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CANADIAN ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL POLICIES: WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH, DOES ONE SIZE TRULY FIT ALL?

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By Lieutenant-Colonel P.J. Fraser

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ABSTRACT

The Profession of Arms (PoA) is a unique profession that the government of Canada calls upon to ensure national sovereignty. The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are charged with the development and sustainment of the PoA and therefore its personnel policies. This paper contends that the personnel policies and their associated compensation and benefits developed for the CAF must be unique and customized to fit those who are in the PoA. They must support the retention of its members, failure to do so will have far reaching effects on the nation's ability to retain a capable and relevant force, ultimately affecting Canadian sovereignty.

Through the exploration of the uniqueness of the CAF and its requirement to have the right person in the right place at the right time, this paper takes a closer look at the relocation policies. Relocation policies impact the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the CAF and its ability to successfully complete a mission. It becomes clear that the requirement to develop and maintain personnel policies designed for the exigencies of military service must remain unique. Those who develop the personnel policies and the associated compensation and benefits for the CAF must not succumb to the pressures imposed by a whole of government approach that typically sees one size to fit all. To enforce a one-size-fits-all model in the interest of cutting costs and reducing defence spending leaves the Canadian government at risk of being unable to maintain a capable and relevant sharp edged tool for the purpose of national defence.

INTRODUCTION

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is the lethal tool, with sharp edges on all fronts, of the Department of National Defence (DND). Although, part of the DND, the CAF is not the same as its civilian counterparts and even less akin to those outside of the department. It is no secret that “. . . the business of defence administration – the building and sustaining of combatant capabilities – separates the Department of National Defence and elements of the Canadian Forces from the business of other departments and central agencies.”¹ Yet there continues to be a push, even a shove toward the integration of its personnel policies and administration with other departments. The whole of government approach (WoG), while successful in some theatres, when applied to personnel policies and administration for the purposes of cost savings, may actually be a threat to the Profession of Arms (PoA) and ultimately to the future capability of the CAF.

Typically extensive pressures, both external and internal have been exerted upon DND and the CAF. With each pressure applied, reactions resulted in the preoccupation of the CAF organization. Consumed with continual internal overhauling and reallocation of resources in an effort to remain relevant, mission focus was often compromised. As the CAF works through another Transformation and Defence Renewal initiative in an effort to find more effective and efficient methods to operate, the decisions affecting the personnel who study, train, support and exercise the art of warfare from within the profession, must be taken carefully. The wrong decisions could leave Canada wanting for a relevant combat capable defence force in the future.

¹Douglas L. Bland, *Transforming National Defence Administration*, School of Policy Studies, Queens University, (Kingston Ontario), 2005, 8.

There are many personnel administrative policies that impact the capabilities of the CAF organization and its ability to retain its personnel resources. The policies that govern the movement of troops within the CAF have evolved over time and are now placed under one relocation program. With relocations historically averaging 15,000 members yearly², there are no other policies that are as significant and far reaching within the CAF as those contained in the Canadian Armed Forces Integrated Relocation Program (CAF IRP). The essential requirements that underpin all military capabilities are to have the right person, in the right place, at the right time. Policies developed for the purpose of achieving these essential requirements must facilitate the movement of troops. Therefore, in developing and applying the processes and policies for relocation the following questions must be asked; do personnel administrative policies for the CAF need to be unique and distinct from all other government departments or should a WoG approach be adopted in their development and administration? Truly, does one size fit all?

A review of some of the more salient pressures imposed upon the CAF from both external and internal sources since the 1960's has been undertaken in this paper in an effort to gain an appreciation of their impact. It is important to understand what pressures have served to shape the environment in which an individual in the PoA must operate. Pressures such as defence spending cuts, high level political agenda's, public perception, media, imposed audits and reviews have ultimately given way to alternative methods of service delivery and private sector management methodologies, replacing traditional military methods. Although, the resulting shock waves have been felt throughout every discipline within the CAF, there is not sufficient time within the confines of this paper to

²Director Relocations Business Management, Canadian Forces Integrated Relocation Program, *Presentation for Industry Day*, TA IRP, Ottawa Ontario, 2013.

explore them. Therefore, this paper will focus on identifying what is the PoA, some of the pressures applied to the organization of which it belongs, and how those pressures affect the management and personnel policy development. Specific examples of their unavoidable impacts on the CAF relocation program will be used to enable the reader to answer the questions posed.

CHAPTER 1 – THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

The Military Organization

Before exploring the Defence Department, specifically the CAF organization, its policies and management, the reader must have a clear understanding of the personnel in uniform who together form the organization. Those in uniform within the CAF are in a profession. A profession is more than simply a job, it has criteria, codes and obligations that must be met before being designated as such. Similar to a teacher or a doctor, the uniformed military member has chosen to take on a career that is dedicated to the service of others for the greater good of their society. In signing a Hippocratic Oath or an Oath of Allegiance, an individual makes a decision to conduct their lives according to a specific code that is distinct from others in society. The professional code of conduct for teachers, doctors, lawyers or military members are in themselves unique from society and from each other. Where they are similar is in that they are Canadian professionals, each belonging to its own profession, containing at their core the Canadian values. A reflection of and in harmony with societies' values are the Canadian military values of duty, loyalty, integrity and courage. As identified in "Duty with Honour"³ these four values are essential to the foundation of the military ethos. The military ethos is said to be the one professional attribute that "...embodies the spirit that binds the profession together."⁴ The military ethos is extremely important to the PoA as it guides the conduct and performance of its members during military operations. The ethical framework for the military

³Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001 *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Kingston, Ontario, 2009).

⁴Ibid., 21.

profession is embedded in the military ethos and enables moral reasoning to be applied to any given situation. As a military professional the ability to apply moral reasoning is essential. Without an ethical framework the PoA would not be as effective in embracing the accepted norms of behaviour and the Canadian values while carrying out its mission. Regardless of the environment in which the battlefield lies the military professional must uphold their oath and maintain their military values.

The Profession

There has been much debate as to what constitutes a profession such as the PoA. Allan English's paper, *Professional and the Military – Past, Present, and Future: A Canadian Perspective*⁵ introduces several scholars such as Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and James Burk who provided criteria necessary for a profession to be recognized. Although the scholars introduced by Allan English may differ in their societies and eras of study, they all agreed that the military is in fact a profession and “. . . in the service of society . . . therefore holds certain moral principles in dealing with laypersons.”⁶ When dealing with the layperson or society the professional must have credibility. To maintain credibility the PoA requires its members to be highly trained in the military ethos and values. Of the four military values, it is integrity that calls for accountability of actions, honesty and “. . . adherence to high ethical standards.”⁷ It is the high ethical standards that separate the military professionals from others.

⁵Allan English, *Professionalism and the Military – Past, Present and future: A Canadian Perspective* (Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2002).

⁶Ibid., 13.

⁷National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001 *Duty With Honour*. . ., 33.

The power and expertise that are part of the military organization must always be used for the interests of a society and not for the good of an individual. The power that the military organization can yield is immense and if creditability is lost there is a true and real threat that the profession itself will be lost. Allan English notes that in Asia “. . . warlords arise when the central regime loses credibility, and power devolves to regional forces.”⁸ The need to have values such as integrity with high ethical standards is critical in the profession of arms. Unlike the doctor who must act to save a life at all times, the military professional must be ready to act on both sides of humanity at any time, and in doing so the actions must be creditable, and accountable. There are situations that will call for the PoA to save a society, and there are times when the PoA will be called to destroy a portion of a society.

Unlimited Liability

The responsibility to act in a manner that upholds the military values must always be at the forefront and must rest with the professionals themselves. Moreover, the military professional unlike the doctor must accept unlimited liability⁹ for their own lives and for those they command. This level of responsibility alone indicates that their ethical responsibilities are unique from other professions. To be in the PoA there must be the ability to evaluate a situation, apply moral reasoning and determine the most ethical approach, particularly when it calls for the loss of life. As discussed in Julia Driver's book, *Ethics: The Fundamentals*¹⁰, the taking of life has long been considered wrong regardless of what moral framework for reasoning is adopted. However, in the PoA the

⁸English, *Professionalism and the Military* . . . , 33.

⁹National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001 *Duty With Honour*. . . , 27.

¹⁰Julia Driver, *Ethics: The Fundamentals*, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).

need to take life is a reality and therefore the need to have special ethical responsibilities is valid. It has been noted in Allan English's paper that the introduction of business ethos "...has had a negative impact on the profession of arms in Canada."¹¹ The PoA must not allow ethical standards of business, law, or those applied in the Hypocritical Oath to confuse the mission at hand in the act of war. Without its own special ethical responsibilities that allow for moral reasoning in all situations, there is a threat that the power inherent with the PoA of arms could be misused or even dissolved.

Uniqueness

The Canadian military is a PoA with its own identity, expertise and responsibility. The military ethos unifies the professional attributes and is considered the critical component. The ethical dilemmas encountered in the PoA are not the same as those encountered by the teacher, the doctor or the lawyer. They are unique and therefore give cause to the requirement for the professionals who serve in the PoA to take on special ethical responsibilities in the face of making war.

The CAF is not unlike many institutions and organizations that are dependent upon professionals to affect their capability. Understanding the culture and the environment in which the professionals must work is essential to understanding the policies that are designed for any particular profession. The following discussion will aim to impart upon the reader, why the PoA needs to be managed and administered different from any other profession and most importantly from any other government department.

Hospitals with Doctors, the Canadian Justice System with Judges and Lawyers and the DND with the CAF, are three examples of such organizations that must invest in

¹¹English, *Professionalism and the Military* . . ., 34.

their professionals to keep their specialized human resources operationally capable and effective. To confirm loyalty, commitment and respect for the profession one aspires to, enrolees are often required to take oaths and allegiances prior to being afforded the opportunity to practice the profession. Doctors must swear to the Hippocratic Oath, Lawyers must swear an oath before admission to the Bar, and members of the Canadian Armed Forces must swear allegiances to the Queen before acceptance into the PoA. Each CAF candidate must swear their allegiance on the Canadian Forces Enrolment Form, whereby they must swear that they will be “. . . faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty. . .”¹² The oath or solemn affirmation means that the individual will forego what many civilians take for granted; their right to place their own interests before the interests of their nation. Signing on the “dotted line,” as it is referred to by many who join, instantly separates the CAF candidate from other professionals. A profession with higher responsibilities, which demands each individual operates as one large team in an effort to execute the nation’s will, is unique and distinct from all others.

The military community is unique....the uniqueness and complexity of military tasks that must be understood and rapidly carried out in the event of war; and the importance of leadership, commitment, discipline and cohesion in encouraging people to put national interests before personal interests.¹³

Trained Effective Strength

¹²Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Enrolment Form*, CF 444 (10-20009), 7530-21-909-1867.

¹³Government of Canada, the Office of the Auditor General, accessed 26 June 2014, http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/au_fs_e_371.html, article 20.8.

Once enrolled in the PoA, the candidates become highly trained, combat ready professionals who have the desire and the will to become the right person, to be at the right place, and at the right time. Recruiting, training and retaining such members in a competitive environment are ongoing challenges for the CAF organization. The organization must compete with both the private and public sectors to encourage highly educated and motivated personnel to join and take up the PoA as a lifestyle and career. With an establishment of full-time regular force serving personnel set to be maintained at 68,000 the organization must work hard to attract new enrollees to be trained and operationally capable to replace continuous attrition. Although the approved establishment is set, the actual number of regular force personnel in June 2014 was reported to be at 66,577.¹⁴ Of the reported 66,577 individual members of the PoA, only 57,354¹⁵ are considered to be trained and therefore effective strength, or in other words professionals in the PoA. The investment in training and the time that it takes to develop a military individual to the point of being combat capable can be extensive. If there are no unforeseen delays it can take three years or more for a recruit to become qualified in their chosen field or expertise.

With a planned strength of 68,000, comparatively speaking the CAF is significantly smaller than many of the nation's military allies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners and the "Five Eyes" alliance consist of some military strengths that far outweigh that of the Canadian military. The Five Eyes are allies that have agreed to share intelligence for the purpose of defence. They include the United

¹⁴Department of National Defence, *June 2014-Production, Attrition, Recruiting, Retention, Analysis (PARRA) Report Summary*, 5555-1 (DPGR 5), July 2014.

¹⁵Ibid.

States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, New Zealand and Canada.¹⁶ The US alone has a force in excess of 1,000,000 while the UK is over 200,000.¹⁷ To be relevant and taken seriously in the world of defence the CAF must work to keep its effective strength at its preferred manning levels and as close to the approved established numbers as possible.

The small size of the CAF is not an indication of its capabilities, as a small force can deliver a strategic blow with lasting impacts. However, the delivery of a blow is dependant on the professional who must take the action. Be it a political manoeuvre, the use of new capabilities or conventional warfare, the impact “. . . will depend greatly on the quality, characteristics, and numbers of men and women who serve their countries in uniform.”¹⁸ Those who are members of this profession must be dedicated professionals who are highly trained, motivated and equipped for any mission provided them. “Members of the profession of arms must believe that what they do is more important than what other professions do, that they are crucial to the survival of the nation.”¹⁹

Compensation and Benefits

Creating an environment that enables the development and continuous evolution of the professionals that an organization depends upon is essential to that organization's survival. Industry, similar to other government departments (OGDs) is not restricted to

¹⁶Privacy International, *Eyes Wide Open; Understanding the Five Eyes*, accessed 12 June 2014, <https://www.privacyinternational.org/reports/eyes-wide-open/understanding-the-five-eyes>.

¹⁷Active Military Manpower by Country, accessed 15 June 2014, <http://www.globalfirepower.com/active-military-manpower.asp>.

¹⁸Curtis L. Gilroy and Cindy Williams, *Service to Country; Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*, BCSIA Studies in International Security, (London England, 2006), 2.

¹⁹Richard A. Gabriel, *The Warrior's Way: A Treatise on Military Ethics* (Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007), 73.

developing their professionals from within. The CAF however, has no alternative but to internally develop the disciplined professional who must achieve the understanding of the art of warfare and the application of its strategies while becoming experts at specific tactics. Further, these professionals must repeatedly fine tune their specific skills necessary to execute, in unison, the strikes of war once called upon to do so. To train and employ such a professional force, applicable personnel policies must be developed and administered. Therefore, it is easy to understand why both force generation and force employment consume the majority of the administrative and operational focus of the CAF.

Force generation of the PoA, involves the full support of the nation for which they serve. Throughout history it has been recognized that those who sign up for unlimited liability, must be fed, housed and compensated by their nation. Without such support there is a risk that the organization would become non-capable or worse disloyal. Policies that are aimed at the reasons for wanting to be part of an organization and a profession are essential to ensure that neither occurs. There are many reasons one joins the PoA, some of the more tangible reasons include pay, benefits, travel, training and rewards. Others, the less tangible include patriotism, family traditions and pride. Whatever the reasons that one holds for joining such an organization, it is the responsibility of the organization to cultivate and expand on policies, that are under their control, in an effort to retain the valuable resource. Continuous reviews, up-dates, and enhancements to personnel policies are the key satisfiers and enablers to recruiting and retention and “[a]s such, personnel

policies are crucial to achieving the transformations underway in the militaries of Europe and North America.”²⁰

The compensation package and personnel policies developed and administered to those within the PoA must be attractive enough to encourage a citizen to join the organization and accept unlimited liability. The policies must be flexible enough to enable specific training and mobility. They must facilitate the ability to perform a rapid response to the needs and goals of the nation and they must reciprocate loyalty. Policies and compensation packages that are developed for the members of the PoA, due to its very nature, must be unique.

It was in the late 1970's that the Treasury Board (TB) introduced the total compensation analysis of pay and compensation benefits.²¹ The goal was to compare the pay benefits of the CAF with that of the Public Service. There was recognition that several aspects of a career in the military could not be equated to that of a career in the Public Service, even if specific tasks were similar, such as ones associated with a staff officer. Some of the aspects of the military career such as the Code of Service Discipline, the turbulence of postings, the separation caused by deployments and training, and frequent posting, to name a few, led to the creation of the Military Factor.²² It is common practice for militaries such as the British with their X-Factor to have similar

²⁰Gilroy and Williams, *Service to Country* . . . , 2.

²¹Department of National Defence, *CF Pay Determination*, MATELOT, Spring 2003, accessed 3 June 14, <http://mshq-qgemfm.mil.ca/repository/dmarp-dmarp2-2-2-dperm2-2-2/0303part2-eng.pdf>.

²²Department of National Defence, *The Military Factor*, accessed 3 Jun 14, http://cmp-cpm.forces.mil.ca/dgcb/dppd/engraph/dppd_faq_e.asp?sidesection=3&sidecat=31.

compensation packages for pay, separating the uniformed member from their civilian counterparts.

Originally, the Military Factor for the CAF was determined by TB to be valued at 4% of the member's salary. It was increased in 1999, due to recommendations by the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA). Then again in 2006, the Military Factor was increased to incorporate ... "Personal Limitations and Liabilities, which further recognize the implications inherent in the military system of unlimited liability."²³ The Military Factor as of 2006 was set at 7.5% of both the non-commissioned member's and the general service officer's salaries.²⁴ As important as it is, salary is only one of the aspects of the compensation package provided many military forces.

The development and the delivery of compensations and benefits to the military population must be carefully considered as to ensure longevity and usefulness of the organization. However, great caution must also be given to the administration of such benefits as to ensure their integrity and the safeguarding of the Crown's funds.

Throughout history, since the beginning of a national military force, military management has been recognized as a necessity. It is believed that during the expansion of the Egyptian Empire "... the first organized national army came into existence [at] about 1600 B.C."²⁵ The philosophy of the management of militaries over time has developed to be separate and distinct from the civilian organizations. In 1950 John Beishline, a United

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵John Robert Beishline, *Military Management for National Defense*, (New York Prentice-Hall, INC. 1950), 11.

States Army Colonel wrote about the management of a military force, recognizing that it must respect the mission and the economy that supports it. At that time “. . . a military philosophy of management include[d] a delineation of military objectives, military management principles, and certain problems that are peculiar to human association.”²⁶

The human problems he refers to are the same issues referred to in modern day personnel administration such as leadership, procedures, morale, the structure of the organization and policies. The philosophy of management in a military organization consistently recognizes three main factors. The first factor is that the mission is essential, the second is that the economy to support it is respected, and finally that human resources must be administered to appropriately.²⁷

WoG Approach

As discussed, the CAF is a unique organization that consists of professionals who must operate as one large team while individually accepting unlimited liability. Having this knowledge, it would seem reasonable to expect that the administration and administrative policies of such an organization would remain unique. However, in the modern accountable environment in which a government must operate, it is essential to focus on financial responsibilities and accountabilities for the spending of public funds. Simultaneously, there is a need to seek methods for combining efforts and streamline processes to ensure cost savings. In doing so, within the Canadian government different departments have been viewed, in many respects, as one.

²⁶ Ibid., 5.

²⁷ Ibid.

The WoG approach is an ideal method for government departments to work together to resolve issues they share, particularly those departments that are involved in similar program deliverables. When it comes to spending, the TB has developed a framework for reporting on programs that support economic, social, international, and government affairs.²⁸ The WoG framework provides governance for departments to align their program efforts with the strategic outcomes expected by the government. For an example, the CAF must provide an output aligned with the Social Affairs. The defence spending allocated must, in part, provide for a safe and secure Canada as one of the expected outcomes. This activity is aligned with OGD such as the RCMP. Under the WoG framework the spending can be reported to parliament as an aligned program activity.

The need for such combined reporting within government is understandable and the resulting accountability to the public is essential. It provides methods to determine redundancies as well as possible avenues for reallocation of funds and efforts. Where the WoG approach becomes an issue for the CAF is when those in positions of influence, such as TB, determine that the administrative policies designed for the exigencies of military service are to be aligned with OGD who are not held to the same operational expectations. After all, the purpose of the WoG approach in the TB framework is to implement consistency and control and to deliver savings and efficiencies. Flexibility and military effectiveness as unique requirements are not part of the framework for reporting on programs. As we will see later in Chapter 2, the same approach of seeking efficient use

²⁸Government of Canada, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, *Whole-of-Government Framework*, accessed 18 Feb 2014, <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ppg-cpr/frame-cadre-eng.aspx>.

of spending was used in the Glassco review, negatively impacting the defence department. The one-size-fits-all mentality under cover of the WoG approach can be detrimental to the business of national defence and war. The WoG approach once applied to administrative methods and policies of DND often fails to recognize the uniqueness of the CAF and the requirements of those who are in the PoA.

Administration

Administration and logistics are the mechanisms used to ensure the feeding, caring, housing, and transportation of a military's human resources, their troops. Well established in today's doctrine as a principle of war,²⁹ both administration and logistics have been credited for some of the greatest victories as well as losses on the battlefield. During WW1, the administrative support for the troops was understood by the civilian population. In 1918, Major G.R. Collins detailed the administrative and logistical support necessary for operational capabilities of the Canadian Forces in his book titled *Military Organization and Administration*. Amongst pay, transportation and nourishment, one of the essentials to be assigned the troops was shelter or quarters.

In 1918, living quarters assigned were determined by the location, duration of the mission and those who would inhabit them. What is interesting is that the quarters provided in wartime situations were often billets or rooms in the civilian population. "A requisition for billets is served upon the Senior Civil Official on A.F. 789, which will show the number of Officers and other ranks and animals to be billeted. The Civil Officials will then issue orders to the inhabitants to provide accommodations according to

²⁹ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine*, National Defence, B-GA-400-000/FP-000, 26.

their capacity.”³⁰ There was no question, by those of the nation who required the services of the military, that care and feeding of the troops was a necessity as well as a responsibility.

Although, during wartime it was direct support provided to the troops for shelter and rations, the responsibility of a nation for its forces was understood and continued beyond the Great War. Records from 1919, detailing benefits allotted the service man and the family, for purposes of duty to Canada, are still held in the cabinets of today’s Director General of Compensation and Benefits. Compensation and benefits have long been part of the PoA, recognizing that without them a nation cannot sustain a healthy and capable military force. “The Minister further observes . . . in order to obviate any financial loss to the married members of these Units by reason of these forced transfers (*sic*), special allowances should be made.”³¹

It has been established that a uniformed member of the CAF is in fact a professional in the PoA. Additionally, it has been established that the requirement to have special allowances, compensation and benefits unique to the PoA has long been recognized to be a necessity. It is now prudent to discuss the external and internal pressures that have shaped the policies for the PoA and how they have a precarious existence.

³⁰Major G.R.N. Collins, *Military Organization and Administration*, (London, Hugh Rees Limited, 1918), 153.

³¹Canadian Governor General, *Orders in Council 1918-19, P.C. 2581, Certified copy of the Report of the Committee of the Privy Council*, approved by His Excellency the Governor General on 24th December, 1919, H.Q. 54-21-23-138, F.D. 291.

CHAPTER 2 – PRESSURES ON CAF

External and Internal Pressures

The following chapter will describe the external and internal pressures that have influenced the CAF organization. The pressures discussed are those that impact administrative policies, particularly the relocation policy, that ultimately affect the strategic, operational and tactical levels of CAF capabilities. The forced transferee in today's CAF requires administrative policies that are specific, unique and arguably unlike any policies required for any other profession in Canada.

As with any organization, if it is to survive, be relevant and remain effective, change must occur. The military organization holds no exception to the need for evolution through change. Be it Unification, Integration, Re-organization, Re-engineering, CF Transformation or Defence Renewal, change continues to occur. Change can be motivated as a result of internal pressures or be imposed directly from or as a result of external pressures. Whatever the source of the pressure, change must occur if the military is to continue to be a sharp edged, relevant tool for national defence.

Traditionally, the CAF was left to its own management and administration in order to enable the development of the personnel and their skills required to exercise the PoA. As public interest in government spending, fiscal accountability, and the business of organizational management grew, so too did the pressures on the CAF. The pressures to reform traditional methods in planning and forecasting would eventually see the CAF leadership succumb to new civilian imposed management techniques. Although, the National Defence Act (NDA) clearly outlines the roles and responsibilities of the appointed government officials and military officers who are charged with the

management and administration of National Defence, there have been periods in recent times where the lines of responsibility have been blurred. While the Minister of National Defence (MND) is responsible for the “. . . management and direction of the Canadian Forces and of all matters relating to national defence. . . ,”³² the Chief of Defence Staff is “. . . subject to the regulations and under the direction of the Minister, [and] charged with the control and administration of the Canadian Forces.”³³ Although clearly stated, there has been conflict over the administration of the CAF. The conflict over the control of management and administration has, at times, been intense a battle as one played out on the field in the theatre of war, seeing the end of many top soldiers’ careers. It is the ongoing struggle with the public perception, the government’s agenda and other government departments (OGD) that drive both internal and external pressures that inevitably shape and reshape the environment that those in the PoA must operate.

Pressures – Government Imposed Change

As defined in the NDA, the MND is ultimately responsible for the department. Although, the delineation of the roles is clearly defined in the NDA, the MND has the discretion to direct the structure of the organization to be changed as he deems necessary. It was the Honourable Brooke Claxton, MND from 1946-1954 that determined unification of the CAF with DND under one Deputy Minister (DM) would be created. The change was to increase coordination and decrease redundancies in functions. The effect of the unification under one command could only, in reality, affect policy as the operational aspects of the CAF remained under the charge of those commissioned

³²Department of National Defence, *National Defence Act R.S.C., 1985, c. N-5*, accessed 21 Feb 14, <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/Statute/N/N-5.pdf>, 8.

³³Ibid., 13.

members in the uniform.³⁴ According to Douglas Bland, the author of *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada*, these structural changes introduced by the MND at that time occurred during what was known as the “Command Era”.³⁵ The command and administration of the CAF was conducted in accordance with the NDA, with three separate Service Chiefs and the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee. The three environmental Chiefs were expected to continue to develop and sustain capabilities in their own field of military expertise, while the Chairman liaised with the national headquarters and the civilian DND administration. Operational command and administrative policies for the CAF remained within the military lines, focused on military capabilities and relied upon military professionals during the Command Era. As Bland explains, the efficiencies in policy and administration at that time “. . . may have been militarily efficient while at the same time being inefficient in the eyes of accountants.”³⁶

And so it was, change was to occur, change that could not be stopped. It was not long after the forced unification of DND and the CAF that the civilian methodologies for planning and forecasting took over the previously respected military professional’s traditional approach to defence planning and policy creation. “How one defines problems often determines who is allowed to form policy; thus the negation of the military profession left the field open to civilians.”³⁷ The reality was that the world was rapidly

³⁴Douglas Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947-1985*, (Kingston, Ontario 1987), 3.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 4.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 5.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 10.

transitioning into an information society where the science of organizational management and information studies were on the increase. The methods used to plan and forecast in organizational management were rapidly advancing in the private and civilian sectors, while the military with its often antiquated information systems and approaches to management and reporting, were slow to react to the changes and to the demands for public access and information sharing. This would keep the CAF behind in the ever growing field of administration and management of human resources, as well as financial planning and reporting. It was in 1960 that a pressure wielding and change driver review was initiated through the Glassco inquiry. The aim of the report, lead by Grant Glassco, was to “. . . promote efficiency, economy, and improved service in the despatch of public business.”³⁸ The report was produced in three years with very little time awarded to the review of the defence administration. The report cited an ever increasing “administrative tail”, similar observations would be made again in organizational reviews including one as recent as 2011, led by now retired Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie.

In its review the Glassco Commission did not recognize the need for military effectiveness; rather it focused on efficiency, economy and service delivery for government departments. One-size-fits-all approach was employed, ignoring the fact that military effectiveness and relevance, when referring to completion of the aim or mission success, does not always fit nicely into the three principles underpinning the Glassco review. However, the final report by the Glassco Commission provided the foundation for a re-organization of DND. One of the most influential observations made in the report was that there was a fear that the ministers who would be charged to ensure civil power

³⁸Ibid., 25.

over military forces would be too heavily influenced by their military advisors. The result was the creation of an additional civilian staff to oversee the management of the CAF. The DM's staff was formed, thereby ensuring civilian influence over CAF management.

In 1964 The MND, Honourable Paul Hellyer incorporated recommendations from the Glassco report into the Defence White Paper and Bill C-90 was released. It was Bill C-90 that enabled integration of management and administration under one authority, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The replacement of the four officers that were previously charged with the management and administration of the CAF by one, the CDS, left the CAF to deal with significant adjustments. The DND and the CDS were to be given equal standing for management and administration of their respective organizations. While adjusting to the latest reorganization the CAF did not have time to prepare for the greatest battle with imposed change yet to come. In 1966, Bill C-243 introduced the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act that enabled the abolishment of the three distinct services and the creation of only one. Unification was born and the CAF entered an era of ongoing reorganization and transformation that negatively impacted loyalty, stability of forces and the capabilities of their future. The three environmental forces were integrated at the hands of government under one uniform, as one entity. The traditions and *raison d'être* were hard to find if not altogether lost.

The deeply wounded CAF senior leadership struggled through the changes with yet another blow to come. It was in 1972, at the hands of the MND the Honourable Edgar Benson, that DND and CAF were integrated into one Headquarters, the National Defence Headquarters.³⁹ The CDS's ability to control and administer the CAF was considered to

³⁹Ibid., 81.

be greatly diminished. Fortunately, change was not to stop and by 1975 all Commands were re-established. In 1986 separate uniforms were issued and “. . . the service chiefs were reinstated and returned to National Defence Headquarters.”⁴⁰ Unification was over and the three Environmental Commands were restored under the CDS. The follow-on changes that were made to the CAF from external pressures have not been as drastic or significant since that time. However, it is customary for government spending to be pulled back, imposing cutbacks onto all departments in an effort to balance the government budget. DND and the CAF were not spared, and budget cuts continued to apply external pressure that could not be ignored. Only a war that would catch the attention and support of the public could pull the CAF out of the nose dive it was in. But as all wars end, so too would public attention and government spending. Traditionally, after a conflict or a war the cuts to DND and the CAF are excessively deep, causing lasting impressions that have at times, left those in the PoA in a less than desirable state.

Since the end of the Cold War, our Canadian Forces (CF) have undergone dramatic change. Bases have been closed, the defence budget cut, headquarters consolidated and the forces radically downsized. Between 1994 and 1999 the defence budget will have been reduced by 23%, down to \$9.25 billion from \$12 billion. When inflation is taken into account, this represents a 30% reduction in real purchasing power. The operating budget for the year 2000 will be approximately 50 to 55% lower than forecast in 1987. Personnel reductions have been in the order of 30%, to approximately 60,000 members. And, the civilian workforce will have been reduced by 45%, down to 20,000 from 36,000 employees.⁴¹

In the 1990s the government exerted its pressure on the CAF through defence spending cuts, deep cuts that left many, including retired CDS, General Rick Hillier, referring to it as the “Decade of Darkness”. The CAF although engaged in increasingly

⁴⁰Wilf Lund, *Integration and Unification of the Canadian Forces*, CFB Esquimalt Naval & Military Museum, accessed 21 May 2014, http://www.navalandmilitarymuseum.org/resource_pages/controversies/unification.html.

⁴¹Government of Canada, *SCONDVA Report to Parliament, 1999*, accessed 15 May 2014, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=1031525&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=36&Ses=1&File=21>.

dangerous operational missions that consumed resources and funds, were not in what the public or government considered a war scenario. Without a conflict played out on the daily news, threatening imminent danger to the sons and daughters of the nation, it was easy for the Canadian public and the government to allow the CAF to sink into a state of disrepair. The PoA began to be consumed with internal re-organization and re-engineering in an effort to adjust to the lack of funding and equipment. The CAF was forced to reallocate internal budgets and resources in order to remain a relevant and capable tool for national defence. The deep cuts and excessive changes created an increasingly discontented organization that was preoccupied with administration rather than increasingly frequent and dangerous operations. As a result of the discontent, the outcry from the members and their families became too loud to be ignored and in 1997 the Standing Committee On National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) commenced a review. Having the most impact since the Glassco review, the SCONDVA review concentrated on administrative policies and processes. For the purpose of this paper, only those recommendations that focused on the policies affecting relocations within the CAF will be discussed.

CHAPTER 3 - CAF RELOCATIONS

Significance of the CAF Relocations

One of, if not the most, important personnel policy to facilitate force generation and employment within the CAF is the relocation policy. At the strategic, operational and tactical levels it is essential to have the right person in the right place at the right time. Understanding what is meant by the right person in the right place at the right time within the CAF is essential to understanding the overall significance of relocations to national defence. If a member of the PoA is to be the right one, that individual must be well trained in their specific classification or trade, appropriately experienced and a subject matter expert in their area of operations. To be in the right place, the individual granted command of the mission or the responsibility of a task must be appropriately chosen and relocated to the area of operations. Finally, to be there at the right time, the individual chosen must be in place at time of mission execution. They cannot be a leader from afar, they must be there to motivate and lead their personnel, to ensure the successful completion of a mission, even in the face of death.

The great leaders of the past who could think strategically, conduct operations and motivate their personnel at the tactical level, were proven experts at the art of warfare and true professionals in the PoA. One such leader from WWI was General Arthur Currie who was the right person, in the right place at the right time for the battle at Vimy Ridge in 1917.⁴² The essential elements of a relocation, with the right person in the right place at the right time, were satisfied and the battle was a success. However, when these elements

⁴²Richard Foot, *Vimy Ridge*, The Canadian Encyclopaedia, accessed 8 August 2014, <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/vimy-ridge/>.

of relocations are not satisfied, the outcome can be horrific. One does not have to look back far in the history of the CAF for a prominent example of how catastrophic it can be, to all levels, when the CAF gets the placement of an individual or groups of individuals wrong.

The “Somalia Affair”⁴³ as it is referred to, is an excellent example of how devastating the lack of professionally trained personnel, co-located in one unit, can be to the tactical, operational and strategic levels of national defence and the PoA. In 1992 the Government committed Canada to the United Nations Operation in Somalia. It was to be a peacekeeping mission however, it went terribly wrong. The Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) was the unit sent on the mission. Believed to be the elite army unit of the CAF, the CAR had brought great pride to the nation in its past missions. Unfortunately at the time of the Somalia conflict there were many indicators that those who were in the CAR were not properly trained or capable of a mission. The CAF was suffering from budget cutbacks at that time, cuts that are often associated with a reduction of training and movement of personnel. The leadership was not ideal and the members of the unit went unchecked and were left to develop a culture of their own. In later investigations it would be revealed that the leadership was indeed weak and CAR members were engaged in racist activities prior to their mission.⁴⁴

When the task came for the United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Mission, the officer who was in charge of the CAR went as far as to declare his unit unfit in an attempt to stop them from proceeding. The result was that the officer was removed from

⁴³David J. Bercuson, *Up From The Ashes: The Re-Professionalization Of The Canadian Forces After The Somalia Affair*, Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2009: 31-39, accessed 6 August 2014, <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no3/doc/06-bercuson-eng.pdf>.

⁴⁴Ibid.

command and another who would not oppose to their capabilities for the mission was put in his place. The CAR went to Somalia where the behaviour displayed was disgraceful to the PoA, eventually cumulating with the torturous murder of a 16 year old local boy. The CAF was disgraced internationally, in the eyes of the UN and in the eyes of its country it was to represent. The investigations that would follow would yield recommendations that included better training and education for all, particularly those in charge. The CAR was eventually disbanded and the manner in which the training and the placement of personnel, those who would be the representatives of the nation, was reviewed and reconsidered. The Officer Corps would undergo extensive training and the requirement for higher education, such as a post-secondary degree, was introduced.

The CAF would ensure that right person would be in the right place at the right time. The policies that apply to those who must relocate are contained under the relocation policy and the tool that is used to ensure the three essential conditions are met is the posting instruction. It is the posting instruction that once issued, contains the order to relocate. It is difficult to understand why a government would consider integrating such a significant functional and critical policy of the CAF with other departments for any reason other than perceived financial savings.

SCONDVA

One of the most significant pressures applied to the relocation policies affecting the CAF personnel and their families was the SCONDVA review. The SCONDVA review was dominated by government opposition interested in exposing the damage that the budget cutbacks were having on the CAF. The review itself included face-to-face interviews from locations across Canada. Several of its recommendations would result in significant changes within the management and administration of the CAF at strategic,

operational and tactical levels. The review ended in 1998 followed by a report to Parliament. The six chapter report provided recommendations for improvements to the CAF through compensation, benefits and quality of life for the military members and their families. SCNDVA found that the “. . . troops have been asked to do too much with too little.”⁴⁵ The salient topics that were highlighted included the practice of alternate service delivery (ASD), family housing and relocation benefits.

The ASD program was born out of a reaction to budget cuts announced in the 1996 Federal Budget. It was believed that savings would be realized, thereby enabling the CAF to continue to progress with operational capabilities in spite of fewer internal resources and increased expenditures. Many of the ASD initiatives in the late 1990s saw a great reduction in the infrastructure. The CAF was charged with maintaining and investing precious and limited funds into locations that were no longer considered essential to operations.

ASD was used in all three Environmental Commands, but in the Air Force, ASD was implemented on a large scale. From Goose Bay, Labrador to Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan, ASD reshaped the Air Wings and their operations while enabling reallocation of resources and new capabilities. 5 Wing Goose Bay went from a base that supported NATO flying training each summer to a station size operation that saw the sale of the military housing, and the contracting of the Air Traffic and aerodrome support services to Serco. 12 Wing Shearwater N.S. sold the large runway, that was so large that it was previously used as an alternate for the space shuttle landing in an emergency situation. Shearwater Cooperation initially took over the runway and the maintenance of

⁴⁵Government of Canada, *SCNDVA Report*. . . ., Chap.1.

the aerodrome. Local flying and air capabilities were reduced to the flight training of CH-124 Sea King Helicopters. 15 Wing Moose Jaw transferred the flight training operations to Bombardier under NATO Flying Training Canada (NFTC), and reduced its military footprint. The end of the flying training on the CT-114 Tutor was realized in 1999, in favour of the new innovative CT-155 Hawk and CT-156 Harvard aircraft providing new capabilities to the Air Force pilots in training. Consolidation, savings and progression through innovative means were the goals of each ASD initiative. But the SCONDVA review revealed what most serving military members were already aware of, that those personnel operating at the location of an ADS initiative, particularly those in the technical trades such as aircraft maintainers were negatively impacted. Civilian employees within Construction and Engineering and various support staff suffered as well. Loss of livelihood, premature relocations, increased responsibility and demands on the skills of those remaining, were some of the negative impacts experienced throughout the organization and department. As a result of the review, one of the recommendations from SCONDVA was “[t]hat when job cuts or mandated relocations are an inevitable consequence of the introduction of ASD, those affected be provided with compensation and benefits.”⁴⁶

Recommendations were made for further pay compensation in the form of what they referred to as global cost-of-living allowance (COLA). This allowance would be provided to members who would be posted across Canada and to locations outside of Canada. The COLA would enable the equalization of income and cost of living equally across Canada for the member and family regardless of the location to which they were

⁴⁶Ibid., Chap. VI.

relocated. The fact that the housing markets, the cost of food, gas and basic necessities varied greatly within Canada and as well as abroad, instigated the call for a pay compensation package to even out the inconsistencies. This particular recommendation was implemented in the form of a Post Living Differential (PLD). The PLD replaced a previously existing benefit known as accommodation assistance allowance (AAA), only with a much broader scope of expenses that would go beyond accommodations to include food, gas, and other essentials.

Another recommendation was to enhance and prolong the Guaranteed Home Sale Plan as well as the Home Equity Assistance Program. Both relocation benefits were designed to encourage the military member and family to become home owners even in the face of frequent relocations. Posting allowances were recommended to be non-taxable and based upon actual costs associated with the turbulence of relocations for all members and not tied to rank at the time of the relocation. Additionally, the concerns for the family of the military member, who must endure several relocations throughout the member's career were addressed. Recommendations covered a variety of approaches to improve the family's situations upon relocation. They recommend altering the Career Manager's approach to enable a more flexible posting plan that would consider family needs. The policies affecting the relocation of the member and the family were to be made flexible enough so that the career managers could consider specific health and education services required by those posted and adjust as needed without negatively impacting careers or operations. Improved services for spousal employment assistance and improved family services at new locations were recommended as well. Recommendations covered the implementation of emergency childcare, spousal career counselling, financial

compensation for professional designations and licences as well as job search services at destination following relocation.

It was recognized and acknowledged by SCONDVA that relocations executed within the CAF must be flexible enough to ensure that individuals, who are required to be in a location at a specific time, can be there and can commence operations without the distractions of family concerns, financial concerns or administration. Many of the benefits and services recommended by SCONDVA in 1998, were to be implemented in varying degrees and through various services the following year. But what was not anticipated was the format of delivery. Relocations and their associated benefits were to be delivered under what was yet another ASD initiative, the Canadian Forces Integrated Relocation Pilot Program (CF IRPP).

ASD and the IRP

In what can be best described as a knee jerk reaction to the continuous negative feedback on relocations, the government decided in 1998 to implement a pilot program that was to be an integrated relocation program (IRP). The program would enable ASD for the ever present requirement to relocate government personnel. The three departments that were to engage in the pilot program the first year were the CAF, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Core Public Service employees under the National Joint Counsel (NJC). So it was, in 1999 the Integrated Relocation Pilot Program was launched. In 2002 the pilot program was made permanent for the three departments. The purpose was said to “. . . improve the quality of life for the transferred employees and reduce the detrimental effects of relocations on departmental operations.”⁴⁷ Before exploring the

integrated program, it is important at this point of the paper to review the purpose of relocations in the CAF. Only then can we explore the similarities and differences between the three entities involved in the integrated relocation program. More importantly it will provide an understanding of the pressures that shape the interdepartmental program at the strategic level, impacting both the operational and tactical levels.

CAF IRP

As noted in chapter one when discussing the PoA, the “forced transferee” was recognized as a member who must move in order to be in the right place at the right time for the purpose of operational effectiveness. Further, the government of Canada has long recognized the reality of the requirement for compensation and benefits to be allocated to those who must relocate. This reality has not changed in today’s CAF benefits, pay and compensations are still provided to those who must relocate. Bill C-25 was amended in 1998, revising sections 12 and 35 of the NDA. These amendments charged the Treasury Board of Canada (TB) with the authority to establish the rates and conditions of issue of pay for members of the PoA as well as the determination and regulation of the expenses and allowances that arise from service.⁴⁸ This revision clearly established the TB as the approving authority that the CDS must seek prior to executing the administration of compensation and benefits to the CAF. It is important to know that it is the TB that approves the relocation benefits for all three government departments within the IRP.

Unlike other organizations, in the CAF a posting instruction issued to a member is a lawful order, whereby the transferee is compelled to relocate. There are provisions built

⁴⁷Government of Canada, Office of the Auditor General, *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, November 2006*, Chap. 5, 1.

⁴⁸National Defence, *National Defence Act...*, accessed 21 Feb 14, <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/Statute/N/N-5.pdf>, 10, 27.

into the compensation and benefits package under the CF IRP to enable the member's family to relocate to the new location as well. However, the bottom line is that the member must report for duty at the new location, on a specific date, for operational purposes. The right person will be at the right place at the right time to execute their assigned duty. Relocations are typically determined by the need of the organization or as those in uniform say, "at the Queen's discretion". It is accepted as one of the many commitments a member of the PoA agrees to obey upon signing on the "dotted line". CAF personnel who sign on that "dotted line", agree to become a professional in the PoA with unlimited liability, this includes relocating when and to where as determined by the organization.

Relocations are common in various organizations and not unique to the CAF. The Five Eyes partners, referred to in Chapter 1 of this paper, each have their own relocation programs that offer benefits to those who must relocate. Additionally, private industries as well as other government departments (OGDs) relocate their employees when required. For example those in the Banking industry are often relocated for progression within the organization. Private industries such as mining and oil companies in western Canada frequently relocate their employees to austere locations to perform their jobs. The skilled laborers who are highly sought after by private industry are often relocated from locations both inside and outside of the country to a job site. Those previously trained by another institution, in a sought after specialty, are also recruited and then relocated by private industries and OGDs.

The RCMP, similar to the CAF, relocate their recruits both before and after training. The NJC employees are relocated as well, to a lesser degree, but nevertheless selected individuals and initial appointees are at times relocated for job requirements.

Where the CAF, Industry and OGDs cease to be similar with regards to relocations is in both purpose and repercussions. Unlike an employee who relocates for job advancement or simple employment opportunities, a member of the CAF has no choice but to relocate for the purpose of national defence. The order to move means that he or she must obey or be charged under the NDA, followed by a release from service. A relocation in the CAF is not simply to progress one's career, it is much more and foremost it is for the purpose of operational capability. Relocation is the tool used to ensure the right person is in the right place at the right time for the sake of the nation not the individual or the company.

It has been explained that training a member of the PoA is specific and must occur from within the organization itself. It is true that some of the common elements of a specific trade or classification can be acquired in institutions and educational facilities external to the organization such as; a degree, a pilot's license, a doctor's license, a driving certificate, aircraft maintenance or even a license to carry a weapon. However, as previously explained and must be emphasized again, to become a member of the PoA one must become proficient in the art of warfare. To remain proficient at the specific skill while operating specific equipment in hostile or austere environments and while under various complex conditions, can only be achieved from within.

The PoA candidate will be sent to various locations throughout Canada to become proficient in their element and with the tools of their classification and specialty. The location and duration of the training will be dependent on the Trade, Classification and Environment of the enrollee. Those who join the Royal Canadian Navy will be relocated from their place of enrollment to a basic training Base and then to either the West Coast or East Coast for their career training as well as for the majority of their employment within the CAF. The Royal Canadian Air Force operates air bases throughout Canada and

there are Army bases north, south, east and west as well. Unlike the NJC or Public Service employees, the CAF enrollee cannot be hired as a fully qualified resource from the general population. It takes specific training that can only be delivered from within the organization to develop a dedicated individual for the PoA. A Military Force that is not trained, dedicated, retained and obedient cannot serve its government. Ultimately, without a capable force, the end result will be a nation with the inability to maintain sovereignty.

The Three Entities of the IRP

Working as part of an integrated program, it is possible to hear senior level public service employees proclaim that relocations for their employees and the CAF are for the same reasons and are equally important. The reality is starkly different, but if not understood by those who have influence on the personnel policies and benefits related to programs such as relocations, the outcome can be crippling to the ability to recruit and retain personnel. As part of NATO and the Five Eyes, the CAF must be trained at global levels as well as domestic to ensure interoperability with their allies, both in doctrine and arms. To become interoperable, tours of duty out of country (OUTCAN) through posting must occur. Several of the OUTCAN relocations do not allow for the family of the CAF member to accompany them. Relocations such as these are referred to as “Prohibited Postings”, a term and condition not known to the NJC or RCMP employees.

The prohibited posting can be used to send a member to a location for a year or more without their family. They are prohibited from various activities that are normally associated with a posting such as purchasing a home or moving their household furniture and effects. These postings are often used for those in the training systems as they provide flexibility of movement. Although restrictive to the member, it is ideal for the

organization. This is an example of a policy developed solely to enable the organization to easily relocate the individual who is on a prohibited posting upon completion of their course or their duty both inside and outside of the country. Understanding the differences between OGDs and the CAF with regards to the requirements on personnel to be at the right place at the right time, is important to the understanding of the impact both internal and external pressures have on the CAF organization.

Volumes of Relocations

Having discussed the fact that relocations are common occurrences in both industry and government organizations, yet fundamentally different than the CAF's purpose and significance, it is important to discuss the scope of the relocation business. To determine what degree of impact relocations actually have on any given organization it is important to know the volumes. According to the Canadian Employee Relocation Council (CERC) the typical volume of relocations for any given company encompasses less than 500 per year.⁴⁹ The NJC conducts approximately 1,200 relocations annually, while the RCMP account for approximately 2,500. The CAF however, have traditionally relocated on average approximately 15,000 members annually.⁵⁰ Such volumes produced by the CAF are not the industry standard and are considered significant in the public and private sectors. When the decision to integrate three departments under one program for the purposes of relocations was made, the complexity of the policies and repercussions of the decision were arguably not realized. The differences between the numbers and the

⁴⁹Canadian Employee Relocation Council (CERC), *CERC Survey of Corporate Practices for the Movement of Household Goods*, July 21, 2014.

⁵⁰Director Relocations Business Management, Canadian Forces Integrated Relocation Program, *Presentation for Industry Day*, TA IRP, Ottawa Ontario, 2013.

processes involved in each department would have provided the first indicators that an integrated program would be integrated by name only.

The NJC relocates the smallest number of personnel as one of the integrated departments under the IRP. There are approximately 1200 employees who are relocated annually. The costs associated with a move are funded through their TB approved policy, the NJC Relocation Directive. The entire policy is considered a collective agreement and must go in front of each of the 62 departmental national coordinators for negotiations prior to proposed changes reaching the TB for final approval. In accordance with the approved directive, the departmental coordinator can offer a relocation to a selected employee. If the relocation is agreed upon the contracted service provider is notified.⁵¹ The contracted service provider ensures that the relocation of the employee is administered and the TB approved benefits are awarded as required.

The RCMP processes approximately 2500 relocations each year. They have their policy that applies to both their regular force members and their civilian employees. Their policy, like the one for the NJC is TB approved, granting benefits and compensation to those who relocate. Similar to the core public service employees, the RCMP have the civilian employees who can negotiate a move. They can request or refuse relocation to a specific location; however they suffer career impacts through the loss of progression opportunities. The most common relocation for civilians occurs when a forensic lab closes in one area, leaving the civilian employees the option to relocate to the new lab or seek employment elsewhere. All regular members of the RCMP are trained centrally in law enforcement. The training occurs in Regina, Saskatchewan at “Depot” from where

⁵¹Government of Canada, Treasury Board, *NJC Relocation Directive*, accessed 2 May 2014, <http://www.njc-cnm.gc.ca/directive/index.php?vid=11&lang=eng>.

they are subsequently relocated to their initial post. Initial post is most often an isolated location in northern Canada, offering austere conditions. Similar to the CAF member, the RCMP regular member can be relocated several times following the initial post. However, unlike the CAF the RCMP regular member relocations are most often negotiated between the member and the organization. Again the regular member can refuse a relocation but risk job progression. They are not however, ordered to move frequently when and where the organization determines, as is the CAF member.

As previously stated the CAF historically relocated 15,000 members annually. The average cost of a domestic relocation is estimated to be approximately \$38,000 as of 2014.⁵² This average cost is based upon a family of four with a sale and purchase of a home. When considering the actual number of people relocated each year by the CAF, the family must be included. Including the family, the estimated average number of people relocated each year since 2009 is approximately 40,000.⁵³ When speaking of relocations, 40,000 is an enormous number of people within one organization, moving around a country each year. An appreciation of the magnitude of this program provides an appreciation of the significance its policy can have on the CAF to affect its mandate. When external pressures occur and a change is created, the impact is not to be ignored.

Differences in the operations and requirements of each of the three departments involved in the IRP have led to three different and distinct policies. Although there are some similarities in the benefits associated with their individual policies, they are fundamentally different. The differences are significant in many ways yet they are

⁵²Director Relocations Business Management, Canadian Forces Integrated Relocation Program, *Presentation to DGCB*, (Ottawa Ontario, 2013).

⁵³Ibid.

administered in a WoG approach through ASD, under the title of an integrated program.

The benefits and compensations approved within the CAF policy are fundamental to the sustainment of personnel numbers and therefore the continued operations of the CAF.

Should the CAF fail to keep its personnel, the previously discussed trained effective strength will suffer and so too will the mandate of the defence department. All of this to arrive at the obvious conclusion once again; it is essential to develop specific and relevant personnel policies that will serve to increase retention of valuable personnel resources and in turn enable force capabilities.

CHAPTER 4 – PRESSURES ON RELOCATION POLICIES

Applied Pressures

Similar to the NJC and the RCMP IRP policies, the CAF's policy must be approved by TB. Once approved the CF IRP policy is applied to all of those within the organization who are trained effective strength and qualified to receive applicable benefits. There are far too many benefits to discuss should this paper hope to keep the interest of the reader. But what is important is the understanding that the pressures applied by external and internal sources have had significant impact on the CAF policies, particularly the relocation policy. Pressures such as Federal Budget cuts to defence spending, political agendas, reviews such as SCONDVA, audits by the OAG, media and public perception have all had influence on the CAF and their policies. The following paragraphs will explore some of those influential pressures.

Impact of SCONDVA

The 97/98 SCONDVA review, discussed earlier, had both positive and negative impacts on the relocations of the CAF personnel. The recommendations did give rise to some increased benefits such as non-taxable posting allowance. However, the open review exposed the great dissatisfaction that members and their families held toward the processes and benefits applied to the CAF during mandatory postings. In turn the swift reaction of the government was to implement the integrated program. One of results of the relocation program becoming integrated is that it opened an avenue to enable others to seek and justify reductions in benefits to the CAF under the pretence of aligning the policy with OGDs. This statement warrants explanation and can be justified with

reference to a specific benefit, the posting allowance. The posting allowance is one benefit that is frequently raised by OGD when comparing relocation policies.

The posting allowance is actually a pay benefit that is awarded to the member upon relocation. The allowance is based upon the member's salary at the time of the relocation as well as the member's status. If the member is single the allowance will equal half of the monthly salary. However, if the member has family to support, the allowance will be the full month's salary. The purpose of this allowance is to compensate for turbulence the member and the family experience during the move process. It is interesting to note that all of the CAF Five Eyes partners recognize the turbulence created by a relocation. Each of the Five Eyes partners provide a "disturbance/posting allowance."⁵⁴ Unlike the employee under the NJC policy or the RCMP who experience few, relatively speaking, or no relocations throughout their career, those in the PoA must undergo several. In the CAF a member will undergo several relocations. After completing the first 17 years in the CAF the author of this paper experienced 7 relocations and can attest that the turbulence experienced during each move cannot be overstated. There is a loss of family, community, friendships and familiar surroundings to deal with. Coupled with the aspects of adjusting to work during the move or worse, loss of employment for a family member, the turbulence can be excessive. The cultures are different from one end of Canada to another as well as cost of living, housing markets, school systems, and job opportunities for spouses and family members. Each province has its own laws and regulations pertaining to health care, education and licensing. The amount of confusion, adjustment and learning on the home front is experienced by any Canadian that relocates,

⁵⁴Samantha Urban, *Relocation Policies, Resources and Assessment Tools*, Department of National Defence, TTCP Document DOC-HUM-09-2012 October 2012.

but CAF member must go through this experience several times throughout their career, depending on the needs of the nation. This is not always understood by the public and surprising enough, not always understood by those in government who have influence on CAF policies and associated benefits such as the TB.

Another recommendation from the SCONDVA review was to enhance the Home Equity Assistance Programme (HEAP). This programme was put into place to assist the member in purchasing and selling their principle residence each time they must relocate. With such high numbers of personnel entering the housing market each year it is recognized by the government that the CAF personnel stimulate the housing market in areas surrounding Bases and Wings. These areas are for the most part more rural than urban, particularly for the Army and Air Force locations. Once a member is ordered to move they must sell their home with the hope to secure another at the new location. The housing market is dependant on so many variables and not the same in any two locations in Canada. For several years, the areas around the Army Base, Edmonton experienced an exponential increase in the housing market, where many who had purchased before the increase in value were able to sell at a significant profit. But those who were posted out after the great boom in the housing market, suffered losses on their home sale. One such case has recently hit the media and is in the courts under review. An officer has taken TB to court seeking to recover his \$88,000 lost in the sale of his home in Bon Accord, Alberta. The officer was posted to Edmonton and purchased in an outlying area when the housing market was strong, but was posted when the market had softened. The HEA policy of today will provide for a percentage of the loss incurred during a sale if several conditions are met. But to receive the maximum of a loss in a sale of a house, a request must be submitted to TB. It is the responsibility of TB to determine if the area has

suffered a depression in the housing market. In this case the TB determined that the area was not considered a “depressed market”⁵⁵ therefore, the member could not be reimbursed his losses.

Depending on where a member is posted, the risks associated with purchasing a home can be very high. Although the government wanted to encourage members to enter the housing market, the reality is that those in the CAF face great risk in purchasing a home as they will encounter several postings. The ability to build home equity as a member in the CAF is not often the same reality as it is for those who can stay in one location. More often the reality of losing an initial investment in the housing market is greatly increased depending on the location one must go and for what duration.

Impact of Media, Public Perception and Political Agendas

The external pressures placed on the CAF such as reviews like SCNDVA can increase with pressures from media and public perception. The court case of the officer who lost \$88,000, was exposed to the public through the media revealing the risks CAF member’s can take when purchasing a home. In that particular case it was the member who challenged the government, TB specifically, in the civilian legal system. The media brought the case out of the court room and into the public eye. The result of the pressures imposed on TB policy for declaring a depressed market may well impact the CAF relocation policy. The HEA policy within the CAF is currently under review with an eye to change.

The media is very powerful at raising the perception of the military to impressive heights, as it did during the war in Afghanistan. But when it comes to spending public

⁵⁵Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Integrated Relocation Program Directive*, A-PP-005-IRP-AG-001, APS 2009-2012.

funds, if there is a hint of wrong doing by the political members of government, the media has no mercy. When the Senator scandal hit the media, there was great cause for concern over the spending of several Conservative Party Senators. Most notably, Pamela Wallin and Mike Duffy were accused of misuse of public funds. Since the stories broke there have been investigations and Mike Duffy was recently charged on several counts by the RCMP. At the hype of the media broadcasting the story of the Conservative Party scandal, an access to information request was revealed by the media focusing on a potential misspending of a high profile Liberal Party candidate, a retired General Officer of the CAF. The information revealed to the public by the media was the cost associated with the retired General's final relocation.

Public perception can exert great pressure on the CAF through the government. It can work for the benefit of the serving members and the veterans or it can be very detrimental. The benefit that was the center of the discussions on retired General's case stems from what is called the intended place of residence (IPR). Each serving member who has qualified, upon release in both the CAF and the RCMP, is entitled to elect a final location to be relocated to at public expense. It is understood that the serving member, while on active duty will move to wherever the nation requires them to be. That location is almost always a place far away from family and friends. Upon retirement the choice to move back to where they have family or friends or simply to a location they would like to live, is theirs to make.

When the media discovered that a retired General had exercised his IPR at a cost in excess of \$70,000 to the public, the CAF experienced a flood of queries. Ultimately, due to the political nature of the individual involved, the pressure was exerted from both external and internal sources, both the public and the political masters of the department.

The result was that the CAF was once again preoccupied with administered policies while mission focus was lost. The IPR policy came under intense review with an eye to remove benefits from the veterans and the releasing members.

In the integrated relocation program, the IPR benefit is in both the RCMP and the CAF relocation policies, but is not present in the NJC's. The RCMP refers to this benefit as retirement relocation, and the purchase residence must be at least 40 km away from the current residence to qualify. In accordance with the Canada Revenue Agency, any residence that is purchased for the purpose of work must be more than 40 km away.⁵⁶ If a residence purchased is for the purposes of work and is within 40 km of the current residence, it cannot be deducted.

In the CAF, the IPR policy is for more than a simple retirement and currently includes a residence within 40 km of the last residence for purpose of release, not for purpose of work. For example, those in the CAF who join in a location such as Halifax Nova Scotia, could very likely spend the first three years or more gaining their career qualifications training in that same location. They may have purchased a home, rented an apartment or been ordered to moved into the military accommodations on base while training. At any time during the training or after the member could be released for course failure, injury, illness or end of service with no offer to continue. Any one of the conditions described happens fairly frequently in the military organization.

Accidents, illness and the inability to adjust to military demands and lifestyle are simply part of what affects the trained effective strength of the CAF. However, it would be unconscionable to allow an individual in any one of these situations to simply pack

⁵⁶Canada Revenue Agency, *Line 219 Expenses You Cannot Deduct*, accessed 20 June 2014, <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/ndvdl/tpcs/nem-tx/rtrn/cmpltng/ddctns/lrs206-236/219/ddct-eng.html>.

their bags and make their own way back to the civilian world they once came from, even if it is in the local area, such as Halifax. If release benefits did not exist, the member would be forced to move more than 40 km away from Halifax (in this case), their family, friends and possibly the needed medical support, just to enable a funded relocation.

It is the nature of the PoA that dictates the location one will live, train and remain as long as required to ensure efficiency and effectiveness. In this scenario it is possible to understand that there needs to be compensation for those who once served in the profession. Due to the media and political attention brought to the IPR relocation policy, the CAF endured significant pressure that will most likely result in some restrictions on the residence within 40 km upon release. This is not to say that the driven change to this policy will not have some positive effect, as long as all scenarios are considered, but it is to say that policy and decisions makers must be intimately aware of the conditions and rationale behind the decision for each and every benefit awarded within the CAF organization.

Simply aligning the CAF policies with that of another government department for the purpose of budgetary concerns does have an impact. Had the IPR for the CAF simply been made to reflect that of the RCMP's policy, as was the original intent, the effects would be long lasting. The ability to recruit those who would consider serving, and retain those currently serving would be hindered, ultimately impacting the capabilities of the CAF to remain effective and the sharp edged tool when the nation calls them into action.

Impact of the Office of the Auditor General

The pressures imposed by SCONDVA, the media, public perception and high level political agendas have had direct impacts on the relocation policy for the CAF, but they are not alone. The fact that the policy must be administered through the IRP as an

integrated government program opens it to yet another external pressure. The Office of the Auditor General (OAG) conducts reviews and investigations into the operations of government departments, programs and agencies. The purpose of their reviews is to provide the government of Canada oversight into the financial and operational aspects of government funded programs. The audits investigate the application of authority and control a department exercises and then holds them accountable for their actions or lack there of. Reporting directly to Parliament independently, the OAG's reports, once tabled can have severe repercussions.

The severity of the repercussions can vary with each report compiled depending on the findings of their legislative audit. There are three types of legislative audits that are conducted; the financial audits, the performance audits and the special examinations.⁵⁷ The overarching term used to define the audits conducted by the OAG is "Comprehensive Auditing."⁵⁸ Regardless of the scope of the audit conducted the OAG must satisfy the requirements as determined by the Auditor General Act. According to the Act, the OAG must report their findings to the House of Commons through the Speaker.⁵⁹ There have been several legislative audits conducted on various aspects of DND and the CAF. In fact the OAG ". . . reports two to three defence audits a year in such subjects as major capital

⁵⁷Government of Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, accessed 26 June 2014, http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/au_fs_e_371.html.

⁵⁸Peter Kasurak, *Legislative Audit for National Defence; The Canadian Experience*, Queens University, (Kingston, Ontario, 2003), 7.

⁵⁹Government of Canada, *Auditor General Act (R.S.C.; 1985, C.A-17)*, accessed 26 June 2014, <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/a-17/page-3.html#docCont>.

projects, major service contracts, efficiency of support services, equipment readiness, and human resource management.”⁶⁰

In 2006, following a request by the governmental Public Accounts Committee, the OAG conducted an audit on the 2004 contract for the Integrated Relocation Program (IRP). As explained in Chapter 3 the IRP is an interdepartmental program designed to support and administer the relocations of personnel from within the CAF, the RCMP and those Core Public Service employees that fall under the NJC. The OAG audit was conducted with a focus on the procurement process “. . . to determine whether government contracting policies and regulations had been respected.”⁶¹ Additionally, this particular audit reviewed the management and performance measures established by the three government departments to oversee the contractor’s performance.

Once the comprehensive audit was completed on the 2004 IRP contract, a report was tabled in Parliament. The report noted several areas of concern for all three departments as well as significant issues for the procurement process. It was deemed that the “. . . contracts were not tendered in a fair and equitable manner.”⁶² Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), was criticized citing that they enabled an unfair advantage to the incumbent service provider. The size of this contract was the largest of its kind in the Canadian relocation business and highly desired, yet only the incumbent bid for the contract. Regardless, the OAG determined that other, would be bidders were placed at a disadvantage, leaving the Government of Canada exposed and vulnerable to

⁶⁰Kasurak, *Legislative Audit for National Defence* . . . , 11.

⁶¹Government of Canada, Office of the Auditor General, *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, November 2006*, Chapter 5, 1.

⁶²*Ibid.*, Chap. 5, 2.

litigation. Without missing a beat, one of the smaller companies, by the name of Envoy, did indeed take on the Government of Canada in litigation. The Ontario Supreme Court Judge, Justice Peter Annis, found in favour of Envoy and awarded in excess of \$40 million for lost profits and damages.⁶³ When the OAG conducts a review, the potential repercussions resulting from their reports are not taken lightly.

The OAG audit on the IRP in 2006 is another example of an external pressure imposed on the CAF affecting its policy and management. The more integrated the CAF becomes with other government departments, the larger the ASD contracts that must be procured. Increased services or materials leads to increased commitment from the government for public funds and resources. In turn there must be controls and procedures put into place to ensure the public's funds are appropriately safeguarded. "The government has committed billions of dollars for Canada's national defence. It would be shameful and perhaps dangerous to national security if "the machinery of government" wasted, through poor administration, these dollars and this unique opportunity to build a responsive, relevant, and modern armed force for Canada."⁶⁴ The IRP contract itself is relatively small, but the business of relocating the three organizations within the IRP equate to a total cost of approximately \$350,000,000 per year. Over a five year contract the government invests just fewer than two billion dollars. The defence portion of this program equates to approximately \$1,250,000,000 with 72% of the government relocations. For expenditures this significant and a contract of this scope, it is necessary to

⁶³Department of Justice Canada, OFFICE OF THE DND/CF LEGAL ADVISOR, *ENVOY RELOCATION SERVICES INC. AND NATIONAL RELOCATION SERVICES*, file number 52710-80, 18 April 2013.

⁶⁴Bland, *Transformation National Defence Administration* . . . , viii.

have checks and balances to ensure appropriate processes and safeguards are in place.

The OAG audits seek to confirm those safeguards are appropriate.

The external pressure applied to the government following the OAG audit on the IRP program resulted in significant changes within the CAF. All changes were made at the operational level Headquarters with the reallocation of personnel within the Level One organization responsible for the relocations of CAF personnel; Chief of Military Personnel. The Compensation and Benefits Directorate implemented a new director with staff to implement the recommendations for contract oversight and management delivered in the 2006 OAG report. The RCMP as well as the NJC immediately set to work to improve their management oversight of the contractor as well. The integrated program had become a cause for concern amongst four separate government departments.

The OAG report to Parliament on the interdepartmental program resulted in the government losing a substantial amount of money in litigation. Since that report and the ensuing court case, the public wanted more. Parliament was persuaded to look into the 2009 contract procurement process for the IRP, along with its current management and oversight practices. As a consequence, once again the OAG is conducting an audit of the integrated program that will be tabled in Parliament in November 2014.

Impact of the Military Ombudsman

Another external pressure that motivates the government to change is the Ombudsman. The Military Ombudsman deals with many personnel policies that are challenged by members within the PoA. Similar to the outcry of dissatisfaction within the CAF that “caught the ear” of SCNDVA in the 1990s, the outcry of dissatisfaction began to ring loud in the ear of the Ombudsman in 2012. A report that assessed the well-being

of the families of the Canadian Forces Members was released in November 2013.⁶⁵ In the report the Ombudsman at the time, Mr. Peter Daigle, identified several concerns that centered on CAF relocations. Spousal employment was one of the concerns of the military families. Similar to what SCONDVA discovered, the spouses continue to find it difficult to secure meaningful employment when enduring frequent relocations. “The spousal employment challenge was repeatedly identified as a major consideration and motivator for serving members to the Canadian Forces.”⁶⁶ Once released in a report, it is difficult for the government to ignore that something as fundamental as relocations are to the CAF, can have such a strategic impact on the intake and retention of the valued and limited numbers of trained effective personnel in the PoA. Change would have to occur.

Some of the recommendations that were provided in the 2013 report were, not surprisingly, directly aimed at the relocations within the CAF. The Ombudsman recommended a reduction in the number of relocations that members and families must endure throughout their career. As a result, the CAF announced that they would indeed reduce the number of relocations and in fact, in 2013, the relocations decreased by 26%⁶⁷ from the historical average of 15,000. It is well established that for every action there is always a reaction, and in this situation the decreased number of relocations is beginning to show in the housing market. In smaller communities such as Greenwood Nova Scotia,

⁶⁵National Defence and the Canadian Forces Ombudsman, *Homefront: Assessing the Well-being of Canada's Military Families in the New Millennium*, (Ottawa, Nov 5 2013), Special Report on <http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca/en/ombudsman-news-events-media-news/military-families.page>, accessed 13 March 2014.

⁶⁶Ibid., 30.

⁶⁷Director Relocations Business Management, Canadian Forces Integrated Relocation Program, TA IRP Annual Relocation Statics, Ottawa Ontario, 2014.

there are presently an increased number of houses owned by military members that have not sold due to decreased number of personnel not posted into the area. The impact on mission focus will be realized at a later date if the homes do not sell and the members become overly distracted or in financial distress.

There is a benefit designed to compensate for situations where a member cannot sell the home at the place of origin but must pay for accommodations at the new place of duty. This benefit is called temporary dual residency assistance (TDRA),⁶⁸ and applies to both the RCMP and the CAF. The benefit enables limited financial assistance for those members who must pay for two residences. But the benefit is limited and is usually only payable for six months. If the house is not sold in that time frame and the spouse is not able to secure work, the burden will weigh heavy on the member and in some cases financial hardship occurs. The impact on mission will be an unavoidable side affect in such situations.

Beyond the obvious call for the reduction in relocations, there was a recommendation to modernize the policy and processes applied in the relocation program. The members and their families called for better services as well as the need to implement a grandfather clause in the policies. The recommended grandfather clause in the relocation policy would ensure that when changes occur, such as they did during the departmental *Strategic Review*,⁶⁹ those already posted would remain under the previous regulations. Therefore, the benefits previously expected and planned for would be honoured until the next relocation was conducted.

⁶⁸National Defence, Canadian Forces Integrated Relocation Program Directive . . .

⁶⁹David Perry, *Defence After the Recession*, Carleton University, Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, April 2012, accessed 2 May 2014, <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Defence%20After%20The%20Recession.pdf>, I.

It is interesting to note that reviews conducted by SCONDVA and the Ombudsman highlighted the factors that draw people to the PoA as well as the ones that compel them to leave. Both reviews revealed that leaving the PoA prematurely was most often associated with compensation and benefits. As was discussed in Chapter 1, there are tangible and non-tangible reasons that a member has joined the PoA. Frequent relocations and the need to have improved services and benefits for the families during the relocations consistently make the top of the list when reviews are conducted. Although it is a condition of service that is understood upon enrollment, the benefits associated with relocation have a strategic impact on the establishment and trained effective strength of the CAF.

Impact of Budget Cuts

An interesting observation is that the outcry from the military population often increases in volume following budget cutbacks. Similar to what prompted the SCONDVA review in the late 1990s, the budget cuts in 2011- 2012 appeared to instigate increased dissatisfaction amongst the military catching the attention of the Ombudsman. The outcry sparked the review that produced the 2013 report, in the midst of government announced budget cuts to defence spending. The government's budget cuts between 2011 and 2013, once again fell heavy upon the CAF. As has been tradition following a war, the resources for defence began to be cut back. They are often reallocated to other departments and programs that were ignored to some extent during the war, or they are funneled toward balancing a deficit.

The end of the war in Afghanistan was no exception. Fiscal restraint due to the government imposed budget cuts became a reality. A study in 2013, conducted by a Canadian Defence Analyst David Perry, found that the "... funding had been reduced by

\$2.12 billion, or 10.6 per cent, in the last two federal budgets. . .”⁷⁰ Budget cutbacks have long term impacts on strategic capability as they affect procurement of essential equipment and maintenance programs within the CAF. Equally, as already demonstrated, the impact of budget cutbacks on policy and management of the CAF is felt at the strategic level. The long term setbacks to the trained effective strength as a result of imposed changes to policy can be devastating for those in the PoA.

On the other side of the coin, external pressures can have a positive lasting effect on policy within the CAF. For example during the early stages of the war in Afghanistan, the CDS at that time, retired General Hillier took control of the management and policy creation for CAF. Operational capabilities were paramount in all of the changes made. The procurement of everything from air lift, to bullets was done without delay and all in the name of mission success for the CAF. Policy administration was done quickly, not always without errors, but with minimal delay yielding timely results. The traditional lengthy staffing processes and red tape were reduced to what could be best described as policy change by CANFORGEN (a flash message that describes the new changes to all within the CAF). Orders and regulations, establishments and resources were created overnight. It was an exciting time to be in uniform as the public perception was much improved and the CAF was, for the first time in many years, well respected. The public support for the operational tempo was high and funding was not a primary concern. Recruiting was in full swing, increasing the overall manning, and most importantly the CAF were mission focused and no longer preoccupied with administration. Much change

⁷⁰Financial Post, Canadian Politics; *Harper government's defence spending cuts raise spectre of another "decade of darkness"*, accessed June 2014, <http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/03/20/harper-governments-defence-spending-cuts-raises>.

occurred under General Hillier's leadership and the organization shifted "eyes right", with all efforts on the mission.

As the external pressures apply their weight on the CAF, internal pressures build resulting in reactions from within. The Internal pressures that have most significantly impacted the CAF organization and its administrative policies in the last 20 years have been as a result of the same external pressures already described. SCONDVA was in part responsible for ASD of the newly created integrated relocation program. The OAG caused a reallocation of internal resources for management of the CF IRP and the Ombudsman achieved a reduction in relocations. But the budget cuts just like in the 1990s created the greatest internal pressures.

Internal Pressures

In the mid 1990s in response to the deep cuts in the defence budget, the CAF employed re-engineering. Re-engineering was the method used to adjust available resources, remove wasteful functions and redesign the CAF in an effort to remain relevant and operational in the face of cutbacks. The re-engineering study was placed under the Management Command and Control Re-engineering Team (MCCRT).⁷¹ As was the case in the 1990s, constant change to the CAF and DND had left the Headquarters preoccupied with administration and management and not equipped for the pressures that were being applied.

The pressures that were pushing down onto the defence department in the 1990s were not so very different than they are today and have been described as, "... external

⁷¹Michael Rostek, Lieutenant-Colonel, *A Framework For Fundamental Change? The Management Command and Control Re-engineering Initiative*, Canadian Military Journal, winter 2004-2005.

and internal influences, ranging from the end of the Cold War and Globalization, to a burgeoning federal deficit and perceived mismanagement and waste.”⁷² Re-engineering was a private sector management tool that was applied to the redesign efforts of the CAF. It was at a time when the ASD program, described in Chapter 2, was the focus of complex processes and services in the CAF. It was more favorable to contract out those functions that could not be preformed as efficiently from within. As was the case with the IRP, using private sector methods and approaches to what are military centric requirements, opens the doors to base lining services and benefits in the name of financial savings. Often the specific processes in the CAF are far more complex and the successful execution of their delivery far more essential to the operations than they are in the private sector, “. . . the belief and application of a “one-size-fits-all” solution to competitive advantage is simply naïve and irresponsible.”⁷³ The MCCRT did have an impact on the move toward a process orientated structure for DND and the CF, breaking down the stove pipe functional approach of the past. But re-organization was not near over, and the organization continued to struggle with internal management and policy concerns.

CF Transformation, introduced by the CDS between 2005 – 2008, retired General Hillier, drastically changed the CAF organization from within. The commands were shaken to their core and the previous private sector approach to organizational management was replaced with an operational focus. Similar to the ideas of the forced unification of the commands in the 1960’s, Hillier’s transformation combined environmental elements under a new command and control structure. This transformation

⁷²Ibid., 66.

⁷³Ibid., 70.

was to enforce joint doctrine and bring CAF capabilities together for the purpose of war fighting. Changing the operational culture within the CAF did not go without resistance. There were those in both the Navy and the Air Force elements who felt that they were treated as subordinates to the dominate Army and its capabilities. Those who opposed the new integrated culture referred to it as the “jarmy culture.”⁷⁴ What the CF Transformation did for the command and control structure is not of interest in this paper, but the fact that this transformation was executed by military management and policy development is. As stated earlier, it was an exciting time to be in uniform.

During General Hillier’s time as CDS he enjoyed the support of the public, the government and the flexibility of an increased defence budget. However, following his departure in 2008 the new CDS would be faced with the beginning of the end of the largest war Canada has participated in since WW 2, the war in Afghanistan. With the end of the war would come the traditional fiscal restraints and defence spending cuts. It was CDS now retired General Walter Natynczyk who ordered one of his top soldiers to conduct another review on the organization. The review would in fact produce the *Report on Transformation 2011*, led by retired Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, completed July of 2011. The aim of the report was to identify savings in the face of budget cutbacks. Ideas were to be developed that would increase efficiency and effectiveness and drive the ever required changes within the organization.

Report on Transformation 2011

The *Report on Transformation 2011*, recognized that the center of gravity for the CAF is the same as what this paper has proclaimed; its trained effective strength, “[o]ur

⁷⁴Allan English, *Outside CF Transformation Looking In*, Canadian Military Journal, (Vol 11, No. 2, Spring 2011), 16.

vital ground is our people, their equipment and their training. . .”⁷⁵ The report also set its sights on rerolling the vital personnel into new disciplines to reinvest in new capabilities that will ensure the existence of a relevant CAF. Once again an internal review would claim that there was too much of an administrative tail that needed to be removed in favor of the sharp edged front required for war making. The phrase used in the review was slightly different but the impact was very familiar. “In short we are going to have to reduce the tail of today while investing in the teeth of tomorrow.”⁷⁶

New Capabilities

As previously acknowledged, change is constant and essential within the CAF. Without it the organization cannot stay relevant or effective. Should the CAF plan to be a relevant tool for national defence, new capabilities must be introduced to defend against new threats. Threats such as those encountered in the ever growing cyber environment require new skills and expertise within the organization. However, to introduce new capabilities while reducing resources and investments into defence spending, could be counter productive as the organization would become preoccupied once again with internal reorganization and reallocation.

“To execute any policy adopted by governments, money must be converted into military capabilities appropriate to that policy.”⁷⁷ This was the promise of the Canada First Defence Strategy that announced a long term strategic investment plan.⁷⁸ However,

⁷⁵Department of National Defence, *Report on Transformation 2011*, accessed 15 November 2013, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/transformation.gov.html>, iv.

⁷⁶Ibid., iv.

⁷⁷Bland, *Transforming National Defence Administration* . . . , 12.

⁷⁸Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, Ottawa Ontario, n.d. 4.

it was clear to the organization and recognized in the *Report on Transformation 2011*, that this promise was not to be realized over the long-term. At the same time that the senior staff was digesting the proposed cuts in General Leslie's report, the government imposed yet another review with an eye on saving. The Strategic Review was launched with the intent to provide the government with an avenue to evaluate and reduce spending on government programs.⁷⁹ The senior leadership within the CAF, once again had cause for concern as they refocused all efforts internally once again.

Strategic Review

The organization went into another significant change mode. Personnel resources began to be reduced, targeting the civilian and the full-time Reserve populations of the department. The *Strategic Review* demanded a fast turn around with each environment forced to identify savings on programs through what was termed "low lying fruit". This is when the benefits to those who serve in the CAF were targeted. The large government program for relocations was considered to have "low lying fruit" and was harvested in the name of savings.

Over late night and weekend hours, the CAF IRP and its associated benefits were picked over, seeking benefits that could be taken away quickly resulting in perceived significant savings in dollars. One such benefit was the mortgage breaking penalty that had long been approved by TB in the relocation policy. When a CAF member is relocated and must sell their current residence, there was compensation if the financial institution that held their mortgage charged a fee to break or change the mortgage. There are methods, in most situations, to ensure that a fee is not incurred upon selling a home such

⁷⁹Perry, *Defence After the Recession* . . . , I.

as securing a portable mortgage when purchasing. However, the CAF personnel who is posted as deemed necessary by the organization to the location deemed necessary, for a specific time deemed necessary, will encounter housing markets and property values that differ greatly from one location to another. Therefore, if a member relocates from an area with high valued properties to an area that requires far less an investment to purchase the same size or appropriate home, the financial institutions will often consider the lesser mortgage requested to be a break in the previous agreement and will subsequently apply charges for breaking the mortgage. This places the member in a position where the penalties can be thousands of dollars after only having purchased the original home two or three years prior. Following the strategic review, no assistance would be offered the member and family for these fees. Another impact as a result of this change is felt by those who are in the training systems or posted out of country. Frequently members are posted out of country as previously discussed on prohibited postings. When the order to relocate on a prohibited posting is issued for domestic or out of country locations, the member is prohibited from purchasing a home. In this case there is no alternative but to break the mortgage they currently hold, resulting in significant fees from their financial institution.

As a result of the *Strategic Review* imposed by the government, the CAF organization dutifully complied and offered up cuts to programs in an effort to secure savings. CANFORGEN 145/12 CMP COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FRAMEWORK was issued 30 July 2012.⁸⁰ There was additional loss of benefits

⁸⁰Department of National Defence, *CANFORGEN 145/12 CMP COMPENSATION and BENEFITS FRAMEWORK CUTS*, accessed 14 June 2014, <http://canadianveteransadvocacy.com/Board2/index.php?PHPSESSID=cfd3dd278d450efc3e657d7d711498dd&action=printpage;topic=5476.0>.

identified in the CANFORGEN, such as pet care, disconnection and connection fees to name only three. Each of these costs incurred as a result of a relocation were referred to the posting allowance, once offered for compensation of the turbulence during a move, now offered as a means of payment for the relocation expenses. The Military Factor, once negotiated by government with the CAF to compensate for service life, was now being used to assist funding in the mandatory relocations. The recommendations made by both the SCONDVA and Military Ombudsman with regards to relocations were forgotten under the pressure of the *Strategic Review*. The impact of these cuts on the strategic intake and the trained effective strength of the CAF is yet to be seen.

OAG and TB

While at present time the OAG is conducting their most recent audit on the IRP, TB is conducting their own review. The aim of the TB review is to align benefits between the three entities of the integrated program; NJC, RCMP and CAF. The ultimate goal is to find cost savings through the alignment exercise. Following the *Strategic Review* the CAF lost relocation benefits that were retained by the NJC and the RCMP such as disconnect and connection fees. It will be interesting to see if they too will lose such benefits or if the CAF will regain what it lost in this WoG approach that claims to align like services, while applying the one-size-fits-all philosophy.

CONCLUSION

This paper has taken a look at the CAF organization, the requirement to manage and administer those who wear the uniform within and those who have joined the PoA. Distinct and unique from all other professions, the members of this organization, who will study and exercise the art of warfare, have agreed to accept unlimited liability. With this acceptance comes the belief that the government and the people of the nation for whom they serve, will grant them the necessary resources, training and support to ensure they are ready and capable to execute any task required of them.

Looking into the past it is possible to gain an appreciation of the complex administrative environment in which those in the PoA must function. The pressures applied to the business of national defence come from the same sources as does the required support. Pressures applied to the CAF from the government, public perception, reviews and audits, have at times forced the organization to buckle and fall into a state of low readiness. Distracted by the need to find new ways to do more with less and reallocate resources from within, all the while maintaining creditable capabilities on an ever changing battlefield, the CAF has found itself vulnerable to OGD and the private sector management methodologies.

Cost saving measures and programs such as ASD, have taken many of the traditional functions out of the hands of the military professional and placed them in the hands of those who do not have unlimited liability, nor in many cases, the understanding of what it truly means. In doing so, the policies associated with the essential military functions have become open to interpretation and manipulation by OGD and the public at large. The need to be accountable to those who provide support and resources is not in

dispute. However, the need to align and reduce the CAF personnel administrative policies and their associated benefits with OGD, in an effort to secure cost savings is in dispute.

“The appropriate national defence is the product of decisions shaped by political, strategic, budgetary, and public administration factors, all considered and balanced within the context of the facts of national life.”⁸¹ Understanding the facts of national life, more specifically, of life in the PoA, is essential to the development of appropriate policies. Having looked at some of the policies that affect the movement of troops and their families to include approximately 40,000 people each year, it is now possible to gain an appreciation of the impact a WoG approach can have on the CAF organization. The integration of a program such as the IRP opened the policies and processes applied to the essential function of relocating personnel to; OAG audits, OGD pressures, public litigation and misinterpretation. Additionally, it provided an avenue for the government to harvest perceived savings directly from those in the PoA.

It is possible to determine from the examples provided in this paper, that an alignment of benefits, an integration of a program and the application of one-size-fits-all philosophy delivers a direct impact on the personnel in the CAF. The SCNDVA and Military Ombudsman reports have confirmed that the policies surrounding relocations are amongst the main drivers of dissatisfaction and retention issues for personnel in the PoA.

Should the CAF wish to maintain a creditable, relevant and capable force it must not succumb to the pressures applied by government cutbacks, fiscal restraint, program initiatives and the belief that CAF policies can be aligned with OGD. The WoG approach should not infiltrate the management and administration of the CAF organization. The pressures associated with this approach have proven to influence and even change the

⁸¹Bland, *Transformation National Defence Administration* . . . , 1.

compensation and benefits offered those in the PoA. The repercussion of the pressures imposed by the WoG approach is felt at all levels ultimately affecting the strategic intake of personnel and the ability to retain and employ those in the PoA. One size does not fit all throughout the government of Canada, where in the complex environment of national defence the essential requirements are to have; the right person, in the right place, at the right time.

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