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## DOES CANADA PUNCH ABOVE ITS WEIGHT?

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Par le major A.J. Delhommeau

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## ABSTRACT

It is often said that Canada as a nation punches above its weight, but what exactly does this mean and does Canada indeed have the right to make this claim? This paper addresses this by equating Canada's weight to national power and then defining Canada's relative weight. It does so by taking three models for measuring national power and coming up with an average score to determine Canada's weight. It then looks at Canadian military and non-military international engagement in order to conclude whether Canada does punch above its weight. For Canada's military international engagement, Canadian defence policy was examined, as was defence spending relative to some other key allies. Next, Canada's significant contribution to the Afghanistan ISAF mission and to the Libya campaign, are examined. When all of these things were considered it is made clear that Canada does punch above its weight militarily. For Canada's non-military international engagement several areas are examined: Canadian participation in international organizations, Canadian foreign policy and international development assistance, and some specific examples of Canada's non-military international engagement. Also explored is the argument that Canada is not doing enough in the global community. As with military international engagement, the conclusion is that Canada is punching above its weight in the world when it comes to non-military international engagement. The overall conclusion of this paper is that Canada can in fact justifiably claim to punch above its weight in the world.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|  |    |
|--|----|
| ABSTRACT.....  | 1  |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS.....   | 2  |
| INTRODUCTION .....   | 3  |
| CHAPTER 1 – POWER, NATIONAL POWER AND CANADIAN POWER.....      | 7  |
| Power .....  | 7  |
| National Power.....  | 10 |
| Canadian Power .....   | 15 |
| CHAPTER 2 - CANADA’S WEIGHT .....                              | 21 |
| Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC).....           | 21 |
| National Power Index (NPI) .....                               | 22 |
| Comprehensive National Power (CNP) .....                       | 24 |
| Weight.....  | 25 |
| CHAPTER 3 - MILITARY .....                                     | 26 |
| General.....   | 26 |
| Afghanistan.....   | 33 |
| Libya .....  | 42 |
| Conclusion .....   | 46 |
| CHAPTER 4 – NON-MILITARY INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT .....        | 48 |
| Canada in International Organizations.....                     | 48 |
| Foreign Affairs and International Development Assistance ..... | 59 |
| Punching Above Its Weight .....                                | 61 |
| Counter Argument .....   | 66 |
| Conclusion .....   | 68 |
| CONCLUSION.....  | 69 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY .....   | 72 |

## INTRODUCTION

*Canada is what I like to call a “smart power.” And this is what has allowed us, throughout our history, to “punch above our weight,” if you will. It is how we continue to “punch above our weight” today.*

- Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird at 12th Annual Herzliya Conference, 30 Jan 2012<sup>1</sup>

It is often said that Canada as a nation punches above its weight, but what exactly does this mean and does Canada indeed have the right to make this claim? The term ‘punching above one’s weight’ comes from boxing where weight is easy to quantify: step on a scale and you find your weight. Weight is then used to assign a class. For example, if one is 70 kg, then one is a middle weight. Punching above your weight as a boxer would mean that, as a 70 kg middle weight fighter you have the punching power of an 82 kg heavy weight. When it is said that a country punches above its weight, what does that mean and how can one quantify or measure this? After all, you cannot put a country on a scale. The best way to determine if a country, in this case Canada, punches above its weight is to first and foremost define said weight. The most logical and defensible way to do this is to assess Canada’s national power and use it as a measure of weight. Only after doing this is it possible to try and determine whether or not Canada does in fact punch above its weight.

In order to so, this paper will first explore some of the existing literature defining power, national power, and how Canadian power has typically been identified in the international context. The next step is to measure Canadian power – a more complicated endeavor. Because the measuring of power is exceedingly complicated and there is no single agreed upon method

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<sup>1</sup> John Baird (speech, 12th Annual Herzliya Conference, Herzliya, Israel, 30 Jan 2012).

that can be accepted by all interested parties, this paper will consider three different existing models for measuring national power.

The first, Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC), is a product of the Correlates of War Project, founded by J. David Singer at the University of Michigan in 1963, and focuses on “configurations of power, as indicated by national capabilities.”<sup>2</sup> These capabilities consist of total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure.<sup>3</sup>

The second, Comprehensive National Power (CNP), comes out of China and is based on a premise from former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping that “strength requires the inclusion of a variety of factors, such as territory, natural resources, military force, economic power, social conditions, domestic government, foreign policy, and international influence.”<sup>4</sup> Xiaoping went on to say that “in measuring a country's national power, one must look at it comprehensively and from all sides.”<sup>5</sup> Xiaoping’s belief regarding national power was further refined and developed but Colonel Huang Shuofeng of the Chinese Academy of Military Science who came up with the term Comprehensive National Power and established the actual model that can be used to measure a nation’s power.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Richard L Merritt and Dina A Zinnes, “Foreward,” in *Measuring the Correlates of War*, ed. J. David Singer and Paul F. Diehl, viii (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1990).

<sup>3</sup> Paul F. Diehl, Correlates of War, “National Material Capabilities,” Accessed 15 January 2013. [http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/cow/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml;jsessionid=f9143e0fd69d0ab961416460c7a8?globalId=hdl:1902.1/10170&studyListingIndex=0\\_f9143e0fd69d0ab961416460c7a8](http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/cow/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml;jsessionid=f9143e0fd69d0ab961416460c7a8?globalId=hdl:1902.1/10170&studyListingIndex=0_f9143e0fd69d0ab961416460c7a8)

<sup>4</sup> Michael Pillsbury, *China debates the future security environment* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2000), 203.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 204.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 211.

The final model that will be examined is the National Power Index (NPI). This model consists of five sub-categories: economy, military, diplomacy, technology and popularity which are measured and calculated using the International Futures (IFs) computer model in order to come up with a comparative national ranking.<sup>7</sup> The IFs computer model, based out of the University of Denver in Colorado, “is a large-scale, long-term, integrated global modeling system. It represents demographic, economic, energy, agricultural, socio-political, and environmental subsystems for 183 countries interacting in the global system.”<sup>8</sup>

After examining all three of these models, Canada’s national power relative to other countries in the world will be determined based upon the average result of the three models. In essence, this paper will determine Canada’s ranking – its weight as a nation – as a measure of national power.

Once Canada’s weight, or power, has been determined, the next step is to seek to conclude whether or not Canada does in fact punch above its weight. It will endeavor to do this in two ways. The first way is by examining Canada’s military in the post-9/11 timeframe. Broadly speaking, it will examine Canadian military policy and spending and do so relative to other countries. It will then, perhaps most importantly, look at military engagement by using two key examples. The first will be Canada’s military engagement in the Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The next will be Canada’s involvement in the United Nations (UN) sanctioned, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led Operation Unified Protector which imposed an arms embargo and no-fly zone on Libya and “called on the international

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<sup>7</sup> National Power Index, Accessed 15 January 2013, <http://nationranking.wordpress.com/2011/03/06/2011-npi/>

<sup>8</sup> International Futures, The University of Denver, Accessed on 15 January 2013, <http://www.ifs.du.edu/>

community to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas in Libya.<sup>9</sup> After examining all of these areas, this paper will conclude that, militarily, Canada punches above its weight.

The next area that will be looked at is Canadian non-military international engagement, again in the post-9/11 timeframe, in order to determine if Canada punches above its weight in non-military international engagements. This will be done first looking at Canada's participation in a multitude of international organizations. It will then look at Canadian foreign policy and international development assistance in general. Next, some examples of Canadian international engagement that demonstrate Canada's significant international contributions will be examined. Finally, it will look at some arguments that say that Canada could be doing more in the world. After scrutinizing all of these areas, this paper will conclude that Canada does in fact punch above its weight when considering non-military international engagement.

Having defined Canada's national power, and after concluding that Canada does punch above its weight militarily and non-militarily, this paper will conclude that Canada as a nation does in fact punch above its weight, and as such, can justifiably make that claim to the world.

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<sup>9</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Canada's Response to the Situation in Libya," Accessed on 20 January 2013, <http://www.international.gc.ca/international/libya-libye.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>



## CHAPTER 1 – POWER, NATIONAL POWER AND CANADIAN POWER

Over the years, much has been written about power, national power and Canadian power. Before defining Canada's weight, or national power, for the purposes of determining whether or not Canada does in fact punch above its weight, this chapter will first discuss the concepts of power and national power. It will then explore some of the literature that exists on Canadian power in order to better understand the dominant ideas surrounding Canadian power.

### Power

Power as a concept is something which has been studied extensively. Philosopher and Nobel Prize winning author Bertrand Russell wrote in his 1960 work *Power: A New Social Analysis* that “power may be defined as the production of intended effects. It is thus a quantitative concept: given two men with similar desires, if one achieves all the desires that the other achieves, and also others, he has more power than that other.”<sup>10</sup> Russell goes on to say that power over people can be classified by the way it is influenced over others. For instance, power can be directly physical such as police or military power. It can be exercised by a series of rewards, punishments or inducements, such as in an economic sense, whereby employment is given or withheld and bonuses are paid for good performance and reprimands are given for poor

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<sup>10</sup> Bertrand Russell, *Power: A New Social Analysis*, (London: Unwin Books, 1960), 27.

performance. Finally, power can be exercised through influence, a more subtle way to exercise power.<sup>11</sup> Arguably Russell's definition is equally applicable to individuals, groups or nations.

Economist John Kenneth Galbraith, in his book *Anatomy of Power*, contends that there are three distinct types of power: condign power, compensatory power, and conditioned power.<sup>12</sup> Condign power is inherently negative in that it threatens physical or punitive actions in order to force someone to your will. Conversely, compensatory power is affirmative in that it offers payment, reward or compensation to achieve one's ends. Both of these are linked in that they achieve submission through either the promise of reward or the threat of sanction.<sup>13</sup> With conditioned power, by contrast, submission is not someone giving in. Rather submission is achieved through the force of ideas, persuasion or education. Essentially, power is achieved by getting your opponent to see your ideas or course of action as the better course of action.<sup>14</sup> As with Russell's ideas on power, Galbraith's are equally applicable when looking at the actions of individuals or states.

Power as a concept is something which is widely studied in political science in general and even more specifically in international relations. As stated by political scientist David A. Baldwin, "most definitions of politics involve power. Most international interactions are political or have ramifications for politics. Thus it is not surprising that power has been prominent in discussions of international interaction from Thucydides to the present day."<sup>15</sup> As a consequence of this, power is addressed in many political science textbooks and the content is based largely

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<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 27-28.

<sup>12</sup> John Kenneth Galbraith, *Anatomy of Power*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983), 4.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 15-22.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 5, 6 and 24.

<sup>15</sup> David A. Baldwin, "Power and International Relations," *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons. (London: Sage Publications, 2002):177.

on the widely accepted literature on the subject. An example of this is *Politics, Power and the Common Good: An Introduction to Political Science*. In this introduction, power is discussed as a means to an end rather than a goal in and of itself. For example, “power is often sought to achieve particular objectives, such as protecting the security of a country.”<sup>16</sup> It goes on to state that power is the ability to influence others, specifically by getting them to do something they otherwise would not have, in order to achieve a particular objective. It further articulates that power is not easily quantifiable or measurable, it can be situation dependent, and it by no means implies total dominance of one party over another. Power is something which can be seen as essential in order to persuade nations to work cooperatively in order to achieve a goal that is for the greater good of all such as cooperation on issues such as environment, economy, and security.<sup>17</sup>

*Politics, Power and the Common Good: An Introduction to Political Science* also discusses several different ways that power can be exercised. Coercion involves one party using intimidation or fear to achieve an objective. Inducement is when rewards or bribes are used to influence. Persuasion is when the person or nation exercising power brings someone to their way of thinking by convincing them to voluntarily come on side. And finally, it suggests that power can be exercised through leadership such as when a country successfully provides security and prosperity of its people, then others may seek to follow or emulate.<sup>18</sup> Power also is noted to be distributed unevenly, is much more complicated than simply a sum of resources, and some nations are much more capable of mobilizing the power that they possess than others are.

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<sup>16</sup> Eric Mintz, David Close, and Osvaldo Croci. *Politics, Power and the Common Good: An Introduction to Political Science*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Toronto: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2009): 7.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 9-11.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

Finally, this text discusses the three faces of power as a way to analyze power distribution. The first face is simply that which is most successful at affecting various decisions. The second face is the ability to control or influence the agenda. For example if one can keep an issue that would be harmful or damaging to one's interests off the agenda, then one is exercising a means of power. Finally, the third face of power is that which affects the dominant ideas in a given area, which allows the shaping of perceptions and ideas.<sup>19</sup>

One of the most cited definitions of power is one that was put forward by preeminent political scientist Robert A. Dahl in his 1957 paper "The Concept of Power" which states: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do."<sup>20</sup> The idea of how exactly it is exercised really does not take away from Dahl's description of power and, given this and the wide academic recognition of this statement; this is an apt description of power.

### **National Power**

One of the preeminent minds in the area of international relations of the last century, Hans Morgenthau, discusses power and national power in his book *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, a work which is "considered by many the premier text in international politics."<sup>21</sup> Morgenthau states that "International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the

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<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 11-14.

<sup>20</sup> Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science* 2, no. 3 (1957): 202-203.

<sup>21</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 7<sup>th</sup> ed. Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 29.

immediate aim.”<sup>22</sup> He goes on to write that a nation “may also try to further its realization through nonpolitical means, such as technical cooperation with other nations or international organizations. But whenever they strive to realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power.”<sup>23</sup> Although national power can almost be understood intuitively given how power has been defined and what has been said about power, Morgenthau contends that national power is not only an application of power as a concept on a national scale, it is also a manifestation of the collective desire of individuals within a society or nation for power.<sup>24</sup> He further argues that “power pursued by the individual for his own sake is considered an evil to be tolerated only within certain bounds and in certain manifestations. Power disguised by ideologies and pursued in the name and for the sake of the nation becomes a good for which all citizens must strive.”<sup>25</sup>

Hans Morgenthau postulates that there are several factors that make up national power and must be considered in any attempt to determine a nation’s power. These elements of national power, as he refers to them are: geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy, and the quality of government.<sup>26</sup> Geography is the most stable element of national power as one cannot change the location of a nation. A country’s geography can be seen as either a strength or a weakness. A country that has no natural obstacles or barriers at its borders can be seen as more

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<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 113-115.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 115.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 122-162.

vulnerable, whereas a continental country such as the United States or Canada, which are largely surrounded by oceans, can be seen as more easily defensible and thereby a source of strength.<sup>27</sup>

Another stable element of national power is natural resources, which are further broken down into food and raw materials. It is a source of strength for a nation, such as Canada, to be self-sufficient in food production and, conversely, a source of weakness to be dependent on imports of food as this makes a nation more vulnerable in times of crisis or war.<sup>28</sup> Self-sufficiency or near self-sufficiency in the raw materials necessary for modern industrial production is a source of power; again, the opposite is true in that a total reliance on imports is a weakness in a country. Some specific raw materials, such as oil, are disproportionate sources of power,<sup>29</sup> not only because of the ability to function independently, but because of the ability to exercise power or control over others who are dependent on the resource.

Industrial capacity is also an essential element of a nation's power. If a nation has natural resources but does not have sufficient modern industrial capacity to use the resources, then that nation will have less power than a nation who not only possesses the resources, but has the capacity to use them. For example, the Congo had significant deposits of uranium but does not have the ability to use it for peaceful power generation or military purposes, whereas Canada also has significant uranium deposits but has the industrial capacity to turn it into power production or, should it desire, into military capability.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 122-124.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 124-126.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 126-130.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 131-133.

The next element of national power that Morgenthau discusses is military preparedness. This element, he espouses, is comprised of technology, leadership, and quality and quantity of a nation's armed forces, but is largely shaped and influenced by the elements of geography, natural resources and industrial capacity. Power in these first three elements enables a country to leverage them into military preparedness.<sup>31</sup> Given the high-tech nature of modern warfare, technological proficiency is an essential element of military preparedness. If a military is technologically superior to an adversary or potential adversary, it is more likely to be able to achieve victory or concessions. Nonetheless, the quality of military leadership should never be discounted as an essential part of military capabilities. Finally, the quality and quantity of a country's military is key to military preparedness and consequently power. A nation that is able to strike the right balance between the number of personnel in the various elements of their forces and the right level of training and readiness will have a great advantage in any potential confrontation and therefore will provide their country with an increased measure of power.<sup>32</sup>

The next element of national power is population. Population size, trends and demographics can be essential in determining not only a nation's power, but its power potential. Although countries with the largest population do not directly translate into the most powerful countries, having a relatively large population does support the potential number of military personnel and industrial workers. As well, a country that is declining in population or whose growth has stagnated compared to others could potentially see its power affected. Equally true is that population distribution can affect national power. For example a country that demographically has a significant percentage outside the age bracket that could provide military

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<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 133.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 133-136.

manpower is likely to have its power diminished when compared to a nation whose population is younger.<sup>33</sup>

The next three elements of national power according to Morgenthau are all very human in nature and are much more difficult to quantify or measure. The first is national character, which is essentially the intellectual and moral qualities that peoples in countries possess that can make them unique and can undoubtedly affect national power both in war and in peace as it can, in part, lead to resilience and determination. One only needs to look at the example of how Germany recovered after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 to see what strong national character can accomplish.<sup>34</sup>

The next element of national power is national morale which is described as “the degree of determination with which a nation supports the foreign policies of its government in peace and war.”<sup>35</sup> National morale is unstable and difficult to measure but it can have a profound effect on national power as it is an intangible which “permeates all activities of a nation, its agricultural and industrial production as well as its military establishment and diplomatic service... its presence or absence and its qualities reveal themselves particularly in times of national crisis.”<sup>36</sup> The Battle of Britain during the Second World War illustrates well how good national morale affected the will of the people to endure and prevail at any cost.

The final human centered element of national power is the quality of a country’s diplomacy. Morgenthau contends that this is the most important element of national power

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 137-140.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 140-144.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 147.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 147.



because it brings together all of the other elements of national power and “awakens their slumbering potentialities by giving them the breath of actual power... diplomacy, one might say, is the brains of national power.”<sup>37</sup> This leads to the final element of overall national power: the quality of government. Good government essentially balances all of the other elements of national power, from the human and material capital to the quality and goals of foreign policy. Good government can strike the right balance and gain greater power for a nation, whereas poor government can actually diminish what would otherwise be good power potential.<sup>38</sup>

There is some debate as to what are the essential elements or components of national power, however Morgenthau’s elements of national power come from one of the foremost experts in the area of international relations and are some of the most widely studied and, as shall be seen later in this paper, they are common threads throughout the models which we will use to determine Canada’s weight or national power.

### **Canadian Power**

Having examined some definitions of power and national power, the question needs answering: how has Canada’s national power been quantified or looked upon traditionally? Canadian power within the international context has typically been identified in one of three ways: as a middle power, a satellite power, or a major, principal or foremost power.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 152-153.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 156-157.

<sup>39</sup> Kim Richard Nossal, Stephane Roussel, and Stephane Paquin, *International Policy and Politics in Canada* (Toronto: Pearson, 2011), 50.

The idea of Canada being a middle power has been central to Canadian foreign policy since the Second World War when Canada used the “concept to further its foreign policy aims and to promote nationalism through an internationally recognized identity.”<sup>40</sup> Canada felt that although it was by no means a great power, it deserved recognition as being more influential and powerful than the majority of other countries. Although the concept of middle power was being debated at the end of the Second World War in 1945, the concept was not defined until 1947 when Canadian diplomat R.G. Riddell stated, “the middle powers are those which by reason of their size, their material resources, their willingness and ability to accept responsibility, their influence and stability are close to being great powers.”<sup>41</sup> There are two general ways of defining a middle power: the first is positional, as in how a country ranks in the international hierarchy when considering elements of power such as population, resources and military abilities. The second is by how a country conducts its foreign policy namely by advocating for steadiness in the international system and pursuing a multilateral approach to foreign policy.<sup>42</sup> Although the prominence of the idea of Canada being a middle power has ebbed and flowed depending on the government in power, overall it has remained probably the most prominent assessment of Canada’s power status since the end of the Second World War.<sup>43</sup>

Possibly the least accepted and least flattering view of Canadian power is the contention that Canada is simply a satellite power. This idea posits that Canada essentially went from a colonial country dependent on Great Britain, to being a country that is dependent on the United

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<sup>40</sup> Adam Chapnick, “The Canadian Middle Power Myth,” *International Journal* 55, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 188.

<sup>41</sup> James Eayrs, “From Middle to Foremost Power: Defining a New Place for Canada in the Hierarchy of World Power,” *International Perspectives* (May/June 1975): 20.

<sup>42</sup> Kim Richard Nossal, Stephane Roussel, and Stephane Paquin, *International Policy and Politics in Canada*, 54-55.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 54-59.

States.<sup>44</sup> As Canadian historian Frank Underhill stated: “In 1940 we passed from the British century of our history to the American century. We became dependent upon the United States for our security. We have, therefore, no choice but to follow American leadership.”<sup>45</sup> This idea gains some traction from Canadian economic dependence on the US, but it is not widely regarded as an accurate representation of Canada as a power.

The third view of Canadian power is that of principal or foremost power. Writing in 1975, renowned Canadian political scientist James Eayrs contended that three events happened between 1970 and 1975 which elevated Canada from its somewhat traditional status as a middle power: the emergence of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the increasing ability of resources to establish wealth, and the decline of the United States.<sup>46</sup> The emergence of OPEC, Eayrs argued, had two consequences relating to the power of nations. First, industrialized countries that were dependent on oil that lacked access to the North Sea oil resources would see their power decrease. Conversely, industrialized countries that were self-sufficient when it came to oil, such as Canada, would see their power increase.<sup>47</sup> Although Eayrs did not negate the importance of technology, he argued that the relative increase in power conferred by technology was decreasing while, simultaneously, relative power was increasing as a function of resources. Essentially, he argued that raw material, minerals and food would not only increase wealth, it would enable countries such as Canada, which possessed an abundance of these, to better overcome anything that might happen in the future, short of nuclear war. Canada had the resources, as well as the ability to exploit technology and thereby was

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<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 60.

<sup>45</sup> Kenneth McNaught, “From Colony to Satellite,” in *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?*, ed Stephen Clarkson, 175 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968).

<sup>46</sup> James Eayrs, “From Middle to Foremost Power, 22-24.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 22-23.

increasingly powerful.<sup>48</sup> Finally, Eayrs claims that because of events such as Watergate and the Vietnam War, the United States was experiencing declining self-confidence and prestige and thereby declining power as well. As a country that is measured against the US, Canada, he contended, could only see a relative power increase. These three events, Eayrs argued elevated Canada from a middle power to what he termed a foremost power.<sup>49</sup>

Building upon James Eayrs belief that Canada is more than a middle power, David Dewitt and John Kirton also argue in their 1983 work *Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations* that Canada is no longer a middle power, but rather has been elevated to the role of principal world power. Dewitt and Kirton state that there were two post-Second World War schools of thought on Canadian foreign policy: the liberal internationalist and the peripheral dependent. The liberal internationalist school posits that Canada, as a middle power, was focused on multinational and international institutions and almost never exercised direct power for its own advantage.<sup>50</sup> The peripheral dependent school believed that Canada was too economically dependent on the US, was induced into supporting US policies and that Canada's support for international institutions was partly based on the advantage these systems gave to the Americans.<sup>51</sup> Dewitt and Kirton argue that neither of these schools of thought take into account changes in the international system predicated on the US defeat in the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in February 1968, the US battering of the international

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<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 23-24.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>50</sup> David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations*, (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1983): 1-2.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

monetary and trade system in August 1971, or the vulnerability of the Americans to the oil shocks in October 1973.<sup>52</sup>

As a result of this, Dewitt and Kirton propose a new school of thought – complex neo-realism – which in part argues that the relative decline of the United States created a diffusion of power in the international system.<sup>53</sup> Although Canada in and of itself would not be considered a principal power, the “increasingly diffuse international system whose structure and order are no longer defined by the dominant powers of old”<sup>54</sup> created the opportunity for Canada to be raised to the status of principal power. This opportunity, coupled with the policies of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s government which were based “on policies, domestic and external, that promote economic growth, social justice and an enhanced quality of life for Canadians”<sup>55</sup> combined to raise Canada to the status of principal power. Dewitt and Kirton define a principal power as a power near the top of the global system who not only acts in pursuit of their own interests, they do so according to their values and with a goal to fostering an international system that cannot be dominated by any single state.<sup>56</sup> An example of Trudeau’s manifestation of Canada as a principal power was through Canadian recognition of the People’s Republic of China on 10 October 1970.<sup>57</sup> In addition to this, Dewitt and Kirton state that military and economic power have been seen as the traditional bases of national power. Although still somewhat relevant to determining power, they argue that given the diffusion in power in the international realm, population, resources and technology are now more applicable, and less

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<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 117-118.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 403.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>57</sup> Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein. *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Toronto: Thomson, Nelson, 2008): 257.

biased as determinants of power, not only because these three elements are large indicators of military and economic power in the present, but also because they are significant indicators of power potential in the future. They go on to argue that when it comes to these three elements, Canada is well endowed for the present and even more so for the future.<sup>58</sup>

Having now examined the concept of power and national power, and having examined the dominant ideas in literature pertaining to Canadian power, the next chapter will attempt to determine Canada's weight or national power.

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<sup>58</sup> David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power*, 117-120.

## CHAPTER 2 - CANADA'S WEIGHT

The previous chapter discussed three different views of Canadian power: middle power, satellite power and foremost or principal power. All three of these have legitimate arguments and varying degrees of support, however they would be difficult to use to quantify Canada's national power in order to determine its weight for the purposes of this paper. This quantifying is necessary to determine whether or not Canada does in fact punch above its weight. This paper will now look at the three models for measuring national power, take the models' ranking of Canadian power, and average them in order to determine Canada's weight or national power.

### **Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC)**

The first model that will be used is the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC). As previously stated in the introduction, this model comes out of the Correlates of War Project. CINC focuses on power as indicated by national capabilities specifically looking at six factors: total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure.<sup>59</sup> These six factors are taken as a ratio of a world total in order to determine the CINC score. The CINC totals divide up 100 percent of the total power in the world among all the countries assessed. For example, the most recent CINC calculation by the Correlates of War Project in 2007 determined that the most powerful country in the world was China with a total of 19.8587% of the total world power, followed by the United States with

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<sup>59</sup> Paul F. Diehl, Correlates of War, "National Material Capabilities," Accessed 15 January 2013. [http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/cow/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml;jsessionid=f9143e0fd69d0ab961416460c7a8?globalId=hdl:1902.1/10170&studyListingIndex=0\\_f9143e0fd69d0ab961416460c7a8](http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/cow/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml;jsessionid=f9143e0fd69d0ab961416460c7a8?globalId=hdl:1902.1/10170&studyListingIndex=0_f9143e0fd69d0ab961416460c7a8)

14.2149% of the total world power. The 2007 CINC ranking assessed that Canada is ranked the 21<sup>st</sup> most powerful country in the world with 1.0683% of the total share of world power.<sup>60</sup>

Although CINC is one of the most widely used measures of national capability, or power,<sup>61</sup> it is, as one might expect from the Correlates of War Project, more heavily weighted on military power and the ability and potential to wage war.

### **National Power Index (NPI)**

The next model is the National Power Index (NPI). This is a quantifiable ranking of national power that uses data extrapolated from the International Futures (IFs) model. This model was “developed over several generations, principally by Dr. Barry B. Hughes of the University of Denver and the Josef Korbel School of International Studies.”<sup>62</sup> As stated earlier, it “is a large-scale, long-term, integrated global modeling system. It represents demographic, economic, energy, agricultural, socio-political, and environmental subsystems for 183 countries interacting in the global system.”<sup>63</sup> The NPI, which is based on the situation at the time of calculation and does not take into consideration things such as economic growth or government ideologies, is calculated with information from the IF database looking at five indexes which the NPI weights to create orders of importance. These indexes are: economy (35%), military (35%), diplomacy (10%), technology (10%), and popularity (10%).<sup>64</sup> These indexes are calculated using several sub-components. The economic index is calculated using a country’s Gross Domestic

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<sup>60</sup> Correlates of War, National Material Capabilities (v4.0), *Composite Index of National Capability*, Accessed on 5 February 2013, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc4.htm#cinc>

<sup>61</sup> Correlates of War, Accessed on 5 February 2013. <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>

<sup>62</sup> International Futures, The University of Denver, Accessed on 15 January 2013, <http://www.ifs.du.edu/>

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> National Power Index, Accessed 15 January 2013, <http://nationranking.wordpress.com/2011/03/06/2011-npi/>



Product (GDP), the current account balance, the public finances,<sup>65</sup> and the number of global 500 corporations.<sup>66</sup> The military index uses a country's nuclear protection (taking into consideration the extent of protection and the independence of protection), the number of manpower fit for military service, military expenditures, and the ability for military power projection (which takes into consideration logistical abilities for long distance deployments, the number of oceans and continents accessible to one's own territory and from foreign controlled bases).<sup>67</sup> The diplomatic index is calculated by considering the size of diplomatic core (taking into consideration the number of missions and the number of countries with missions), United Nations (UN) membership, and permanent UN Security Council membership. The technology index considers the total number of patents and industrial designs. And finally, the popularity index is calculated by looking at official development aid and the British Broadcasting Corporation Attitudes toward Countries poll (factoring in 'mainly positive' views and 'mainly negative' views).<sup>68</sup> When all of these indexes were used to calculate the most recent results for the NPI for 2011, Canada ranked 8<sup>th</sup> in the world in terms of economy, 12<sup>th</sup> militarily, 16<sup>th</sup> for diplomacy, 9<sup>th</sup> in technology, and 6<sup>th</sup> for popularity. All of this combines to give Canada an overall National Power ranking as the 9<sup>th</sup> most powerful country in the world.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Public Finances is the effort needed to balance the government budget and reimburse the government debt over a 10 year period, as percentage of government revenue, National Power Index, Accessed 4 February 2013, <http://nationranking.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/nation-ranking-methodology.pdf>

<sup>66</sup> National Power Index, Accessed 4 February 2013, <http://nationranking.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/nation-ranking-methodology.pdf>

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, Accessed 4 February 2013.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, Accessed 4 February 2013.

<sup>69</sup> National Power Index, Accessed 15 January 2013, <http://nationranking.wordpress.com/2011/03/06/2011-npi/>

## Comprehensive National Power (CNP)

The final model which will be used to determine Canada's power ranking is Comprehensive National Power (CNP). As previously stated in the introduction, no method of measuring national power is simple or straightforward. That being said, CNP is undeniably the most complicated of the three models this paper uses; it is also the one with the least comprehended calculations. Despite this, the CNP model will be used to give a score, in large part because it comes out of China and the other two models used are Western based, and therefore possibly biased on Western thinking whereas CNP offers an undeniably Eastern perspective. By including CNP, this paper hopes to have a more balanced average ranking of national power for Canada. "CNP refers to the combined overall conditions and strengths of a country and power indices [the measurements] were designed to measure a country's national power comprehensively and from all angles"<sup>70</sup> The idea of CNP came from former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's belief that "in measuring a country's national power, one must look at it comprehensively and from all sides."<sup>71</sup> Xiaoping's belief regarding national power was further refined and developed by Colonel Huang Shuofeng of the Chinese Academy of Military Science who came up with the term Comprehensive National Power and established the actual model that can be used to measure a nation's power.<sup>72</sup> Colonel Shuofeng's model is based on a series of national power factors. These being national resources, science and technology, economic,

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<sup>70</sup> Weihong Zhang, "China's Cultural Future: From Soft Power to Comprehensive National Power," *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 16 no. 4 (November 2010): 386.

<sup>71</sup> Michael Pillsbury, *China debates the future security environment*, 204.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 211.

national defence, cultural and educational, foreign affairs, national embodiment, and coordinated power. These factors are then used to calculate CNP.<sup>73</sup> The complex calculations using this model rank Canada as the 10<sup>th</sup> most powerful country in the world.<sup>74</sup>

## **Weight**

Having now taken the power ranking for Canada from the three different models, 21<sup>st</sup> for Composite Index of National Capabilities, 9<sup>th</sup> for National Power Index, and 10<sup>th</sup> for Comprehensive National Power, (all of which have factors that are not at all dissimilar to Morgenthau's elements of national power), Canada's national power, or weight, will be determined by taking an average of the three models. Doing this, it can be determined that Canada's national power ranks as the 13<sup>th</sup> most powerful country in the world. Given this, for the purposes of this paper, when it is argued that Canada punches above its weight, it will be considered as contributing greater than that which might be expected of a country with the ranking of 13.

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<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 232-239.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 248.

## CHAPTER 3 - MILITARY

### General

Canada as a country is in a fortunate position for any number of reasons, one of which being its geographical location insofar as it is provided a large measure of security by the United States. As Canadian strategic thinker R.J. Sutherland stated in 1962, “the United States is bound to defend Canada from external aggression almost regardless of whether or not Canadians wish to be defended.”<sup>75</sup> This has led to much debate over the years as to how much Canada should invest in defence. One of the most notable arguments on this topic is from political scientist Nils Orvik who came up with the idea of ‘defence against help.’ He argued that Canadian and American security was essentially the same thing and in order for Canada to maintain sovereignty and security, it must do its share for the collective defence.<sup>76</sup> Despite Orvik’s contention, the reality of the security provided by the United States has meant that, when it comes to military spending, Canada could be somewhat of a free rider, and arguably, by the time of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, Canada, at least from the perspective of the Americans, was trending that way. Despite significant contributions to peacekeeping in the 1990s, most notably in the former Yugoslavia, for the Liberal government under Prime Minister Jean Chretien, Defence was not a priority. Canada was portraying itself almost as a ‘moral superpower,’ unfortunately without the teeth to back it up.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> R.J. Sutherland, “Canada’s Long-Term Strategic Situation,” *International Journal* 17, no. 3 (Summer 1962): 202.

<sup>76</sup> Nils Orvik, “Canadian Security and ‘Defence Against Help,’” *International Perspectives*, (May/June 1983), 6.

A prosperous nation, Canada possesses an abundance of natural resources and a robust economy. There is no doubt that Canada has the means to be punching above its weight militarily in the world. The reality, however, is that the means must be matched by the political will in order for a country to actually punch above its weight in the world, and in the years leading up to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, Canada was arguably not matching the means with the will to contribute disproportionately in the world. This changed after the attacks, but even more so after Paul Martin replaced Chretien as Prime Minister in 2003. Martin made defence a priority and started Canada back on the path to punching above its weight militarily from a resource and policy perspective.

In April 2005, Prime Minister Martin's Minister of National Defence, Bill Graham, released a Defence Policy Statement titled, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence*. This document stated a number of things which were good for Canada's military. First of all, it reflected that the 2005 Budget made the most significant defence investment in decades, totaling \$13 billion over twenty years.<sup>78</sup> Not only did it call for an increase in funding for defence, it called for the Canadian Forces to increase by 5,000 regular force and 3,000 reserve force personnel. It also outlined a series of significant capital investments that would take place such as modernizing the Halifax class frigates, acquiring unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and replacing the Leopard I tank with a new mobile gun system.<sup>79</sup> This document went on to outline a vision for transformation of the Canadian Forces. This transformation called upon the CF to:

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<sup>77</sup> Joseph R. Nunez, "Canada's Global Role: A Strategic Assessment of its Military Power," *Parameters* 34, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 76-79.

<sup>78</sup> Department of National Defence, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence*. Ottawa: Assistant Deputy Minister Public Affairs, 2005.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-15.

- adopt a fully integrated and unified approach to operations;
- evaluate the force structure on an ongoing basis;
- improve coordination with other government departments and interoperability with allied forces;
- update the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities;
- place greater emphasis on experimentation; and
- continue to invest in people.<sup>80</sup>

Although this policy statement reiterated that defence of Canada and North America would always be the first priority for the Canadian Forces, it also emphasized that defence at home starts abroad, and because of this the CF must have expeditionary capabilities which are able to operate in failed and failing states and do so in the full spectrum of operations from humanitarian assistance to combat operations.<sup>81</sup> This policy statement put the Canadian Forces on track to punch above its weight from a defence policy and resource perspective, a track which would not only be followed, but would be expedited and improved upon by the subsequent Conservative government.

As much as defence was a priority for Prime Minister Martin, especially when compared with Jean Chretien, it was even more of a priority for the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper. This was clearly in evidence in the Speech from the Throne on 16 October 2007 which stated: “Our Government will modernize Canada’s military to provide effective surveillance and protection for all of our country, cooperate in the defence of North America, and meet our responsibilities abroad to the United Nations and our allies.”<sup>82</sup> The speech went on to say that “rebuilding our capabilities and standing up for our sovereignty have sent a clear message to the world: Canada is back as a credible player on the international stage.

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<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 11-12.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-3.

<sup>82</sup> Michaëlle Jean, “Speech from the Throne to Open the Second Session Thirty-Ninth Parliament of Canada,” (Speech, Ottawa, October 16, 2007).

Our government believes that focus and action, rather than rhetoric and posturing, are restoring our influence in global affairs.”<sup>83</sup> A significant section of this Speech from the Throne pertained to defence and can be seen as a statement to both the Canadian people and to Canada’s allies that Canada was going to match the resources and the political will necessary to punch above its weight militarily.

The Conservatives followed this by releasing the *Canada First Defence Strategy* (CFDS) in May 2008. This document emphasized that the government was going to fund the Canadian Forces appropriately to enable a modern, first class military capable of dealing with the volatile realities of the complex modern world. CFDS stressed that there were three key roles for the CF: to “deliver excellence at home, be a strong and reliable partner in the defence of North America, and project leadership abroad by contributing to international operations in support of Canadian interests and values.”<sup>84</sup> Of particular note for this paper is the contributing to North American defence and to international operations. The CFDS emphasizes that Canada will be a reliable defence partner in the defence of North America with the Americans, and that Canada will maintain interoperability both in terms of equipment and doctrine.<sup>85</sup> Because the Canadian government was committing to interoperability with the Americans, the most technologically and doctrinally advanced military in the world; they were declaring that the Canadian Forces would also stay on the cutting edge. For contributing to international peace and security, the CFDS echoed the Martin government’s commitment that the CF would be capable of deploying for the full scale of missions up to and including combat. But the Harper government was even more

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<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2008), 7.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

forceful when it stated that “Canada cannot lead with words alone. Above all else, leadership requires the ability to deploy military assets, including ‘boots on the ground.’ In concert with its allies, Canada must be prepared to act and provide appropriate resources in support of national interests and objectives.”<sup>86</sup> The CFDS also commits (some of it reiterating previous announcements) to recapitalizing key defence capabilities by procuring equipment such as the C-130J Hercules transport aircraft, replacing destroyers and frigates, and fighter aircraft. And even more importantly from the perspective of Canada punching above its weight militarily, it commits to significant new capabilities such as the C-17 Globemaster, the CH-47F Chinook helicopter and the Arctic/Offshore patrol ship.<sup>87</sup> These replacements and new investments truly have helped and will continue to help the Canadian Forces punch above its weight. This is especially true for assets such as the C-17 Globemaster strategic lift aircraft as it allows the CF to project power on a significantly greater scale than in the past. Whether combat power, such as in Afghanistan, humanitarian power, such as in the response to the Haitian earthquake in 2010, or most recently by supporting the French in their deployment and ongoing support operations in Mali; in all of these operations Canada contributed disproportionately, which was only possible because of this newly acquired asset.

Another important way to demonstrate that Canada is punching above its weight militarily is to examine spending and force strength relative to key allies. Before doing so, however, it is important to bear in mind that Canada, unlike its European NATO allies, has not faced a proximate threat in generations and, given its location next to the United States, could get away with spending almost nothing on defence (although not without consequences outside the

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<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.



realm of defence) because of the security that the Americans would provide. When examining spending and force strength, this paper will look at military spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and then the reported strength of the total regular force and will do so for Canada and for several of its key NATO allies: the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, the Netherlands, France and Germany. In doing so, it will look at the data from 2001 and 2011 to not only assess the current situation but to look at the trend from the past decade. Finally, it will look at Canada's actual 2011 military spending and determine the rank in NATO in terms of spending. The table below illustrates military spending as a percentage of GDP in both 2001 and 2011.

| Nation / Year | Canada | US   | UK   | Norway | Netherlands | France | Germany |
|---------------|--------|------|------|--------|-------------|--------|---------|
| 2001          | 1.1%   | 2.9% | 2.4% | 1.8%   | 1.6%        | 2.6%   | 1.5%    |
| 2011          | 1.4%   | 4.8% | 2.6% | 1.5%   | 1.3%        | 1.9%   | 1.4%    |

What these numbers show is that from 2001 to 2011, with the exception of the United States, while the majority of Canada's allies were significantly decreasing their defence spending as a percentage of GDP, Canada experienced an increase of over 27% as a percentage of GDP.<sup>88</sup>

While this in part, reflects Canada's reduced emphasis on defence in 2001, it also shows the significant turnaround and greater importance of defence to Canada. The table below illustrates the regular force declared strengths in thousands for 2001 and 2011:

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<sup>88</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Information on Defence Expenditures," Accessed 14 February 2013, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49198.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49198.htm)

| Nation /<br>Year | Canada | US   | UK  | Norway | Netherlands | France | Germany |
|------------------|--------|------|-----|--------|-------------|--------|---------|
| 2001             | 59     | 1482 | 219 | 31     | 52          | 367    | 307     |
| 2011             | 60     | 1427 | 192 | 21     | 48          | 227    | 205     |

<sup>89</sup> Again, this partially reflects Canada's position in 2001, but more importantly, it shows that in the decade from 2001 to 2011, while all of these allies, including the Americans, reduced their force strength, some such as France by 38%, Canada was the only one that grew its forces, albeit by only 1.7%. Finally, Canada's 2011 defence spending in US dollars was \$23.685 billion, a number which placed Canada as the sixth largest defence spender of the twenty-eight countries in NATO.<sup>90</sup> In the decade following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, despite engaging in NATO's first ever combat mission, total NATO European defence spending decreased by approximately 15%.<sup>91</sup> Conversely, Canadian defence spending in approximately the same time period increased by around 52%.<sup>92</sup> All of this data taken together is evidence that Canada is matching its resources with political will, and is in fact punching above its weight military, especially when compared to some of our allies.

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<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> Robert M. Gates (speech, The Security and Defense Agenda, Future of NATO, Brussels, Belgium, June 10, 2011).

<sup>92</sup> Kenneth M. Holland, "How Unipolarity Impacts Canada's Engagement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 18, no. 2 (March 2012): 54.

## Afghanistan

The strongest and most obvious example that Canada is punching above its weight militarily is the Canadian contribution to the Afghanistan theatre of operations. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Secretary General of NATO, Lord George Robertson, stated that the attacks on the United States were being considered as an attack on all members of the Alliance under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced almost immediately that Canada would contribute to the campaign to counter terrorism, launching what would become the largest Canadian military effort since the Korean War.<sup>93</sup>

Canada's initial response to this situation was to implement Operation Apollo, the Canadian Forces contribution to the fight against international terrorism. Canada was among the first nations to contribute forces in the form of a naval task group which left in October 2001 to join the American naval forces in the "United States Central Command area of responsibility, which stretches from the Horn of Africa to Central Asia."<sup>94</sup> The Canadian task group became part of Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 and was the first non-American contribution to the fleet. Initially, while operating off the coast of Pakistan, the Canadian task group provided security for US Marine amphibious forces which were staging for operations in Afghanistan.<sup>95</sup> Between October 2001 and October 2003, the Royal Canadian Navy rotated 18 of 20 ships in the entire Canadian fleet through duty with CTF 151 performing the duties of "force-protection

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<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 59-60.

<sup>94</sup> Royal Canadian Navy, Background Summaries: Summary: Operation APOLLO (Oct. 2001– Oct. 2003). Accessed on 8 February 2013, [http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/4/4-a\\_eng.asp?id=504](http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/4/4-a_eng.asp?id=504)

<sup>95</sup> David S. McDonough, "The Paradox of Afghanistan," *International Journal* 62, no. 3, (Summer 2007): 623.

operations, fleet-support operations, leadership interdiction operations, and maritime interdiction operations.”<sup>96</sup> The Canadian task group worked so well and integrated so seamlessly with the Americans that a Canadian commodore was given command of CTF 151 for a period of time, something which was almost unheard of in a combat environment.<sup>97</sup> During the first two years that the Canadian task group was part of CTF 151, boarding party teams from the ships conducted almost 60 percent all of the boardings handled by the entire fleet, demonstrating that Canadians were punching above their weight from a naval perspective.<sup>98</sup> The Royal Canadian Navy has continued to punch above its weight, keeping a presence even after the initial combat surge into the region by having at least one ship operating in this area of the world as part of the campaign against terrorism and piracy, with the latest ship, HMCS Toronto, having deployed on 14 January 2013.<sup>99</sup>

Canada’s naval contribution is both significant, and among the first non-US forces in the campaign against terrorism after the 11 September 2001 attacks. The Canadian Army was also one of the first non-US forces to enter the fight in Afghanistan. After the US invasion of Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban, the Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was formed as a result of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 in December 2001.<sup>100</sup> Canada immediately entered the fight, first by sending Joint Task Force 2 (JTF 2) Special Forces operators in December 2001 to work with American Special Forces in Afghanistan and then in early 2002 by sending a battle group based on the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion of the

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<sup>96</sup> Royal Canadian Navy, Background Summaries: Summary: Operation APOLLO.

<sup>97</sup> David S. McDonough, “The Paradox of Afghanistan,” 623.

<sup>98</sup> Royal Canadian Navy, Background Summaries: Summary: Operation APOLLO.

<sup>99</sup> Royal Canadian Navy, International Operations: Canada extends its presence in the Arabian Sea Region, Accessed on 8 February 2013, [http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/4/4-a\\_eng.asp?category=15&id=928](http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/4/4-a_eng.asp?category=15&id=928)

<sup>100</sup> National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Operation Athena, Accessed 6 February 2013, <http://cjoc-coic.forces.gc.ca/exp/athena/index-eng.asp>

Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI).<sup>101</sup> During the six months that the 3 PPCLI battle group was in Afghanistan, they fought extremely well and they were very highly regarded by their American counterparts, so much so, that after participating in the fierce combat that was the American led Operation Anaconda, the Canadians then lead American forces in Operation Harpoon to clear enemy forces from mountainous caves. The Americans were not only impressed with the Canadian soldiers in combat, in their winter warfare skills and in their ability to cultivate good relations with Afghan villagers, they were greatly enamored with the Canadian Coyote armoured reconnaissance vehicles and the Canadian sniper rifle.<sup>102</sup> Again, by being one of the first in the fight and by operating within an American Brigade in combat during the initial foray in Afghanistan, this battle group represented Canada extremely well and most certainly punched above its weight in contributing to the first stage of the conflict in Afghanistan. It is also worth noting, especially since Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was invoked, that this contribution was significantly greater than most NATO members.

Although the Canadians left Afghanistan in the summer of 2002, they returned in the spring of 2003, this time to Kabul. For the next two years, Canada provided a battle group of over 2000 personnel that operated within the Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB) providing support and security to the capital area. As one of the largest contributors to the force, "Canada was instrumental in both expanding ISAF to the surrounding region and convincing NATO to take over the mission."<sup>103</sup> Canada's influence and leadership was reflected in the fact that Canadian general officers were given command of the KMNB first in 2003 and again in 2004.

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<sup>101</sup> P.H. Chapin, "Into Afghanistan: The Transformation of Canada's International Security Policy Since 9/11," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 40, no. 2, (June 2010): 194.

<sup>102</sup> Joseph R. Nunez, "Canada's Global Role: A Strategic Assessment of its Military Power," 77-79.

<sup>103</sup> David S. McDonough, "Afghanistan and renewing Canadian Leadership: Panacea or Hubris?," *International Journal* 64, no 3 (Summer 2009): 649.

As well, in February 2004 a Canadian, then Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, took command of the ISAF mission, a position of great influence and prestige.<sup>104</sup> Clearly the influence that Canada had with NATO, coupled with the key commands that Canadian officers were given, illustrates that from 2003 to 2005 Canada was punching significantly above its weight with its military contributions to Afghanistan.

Another unique contribution that the Canadian Forces made was the launching of the Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) – Afghanistan. This team, comprised of fifteen members, twelve military officers, two Department of National Defence public servants and one member of CIDA, was put together at the direction of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Hillier in the summer of 2005, responding to a request from Afghan President Hamid Karzai for a group of planners to assist the Afghan government.<sup>105</sup> Because it was created in response to a personal request from Karzai to Hillier, this team had support and access in the Afghan government that it otherwise would not have had. From 2005 to 2008, the SAT provided instrumental support to the Karzai government in the form of planning and mentorship while working in the areas of construction, reconstruction and governance. By the time the team was stood down in 2008, they had made significant contributions in almost all areas of the Afghan government including the ministries of Justice, National Communications, Education, Transportation and Civil Aviation, and Finance.<sup>106</sup> Globe and Mail reporter Christie Blatchford stated of the SAT that they were “the smallest and arguably most influential group of Canadians working in Afghanistan.”<sup>107</sup> This is an example of how a small Canadian military team made contributions that were

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<sup>104</sup> David S. McDonough, “The Paradox of Afghanistan,” 624.

<sup>105</sup> Michel-Henri St-Louis, “The Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan – Part of the Canadian Comprehensive Approach to Stability Operations,” *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 3 (2009): 59-60.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

<sup>107</sup> Christie Blatchford, “Small Strategic Team Making Big Difference,” *Globe and Mail*, 8 May 2006.

disproportionate to its size and thereby gained Canada a measure of influence with the Afghan government and with its allies.

Up to this point, as one of the key contributors to the Afghanistan theatre, Canada was undeniably doing disproportionately heavy lifting militarily. Canada's contribution was soon to become even more significant with the move of Canadian Forces personnel from Kabul to Kandahar, the region that was the heartland of Taliban power and support.

Early on in the Afghanistan conflict, the Americans realized that one of the keys to success in Afghanistan was to help the Afghan government to provide stability to the 34 provinces in order to prevent the Taliban from regaining influence. The concept that the Americans came up with to provide stability and expand the influence of the government in Kabul was to create Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs were organizations of military and civilian experts who worked together with the goal of expanding the influence and ability to govern of the Afghan government through reconstruction and redevelopment.<sup>108</sup>

Although there is discussion as to how Canada ended up with it, in 2005 Canada agreed to take responsibility for the Kandahar PRT from the Americans and deployed a 250 person PRT and battle group for a total of almost 3000 personnel. Reportedly Prime Minister Paul Martin, Defence Minister Bill Graham and Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Rick Hillier were all "eager to demonstrate the country's military prowess and ability to achieve strategic influence."<sup>109</sup> As a prime contributor and nation with influence in the Afghanistan theatre, Canada could have had its choice of other PRTs but Canadian leaders felt that Kandahar offered

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<sup>108</sup> Kenneth Holland, "The Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team: The Arm of Development in Kandahar Province," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 40, no. 2 (June 2010): 278.

<sup>109</sup> David S. McDonough, "Afghanistan and renewing Canadian Leadership: Panacea or Hubris?," *International Journal* 64, no 3 (Summer 2009): 649.

several opportunities. It provided maximum visibility on the international stage as Kandahar was both one of the provinces with the most need and one of the most frequently targeted by the Taliban. Taking responsibility for the Kandahar PRT would give Canada the opportunity to command Regional Command (RC) South, a key leadership position. As Kandahar was the ancestral home of the Taliban, success there would make Canada a significant contributor to overall mission success. Its location was ideal for support and for working with key allies such as the Americans, the British, and the Dutch. It offered the opportunity for Canada to play a significant combat role, which would allow Canadians to shed the image of peacekeepers, improve relations and gain influence with the Americans, and work as the impetus for the modernization of the Canadian Forces.<sup>110</sup> For the next six years the Canadian Forces in Kandahar fostered development, engaged in full scale combat operations, sustained the highest casualty rates per capita contribution of any nation operating in Afghanistan<sup>111</sup> and in doing so, gained a measure of prestige and influence significantly out of proportion to Canada as a nation.

The Canadian Forces punching above their weight and proving to be a preeminent force was demonstrated not only by contributing to the Afghanistan effort, but in *how* Canada contributed. When Canada transitioned to operations in Kandahar province it truly was a whole new war. When the fighting season started in the spring of 2006, the Canadian forces found themselves not only participating in, but also leading full scale combat operations. During a sixteen week period, known as Operation Medusa, the Canadian Battle group led by Brigadier General David Fraser, and supported by small elements of the Afghan National Army (ANA), British, Dutch, and American forces engaged a force of approximately 12,000 Taliban who were

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<sup>110</sup> Kenneth Holland, "The Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team, 279-280.

<sup>111</sup> James Sperling and Mark Webber, "NATO: from Kosovo to Kabul," *International Affairs* 85, no. 3 (2009): 507-509.



intent on taking control of the region and the city of Kandahar itself.<sup>112</sup> The ferocity of the Taliban attacks caught everyone by surprise, but the Canadians, although hugely outnumbered, successfully prevented the Taliban from seizing control of the region and in doing so earned the respect of Canada's allies in Afghanistan, of the greater international community, and of the Canadian people as well. General Rick Hillier stated of the operations in Kandahar in 2006, "If Kandahar had been encircled, if Highway 1 had been shut down and if the Panjwayi [a district in Kandahar province] had been held by the Taliban, the government in Kabul would have fallen."<sup>113</sup> The ISAF commander at the time, British General David Richards echoed Hillier's sentiments when in 2007 he stated, "If Kandahar fell, and it was reasonably close run last year, it did not matter how well the Dutch did in Uruzgan or how well the British did in Helmand. Their two provinces would also, as night followed day, have failed because we would have lost the consent of the Pashtun [the largest ethnic group in the country, and the dominant tribe in southern Afghanistan] people."<sup>114</sup> This fight did not come without a cost: Canada lost 38 soldiers in 2006 alone.<sup>115</sup> The fight in which the Canadians engaged, the price that they paid, and the importance that it was to the overall Afghanistan mission clearly show, that in 2006 the Canadian Forces were well and truly heavy weights.

Although 2006 saw some of the heaviest fighting that the Canadians experienced during their time in Afghanistan, it was hardly unique as there were combat operations throughout Canada's tenure in Kandahar. Another example is the Battle of Arghandab from 31 October to 1

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<sup>112</sup> P.H. Chapin, "Into Afghanistan: The Transformation of Canada's International, 195.

<sup>113</sup> Bernd Horn, "No Small Action: Operation Medusa, Panjwayi, Afghanistan," *Fortune Favours the Brave: Tales of Courage and Tenacity in Canadian Military History*, ed. Bernd Horn (Toronto: Dundurn, 2009): 400.

<sup>114</sup> Bernd Horn, *No Lack of Courage: Operation Medusa, Afghanistan* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2010): 113.

<sup>115</sup> P.H. Chapin, "Into Afghanistan: The Transformation of Canada's International, 195.

November 2007 during which the “Canadian-led multinational effort blocked a major Taliban move to dominate key physical and, more important, psychological terrain in Kandahar City.”<sup>116</sup> Yet again, this was a case where, had the Canadians not been successful there would have been “catastrophic operational consequences for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in the fight against the Taliban, not to mention long-term ramifications for the alliance efforts in the region.”<sup>117</sup> Operation Medusa and the Battle of Arghandab are examples of how Canada punched above its weight, especially when one considers operations such as these and compares how Canada engaged in operations in Afghanistan relative to how many of our allies and partners conducted operations; specifically the national caveats that many of the ‘big contributors’ operated under and the freedom of action that the Canadian Forces had.

Canada’s force contribution was significant simply from a numerical perspective; when the contribution is looked at qualitatively rather than quantitatively, it is clear that the Canadian contribution was disproportionate, especially when compared to some substantial NATO allies.<sup>118</sup> National caveats are restrictions or limitations that are placed upon a military force and they are rarely self-imposed by senior military commanders. Rather they are imposed on military forces by their national governments for any number of reasons, mostly stemming from domestic political considerations.<sup>119</sup> Regardless of whether or not a deployed military force agrees with its caveats, it has to live within them and the reality is that restrictive caveats not only affect how one is perceived by one’s allies, but it can also affect the utility of a force within an alliance

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<sup>116</sup> Sean Maloney, “Operation Intizaar Zmarey: The Battle of Arghandab, 30 October – 1 November 2007,” *Fortune Favours the Brave: Tales of Courage and Tenacity in Canadian Military History*, ed. Bernd Horn (Toronto: Dundurn, 2009): 417.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, 417.

<sup>118</sup> Joseph T. Jockel and Joel Sokolosky, “Canada and the War in Afghanistan: NATO’s Odd Man Out Steps Forward,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 6, no. 1 (April 2008): 107.

<sup>119</sup> James Sperling and Mark Webber, “NATO: from Kosovo to Kabul, 509.

itself. Canada largely “operated without national combat operational restrictions ‘caveats’”<sup>120</sup> and therefore became “one of the most forward-leaning countries despite operating in the most dangerous area.”<sup>121</sup> Canadian commanders were given “full freedom to authorize and conduct operations as [they] saw fit”<sup>122</sup> and were therefore not only much more combat effective, they were able to contribute more to ISAF goals than some other nations’ contingents. Nations such as Belgium, Spain, Turkey, Italy, and Germany all had very restrictive caveats that greatly hindered their ability to operate. The Germans, for example, despite having a reputation as being outstanding soldiers, were not allowed to leave the relative peace of Regional Command North and were not able to fire upon the enemy once the enemy started to move, even if they were simply repositioning.<sup>123</sup> As one can imagine, this damaged the military reputation of nations that were restricted and meant the countries like Canada, which was unrestricted, saw their stock within the alliance rise, particularly among the more powerful allies, such as the Americans and the British. Canada’s ability to operate freely in Afghanistan is a clear manifestation of matching resources to political will. By the Canadian government deciding that its military would operate within the bounds of what was operationally necessary instead of imposing caveats, the Canadian military was clearly able to punch well above its weight in Afghanistan, especially compared to countries like Germany or Italy, which, although they had the resources, did not match it with the political will to operate unrestricted. This in turn clearly demonstrates that Canada was punching above its weight militarily in the world, especially compared to larger NATO allies.

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<sup>120</sup> Carl Ek, “Canada and Afghanistan,” *Congressional Research Service Report*, (Washington: US Congressional Research Service, 2011): 22.

<sup>121</sup> Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions Upon NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan,” *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (2012): 74.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 74.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.

## Libya

The Canadian Forces contribution to the NATO-led, United Nations-sanctioned mission in Libya is the most recent example of how Canada is punching above its weight militarily. The uprisings in Arab countries in North Africa and the Middle East began in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread across the region. Demonstrations started in Libya on 13 January 2011 and, not surprisingly, Libyan dictator Colonel Moammar Gadhafi moved to crush the uprising with targeted air and ground attacks, often hitting innocent civilians. The United Nations Security Council reacted to Gadhafi's brutality by first passing a UNSC Resolution implementing an arms embargo and asset freeze on 26 February 2011 and subsequently, by passing another resolution strengthening the embargo and imposing a no-fly zone over Libya on 17 March 2011. Canada was one of the first countries to commit forces and did so with a significant force.<sup>124</sup> As former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations Paul Heinbecker stated of the Libyan mission, "successful intervention takes military muscle as well as political will, and the disposition and capacity of the Harper government to contribute militarily to the NATO effort was crucial."<sup>125</sup>

The Canadian reaction to the situation in Libya was immediate. Despite the fact that Canada had "no significant material investment in the Libyan economy on par with that of the Europeans, and no particular relationship, hostile or otherwise, with the regime of leader Moammar Gadhafi"<sup>126</sup> Canada was one of the first countries both to call for a no-fly zone and to

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<sup>124</sup> National Defence and the Canadian Forces, "Operation Mobile," Accessed on 6 February 2013, <http://www.cjoc-coic.forces.gc.ca/exp/mobile/index-eng.asp>

<sup>125</sup> Paul Heinbecker, "Plenty of Credit to Go Around in Gadhafi's Fall," Accessed 6 February 2013, <http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2011/08/plenty-credit-go-around-gadhafis-fall>

<sup>126</sup> "Canada's Involvement in the Libyan Campaign." 2011. Stratfor Analysis: 137-137.

commit forces. This was done in part because Canada wanted to continue to “raise its geopolitical profile internationally and demonstrate that Canada is a staunch and reliable Western ally.”<sup>127</sup> The NATO Operation was called Unified Protector and Canada’s contribution was termed Operation Mobile. The first two acts of Operation Mobile were for Canada to order HMCS Charlottetown to prepare for deployment and to initiate a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). The first evacuation flight of the NEO was conducted by a C-17 Globemaster on 26 February 2011 and brought 24 Canadians and 22 allied nationals out of Tripoli International Airport. Although the NEO started with just one C-17 over the course of the 11 days of the evacuation, there was eventually two C-17s and two CC-130J transport planes.<sup>128</sup> The HMCS Charlottetown was also rapidly deployed, departing Halifax on 2 March 2011 to take up duties enforcing the embargo on Libya. The Charlottetown’s mission would evolve after the UNSCR on 17 March to include defending the civilians in the Libyan port city of Misrata and protecting the port from “seaborne attacks, safeguarding vessels conducting de-mining operations and providing accurate, real-time surveillance and intelligence data in support of NATO Air strikes. HMCS Charlottetown was replaced by HMCS Vancouver before the Charlottetown’s return to Halifax on 2 September 2011.<sup>129</sup> Over the course of Operation Mobile, these two Canadian ships conducted over 13% of that hailings and 6% of the boardings that were done under the auspices of Unified Protector.<sup>130</sup> Although these numbers alone would show that Canada’s navy punched above its weight during the Libya campaign, an even more important

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<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, 137.

<sup>128</sup> National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Operation Mobile,” Accessed on 6 February 2013,

<sup>129</sup> National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Canada Welcomes HMCS Charlottetown Home From Fighting the Gadhafi Regime,” Accessed on 6 February 2013, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=3918>

<sup>130</sup> National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Operation Mobile: Mission Metrics,” Accessed on 6 February 2013, <http://www.cjoc-cioc.forces.gc.ca/exp/mobile/opmobile-eng.asp>

aspect is the that Royal Canadian Navy operated without national caveats, which, as in Afghanistan, magnifies the contribution and further demonstrates that Canada once again punched above its weight.<sup>131</sup>

After UNSCR 1973 tightening the embargo and imposing a no-fly zone over Libya was passed on 17 March 2011, Canada's reaction was strong and immediate. Canada dispatched seven CF-18 fighter aircraft accompanied by two CC-150 Polaris air-to-air refueling aircraft on 18 March 2011 to Trapani, Italy and the first combat sorties were flown by the Canadians on 21 March 2011. One week later Canada deployed two CP-140 Aurora Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft.<sup>132</sup> Throughout this mission, Canada's contribution was disproportionately large. As one NATO official put it, "the burden of the strike sorties fell on the shoulders of predominately the Canadians, the British, and the French. I must say that, Canada in particular, being the smallest of the three air forces, once again punched well above its weight."<sup>133</sup> The Canadian CF-18s conducted 946 combat sorties, 10% of the total Unified Protector combat sorties. These were again without caveats making the contribution qualitatively even greater. The Canadian air-to-air refueling aircraft conducted 389 sorties delivering over 18.5 million pounds of fuel to aircraft from six different countries. And the CP-140 Aurora ISR aircraft flew 189 sorties, providing invaluable information for alliance use.<sup>134</sup> In addition to this disproportionately significant combat and combat support power that Canada brought to the air campaign in Libya, Canada also brought significant leadership and influence to the alliance. This

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<sup>131</sup> Stephen Harper (speech, "PM Thanks Members of the Canadian Armed Forces for their Efforts to Protect Civilians in Libya," Trapani, Italy, September 1, 2011).

<sup>132</sup> National Defence and the Canadian Forces, "Military Heroes Return Home," Accessed on 6 February 2013, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=3994>

<sup>133</sup> Tom Blackwell, "Canada Contributed a Disproportionate Amount to Libya Air Strikes: Sources," *National Post*, 25 August 2011.

<sup>134</sup> National Defence and the Canadian Forces, "Operation Mobile: Mission Metrics."

is particularly evident in the fact that a Canadian, Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard, was selected and appointed as the commander of Operation Unified Protector on 31 March 2011 until the mission concluded on 31 October 2011.<sup>135</sup>

Canada's contribution to Operation Unified Protector to safe-guard Libyan civilians is yet another example of how, when it comes to military matters, Canada does indeed punch above its weight. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, the Canadian military showed that it was hitting in a class above its weight. This was evidenced not only by statements from NATO officials, but also in a statement from the US Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates. Gates stated that the Libya mission showed that NATO was in serious danger of becoming a two tier alliance with those who are willing to take on strike missions, and those who are either unwilling or unable to do so. He went on to say that the dearth of ISR assets was an equally significant problem.<sup>136</sup> Canada showed that it was definitely in the top tier, both in the willingness to take on strike missions without caveat, and through the provision of ISR assets in the form of the CP-140 Aurora. Gates went on to say specifically that Canada was one of the few nations that made major contributions to strike missions in Operation Unified Protector and was among the few countries who "found ways to do the training, buy the equipment, and field the platforms necessary to make a credible military contribution."<sup>137</sup> All of this information taken together on Canada's contribution to the mission in Libya clearly illustrates that when it comes to military matters, Canada is punching above its weight.

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<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>136</sup> Robert M. Gates, (speech, The Security and Defense Agenda, Future of NATO, Brussels, Belgium, June 10, 2011).

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*

## Conclusion

As has been clearly evidenced in this chapter, first by examining Canadian military policy, then military funding relative to allies, and finally and most importantly by looking at the contemporary examples of Canada's contribution to the missions in Afghanistan and Libya, Canada punches above its weight militarily. Both quantitatively, and perhaps most importantly, qualitatively, Canada contributes disproportionately. As stated by political scientists Peter Jones and Philippe Lagasse, "Though the CF are relatively small, they are highly professional. Moreover, successive Canadian governments of different political persuasions have shown that Canada is amongst a select group who are prepared to place their forces on the front line of Alliance action."<sup>138</sup> Furthermore, both in Afghanistan and Libya, "Canada has shouldered a disproportionate share of the fighting, while other, and often larger, allies have shied away."<sup>139</sup> Despite this conclusion that Canada does indeed punch above its weight militarily on the international stage, this is not something that the Canadian government and indeed the Canadian people should take for granted. The world is a dangerous place with many complexities which simply does not allow any country that wishes to have a measure of power, influence and prestige in the world to rely on what it did yesterday. Although Canada's contribution to Afghanistan was and still is significant and the contribution to the Libya campaign was equally disproportionate to our weight in the world, the power and influence gained only lasts until the next crisis, conflict or call for international assistance. There is understandably in international military relations a sense of 'thanks for what you did, but have you done today?' If Canada

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<sup>138</sup> Peter Jones and Philippe Lagasse, "Rhetoric Versus Reality: Canadian Defence Planning in a Time of Austerity," *Defense and Security Analysis* 28, no. 2 (June 2012): 141.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, 141.



wishes to continue punching above its weight militarily, then it must not neglect its forces, and the Canadian government must continue to provide military forces when and where needed and do so without caveats that restrict the utility of the force being supplied. If a contribution is going to be made, it must be one that allies appreciate and respect, for that is the way to not only have a seat at the table, but to have a voice which is disproportionately influential.

## CHAPTER 4 – NON-MILITARY INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

The question as to whether or not Canada punches above its weight in non-military international engagement is somewhat more difficult to address. Although there is an opinion that Canada is not doing enough in the world, this chapter will show that Canada does in fact contribute disproportionately in its international engagement. It will do so by first looking at Canada's participation in international organizations and show how this results in Canada's strong international presence. Then it will examine Canadian foreign policy and international development assistance. Next, and most importantly, it will look at some specific examples of Canada's non-military international engagement and how it shows that Canada is punching above its weight. After doing this, it will then explore some of the arguments that Canada is not doing enough in the global community. Finally it will conclude that, considering Canada's weight as defined in this paper as the 13<sup>th</sup> most powerful country, Canada does in fact punch above its weight in its non-military international engagement.

### **Canada in International Organizations**

In the past century there have been some undoubted changes in Canadian foreign policy. At the beginning of the First World War in 1914, Canada was seen simply as a member of the British Empire. Canadian foreign policy at the end of the war and in the years following was primarily focused on getting Canada recognized as having “‘independent personality’ in world politics – a sovereign state independent of Britain and the Empire.”<sup>140</sup> This desire revealed itself

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<sup>140</sup> Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1997), 53.

in Canada's demand to have independent representation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. By the end of the Second World War in 1945, in no small part because of Canada's significant contribution to the war effort, Canada had moved beyond this and was instead focused on being suitably recognized in post-war discussions and alliances. As then Canadian Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King put it to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill when discussing Canadian participation in post-war decision making, "you will, I am sure, appreciate how difficult it would be for Canada, after enlisting nearly one million persons in her armed forces and trebling her national debt in order to assist in restoring peace, to accept a position of parity..... with the Dominican Republic or El Salvador."<sup>141</sup> In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War when conferences were held to discuss international organizations, "Canadian officials were preoccupied with securing recognition for what they saw as Canada's special status."<sup>142</sup> Furthermore, there seemed to be "a clear reflection that the overriding Canadian objective at most of these meetings was to further the process and to gain a place for Canada at the decision making table."<sup>143</sup> This desire to have a seat at the table has remained a constant in Canadian foreign policy to this day and is the reason why Canada is a significant member of many international organizations, clubs or forums. Canada's seat at the table of so many diverse international bodies is a source of Canadian power, due in part to the fact that these multilateral institutions arguably diffuse power from the top tier of the most powerful countries

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<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, 54.

<sup>142</sup> Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993), 28.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

to other countries that are represented at the table,<sup>144</sup> which contributes to Canada punching above its weight in non-military international relations.

There are several different types of organizations that Canada is a member of. There are open international organizations which are largely universal such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Open non-universal international organizations whose membership is limited by things such as geography (the Organization of American States (OAS)), economic achievement (the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)), language (the Francophonie), and shared history (The Commonwealth).<sup>145</sup> There are clubs or coalitions which are generally comprised of countries that are friends or are at least like-minded, and usually membership is only by invitation. Two such groups that Canada is a member of are considered the “most important groups in the architecture of contemporary global governance,”<sup>146</sup> these being the Group of 8 (G8) and the Group of 20 (G20). It has been said by senior Canadian government officials that the G7, which became the G8, is “the most exclusive multilateral forum in the world.”<sup>147</sup> Finally, there are alliances, of which Canada is a member of just one, but arguably the most important one; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).<sup>148</sup> This paper will now discuss Canadian participation in several of these organizations including the Francophonie, the Commonwealth, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the OAS, the OECD, the Arctic Council, the World Bank, and the G8, in order to show

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<sup>144</sup> Tom Keating, “Multilateralism: Past Imperfect, Future Conditional,” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 16, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 12-15.

<sup>145</sup> Kim Richard Nossal, Stephane Roussel, and Stephane Paquin, *International Policy and Politics in Canada* (Toronto: Pearson, 2011), 38.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.

<sup>147</sup> J.H. Taylor, “Preparing for the Halifax Summit: Reflections on Past Summits,” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 3, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 46.

<sup>148</sup> Kim Richard Nossal, Stephane Roussel, and Stephane Paquin, *International Policy and Politics in Canada*, 44.

Canada's collective membership in these types of bodies equates to an overall disproportionate international contribution.

The Francophonie is an international organization based upon two founding principals; "the French language and its humanist values."<sup>149</sup> There are 75 member countries, 56 full members and 19 observers encompassing a total of 220 million French language speakers and a total overall population of 890 million.<sup>150</sup> Currently there are four missions that are the focus of the Francophonie:

- promoting the French language and cultural and linguistic diversity;
- promoting peace, democracy and human rights;
- supporting education, training, higher education and research; and
- developing cooperation to ensure sustainable development and solidarity.<sup>151</sup>

Canada is one of the key members of this organization, helps to shape and develop the institution, and is also one of the largest financial contributors, being second only to France.<sup>152</sup> Given this, Canada is undoubtedly one of the main players in this organization which is a leading cultural institution in the world.

Like the Francophonie, the Commonwealth is another international organization that is built upon a shared history, and Canada is a key member. Although the modern Commonwealth is a twentieth century creation, the idea of the Commonwealth first came about when, in 1867, Canada became "the first colony to be transformed into a self-governing 'Dominion', a newly constituted status that implied equality with Britain."<sup>153</sup> Commonwealth membership is based

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<sup>149</sup> La Francophonie, Accessed on 26 February 2012, <http://www.francophonie.org/English.html>

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>151</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and La Francophonie," Accessed on 24 February 2012, <http://international.gc.ca/franco/index.aspx?view=d>

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*

upon nations which were formerly part of the British Empire and is “a voluntary association of 54 countries [with a total population of over 2 billion] that support each other and work together towards shared goals in democracy and development.”<sup>154</sup> The Commonwealth is the oldest political association of independent states in the world and is focused on promoting its shared beliefs and values.<sup>155</sup> These values are “democracy, freedom, peace, the rule of law and opportunity for all,”<sup>156</sup> and these universal values are undoubtedly why the Commonwealth has been so influential in the world. A significant example of this influence is that this organization’s ideas have been subsequently adopted by other influential organizations. For instance,

Commonwealth ideas have been taken up by the World Bank on Small States, by the World Health Organization on the migration of doctors and nurses, by the International Labour Organization on the migration of teachers. Its support and expertise have been enlisted by the European Union (EU) and the African Union on building governance in Africa, and by the EU and the Pacific Islands Forum on building governance in the Pacific.<sup>157</sup>

Within this diverse and dynamic group, Canada is very active, whether through things such as the contributions of Senator Hugh Segal to Commonwealth renewal, former Prime Minister Joe Clark’s leadership of the Commonwealth election observer team for the 2004 elections in Cameroon, or former Member of Parliament Audrey McLaughlin’s participation in the Commonwealth election observation team in Tanzania in 2005, Canada is once again punching

<sup>153</sup> The Commonwealth, “History,” Accessed on 2 March 2013, <http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/191086/191247/34493/history/>

<sup>154</sup> The Commonwealth, Accessed on 26 February 2013, [http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/191086/191247/the\\_commonwealth/](http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/191086/191247/the_commonwealth/)

<sup>155</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “Canada and the Commonwealth,” Accessed on 24 February 2013, <http://www.international.gc.ca/commonwealth/index.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>

<sup>156</sup> The Commonwealth, Accessed on 26 February 2013, [http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/191086/191247/the\\_commonwealth/](http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/191086/191247/the_commonwealth/)

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*

above its weight.<sup>158</sup> This disproportionate influence is also seen financially with Canada being both the second largest financial contributor to the organization as a whole, and the second largest contributor to the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation, which is focused on promoting things such as public sector governance, gender equality, democracy, and economic development among member nations.<sup>159</sup> Again, this is evidence of Canada punching above its weight in the world.

Another international organization of which Canada is a founding member is the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. This organization is an economic forum whose 21 member nations account for 40% of the world population and 44% of global trade.<sup>160</sup> There are three core goals of APEC: “Trade and Investment Liberalization, Business Facilitation, and Economic and Technical Cooperation [and they have] helped drive economic growth and improve employment opportunities and standards of living for the citizens of the region.”<sup>161</sup> Canada is a key member of this organization as was demonstrated at the 2012 APEC Summit in Vladivostok, Russia when Canada worked closely with the United States, New Zealand, Australia and Japan to achieve cooperation in the overall reduction of tariffs on numerous environmental goods to help promote further trade liberalization and the proliferation of environmental goods.<sup>162</sup> This again shows a measure of Canadian influence.

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<sup>158</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada and La Francophonie,” Accessed on 24 February 2012, <http://international.gc.ca/franco/index.aspx?view=d>

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>160</sup> Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, “Achievements and Benefits,” <http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Achievements-and-Benefits.aspx>

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>162</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “APEC,” Accessed on 1 March 2013, <http://www.international.gc.ca/apec/index.aspx?view=d>

In being a member of the Commonwealth, Canada is a member of the oldest organization of independent political states in the world. In being a member of the Organization of American States, it is a member of the oldest regional organization in the world.<sup>163</sup> “The OAS brings together all 35 independent states of the Americas and constitutes the main political, juridical, and social governmental forum in the Hemisphere.”<sup>164</sup> The OAS is focused on “four main pillars: democracy, human rights, security, and development.”<sup>165</sup> The organization fosters these four pillars “through political dialogue, inclusiveness, cooperation, and legal and follow-up instruments that provide the OAS with the tools to maximize its work in the Hemisphere.”<sup>166</sup> The Canadian government’s recent work with Guatemala provides an example of Canada’s participation in the Americas. On 23 June, 2011 the Canadian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Americas and Consular Affairs), Diane Ablonczy, announced that Canada would be contributing \$7.1 million to strengthen justice and security in Guatemala.<sup>167</sup> On 6 December 2012, Minister Ablonczy was in Guatemala with the Governor General, David Johnston to participate in the opening of new archive facilities at the Guatemalan National Police headquarters that was funded by Canada as part of “Canada’s overarching commitment to strengthen justice in Guatemala.”<sup>168</sup> In addition to this type of engagement, Canada chairs two significant working groups within the OAS, the Review on OAS Programs and the Strengthening the Inter-American Committee for Integral Development working groups and is also the second

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<sup>163</sup> Organization of American States. Accessed 26 February 2013, [http://www.oas.org/en/about/who\\_we\\_are.asp](http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp)

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>167</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada Committed to Peace, Justice and Security in Guatemala,” Accessed on 24 February 2013, <http://www.international.gc.ca/media/state-etat/news-communiques/2011/177.aspx?view=d>

<sup>168</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Minister Ablonczy Announces Assistance to Prosecute Serious Crimes in Guatemala,” Accessed on 24 February 2013, <http://www.international.gc.ca/media/state-etat/news-communiques/2012/12/06a.aspx?lan=eng>



largest financial contributor to the organization, all of which demonstrate that Canada is punching above its weight within this organization.<sup>169</sup>

Another key international organization of which Canada is a member is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). There are 34 members of the OECD, a body which is focused on “promoting policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world.”<sup>170</sup> It does so by focusing on a number of key issues, some of which are: change related to social, economic or environmental issues, setting global standards in several areas including agriculture chemical safety, and doing trend analysis to help find solutions to problems and predict future outcomes.<sup>171</sup> In addition to this, there are several semi-autonomous organizations that are tied to the OECD: the International Energy Agency, the Nuclear Energy Agency, and the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation,<sup>172</sup> all of which extend the influence of the OECD. Canada is a key member of this organization and as the 8<sup>th</sup> largest financial contributor is yet again punching above its weight.

Canada was the founding member of the Arctic Council, a unique organization that consists of the eight Arctic nations plus participation from six international indigenous groups and of which Canada is currently the chair.<sup>173</sup> The Arctic Council is sub-divided into six working groups: the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment

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<sup>169</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “The Organization of American States (OAS),” Accessed on 24 February 2013, <http://www.international.gc.ca/americas-ameriques/oas-oea/index.aspx?view=d>

<sup>170</sup> Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Accessed on 25 February 2013, <http://www.oecd.org/about>

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>172</sup> Government of Canada, “Canadian participation in the work of the OECD,” Accessed on 4 March 2013, [http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/oecd-ocde/canadian\\_participation-participation\\_canadienne.aspx?lang=eng&menu\\_id=29&view=d](http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/oecd-ocde/canadian_participation-participation_canadienne.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=29&view=d)

<sup>173</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Arctic Council,” Accessed on 24 February 2013, <http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/council-conseil.aspx?lang=en&view=d>

Programme (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), and Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG). This is another organization whose membership is restricted and thus denotes an element of prestige, particularly given that many others, such as China and the European Union are seeking permanent observer status on the Council, but have been denied.<sup>174</sup> As an example of Canadian influence within the Arctic Council, in late 2009, Canada was asked to draft an overall communications and outreach policy for the council.<sup>175</sup> Canada, as the current chair of the Arctic Council will also have the opportunity to largely shape the agenda for this organization for the next two years, proving yet again that Canada is punching above its weight.

The World Bank is a universal group which is comprised of five institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).<sup>176</sup> The groups that make up the World Bank are entirely owned by the member country governments and the Bank has six core themes: “focusing on the poorest countries, fragile and conflict-affected states, the Arab world, middle-income countries, global public goods issues,

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<sup>174</sup> Lisa Gregoire, “Arctic Council should be cautious about new observer hopefuls: Inuit org president,” Accessed on 4 March 2013, [http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674arctic\\_council\\_should\\_be\\_cautious\\_about\\_new\\_observer\\_hopefuls\\_inuit\\_or/](http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674arctic_council_should_be_cautious_about_new_observer_hopefuls_inuit_or/)

<sup>175</sup> Andrea Charron, “Canada and the Arctic Council,” *International Journal* 67, no. 3 (Summer 2012): 772-774.

<sup>176</sup> The World Bank, Accessed on 26 February 2013, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,pagePK:50004410~piPK:36602~theSitePK:29708,00.html>

and delivery of knowledge and learning services.”<sup>177</sup> Although this very influential body has a universal membership, evidence of Canadian disproportionate weight is in the fact that Canada is the seventh largest contributor to the World Bank and controls 3.08% of the voting shares of the Bank, significantly more than Canada’s percentage share of either the world population or world economy.<sup>178</sup>

The final organization which will be discussed as proof of Canada contributing disproportionately is the G8. Simply being a member of this exclusive club is proof of Canada’s influence for a nation of its size. The annual G8 Summits focus on any number of issues, including international economic and political concerns, international development, peace and security, and international health concerns.<sup>179</sup> In addition to being, “the most exclusive multilateral forum in the world,”<sup>180</sup> when a country is the chair of the organization, it has the opportunity to shape and influence the agenda and focus some of the most powerful nations in the world on issues which the chair feels are important or will make a difference in the world. For example, at the 2010 Muskoka Summit, which Canada chaired, one of the top priorities was to “improve the health of mothers, newborns and children under the age of five in developing countries... Canada looked to mobilize G-8 governments, other key donor governments, developing country partners, non-governmental organizations and private foundations to reduce mortality rates in mothers, newborns and children.”<sup>181</sup> Clearly, being a member of this

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<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>178</sup> World Bank Finances, Accessed on 26 February 2013, <http://finances.worldbank.org/Shareholder-Equity/voting-power-2012/ujqp-6gk4>

<sup>179</sup> Government of Canada, “Canada’s G8 Website,” Accessed on 24 February 2013, <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/about-apropos/work-travail.aspx?view=d> and What is the G8, Accessed on 26 February 2013, [http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/what\\_is\\_g8.html](http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/what_is_g8.html)

<sup>180</sup> J.H. Taylor, “Preparing for the Halifax Summit: Reflections on Past Summits,” 46.

organization, having the opportunity to shape the agenda, marshal the will and resources, and get the commitment of some of the most powerful countries in the world is evidence that, in the international arena, Canada is punching above its weight.

Canada is a member of many diverse and influential international organizations. Whether it is promoting trade liberalization at a table with the likes of Japan, Australia, China, the US and Russia; contributing to the furtherance of democracy in places like Cameroon and Tanzania; discussing environmental issues in the Arctic with Norway, Russia and the US; helping Guatemala to develop the ability to prosecute serious crimes; or sitting on the board of the World Bank, Canada sits at the table of many of the most influential and powerful organizations in the world. Just having the ability to participate in so many diverse international organizations is in and of itself a source of power, but Canada does not merely sit at the table: it contributes. In all of these diverse organizations, Canada is consistently one of the key players and is arguably one of the most influential in many. If one is a member of many diverse organizations, organizations that in some cases are almost on opposite sides of the spectrum in terms of members (Commonwealth and the Francophonie), and you are consistently one of the key players in the organization, then it stands to reason that you are powerful. This paper has defined Canada's weight as a nation is the 13<sup>th</sup> most powerful in the world. In looking at Canada's overall membership and contribution to the international organizations that have been discussed, it is clearly evident that Canada is contributing at a significantly greater level than 13<sup>th</sup>. Undoubtedly,

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<sup>181</sup> Government of Canada, "Canada's G8 Website, Summit Outcomes," Accessed on 4 March 2013, <http://canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/summit-sommet/2010/muskoka-results-muskoka.aspx?lang=eng&view=d> and *G8 Muskoka Declaration Recovery and New Beginnings* Muskoka, Canada, 25-26 June 2010, Accessed 4 March 2013, <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/summit-sommet/2010/muskoka-declaration-muskoka.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>

when looking at the overall Canadian contribution and the resulting power and influence derived from these memberships, it is clear that Canada is at least in the top ten countries in the world, therefore proving that Canada is punching above its weight in the non-military international realm.

### **Foreign Affairs and International Development Assistance**

When Paul Martin became Prime Minister in 2003, he was “determined to distinguish his government from that of Jean Chretien in almost every way possible”<sup>182</sup> and foreign policy was no exception. In this regard, Martin “shifted the national focus from human security to the broader hard and soft power challenges created by a proliferation of failed and failing states.”<sup>183</sup> When the Conservative government took power in 2006, it was largely inexperienced in the realm of foreign affairs and this caused some growing pains. Prime Minister Harper wanted to distinguish his government from the previous Chretien and Martin administrations in some key ways. First of all, he set about to have all reference to human security – an idea put forth by Chretien’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Lloyd Axworthy – expunged from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).<sup>184</sup> He then instilled a somewhat more pragmatic approach to foreign affairs that is perhaps best encapsulated by Harper’s 2010 address to the UN General Assembly when he stated: “Our preference is to take meaningful action. Action that produces real results [going on to say] Canada refused to compromise its positions or

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<sup>182</sup> David J. Bercuson, J.L. Granatstein with Nancy Pearson Mackie, “Lessons Learned? What Canada Should Learn from Afghanistan,” *Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute*, Calgary, October 2011, 13.

<sup>183</sup> Adam Chapnick, “A Diplomatic Counter-Revolution: Conservative Foreign Policy, 2006-11,” *International Journal* 67, no 1 (2011), 141.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, 143-145.

beliefs for the sake of building a watered down, and therefore meaningless, global consensus.”<sup>185</sup> Although some argue that Canada’s departure under the Conservatives from its previous consensus building approach to foreign policy has hurt its reputation in the world, evidenced by Canadian failure to gain a seat on the UN Security Council, there is perhaps a stronger argument to be made that Canada “more than made up for [this] by the long-term results of an effort to rebrand the country as a principal global actor.”<sup>186</sup> Let us now examine Canada’s Foreign Affairs policy and development assistance spending and look at some key examples of the policy or Canadian leadership which will again demonstrate that Canada does punch above its weight in the world.

Perhaps one of the best ways to examine Canada’s Foreign Affairs policy is to look at DFAIT’s priorities for 2012-13 as detailed in *Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada: Report on Plans and Priorities 2012-13*. This report details DFAIT’s key priorities as being:

- Expanding trade and opening new markets for Canadian businesses;
- Reinforcing the Canada-US relationship, while continuing to encourage Canada as an energy supplier of choice;
- Promoting democracy and respect for human rights, and contributing to effective global governance in international security;
- The further implementation of Canada’s Arctic foreign policy; and
- Modernize consular services.<sup>187</sup>

These priorities, with the exception of the third, may not seem like they would set Canada on the path to punching above its weight, but after looking at the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and then some key examples of Canada’s international engagement, it will become apparent that Canada is hitting above its class.

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<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, 147.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, 153.

<sup>187</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada: Report on Plans and Priorities 2012-13*, 2012, 1.

“CIDA's mission is to lead Canada's international effort to help people living in poverty.”<sup>188</sup> It does this by focusing primarily on three priorities: “increasing food security, securing the future of children and youth, and stimulating sustainable economic growth.”<sup>189</sup> Furthermore, Canada has chosen to focus its development assistance primarily on 20 countries that are a priority for Canada in order to try and achieve the most beneficial results. Finally, CIDA strives to be both effective and efficient. This was evidenced when Canada showed global leadership by untying aid. This meant, for example, that Canadian food aid no longer had to be purchased in Canada, but could be purchased closer to those in need thereby not only creating greater efficiency and reducing transport costs, but also by stimulating economic growth in the country in need of assistance.<sup>190</sup> This paper will now look at some key examples, which will demonstrate that Canada is in fact punching above its weight.

### **Punching Above Its Weight**

Looking at financial data makes it clear that Canada is punching above its weight as the 13<sup>th</sup> most powerful country. Although there is an argument that a country like Canada could or should be spending more on foreign affairs or on official development assistance (ODA) than it does, and given the need in the world, this argument is not without merit. However, the fact remains that with Canada's weight being what it is; Canada is punching above it financially. The DFAIT budget in the fiscal year 2012/13 is almost \$600 million more than it was in fiscal year

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<sup>188</sup> Canadian International Development Agency, “About CIDA,” Accessed on 22 March 2013, <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/NIC-5313423-N2A>

<sup>189</sup> Canadian International Development Agency, *Canada's Aid Effectiveness Agenda: Focusing on Results*, Accessed on 21 February 2013, [http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/AidEffectiveness/\\$file/FocusingOnResults-EN.pdf](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/AidEffectiveness/$file/FocusingOnResults-EN.pdf)

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*

2008/09. And despite massive ongoing spending cuts across all of government, in Canada and among most of our allies, the projected DFAIT budget for fiscal year 2014/15 will still be \$150 million more than during 2008/09.<sup>191</sup> In addition to this, according to the latest data from the OECD, Canadian ODA more than doubled between 2004 and 2011 going from \$2.6 billion to \$5.3 billion and has consistently been the 8<sup>th</sup> largest contributor of ODA in the world<sup>192</sup> – clearly placing Canada higher than 13<sup>th</sup>. Finally, Canada is one of the top ten contributors to the UN peacekeeping budget, not even considering the contributions to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Canada is also the 6<sup>th</sup> greatest donor to the UN Peace Building Fund.<sup>193</sup> Clearly all of these taken together show that financially, Canada is punching above its weight in non-military financial international engagements.

The next example of how Canada punches above its weight is indicated by Canadian aid to Latin America and the Caribbean. Canadian assistance to this region has more than tripled between 2000 and 2010, from \$260 million to \$800 million annually.<sup>194</sup> CIDA's objectives for this region are to improve the prospects of children and youth and to reduce poverty by stimulating economic growth. It is achieving the former by becoming the third largest contributor to the Pan-American Health Organization. It is achieving the latter by doing things such as increasing Canadian contributions to the Inter-American Development bank from \$6.6 million in 2000 to \$43 million in 2010 and to the Caribbean Development Bank from \$1.9 million in 2000

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<sup>191</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada: Report on Plans and Priorities 2012-13*, 2012, 9.

<sup>192</sup> OECD Library "Development aid: Net official development assistance (ODA) Net disbursements at current prices and exchange rates," Accessed on 5 April 2013, [http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/development-aid-net-official-development-assistance-oda-2012\\_aid-oda-table-2012-1-en](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/development-aid-net-official-development-assistance-oda-2012_aid-oda-table-2012-1-en)

<sup>193</sup> Christina G. Badescu, "Canada's Continuing Engagement with United Nations Peace Operations," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 16 no. 2 (Spring 2010): 53.

<sup>194</sup> Chantal Blouin, Dorotea Lopez Giral, and Aniket Bhushan, "Reducing Poverty and Inequality in Latin America: What Role For Canada?," *International Journal*, (Summer 2012): 628.



to \$28 million in 2010.<sup>195</sup> Perhaps the most notable way that Canada is contributing to the region is through expanding trade and opening new markets. Since 2007, Canada has negotiated free trade agreements (FTAs) with Peru, Columbia, Panama and Honduras. Although there is some debate as to whether this alone would lower poverty rates while at the same time stimulating regional economic growth, Canada matched these agreements with a \$18 million program specifically designed to help small and medium sized businesses to take advantage of the FTAs in order to ensure poverty is reduced.<sup>196</sup> Canadian engagement in this region demonstrates yet again that Canada is punching above its weight.

The next, and perhaps the most recent, example of Canada doing more than its share is with the establishment of the Canadian Office of Religious Freedom in February 2013. This office and its mandate will be a Canadian foreign policy priority and it “will be an important vehicle through which Canada can advance fundamental Canadian values, including freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law worldwide.”<sup>197</sup> Through activism and diplomacy, “the Office will focus on advocacy, analysis, policy development and programming relating to protecting and advocating on behalf of religious minorities under threat, opposing religious hatred and intolerance, and promoting pluralism abroad.”<sup>198</sup> The Office of Religious Freedom will also manage the Religious Freedom Fund which will provide funding for activities which:

- assisting groups in critical situations or human rights defenders working on behalf of persecuted groups to cover legal or specialized services;
- supporting conferences and seminars to promote interreligious dialogue;

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<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*, 630.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, 631-632.

<sup>197</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “Mandate of the Office of Religious Freedom,” Accessed on 5 April 2013, [http://www.international.gc.ca/religious\\_freedom-liberte\\_de\\_religion/mandate\\_mandat.aspx?lang=eng](http://www.international.gc.ca/religious_freedom-liberte_de_religion/mandate_mandat.aspx?lang=eng)

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*

- developing materials in support of engaging governments on religious tolerance; and
- supporting awareness initiatives with multilateral organizations to help mainstream issues of tolerance and education on freedom of religion or belief.<sup>199</sup>

This new office, which is clearly aimed at promoting Canadian values abroad, is an excellent example of Canada's disproportionate international engagement.

The final example that will be discussed is Canadian global leadership on two key issues: advancing maternal, newborn and child health and containing the global economic crisis. When Canada hosted the 2010 G8 Summit in Muskoka, Ontario, one of the key areas on which Prime Minister Harper placed emphasis was health, specifically maternal, newborn and child health.<sup>200</sup> Canada's leadership on this initiative resulted in the *Muskoka Initiative for Maternal, Newborn, and Child Health*. This "initiative is focused on achieving significant progress on health system strengthening in developing countries facing high burdens of maternal and under-five child mortality and an unmet need for family planning."<sup>201</sup> Canada managed, during this time of fiscal austerity, to get \$7.3 billion in new funding for maternal, newborn and child health; leading with a \$1 billion contribution. Canada's leadership in bringing this important global issue forward did not just result in \$7.3 billion in new funding (which is massive), in September at the UN Millennium Development Goal Summit in New York, billions more was committed by the global community for a total of \$40 billion committed.<sup>202</sup> Canada's leadership on this could have a positive and lasting impact on generations in the developing world and is an incredible example of Canada punching above its weight.

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<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>200</sup> John Kirton, "Vulnerable America, Capable Canada: Convergent Leadership for an Interconnected World," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 18 no. 1, (March 2012): 139.

<sup>201</sup> *The G8 Muskoka Initiative: Maternal, Newborn and Under-Five Child Health*, Muskoka, Canada, June 26, 2010.

<sup>202</sup> John Kirton, "Vulnerable America, Capable Canada: 139.

Canada was also a global leader in the response to the European financial crisis. In September 2008, Canada was instrumental in initiating the first G20 Leaders Summit in order to address the financial situation. At this meeting which took place in November 2008 in Washington, DC, “Canada’s strong message was ‘fix the banks first.’ [Prime Minister] Harper was recognized for providing thoughtful interventions, especially on fiscal policy. He called on colleagues to start thinking about exit strategies, and about the global banking and financial system, as no Canadian institutions had failed.”<sup>203</sup> At the next summit in April 2009, Prime Minister Harper was one of the key leaders who successfully advocated against a global bank tax. In the lead up to the June 2010 summit, which Canada hosted, the European financial situation had worsened and Greece was on the verge of collapsing. A few weeks before the summit, Prime Minister Harper sent a letter to the G20 leaders urging that fiscal consolidation be the focus of the summit, with the aim to achieve specific goals and timeframes for debt and deficit reduction.<sup>204</sup> After much diplomatic wrangling to convince the Americans, and several countries with emerging economies, to agree to the Canadian approach, Prime Minister Harper managed to get all the developed economy members, except Japan, to agree to halve their deficits by 2013 and stop the deficit growth relative to GDP by 2016.<sup>205</sup> “Most commentators felt that Harper's summit had got the macroeconomic approach and message right. So did the markets, as the euro crisis was contained.”<sup>206</sup> With both the Muskoka Initiative and European economic crisis, Canada’s global leadership arguably had an impact on the entire world that could have lasting effects for generations.

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<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, 140.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, 141.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, 141.

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*, 141.

## Counter Argument

Although this paper argues that Canada punches above its weight, a case could be made that Canada is in fact not doing enough in the world. For example, Dr. Gregory Chin from York University argues that if Canada wants to be punching above its diplomatic weight, then it should be focusing more on the area of the world that has the largest potential, namely Asia.<sup>207</sup> Chin goes on to say that “there is a gaping hole in Canada’s foreign policy in terms of securing Canadian interests, both national and international, vis-à-vis China and India especially, but also Japan, Russia and South Korea.”<sup>208</sup> Another argument that Canada is not doing enough in the world relates to UN Peacekeeping. As of January 2013, Canada was contributing 130 personnel to UN Peacekeeping missions of the total 93,244 peacekeepers worldwide, ranking it 56<sup>th</sup> among contributing nations.<sup>209</sup> This is a far cry from 1988 when UN peacekeepers were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and Canada had contributed more than 10 percent of all peacekeepers since operations started in 1947, and was the largest single contributor.<sup>210</sup> The final counter argument that will be mentioned relates to Canada’s participation in the United Nations as a whole. Former Canadian Ambassador to the UN and former UN Deputy Secretary General, Louise Frechette, argues that since the Conservatives formed that government in 2006, “Prime Minister Harper has shown no particular interest in the life of the organization [UN].”<sup>211</sup> She says that this is

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<sup>207</sup> Gregory Chin, “Shifting Purpose: Asia’s Rise and Canada’s Foreign Aid,” *International Journal*, 64, no 1 (Autumn 2009): 991.

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*, 991.

<sup>209</sup> Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations, Accessed on 5 April 2013, [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/jan13\\_2.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/jan13_2.pdf)

<sup>210</sup> Christina G. Badescu, “Canada’s Continuing Engagement: 47.

<sup>211</sup> Louise Frechette, “Canada at the United Nations: A Shadow of its Former Self,” in *Canada Among Nations 2009-2010: As Others See Us*, ed. Fen Olser Hampson and Paul Heinbecker, 269 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010).

disappointing because, although Canada's vast participation in other multilateral organizations is commendable, the UN is the only organization that "can set rules for the entire international community.... and command that kind of cooperation that is needed to tackle truly global problems."<sup>212</sup> Ms Frechette went on to say that Canada could be a leader on a number of issues in the UN such as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and agricultural development and food security to name a few.<sup>213</sup>

While it may be true that Canada *could* do more, that does not mean that Canada is not punching above its weight now. Canada could strengthen its ties with Asia, but both for geographical and historical reasons Canada has been less focused on Asia. This is arguably in the process of changing as evidenced by Prime Minister Harper while in the Philippines on 10 November 2012 when he stated: "our Government is taking action to aggressively expand commercial relations with the entire Asia Pacific region. We're doing so to help create jobs, economic growth, and a better quality of life both in Asia and in Canada."<sup>214</sup> As to peacekeeping, Canada has significantly reduced its contributions, but so have all Western nations, while Canada remains one of the top financial contributors as well as a key enabler "providing diplomatic, financial, and expert support to the African Union, as well as assisting it with strategic planning, logistics and air operations, training, information support and communications."<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*, 270.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, 270-272.

<sup>214</sup> Stephen Harper (speech, Manila, Philippines, November 10, 2012).

<sup>215</sup> Christina G. Badescu, "Canada's Continuing Engagement: 55.

## **Conclusion**

As has been clearly evidenced in this chapter, first by examining Canadian participation in international organizations, then by looking at Canadian policy, and finally and most importantly by looking at the contemporary examples of Canada's international engagement, it has been clearly demonstrated that Canada punches above its weight in non-military international engagement. Whether through Canada's participation in international organizations, its financial contributions, its contributions to international structures and governance, or perhaps most importantly, its global leadership in key areas, Canada is definitely ahead of its class. Although there is an argument that Canada could be doing more in the international community, this does not take away from the fact that with Canada's weight defined as 13<sup>th</sup>, Canada is clearly engaging internationally at a level higher than what would be expected of the 13<sup>th</sup> most powerful country in the world.

## CONCLUSION

Canadian governments, regardless of political affiliation, have often claimed that Canada punches above its weight in the world. This claim is embraced by Canadians and is a source of national pride. However the question needed exploring as to whether or not Canada is in fact justified in making the claim that it punches above its weight in the world and this paper has done so. The foundation for this exploration was set by examining the literature on what is power and national power, particularly the writings of esteemed authors in the field such as Bertrand Russell, Robert A. Dahl, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Hans J. Morgenthau. It then moved on to survey how Canadian power has typically been identified in the international context, highlighting some of the key works by authors such as James Eayrs, John J. Kirton, David B. Dewitt, and Kim Richard Nossal.

After setting the foundation, and before determining whether or not Canada punches above its weight in the world, Canadian weight was determined by equating weight to national power. Canadian national power was determined by using three different models – the Comprehensive Index of National Capabilities, the National Power Index, and Comprehensive National Power – taking Canada’s average score from these three models, and using this to determine Canadian national power, or weight, relative to other countries in the world. Canada’s score was determined to be the 13<sup>th</sup> most powerful country in the world.

Having determined Canada’s weight, Canadian military and non-military international engagement was examined in order to determine whether or not Canada punches above its weight. For Canada’s military international engagement, Canadian defence policy was examined as was defence spending relative to some other key allies. Next, Canada’s significant

contribution to the Afghanistan ISAF mission and to the Libya campaign were examined. When all of these things were considered, it was made clear that in these two recent and high profile conflicts “Canada has shouldered a disproportionate share of the fighting, while other, and often larger, allies have shied away.”<sup>216</sup> For Canada’s non-military international engagement several areas were examined: Canadian participation in international organizations, Canadian foreign policy and international development assistance, and some specific examples of Canada’s non-military international engagement. Also explored was the argument that Canada is not doing enough in the global community. As with military international engagement, the conclusion is that Canada is punching above its weight in the world when it comes to non-military international engagement.

The conclusion of this paper, therefore, is that Canada does in fact punch above its weight in the world, given its defined weight as the 13<sup>th</sup> most powerful country, and can thereby proudly make that claim.

Some in the academic and diplomatic community argue that Canada could do more militarily, have a more active foreign policy agenda, and contribute more to international development assistance. The response to this is of course Canada could do more. Canada is a prosperous nation with international credibility and beliefs and values that could be further promoted abroad, both for Canadian interests and in the interests of other countries in the world. This being said, the fact that Canada arguably could do more should not diminish what Canada is already doing, and it is doing a lot, clearly enough to be ranked higher than its defined weight of 13<sup>th</sup>.

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<sup>216</sup> Peter Jones and Philippe Lagasse, “Rhetoric Versus Reality: 141.



If Canada is justified in making the claim that it punches above its weight in the world, what exactly does that mean for Canada's future? Canada's relative weight and its international engagement will always be in a state of flux. It is not unreasonable to think that some countries with emerging economies and expanding military capabilities and the will to use them could bypass Canada in international power rankings in the coming years and thereby reduce Canada's relative weight. It is equally true that Canadian governments could become more or less internationally engaged, thereby affecting Canada's ability to make the claim that it punches above its weight in the world.

So what does this mean? If Canada wants to be able to continue to make the claim that it punches above its weight, if it wants to have disproportionate influence, and if it wants to continue to make a difference in the lives millions of people in the world that are less fortunate than the typical Canadian, then it needs to continue to make international engagement a national priority. It needs to continue to fund its military and employ it with the goal to make a difference in the world without being overly risk adverse. It needs to continue to be a world leader in providing development assistance. And perhaps most importantly, Canada needs to continue bringing forward ideas based on Canadian interests and values, which will improve the lives and security of people around the world. If Canada continues to do this, then it will always be able to make the claim that it punches above its weight in the world.

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