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AND THOSE CAISSONS GO ROLLING ALONG…: THE U.S. ARMY FIELD ARTILLERY AND NON-STANDARD MISSIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

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ABSTRACT[1]

During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) many U.S. Army field artillery units executed an array of missions outside the usual purview of traditional field artillery – integration and delivery of lethal and non-lethal fires to enable joint and maneuver commanders to dominate their operational environment. Some of the notable non-standard missions conducted by field artillery units included the reorganization as infantry units to conduct counterinsurgency operations, transformation into armed escorts for convoy security, and providing security for key infrastructure. This fact is significant in that historic efforts were required to repurpose and train these units, ultimately at the cost of atrophied skills in the integration and delivery of fires. The analysis within this paper answers two questions regarding this phenomenon – why was the U.S. Army field artillery not better prepared to conduct non-standard missions in support of counterinsurgency operations; and as the Army transitions from continuous combat operations, how is the field artillery posturing for the future? What is discovered through scrutinizing primary and secondary academic and professional military sources is that the field artillery both failed to anticipate the requirement to conduct non-standard missions and failed to learn lessons from conflicts in the later portion of the 20th-century. Furthermore, it was found that it is possible conditions are being created for the loss of the knowledge gained during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in regard to the field artillery and non-standard missions – meaning that critical lessons may have to be relearned during future conflicts.

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[1] The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

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INTRODUCTION

What is past is prologue.[2] This phrase is generally understood to mean the influence of history is responsible for the context of the present. Therefore, this paper will examine relevant military operations and literature from, and pertaining to, the late 20th and early 21st-centuries to understand the context of military affairs specific to the United States Army Field Artillery both leading to, and following, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Field Artillery (FA) units during OIF and OEF conducted numerous missions outside the traditional roles of fire support – the integration and delivery of lethal and non-lethal fires. Some examples of these missions, commonly termed non-standard missions, include reorganization to own battlespace[3] and conduct counterinsurgency operations, transformation into armed escorts for convoy security, and providing security for key infrastructure. Still, it must be noted that many FA units did and continue to integrate and deliver lethal and non-lethal fires in support of maneuver units. Be that as it may, these units were in a very small minority during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Even in Afghanistan where the demand for fires has been substantial, many FA units conducted the aforementioned non-standard missions. Therefore, this analysis intends to answer two questions – why was the United States Army Field Artillery not better prepared to conduct non-standard missions in support of counterinsurgency operations; and as the Army transitions from continuous combat operations, how is the FA posturing for the future?

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[2] William Shakespeare, "The Tempest," in *The Comedies of William Shakespeare* (Norwalk, Connecticut: The Easton Press, 1980), 32.

[3] The term battlespace has been replaced by operational environment. However, battlespace will be used in this paper because it is assumed it is an easier term for non-military personnel to conceptualize. Additionally, " to own battlespace" is military jargon meaning to be responsible for a designated geographical area.

The analytical approach for this examination borrows from *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* by Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch.[4] The Cohen and Gooch analytical approach to military operations addresses the question of, "Why do competent military organizations fail?"[5] The approach provides an examination of critical tasks and the relative contributions to those tasks at different levels of an organization. This paper does not focus on the relationships between various organizations. Instead, the analysis in this paper first examines issues pertaining to the Army as a whole, before analyzing those same issues in regard to the FA. The intention is to provide an understanding of the environment within the Army in which the FA operates. Importantly, Cohen and Gooch posit in their book that all military failures can be classified as a failure to anticipate, learn or adapt; or any combination of the three. A failure in one area is classified as a simple failure; and logically, failure in only one area is easiest to overcome to avoid disaster. Recovery from two failures in combination, known as aggregate failures, is understandably more difficult to achieve; but even aggregate failures do not necessarily result in total defeat. Catastrophic failure results from the simultaneous or consecutive experience of all three failures. A catastrophic failure is almost certain to result in total defeat without extensive assistance from outside the organization.[6] The Cohen and Gooch failure theory provides the framework for this

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[4] At the time *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* was published, Eliot Cohen was a Bradley Senior Research Associate at Harvard's Olin Institute for Strategic studies and a previously published author. John Gooch was a professor of history at the University of Lancaster, England, a leading military historian and a published author.

[5] Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), v.

[6] *Ibid*., 25-26.

paper. However, it is assumed that the FA achieved success in adapting to meet the operational needs in Iraq and Afghanistan, ultimately resulting in mission success. Therefore, regarding the FA and the conduct of non-standard missions in OIF and OEF, only the possible failure to anticipate future operational requirements and failure to learn from previous operations are germane to this paper. Hence, how the FA achieved the individual and organizational adaptability to achieve success in each operation will not be evaluated, though the topic will be explored in the final chapter regarding the transition away from continuous combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Regardless of the results concerning anticipation and learning prior to OIF and OEF, now that the completion of both operation nears, the question remains as to what the FA has now learned, what is it anticipating and can it, as an institution, achieve pervasive adaptability throughout its force?

Certain terms in this paper are used nearly synonymously and therefore deserve a brief explanation for clarity. The terms: Low-intensity Conflict (LIC), Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) or Operations Other Than War (OOTW), Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSC), and Stability Operations (SO) are all terms used to define what is commonly understood as "small wars." Some examples of operations classified under these terms are counterinsurgencies, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and military assistance to civilian agencies. These operations may or may not involve the use or threat of force. More simply, each of these terms is an attempt by the military to categorize missions other than the conduct of conventional force-on-force warfighting that the Army has and may be called upon to execute. Determination of when

each term is used is based on which one was used in the cited reference or assumed appropriate within the time period of discussion. In general terms, LIC was the most common term from the late 1980s to 1993 when OOTW was first used in Army doctrine and stability operations is the term used in the current Army vernacular. These terms are important because counterinsurgency, like that conducted during OIF and OEF, is a subset of the broader category defined by each.

Lastly, it is understood that the conduct of stability operations (LIC/OOTW/SSC/SO) does not demand the utilization of FA soldiers and units in non-standard roles. It is assumed that artillery fires have a place in these operations determined by the mission, enemy, terrain, time, troops available and civilian considerations – just as it was during OIF and OEF. Yet, the focus of this examination is solely on the conduct of non-standard mission and not how to deliver fires and their effects in the wide range of possible scenarios. Finally, it is not the intention of this analysis to judge performance, but to seek institutional and organizational improvement through the interpretation of pertinent primary and secondary sources.

CHAPTER 1 - LITERATURE REVIEW

A wide range of primary and secondary resources were surveyed for this analysis. However, a notable literature shortcoming is evident in regards to the FA and non-standard missions. Outside of Dr. Lawrence A. Yates'[7] book *Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War: An Overview of the US Experience*, additional analysis specific to the FA must be derived from primary sources consisting of doctrine and articles in the FA professional journal *Field Artillery*.[8] Dr. Yates' book presented an exceptional overview of FA experiences in OOTW, furnishing insight into possible sources for lessons learned, but it is his statement that there is a "paucity of MOOTW artillery studies"[9] that provides credence to the examination as to whether or not there was a failure to anticipate and learn prior to OIF and OEF. Remarkably, though an extremely valuable book on the topic of the FA in OOTW, Dr. Yates' survey of operations from 1789-2000 concludes after only 43 pages of literature. Fortunately, *Field Artillery* provided outstanding primary and secondary resources. The FA maintains an archive of these professional journals dating back to Volume 1, Number 1 published by the United States Field Artillery Association January-March 1911. The purpose of the journal is for the dissemination of professional knowledge pertaining to the FA and the vast majority of articles are written by active duty field artillerymen. Additionally, it is common practice for the inclusion of articles or interviews of senior artillerymen, particularly the Chief of the Field Artillery, addressing the current state of the branch or

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[7] From 1981 to 2005, Dr. Yates was a member of the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas who spent over twenty years studying the Army and stability operations.

[8] Now known as the *Fires*.

[9] Lawrence A. Yates, *Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War: An Overview of the US Experience* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 1.

initiatives regarding organizations and equipment which provided outstanding understanding of prevailing thoughts and priorities at specific moments in time.

Additional professional publications like *Military Review* and *Parameters* were referenced to survey prevailing Army discourse. *Military Review*, whose stated target audience is senior noncommissioned officers through flag officers and including scholars, Department of State civilians and Congressional staff, provided the preponderance of referenced articles. The intent of the *Military Review* as a publication is to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas to stimulate critical thinking, preferring articles of a practical nature associated with division or corps level campaign planning and execution. For this paper the *Military Review* articles contributed exceptional insight into the debate over LIC/OOTW in the 1990s with articles such as "Emerging Doctrine for LIC" (1991), "Operations Other Than War: A CINC's Perspective" (1994) and "OOTW: A Concept in Flux" (1996) for example. *Military Review* articles also supplied understanding of doctrinal updates and debates with articles like "Versatility: The Fifth Tenet" (1993), "Paying the Price for Versatility" (1997), and "Unified Land Operations: The Evolution of Army Doctrine for Success in the 21st Century" (2012). *Parameters* is similar to *Military Review* in regards to intent, but where *Military Review* tends to focus on tactical to operational level concerns, *Parameters* audience is more concerned with operational to strategic level issues. The *Parameters* articles provided much of the same information garnered from *Military Review*, though within higher-level context which provided an understanding of how well prevailing thoughts pervaded the Army as an institution.

As is the case for most FA related studies since 2004, Major General J.B.A. Bailey's definitive study on the development and use of artillery, *Field Artillery and Firepower* was referenced. Though this book confirms that OIF and OEF were not entirely unique regarding to the utilization of the FA in non-standard missions, again the amount of information available for study was somewhat scarce; information valuable to this examination was contained entirely in a single chapter, "Operations Since 1945." However, there were significantly more materials available for the examination of the Army. The strengths of these references reside in the details provided for specific conflicts and operations such as Vietnam, Operation Just Cause, and OIF. However, discussion of inter-conflict initiatives since the end of the Vietnam War is lacking. *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet was referenced, yet, though the 1996 publication does address some pertinent generalities regarding inter-conflict periods, the studies used fall outside the time period of this examination. Also, a query to the Army Center of Army Lesson Learned for pertinent materials was made, however, none of the references provided were deemed beneficial to this paper.

Lastly, Army concept documents and doctrine provided the vast majority of primary resources. When examining what was anticipated and what could have been learned, the doctrine of interest was the Army's capstone publications, *Operations*, and any manual, to include joint publications, regarding LIC/MOOTW/Stability operations. The same approach was used when evaluating the FA's posture for future operations, but

with emphasis on Training and Doctrine Command publications concerning operational concepts for 2016 to 2028.

In summary, the literature available for review shows a lack of study concerning the FA's conduct of non-standard missions and its role in stability operations. This paper will fill this gap in a limited means through the evaluation of the context of the Army and FA institutions prior to OIF and OEF and with an appraisal of what the FA has learned from its recent experiences, what it anticipates for future operations, and how it can build adaptability throughout the institution.

CHAPTER 2 - FAILURE TO ANTICIPATE?

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adopt themselves after they occur.
-General Guilio Douet[10]

Dictionary.com defines anticipation as: "realization in advance; expectation or hope; previous notion; intuition, foreknowledge; or prescience."[11] Notably, this is not prediction, which is defined as: "to declare or tell in advance; prophesy; foretell."[12] The distinction is subtle, yet significant. Prediction and prophesy conjures images of shadowy figures in touch with magical forces to see into the future, or sports stars making bold statements to profess their confidence in future victories - this is not the realm of the professional military. However, anticipation is in the purview of the military. Anticipation in the U.S. Army doctrine prior to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq was a consideration of strategic responsiveness. Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, stated that commanders are to anticipate future operations to focus training and prepare their units for possible change of missions.[13] Furthermore, as previously discussed, a failure to anticipate is one of three possible organizational shortcomings that can lead to military misfortunes in the analytical approach developed by Eliot Cohen and John Gooch in their study of the anatomy of failure in war.[14]

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[10] "Military Quotes," last accessed 26 March 2013, http://www.military-quotes.com/database/d.htm.
[11] Dictionary.com, LLC, "Dictionary.com," last accessed 26 March 2013, http://www.dictionary.reference.com.
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] United States, *Field Manual 3-0, Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2001), 3-5.
[14] Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: The Free Press, 1990).

Cohen and Gooch give further explanations of anticipation that provides the theme for this chapter and the exploration to the thought that the U.S. Field Artillery (FA) should have anticipated the non-standard missions as a part of counterinsurgency operations in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. They state that effective anticipation is the comparing of one's way of war to likely enemy actions.[15] Borrowing from a Soviet definition of doctrine, they make the case that doctrine is a picture of future war and then a failure to anticipate can be seen as a failure in doctrine.[16] Therefore, an examination of U.S. doctrine prior to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is vital in understanding the state of the FA as its units began operations. Additionally, they outline the importance of understanding the political environment of one's own nation and that of its potential adversaries, articulating that when military organization anticipate future conflicts they must contemplate "politicomilitary conditions" to understand threat tactics and the relationship between action and reaction for the opposing forces.[17] This chapter surveys the policies, doctrine and prevailing academic and professional thought from roughly 1991 until the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 with the intent to answer the question – should the United States Army Field Artillery have anticipated the non-standard missions its units and individuals conducted during Operations Iraq and Enduring Freedom?

1991-1993 Professional and Academic Discussion

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[15] *Ibid.,* 237.
[16] *Ibid.,* 238-239.
[17] *Ibid.*

28 February 1991 marked the official end of the Gulf War, the same year many consider the end of the Cold War. On the heels of these historic events, academic and military discussions emerged regarding future conflicts and many of those discussions revolved around low-intensity conflict (LIC). In the vernacular of the time, LIC essentially encompassed all military actions considered to be irregular or non-standard; such as peacekeeping, insurgency and counterinsurgency support and humanitarian assistance. Notably, the June 1991 issue of *Military Review* was the seventh issue out of the previous three years regarding LIC and related themes.[18] Academics were also devoting significant energy into LIC studies during this time. An example is the book, *Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict*, a collection of academic works spearheaded by General John R. Galvin,[19] who at the time was the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. His initiative intended to "revitalize strategic thinking as it pertains to small wars."[20] Other academics such as Steven Metz[21] wrote articles such as "US Strategy and the Changing LIC Threat" for *Military Review*. On the

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[18] Steven F. Rausch, "Low-Intensity Conflict: Gearing for the Long Haul," *Military Review* LXXI, no. 6 (June 1991): n.p.

[19] General John R. Galvin was a decorated officer whose awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Silver Star, Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters) and the Bronze Star Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters) to name a few. He had the distinction to command two Department of Defense Unified Commands, US Southern Command in Panama and US European Command. He is also the author of *The Minute Men*, a study of the first battle of the American Revolution; *Air Assault*, an analysis of the development of air mobility in twentieth century warfare; and *Tree Men of Boston*, a study of the political events that led to the American Revolution.

[20] Max G. Manwaring, *Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991), xiii.

[21] At the time of writing, Dr. Steven Metz is the Director of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and the research director for the Joint Strategic Landpower Task Force and co-director of the SSI's Future of American Strategy Project. He has worked with SSI since 1993.

fringe of these discussions was an extreme thought noted by renown British historian Michael Howard[22] in his book, *The Lessons of History*:

> It is quite possible, that war in the sense of major, organized armed conflict between developed societies may not recur,…Nevertheless violence will continue to erupt within developed societies as well as underdeveloped, creating situations of local armed conflict often indistinguishable from traditional war.[23]

Therefore, though counterinsurgency, as it was and is understood in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively, was not discussed or described directly, many understood the reality that operations other than conventional conflict were credible enough to deserve serious study. Specifics within the LIC literature of the time are very helpful to understanding how the military and academia foresaw future operations.

Noticeably counter to the emerging LIC discourse movement, at the time the dominate approach to warfare was still focused on large conventional battles, based on AirLand Battle doctrine in anticipation of a large interstate conflict in Europe. A level of "corporate inertia" had set in after roughly four decades of focusing the nation's wealth and foreign and military policies on coping with the Soviets. Institutional habits had formed[24] as well as a predominate vision of warfare, ultimately creating an environment where many viewed future adversaries conveniently as ones who would fight in a manner that matched the AirLand Battle doctrine.[25] Regarding insurgencies specifically, some

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[22] Sir Michael Howard, a veteran of the Second World War, holds B.A., M.A. and Litt D. degrees from Oxford, where he has been the Regius Professor of Modern History. He is the author of numerous books and articles and is listed as an external researcher for the Strategic Studies Institute.

[23] Michael Howard, "War and Social Change, in *The Lessons of History* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1991), 176.

[24] Max G. Manwaring, *Uncomfortable Wars*…,47.

[25] *Ibid*., 9.

"[p]olicymakers, military leaders, and defense experts assumed that insurgency was a relic of the Cold War, posing little challenge in the 'new world order.'"[26] In spite of the growing interest of the subject, it was not inculcated into the fabric of the military. Lieutenant Colonel John B. Hunt[27] explained in his 1991 article "Emerging Doctrine for LIC," since LIC was not seen as a threat to the survival of the nation, all LIC operations were engaged as a lesser concern[28] and that to obtain the LIC imperative of adaptability, a change in attitudes would be required.[29] As further evidence of military resistance to anything other than traditional conventional war was the statement in the report of the Strategic Studies Institute's roundtable regarding multinational peace operations: "Given the inherent difficulties of preserving this proficiency [conventional warfighting] … it is easy to see multinational peace operations as a *distraction* [emphasis added]."[30] The report also claimed the most pressing task for the Army was not changes in organizations or doctrine, but in *attitudes.*[31] Nevertheless, though there was resistance to LIC operations, by 1993 the US Army incorporated LIC into its capstone doctrine under the title, operations other than war (OOTW).

1993-1997 Doctrine and Debate

[26] Steven Metz, "New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency," *Parameters* 37, no. 4 (Winter 2007-2008): 20.

[27] Lieutenant Colonel John B. Hunt was a regular contributor to *Military Review* in the early and mid-1990s. As of 1993, he was retired and working with the Army Proponency for Low-Intensity Conflict, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, US Army Command and General Staff College.

[28] John B. Hunt, "Emerging Doctrine for LIC," *Military Review* LXXI, no. 6 (June 1991): 52.

[29] *Ibid*., 58.

[30] William J. Doll and Steven Metz, *The Army and Multinational Peace Operations: Problems and Solutions* (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1993), n.p.

[31] Italicized in original report for emphasis.

In June of 1993 the Army disseminated its latest capstone manual, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations.* The doctrine within this new publication was regarded as an engine of change; it was to provide a doctrine-based army an updated approach to thinking about warfighting and the conduct of operations other than war.[32] *Operations* contained three key updates over the previous keystone doctrine which provides evidence the Army anticipated changes in the strategic environment – full dimensional operations, the addition of versatility as a basic tenet and the inclusion of OOTW. As stated in the publication's introduction, this manual was a reflection of the Army's new thinking in the post-Cold War era and some saw this as a significant step in the Army's adaptation to the post-Cold War environment.[33]

Full-dimensional operations were defined in FM 100-5 as "the application of all capabilities available to an Army commander to accomplish his mission decisively and at the least cost across the full range of possible operations [war and OOTW]."[34] To further explain to the force the range of possible operations, the manual described and explained the range of military operations, describing that the US strives to achieve strategic goals in three unique environments – peacetime, conflict and war. Additionally, the Army defined its activities during peacetime and conflict as OOTW. Those activities were used to influence the operating environment. Conflict was defined as the attempt to secure strategic objectives through hostilities. The third environment, war, was defined as the

[32] General Fredrick M. Franks Jr., "Full-Dimensional Operations: A Doctrine for an Era of Change," *Military Review* LXXVII, no. 1 (January-February 1997): n.p.

[33] Gordon R. Sullivan and Andrew B. Twomey, "The Challenges of Peace," *Parameters* XXIV (Autumn 1994): 11.

[34] United States, *Field Manual 100-5, Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), Glossary-4.

use of force against an armed adversary.[35] What is noteworthy is that the Army clearly accepted its involvement in operations not considered traditional warfare and furthermore anticipated some of those operations would still require the use of force. Therefore, it is easy to infer the Army anticipated involvement in a wide range of operations. However, of the possible operations provided as examples, counterinsurgency was not listed.

The addition of versatility as a basic tenet was very important in regards to the Army's anticipation of future operations and the ensuing debate over versatility provides exceptional insight for understanding the Army zeitgeist in the mid-1990s. A tenet is defined as, "a basic truth held by an organization."[36] Prior to 1993, the Army had four tenets: initiative, agility, depth and synchronization. Versatility was added to address the need to operate in the previously discussed full-dimensional operations and was defined as, "the ability of units to meet diverse challenges, shift focus, tailor forces, and move from one role or mission to another rapidly and efficiently."[37] The Army reviewed Operations Just Cause (Panama), Desert Storm (Iraq) and Provide Comfort (Somalia) and determined a need for the ability to quickly and successfully "action across a wide range of war and operations other than war."[38] Some of the Army's senior leaders found this tenet important enough to discuss and support in professional journals like *Military Review*. Colonel James McDonough, the then director for the School of Advanced

[35] *Ibid.*, 2-0.

[36] *Ibid.*, 2-6.
[37] *Ibid.*, Glossary-9.
[38] *Ibid.*, 2-9.

Military Studies of the US Army Command and General Staff College,[39] wrote in his article "Versatility: The Fifth Tenet," that there is no room in today's military for specialized units incapable of contributing to all types of conflict and therefore, all Army units must be prepared to commit all operations, warfighting and OOTW.[40] Also, the 32nd Chief of Staff of the Army General Gordon R. Sullivan wrote that, "[t]omorrow's war and operations other than war will require leaders versatile in mind and will," and that versatility in leaders is the ability to improvise solutions during uncertainty and changing battlefield conditions.[41] Yet, this tenet was not seen as a solution to everyone in the Army and its perceived shortcomings will be discussed after a description of FM 100-5's inclusion of OOTW.

Chapter 13 of *Operations* (1993) is titled, "Operations Other Than War." Though the inclusion of this chapter is clear evidence concerning the Army's acceptance of the changing strategic operational environment, it is notable that the opening sentences are: "The Army's primary focus is to fight and win the nation's wars. However, Army forces and soldiers operate around the world in an environment that may not involve combat."[42] These sentences tie back to another like sentence in the Introduction: "Winning wars is

[39] At the time of his article, Colonel McDonough had been selected to assume command of a separate brigade (light) in the Southern European Task Force in January 1994. He was also an established author with the books, *Platoon Leader, The Defense of Hill 781* and *The Limits of Glory* in addition to his 1991 *Military Review* article, "Building the New FM 100-5: Process and Product."

[40] Colonel James R. McDonough, "Versatility: The Fifth Tenet," *Military Review* LXXIII, no. 12 (December 1993): 13.

[41] General Gordon R. Sullivan, "Leadership, Versatility and All That Jazz," *Military Review* LXXVII, no. 1 (January-February 1997): n.p.

[42] United States, *Field Manual 100-5, Operations* …, 13-0.

the primary purpose of the doctrine in this manual."[43] So, though the chapter outlines the environment, principles and activities associated with OOTW, it makes it very easy to infer that OOTW are lesser missions than warfighting and that fact may have serious implications regarding the FA's anticipation of its roles in future conflicts. At a minimum, it opened the debate to whether or not the Army had fully accepted OOTW as its mission and whether or not a single chapter devoted to an amplitude of activities that ranged from support to domestic civil authorities and humanitarian relief, to peace enforcement, and support of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.

Before delving deeper into the shortcomings of the Army's capstone manual and doctrine, it is worth quickly reviewing Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*. JP 3-07 was published 16 June 1995 and could have been combined with FM 100-5 by the officers and soldiers of the Army (including the FA) to prepare for future operations, specifically OOTW. Like FM 100-5, JP 3-07 acknowledged a change in the operating environment with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's opening statement: "While we have historically focused on warfighting, our military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operations-other than war."[44] Therefore, by 1995 there was more than just a chapter within the available doctrine regarding OOTW. However, within the context of the anticipation of non-standard missions by Field Artillerymen and units in Iraq and Afghanistan, there were still significant shortcomings. Counterinsurgency was not listed

[43] *Ibid.*, v.

[44] United States, *Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Fort Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 1995), n.p.

as its own type of operation. It instead combined it with nation assistance and titled, "Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency."[45] Additionally, neither the term "Field Artillery," nor "non-standard" was used once in the publication; furthermore, the terms "versatility" and "economy of force" are each used only a single time. So, from this publication it is difficult to find where the FA should have anticipated its role within future OOTW.

"FM 100-5's greatest potential flaw resides in the added battle tenet, versatility, which is really no more than a hiding place for a less-than-total commitment to OOTW."[46] This quote from Colonel Steven P. Schook[47] was not a sentiment without support. Lieutenant Colonel John B. Hunt also wrote that, "the Army has no valid OOOW concept,"[48] and that FM 100-5 failed to address "the circumstances, goals or necessary OOTW methods." [49] Colonel Schook's argument was that versatility was a "catch-all" tenet that had little value to the warfighter. The premise of the tenet was that units and individuals needed "to be 'multifunctional' and not mission-essential task list myopic."[50] His concern was this tenet was a harkening back to pre-FM 25-100, *Training the Force* when units were expected to do anything and everything, and therefore a break from standing training doctrine that focused units on tasks deemed essential in order to

[45] *Ibid*., iv.
[46] Colonel Steven P. Schook, "Paying the Price for Versatility," *Military Review* (September-October 1997): n.p.
[47] Former School of Advanced Military Studies director and prolific military author.
[48] Lieutenant Colonel John B. Hunt, "OOTW: A Concept in Flux," *Military Review* LXXVI, no. 5 (September-October 1996): 3.
[49] *Ibid.*

[50] General George A. Joulwan, "Operations Other Than War: A CINC's Perspective," *Military Review* LXXIV, no. 2 (February 1994): 10.

focus training to ensure proficiency on those tasks. He essentially assessed that the Army had failed to fully accept OOTW as a requirement because OOTW tasks were absent from any unit's mission-essential task list; further stating that "the Army will not sacrifice its ability to win the next war for anything less than war." This statement is important because it speaks to the attitude towards OOTW within the Army and there is significant evidence that though versatility and OOTW was added to FM 100-5, the tenet and need to prepare for OOTW did not pervade the force.

For context, in the mid-1990s, the military was still required to field forces capable of winning two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.[51] However, it was also understood that strategically OOTW were growing in importance:

> We understand the difficulties of ethnic conflict and peace operations [OOTW]. We understand as well the need to be ready to fight and win two major regional conflicts. *Most important* [emphasis added], we must understand that we cannot meet either of these challenges at the expense of our ability to respond to the other.[52]

Yet, that understanding does not seem to have been universal. As mentioned before, *Operations* stated that warfighting was primary to all other missions. Hunt claimed that the Army refused to recognize any warfare not of the Clauswitzian tradition based off of still reverberating repercussions from Vietnam and that the military success of Operation Desert Strom reinforced this attitude.[53] There is an abundance of evidence concerning this attitude. In an article published in FA's professional journal in 1994, "The Emerging

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[51] Gordon R. Sullivan and Andrew B. Twomey, "The Challenges of Peace," …: 13.
[52] *Ibid*., 6.

[53] Lieutenant Colonel John B. Hunt, "OOTW: A Concept in Flux," …: 4.

National Military Strategy," the authors diminish OOTW. They first labeled issues concerning terrorism and internal conflicts that undermined stability and international order as "lesser dangers."[54] Then they stated that the humanitarian and peace support operations are "in addition to his [a battalion commander] principle responsibility-warfighting."[55] Lastly, they assert that the Army must ensure OOTW requirements do not interfere with the Army's primary mission of "deterrence and warfighting."[56] All of this while acknowledging that OOTW were a part of the new strategic reality, specifically saying that "Somalia is an example of this new strategic reality,"[57] and noting that deployments in support of OOTW had increased 300% between 1990 and 1994 with the Army having between 16,000 and 20,000 soldiers deployed in up to 70 countries performing "overseas presence missions."[58]

An additional piece of evidence to examine regarding the prevailing attitudes towards OOTW and versatility is "The Battalion Commander's Handbook". This handbook was written and edited by former Army battalion commanders of the United States Army War College, Class of 1996. The purpose of the handbook was to synthesize the combined wisdom and distilled experience of 62 successful former battalion commanders for use by incoming commanders seeking guidance and information. First and foremost, the terms counterinsurgency, economy of force, OOTW and versatility are not used a single time throughout the 152 page document. The handbook stresses the

[54] Colonel John R. Wood and Major Steven A. Greene, "The Emerging National Military Strategy," *Field Artillery* (June 1994): 34.
[55] *Ibid.*, 37.
[56] *Ibid.*
[57] *Ibid.*, 35.
[58] *Ibid.*, 36-37.

value of mission-essential task list (METL), stating that a new commander should "[i]mmediately after taking command, conduct a detailed Mission Essential Task List cross-walk from battalion level tasks down to individual tasks."[59] Yet the document reinforces that OOTW were not on unit METLs with the statement: "*After* [emphasis added] completing a thorough mission analysis [for a peacekeeping mission], develop a mission essential task list (METL) that will facilitate successful execution of your peacekeeping mission."[60] This is somewhat of an amazing fact considering the following is found in the same document:

> During the past five years, America's elected leadership has expanded the Army's missions to include deployments in support of peacekeeping operations (Somalia, Croatia, Rwanda, Haiti, Macedonia and Bosnia). As a result, the likelihood of US forces being deployed for combat operations as executed during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War diminished significantly.[61]

All further evidence that the Army and its leaders had anticipated more OOTW missions, yet there was a prevailing attitude that prevented a complete acquiescence to the need to prepare for such missions or to at least consider the supporting tasks as essential. Somewhat remarkable when men like the then Chief of Staff of the Army General Gordon R. Sullivan stated in 1994 that it was unlikely that future conflicts would require only the destruction of and armed opponent; that victory in future conflicts would require domination or control over the land and population.[62]

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[59] Colonel Alfred H. Gross, Lieutenant Colonel (P) Harold E. Cooney, Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. Flood, Lieutenant Colonel (P) Walter L. Holton, Lieutenant Colonel Wayne R. Kniskern, Lieutenant Colonel (P) James V. Mudd, Lieutenant Colonel Ronnie R. Roberts, and Lieutenant Colonel Richard B. Waterhouse, *The Battalion Commander's Handbook, 1996* (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1996), 14.

[60] *Ibid*., 95.

[61] *Ibid*., 92.

1997-2001 Preparing for the 21st Century

Today, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the 1997 National Military Strategy provide exceptional starring points to gain insight into the thinking of senior civilian and military leadership with regards to long-term Department of Defense strategy and priorities at the beginning of the 21st-century. Each document assesses and threats in order to ensure Department of Defense strategies, capabilities and forces match requirements for current and future defense needs.[63]

Notably in the 1997 QDR under "Defense Strategy," it charged that U.S. forces must be able to conduct full-spectrum operations – full-spectrum operations meaning the ability to conduct operations from conventional warfare to humanitarian operations. The QDR stated: "At the high end of the crisis is fighting and winning major theater wars [conventional warfighting]" and that this type of "mission is the most stressing requirement for the U.S. military."[64] This seemingly placed conventional warfighting as the priority for all U.S. units – a continuation of the prevailing thought from 1993-1997. However, the QDR also stated that current intelligence projections and recent experience deem that involvement in "smaller-scale contingencies" for the coming 15 to 20 years was probable. One can infer from the sections "Conducting Smaller-Scale Contingency (SSC) Operations" and "Fighting and Winning Major Theater Wars (MTW)" that the

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[62] Gordon R. Sullivan and Andrew B. Twomey, "The Challenges of Peace," …: 15.

[63] United States Department of Defense, "U.S. Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review," last accessed 02 February 2013. http://www.defense.gov/qdr/.

[64] United States, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1997), Section III. http://www.fas.org/man/docs/qdr/.

writers of the QDR viewed SSCs as the more likely operations in the near future, but MTW as the most demanding for training and the more critical conflict for national security. This is an important point for consideration as even today, due to scale, some consider conventional conflict between states as the most dangerous form of human conflict.[65] This point will be considered again later when evaluating what the FA as a branch should have anticipated. However, it should also be noted that counterinsurgency was not listed as an example of a SSC in the QDR. Instead it dictated that the U.S. military must be able to conduct SSC operations anywhere in the world against an adversary that may use "asymmetric means, such as NBC weapons," and that those same forces must be able to withdraw from those operations to deploy in support of a major theater war.[66] The requirement of full-spectrum operations and the ability to quickly shift from SSC to MTW was certainly a high demand on a force with finite resources.

Regarding forces and manpower, the 1997 QDR outlined significant reductions. The QDR portrayed a future force that leveraged technological advantages with an emphasis on precision engagements which included FA specific equipment such as the Crusader self-propelled howitzer and Brilliant Anti-Tank munitions. This reliance on technology and precision munitions would allow for Army troop strength reductions of 15,000 active and 45,000 reserve personnel.[67] Additionally, the QDR addressed missions and size for the eight Army National Guard Divisions, noting that, "[e]xisting plans do

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[65] Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges," *Joint Force Quarterly: JFQ* no. 52 (2009): 37.

[66] United States, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1997), Section III. http://www.fas.org/man/docs/qdr/.

[67] United States, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1997), Section V. http://www.fas.org/man/docs/qdr/.

not call for these units to participate in major theater wars."[68] This is an interesting fact with regard to the FA, because by 2000, nearly 70 percent of FA organizations and personnel were in the Army National Guard.[69] These facts may have directly affected how the FA anticipated its involvement in future operations.

The 1997 National Military Strategy was a supporting document to the 1997 QDR. It was the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (General John M. Shalikashvili) on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces in implementing the guidance in the President's national security strategy and the QDR. It reinforced the requirement to conduct major theater wars and small-scale contingencies, but it also described the characteristics of a full spectrum force as "multi-mission capable." The full spectrum force had to be "proficient in their core warfighting competencies," be able to "transition smoothly" between missions, and "quickly shift from one type of operation to another."[70] This document is further evidence that institutionally the government and military identified a necessity to conduct OOTW missions in support of future national objectives. Nevertheless, debates similar to those seen over FM 100-5's versatility and treatment of OOTW continued, and much of it revolved around institutional and organizational attitudes.

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[68] *Ibid.*

[69] Major General Toney Stricklin, "State of the Field Artillery 2000: Looking Ahead to the Objective Force," *Field Artillery*, no. 6 (November-December 2000): n.p.

[70] General John M. Shalikashvili, "National Military Strategy, 1997," last accessed January 18, 2013. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nms/.

In 2000, the then Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric K. Shinseki and the then Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera published, "Army Vision: Soldiers On Point for the Nation…Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War," in *Military Review*. They addressed future operations with saying that "[t]he spectrum of likely operations…a variety of missions extending from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major theater wars…The Army will be responsive and dominate at every point on that spectrum."[71] This message is seemingly a continuation of General Sullivan's vision published six years earlier, leading to inference that messaging from the most senior Army leadership regarding OOTW was consistent. Yet, in 1997 Colonel Charles J. Dunlap Jr.[72] contributed the article, "21st-Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths" to *Parameters*. In that article, he argued the number one myth within the United States defense establishment was that the most likely future adversaries would be similar in organization and doctrine to the United States. He made the claim that the defense establishment focused warfighting preparation against peer/near-peer foes in a conventional fight, marginalizing other options. Importantly, he prophesied that the key issue for 21st-centrury land warfare was how will the United States' technological dominance drive future adversaries to behave?[73] This is a question that will be explored

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[71] Honorable Louis Caldera and General Eric K. Shinseki, "Army Vision: Soldiers On Point for the Nation…Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War," *Military Review* LXXX, no. 5 (September-October 2000): 3.

[72] Retired as a Major General in 2010. Well known for speaking and writing on legal and national security issues. He has been published in numerous periodicals to include, *Parameters, Military Review, Air and Space Power Journal* and the *Air Force Times.*

[73] Colonel Charles J. Dunlap Jr., "21st-Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths," *Parameters* (Autumn 1997): n.p.

later in this chapter. Also, another contributor to *Parameters*, Colonel Mark E. Vinson[74] wrote in 2000 that:

> Until recently, senior Army leaders resisted reorganizing the Army's force structure to more effectively and efficiently focus unit capabilities and training on the full spectrum of missions required by the National Security Strategy. They pointed out that the military's primary purpose is to fight the nation's wars and argued that the force structure should not be shaped to perform lesser missions.[75]

He further argued that the Army's first purposeful step towards full-spectrum operations did not occur until General Eric Shinseki's arrival as Chief of Staff of the Army in spite of the fact that the Army was increasingly involved in operations other than war. In 1997 he argued that "on average, more than 31,000 soldiers were deployed every day to 70 different countries around the world."[76] Therefore, it seems reasonable to assess that as the 21st century approached, attitude towards OOTW, to include counterinsurgency and nation building remain incongruent throughout the force, possibly nullifying some of the effects of anticipating the character of future adversaries and missions.

It is during this timeframe there was a heavy emphasis on technological advances and how that would affect the nature of warfare; starting with the 1997 QDR statement that the United States would "Exploit the 'Revolution in Military Affairs'." The general thought behind the revolution in military affairs (RMA) of the time was that information dominance, coupled with communication and precision strike capabilities, would

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[74] At the time of his article, Colonel Vinson was the Deputy Chief of Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, US Army, Europe and had been selected as the TRADOC Systems Manager for the Combined Arms Tactical Trainer.

[75] Colonel Mark E. Vinson, "Structuring the Army for Full-Spectrum Readiness," *Parameters* (Summer 2000): n.p.

[76] *Ibid*.

eliminate "the fog of war."[77] In hindsight, RMA advocates failed to fully appreciate the limitations of emerging technologies[78] and enemy tactics that would be used to abate technological advantages. This is somewhat surprising. As stated previously, Colonel Charles Dunlap Jr. noted the key issue for the 21st-century land warfare was how will the United States' technological dominance drive future adversaries to behave?[79] Also, *The Economist* 1997 article "The Future of Warfare" made the claim that American superiority in information and weapon technology "will make it foolish to take them [the US] on in a high-intensity shooting war, as Saddam Hussein did."[80] This line of thinking also predates the 1997 QDR. General Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel James M. Dubik[81] wrote in 1993 that future adversaries were learning lessons from Operation Just Cause (1989) and the 1991 Gulf War, and that they would look to prolong conflicts and to deny minimal cost, decisive victories.[82] Furthermore, in 1996 Lieutenant Colonel John Hunt wrote that: "No rational person would take on US armed forces … in an armor-heavy battle in the desert when the prospects for success are higher through using the safer and cheaper OOTW methods of politics, propaganda and terrorism."[83] Therefore, though not

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[77] Michael R. Melillo, "Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities," *Parameters* 36, no. 3 (Autumn 2006): 25.

[78] Department of the Army, *TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept, Operational Adaptability: Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict 2012-2028* (Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, December 21, 2009), 6.

[79] Charles J. Dunlap Jr., "21st-Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths," *Parameters* (Autumn 1997): n.p.

[80] "The Future of Warfare," *The Economist* 342, no. 8007 (March 8, 1997): 15-16.

[81] In 1993, Lieutenant Colonel Dubik was serving on the personal staff of the Army Chief of Staff. He went on to attain the rank of Lieutenant General before retiring after 37 years of active service. Notably, he was once the commander of the Mulitnational Security Transition Command-Iraq and the NATO Training Mission-Iraq, relinquishing command on 3 July 2008. At the time of writing, he has published over 50 essays in a variety of publications.

[82] General Gordon R. Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel James M. Dubik, *Land Warfare in the 21st Century* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993), viii.

[83] Lieutenant Colonel John B. Hunt, "OOTW: A Concept in Flux," …: 8.

explicitly said, it appears some had a fairly clear vision of a future operating environment that required counterinsurgency, or like tactics.

So, as the turn of the century approached, there is conflicting evidence to what policymakers and the Army actually anticipated. It is obvious through analysis of the of professional and academic written material, doctrine and the 1997 QDR that there was an admirable effort to prepare the military for "irregular" adversaries and not the conventional warfare once anticipated for a European theater. However, there is also evidence that this vision did not pervade the force resulting in an emphasis on training for conventional warfare. But, before looking closely at the FA and what it anticipated, it is important to evaluate the early years of the Bush administration and the planning leading to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Candidate and then President George W. Bush delivered a number of significant speeches concerning the military and future operations. Based on these speeches, the military expected to be relieved of nation-building missions.[84] An example was his speech referred to as "A Period of Consequences" delivered 23 September, 1999 where said that military resources were overstretched and that the mission for the military "is to deter wars – and win wars when deterrence fails. Sending our military on vague, aimless and endless deployments is the swift solvent of morale."[85] Of note, he continued the emphasis of precision guided muntions and painted a picture of a future adversary armed

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[84] Michael R. Melillo, "Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities," …: 28.

[85] George W. Bush (speech, A Period of Consequences, The Citadel, SC, September 23, 1999). http://www.citadel.edu/root/pres_bush.

with ballistic and cruise missiles and a willingness to use weapons of mass destruction; but no mention of insurgencies or counterinsurgencies. Later, in the first year of his presidency, the 2001 QDR was produced and endorsed by then Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld.

The 2001 QDR provided a significant change in focus for the defense establishment. The 2001 professed a shift from "threat-based" to a "capabilities-based" approach. Instead of attempting to anticipate who the future adversary may be and preparing for that threat specifically, the capabilities-based approach focused on the warfighting capabilities of any possible adversary. Then it stated that potential adversaries possessed a wide range of capabilities, 'including asymmetric approaches to warfare."[86] Therefore, the United States needed to identify the "capabilities required to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objective."[87] The QDR also mentioned insurgencies: "While the Western Hemisphere remains largely at peace, the danger exists that crisis or insurgencies…might spread across borders, destabilizing neighboring states, and place U.S. economic and political interests at risk."[88] In his 2002 article "Transforming the Military," then Secretary of State Rumsfeld explained the thought process behind the 2001 QDR. There are three items of particular note from this article. First is his statement that:

> …it makes little sense for potential adversaries to try to compete with us directly. They learned in the Persian Gulf War that challenging our armed forces head-to-

[86] United States, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2001), 3.
[87] *Ibid*., 14.
[88] *Ibid*., 5.

> head is foolhardy…they will likely seek to challenge us asymmetrically by looking for vulnerabilities and trying to exploit them.[89]

Secondly, there was no indication that the military would attempt any military operation with a limited amount of troop strength. Lastly, his article clearly advocates a continuance of reliance on technological advances. The last point seemingly runs counterintuitive to the first in that the increased technology would be focused on increasing stand-off while improving accuracy against massed targets, a thought that exemplifies conventional warfighting.

Finally, a quick examination of the immediate time leading up to the invasion of Iraq will provide a full understanding of the environment the FA operated in prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. It is fairly well known that the planners at United States Central Command (CENTCOM) believed that Phase IV, the post invasion transition plan, would be relatively short.[90] This belief was at least partly derived from US Government studies conducted in 2002 regarding post-conflict (conventional fighting) threats. Multiple studies were commissioned to assist the government's understanding of what might occur after a military defeat of the Saddam government. Though study results differed, none of the organizations concluded "that a serious insurgent resistance would emerge after a successful Coalition campaign against the Baathist regime."[91] Even in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, senior leaders did not foresee a reason to prepare for

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[89] Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 3 (May-June 2002): n.p.

[90] Dr. Donald P. Wright and Colonel Timothy R. Reese, *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press US Army Combined Arms Center, 2008), 27.

[91] *Ibid*., 88.

counterinsurgency operations nor did they assess a manning shortage that would demand the repurposing of FA units. During a visit to Baghdad on April 16, 2003, General Tommy Franks[92], the commander of CENTCOM told subordinate leaders to prepare for an abbreviated period of stability operations followed by the redeployment of the majority of forces out of Iraq by September 2003. That same month he recommended to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to not deploy the 1st Cavalry Division.[93] Therefore, even as the military had transitioned to post-combat operations, there were no indicators for the FA that it should anticipate non-standard missions.

Lastly, with an understanding of the environment created by academics, policymakers and the senior leadership of the United States Army over nearly a decade leading to the Global War on Terrorism, an evaluation of whether or not the United States Army Field Artillery should have anticipated the non-standard missions its units and individuals conducted in support of counterinsurgency operations is possible. First, it must be confirmed that there is no indication the FA every anticipated the non-standard missions. Examination of the articles of *Field Artillery* provides an understanding of a conventionally focused organization. Evidence includes the "State of the Field Artillery" articles written by the Chief of the Artillery in 2000 (Major General Toney Strickland) and in 2002 (Major General Michael D. Maples). In the 2000 article, the Chief of the Artillery acknowledges the Chief of Staff of the Army's vision that included the ability to win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars while simultaneously maintaining the ability to conduct small-scale contingencies (SSC) and stability and support operations

[92] Interestingly, General Franks was an artilleryman. He was commissioned into the Field Artillery in 1967. His artillery commands included 2nd Battalion, 78th Field Artillery and the 82nd Field Artillery Regiment.

[93] Dr. Donald P. Wright and Colonel Timothy R. Reese, *On Point II:*…, 27.

(SASO).[94] In the same article he proclaimed that the number one issue facing the FA at the time was a perception that fires were unresponsive. Because of that, it is not surprising the focus of the article was on lethality within a conventional fight with the exception of stating that the under-development high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) would be a powerful strategic capability during stability and support operations (SASO). However, when discussing precision guided munitions, the focus was on increased lethality without consideration for a reduction in collateral damage; a point of emphasis in the counterinsurgency doctrine produced in 2006.[95] The 2002 State of the Field Artillery article provides evidence of FA units adapting to some non-standard missions, applauding the efforts of units who conducted civil disturbance training and installation security missions. Yet, the major take-away from the article was the absence of cannon artillery in Afghanistan and how the lack of cannon delivered fires reinforced the criticality of the FA to the combined arms team (in a conventional context).[96]

The question of whether or not the FA should have anticipated the non-standard missions it eventually conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan remains to be answered. Based on the doctrinal updates in the 1990s, the answer appears to be that it should have. The FA as an institution should have trained units and individuals to have the versatility to conduct non-standard missions while retaining its core/conventional warfighting skills.

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[94] Major General Toney Stricklin, "State of the Field Artillery 2000: Looking Ahead to the Objective Force," *Field Artillery*, no. 6 (November-December 2000): n.p.

[95] United States, *Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006).

[96] Major General Michael D. Maples, "2002 State of the Field Artillery," *Field Artillery*, no. 5, (November-December 2002): 6.

However, though a certain level of versatility must have been embedded within the FA community to give it the ability to successfully adapt to it counterinsurgency requirements, though it ultimately had to do so at the sacrifice of its conventional skills proficiency.[97] The implication is, institutionally the FA did not foresee the training needs to facilitate its support of counterinsurgency operations (small-scale contingency skills) while maintaining the skills to quickly and successfully shift focus to conventional operations. But to admonish the FA for this failure would be an oversimplification.

As stated, the FA should have anticipated, but a failure to do so does not mean the FA was irresponsible or derelict in duty. As previously cited in this chapter, a military requirement was to conduct two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. Additionally, the governing capstone doctrine affirmed that winning wars was the Army's primary focus. Because of these factors and that LIC/SSC/OOTW missions were not viewed as threats to the survival of the nation, an attitude prevailed that the army should not sacrifice conventional capabilities to prepare for LIC/SSC/OOTW and this approach seemed to have pervaded the force. As evidence, the advice provided to incoming FA battalion commander in the 1996 Battalion Commander's Handbook focused solely on fire support to maneuver elements.[98] Even in hindsight, condemnation of this

[97] Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Newsletter 12-19: NTC Decisive Action Training Environment* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2012) ; and Gian P Gentile "Let's Build an Army to Win all Wars." *Joint Force Quarterly: JFQ* no. 52 (First Quarter 2009): 31; and Frank G. Hoffman, "Striking a Balance," *Armed Forces Journal* (Jul 1, 2009); and Major General Michael S. Tucker and Major Jason P. Conroy, "Maintaining the Combat Edge," *Military Review* XCI, no. 3 (May-June 2011).

[98] Colonel Alfred H. Gross, Lieutenant Colonel (P) Harold E. Cooney, Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. Flood, Lieutenant Colonel (P) Walter L. Holton, Lieutenant Colonel Wayne R. Kniskern, Lieutenant Colonel (P) James V. Mudd, Lieutenant Colonel Ronnie R. Roberts, and Lieutenant Colonel Richard B. Waterhouse, *The Battalion Commander's Handbook, 1996* …, 49.

prioritization would not be universal. Some would view the emphasis on conventional warfare as historically justified with the claim that the Army has had to repeatedly organize, train and deploy in support of conventional combat operations to defeat uniformed national militaries.[99] But of greater concern when analyzing the FA independently is the fact that by 2000, nearly 70 percent of FA organizations and personnel were in the Army National Guard; and according to the 1997 QDR, major theater war plans did not include the Army's eight National Guard divisions. This fact would have placed an extraordinary amount of pressure on the active duty field artillery to perform conventional warfighting tasks in support of winning the nation's wars.

Conclusion

In summary, the FA should have had the expectation, intuition or realization in advance (anticipation) that its units and individuals would have to conduct non-standard missions similar to the ones executed in support of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army's doctrine developed in the 1990s painted a picture of future warfare more similar to that actualized in Iraq and Afghanistan than the warfare envisioned, but never realized for the European theater in the 1980s. Yet, the FA was not alone in this failure. The evidence provided demonstrates an Army with an attitude towards anything other than conventional conflict to be wanting, almost diametrically opposed to emerging doctrine. Nevertheless, even if the FA had correctly anticipated its future requirements it still may not have been any better prepared at the onset of conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the beginning of the 21st-century the military was still

[99] Dr. Donald P. Wright and Colonel Timothy R. Reese, *On Point II:*…, 49.

responsible for winning two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. Yet, at the turn of the century, nearly 70 percent of FA organizations and personnel were in the Army National Guard; and major theater war plans did not include the Army's eight National Guard divisions. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that if the FA had anticipated future non-standard missions, it may have still prioritized conventional warfighting efforts for its active duty organizations to meet the major theater war demands. However, before drawing a final conclusion in that regard, an analysis of whether or not the FA should have learned from previous conflicts must be considered first.

CHAPTER 3 - FAILURE TO LEARN?

One of the few unequivocally sound lessons of history is that the lessons we should learn are usually learned imperfectly, if at all.
-Bernard Brodie[100]

It was concluded that the FA had failed to anticipate its eventual non-standard mission requirements, but anticipation can be very formidable. Because of the inherent difficulty, anticipation is likely the easiest of the three explanations for military misfortune provided by Cohen and Gooch to sympathize. However, failure to learn is anticipation's antithesis in this regard. If the hard and often painful lessons learned in conflict are forgotten in times of peace only to be arduously learned again, sympathy for those responsible for the institutional apathy will be hard to find. Particularly since the United States Army prides itself as a learning institution. As evidence of the latter, in the 1990s the Army developed and matured a method to institutionalize lessons learned. This included using the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) as the center of gravity for collecting lessons for the Army to analyze and incorporate into training. Also, combat training centers (the National Training Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center, Combat Maneuver Training Center, and Battle Command Training Program) incorporated lessons learned in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and the Balkans into training scenarios.[101] Despite that, the process of learning is one that is surprisingly difficult and one that can be wrought with pitfalls. All military organizations study lessons to some

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[100] Quoted in David H. Petraeus, "Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam," *Parameters* 40, no. 4 (Winter 2010-2011).

[101] Colonel Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 14-15.

degree, yet the problem they all face is deciding which of military experiences are relevant to their present and future, and thereby necessary for inculcation.[102] Therefore, for an organization to succeed in learning it must perceive the need to learn, the ability to receive, analyze, distribute and integrate lessons to be learned and it must learn the correct lessons. This chapter will look at the Army's desire to learn applicable lessons prior to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, followed by an analysis of lessons available to the FA, before ending with a closer exclusive look the FA regarding failure or success in learning.

Desire to learn.

One of the issues with learning from unconventional or small wars is that they are seldom popular. If they were held in equal regard as conventional conflicts, men such as Smedly Butler (Philippines, the Boxer Rebellion, and the Banana Wars), John Rodgers (Barbary Wars and the War of 1812), and J. Franklin Bell (Philippines) would be household names like Sherman (Civil War), Patton (World War II) and Schwarzkopf (Desert Storm).[103] This is a very interesting notion when it is considered that in the years between the end of World War II and Desert Storm the United States used, or threatened to use, force over 500 times with nearly each occasion in situations once termed low-intensity conflicts (LIC). Yet, in the estimation of William J. Olson who in 1991 was the director of the Low-Intensity Conflict Organization of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

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[102] Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes:*…, 234.

[103] Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 282.

for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, the United States conducted itself as if each independent event was the nation's first LIC experience.[104] That is a nasty implication against an institution's ability to apply lessons learned but not one universally shared, at least not when the Army of the 1990s is included.

The authors of *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, apply great effort to paint the post-Desert Storm Army as an institution devoted to introspective change; willing and wanting to incorporate lessons learned to innovate and ensure it was not merely preparing to fight its last victorious war.[105] They note that the authors of *FM 100-5, Operations* (1993) chose historical vignettes to illustrate lessons, drawing from a wide range of missions to include the American Revolution, the Korean War and Operation Just Cause.[106] They go as far to say, "regardless of the verdict of success or failure, what is clear is that the Army was able to learn from these early experiences in the 1990s' warfare."[107]

However, in 2006 Colonel Michael Melillo[108] wrote that in retrospect it was clear that the military was "blinded by it preference for conventional war," and that defense planners disregarded the lessons/significance of events in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Haiti though they served as clear examples of the unconventional and uncertain

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[104] Max G. Manwaring, *Uncomfortable Wars:*…, 46.

[105] Colonel Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, *On Point:*…, 1-2.

[106] *Ibid.*, 8.

[107] *Ibid.*, 11.

[108] At the time of his article, "Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities" in 2006, Colonel Melillo was the Chief, Operations and Training Branch at the Security Cooperation Education and Training Center, Quantico, Virginia.

challenges the United States would face in the near future.[109] What is seen as evidence of the same attitude towards operations other than conventional warfare, retarding the Army's ability to anticipate future requirements, may have also impaired the Army's ability to inculcate lessons learned. There is "a tradition of forgetting because the Army has traditionally seen operations other than war as "someone else's job."[110] In all, the desire to learn is one of mixed reviews. Clearly with the establishment of the CALL, incorporation of lessons learned into combat trainer center scenarios and the use of historical vignettes in doctrine, there is undeniable evidence of a willingness to learn. However, there is counter-evidence that the willingness did not pervade the force. Though many leaders acknowledged OOTWs as valid missions, it was thought they were only important to specific military trades such as civil affairs, military police, engineers, lawyers and the Special Forces.[111] Therefore, in order to gain a deeper understanding, an analysis of the lessons available must be conducted.

The Available Lessons.

Though the United States has over 200 years of experience in operations other than conventional war, for the sake of brevity and relevance, this chapter will focus on lessons available from the Vietnam War to the end of the 20th century.

[109] Michael R. Melillo, "Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities," …: 22-23.

[110] Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press), 2.

[111] *Ibid*., 22.

Vietnam

Until the United States' current operations in Afghanistan, Vietnam was the longest war in its history. It was a conflict defined by some as a combination of a limited war against regular forces and a guerilla war requiring counterinsurgency or similar tactics.[112] Yet, in spite of its length and unique characteristics, it is easy to find evidence that the military either failed to learn from this conflict or it chose to learn the wrong lessons. Depending on the challenge, the immediate post-Vietnam years are considered a reprehensible institutional memory dump[113] during which the main lesson was the military could not or should not attempt to conduct large-scale counterinsurgencies.[114] In combination with that, after Vietnam the Army focused on conventional operations in the European theater, a development that will be addressed later in more detail. According to Ambassador Edwin G. Corr,[115] because of the significant national division caused by the Vietnam War, America through the 1970s and 1980s was reluctant to address LIC in a desire to return to a World War II (conventional warfare) mindset.[116] Consequently, there was a national desire to move past the dissatisfaction of the Vietnam War, and the shift in focus to conventional warfare in Europe helped relieve the Vietnam frustration.[117]

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[112] *Ibid.*, 17 and Bruce I. Gudmundsson, "Postwar Development," in *On Artillery* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993), 151.

[113] Frank G. Hoffman, "Striking a Balance," *Armed Forces Journal* (Jul 1, 2009).

[114] David H. Petraeus, "Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam," *Parameters* 40, no. 4 (Winter 2010-2011): 51; and Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 319.

[115] Ambassador Corr was a career Foreign Service Officer who served as an ambassador in the 1980s to Peru, Bolivia and El Salvador. He also had military experience, serving as an infantry officer in the United States Marines.

[116] Max G. Manwaring, *Uncomfortable Wars:*…, 128.

[117] Richard Duncan Downie, *Learning From Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1998), 70.

Still, the Army did conduct studies during and after Vietnam in an attempt to gain lessons applicable to future LIC operations. Notably, each study recommended altering the doctrine for counterinsurgency and LIC.[118] The Army War College (AWC) Vietnam Lessons Learned Study published in June 1980 concluded that the Army had not confronted the lessons of Vietnam and therefore had not developed an acceptable approach to counterinsurgencies. The study charged the lesson the United States chose to learn was that interventions were to be avoided.[119] The study complained that strategists and scholars limited learning from Vietnam by claiming that the Vietnam War was so unique that any lessons learned would be useless or even dangerous. This resulted in the Army failing to institutionalize lessons from the Vietnam War and in time, even the study itself was forgotten with the book *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* becoming the preferred reference for study at the Army's Command and General Staff College. *On Strategy* used Clausewitz's *On War* for its theoretical framework and emphasized a focus on conventional warfare.[120] This apparent lack of desire to learn is reinforced by Colonel (Ret.) John D. Waghelstein's[121] 2006 article, "What's Wrong in Iraq? Or Ruminations of a Pachyderm." In his article, Waghelstein explains that after accruing 4-plus years of counterinsurgency experience in Latin America and Vietnam he wanted to go to Fort Benning to help train those destined for Vietnam. He had to fight for

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[118] *Ibid*., 67.
[119] *Ibid*., 71.
[120] *Ibid*., 72, 73-74.
[121] Colonel (Ret.) John D. Waghelstein was an instructor at the U.S. Naval War College at the time of his article. During his career he served in Special Forces command and staff positions in Panama, El Salvador, Bolivia, Vietnam and the continental United States. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College and he holds a PhD. from Temple University.

this assignment because the infantry branch wanted him at Fort Knox, Kentucky to prepare for 'the real Army in Europe.' After winning the argument to go to Benning he discovered that in spite of the ongoing war effort in Vietnam, little adjustments to the course curriculum had been made. He further explained that he and others with combat/counterinsurgency experience conducted informal information sessions to share lessons learned. These sessions were taped in order to share with those who could not attend. Copies of the tapes were provided to the Infantry school for situational awareness and the school returned the copies with critiques focused on the technical production of the tapes and no evaluation of, or concern over, the substance of the sessions.[122] He further noted that in 1977 at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, LIC instruction only accounted for 40 hours out of the 1,000 hour curriculum.

It seems apparent there were significant issues regarding the institutionalization of lessons learned from Vietnam. However, the question remains as to what lessons the FA should have carried forward from the conflict. Unfortunately, lessons applicable to the non-standard missions so many U.S. FA units conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan are hard to find. The important contribution of the FA in Vietnam was firepower, and its attributes were coverage and responsiveness.[123] Firepower was held in such primacy that tactical nuclear strikes were contemplated (though never used).[124] General William C. Westmoreland, the Army Chief of Staff from 1968 to 1972, and the officer most often

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[122] Colonel John D. Waghelstein, "What's Wrong in Iraq? Or Ruminations of a Pachyderm," *Military Review* 86, no. 1 (January-February 2006): 113.

[123] Bruce I. Gudmundsson, "Postwar Development," in *On Artillery* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993), 151.

[124] General William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1976), 338.

associated with the prosecution of the Vietnam War, held firepower in the highest regard and he viewed the correct employment of artillery as the construct of interlocking fire-support bases where artillery units could support patrols and each other.[125] Through his own study (an example of learning), he had determined the previous French failure in Vietnam was due to a lack of firepower. His application of this "lesson learned" is most prevalent the preparation for combat operations at Khe Sanh. He drew parallels between Khe Sanh and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954.[126] From his studies prior to combat operations at Khe Sanh, he felt the area could be held by a relatively small ground force if supported by overwhelming firepower. Unlike the French at Dien Bien Phu, he would ensure the forces were supported by artillery outside of the immediate area, notably providing sixteen powerful U.S. Army 175-mm guns fourteen miles away.[127]

This approach was not isolated to Khe Sanh, before or after. In 1966 during an expansion of U.S. forces in Vietnam, the number of artillery units doubled in size.[128] During this time artillery units fired an abundance of harassment and interdiction (H&I) fires with the intent to disrupt enemy supply lines - in 1966, H&I fires accounted for nearly two-thirds of all artillery missions and bombs dropped.[129] Between January and June 1967 45 percent of all artillery missions were H&I fire.[130] The 1969 U.S. Army War College study *The Dynamics of Fire and Maneuver* concluded that firepower dominated

[125] *Ibid*., 282.

[126] This battle is generally recognized as the culmination of French operations in Vietnam, leading directly to negotiations and the eventual withdrawal of French forces.

[127] General William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* …, 337.

[128] Major General J.B.A. Bailey, *Field Artillery and Firepower* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 370.

[129] Max G. Manwaring, *Uncomfortable Wars:*…, 301.

[130] Major General J.B.A. Bailey, *Field Artillery and Firepower* …, 379.

the battlefield. Some found this phenomenon disturbing, because it encouraged the application of fire when other solutions might have been more effective.[131] Yet, the perception existed that artillery firepower was advantageous to the point that it altered tactics - in time, infantry patrols reduced in size - using the logic, "infantry finds, artillery kills."[132] Interestingly, American author and military historian Max Boot provides as additional evidence of the primacy of firepower during General Westmoreland's time in Vietnam in his book *The Savage Wars of Peace.* Boots recounts that when the heavy firepower approach did not provide the desired results, General Westmoreland and other generals did not see fault in their approach, but blamed the South Vietnamese army, noting that when asked at a press conference what the answer to counterinsurgency was, Westmoreland responded only with, "Firepower."[133]

The 2005 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Occasional Paper, *Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War: An Overview of the US Experience* written by Dr. Lawrence A. Yates states that during Vietnam there were artillerymen employed in non-standard roles such as "light infantry or in other capacities that had nothing to do with firing the weapons on which they had trained and honed their skills."[134] Yet, it seems clear the empirical lessons for the FA to learn from its Vietnam experiences overwhelmingly concern the delivery of firepower. Therefore, any lessons to be drawn to better prepare the FA to conduct non-standard missions in Iraq and

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[131] *Ibid.*
[132] Bruce I. Gudmundsson, "Postwar Development," …, 152.

[133] Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 294.
[134] Lawrence A. Yates, *Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War:*…, 27.

Afghanistan would have to have been theoretical in nature. If the Army as an institution had heeded the advice of its studies which had identified a shortcoming in capturing and indoctrinating lessons learned from Vietnam it is possible the FA could have been better prepared to non-standard missions in a counterinsurgency environment. It is reasonable to conclude that an introspective examination could have concluded that severely restricted terrain such as jungle or urban areas could be used to negate superiority in firepower.[135] Furthermore, if firepower lacked necessity, it could have been extrapolated that more forces would be necessary, building a case to prepare for non-standard missions. However, these lessons were not cultivated, instead, in an attempt to move past Vietnam and start rebuilding the professionalism of the Army, professional focus shifted to conventional (high intensity) warfare in Europe.

This decision to shift focus to the European theater had a number of causes. At the conclusion of the Vietnam War, the Cold War still ran hot with no end in sight. Although the Army was reluctant to learn lessons from Vietnam, as an institution it still sought lessons to advance its doctrine in pursuit of national defense. Some saw Vietnam as a unique conflict, not to be experienced again; instead, it was the October 1973 war between Israel and its Arab adversaries in the Middle East served as the harbinger of future conflicts for the Army.[136] The Army's study of that conflict provided shocking results concerning lessons in the advance of "the lethality of modern weaponry and the essentiality of better suppressive tactics, use of terrain, camouflage, routes of advance,

[135] Brian Steed, *Armed Conflict: The Lessons of Modern Warfare* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2002), 101.

[136] Richard Duncan Downie, *Learning From Conflict:*…, 70.

and combined arms coordination," all of which had a profound effect on the military.[137] The result was an intense evaluation of equipment and doctrine motivated to close the gap between the United States and the perceived technological edge the Soviet Union had gained while the nation focused on Vietnam.[138] The result was the AirLand Battle doctrine that marked the reorientation from the infantry-airmobile warfighting of Vietnam to the United States' primary strategic concern of conventional warfare in Europe.[139] This effort and resulting doctrine was seemingly validated in the 1991 Gulf War where the US led coalition achieved a sweeping, certain victory over the then fourth-largest 20th century army.[140]

Operations Nimrod Dancer and Just Cause (Panama)

Despite the demands of the Cold War, in the late 1980s the United States conducted two operations in Panama worth reviewing – the well-known Operation Just Cause and the lesser known precursor, Operation Nimrod Dancer. Operation Nimrod Dancer was the deployment of an infantry brigade task force from 7th Infantry Division with augmentation of a mechanized battalion from 5th Infantry Division to protect US citizens and possessions from May to December 1989. This operation is significant because of the involvement of 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery. Operation Just Cause is

[137] John L. Romjue, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982* (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984), 3.
[138] *Ibid.*, 1.
[139] *Ibid.*, 3.

[140] Colonel Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, *On Point:…*, 2-3.

equally valuable for evaluation because it was considered a model for future operations[141] for its combination of traditional military mission to defeat a state armed organization followed by nontraditional missions such as establishing population control.[142]

2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Perry F. Balitmore, was integrated into the infantry brigade task force and deployed with the expectation its only missions would revolve around fire support tasks.[143] However, due to no requirement for artillery beyond providing a show of force,[144] the battalion received missions to include: support freedom of movement convoys, daily security activities in US military communities, joint training exercises, show-of-force operations and contingency planning.[145] Also, because of constraints that denied the Army the ability to deploy sufficient maneuver command and control headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Balitmore and his staff's most significant contribution to the operation was as the controlling headquarters of a maneuver task force.[146] Of importance regarding this operation is the authors'[147] quote, "Unfortunately, doctrine provided little guidance for the employment of light artillery in LIC...available doctrine focuses on war-fighting in mid- to high-intensity conflict where the delivery of fires and fire support coordination

[141] Lawrence A. Yates, *Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War:*…, 31.
[142] Gordon R. Sullivan and Andrew B. Twomey, "The Challenges of Peace," …: 14.
[143] Colonel Joseph E. DeFrancisco and Major Robert J. Reese, "Nimrod Dancer Artillery: Fire Support in Low-Intensity Conflict," *Field Artillery* (April 1990): 19.

[144] *Ibid*., ("Bravo Battery's role in LIC was only to *maintain and demonstrate the capability of delivering firepower*." [italics in original]) p. 20
[145] *Ibid.,* 18.
[146] *Ibid*., 19.
[147] At the time of the article, Colonel DeFrancisco was the commander of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) Artillery and Major Reese was the executive officer of 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery and during Operation Nimrod Dancer he served as the Fire Support Officer for the 9th Regimental Combat Team.

outweigh other factors."[148] Clearly, Operation Nimrod Dancer provided an opportunity to identify shortcomings in doctrine while providing experiences for evaluation and possible institutionalization for future doctrinal application by FA units and formations.

In the same month Operation Nimrod Dancer ended, Operation Just Cause was executed. In December 1989, United States forces invaded Panama in a campaign consisting of two ambitious operations. The first was to protect American lives and facilities while defeating the PDF and capturing Manuel Noriega. The second was what could be defined as stability operations or nation-building; it was the mission to replace the Noriega rule with an elected government and to rebuild the PDF.[149] In spite of the fact the Joint History Office's monograph *Operation Just Cause* does not mention the FA; and *Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War: An Overview of the US Experience* states that neither indirect artillery fires were delivered during Operation Just Cause nor FA units assisted in the stability operations that followed the defeat of the PDF,[150] the opportunity to learn existed.

The artillery units involved in the operation were: 6th Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, 5th Battalion, 1st Field Artillery, 320th Field Artillery, 7th Battalion, 15th Field Artillery. An example of the FA's contributions was, as a component of Task Force Bayonet, D Battery of 320th Field Artillery provided direct fires against Panamanian

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[148] *Ibid*., 18.

[149] Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 398.

[150] Lawrence A. Yates, *Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War:*…, 31.

Defense Force barracks with two 105-mm towed howitzers.[151] Also, in a show of force, B Battery of 7th Battalion, 15th Field Artillery provided illumination fires for B Company of 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry over the Texaco station in the city of Colon which was thought to be a staging area for snipers.[152] Yet for the most part the artillerymen of B Battery were frustrated over their lack of firing in support of maneuver.[153] The unit eventually did fire, but like D Battery of the 320th Field Artillery, only in the direct fire mode.[154] Notably, in order to get into position to provide direct fires, B Battery had to travel through populated areas and the experience of the battery commander, Captain Dwight Watkins, foreshadowed experiences of artillerymen over a decade later: "The frightening part is not knowing who can actually pull a piece out and fire it. So you really had to be cautious. There could be some twelve-year-old kid out there, clapping his hands and cheering and stuff, and all of sudden another twelve-year-old kid pops some rounds."[155] In all, the FA units' limited fire support operations and experience operating in and around population centers provide some foreshadowing to future operations in Iraq, though less so in Afghanistan. However, when the overall conduct of Operation Just Cause is considered, it becomes more evident that those who deemed this operation as a model for future were right and therefore the lessons to be learned should have been captured and disseminated through the FA institution.

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[151] Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause:*…, 166.
[152] *Ibid*., 259.
[153] *Ibid.*, 293.
[154] *Ibid.*, 301.

[155] *Ibid*., 300.

As the Army transitioned from combat to stability operations in Panama it moved from its strength to its weakness and one of the results was widespread looting in the week following combat operations.[156] The conditions for this poor transition between combat and stability operations were partly caused by Corps planners. The Corps-level planners focused their time on the combat phase of the operation, doing little more than establishing rules of engagement to minimize damage to Panama's military, civilian population and economic infrastructure.[157] Also, because of poor coordination at the Corps and Combatant Command levels, as the operation transitioned to stability operations, few military police and civil affairs personnel were available,[158] therefore, much of the initial "nation-building" responsibilities fell to the infantry.[159] As a result, many infantry company commanders found themselves mayors of Panamanian communities.[160]

General Carl Stiner, the operational commander for Operation Just Cause reportedly claimed there were no lessons to learn from the operation. He based his claim on the fact that the overwhelming success of Operation Just Cause (presumably only regarding the invasion and defeat of the PDF) was simply a validation for the Army's training, doctrine and equipment.[161] However, ignoring the fact that "success can be as costly as failure if it blinds the victor to the fleeting nature of victory;"[162] in retrospect

[156] *Ibid*., 400-401.
[157] Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005* …, 23-24.
[158] *Ibid.*
[159] Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause:*…, 409.
[160] *Ibid*., 370.

[161] *Ibid*., 393.
[162] *Ibid.*

there are significant lessons could have been ascertained. The first lesson was that it would be improbable for there to be enough military police and civil affairs personnel immediately following combat operations to take full responsibility for stability operations. Even if there were, in a prolonged stability operation, the finite number of military police and civil affairs would eventually culminate. For this reason, the fact infantry units in Panama had to participate in stability operations at the completion of combat operations should not have been viewed as unique. Furthermore, the infantry, like all military organizations has finite resources. Consequently, the second possible lesson could have been that other branches should have anticipated they would be called on to assist in stability operations and therefore needed to learn lessons from the infantry experience. This is especially true for the FA which could have learned that in future operations, the use of artillery would likely remain limited and tightly controlled. During the operation, artillery fire required at least battalion commander approval and 105-mm artillery was only used for illumination and direct fires.[163] Strikingly, Operation Just Cause is not referenced once in *FM 100-23, Peace Operations* published in December 1994 and none of the times it is referenced in June 1993 version of *FM 100-5, Operations* is it done so in the context of stability operations or operations other than war. Seemingly, this omission is further evidence of the Army failing to capture and disseminate critical lessons learned that could have benefited future operations.

Kosovo

[163] *Ibid*., 406.

Operations in Kosovo, specifically Task Forces Hawk and Falcon, provide yet additional useful case studies that illustrate a failure to capitalize on lessons learned for future application. Kosovo is an interesting case in that it supposedly reinforced lessons learned during stability and support operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia[164] and the involvement of 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery in Task Force Falcon. Though limited in information, each of these two task forces provides telling lessons that could have been used in both Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom.

Task Force Hawk was an attack helicopter task force deployed to Albania which provided valuable air-ground integration and capability-based task organization lessons ultimately applied in Iraq.[165] Though the task force faced significant difficulties in its deployment, it demonstrated the Army's capability to create a fighting force to address contingencies in challenging operational environments.[166] To provide a suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) capability and an option to support possible air assault missions, the Army deployed 105-mm howitzers, Paladins,[167] and Army-tactical missile system capable multiple-launch rocket systems.[168] Task Force Hawk was supported by a traditional FA employment that provided conventional fighting lessons learned. As the

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[164] Colonel Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, *On Point:…*, 14.

[165] *Ibid.*

[166] R. Cody Phillips, *Operation Joint Guardian: The U.S. Army in Kosovo* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2007), 16.

[167] 155-mm self-propelled howitzers.

[168] Patricia Slayden Hollis, "Transforming the Army to Meet the 21st Century Threat," *Field Artillery*, no. 3 (May-June 2000): 4.

nature of the conflict progressed towards stability operations, 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery was selected to support Task Force Falcon.

In the 2000 May-June edition of *Field Artillery*, "Role and Mission for the FA in TF Falcon, Kosovo," written by the 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery Commander Lieutenant Colonel James M. Waring and his S-3[169] outlined that unit's experience. It is explained in the article that the overall mission was to:

> …monitor, verify and, when necessary, enforce compliance with the MTA [Military Technical Agreement], provide humanitarian assistance in support of UNHCR [United Nations High Commission for Refugees] and establish basic law and order and core civil functions.[170]

Initially, the battalion focused on traditional fire support tasks. The battalion maintained two-gun platoons on two different camps which were always ready to provide timely and accurate fires, similar to the fire bases used during Vietnam. Also, due to an abundance of manpower derived from needing to man only four howitzers at any one time coupled with the lack of fire support actually required, soldiers of the battalion augmented maneuver forces at checkpoints, on patrols and during various security operations.[171] Because these were non-standard missions (very similar to those that would be conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan) the battalion leadership had to coordinate training for their artillerymen. They coordinated for patrolling, checkpoint and security operations training from the task

[169] Operations Officer.
[170] Lieutenant Colonel James M. Waring and Major C. Phillip Royce, "Role and Mission of the FA in TF Falcon, Kosovo," *Field Artillery* (May-June 2000): 22.
[171] *Ibid*., 23-24.

force maneuver elements and referenced CALL products to learn tactics, techniques, and procedures from previous operations in Bosnia.[172]

Waring also states that *FM 100-23, Peace Operations* provided the framework for artillery employment.[173] This is a peculiar statement because the reference within the FM is only in regards to howitzers ready to provide artillery fires. Though *FM 100-23* professes it "incorporates lessons learned from recent peace operations and existing doctrine to provide a framework for development in the conduct of peace operations,"[174] there is no associated historical perspective involving the artillery, no discussion of non-standard missions for artillery units and all fire support discussion focuses on deterrence, force protection and collateral damage.

In summary, the Kosovo examples provide the lesson that artillery units had to remain proficient on the delivery of fires, but they also needed to be prepared to augment maneuver forces during stability operations. The examples also demonstrated the Army had begun to catalogue valuable lessons learned that could be shared with deployed units so they could practice, mature and codify tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) developed from previous operations. However, it was also shown that the doctrine of the time had not addressed non-standard employment of artillery units.

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[172] *Ibid*., 24.
[173] *Ibid*., 23.
[174] United States, *FM 100-23, Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1994), iii.

Other Noteworthy Operations

U.S. operations in Grenada (1983), Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994) and Bosnia (1995) plus the Soviet experience in Afghanistan (1979-1989) also merit brief analysis. Though the United States has been involved in small wars nearly since its inception,[175] these operations are significant because of their proximity in time to Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. The Soviet invasion and following occupation of Afghanistan is also important as a comparison with Operation Enduring Freedom.

In Grenada, there was little use of artillery outside of providing 105-mm prepatory fires.[176] This limited use of artillery makes other lessons learned difficult to deduce. Attempts to learn would have been focused on improving the accuracy of fires. However, if viewed in context with Panama and Kosovo, a trend of not using artillery fires during LIC emerges.

Operation Restore Hope (Somalia) was the first significant humanitarian assistance (HA) operation of the post-Cold War era.[177] When Somali warlords started to interfere with HA efforts the Army expanded its security operations to include counterinsurgency operations against key individuals.[178] The resulting Battle of

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[175] See Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press); and Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

[176] Lawrence A. Yates, *Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War:*…, 30.

[177] Colonel Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, *On Point:*…, 11.

[178] Dr. Donald P. Wright and Colonel Timothy R. Reese, *On Point II:*…, 56.

Mogadishu taught the Army the need to maintain a multifaceted force capable of rapidly transitioning from peace to combat operations.[179] However, prior to the Battle of Mogadishu, Colonel Evan R. Gaddis, a former commander of the 10th Mountain Division Artillery participated in 10th Mountain Infantry Division's HA efforts and he shared his lessons learned with the FA community in his article, "Leadership Versatility for Operations Other Than War" published in the June 1994 edition of *Field Artillery*. His experience for the article was drawn from both Operation Restore Hope and Operation Hurricane Andrew Relief.[180] The main take-away of this piece was that units did not need to change their mission essential task lists (METL) and by extension, their approach to training to be ready for OOTW: "We didn't need to revise our METL for Somalia; in fact, we applied our METL and associated battle tasks every day."[181] This position is in line with that of the former 10th Mountain Division commander, Major General S.L. Arnold. In his 1993 *Military Review* article, Major General Arnold stated: "Well-trained, combat-ready, disciplined soldiers can easily adapt to peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. Train them for war; they adapt quickly and easily to Somalia-type situations."[182] It appears, at the time, the general lesson to learn regarding preparing units for OOTW was to simply train them for war, just as the Army always had.

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[179] Colonel Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, *On Point:*…, 12.

[180] Hurricane Andrew was a destructive tropical cyclone that causes tremendous damage within the state of Florida in 1992. The damage was severe enough is scope the U.S. forces were tasked to provide defense support of civil authorities.

[181] Colonel Evan R. Gaddis, "Leadership Versatility for Operations Other Than War," *Field Artillery* (June 1994): 13.

[182] Major General S. L. Arnold, "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War," *Military Review* LXXIII, no. 12 (December 1993): 35.

Operation Restore Democracy (Haiti) was the Army's first post-Cold War experience in regime change operations.[183] Though this regime change came without the anticipated armed conflict, the intended invasion force still entered Haiti to provide security and set the conditions for national elections.[184] For this operation no artillery was deemed necessary, so no artillery pieces were sent to Haiti. However, artillerymen did deploy with the 10th Mountain Division. The division's artillery staff supplemented maneuver headquarters and others adapted their warfighting skills to plan and conduct civil-military operations, including running a civil-military operations center which supported government and law enforcement activities.[185] The actions of these artillerymen could have provided an excellent source for lessons to learn, capture, and codify if the FA recognized it at the time. As for the Army, the lesson that tactical level actions by soldiers could have significant strategic, diplomatic and informational effects was relearned during this operation.[186]

Actions in Bosnia provided similar experiences as those in later in Kosovo, seemingly complementing lessons drawn from the operations. Artillery units provided firepower demonstrations from fixed firebases similar to those used during Vietnam. The artillerymen not needed on the guns were used for non-standard missions such as mine strike investigations, inspection of weapon storage sites, guard duties, mounted patrols,

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[183] Colonel Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, *On Point:*…, 12.

[184] Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005* …, 20.

[185] Lawrence A. Yates, *Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War:*…, 35.

[186] Colonel Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, *On Point:*…, 12.

kitchen duties and as riflemen in convoys.[187] As in the Kosovo examples previously discussed, the lessons available were that artillery units had to remain proficient on the delivery of fires, but also be prepared to augment maneuver forces during stability operations.

Lastly, the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 seemingly would have provided an exceptional source for learning prior to Operation Enduring Freedom. In 1997, the Lester Grau[188] article "Artillery and Counterinsurgency: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan was published in *Field Artillery*. The fact that this article appeared in *Field Artillery* provides evidence of an institutional desire to learn and an acknowledgement of the possibility of involvement in a counterinsurgency. However, based on the lessons identified by Grau for U.S. artillerymen[189] and his description of the employment of Soviet artillery, there is no specific evidence that the FA missed an opportunity to better prepare for employment in non-standard missions.

The Field Artillery

[187] Lawrence A. Yates, *Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War:*…, 35-36.

[188] Lester Grau is a retired infantry officer and Soviet Foreign Area Officer. He is a renowned author whose credits include *The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan* and *The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War*.

[189] (Paraphrased) 1. Counterinsurgency requires innovative thinking. 2. Maneuver and artillery must be more closely integrated than in conventional warfare. 3. Artillery direct fire is a viable offensive option. 4. Artillery assets can play a major role in convoy escort and accompaniment in rugged terrain. 5. Civilians are a major consideration. 6. Precision guided munitions are showing an increased role in counterinsurgency. 7. The biggest problem for the artillery in counterinsurgency is finding viable targets.

Though the FA may have missed lessons that could have better prepared the FA units for non-standard missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, overall the FA and the Army were learning institutions. Two additional *Field Artillery* articles near the turn of the century illuminate this point, showing that either right or wrong in the lessons it chose to learn, there was no institutional apathy.

The first example is, "Targeting on the LIC and PKO Battlefield: A Paradigm Shift." The premise of this article was that in the evolution of "today's conflicts" (published in 1999) it was critical to focus on "lower" categories of targets such as civilian population and terrorist groups.[190] The authors note that doctrine provided little guidance regarding targeting in LIC and the 13 target categories in the doctrine of the time did not include a wide range of targets that could severely impact operations at the tactical level.[191] Drawing from Clausewitz, operations in Lebanon and Vietnam and their own observations at the Joint Readiness Training Center, the authors provided the reader a conceptual approach to non-lethal targeting and the need to focus targeting efforts on terrorist groups. Later both population centers and terrorist groups would be featured prominently in *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency* published in December 2006.

The second example is the article, "Report Out: Senior Field Artillery Leaders Conference." This article summarized a four-day conference commissioned by the Chief of Field Artillery in 2002. The goal of the conference was to address the challenges faced

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[190] Major David A. Bushey, Major Douglas L. Flohr, and Captain Michael J. Forsyth, "Targeting on the LIC and PKO Battlefield: A Paradigm Shift," *Field Artillery*, no. 1 (January-February 1999): 5.

[191] *Ibid*., 6.

by the FA to meet the then current mission requirements. The participants identified two major points that would later prove relevant in Iraq and Afghanistan. The first was the acknowledgement that fire support officers routinely were assigned as information operations (IO) officers during stability and support operations; stating that: "We should look at adding these TTPs[192] captured from Bosnia and Kosovo into our training and leader development."[193] The second relevant point was confirmation that the targeting methodology of *decide, detect, deliver, assess* (D3A) designed for lethal targeting worked for non-lethal targeting as well.

Conclusion

When viewed in sequence a trend becomes evident. From the Vietnam War to operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, the use of conventional artillery fires nearly vanished. The obvious exception is the 1991 Gulf War. Nevertheless, in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, if artillery was employed it was severely restricted and seldom used. Additionally, in the 1990s the utilization of field artillerymen in non-standard roles began to take shape. Combining the two trends, a steady progression to the non-standard missions conducted by FA units in Iraq and Afghanistan emerges. In Grenada and Panama there was little use of artillery, but in Panama additional forces provided by the infantry were required to conduct stability operations. In Somalia and Haiti, FA units were not deployed, but artillerymen did deploy to augment maneuver

[192] Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.

[193] Brigadier General David C. Ralston and Colonel Stephen D. Mitchell, "Report Out: Senior Field Artillery Leaders Conference," *Field Artillery*, no. 3 (May-August 2002): 53.

elements conducting OOTW missions. Though in Bosnia and Kosovo artillery units established firing capability, their main contributions were in non-standard missions by way of augmenting maneuver forces to increase manpower.

In the final analysis, the trend provided by these operations should have established an ability to anticipate continued execution of non-standard missions and provided ample sources for study to cultivate lessons learned. Yet, with the exception of 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery using CALL materials to train for non-standard missions, there is little evidence lessons from each conflict were carried forward into the next. Even in the successful case of 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery, it must be acknowledged the unit did not access those lessons until after they were already operating in Kosovo. Lastly, in retrospect, Operation Just Cause provided the greatest source of potential lessons to learn. The transition from combat to stability operations with a lack of manpower to conduct the required stability missions is almost a perfect prelude to Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. In summary, the Army and the FA demonstrated a desire to learn, though what was perceived as important for institutionalization, at least in regards to non-standard missions associated with operations other than war, was wanting. Ultimately, though the ability to receive, analyze, distribute and integrate lessons to be learned was present, the Army and the FA failed to inculcate the lessons necessary to best prepare for the transition from combat to stability (and ultimately counterinsurgency) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

CHAPTER 4 - NOW WHAT?

In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the Army.
-General Douglas MacArthur[194]

Difficulties mastered are opportunities won.
-Winston Churchill[195]

After gaining an understanding in the previous two chapters of why the FA was postured as it was leading into the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is now appropriate to evaluate the Army's advance towards a new post-conflict era. The transition out of Iraq and eventual transfer of security responsibilities in Afghanistan provide a potential perspective through which to examine the future. The military has now experienced two major conflicts and undoubtedly their prolonged nature will shape the view of institutional leaders who spent so much time immersed in each operation. With the inclusion of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, the beginning of the 21st Century has provided ample lessons in warfighting and has started to define the nature of warfare for the coming decades. In this environment, current military leaders are responsible to place the Army and the FA on the path to future success. How they establish the conditions for institutional learning, what they anticipate as future requirements, and how adaptability is built into organizations are paramount to the security of the United States of America. Therefore, in this final chapter Army institutions, literature, and doctrine will be

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[194] "Military Quotes," last accessed 26 March 2013, http://www.military-quotes.com/norsk/Macarthur.htm.
[195] "BrainyQuote," last accessed 26 March 2013, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/w/winstonchu156886.html.

scrutinized to understand what the Army and FA as institutions have learned, are anticipating, and how they can achieve adaptability throughout the force.

What Was Learned?

Firstly, it must be recognize that senior leaders have expressed a strong desire to retain lessons learned from recent conflicts. The Chief of Staff (CSA) of the Army General Raymond T. Odierno stated that "we will not walk away from that experience [Iraq and Afghanistan]"[196] and the Chief of the Field Artillery Major General David D. Halverson posited: "There are invaluable lessons to be taken away from the last decade of war. Our professional responsibility is to integrate those lessons into forward-looking force development and training."[197] Also, President Obama's remarks at the 2009 US Naval Academy Commencement provide great context for the Army and learning as it looks beyond Iraq and Afghanistan:

> For history teaches us that the nations that grow comfortable with the old ways and complacent in the face of new threats, those nations do not long endure. And in the 21st century, we do not have the luxury of deciding which challenges to prepare for and which to ignore. We must overcome the full spectrum of threats -- the conventional and the unconventional; the nation-state and the terrorist network; the spread of deadly technologies and the spread of hateful ideologies; 18th century-style piracy and 21st century cyber threats.[198]

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[196] General Raymond T. Odierno, "CSA's Strategic Intent: Delivering Strategic Landpower in an Uncertain World," last accessed February 07, 2013, http://www.army.mil/article/95729.

[197] Major General David D. Halverson, "Make the Fires Force the Strength of the Army," *Fires* (September-October 2011): 3.

[198] Barak Obama, "Remarks by the President at the United States Naval Academy Commencement," last modified May 22, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-us-naval-academy-commencement

The US Army cannot simply prepare to fight its last war(s) as many armies have been accused of doing in the past. Yet, as shown in chapter 2, nearly every significant military action that took place provides lessons that if inculcated, will better prepare forces for future conflicts. Additionally it should be noted that in the mist of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan a debate raged over the future of warfare and how the U.S. military should prepare for operations. This exchange centered on the argument for focusing centrally on recently learned (relearned) lessons in counterinsurgency, opposed to those who cautioned that conventional operations must be central to military practice. What ultimately came of this debate was a doctrinal compromise based on building and maintaining a force agile enough to address any contingency. That in itself is a valuable lesson learned by the Army at the dawn of the new century. It recognizes the need to be able to exert military power across a wide range of operations. Unlike the Army of the 1980s and 1990s which wanted to dismiss anything other than conventional warfighting as someone else's business, the current Army recognizes the need to execute a wide range of missions in support of national security.

In recent years the Army has produced an abundance of new doctrine presumably reflective of recent lessons learned. In the recent operations, the Army learned it had to nearly stop all tasks supporting conventional warfare to prosecute prolonged counterinsurgencies, resulting in diminished warfighting skills.[199] The FA learned that due to the lack of requirements for indirect fires in counterinsurgency and stability

[199] Major General Michael S. Tucker and Major Jason P. Conroy, "Maintaining the Combat Edge," *Military Review* XCI, no. 3 (May-June 2011): 10, 12.

operations that maneuver commanders would task organize their fires organizations as maneuver battalions to own battlespace, escort convoys or provide additional base security.[200] The Army showed a commitment to continuously update its doctrine, evidenced by *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency* published in December 2006 and its latest capstone manual, *Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations* published in October 2011. *ADP 3-0, ADRP 3-09, Fires* dated August 2012 provide the latest doctrinal principles for the employment of fires.[201]

It is important to highlight a few key elements from each of these publications. Regarding the FA, it is noteworthy that *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency* only uses the word "artillery" three times.[202] In this context its most significant use is in regards to a unit's possible need to draw equipment to conduct a counterinsurgency function. The example given is an artillery unit deploying without howitzers and requiring the draw of high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) to conduct security missions.[203] One can infer that the key lesson is that FA units must be prepared to conduct the same missions they conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. Interestingly, no lessons from the experience of how to task organize or re-purpose a FA unit to conduct counterinsurgency operations were captured in the manual. Any FA unit in the future required to execute this task will likely have to rely on Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) materials, old standard operating procedures (SOP), experience and outputs from the unit's

[200] *Ibid.,* 12.

[201] Fires are the use of weapons systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. The FA plays a vital role in the employment of fires and is defined in *ADRP 3-09* as "the equipment, supplies, ammunition, and personnel involved in the use of indirect fire cannon, rocket, or surface-to-surface missile launchers."

[202] Additionally, it is not used a single time in *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-07, Stability.*

[203] United States, *Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency* …, 8-8.

operations process. The manual is an exceptional reference publication for units who will and are conducting counterinsurgencies, however, failing to identify some of the difficulties incumbent for units who will have to execute non-standard missions during a counterinsurgency is a substantial shortcoming. One way to address this would be the publication of an associated Army Techniques Publication (ATP)[204] tied to *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency*. The ATP would encapsulate the methods used in Iraq and Afghanistan to task organize, train, and certify FA units for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. This ATP or a similar product is certainly necessary before crediting the Army and the FA with learning all they could from Iraq and Afghanistan in this regard.

ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations (ULO) is the evolution of Army doctrine designed to meet the challenges of the 21st century.[205] In his article "Unified Land Operations: The Evolution of Army Doctrine for Success in the 21st Century," Colonel Bill Benson[206] concludes that *FM 3-0, Operations* published in 2008 provided the "most significant and controversial doctrinal evolution of the past 30 years"[207] – that stability operations are tantamount to both offensive and defensive operations. *ADP 3-0* maintains

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[204] Army Technique Publications (ATP) are publications that contain techniques – "Non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks (Joint Publication 1-02, 8 November 2010 – As Amended Through 15 January 2012).

[205] Colonel Bill Benson, "Unified Land Operations: The Evolution of Army Doctrine for Success in the 21st Century," *Military Review* 92, no. 2 (March-April 2012): 47.

[206] At the time of his article, Colonel Bill Benson was the commander of 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. He completed the Advance Operational Arts Studies Fellowship at the School for Advanced Military Studies and helped with Army Doctrine Publication 3-0. He is also a combat veteran, having deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom three times.

[207] *Ibid*., 53.

that stability operations (formerly known as operations other than war) are of equal importance to major combat operations (conventional warfare).[208] Related, but more important is the inclusion of "decisive action." Decisive action is "the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities task."[209] What the Army has now acknowledges is that every operation will likely require the execution of offensive, defensive and stability tasks and the nature of a mission and operating environment will dictate the relative weight of effort given to elements of the decisive action.[210] This was an operational concept that could have been deduced following Operation Just Cause, but was not realized and codified until 2008.[211] This development may counter any institutional desire to revert back to conventional only focused Army, ultimately abating the attitude that hindered the versatility concept discussed in chapter one. Overall, *ADP 3-0* is evidence of an evolution of learning. In a message to all artillerymen in his 2011 Fires article, "Make the Fires Force the Strength of the Army," Major General Halverson stated that: "Unified Land Operations incorporates specific lessons from the last 10 years of war with broader lessons from history,"[212] and Colonel Benson in 2012 succinctly worded that Unified Land Operations: "cements the best ideas of past doctrine into one statement that reaffirms the intent of all Army operations, regardless of conditions, environment, or operational context."[213]

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[208] *Ibid.,* 54-55.

[209] United States, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 2-2.

[210] *Ibid*., 2-2 – 2-3.

[211] This concept first appeared in *FM 3-0, Operations* published February 2008 and was retained in *ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations*.

[212] Major General David D. Halverson, "Make the Fires Force the Strength of the Army," …: 3.

[213] Colonel Bill Benson, "Unified Land Operations: The Evolution of Army Doctrine for Success in the 21st Century," …: 55.

Lastly, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-09, Fires* dated August 2012 is touted as a publication for the commanders, leaders and staff of the fires warfighting function. It builds on the observations of recent operations and exercises while being rooted in "time-tested principles and fundamentals."[214] It is nested with ADP (and ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* and "grounded in joint doctrine."[215] However, any lesson applied from Iraq and Afghanistan is not explicit within the publication. No reference is made to either Iraq or Afghanistan and counterinsurgency is only used once. Additionally, in regards to the joint principle of economy of force, the discussion focuses on units conducting operations without optimum fires support and the need to assume risk and not the use of FA units in a manner to allow the concentration of maneuver forces to provide the maximum possible of combat power in terms of maneuver against primary counterinsurgency or stability efforts.[216] Yet, there are implicit lessons prevalent, such as the use of scalable capabilities in order to provide desired effects while reducing collateral damage. Additionally, the joint principle of restraint, an important counterinsurgency trait, is also emphasized in the publication.[217] The issue with this publication in regards to the FA and non-standard missions is that *ADRP 3-09* is for the fires warfighting function[218] as a whole and not is specific to the FA. Therefore, as

[214] United States, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-09, Fires* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), iii-iv.

[215] *Ibid.*

[216] *Ibid*., 1-9 – 1-10.

[217] *Ibid*., 1-6, 1-10.

[218] A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes), united by a common purpose, that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. The Army has six warfighting functions: Mission Command, Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Fires, Sustainment, and Protection. (ADP 3-0) The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and

mentioned before, the creation of an ATP to document techniques used in Iraq and Afghanistan are needed to demonstrate what was learned in Iraq and Afghanistan and make those lessons readily available for future reference and application.

Overall, it appears lessons have been learned over the last decade and applied to the latest doctrine. However, to date there is no clear evidence of what lessons the Army and the FA feel it must carry into the future, at least not in explicit terms. In 2011 Major General Halverson wrote that the FA had groom artillerymen capable of accomplishing numerous non-standard mission sets,[219] yet the detail - "the how to" - for those missions sets are not currently captured in the Army's formal doctrine. General Odierno declared that the Army must preserve the knowledge gained in counterinsurgency, stability operations and advise-and-assist missions,[220] but ensured to clarify that irregular warfare is only one subset of the operations the Army must be ready to perform.[221] From the evidence currently available, it seems that field artillerymen must be able to conduct non-standard missions, but the only current references for preparation are queries to CALL, unit SOPs and the results of unit analysis through the operations process.

What Is Anticipated?

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coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process. The fires warfighting function includes the tasks of deliver fires, integrate all forms of Army, joint and multinational fires, and conduct targeting. (ADRP 3-09)

[219] Major General David D. Halverson, "Make the Fires Force the Strength of the Army," …: 3.

[220] General Raymond T. Odierno, "The U.S. Army in a Time of Transition: Building a Flexible Force," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 3 (May-June 2012): 10.

[221] United States Army, "CSA's Strategic Intent: Delivering Strategic Landpower in an Uncertain World." Last accessed 07 February 2013. http://www.army.mil/article/95729.

Referring to Cohen and Gooch, they state that effective anticipation is the comparing of one's way of war to likely enemy actions[222] and they reference the Soviet definition of doctrine, that doctrine is a picture of future war.[223] Therefore, further examination of the latest concepts and doctrine is required. The best source is *TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept, Operational Adaptability: Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict 2016-2028.* In this publication the Army explicitly articulates its vision of the future by defining the Army's mission and military objects; providing a description of the future operational environment; and by identifying recent conflicts – Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Second Lebanon War (2006), and Operation Enduring Freedom, as harbingers of future conflict.[224] From these conflicts the Army has identified an emerging trend which garners significant focus – hybrid warfare.

U.S. doctrine defines a hybrid threat as "the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects."[225] Hybrid wars blend the lethality of conventional warfare with zealous and usually protracted fervor of irregular warfare.[226] Though the listing of hybrid threats in doctrine as "emerging" is debatable, the label is significant. It signifies that the U.S. Army sees warfare against hybrid adversaries as a likely possibility, and that these

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[222] Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes:*…, 237.
[223] *Ibid.*, 238-239.

[224] United States, *TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept, Operational Adaptability: Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict 2016-2028* (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2009), 9-13.
[225] United States, *Training Circular 7-100, Hybrid Threat* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2010), v.
[226] Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges," ...: 37.

hybrid threats require preparation across a wide range of contingencies. Thereupon, the Army published *Training Circular 7-100, Hybrid Threat* in 2010 to assist units in training against hybrid threats. Additionally, the CSA has repeatedly highlighted hybrid threats, for example: "The army will also make sure it firmly embeds one of the most costly lessons it has learned over the last decade: how to deal with the challenge of hybrid warfare."[227] Future operating environments will be filled by a mixture of regular and irregular adversaries with the presence of terrorist or criminal organizations[228] and future enemies will combine unconventional tactics with advanced weapons and these emerging threats require our military to maintain a broad range of capabilities.[229] Furthermore, the United States combat training centers such as the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California have begun building training scenarios based on the hybrid threat.[230]

Overall, it appears the Army and FA will remain focused on a broad range of capability in an attempt to address any possible contingency because of the volatility of the anticipated strategic landscape. The future operating environment is not well described beyond "complex;" exemplified by General Odierno's vision of the future strategic landscape, described as "complex, technologically interconnected, and politically fragmented."[231] How to address this broad range of threats is still not perfectly

[227] General Raymond T. Odierno, "The U.S. Army in a Time of Transition: Building a Flexible Force," …: 10.

[228] *Ibid.*

[229] United States Army, "CSA's Strategic Intent: …

[230] United States, *Newsletter 12-19: NTC Decisive Action Training Environment* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2012).

[231] United States Army, "CSA's Strategic Intent: …

understood. The CSA as recently as 07 February, 2013 wrote that traditional threats from North Korea and Iran remain credible and the Army's first priority is the ability to rapidly deploy to win the nations wars; but that national security increasingly depends on the successful completion of a broader range of missions that come with less fanfare.[232] Seemingly this puts the Army on a path to be generalists across a wide range of operations which feed back into the previously mentioned debate over future operations. Exploration of that debate and the CSA's regional alignment plan are beyond the scope of this paper. Despite that, it is referenced to express the difficulty in providing focus for training through the development of a well-defined anticipated operating environment and potential adversary.[233]

There are two significant publications specific to the FA that provide some understanding of its anticipated role in future operations: *TRADOC Pam 525-3-4, The United States Army Functional Concept for Fires 2016-2028* and *Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-09, Fires*, published in 2010 and 2012 respectively. *TRADOC Pam 525-3-4's* description of future adversaries, operating environments and operations are nested with that postulated in *TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept, Operational Adaptability: Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict 2016-2028.* Following those descriptions the publication defines "The military problem" for the field artillery within the future context:

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[232] *Ibid.*

[233] For a further understanding of this debate reference Frank G. Hoffman, "Striking a Balance,' *Armed Forces Journal* (July 1, 2009); and Michael S. Coombes, "To Be Determined: The Debate Over Future Operations," (Joint Command and Staff College Course Paper, Canadian Forces College, 2013).

> How will fires demonstrate operational adaptability? What fires capabilities must the Army have to respond to uncertainty and complexity? What capabilities does the Army require to employ fires across the spectrum of conflict? How do fires enable future decentralized combined arms action in full-spectrum operations from the tactical to strategic levels? How does the Army achieve timely and responsive offensive and defensive fires over wide areas to defeat the full range of threats and contribute to providing protection? How will the Army enable joint, Army, and multinational fires on the ground and through the airspace in decentralized operations?[234]

Notably, the military problem is solely fire support and fires delivery focused. The term non-standard is not found once in the publication though the utilization of field artillerymen in non-standard missions is referenced under the subsection, "Employ versatile fires capabilities." Under versatility it is stated that "future stability and support operations may require fires units to have the versatility[235] to conduct other missions not requiring the delivery of offensive and defensive fires."[236] Interestingly, the same term, versatility, is not found once in *ADRP 3-09, Fires* (the term versatile is found twice, but within the context of fires, not non-standard missions). All discussion within *ADRP 3-09* regarding stability operations center on fire support within a mission to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, without any mention of conducting missions other than the delivery of offensive or defensive fires.[237] Therefore, based on the doctrine currently available, it is possible to infer that the FA does not envision a future conflict where its units will conduct missions outside of the scope of delivering fires. In its 2010

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[234] United States, *TRADOC Pam 525-3-4, The United States Army Functional Concept for Fires 2016-2028*, (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2010), 9.

[235] It is assumed versatility is defined as the capacity to be multifunctional, but it is worthy of note that versatility is no longer one of the Army's tenets as defined in *Army Doctrine Publication 3-0*, dated 10 October 2010.

[236] *Ibid*., 14.

[237] United States, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-09, Fires* …, 1-7 – 1-8.

concept publication, non-fires related missions received only a cursory address and those missions are not alluded to within *ADRP 3-09,* even though the publication professes to provide a broad scope "in its focus in order to deal with fires as a *complete entity* [emphasis added]."[238]

Building Adaptability

This is the first opportunity to address adaptability in this paper though it is one of three possible organizational shortcomings that can lead to military misfortunes in the analytical approach developed by Eliot Cohen and John Gooch in their study of the anatomy of failure in war.[239] In their seminal work *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*, Cohen and Gooch do not explicitly define adaptability, though they do state that: "By encouraging the development of initiative, troops can be trained to make the most of opportunities which present themselves on the ground."[240] This is not too far from the central idea of operational adaptability presented in the 2009 *Army Capstone Concept* which is defined as "a quality that Army leaders and forces exhibit based on critical thinking, comfort with ambiguity and decentralization, a willingness to accept prudent risk, and an ability to make rapid adjustments based on a continuous assessment of the situation."[241] Also, adaptability is one of the tenets of unified land operations and though described in 260 words, it essentially matches the definition provided in the

[238] *Ibid.,* iii.
[239] Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes:*…
[240] *Ibid*., 239.

[241] United States, *TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept, Operational Adaptability: Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict 2016-2028* (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2009), 16.

capstone concept with an additional emphasis on understanding the operational environment by well-educated and trained leaders.[242]

The remainder of this chapter will focus on how to train adaptability, because as previously demonstrated, what the Army anticipates for future requirements lacks fidelity which frankly is more a product of the difficulty in gaining foreknowledge of future events than a lack of effort. Then Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates noted in 2011, in a response to a question at the American Enterprise Institute, there is not an example since Vietnam where the military has correctly anticipated the location of the next military action, saying that, "[t]here isn't a single instance – Grenada, Panama, the first Gulf War, the Balkans, Haiti, and just keep going through the list – where we knew and planned for such a conflict six months in advance, or knew that we would be involved as early as six months ahead of time."[243] Therefore, a case could be made that the ability to adapt is paramount because the ability to anticipate is unreliable and as evidence provided by Iraq and Afghanistan, it can be assumed that success in adaptability can overcome failure to learn to avoid failure in war.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders states under the principles of unit training the need to "train to develop adaptability." It further states that: "By mastering the few key tasks under varying, challenging, and complex conditions, Soldiers and their leaders become

[242] United States, *Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011), 8.

[243] Robert M. Gates, "Remarks by Secretary Gates to the American Enterprise Institute." Last accessed 15 March 2013. http://www.defense.gov/transcripts.transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4827.

confident that they can adapt to any new mission," even those which they have not trained.[244] Impressively, the Army has empowered its leaders with a tool to achieve "train to develop adaptability" through the inclusion of the operations process for the development and management of training;[245] meaning that commanders through their staffs and the military decision making process will make training decisions based on their best understanding of the operating environment, potential missions and unit capabilities. Essentially, the training process is now more adaptive and therefore responsive to unit needs. However, the issue remains that the definitions currently provided for adaptability are merely preliminary in that they provide a start point for leaders, but lacks a well-articulated end state – how does a unit or leader know they are adaptable, or more precisely, how will a FA unit know it has achieved the required adaptability to achieve success in any operating environment?

The article "Agile Fires and Decisive Action: Achieving Pervasive Agility by focusing on Fundamentals" provides an exceptional framework to achieve adaptability – focus on fundamentals, build agile fires organizations and establish agile standards and processes.[246] Essentially the authors do not propose any revolutionary approaches to training, organization or warfighting, but a honing of conventional artillery skills, a focus on basic skills, and codifying tactics, techniques and procedures in unit SOPs. Nevertheless, the article provides three poignant points worthy of highlighting. The first

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[244] United States, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 2-2.

[245] *Ibid*., v.

[246] United States, *Newsletter 12-19: NTC Decisive Action Training Environment* …, 1-9.

is that there are common requirements among the broad range of potential missions, an idea borrowed from *The Army Operating Concept*. The second is that specialized units and training limit organization flexibility. Thirdly, is the assumption that FA soldiers and units will have to conduct non-standard missions similar to those executed in Iraq and Afghanistan and therefore the need to plan accordingly.

The idea that the array of possible future mission sets has universal or near-universal requirements is important. This thought is also found in Stephen Biddle[247] and Jeffery A. Friedman's[248] work, *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*.[249] These common required skills could be referred to as the "Zone of Maximum Return" in regards to training. Leaders will know that time spent on these skills will always provide direct results in any operating environment. Examples of these widely applicable skills are marksmanship, movement techniques, the conduct of rehearsals and understanding the Geneva Conventions. Examples of skills specific to field artillerymen are the delivery of fires while minimizing collateral damage, employment of precision guided munitions, and mastery of unique artillery mission command systems such as the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). Many of these skills have been identified in *Field Manual 7-15, The Army Universal Task List,* however, as stated in its preface, its listing is not all inclusive,

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[248] At the time of publication, Jeffry A. Friedman was a doctoral student in public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government. Mr. Friedman holds a Bachelor's Degree in Government from Harvard College.

[249] Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman, *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 82-83.

but it is a tool used for the development of mission essential task lists.[250] Yet, these skills, if identified and mastered, create the conditions for success in any environment by providing the ability to act, react, and adapt with speed and creativity. Therefore, the FA should development supporting doctrine, specifically Army Techniques Publications that identify for tactical units the skills that are found in the offense, defense and stability tasks in both fires and maneuver centric task oriented missions. The argument that units will do this through their operations process and an attempt to centralize tasks in an ATP is shortsighted. The development of a coherent body of policy and doctrine to support the training of tactical units is an institutional responsibility that will provide a measure of quality assurance throughout the FA community.

During Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom it was not uncommon for FA units to employ its subordinate units as exclusively firing elements or maneuver units in order to ensure a higher level of competency in each skill set.[251] However, in order to be adaptive, FA units must be multifunctional to have the ability to make rapid adjustments based on a continuous assessment of the situation. Specialization is the reason the FA was not fully prepared for non-standard missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and conversely why senior leaders assess the field artillery's ability to deliver fires in support of conventional warfare has deteriorated: "Our ability to 'shoot, move, and communicate' in full spectrum operations, particularly in combined arms and maneuver environment, has

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[250] United States, *Field Manual 7-15, The Army Universal Task List* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009), ix.

[251] United States, *Newsletter 12-19: NTC Decisive Action Training Environment* …, 6.

atrophied after 10 years of war, repetitive non-standard missions, and short 'dwell'[252] time between deployments."[253] Focusing on the "Zone of Maximum Return" in combination with using the operations process to develop training plans will help any unit achieve training standards while developing soldiers and organizations capable of adapting to any environment.

Lastly, regardless of the lack of doctrine devoted to potential non-standard missions by FA soldiers and units, it must be assumed they will conduct missions similar to those conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. As noted before, General Odierno recognizes that national security increasingly will rely on missions other than conventional war. Now that FA units in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven the ability to conduct a wide range of missions outside the purview of fire support, those soldiers and units will likely be counted on to do the same when conditions dictate. For over ten years of conflict, FA non-standard mission sets have been the norm and this will surely have an effect on future senior leaders and their expectations of what artillerymen provide their formations. Therefore, the FA must prioritize and train non-standard tasks; and develop procedures to transition between those tasks and traditional fire support tasks – and back again.

Conclusion

[252] Dwell is military jargon for the time between operational deployments. This time is used for reset (post-deployment operations) and training (for the next deployment).

[253] Brigadier General Thomas S. Vandal, "Growing a New Field Artillery: Agile, Smart, Deadly," *Fires* (September-October 2011): 4.

As the Army and FA prepare for future operations in a post-Iraq and Afghanistan environment, it appears they do so with an understanding of what lessons they wish to learn from the early 21st century conflicts; an appreciation for the unpredictability of the future; and a desire to train and maintain a force capable of adapting to any future reality. However, it also appears the Army and FA may not realize all of the opportunities won through the difficulties overcome in Iraq and Afghanistan. The opportunity to catalogue and codify all of the techniques and procedures to task organize FA units into maneuver, transportation, and security elements into Army doctrine may pass soon, as the focus shifts to improving upon the atrophied skills in fire support and delivery. This may set the conditions for the need to relearn lessons, just as the Army had to do in Iraq and Afghanistan after its institutional failure to retain lessons from Vietnam and Operation Just Cause. Nevertheless, the anticipation of future operations requiring broad capabilities and the execution of simultaneous offensive, defensive and stability tasks, though not perfectly defined, provides leaders within the Army and FA the understanding that they cannot train their formations to focus on a particular subset of warfare. Because of this consideration and the empowerment of commanders through the operations process in the development and management of training, units are furnished with the tools necessary to develop adaptive soldiers and formations. Though it is likely the military will maintain its perfect record of failing to anticipate the location of its next operation, US Army units should be postured to achieve ultimate success obtained by train leaders and soldiers capable of acting, reacting, and adapting faster and with more initiative than their adversaries.

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis provided, it can be assessed that the field artillery experienced an aggregate failure regarding the conduct of non-standard missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The FA as an institution failed to anticipate future requirements and failed to learn from the conflicts of late 20th-century. Yet clearly, if the leadership within the field artillery branch had not been able to lead organizational adaptability, the FA would have experienced a military misfortune that may have determined the branch as expendable or worse, could have led to military disaster in both operations. Additionally, as the FA transitions from operations in support of OIF and OEF it appears many of these difficult lessons learned may be lost as the focus shifts to delivery of fires with little guidance regarding future non-standard missions.

As stated in chapter 2, the FA's failure to anticipate can be justified. The FA was not irresponsible or derelict in duty because the requirement to conduct two nearly simultaneous major theater wars was absolute and demanding. Failure in a conventional war has a higher likelihood of threating the survival of a nation than a failure in stability operations. However, in the late 1990s, nearly 70 percent of the FA organizations and personnel resided in the Army National Guard, but the National Guard was not included in the plans for major theater wars. Therefore, though there is no evidence the FA did anticipate the non-standard missions conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is possible to postulate the FA force structure and the demand of preparing for two nearly simultaneous major theater wars makes the argument mute. The demands of major theater wars and

the force structure could have demanded that the FA as an institution prioritize training that neglected non-standard missions not out of neglect, but out of necessity. Despite this postulation, the fact remains the FA failed to anticipate.

If the FA had correctly anticipated the possibility that the Army could call on FA units to conduct stability operations like those conducted by infantry units in Panama during Operation Just Cause and then realized later in Iraq and Afghanistan, at a minimum, contingency plans could have been developed to address such a scenario. This assessment is just based on the Army's doctrinal evolution concerning operations other than war and the tenet versatility covered in detail in chapter 2. However, there is no evidence the FA conducted any contingency planning. Conversely, there is ample evidence of a prevailing attitude that stability operations were "someone else's job," resulting in little emphasis in the Army as a whole and consequently nearly zero attention by the field artillery.

Chapter 3 shows a failure to learn and more evidence that missions similar to those conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan should have been anticipated. When viewed in total, operations from the Vietnam War to the Balkans present two trends. The first is the use of conventional artillery support nearly vanishes, and when employed it was severely restricted. The second is the utilization of combat arms units for stability operations to include field artillerymen taking greater roles occurred as the 1990s progressed. Still, with the exception of 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery using CALL materials to train for non-standard missions, there is little evidence lessons from one conflict were carried

forward to the next. Even in the case of 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery, the unit did not access the lessons learned from CALL until after the unit was already in Kosovo and conducting "on-the-job" training. Nevertheless, the most prominent opportunity for lessons learned missed was from Operation Just Cause. The transition from combat to stability operations with a lack of manpower to conduct the required missions is almost a prototype for OIF and OEF. The lessons missed in that operation was that it would be improbable for there to be enough military police and civil affairs personnel immediately following combat operations to take full responsibility for stability operations or sustain mission requirements over extended periods. Theoretically, the same would hold true for the infantry in a prolonged operation resulting in the second possible lesson - that other branches should have anticipated they would be called on to assist in stability operations and therefore needed to learn lessons from the infantry experience. This is especially true for the FA which could have learned that in similar operations, the use of artillery would likely remain limited and tightly controlled.

There is evidence of attempts to learn, notably the Army in the 1990s established a method to institutionalize lessons learned. The Army sanctioned the Center for Army Lessons Learned as the center of gravity to collect and analyze lessons to incorporate into training. Additionally, combat training centers evolved training scenarios reflective of lessons learned in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and the Balkans. Institutionally, the ability to receive, analyze, distribute and integrate lessons learned existed, but in regards to FA non-standard missions during stability operations there was a significant shortcoming prior to OIF and OEF.

In summary, the FA could have been better prepared for the conduct of non-standard missions during OIF and OEF. Clearly the argument can (and has) been made that the entire Army was not prepared to deal with insurgencies, but that fact should not preclude the field artillery from internal evaluation to identify shortcomings and apply applicable lessons learned to future operations. This paper has provided a limited evaluation into two of the three possible military failures posited by Cohen and Gooch. Additional research into the ability of the FA to successfully adapt and meet the mission requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan is required to provide the fullest understanding of the FA's preparation at the turn of the century in order to discern every lesson, both positive and negative, that should be carried forward.

As one looks to the future, with the Training and Doctrine Command publications pertaining to operating concepts from 2016-2028 it appears the Army and FA are moving forward with an understanding of what lessons they deem relevant; an appreciation for the unpredictability of the future; and a desire to train and maintain a force capable of adapting to any future reality. Nevertheless, it appears the FA may not capitalize on the opportunity to catalogue and codify all of the techniques and procedures to task organize FA units into maneuver, transportation, and security elements as it focuses on regaining the skills of fire support and delivery that were sacrificed as it worked to adapt to meet the non-standard mission requirements demanded in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore it is possible conditions are being created for the loss of knowledge and the need to relearn critical lessons. But what remains to be seen is whether or not the anticipation of future

requirements requiring broad capabilities and the development of the *Unified Land Operations* doctrine will provide enough incentive and guidance to maintain a balance in preparation for offensive, defensive and stability operations to facilitate success in future operations.

In spite of the conclusions expressed in this paper, additional areas of possible research remain. As mentioned, evaluation of how the FA achieved success in adaptability should be analyzed for application into institutional training. Also, it has been identified that the FA has not formalized the cataloging and codifying of the techniques, procedures and lessons learned from the task organization of FA units into maneuver, transportation, security elements, etc. Though much of this information likely resides in unit standing operating procedures, Center of Army Lesson Learned products, and various after-action reviews, this information should be centrally collected, analyzed and then distributed in the form of an Army Technique Publication. Lastly, the FA should product a supporting training document to assist unit commanders with the development of training plans. Though the Army empowered its leaders "train to develop adaptability" through the inclusion of the operations process for the development and management of training; the FA branch should develop and disseminate a document that skills with a "zone of maximum returns." If the FA branch produced such a document instead of leaving the determination solely to the operations process of each FA unit, it would both save staff time throughout the Army and also provide a degree of universal standardization among FA units, ultimately increasing operational flexibility across the

Army. Regardless, one way or another the field artillerymen will find a way to succeed and will the caissons will continue to go rolling along - but where to?

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