.

OPTEMPO

The effect of OPTEMPO on readiness levels cannot be forgotten. While OPTEMPO tends to focus on the human dimension of readiness, it requires deliberate planning, monitoring and responses to mitigate its impact on readiness.[85] The stress that OPTEMPO can have on readiness was documented by the US Army where it saw a force size decrease of 34 percent at the end of the Cold War but a 300 percent increase to international missions for that same force.[86] Canada was no different as the CF experienced a similar impact in the late 1990s at the end of the *decade of darkness* where funding steadily decreased, the number of soldiers declined but the demand for soldiers to deploy increased, most notably with the initial commitment to Afghanistan in 2001.[87] The Canadian Army (CA) attempted "to preserve its institutional commitments to training its soldiers and units and to maintain a ready pool of reserves that

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[84] Craig S. Moore, J. A. Stockfisch, Matthew S. Golberg, Suzanne M. Holroyd, and Gregory G. Hildebrandt, *Measuring Military Readiness and Sustainability* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1991), 3.

[85] Douglas A. Furst, "Readiness - A Commander's Responsibility," *Air Force Journal of Logistics* 26, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 16.

[86] Herbert H. Bateman, *Military Readiness – Full Training Benefits from Army's Combat Training Centers Are Not being Realized* (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, 1999), 13.

[87] David Jay Bercuson, J. L. Granatstein, and Nancy Pearson Mackie, *Lessons Learned? What Canada should Learn from Afghanistan* (Calgary, AB: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2011), 3.

[could] respond rapidly to new contingencies."[88] This resulted in a dramatic increase in OPTEMPO since fewer people were attempting to do the same tasks of a much larger force. Similarly in the United Kingdom (UK) , their Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated "the Army's current commitment to operations [has] meant that some peacetime activities, such as collective training for roles not employed in current operations, had been curtailed."[89] This shows that increased OPTEMPO can negatively impact readiness levels, particularly in terms of Betts' *ready for what* criteria while being a necessary evil in order to satisfy Betts's *ready for* when criteria. Therefore, planners must find was to balance OPTEMPO with training plans to ensure the greatest cost-benefit of both with money and time constraints.

Training

The final factor that requires consideration is training. Training activities are remarked to be the closest proxies available short of war to evaluate readiness levels since it clearly gives commanders an ability to see if a unit is capable of carrying out tasks and duties.[90] In order to properly assess readiness, there must be an appropriate level of corresponding training, and it is the duty of the organization to enable and realize this training. Unfortunately, training levels are directly impacted by the first two factors, economy and OPTEMPO. To counter this, training must be efficiently designed to achieve the necessary objectives. By conducting too much

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[88] Lynn E. Davis, J. Michael Polich, William Hix M., Michael D. Greenberg, Stephen D. Brady, and Ronald E. Sortor, *Stretched Thin – Army Forces for Sustained Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2005), xi.

[89] *Ministry of Defence: Assessing and Reporting Military Readiness*, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 72 Session 2005 – 2006 (London, UK: National Audit Office, 2005), 20.

[90] Craig S. Moore, J. A. Stockfisch, Matthew S. Golberg, Suzanne M. Holroyd, and Gregory G. Hildebrandt, *Measuring Military Readiness and Sustainability* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1991), 41.

training, you risk burning soldiers out; by conducting too little, you risk unit skill decay. It is imperative commanders find the balance as "the only means of sustaining high levels of combat readiness is to increase the frequency of tough, realistic field training."[91] Balancing training with a sustainable OPTEMPO while remaining within budget is not easy and something that directly impacts the readiness of the force. Developing a mechanism to achieve this as efficiently as possible has been widely researched, debated and continues to this day.

Graduated Readiness

It is only in a perfect world where the idea of complete readiness can be achieved; perfect readiness meaning to have sufficient, well-equipped, well-supplied people in the right place at the right time to deal with any given unforeseen situation.[92] No nation today, including the US, can afford this due to its high costs, which would bleed the treasury to an unaffordable extent.[93] Given the need to balance the impacts of economy, OPTEMPO and training, a system of graduated readiness has been developed where forces are held at varying levels of readiness for fixed periods. This allows militaries the ability to adapt to emerging threats and the time to develop the readiness required to counter those threats.[94] The biggest drawback from this system is that it assumes a certain amount of risk since it may take time to get forces at the correct level

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[91] Albert C. Stahl, "Live Fire Training: Lifeblood for the Light Infantryman" (Masters of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2001), 34.

[92] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 42.

[93] M. R. Voith, "Military Readiness," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, 4, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 47.

[94] *Ministry of Defence: Assessing and Reporting Military Readiness*, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 72 Session 2005 – 2006 (London, UK: National Audit Office, 2005), 19.

of readiness to counter an unexpected threat. Militaries that have adopted this system, Canada being one of them[95], have put into place means to mitigate risk in order to make the cost-benefit more palatable compared to perfect readiness.[96] While most nations would prefer to be ready for all possibilities all of the time, it is just not realistic. As such, this graduated readiness system has given militaries the best option to balance readiness levels with the myriad tasks and factors that influence readiness.

Summary

It is clear there are varying opinions and definitions of what readiness means and having an understanding of what goes into being military ready is important. As pointed out by Laird, no matter how imperfect the understanding or measurement of readiness, "it must be attempted because if and when hostilities break out it will be too late to discover that you are not."[97] As discussed earlier, the general readiness definition of "the ability to provide a timely and appropriate military response to any threat"[98] while general, is the most understandable. This definition has been developed largely by the works of Betts with continuous influence by people, such as Singh, who continue to challenge and refine what readiness means. In defining readiness, functions of preparedness, capability and effectiveness have been examined to determine the role they play in readiness, as well as the confusion or hindrances they have on the process. Second to

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[95] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 42.

[96] *Ministry of Defence: Assessing and Reporting Military Readiness*, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 72 Session 2005 – 2006 (London, UK: National Audit Office, 2005), 19.

[97] Melvin R. Laird and Lawrence J. Korb, *The Problem of Military Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), 21.

[98] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), 2-6.

this are the challenges in assessing and reporting readiness, both items which continue to impact militaries as they strive to provide the deterrence and credibility demanded by their respective governments. Finally, the impacts of the economy, OPTEMPO and training have been examined to determine how they influence the readiness process, and how the system of graduated readiness has evolved to mitigate and achieve greater efficiencies as the world moves toward an uncertain future. This appreciation of the readiness system and what it means to be ready have set the stage for how the CF achieves the readiness levels directed by the government as will be discussed in the next chapter.[99]

[99] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-000/FP-000, Canada's Army – We Stand on Guard for Thee* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 1998), 90 – 91.

CHAPTER 2 – READINESS IN THE CF

Men are seldom born brave but they acquire courage through training and discipline—a handful of men inured to war proceed to certain victory; while on the contrary numerous armies of raw and undisciplined troops are but multitudes of men dragged to the slaughter.

– Vegetius, B-GL-300-008 - Training for Land Operations[100]

Having discussed what readiness means in the previous chapter, it should now be understood that any readiness definition relies on Betts's concepts of being ready for what (i.e. the potential perceived threat) and ready for when (the necessary time needed to confront/face that threat).[101] The CF uses criteria contained in federal direction to ensure the military is supporting the government's broader national security and foreign policy objectives.[102] This is a difficult task, so the military uses several key policy documents and plans to standardize the readiness of the force pan CF. To better understand these, this chapter will review the readiness guidelines contained in strategic level guidance as a means to outline how the government's task translates into readiness objectives for the military. This chapter will then discuss the importance of having a formal readiness system, followed by how the strategic guidance is translated down to the Army's operational and tactical levels in the form of the MRP. The chapter will then focus on how readiness affects the infantry corps as the cornerstone of CF TFs, as well as the relationship between readiness levels and training. This, in turn, will allow for a detailed

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[100] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), 5-1.

[101] M. R. Voith, "Military Readiness," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, 4, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 43.

[102] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2008), 21.

understanding of how this system regulates and sustains the capability the Army is directed to achieve in order to avoid the slaughter Vegetius comments on in the epigraph to this chapter.

Strategic Direction and Readiness

Achieving a high level of strategic readiness relies not only on compliance by subordinate formations, but also on clear direction from the political masters. Principally, this direction comes to the CF from the CFDS, which mandates the CF to "deliver excellence at home, be a strong and reliable partner in the defence of North America, and project leadership abroad by making meaningful contributions to operations overseas."[103] While being fairly nebulous, the CFDS provides amplifying direction to the CF. This shapes the CF's overarching mission, notably when the CFDS states that in order to "carry out these missions, the [CF] will need to be fully integrated, flexible, multi-role and combat-capable military, working in partnership with the knowledgeable and responsive civilian personnel of the Department of National Defence."[104] The CF used this to develop a standardized readiness definition: "a measure of the ability of an element of the CF to undertake an assigned task."[105] This led to a readiness framework (introduced in the previous chapter), which gave the CDS the ability to provide the federal government with viable military options, based on a "detailed awareness of military capabilities and capacity."[106] At first glance, this direction does not appear to deliver

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[103] Ibid.

[104] Ibid., 3.

[105] Department of National Defence, *B-GJ-005-300/FP-001, Canadian Forces Joint Publication 3.0 – Operations* (Ottawa, ON: Joint Doctrine Branch Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, 2010), 7-6.

[106] L. Hunt, *Survey of Managed Readiness – Best Practices and Lessons Learned* (n.p.: Defence Research and Development Canada, 2011), 7.

tangible metrics that can be used to outline a readiness strategy. However, it outlines certain requirements the Army needs to achieve as a part of this, such as being flexible and combat capable, both terminology that will shape the readiness requirement of the force as will be discussed later in this chapter. Specifically, it recognizes that commitments must be

> …combat-effective since combat is either a reality, or at least a distinct possibility, in most missions and readiness to under-take the most difficult military operations in war will best prepare [the CF] for success in all operations, including domestic emergencies and peace support operations (which are in themselves increasingly unpredictable and dangerous).[107]

This statement is critical in shaping the readiness response of the CF since it is not the CF that determines which missions it goes on but instead the federal government that will determine what capabilities it wants the CF to maintain for use of force contingencies and what risks it is willing to assume in providing those ready capabilities.[108] As discussed in Figure 1 of the introduction to this paper, the CFDS outlines readiness of the forces as one of four pillars, which makeup the CFDS framework, a testament to the importance readiness has to play in achieving the government's strategic and political goals.[109] This is done in three regions – at home, in North America and internationally – exemplified by the actions of the CF during the Olympics in 2010, continued support to the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD),

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[107] Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose*, edited by Directorate Land Strategic Planning, 2nd ed. (Ottawa, ON: Directorate of Land Strategic Planning, 2009), 14 – 15.

[108] Lynn E. Davis, J. Michael Polich, William Hix M., Michael D. Greenberg, Stephen D. Brady, and Ronald E. Sortor, *Stretched Thin – Army Forces for Sustained Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2005), 31.

[109] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2008), 14.

counter drug efforts in the Caribbean and the continued commitment to Afghanistan.[110] In addition, the CF must also maintain the training and readiness of units at home who may be needed to immediately respond to an unforeseen threat.[111] As the cornerstone strategic document for the CF, the CFDS provides the foundation needed for the CF to understand what military objectives the government wants to achieve, and translates this into action through a comprehensive readiness system. The next step is to understand how the strategic guidance is translated into a sustainable process the Army can employ at the operational and tactical level.

Impetus for a Formal Readiness System in the CF

While how strategic readiness translates into military action may appear rather elementary, it was not always so. The CF only needs to look back less than twenty years ago to the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia to see what happens when there is no formal readiness system in place.[112] Canada deployed soldiers who lacked sufficiently training, discipline and professional competency, which reflected poorly on the CF and Canada as a whole.[113] The CF learned a lot from that experience and from the fact that since the early 1990s

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[110] Walter J. Natynczyk, "The Canadian Forces in 2010 and 2011 – Looking Back and Looking Forward," *Canadian Military Journal,* 11, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 7.

[111] Lynn E. Davis, J. Michael Polich, William Hix M., Michael D. Greenberg, Stephen D. Brady, and Ronald E. Sortor, *Stretched Thin – Army Forces for Sustained Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2005), 31.

[112] Gilles Létourneau, Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 1997), ES-2.

[113] Ibid., ES-15.

the majority of CF deployments have been expeditionary in nature with extended timelines.[114] The CF acknowledged that these deployments were the way of the future and realized that a system had to be developed which allowed the CF to continue deploying forces in accordance with governmental direction.[115] It was quickly realized that having the entire force at a high readiness level was too costly, so another system had to be developed to sustain a high level of readiness if deployed missions were going to continue.[116] As Douglas Bland indicated, in times of fiscal restraint, the federal government tends to withdraw the military from international commitments and focuses exclusively on domestic/regional missions as they tend to be less expensive, which is attributable to Canada's lack of international interests that need to be defended with force.[117] Since the government was unwilling to completely withdraw from international commitments, the Army was forced to develop a manageable system a operational/tactical level to achieve the readiness the government demanded.

Operationalizing Readiness

In order to give readiness meaning to the field force, it is necessary to bring readiness down to the operational and the tactical levels. Readiness at the tactical level is defined as

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[114] G. E. Sharpe and Allan English, *Observations on the Association between Operational Readiness and Personal Readiness in the Canadian Forces* (Toronto, ON: Defence Research and Development – Toronto, 2006), 7.

[115] David Pentney, "Managed Readiness – Flawed Assumptions, Poor Deductions and Unintended Consequences," *The Canadian Army Journal* 10, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 26.

[116] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 7.

[117] Douglas Bland, "Everything Military Officers Need to Know About Defence Policy-Making in Canada," *Canadian Strategic Forecast 2000: Advance of Retreat? Canadian Defence in the 21st Century,* edited by David Rudd, Jim Hansen and Jessica Blitt (Toronto, ON: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000), 19 – 21.

"where the skills of the soldier are merged with equipment and the doctrine to fight."[118] As a mechanism to prioritize the Commander of the Canadian Army's (CCA) priorities, force readiness is directed as being the most important task of the Army, followed by force generation to support readiness.[119] This priority was viewed along four major themes: contributing a battalion/Battle Group (BG) sized element for peace support operations under Chapter 6 or 7 of the United Nations Charter, a brigade group in a war-fighting capacity, a domestic contingent in response of a major domestic operations as well as a company-sized elements for an overseas Non-Combatant Evacuation operation (NEO).[120] These responses have since become the Army's four Lines of Operation (LOO) used to define its commitments and prioritize its readiness levels.[121] While it is easy to state that readiness is the chief objective of Army activities, it is normally the first thing to get impacted during periods of economic constraint.[122] Given the size of the CA and the resource constraints that are inherent with a small force (comparatively to the US Army), there are certain limits to what can be achieved. The goal is to do just enough for the government's bidding while maintaining credibility with the US and providing insurance against

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[118] M. R. Voith, "Military Readiness," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin,* 4, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 45.

[119] Department of National Defence, *Army Operating Plan FY 13/14 V2* (Ottawa, ON: DLS 2-2, 2013), 1-4/13.

[120] L. B. Sherrard, "From the Directorate of Army Doctrine – The Future Battle Group in Operations," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin,* 6, no. 3 (Fall/Winter 2003): 7.

[121] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 2.

[122] Andrew Leslie, *Report on Transformation 2011* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2011), vi.

the worst-case scenarios on the domestic front.[123] The question that needs to be answered is how to maintain readiness in the Army against the four LOOs while balancing the budget without sacrificing the future security of Canada.[124] The answer to this came in the form of the graduated readiness system titled the MRP.

The MRP

In 2005, the CCA at the time (Major-General Carron) instituted the Army's MRP, which balanced transformation tasks of the Army with the generation and sustainment tasks necessary to promote readiness.[125] Army elements were treated the same for eligibility along six phases of the MRP with each phase being six months in duration: Phase 1 – Recovery, Phase 2 and 3 – Regeneration/Support, Phase 4 – Training/Support, Phase 5 – High Readiness Training, and Phase 6 – High Readiness Employment/Operations.[126] This cycle is best depicted as per Figure 4 below:

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[123] Chris Madsen, "Military Responses and Capabilities in Canada's Domestic Context Post 9/11," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 13, no. 3 (Spring 2011): 2.

[124] D. R. Drew, "Combat Readiness and Canada's Army," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* 2, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 40.

[125] J. H. P. M. Caron, *Managing the Army's Readiness* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of the Land Staff, 2005), 4.

[126] Ibid., 6.



Figure 4: Army Managed Readiness Plan[127]

This plan was based off experience from continued deployments to the Balkans and Kosovo where the Army was expected to generate 12 TFs called BGs. These BGs were based off formed units that possessed three effective sub-units and were task-tailored entities grouped to perform a specific task.[128] This system was designed to bring order and deliberation to the readiness process by dividing the force into three equal parts and rotating through three training cycles in order to bring predictability in the provision of resources.[129] By employing a cyclical plan, training indicators were used to quantify the levels of training into Levels of Capability (LOCs) and Theatre Mission Specific Training (TMST) in order to promote a common understanding of

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[127] Ibid., A2-1/2.

[128] David Pentney, "Managed Readiness – Flawed Assumptions, Poor Deductions and Unintended Consequences," *The Canadian Army Journal* 10, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 30.

[129] André Harvey, "Directorate of Army Training Update: Brigade Training Event: Managed Readiness Versus Operational Readiness," *The Canadian Army Journal*, 7, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 7.

the requirements.[130] These LOCs were then used to assess readiness levels, tiering them based off the accomplishment of a certain number of LOCs at each stage in the MRP, with the TMST being the LOC needed prior to deploying on a dedicated expeditionary mission.[131] This plan afforded "considerable flexibility in the management of units within the MRP, making task-tailoring options possible and presenting commanders a means to measure and move units from one readiness state to another efficiently and economically."[132] The MRP was also designed to minimize the OPTEMPO issues seen in the early stages of the Afghanistan Campaign and the Bosnia deployment where personnel deployed on successive tours. The MRP allowed personnel to achieve a minimum of 12 months between deployments while the Army maintained a high operational commitment.[133] The adoption of the MRP brought Canada inline with the actions of the US Army who followed a three-phase cyclical readiness cycle for its forces based on a similar reset phase, train/ready phase and an available for deployment phase.[134] This was important because interoperability with the US was, and continues to be, an essential factor for the CF to achieve where possible.[135]

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[130] Ibid.

[131] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), 2-5, 2-13.

[132] Ibid., 2-9.

[133] G. E. Sharpe and Allan English, *Observations on the Association between Operational Readiness and Personal Readiness in the Canadian Forces* (Toronto, ON: Defence Research and Development – Toronto, 2006), 13.

[134] Department of the Army, *TC 3-21.20, Infantry Battalion Collective Task Publication* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2012), 1-12.

[135] Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment 2008 – 2030 – Part 1: Current and Emerging Trends* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Force Development, 2009), 69.

Updated Managed Readiness Plan

As a framework, the MRP was a viable mechanism to achieve congruency with the Army's tasks from its inception in 2005, but it was not the panacea that was anticipated. The tempo of Army's commitments proved to be too much to manage when balanced with the other "routine" missions as well as regional and domestic taskings. This was due largely to the fact that for the infantry it took three peacetime sub-units to make two operationally ready sub-units.[136] This manning problem not isolated to the infantry, as the perception of manning shortages at the strategic level did not match the tactical level.[137] Despite the complication manning had on achieving the MRP, the Army managed to maintain its commitments through the course of the Afghanistan deployment by focusing on managing tasks at the sub-unit level and piecing together BGs for operations.[138] Since the beginning of the drawdown in Afghanistan, the MRP has been overhauled in order to achieve readiness across the four LOOs. In the absence of a defined major mission by the government, the CA has now adopted a twelve-month MRP cycle in order to mitigate the OPTEMPO concerns identified throughout the Afghanistan campaign as well as resource and fiscal concerns raised due to frequent training cycles and major training events (i.e. high readiness serials through the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC)).[139] This updated MRP is depicted in Figure 5 below:

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[136] Rob D. McIlroy, "Army Restructure: The Key to Making Managed Readiness Truly Work," *The Canadian Army Journal,* 9, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 147 – 148.

[137] Ibid.

[138] Christopher Hunt, "Beyond the Next Bound: One Captain's Views on the Army of Tomorrow," *The Canadian Army Journal,* 7, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 44.

[139] Peter Devlin, *3350-1 (Army G35) Canadian Army Managed Readiness Plan* (Ottawa, ON: Commander Canadian Army, 2013), 2.



Notes:
1. Timeline in months.
2. HR = High Readiness.
3. RTHR = Road to High Readiness

Figure 5: Managed Readiness Plan[140]

The amended MRP does not differ largely from its predecessor. There continues to be four LOOs, which are split between domestic and expeditionary tasks. Given the finite limitations of resources, equipment and personnel, this graduated readiness system accounts for the current state of the Army, the existing structure of the three regular force combat brigades in the Army (the impacts of the reserve force as part of the MRP are outside the scope of this paper).[141] These combat brigades each house approximately 5,000 soldiers each from a variety of units such as the infantry (making up over a third of the brigade), armoured, combat engineer, artillery, medics, military police, signallers and service support personnel.[142] The point of the MRP is still to have rotating readiness levels across the three brigades in order to maintain a steady commitment of forces to achieve government objectives. To support the MRP, the LOOs and their commitment will now be reviewed, broken down domestically and internationally.

Domestic Readiness

[140] Ibid., 10.

[141] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2008), 14 – 15.

[142] Canadian Army, "About the Army," Last modified 17 September 2012, http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/ata-asl/index-eng.asp.

LOO One and Two directly support domestic operations in Canada and the immediate approaches to Canada by maintaining an immediate response capability held on a short notice to move readiness level in each region of Canada (based on the three regular force brigades).[143] These LOOs directly support four of the six core missions as directed in the CFDS, specifically to conduct daily domestic and continental operations, support major international events within Canada, respond to a major terrorist attack, and to support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster.[144] These missions cover a variety of different scenarios, which encompass the entire spectrum of conflict as discussed in Figure 2 of the introduction to this paper. To support this, the Army mandates that each brigade maintain a standing commitment of a unit sized element (approximately 450 – 550 personnel) as an Immediate Reaction Unit (IRU) flexible enough to adapt to one of the four missions while assigned this standing task.[145] This IRU consists of a component headquarters, as well as three relatively identical sub-units of approximately 120 personnel each, formed from the companies, squadrons and batteries[146] of the

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[143] Peter Devlin, *3350-1 (Army G35) Canadian Army Managed Readiness Plan* (Ottawa, ON: Commander Canadian Army, 2013), 8.

[144] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2008), 10.

[145] Department of National Defence, *Army Operating Plan FY 13/14 V2* (Ottawa, ON: DLS 2-2, 2013), 2-8/26.

[146] The terms company, squadron and battery speak to a sub-unit sized elements in the infantry, armoured corps, combat engineers and artillery respectively as the combat arms units within the brigade. Each sub-unit consists of headquarters element of approximately 15 – 20 people including the support element – or quartermaster – and three symmetrical sub-sub-units – called platoons for the infantry and troops for the armoured corps, artillery and engineers. These sub-sub-units have approximately 40 personnel in an ideal situation and contain a headquarters element of approximately 10 personnel and three identical sections of 10 personnel.

brigade units.[147] This plan allows them to carry out routine tasks such as training and tasks without being impeded by commitments to the IRU. Brigades manage this task according to their own tempo as a rotating task, the timelines of which depend on the brigade and will not be a focus of this discussion. It is important to note these tasks are not specific to one trade as each unit in each brigade must be capable of maintaining this commitment. Therefore, the Army is deemed to possess a high degree of readiness as it is able to respond to myriad domestic crises such as the responses to the firestorm in British Columbia in 2003, the Winnipeg Floods in 2011 and the various arctic patrols that occur annually.[148] While the defence of Canada is the number one priority in the CFDS and the primary focus of the government[149], leadership on the global stage is equally important and exercised through Canada's commitments overseas.[150]

Expeditionary Readiness

MRP LOO Three and Four address the potential for international commitments of varying size. LOO Three deals with the commitment to a major international sustained operation as defined by the fifth CFDS mission to "lead or conduct a major international operation for an extended period,"[151] equal in size to the 2400 personnel TF that was committed to Afghanistan

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[147] Peter Devlin, 3350-1 (Army G35 Contl) Army Support Plan Immediate Reaction Units (Ottawa, ON: Commander Canadian Army, 2011), 1 – 3.

[148] Department of National Defence, *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow – A Land Operations 2021 Publication* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, 2011), 21 – 22.

[149] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2008), 1.

[150] Department of National Defence, *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow – A Land Operations 2021 Publication* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, 2011), 3.

[151] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2008), 10.

from 2006 until 2011.[152] LOO Four achieves the CFDS mission six, that of "deploying forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods."[153] An example of this type of commitment is the UN mission to Eritrea where the Army deployed an infantry sub-unit group[154] or the unit that was deployed to Haiti following the earthquake in 2010.[155] The MRP achieves this by committing a unit[156] to this task, rotating across the three brigades.[157] Unlike domestic tasks, international TF structures are specific to units as a result of the capabilities and functionality provided by those units. Specifically, the LOO Four has only been assigned to infantry battalions due to the specific nature of the task and the capabilities required.[158] That is not to say that only infantry soldiers have been deploying on this task, only that the infantry has formed the nucleus of the commitment and individual augmentation has been provided as required. With respect to LOO Three, again the main bulk of the task is fielded by the infantry. Each TF commitment can be viewed as either being part of the combat arms manoeuvre element, or support to that element. The important fact is that the combat arms elements will actually be

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[152] Peter Devlin, *3350-1 (Army G35) Canadian Army Managed Readiness Plan* (Ottawa, ON: Commander Canadian Army, 2013), 8 – 9.

[153] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2008), 10.

[154] J. M. Barr, "The Future of Canadian Army Brigade Groups: Are They on Track to be Strategically Relevant and Tactically Decisive?" (Masters of Defence Studies, Canadian Forces College, 2004), 30.

[155] D. Matsalla and D. Rivière, "Sustainment of Hasty Deployment: Lessons Learned from Op HESTIA," *The Canadian Army Journal* 13, no. 3 (Autumn 2010): 88.

[156] For this task, the term unit refers to an infantry battalion. At the basic level, the structure of an infantry unit does not vary greatly from that of an armoured, engineer and artillery regiment. For ease, the infantry form will be used. This unit has a headquarters element/command cell, generally three similar sized manoeuvre sub-units, a fourth sub-unit that provides combat support depending on the capabilities of the unit and an administration sub-unit that provides service support to the unit. For the purpose of this paper the term unit will be used for clarity.

[157] Peter Devlin, *3350-1 (Army G35) Canadian Army Managed Readiness Plan* (Ottawa, ON: Commander Canadian Army, 2013), 8 – 9.

[158] Ibid., 9.

executing the missions on behalf of the TF and government. The MRP indicates that over half the TF combat arms commitment resides in the infantry through a unit (a headquarters, three sub-units plus a combat support element and administration sub-unit, augmented by an additional armoured squadron/sub-unit).[159] This is a significant point that illustrates how the MRP provides sustainability and predictability, and it serves to showcase the importance of the infantry as the cornerstone of any commitment[160] with the remainder of the TF built on it.[161]

Infantry as Cornerstone to Readiness

As discussed above, the updated MRP centres on deploying TFs to commitments in Canada and abroad. As well, the nucleus of those commitments is the infantry, which is not a new concept for the CF or other militaries. This is something the Marine Corps adheres to with "the infantry [as] the fundamental building block for combat forces, not parts of it."[162] Additionally, the Australian Army has been working on the same principal throughout its commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan by consistently deploying infantry-based combat teams as its baseline commitment.[163] This is important for two reasons.

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[159] Ibid., Enclosure 2.

[160] Christopher Hunt, "Beyond the Next Bound: One Captain's Views on the Army of Tomorrow," *The Canadian Army Journal* 7, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 42.

[161] David Pentney, "Managed Readiness – Flawed Assumptions, Poor Deductions and Unintended Consequences," *The Canadian Army Journal,* 10, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 27 – 28.

[162] Jonathon Hubble, "Shrink to Grow: Managed Readiness, Force Restructuring and Necessary Debate," *The Canadian Army Journal,* 10, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 124.

[163] Scott Klima, "Combat Focus: A Commander's Responsibility in the Formation, Development and Training of Today's Combat Team," *Australian Army Journal,* IX, no. 2 (Winter 2012): 100.

The first is that this trend towards infantry-centric commitments is not based on bias but operationally proven evidence. The majority of Canadian commitments since Somalia have been infantry-based battalion groups with a few exceptions.[164] This statement must be balanced with the fact that the CF did employ armoured BGs during the Balkan campaign (in the late 1990s and into 2000) where the armoured regiment was re-roled to function in a similar fashion as an infantry battalion.[165] While this was done in the past, it has not been done in a current theatre such as in the Afghanistan campaign and it is not expected to occur again unless there is a major shift in the organization of the CF, which is not anticipated at this time.[166] One can look at Canadian operations in Afghanistan as commented by Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope during Operation Archer in 2006 where the majority of the 27 engagements throughout the deployment were conducted at the infantry sub-unit level due to the nature of the operating environment.[167]

The second point relates to the current operating environment, which has called for commitments that are adaptive and responsive, not rigid Cold War structures that do not suit the current threat (this idea will be discussed further in Chapters Four and Five).[168] The response to the threat has shaped the approach toward a force structure that is modular, calling on the

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[164] J. C. A. E. Dion, "The E-Forces! The Evolution of Battle-Groupings in the Face of 21st Century Challenges," *The Canadian Army Journal*, 7, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 92.

[165] Charles Branchaud, "Let's Face Reality…" *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, 2, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 116 – 117.

[166] Paul Mooney, "Army Prepares for Post-Afghanistan," *Canadian Military Journal,* 10, no. 4 (Autumn 2010): 66 – 67.

[167] Ian Hope, "Guest Editorial," *The Canadian Army Journal,* 10, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 5 – 9.

[168] Department of National Defence, *Purpose Defined – The Force Employment Concept for the Army* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Doctrine, 2004), 11.

injection of cohesive sub-units to TFs in response to the tactical situation and threat.[169] Modularity will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5 of this paper.

Summary

The MRP and CFDS both rely on having a sustainable readiness plan across the force, which the Army has managed to implement to varying degrees of success. The CFDS describes the strategic intent while the MRP is the document that translates this intent into something tangible: a graduated readiness system. By breaking down the CFDS and assigning tasks across the four LOOs, the Army has managed to achieve efficiencies in the six missions of the CFDS, not an easy process when considering the scope of the missions. While the LOOs have not undergone revision, the MRP has moved towards a more efficient and comprehensive plan, allowing the Army to break down tasks largely into infantry-centric organizations. By doing this, the Army has achieved answering Betts's questions of being *ready for when* and the *readiness of what*. This time-based system also allows the Army to achieve sustainable readiness for an extended period of time, thereby enabling the flexibility and combat-capability the CF and government desires. While it is important to see how readiness writ large is achieved, what has not been discussed is the metrics of how these organizations move along the MRP from one level of readiness to the next, and how this is assessed in a standardized fashion through the Army's training. As one past CCA commented, "our vital ground is our people, their equipment and their training."[170] This training is considered critical to success since the force generation for missions

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[169] Ibid.

[170] Andrew Leslie, *Report on Transformation 2011* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2011), iv.

and their sustainment is founded on the Army's training system.[171] With training as one of the critical pillars of the Army's Strategic Framework that guides readiness[172], it reasons that the infantry training is paramount to achieving the readiness necessary to the Army's current and future missions. How the infantry is trained and what makes up that training will be the focus of the next chapter.

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[171] André Harvey, "Directorate of Army Training Update: Brigade Training Event: Managed Readiness Versus Operational Readiness," *The Canadian Army Journal*, 7, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 9.

[172] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 6.

CHAPTER 3 – TRAINING IN THE INFANTRY

Good training and hence, operationally effective units will be the result of applying the principles [of training] effectively. Those who choose to ignore or overlook the fundamentals might well achieve short-term aims, but their troops will not be sufficiently well trained to withstand prolonged operations or meet the multiplicity of demands of today and the future.

– Ernest B. Beno, Training to Fight and Win: Training in the Canadian Army[173]

As previously mentioned in this paper, armed forces must continue to think about and train for conflicts of the future in order to be best prepared and ready for them.[174] The last chapter briefly touched on the importance of training in the readiness system and how levels of training are directly proportional to readiness since training achieves Betts's *readiness of what* and *readiness for when* criteria. The influence on readiness stems from the fact that training levels are progressive and not achieved in a single step. As General (retired) Beno comments above in the epigraph, training is what the Army and the infantry is all about, "honing battle skills and building teams capable of withstanding the physical and mental stressors of operations."[175] This leads to trust, cohesion and the ability to depend on each other under even the harshest conditions[176] since this training is "tough, realistic multi-echeloned combined arms

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[173] Ernest B. Beno, Training to Fight and Win: Training in the Canadian Army (Kingston, ON: n.p., 1999), ix.

[174] Department of National Defence, *Land Operations 2021 – Adaptive Dispersed Operations – The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, edited by Andrew B. Godefroy (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2007), 10.

[175] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), 3-2.

[176] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), 3-1.

training designed to challenge and develop individuals, leaders and units."[177] As discussed in the previous chapter, the infantry has been the cornerstone of deployments on international missions and, as will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five, this fact will not soon change. In order to appreciate the link between readiness and training, this chapter will now review in detail the purpose of training in the CA, with special focus on the infantry, followed by a discussion on the components of training from individual training to collective training. This chapter will then discuss how the different levels of training are validated, including the systems used, and how live-fire training plays a critical role in each level. This chapter will conclude by focusing on the frequency of training, continuation training, and how training enables the maintenance/sustainment of a combat capable and ready force. This concept is important as General McArthur stated, "[in] no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military."[178]

Training Purpose

In the previous chapter, the idea that training supports readiness was briefly discussed, but what was not discussed was the purpose of training and how it is used to guide the readiness process. The Army Operating Plan states that training is important not only because it provides soldiers with functional skills, but also because it enables the Army to be a "highly capable

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[177] Ernest B. Beno, "The General as a Trainer," Chap. V, In *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, edited by Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris (St. Catherines, ON: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 529.

[178] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-000/FP-000 Canada's Army – We Stand on Guard for Thee* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 1998), 90.

fighting force that is well balanced and ready to meet Canada's security challenges."[179] Therefore, training is used as a vehicle for understanding and learning because experience reinforces education. This gives training a context since the majority of skills required in the infantry cannot be taught in the classroom and requires practical application and/or operational experience.[180] As General Beno commented, "[there] is nothing more important to the Army than training,"[181] especially during peacetime where the Army's focus is on preparing for future threats. In a report on the evaluation of land force readiness and training published in 2011, the Chief of Review Services predicted the focus of military training would shift from preparing for the war in Afghanistan towards the generalized skills needed to fight across the entire spectrum of conflict.[182] This is important since this is balanced with achieving cost effectiveness versus efficiency in training at a point when the majority of the force does not have an assigned LOO Three or Four mission.[183] While managing training to be cost-effective is a good concept, it should not act as the sole guiding principle for designing training since efficient training tends to get confused for cheap training.[184] Training must be effective at achieving the goals and

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[179] Department of National Defence, *Army Operating Plan FY 13/14 V2* (Ottawa, ON: DLS 2-2, 2013), 1-1/14.

[180] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), 7-3.

[181] Ernest B. Beno, "The General as a Trainer," Chap. V, In *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, edited by Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris (St. Catherines, ON: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 522.

[182] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 46.

[183] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), 3-3.

[184] Department of National Defence, *Future Army Capabilities* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2001), 42.

readiness standards as dictated by the MRP since ineffective training has the potential to endanger Army missions and ultimately wastes precious resources.[185] Training is essentially practicing until a certain standard is achieved, but there has been a tendency to link training with achieving the maximum number of practice run-throughs, not achieving standards.[186] While every training opportunity that can be taken must be taken, training is about increasing the challenges and not just about repeating the same experiences again and again. Training that focuses solely on number of practices and not skill achievement serves to endanger lives and mission success by breeding a false sense of security.[187] In addition, training must focus on achieving skills across the spectrum of conflict with particular emphasis on war-fighting as the worst-case scenario since this must always be a military's primary focus.[188] This is something that is too easily forgotten as occurred in the 1990s when the training focus narrowed steadily toward current operations of the time, focusing exclusively on only achieving the pre-deployment training necessary to deploy and not on maintaining a breadth of skills across the spectrum of conflict.[189] As stated by the Chief of Review Services, "in the context of future global uncertainty and internal funding pressures there is a need to ensure that [Army] training is relevant, effective and yet affordable."[190] When funding limits training, the Army must train for

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[185] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), 3-4.

[186] Ibid., 8-2.

[187] Ibid., 1-11.

[188] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-000/FP-000, Canada's Army – We Stand on Guard for Thee* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 1998), 88 – 89.

[189] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 12.

[190] Ibid., 54.

war first, and then focus on developing the skills needed for more permissive environments since the former will build the cohesion and skills necessary to succeed in any environment, which is the goal of training.[191]

Training Components

Directing that all training is relevant, effective and affordable is easy to say yet hard to achieve once all the necessary parts, gateways and resources are considered. It is an intricate balance that must be maintained as the "CF must address the dichotomy between the requirement for a small highly trained force (in both tactical and technical terms) for peacetime operational tasks and the need for a larger, less highly trained, mobilized force for war or domestic emergency."[192] In order to ensure this, the Army employs a centrally controlled system that delineates priorities according to the MRP.[193] This system is founded along three training parts consisting of Individual Training (IT), Collective Training (CT) and professional development. IT focuses on achieving individual performance standards (such as in individual marksmanship test) where CT "enables a group of individuals to work cohesively and in concert to provide a capability."[194] Specifically, CT is viewed as a function of command and "is the mechanism

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[191] D. R. Drew, "Combat Readiness and Canada's Army," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin,* 2, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 43.

[192] Department of National Defence, *Future Army Capabilities* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2001), 4.

[193] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), 1-2.

[194] Ibid., 3-9.

where commanders create collective confidence and cohesion,"[195] factors which directly relate to readiness. Professional development in the training system speaks to augmenting the body of professional knowledge a person or organization possesses to increase their capability and performance standards[196], a subject that runs independent of the timelines in the MRP and is outside the scope of this paper. The Army training system is progressive and cyclical in nature and never really ends. It begins with IT to achieve personal skills, then moves to CT to achieve more complex requirements, followed by continuation training in order to guard against readiness atrophy until the organization's readiness window is finished, and then sees the organization rotating back to honing IT skills.[197] Earlier in this paper the influence of economy was introduced as playing a significant role in readiness. In the case of the Army, this is accounted for and managed by the annual Army Operating Plan by tasking regions with LOO tasks and stating the minimum levels of training to be achieved for specific timeframes.[198] This ensures that commonality is achieved across the Army and culminates with combat capable and operationally ready units.[199] This gives a holistic approach to training but the different levels of the training system must also be discussed to truly appreciate the complexity involved.

Training Validation

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[195] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 25.

[196] Department of National Defence, *A-PA-005-000/AP-001, Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2009), 16.

[197] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 8.

[198] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001 Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), 3-2.

[199] Ibid., 3-2.

With respect to tasks and standards across the training process, there are myriad items that need to be assessed from small arms weapons training to individual field craft skills. The Army publication *B-GL-383-002/PS-002 Battle Task Standards* (BTS) identifies all tasks common to Army trades and goes into detail on the specific criteria required to be achieved, including trade specific items such as how a combat team effects a screen[200]or the standard for how engineers construct wire obstacles.[201] With respect to the infantry, there is a separate publication, *B-GL-383-002/PT-015 BTS – Infantry*, which complements the common BTS and amplifies additional tasks and criteria that must be achieved as part of the IT and CT cycle with focus at the section and platoon level.[202] These BTS are the means used across the Army to achieve one common standard that commanders use to assess the achievement of each level in the training system where the successful achievement of an item allows for progression onto the next more challenging objective. The different levels of training are best depicted as per Figure 6 below:

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[200] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-383-002/PS-002, Battle Task Standards*. Vol. 2 (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training Battle Task Standards and Validation, 2007), 797 – 798.

[201] Ibid., 585.

[202] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-383-002/PT-015, Battle Task Standards – Infantry* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training 3, 1998), v.

Figure 6: Army Levels of Training[203]

As per the Figure 6, the BTS guide personnel through the training beginning with Level 1 – individual BTS/IT – and onto the levels of collective training – Levels 2 to 10.[204] As a function of these levels and BTS, the Army recognizes a Minimum Level of Capability (MLOC), which denotes the "minimum level of competency that reflects the professional skills/knowledge and experience needed by forces before they can progress to a more advanced readiness state or before commitment to operations."[205] The assignment of a MLOC for the majority of Army units and high readiness for others is managed by the MRP and assigned in the Army Operation Plan, such as directing that the unit assigned to high readiness on a LOO Three task must achieve

[203] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), 2-9.

[204] Ibid., 6-1.

[205] Ibid., 2-13.

Level 5 live (for the infantry this is the combat team[206] level live-fire) prior to deploying.[207] It is important to note that the Army Operating Plan states the centre of gravity for the Army – the critical thing that must be accomplished as an absolute bare minimum – is Level 5 tactics (sub-unit/combat team) since it is the cornerstone of combined operations and the key to the CA's success for units deploying on overseas deployment.[208] For those not assigned to a LOO mission, the highest level of training resourced is only Level 3 – or platoon/sub-sub-unit for the infantry – not sub-unit level or even at Level 5.[209] Interestingly, this highlights the requirement for a higher level of readiness in a deployed capacity, but also implies that a certain amount of risk is being accepted for those units not deploying to Afghanistan since they are not allocated the resources to achieve the Army's centre of gravity. This idea will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper. While training is the key to Army readiness, good training is the key to creating and developing those operationally capable units. It must also be concluded that in order to have different levels of training, there is a requirement to evaluate effectiveness at those different levels and therefore, "a sound evaluation process is a vital component of that training"[210] and

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[206] A combat team consists of an infantry sub-unit/company with an attached squadron of armour, a troop of engineers, artillery and other enablers. For the purposes of the paper, whether talking about a combat team, specifically for pre-deployment training or routine/continuation training, the term sub-unit will be used for clarity.

[207] Department of National Defence, *Army Operating Plan FY 13/14 V2* (Ottawa, ON: DLS 2-2, 2013), 2-3/26.

[208] Ibid., 1-2/13.

[209] Ibid., 2-3/26.

[210] Ernest B. Beno, "The General as a Trainer," Chap. V, In *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, edited by Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris (St. Catherines, ON: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 546.

without it there would be "no means by which units and their leaders can be held accountable to achieve the desired end-state."[211]

BTS

Every year, planners and commanders take the directed objectives in the Army Operating Plan and translate them into training events in order to generate a training plan that will achieve objectives as per the BTS according to the required time, accuracy standards and the conditions that define success.[212] When assessing the BTS against the guidelines, it is the commanders who plays the role of determining the degree to which the BTS have been achieved and if the MLOC has been achieved.[213] This is similar to assessments in the civilian world except the bottom line in the military is not solely profit driven.[214] In order to avoid having a supervisor assessing a direct subordinate in the training Levels 1 through 5, the training system directs that the assessment is completed/confirmed by two levels up the chain of command (a platoon commander would be assessed by a unit commanding officer and a company commander would be assessed by a brigade commander).[215] Confirmation of Levels 6 and higher is completed by either a training system, such as the CMTC (responsible for the confirmation of units for Level 6

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[211] Ibid., 546.

[212] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 32.

[213] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 33.

[214] Ernest B. Beno, "The General as a Trainer," Chap. V, In *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, edited by Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris (St. Catherines, ON: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 549.

[215] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), 1-12.

and 7 prior to deploying on LOO Three and Four tasks), or the Army for Levels 8 and higher. While the system and the assessment appear cumbersome at first glance, it is necessary to prevent units conducting training they are ill-prepared for and allows them to get the most out of the training.[216] Without this directed means of evaluation, the Army would run the risk of lacking a credible validation system to denote ready and unready forces, thereby not achieving Betts's *ready of what* criteria.

Live-Fire Training

Throughout the BTS process and the progression for each level, it is important to note that while the confirmation assessment is up to the commander, it is only through the successful completion of a live-fire iteration that authorization is given to progress to the next level. This is the result of acknowledging that units must be assessed under the same conditions and circumstances they will experience under deployed conditions, which is a necessity, not a luxury.[217] In fact, the CA holds live-fire training as the culmination of training for forces preparing for LOO Three and Four tasks, and assigns ammunition and resources based on these live-fire training objectives.[218] Our allies hold live-fire training in high regard as well. Live-fire serves as the training cornerstone for the US Army[219] since the US Army believes that only in

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[216] Ernest B. Beno, "The General as a Trainer," Chap. V, In *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, edited by Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris (St. Catherines, ON: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 536.

[217] Douglas A. Furst, "Readiness - A Commander's Responsibility," *Air Force Journal of Logistics*, 26, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 18.

[218] Department of National Defence, *Army Operating Plan FY 13/14 V2* (Ottawa, ON: DLS 2-2, 2013), 1-4/13.

[219] Department of the Army, *Army Range and Training Land Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2004), 2 – 3.

"this type of high-risk, high-payoff training that bonds are established, where individuals become fire teams, fire teams become squads, and squads turn into unified, cohesive platoons."[220] This stems from a mentality where "professionalism on operations evolves from professional training"[221] or, more boldly, "the more [they] sweat in training the least likely [they will] bleed in war, and the more relevant [the] force posture and packaging, the more effective [they] will be."[222]

There are many reasons why live training is superior to dry training. Primarily, live-fire exposes soldiers to a unique set of stressors such as "operating in close proximity to explosive munitions and fires, targeting deadly fire in proximity to one's own troops and the allocation of deadly fire to support specific units or objectives."[223] Secondly, live-fire training instils confidence in soldiers with respect to their own abilities under fire, their leaders, their teammates and their equipment.[224] This confidence is derived from knowing and understandings the effects of live-fire ammunition, muzzle blast effects, ricochets, ammunition effects on the enemy force, and that their teammates can hit targets and execute tactical tasks without endangering others.[225]

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[220] Albert C. Stahl, "Live Fire Training: Lifeblood for the Light Infantryman" (Masters of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2001), 6.

[221] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), 9-1.

[222] J. C. A. E. Dion, "*e-Generation: Generating Canada's 21st Century 1e-Force* (Master's Thesis Management and Defence Policy, Royal Military College, 2007), 2.

[223] Kevin Murphy, James L. Farr, and Greg Loviscky, *Study to Quantify the Benefits and Costs of Simulated Versus Live-Fire Training at USMC Ranges – Phase 1 Interim Report* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2007), 10.

[224] Maynard L. Burkett, William J. Mullen, and Larry L. Meliza, *Live Fire Futures* (Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioural Sciences, 2000), 11.

[225] Ibid., 14 – 15.

Finally, it is only during live-fire training where all the aspects of the infantry can be practiced "such as ammunition handling, loading and reloading, and correcting weapons malfunctions"[226] that are critical skills to enabling operational effectiveness. As one Australian combat leader said, "do not expect the combat fairy to come bonk you with the combat wand and suddenly make you capable of doing things that you never rehearsed before. It will not happen."[227]

The benefits of live-fire training are well documented. S.L.A. Marshall, a noted historian, wrote about the need to "train the eye to look for the signs of order and progress amid the confusion of war"[228] and to make "men knowledgeable of human nature as it is and as it reacts under the various and extreme stresses of the field."[229] There are modern examples where soldiers instinctively react to threats due to the effectiveness of training, as documented by Lieutenant-Colonel Hope in Afghanistan on the speed and effectiveness of attached US forces in destroying Taliban resistance.[230]

This is not to say that live-fire training does not have its downside. Safety constraints imposed during peacetime training have the potential to teach bad habits, which can put soldiers' lives at risk overseas. Prior to deploying to Iraq, soldiers from the US Army's Third Infantry

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[226] Ibid., 15.

[227] Scott Klima, "Combat Focus: A Commander's Responsibility in the Formation, Development and Training of Today's Combat Team," *Australian Army Journal*, IX, no. 2 (Winter 2012): 106.

[228] Thomas J. Williams, "Strategic Leader Readiness and Competencies for Asymmetric Warfare," *Parameters* 33, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 28 – 29.

[229] S. L. A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 181.

[230] Ian Hope, *Dancing with the Dushman: Command Imperatives for the Counter-Insurgency Fight in Afghanistan* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2008), 127.

Division were required to keep their weapons pointed at the ground when conducting live-fire training except when shooting, whereas in actual combat they are instructed to point their weapons up towards the rooftops, which introduced the potential that a seemingly benign safety measure had the potential to produce bad habits that put soldiers at greater overall risk since at times of great stress and chaos soldiers will instinctively adhere to what they have been trained and drilled to do.[231] While safety during training is critical, the number of safety measures employed in peacetime must be reduced as much as possible to mimic wartime functions, or the risk of introducing those dangerous training scars increases.

The second drawback of live-fire training is focused on the cost associated with ammunition and resources. As the Army attempts to gain greater efficiencies and exploit advances in technologies, several advances emerge to complement live-fire training such as an increased use of simulators to replicate the battlefield. While the use of simulators have training benefits in better preparing soldiers, they will never replace live-fire training as the benefits outweigh of live fire training the costs.

Live-Fire Training Versus Simulation

It is unrealistic to think that armies can afford to conduct all training in a live environment so a balance of live and alternative means must be employed.[232] This is especially true when considering not only the cost associated with acquiring the necessary level of

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[231] Jonathan Gratch and Stacy Marsella, "Fight the Way You Train: The Role and Limits of Emotions in Training for Combat," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, X, no. 1 (Summer/Fall 2003): 3.

[232] Department of the Army, *ADP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the United States Army, 2012), 4.

readiness, but also the cost associated with continuation/sustainment training to avoid readiness atrophy.[233] The Army has a variety of mechanisms it employs to complement/prepare forces to be effective while reducing the minimum number of live-fire iterations, these include: classroom instruction, tactical exercises without troops and simulations (both Weapons Effects Simulators (WES) and computer assisted exercises).[234] The *Training for Land Operations* manual even prescribes a fixed number to iterations for training practices, requiring three to six practices of any nature to achieve competency, which starts with a dry iteration, followed by an iteration using blank ammunition, followed by a pair of iterations using live ammunitions and then a pair of iterations using the WES.[235] While this is a good framework to follow when there is sufficient time available to conduct training, in times of financial constraints efforts must be focused at getting the best training value for the time and money available. As stated by General Beno, simulation training and WES systems are not the *be-all and end-all* of training since they were originally designed to support live training, not replace it.[236] This is reinforced by the Army's *Training Safety* manual which states that while "classroom instruction, tactical exercises without troops, and other training methods are valuable, range practices and live-firing of weapons in the field in simulated tactical settings with a high degree of realism are essential for good operational

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[233] Department of the Army, *FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations* (Fort Eustis, VA: United States Training and Doctrine Command, 2008), 2-7.

[234] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), 1-12.

[235] Ibid., 6-8.

[236] Ernest B. Beno, "The General as a Trainer," Chap. V, In *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, edited by Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris (St. Catherines, ON: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 548.

training."[237] While the increased use of simulation has reduced the costs of training, there is no evidence to prove that it has actually improved the effectiveness of training. In fact, in one Marine Corps study, only one-third of training standards were achieved using simulators and two-thirds could only be achieved through live-fire training.[238] This leads to the conclusion that in order to properly train and achieve the levels of readiness needed, soldiers must train on the actual weapons systems they will use in the real world, not WES systems that limits the unpredictability that terrain and weather impose much like during operations.[239] Therefore, the only way to achieve readiness is through confirmation/validation in a live-fire setting, which will reduce friction on the battlefield and promote morale, cohesiveness and esprit-de-corps.[240]

Continuation Training

The final dynamic that must be considered with respect to training and live-fire skills has to do with skill atrophy, continuation training and the frequency of training. These are all intrinsically linked and dependent. The concern here is that the readiness skills acquired in training deteriorate over time, "leaving a false sense of security if those skills are not used in a post-training environment."[241]

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[237] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-381-001/TS-001, Training Safety* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2007), 1-1.

[238] Kevin Murphy, James L. Farr, and Greg Loviscky, *Study to Quantify the Benefits and Costs of Simulated Versus Live-Fire Training at USMC Ranges – Phase 1 Interim Report* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2007), 39 – 40.

[239] Ibid., 26.

[240] Ibid., 39 – 40.

[241] Ibid., 6.

A review of CA publications, directives and literature reveals that there is no set standard on how often continuation training should be conducted, leaving it up to the commanders to decide how and when it will be done. Unfortunately, the real motivation behind how often it is conducted is based on what funding is available since training is constantly under "scrutiny in order to identify savings and avoid wasting time and resources on redundant or superfluous training."[242] This is contrary to the US Army where they are directed to conduct this type of training "every three months for platoons and lower echelons. Every six months for company teams and cavalry troops. Annually for battalion TFs/squadrons."[243] While it is promising that this direction exists, the strategies and ammunition requirements do not automatically translate into authorizations, which limits the frequency of training the US Conducts.[244] Moreover, limited training area space to conduct manoeuvres also limits the ability to achieve this direction as the US Army experienced when attempting to train its Brigade Combat Teams to this standard which left nine of them without time and terrain to train.[245] As with most things in the Army, it will be left to the commanders to develop innovative solutions to these problems as they are best able to see where efficiencies can be achieved, including bypassing certain training gateways by

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[242] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 12.

[243] Maynard L. Burkett, William J. Mullen, and Larry L. Meliza, *Live Fire Futures* (Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioural Sciences, 2000), 20.

[244] Albert C. Stahl, "Live Fire Training: Lifeblood for the Light Infantryman" (Masters of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2001), 18.

[245] Sharon L. Pickup, *Military Training – Army and Marine Corps Face Challenges to Address Projected Future Requirements* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, 2010), 2.

accepting risk.[246] Dogma with regulations and restrictive measures must not be allowed to determine this training frequency and it is up to the commanders to be ready to justify the training required for requisite readiness levels.

Summary

Throughout this chapter, the influence of training on readiness has been stressed, including the requirement to develop and conduct it in a manner that eliminates unnecessary effort and achieves a high standard of readiness.[247] It is only through training that the Army, and specifically the infantry, can achieve the readiness objectives as set out by the CF and the government. Built on a foundation of IT, the main effort of the training system is in achieving the directed levels of CT to correspond to assigned LOCs as per the MRP. However, in order to maintain Canada's relevance and interoperability amongst our allies, the Army must be trained to an equal standard or risk having only a portion of the readiness needed to respond to any threat.[248] Given the directed levels in the MRP, it is clear that for the infantry, the goal for deployed operations is to maintain sub-unit live-fire as the benchmark for training.[249] Live-fire training is the only way to achieve a level of readiness that develops and preserves the experience, teamwork, attitude and persistent efforts to overcome weaknesses needed while

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[246] Andrew Leslie, *Report on Transformation 2011* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2011), 6.

[247] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), 3-3.

[248] Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment 2008 – 2030 – Part 1: Current and Emerging Trends* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Force Development, 2009), 69.

[249] Paul Mooney, "Army Prepares for Post-Afghanistan," *Canadian Military Journal*, 10, no. 4 (Autumn 2010): 68.

deployed.[250] It must be noted that, "the triumphs of today do not guarantee the successes of tomorrow."[251] Therefore, the purpose of training is to incorporate lessons learned from current operations to be ready for the future by developing the flexibility and adaptability needed to survive in the operations of the future.[252] As such, the CA must not let financial constraints reduce what is seen as the necessary level of readiness of the Army. Given the Army and infantry serve as a deterrent, its credibility it based on its effectiveness in training, which must be maximized in order to be best prepared for the uncertainty of the FSE. Despite their being no assigned international mission, live-fire training for all sub-units in the infantry must be incorporated into the MRP to ensure high readiness for the threats of the future.

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[250] Douglas A. Furst, "Readiness – A Commander's Responsibility," *Air Force Journal of Logistics*, 26, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 20.

[251] Andrew Leslie, *Report on Transformation 2011* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2011), iv.

[252] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-000/FP-000, Canada's Army – We Stand on Guard for Thee* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 1998), 88 – 89.

CHAPTER 4 – THE FSE

It is now time to recognize that a paradigm shift in war has undoubtedly occurred: from armies with comparable forces doing battle on a field of strategic confrontation between a range of combatants, not all of which are armies, and using different types of weapons, often improvised. The old paradigm was that of interstate industrial war. The new one is the paradigm of war amongst the people...

– Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force[253]

In order to be prepared for the future, the government is committed to ensuring the CF has the capabilities it needs to face the full range of threats and challenges in the uncertain environment of tomorrow.[254] This is an aggressive statement considering many analysts now claim that today's world is more chaotic and unpredictable than at any other period in history.[255] Armies must study current trends and attempt to predict the future in order to be relevant and ready for when the next threat is revealed because "if an Army loses its capacity to kill, and to win the close fight, it will be unable to exert influence."[256] As Rupert Smith commented above in the epigraph, it is critical that the Army recognizes the change in how conflict is conducted, spends the necessary effort to predict future threats and uses innovation to develop the necessary readiness to be responsive. This is especially difficult since predicting the next major attack is not normally possible and no matter how hard one tries, the next threat may not be

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[253] Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 5.

[254] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2008), 6.

[255] Department of National Defence, *Toward Land Operations 2021 – Studies in Support of the Army of Tomorrow Force Employment Concept*, edited by Andrew B. Godefroy and Peter Gizewski (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2009), 1-1.

[256] Peter Connolly, *Counterinsurgency in Uruzgan 2009*, edited by Michelle Lovi (Canberra, AU: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2011), 71.

foreseeable.[257] Regardless, there is fair certainty in knowing that future operations will be challenging, plentiful and cover the spectrum of military operations at home and abroad.[258] By reviewing the scope of current conflicts and the enemy that have emerged, a better understanding of what the future Army will face can be gained. This again relates to Betts's readiness criteria since it will assist in answering the readiness for when and the readiness of what. If a prediction can be made on future requirements, then the appropriate levels of readiness and necessary training can be determined. This is a critical function of any military since "reactive [versus proactive] planning by militaries can result in high costs of blood and/or treasure."[259] Studying the FSE now, can save time and lives later.

Scope of the FSE

When considering the FSE, there is only one certainty: "despite its exalted position as the most intelligent species on the planet, humans have a long and sordid history of conflict. Sadly, it seems inevitable that war and conflict will continue into the future."[260] Drawing from current global trends indicate that the future will be dominated by continuous globalization, technological advances, demographic change, resource demands, climate change, radical

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[257] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 40.

[258] Andrew Leslie, *Report on Transformation 2011* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2011), 13.

[259] Michael A. Rostek, Peter Gizewski, Regan Reshke, R. Bell, John Sheahan, and Steve Larouche, *Toward Army 2040: Exploring Key Dimensions of the Global Environment*, The Claxton Papers (Kingston, ON: Defence Management Studies Program, Queen's University, 2011), 47.

[260] Ibid., 20.

fundamentalism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[261] These concepts along with the Army's recent experience allow for some insight.[262] Over the last twenty years it has become apparent that the initiative rests with the enemy. This is evidenced by the campaign in Afghanistan, Libya and Mali since the actions of Canada and our allies have been reactive to major incidents initiated by insurgent forces. As such, these wars can be considered "fight-anywhere, fight-anytime wars, where anywhere and anytime [is] largely defined by the enemy."[263] Since the enemy has the initiative, the corresponding level of readiness must account for this fact, with potential conflict resting anywhere along the spectrum of conflict. Not only is the range of possible threats along that spectrum a concern, but also the fact that events unfold at an alarming rate, where uncertainty, volatility and rapid change dominate.[264] This uncertainty is compounded by the fact that these types of conflicts have no precise beginning nor conclusion since the CF and allies normally participate in them after the conflict has started. Furthermore, influences of differences in nationality, language, culture and motivation need to be understood in order to operate effectively in this environment.[265] The current operating environment as defined by the CF has been

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[261] Peter Devlin, "Army Futures," *Canadian Military Journal*, 11, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 47.

[262] Department of National Defence, *Future Force – Concepts for Future Force Army Capabilities* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2003), 61.

[263] Douglas A. Furst, "Readiness - A Commander's Responsibility," *Air Force Journal of Logistics*, 26, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 15.

[264] Michael A. Rostek, Peter Gizewski, Regan Reshke, R. Bell, John Sheahan, and Steve Larouche, *Toward Army 2040: Exploring Key Dimensions of the Global Environment*, The Claxton Papers (Kingston, ON: Defence Management Studies Program, Queen's University, 2011), 33.

[265] Department of National Defence, *Integrated Capstone Concept* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Force Development, 2010), 22.

> characterized by complex, multi-dimensional conflict, simultaneous, full spectrum operations, and a non-contiguous, dispersed operational framework along with an approach to operating within an environment that seeks to create a tactical advantage through the deliberate use of dispersion by adaptive forces.[266]

This definition contains a number of critical planning factors such as simultaneous and dispersion. These ideas will shape the Army's response and will be covered in the next chapter. Although there is little certainty or guarantee when contemplating the FSE, the trends over the last ten years serve as the best indicators of what to expect in future conflict and those trends are what are relied upon to shape responses.[267]

One only needs to look back at the operations conducted over the last twenty years to see the noticeable shift in the way the Army conducts operations as evidenced during the deployments to Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Afghanistan and Libya. The differences between recent conflicts and the traditional force-on-force conflict Canada participated in in places like Korea and both World Wars are significant. There is a shift from the traditional style, linear engagement warfare of the past towards the counter-insurgency seen in Afghanistan. The "attritionalist approach focusing on physical mass and firepower against a templated symmetrical enemy, meeting on a carefully crafted linear battlefield with its choreography of front, boundaries, phase lines, timings and carefully details sequencing is already gone."[268] The trend here is that the Army elements will be operating over extended distances and in smaller and

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[266] Department of National Defence, *The Army of Tomorrow – Assessing Concepts and Capabilities for Land Operations Evolution* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2006), 16.

[267] Roy van den Berg, "The 21st Century Battlespace: The Danger of Technological Ethnocentrism," *Canadian Military Journal*, 10, no. 4 (Autumn 2010): 10.

[268] Department of National Defence, *Future Force – Concepts for Future Force Army Capabilities* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2003), iv.

smaller groups (from a brigade manoeuvring on its own to disparate sub-unit groups operating independently).[269] This fact has been incorporated into the UK's doctrine since a fifth planning factor – dispersion – has been added to the existing four – demand, distance, destination and duration – to reflect the need for larger organizations such as the BG and brigades to disperse into smaller elements like the combat team and company group.[270] Similarly, the US Army's updated doctrine calls for commanders to be increasingly spread out across the battlefields of the future as these battlefields will be non-linear and non-contiguous, due to the full spectrum asymmetric threat.[271] In order to compete in this type of environment, the future force will need to be highly flexible and adaptable to battlefields and any changes to them, since the "techniques, tactics and procedures used in similar operations, or even at an earlier time in the same operation, will rarely achieve the same outcomes, or may in fact become counter-productive."[272]

Future Battlefield

The trends observed over the last few years are likely to continue, resulting in more fluid, non-linear engagements with a wider range of technologies and tactics that are employed on

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[269] Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Shelby Cullom Davis, *The Marine Corps – America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: The Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis Inc., 2011), 52.

[270] Ministry of Defence, *Joint Concept Note 2/12 – Future Land Operating Concept* (Shrivenham, UK: Director Joint Forces (Concepts and Doctrine), 2012), 2-14.

[271] Department of the Army, *FM 7-1, Battle Focused Training* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the United States Army, 2003), A-1.

[272] Department of National Defence, *Integrated Capstone Concept* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Force Development, 2010), 25.

innumerable and often non-military targets.[273] These targets not only operate on the air, naval and land battlefields, but also through increasing use of space, cyberspace and human battlefields, with many occurring concurrently.[274] Furthermore, the physical battlefield has transitioned from the open planes of Europe to frequent engagements in urban centres chosen by the enemy, resulting in these urban centres (including those in third world countries) becoming key terrain that needs to be controlled.[275] This fact is compounded by the fact that it is expected that 60% of the global population will live in urban settings by 2030.[276] These will give the enemy the advantage as they are better able to pick where and when they engage our forces.

> Large, unregulated cities will provide criminals, terrorists, and insurgents with new havens from which they can organize and launch operations; they will also offer a ready pool of disenchanted recruits. Not only will adversaries be able to blend and embed themselves into massive city populations, they will be able to hide behind civilians and mitigate the firepower advantages of nations who abide by international law and whose rules of engagement and/or public opinion preclude collateral damage.[277]

This becomes increasingly complex when considering how to engage an elusive enemy while not risking civilian lives and not destroying the critical infrastructure the civilian populace needs to

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[273] Department of National Defence, *Toward Land Operations 2021 – Studies in Support of the Army of Tomorrow Force Employment Concept*, edited by Andrew B. Godefroy and Peter Gizewski (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2009), 1-24.

[274] Department of National Defence, *Integrated Capstone Concept* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Force Development, 2010), 33 – 35.

[275] Roch Legault, "The Urban Battlefield and the Army: Changes and Doctrines," *Canadian Military Journal* (Autumn 2000): 39.

[276] Michael A. Rostek, Peter Gizewski, Regan Reshke, R. Bell, John Sheahan, and Steve Larouche, *Toward Army 2040: Exploring Key Dimensions of the Global Environment*, The Claxton Papers (Kingston, ON: Defence Management Studies Program, Queen's University, 2011), 30.

[277] Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment 2008 – 2030 – Part 1: Current and Emerging Trends* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Force Development, 2009), 24.

survive.[278] The key with this trend is that any response has to be measured, systematic and able to fight along the spectrum of conflict in order to be capable to responding and surviving in this chaos.

Hybrid Warfare

The idea of a full spectrum threat across a dispersed battlefield has led to CA theorists to believe that

> large force-on-force exchanges will not disappear, but irregular warfare conducted by highly adaptive and technologically enable adversaries, rogue states bent on challenging the status quo, and transnational criminal organizations will remain the most likely defence and security threat.[279]

From this concept has precipitated the term *hybrid threat,* which is used to "capture the seemingly increased complexity of operations and the multiplicity of actors involved."[280] It indicates an environment where the Army will prepare for both conventional battles and asymmetric conflicts in the same area of operations, initiated by challengers who are wide-ranging and may not only include states but a diverse range of non-state actors such as: media-savvy transnational terrorist organizations intent on limiting Western influence and presence in their lands, warlords seeking to retain power and influence over local populations at any price

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[278] Shaye K. Friesen and Andrew N. Fale, "Slaying the Dragon: The Future Security Environment and Limitations on Industrial Age Security," *Canadian Military Journal,* 11, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 33.

[279] Department of National Defence, *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow – A Land Operations 2021 Publication* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, 2011), 18.

[280] Department of the Army, *TC 3-21.10, Infantry Rifle Company Collective Task Publication* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the United States Army, 2012), 1-12.

and transnational criminal organizations.[281] As a result of globalization as well as the spread of science and technology, these diverse threats are empowered in their actions against western armies.[282] Moreover, the technological advantage currently enjoyed by industrial technological nations is narrowing, resulting in an operating concept where bigger and more forces may not necessarily result in a decisive victory.[283] This threat will manifest itself in differing ways, often simultaneously employing all forms of war and tactics.[284] This raises many unique challenges not seen in the past since the only way to defeat this threat is to understand it, meeting Betts's *ready for what* criteria, something that will be discussed in further detail in the next section.

The Future Threat

The idea that "the security environment of today and tomorrow contains a plethora threats, adversaries and actors with divergent motivations not limited to traditional theories of international relations"[285] creates a unique problem not experienced in past conflicts. Current defence planners "face a spectrum of threats from weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, terrorism, cyber attack, piracy, failed states, illegal trafficking, natural disasters,

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[281] Department of National Defence, *Toward Land Operations 2021 – Studies in Support of the Army of Tomorrow Force Employment Concept*, edited by Andrew B. Godefroy and Peter Gizewski (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2009), 1-23.

[282] Michael A. Rostek, Peter Gizewski, Regan Reshke, R. Bell, John Sheahan, and Steve Larouche, *Toward Army 2040: Exploring Key Dimensions of the Global Environment*, The Claxton Papers (Kingston, ON: Defence Management Studies Program, Queen's University, 2011), 16.

[283] Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment 2008 – 2030 – Part 1: Current and Emerging Trends* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Force Development, 2009), 76.

[284] Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges," *Joint Force Quarterly*, 52 (First Quarter 2009): 35.

[285] Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment 2008 – 2030 – Part 1: Current and Emerging Trends* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Force Development, 2009), 8.

disease, and limited energy and natural resources – all on top of the more conventional military threats."[286] This fact is being realized throughout the world with the proliferation of advanced weapons and the potential for new, nuclear-capable adversarial states headed by unpredictable regimes, the influence of Islamist militants and the build up of conventional forces in Asia Pacific countries.[287] In order to gain the advantage, emerging threat forces will choose to avoid the strength of the Army in an attempt to undermine and negate it, employing methods that differ significantly from the Army's tactics to exploit its weaknesses.[288] These threats will disperse their forces into small mobile combat teams, aggregating "only when required to strike a common objective and becoming invisible by blending in with the local population"[289] in order to use it for its support, cover and concealment, and negate the advantage of allied forces technology.[290] Additionally, this adversary "will target local populations to demonstrate their freedom of action and [the allied forces's] inability to protect the population"[291] which indicates that much of this violence will occur in the developing world where dictators, organized crime

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[286] Andrew Leslie, *Report on Transformation 2011* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2011), 9.

[287] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2008), 6.

[288] Department of National Defence, *Future Force – Concepts for Future Force Army Capabilities* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2003), 63.

[289] Department of the Army, *FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations* (Fort Eustis, VA: United States Training and Doctrine Command, 2008), 1-2 – 1-3.

[290] Department of Defence, *The Army Objective Force 2030 Primer* (Canberra, AU: Defence Publishing Service, 2001), 10.

[291] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-001, Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Doctrine, 2008), 2A-4 – 2A-5.

groups and revolutionary movements fight for control of increasingly desperate societies.[292] As a function of this, large and chaotic urban centres in these developing worlds will become the new battleground as discussed previously. These adversaries "will work in increasingly complex networks composed of small organizations made up from a number of dispersed individuals that communicate, coordinate, and conduct operations in a networked manner."[293] Since these smaller groups will be harder to identify, "their actions will be less conducive to anticipation or deterrence, and they will be more likely to employ asymmetric tactics than risk a conventional, head-on confrontation."[294] This, in turn, "will probably reduce the efficacy of certain traditional countermeasures, such as targeting leadership, and make such organizations extremely difficult to penetrate due to the absence of direct physical linkages."[295] As a result, "military advantage [will] belong to whomever is quickest and best able to acquire and exploit new capabilities, thus increasing the adversarial capability of non-state actors to levels that rival those of nation states."[296] With the advances in the FSE, this military advantage must be equally responsive both domestically and outside of Canada.

Domestic Versus International Threats

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[292] Michael A. Rostek, Peter Gizewski, and Regan Reshke, *Conceiving an Army for the 21st Century* (Ottawa, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada, 2010), 22.

[293] Department of National Defence, *Future Force – Concepts for Future Force Army Capabilities* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2003), 64.

[294] Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment 2008 – 2030 – Part 1: Current and Emerging Trends* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Force Development, 2009), 79.

[295] Ibid., 82 – 83.

[296] Department of National Defence, *Integrated Capstone Concept* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Force Development, 2010), 7.

Up to this point, the focus on the current and future threat has been external to Canada. This is not to say that Canada is safe from the emerging threats. In actuality, immigration and refugee policy will play in important part in keeping Canada secure.[297] In addition, industrial espionage, terrorist espionage, information operations, epidemics, natural disasters and economic downturns in key economies all have the potential to disrupt and harm society.[298] This leads to the conclusion that the FSE threats that Canada will face will be essentially the same both domestically and outside of Canada. The readiness and training that the Army must complete in order to be ready for the FSE are of the same scope and nature, and rely on the same validation requirements of a deployed/high readiness force based off the MRP.[299] Therefore, provisions must be made to ensure live-fire training continues so the infantry can be prepared for the worst-case scenario and can draw upon the benefits – trust in themselves, trust in their fellow soldiers and trust in their leaders – which is required to be flexible and adaptable to respond to the FSE.

Summary

Given the unique and drastic changes that have emerged as the future threat by a myriad number of actors, the FSE will be challenging and chaotic. The Army "must understand individual and group motivations, technology as an enabler to human networks, and adversarial

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[297] Department of National Defence, *Future Force – Concepts for Future Force Army Capabilities* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2003), 18.

[298] Ibid., 20.

[299] J. H. P. M. Caron, *Managing the Army's Readiness* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of the Land Staff, 2005), B-5 – B-6.

intent"[300] as well as developing new methods to identify, detect, recognize and mark them for future prosecution.[301] This is something that the CF will not only face on deployed operations, but at home as those threats precipitate into domestic threats.[302] The speed at which advances are emerging dictate that the Army must develop the flexibility, adaptability and readiness to respond to all threats across the spectrum of conflict. In order to be ready for when and ready for what, the Army must not only understand what the potential threats are, but how it must respond to these threats in order to be successful on future operations. By thinking about and planning for future contingencies, the Army will then be in a position to plan future requirements and assign readiness levels and training to formations needed to act as an effective and capable deterrent. Despite a shrinking defence budget, there is scope for the Army to enable the infantry to conduct sub-unit live-fire training as their training baseline since the scope of operations continues to grow and demand a higher level of adaptability and flexibility.

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[300] Department of National Defence, *Integrated Capstone Concept* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Force Development, 2010), 32.

[301] Department of National Defence, *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow – A Land Operations 2021 Publication* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, 2011), 78.

[302] Department of National Defence, *Toward Land Operations 2021 – Studies in Support of the Army of Tomorrow Force Employment Concept*, edited by Andrew B. Godefroy and Peter Gizewski (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2009), 1-28.

CHAPTER 5 – IMPACTS, READINESS AND THE WAY AHEAD

... to mitigate the risks of an unpredictable future the Army will need to pursue a balanced, sustainable, combat-effective force structure that permits maximum institutional agility and the capacity to rapidly and successfully embrace change.

– Department of National Defence, Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow[303]

In the CFDS, the government demands that Canada has a "well-trained and well-equipped military with the core capabilities and flexibility required to successfully address both the conventional and asymmetric threats, including terrorism, insurgencies and cyber attacks."[304] Given the uncertainty and chaos that exists in the FSE as discussed in the previous chapter, the Army requires capabilities and the adaptability to confront a myriad threats on both expeditionary and domestic operations.[305] While it is easy to demand this of the CF, it requires a significant amount of funding to support. History has proven that while having a fully capable combat force is the most valuable, it is also "the most vulnerable as [it has] traditionally been the easiest to reduce or cut."[306] When there is no apparent threat, the government justifies cutting military costs to save for immediate public gains with a view of potential future investment back into the military later when a threat emerges.[307] This illustrates the cyclical nature of military

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[303] Department of National Defence, *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow – A Land Operations 2021 Publication* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, 2011), 68

[304] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2008), 7.

[305] Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment 2008 – 2030 – Part 1: Current and Emerging Trends* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Force Development, 2009), 88.

[306] Andrew Leslie, *Report on Transformation 2011* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2011), 79.

[307] M. R. Voith, "Military Readiness," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin,* 4, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 46.

funding, capitalizing on opportunities when funding is available due to perceived threats, and fighting to maintain readiness when funding is tight.[308] This is all the more complicated when considering the areas where the CF is to have influence: domestically, regionally and internationally. As was mentioned earlier by Douglas Bland, providing a ready and credible force to deal with domestic and regional security issues is considered mandatory, while committing forces to international missions depends on the financial environment and the government's resolve to spend money and commit forces.[309] This must be considered against the fact that training for expeditionary operations to the standard of the MRP, sub-unit live-fire, builds a degree of flexibility and adaptability to not only be successful internationally, but also on domestic missions (without training for specific domestic scenarios) which does not work in the inverse.[310] Having considered the FSE and the prominent trends concerning the threats of tomorrow, and considering the comments made in the epigraph to this chapter, consideration can now be given on how this shapes the Army of tomorrow, its structural focus and the corresponding readiness in order to remain relevant and addressing Betts's criteria of *readiness of what*. By considering these three aspects, further thought can be made into areas that will directly influence the readiness of the Army of tomorrow and the necessary support of funding and resources that are needed. This is important since the decisions that are made now shape the size, structure, and readiness of the Army, and have the potential to impact its effectiveness for

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[308] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 54.

[309] Douglas Bland, "Everything Military Officers Need to Know About Defence Policy-Making in Canada," *Canadian Strategic Forecast 2000: Advance of Retreat? Canadian Defence in the 21st Century,* edited by David Rudd, Jim Hansen and Jessica Blitt (Toronto, ON: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000), 15 – 18.

[310] Department of National Defence, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of the Maritime Staff, 2001), 16.

decades. Care must thus be taken, especially in times of fiscal restraint, to ensure those decisions are not made in haste and the Army retains the adaptability and flexibility needed for both current and future success.[311]

Enduring Nature of the Infantry

As discussed earlier in this paper, the increased uncertainty and the operations of the last twenty years has moved the Army towards infantry-centric BGs that are built around the infantry sub-unit.[312] Given the trend that future engagements will occur in an urban (or complex environments of which urban is one) setting, the Army will "continue to be [an] infantry-based, medium-weight force, capable of full-spectrum operations"[313] as confirmed by the CCA, Lieutenant-General (LGen) Devlin. While this paper discusses the Army writ large, the intent is to narrow the focus on the readiness and requirements of the infantry, as the basic building block for all future operations. As such, this discussion will use Army examples but will relate back to the infantry as the backbone for the Army's future success.

The Army of Tomorrow

When discussing the concept of readiness and being ready across the spectrum of conflict, Betts's questions of being *ready for what, when* and *of what* are a major influencing factor. Earlier in this paper, the justification was made that "an Army trained for combat is best

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[311] Michael A. Rostek, Peter Gizewski, Regan Reshke, R. Bell, John Sheahan, and Steve Larouche, *Toward Army 2040: Exploring Key Dimensions of the Global Environment*, The Claxton Papers (Kingston, ON: Defence Management Studies Program, Queen's University, 2011), 47.

[312] Alex Ruff, "Forging Land Forces for the Army of Tomorrow – The Battle Group 2021 Study," *The Canadian Army Journal,* 11, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 12.

[313] Peter Devlin, "Army Futures," *Canadian Military Journal,* 11, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 45.

able to adapt to other missions such as stabilization and assistance operations"[314] but the converse to this statement – that units trained for peacekeeping missions can seamlessly transition to war-fighting tasks – is not true.[315] Therefore, the key to being ready and successful in future conflicts is not by training for all situations and accumulating the largest amount of armour, artillery, or fighter planes, but by having a light-weight, flexible force capable of completing its assigned missions across the spectrum of conflict.[316] Since the Army cannot afford to train for all future operations, it must train for those operations that give it the greatest capability along the spectrum of conflict within financial constraints.[317] This concept involves a certain amount of risk, which the government and senior leaders must accept, specifically what type of training and how many resources are allocated to be ready for these future contingencies and the scope of commitment/size of the ready force.[318] Recent missions and current trends indicate future missions will continue to be of the same scope as recent ones (like Afghanistan) where success will be based largely off having soldiers on the ground to provide security, keep the support of the local population and defeat the enemy when necessary; indicative of the requirement for good quality infantry who are trained for combat operations and capable of

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[314] Department of National Defence, *Land Operations 2021 – Adaptive Dispersed Operations – The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, edited by Andrew B. Godefroy (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2007), 8.

[315] David Morrison, "Army After Afghanistan," *Australian Army Journal,* IX, no. 2 (Winter 2012): 11.

[316] Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Shelby Cullom Davis, *The Marine Corps – America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: The Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis Inc., 2011), 9.

[317] Department of National Defence, *Future Army Capabilities* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2001), 5.

[318] Lynn E. Davis, J. Michael Polich, William Hix M., Michael D. Greenberg, Stephen D. Brady, and Ronald E. Sortor, *Stretched Thin – Army Forces for Sustained Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2005), xiii.

stabilization tasks.[319] As discussed in the previous chapter, these conflicts will occur across a widely dispersed battlespace in order to create a tactical advantage for the enemy [320], a dispersion that requires Army elements capable of operating at smaller structural levels then seen in the past (i.e. not as a formed brigade or BG but at the sub-unit and on occasion, the sub-sub-unit level) to exploit opportunities, be it combat action or rebuilding activities.[321] This was evidenced by Lieutenant-Colonel Hope's experience in Afghanistan in 2006 where the BG's success was due to a careful balance between combat and non-combat activities, which exploited success, kept the enemy off balance and allowed the BG to emerge victorious.[322] One of the keys to operating in these conditions was to acknowledge that technology was not the key enabler that guaranteed victory. "History is full of examples where the most technologically advanced combatant has lost to the combatant that is the best trained and that possessed the greatest level of cohesion, unity and esprit-de-corps."[323] Instead, it is the flexibility and adaptability of agile junior leaders that influences success in the FSE rather than sizeable battalions and BGs of past operations.[324] As such, being ready for the next operation will not mean having formed masses ready to conduct

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[319] L. R. Mader, "The Come as You Want War: Some Thoughts on Forces Structuring in the Era of Discretionary Conflict," *The Canadian Army Journal*, 7, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 55.

[320] Department of National Defence, *The Army of Tomorrow – Assessing Concepts and Capabilities for Land Operations Evolution* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2006), 9.

[321] Department of National Defence, *Integrated Capstone Concept* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Force Development, 2010), 15.

[322] Ian Hope, *Dancing with the Dushman: Command Imperatives for the Counter-Insurgency Fight in Afghanistan* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2008), 18 – 19.

[323] Albert C. Stahl, "Live Fire Training: Lifeblood for the Light Infantryman" (Masters of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2001), ii.

[324] Jon H. Moilanen, "Leader Competency and Army Readiness," *Military Review* (July – August 2002): 58.

operations of the future, rather it will require having smaller groups of forces (i.e. sub-units) trained and validated by live-fire and ready to execute operations.

Army of Tomorrow Structure

The future calls for a shift in mentality and for the adoption of an updated readiness mechanism. History illustrates that from the First World War until present "the troop density or force to space ratio on the battlefield has continued to fall."[325] The requirement for dispersion as discussed in the previous chapter indicates that there may not be value in attempting to achieve a steady state of readiness at the brigade level or higher. The other factor that must be considered is that armies have always expanded in times of crises (such as the Afghan War) and contracted as perceived threats are reduced – along with their corresponding defence budgets (as is being predicted with the coming drawdown in Afghanistan).[326] The key for the CA is to define the level of training that must be maintained as a baseline for future functionality. Given increases in technology and the dispersion of the enemy, future trends are calling on more mobile, lethal and agile forces to dominate increasingly larger areas[327]; a modular force able to aggregating as the tactical situation dictates.[328] By being modular, the CF will possess the flexibility and adaptability necessary to "function effectively in a decentralized manner in an unpredictable,

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[325] Department of Defence, *Army's Future Land Operating Concept* (Canberra, AU: Directorate of Army Research and Analysis, 2009), 17.

[326] Ministry of Defence, *Joint Concept Note 2/12 – Future Land Operating Concept* (Shrivenham, UK: Director Joint Forces (Concepts and Doctrine), 2012), 2-9.

[327] Department of National Defence, *Future Force – Concepts for Future Force Army Capabilities* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2003), iv.

[328] Department of National Defence, *Purpose Defined – The Force Employment Concept for the Army* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Doctrine, 2004), 11 – 12.

constantly changing environment."[329] This is a function of the operating environment where speed and flexibility are key, as indicated by Lieutenant-Colonel Hope when he called for "each sub-unit to continue to execute our concept of offensive manoeuvre operations designed to reduce the enemy capacity, maintain the initiative, and continuously create conditions that I could exploit positively in information operations."[330]

As discussed earlier, it is the infantry sub-unit, which provides this balance of functionality on the battlefield since it possesses significant firepower, mobility and a basic level of sustainability. Recent operations provide ample evidence where infantry-centric BGs deployed overseas conducted solely sub-unit sized fights, and BG operations were nothing more than individual sub-unit actions that occurred in a BG area of operations.[331] This is not exclusive to Afghanistan, but something evidenced through the deployments of the last fifteen years to Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo and Haiti where training emphasis was placed on higher-level formations, while actual operations were conducted at the sub-unit level.[332] This is further reinforced by LGen Devlin as he sees the combat capability of the Army resting on the shoulders of "sub-units deliberately selected for their expertise."[333] With greater focus at the sub-unit level,

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[329] Department of National Defence, *Land Operations 2021 – Adaptive Dispersed Operations – The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, edited by Andrew B. Godefroy (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2007), 13.

[330] Ian Hope, *Dancing with the Dushman: Command Imperatives for the Counter-Insurgency Fight in Afghanistan* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2008), 149.

[331] Ibid., 52.

[332] Sean Hackett, *Modularity and the Canadian Army – Dispersion, Command and Building the Sum of all Parts*, Jadex Papers, edited by Andrew B. Godefroy, Vol. 2 (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, 2007), 34.

[333] Peter Devlin, "Army Futures," *Canadian Military Journal*, 11, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 48.

the BG "no longer provides a basic organizational model applicable for all or arguably even most missions."[334] One notable exception to this occurred in 2007 with the BG operation at Sperwan Ghar, Afghanistan. This is a noteworthy example where a BG fought as a formed organization and not disparate sub-units within the same area of operations.[335] While this example contradicts this argument, it is the only instance of this on deployed operations over the last ten years amongst dozens of sub-units engagements. This goes back to a previous statement that large force-on-force engagements cannot be discounted in the future, only that they will become increasingly rare and, as such, greater emphasis should be placed on focusing on the future operations of greatest likelihood of occurrence.[336] This leads to Betts's criteria of the *readiness of what*, which must be answered if a ready force is to be generated.

The Sub-Unit and Readiness

In a fiscally constrained environment, it is imperative that training and readiness emphasis be placed on those elements that will bring success on the battlefield if the CA wants to remain credible and effective. Since the Army does not have a defined mission for LOO Three and Four and the BG does not provide the capability it once did, it is time that training resources be diverted to preparing all infantry sub-units towards future conflict. By focusing on the sub-unit, a number of points of friction from the future battle space will be mitigated. Sub-units are

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[334] D. R. Bobbitt, "The Optimized Battle Group: A Contradiction in Terms?" *The Canadian Army Journal,* 13, no. 2 (2010): 203.

[335] Bernd Horn, *No Lack of Courage: Operation Medusa, Afghanistan* (Toronto, ON: Dundurn Press, 2010), 53 – 54.

[336] Department of National Defence, *Land Operations 2021 – Adaptive Dispersed Operations – The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, edited by Andrew B. Godefroy (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2007), 2.

designed to operate independently and aggregate when needed as part of their normal operating procedures.[337] By design, they are homogenous, modular and unbreakable, possessing the key ability to be employed as part of a larger group or on their own, maintaining an ability to support itself for short periods of time to continue the fight.[338] It is only in exceptional circumstances that the sub-unit should be broken up, and it should never be done as a long-term requirement.[339] The sub-unit possesses the ability to provide its own command and control, sustainment and ability to rapidly disperse, which are the key items that differentiate it from the BG and also its sub-sub-units (the platoons that make it up).[340] If the trend of being connected to the network of higher formations and the execution of mission command through decentralized decision making continues, the sub-unit is the key organization which can achieve the above features for prolonged periods necessary for extended operations.[341] Since the key to readiness is through effective training, then the FSE demands that readiness training focus on the sub-units of the future.[342] Concrete examples of how this can been seen with the US Army. Despite being

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[337] Department of National Defence, *Land Operations 2021 – Adaptive Dispersed Operations – The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, edited by Andrew B. Godefroy (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2007), 21.

[338] Department of National Defence, *Future Army Capabilities* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2001), 43.

[339] L. B. Sherrard, "From the Directorate of Army Doctrine – The Future Battle Group in Operations," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* 6, no. 3 (Fall/Winter 2003): 12.

[340] J. C. A. E. Dion, "The E-Forces! The Evolution of Battle-Groupings in the Face of 21st Century Challenges," *The Canadian Army Journal*, 7, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 89.

[341] Sean Hackett, *Modularity and the Canadian Army – Dispersion, Command and Building the Sum of all Parts*, Jadex Papers, edited by Andrew B. Godefroy, Vol. 2 (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, 2007), 18.

[342] Department of National Defence, *Toward Land Operations 2021 – Studies in Support of the Army of Tomorrow Force Employment Concept*, edited by Andrew B. Godefroy and Peter Gizewski (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2009), 1-29.

significantly larger in size than the CA, the US Army credits their successes in current operations due to the training efforts focused at the sub-unit level, whose proficiencies have resulted in the achievements evidenced throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.[343] The Australian Army operates under the same principles, currently employing a generic structure built around the infantry to the sub-unit level, which is then used as the building block for deployed TFs and operations.[344] Using these operations to dictate the structure and posture for future readiness has clearly lead to the infantry sub-unit being the element of primacy for training focus. As stated by LGen (retired) Crabbe, current wars are "the wars of company and platoon commanders,"[345] so the training and resources necessary to enable the readiness directed by the government for current and future operations should focus primarily on them.

Enduring Readiness

Given the significant increase in operational experience obtained by the Army with the decade of deployments to Afghanistan, a large part of the Army now possesses a level of combat capability not seen since the end of the Korean War. It is clear that "as the Army transitions from an Army at war to an Army in preparation, the Army cannot afford to lose the tactical superiority gained over the last decade."[346] This type of experience must be reinvested into training to not

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[343] Sean Hackett, *Modularity and the Canadian Army – Dispersion, Command and Building the Sum of all Parts*, Jadex Papers, edited by Andrew B. Godefroy, Vol. 2 (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, 2007), 11.

[344] Department of Defence, *The Army Objective Force 2030 Primer* (Canberra, AU: Defence Publishing Service, 2001), 40.

[345] R. R. Crabbe, L. G. Mason, and F. R. Sutherland, *A Report on the Validation of the Transformed Canadian Forces Command Structure* (Ottawa, ON: n.p., 2007), 18.

[346] Department of the Army, *The Army Training Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the United States Army, 2012), 6.

only educate new members, but also to challenge and maintain those high readiness skills.[347] If not maintained, these skills will atrophy and is something that cannot be left to impact the proficiencies of the infantry sub-units no matter the cost, given their importance in the Army of tomorrow. A former officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Dan Drew, commented on how the currency of a unit's training directly influenced the readiness of that unit as evidenced when Canada allowed its military to wither and become garrison focused post World War One (WWI), while the German Army trained in perfecting war-fighting skills.[348] This disparity in training between the two countries led to unnecessary Canadian deaths during WWI and left others stating "the Canadian soldier should not have to pay with his life in wartime to learn a trade that irresponsible leadership neglected to teach him in peacetime."[349] Soldiers must train as they will fight and no substitute will adequately prepare them for the rigours of combat except training which mirrors what they will see in real life.[350] As Furst comments, a concerted effort must be made to preserve readiness training since "troops do not achieve readiness by performing day-to-day job skills and attending annual refresher training."[351] In order to achieve a high standard of readiness, sub-units have to conduct live field training, culminating in sub-unit live-fire. The need to protect funds and resources for this was clearly stated by LGen Leslie in the 2011 Transformation Report. Despite attempting to achieve efficiencies and reduce expenditures, he

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[347] Ibid.

[348] D. R. Drew, "Combat Readiness and Canada's Army," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin,* 2, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 46.

[349] Ibid.

[350] Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Training, 2009), 1-6 – 1-7.

[351] Douglas A. Furst, "Readiness – A Commander's Responsibility," *Air Force Journal of Logistics,* 26, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 16.

saw the protection of funds for readiness training as paramount, identifying it as the Army's vital ground.[352] The commitment of funds to readiness training directly translates into integrity, credibility and trust with our allies.[353] This is imperative for future operations since maintaining the sub-units at their highest level of readiness will allow an immediate response to any situation that emerges either domestically or internationally and failing to do so would mean the Army would be unprepared to react.[354] As discussed earlier in this paper, this is not an easy balance to achieve but that does not mean that it is not insurmountable. It will take a culture and mindset shift since the current trend is to accept risk by possessing just enough readiness to sustain the basic tasks outlined in the CFDS, instead of allocating funds for the entire force to maintain a baseline degree of readiness.[355] When this mentality is inculcated, war-fighting skills across the Army will atrophy and result in readiness degrading. Since the infantry is in a state of recovering from operations and preparing for the next war, now is the time to benefit from a decade of readiness training and combat experience and maintain that standard for success on the next battlefield.[356]

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[352] Andrew Leslie, *Report on Transformation 2011* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2011), ix.

[353] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 37.

[354] Department of Defence, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030* (Canberra, AU: Australian Government, 2009), 87.

[355] J. C. A. E. Dion, "*e-Generation: Generating Canada's 21st Century 1e-Force* (Master's Thesis Management and Defence Policy, Royal Military College, 2007), 14.

[356] Herbert H. Bateman, *Military Readiness – Full Training Benefits from Army's Combat Training Centers Are Not being Realized* (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, 1999), 13 – 14.

A MRP for the Future?

While focusing and dedicating resources at all infantry sub-units would increase readiness across the force it would also mean changing the MRP. At this time, when one unit is in high readiness, it is up to the remainder of the Army to provide the manpower to assist in training, fill the tasks that support training and facilitate the exercises to get that force to a high state of readiness. When these units are supporting the high readiness units (the other two sides of the MRP triad discussed in the second chapter), the supporting units do not have the time and resources to train themselves to the sub-unit level.[357] While this was an effective means to enable the readiness for the Afghan war, this is not a viable model to sustain a high degree of readiness across the force; it was a "just enough" solution for a war where delivering one infantry heavy [BG] every six months significantly challenged the CF.[358] The institutional shortcomings that affected force generation and sustainment led to disparate training opportunities and caused experiential gaps amongst personnel, resulted in fewer trainers available to force-generate, which only exacerbated the problem.[359] This issue illustrates the flaws in adhering to a time-based readiness cycle. Rather, a baseline readiness standard across the infantry should be followed so that readiness for the next conflict can be achieved.[360] The Army can look to the US Marine Corps who have come to that conclusion since a time-based readiness system did not afford them

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[357] Rob D. McIlroy, "Army Restructure: The Key to Making Managed Readiness Truly Work," *The Canadian Army Journal*, 9, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 148.

[358] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 36.

[359] Ibid., 39

[360] David Pentney, "Managed Readiness – Flawed Assumptions, Poor Deductions and Unintended Consequences," *The Canadian Army Journal*, 10, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 30.

the readiness levels needed for continued readiness.[361] This does not mean the MRP should have the Army staff centralize sub-unit training. Instead it means allocating sufficient resources and support to allow the units the ability to have their forces at a baseline readiness standard of sub-unit live-fire on an annual basis. The benefit here is a better ability to maintain the skills acquired over the last ten years and greater proficiency at the foundation that will be called on in the next conflict and answer Betts's question of being *ready for when*.

Summary

With the drawdown in Afghanistan and no future international mission confirmed, the CA is in an interesting position. On one end, maintaining and building on the capabilities that a decade of war has taught should be simple, however, there is the temptation to relax, recover from the high operational tempo and weather the fiscal storm. By doing the latter, the Army will lose focus of what recent experience has taught us. By reviewing Betts's readiness criteria, the Army can achieve the answers to being ready for when, of what and for what. Since we know the next conflict will be increasingly complex, the Army must review and adopt its structure to that complexity by focusing on the infantry sub-unit just as was done for Afghanistan. Given the increase in experience across the force, the Army needs to learn from past experiences by not loosing its readiness only to regain it at the cost of soldier lives, just at the US Army cautions against and was shown by the Canadian example from WWI.[362] By shedding the time based MRP and allocating sufficient resources to enable sub-unit live-fire across the infantry an annual

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[361] Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Shelby Cullom Davis, *The Marine Corps – America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: The Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis Inc., 2011), 101.

[362] Department of the Army, *2012 Army Posture: The Nation's Force of Decisive Action* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2012), 16.

requirement, the skills and experience needed to maintain a high degree of skills and responsiveness will not atrophy. It may be tempting to save money in an era of government cutbacks; however, the cost to the infantry's readiness, capability and credibility would be damaging since the popular support for the Army hinges on the level of trust and confidence the populace and allies have in it.[363]

[363] Michael A. Rostek, Peter Gizewski, Regan Reshke, R. Bell, John Sheahan, and Steve Larouche, *Toward Army 2040: Exploring Key Dimensions of the Global Environment*, The Claxton Papers (Kingston, ON: Defence Management Studies Program, Queen's University, 2011), 38 – 39.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As the commander of the army, I deliver readiness to the CF and to Canada across the spectrum of conflict, rom peacekeeping to combat, with the soldiers and the equipment to be able to do that. The future security environment is filled with uncertainty, complexity and volatility. As a result, the army is looking to be agile, versatile and scalable to be able to deal with that uncertainty.

– Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin, Reloaded: Positioning the Army for 2021[364]

Conclusion

As the basic building block for the CA, the infantry is in a unique position. On one side it can be seen as being the main effort, or that element that is needed in order for the organization to be successful, and so it should have much say and influence. However, this great influence also means great responsibility. With the end of Canada's commitment to the war in Afghanistan and the desire by the government to reduce the deficit, there are significant reductions that will be imposed on the infantry that will cause it difficulty in achieving its assigned tasks.[365] As the CCA comments in the epigraph to this section, the challenge will be "[balancing] training and equipment requirements to maintain units and formations currently at high readiness but not deploying, against the needs of units on the road to high readiness, as well as the remainder of the institutional Army."[366] As discussed in the first chapter, readiness can be best viewed through Betts's three criteria's of the *readiness of what, for what* and *for when*. Despite the myriad factors that influence readiness of a unit, these criteria serve as the best metrics to define

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[364] Peter Devlin, "Reloaded: Positioning the Army for 2021," Vanguard (February/March 2013): 12.

[365] Department of National Defence, *Army Operating Plan FY 13/14 V2* (Ottawa, ON: DLS 2-2, 2013), 1-3/13.

[366] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 43.

readiness of a military force. As such, the second chapter discussed how these criteria are applied to the CF, translating the government's strategic framework in the CFDS and the assigned missions to the CF into a graduated readiness plan for the Army, which is sustainable and manageable for both domestic and international tasks. Chapter three then took the MRP and applied the meaning of readiness to the Army's training system, highlighting what it means to be trained to a "ready" level and touching on the importance of sub-unit live-fire as the cornerstone of the readiness system. Following that, this paper briefly discussed the FSE including current and emerging trends, indicating the FSE will be plagued by both conventional and asymmetric actors who introduce a level of uncertainty not experienced in previous conflicts.[367] This enemy will be adaptable and will seek to exploit the Army's weakness through speed and manipulation, and the Army must be ready and able to respond. The final chapter then analyzed emerging trends in the FSE in order to question the validity of a time-based readiness plan for the infantry. It also confirmed the structure for future deployed TFs based on the infantry sub-unit, and the need to for flexibility and adaptability in the CA and infantry, highlighting the need for sub-unit live-fire training as the essential element for any ready force in the CA.

As this paper has shown, now is the time for the CA to admit that the MRP that allowed the Army to deploy operational ready forces to Afghanistan was suitable for that war, but it is no longer a viable plan to maintain the readiness required for the future. While the requirement to continue to use live-fire validation as the baseline standard for readiness remains, it is the level that the Army trains to that must be revisited. The FSE is a complex, confusing and chaotic

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[367] Department of National Defence, *Toward Land Operations 2021 – Studies in Support of the Army of Tomorrow Force Employment Concept*, edited by Andrew B. Godefroy and Peter Gizewski (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2009), 1-28.

environment that demands the Army and CF possess the ability to thrive in uncertainty. Since the last ten years in Afghanistan have proven the infantry sub-unit as the basic building block of the TFs of the future, it must be the infantry sub-unit that serves as the baseline organization that is trained to be operationally ready. In order to remain a credible, adaptable and realistic deterrent, the Army must use sub-unit live-fire training as the baseline readiness standard across the Army. The Army must rid itself of the mentality that only those in high readiness will be authorized to train to such a standard and enforce this across the force, in order to build the skill of the force across the spectrum of conflict for the future.

Recommendations for Further Research

While this paper has identified the points of friction and concern for the future, more research is required in identifying the second and third order effects that the financial reductions will have. Specifically, more work should be done to identify the financial requirements to achieve the readiness levels in this paper in hopes to clearly indicate the cost associated with having all infantry sub-units achieve live-fire annually, and compare this with current allocations. Once the difference between what is needed and what is allocated is determined, efforts can be directed towards achieving that level of funding.

The second area where more research should be directed is with respect to the OPTEMPO of the Afghanistan campaign and the impact this had on readiness. It was outside the scope of this paper but there is a direct correlation between the OPTEMPO experienced by the infantry and readiness levels. Work in this area would be invaluable, especially if Canada intends

to commit forces to an extended campaign as defined by the fifth mission for the CF stated in the CFDS.[368]

The final area where more research should be done is considering the viability of tiered readiness levels broken down by military trades. This would be a difficult process but valuable in an environment plagued by financial constraints. Such a process would allow the resources and ammunition to be assigned by position across the Army, not just by the MRP. While this would be labourious and a considerable amount of work, it may be the only way to preserve the necessary readiness levels within current funding limitations. It would also serve as a viable means to justify why more funding and resources are needed to achieve the CF's and government's missions.

With the promulgation of the latest version of the MRP in March 2013, it is clear the time-based readiness cycle will not disappear. As such, the infantry will have no choice but to achieve the tasks within assigned resources. With respect to the infantry, in order to maintain readiness, "funding must be sufficient to support training and equipment requirements to maintain non-deploying units at high readiness without skill fade, while also catering to the needs of unit that are now on the road to high readiness."[369] Since training is the foundation of the infantry's readiness, any cuts to training will directly impact the infantry and Army's readiness. This is why in a recent article, LGen Leslie's comments caused alarms when he stated that the current round of government cutbacks were "going to result in lower levels of readiness,

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[368] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2008), 10.

[369] Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Land Force Readiness and Training* (Ottawa, ON: Chief of Review Services, 2011), 43.

[and] going to mean our troops are not as well trained."[370] The onus will be on the leadership to develop creative solutions to preserve the readiness levels to achieve the government's objectives.[371] As quoted by a past infantry battalion commanding officer, "nothing will further mitigate the risks and uncertainties of land warfare than the direct investment of resources in considering and planning ahead for those challenges."[372] Doing so will serve to enable a ready force, achieving Betts's readiness questions of *ready for when*, *for what* and *of what*. Therefore, the infantry and Army will be in a position to dedicate the resources needed to achieve the baseline level of competency by achieving proficiency in realistic live-fire training to the sub-unit level. This training must continue to serve as the baseline standard to build the competency and confidence needed to be ready for future operations.[373] If the goal is to maintain the Army as a "strategically relevant, tactically decisive, knowledge-based, medium weight force,"[374] there is a certain financial bill that must be realized by the government if it hopes the Army to be achieve the realistic element of national power.

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[370] "Ex-top Army Commander Sounds the Alarm on Defence Spending," CBC News, January 19, 2013, 8:31 am, Last Updated January 19, 2013 2:42 pm. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2013/01/19/pol-the-house-retired-lieutenant-general-andrew-leslie.html.

[371] Peter Power, "Cutting Where it Hurts Most," *Maclean's, March 25, 2013,* 15.

[372] Alex Ruff, "Forging Land Forces for the Army of Tomorrow – The Battle Group 2021 Study," *The Canadian Army Journal,* 11, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 11.

[373] Department of the Army, *TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, The United States Army Capstone Concept 2016 – 2028* (Newport News, VA: United States Training and Doctrine Command, 2010), 35.

[374] Department of National Defence, *The Army of Tomorrow – Assessing Concepts and Capabilities for Land Operations Evolution* (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2006), 11.

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