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A CASTLE WITHOUT WALLS: NON-MILITARY ROLES FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES IN THE DEFENCE OF THE CANADIAN STATE

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**A Castle Without Walls: Non-Military Roles for the Canadian Forces in
the Defence of the Canadian State**

By/par Lieutenant Commander Joshua Yanchus

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... For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world ...

Ephesians 6:12

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ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Second World War, western armed forces have been increasingly asked to take on more and more responsibilities outside of the so-called traditional roles. Canada, as both a would-be middle power and a historical supporter of collaborative uses of armed force outside its own borders, provides an interesting perspective for examining this trend. Canadian governments have proven consistent since the Second World War in their use of military forces abroad in the pursuit of strategic objectives in war, and far more often, in peace. Is this trend of non-military duties for armed forces a perversion of their traditional role? Considering the paucity of national resources, and relative safety of the Canadian homeland from state-versus-state incursion, the reliance of the Canadian state on the use of military forces for its national interest warrants explanation. This paper examines how the trend of armed forces conducting non-military functions has developed throughout the world, with emphasis on the states that have influenced Canada's own strategic interests. The fundamental aspects of Canadian international security policy are also examined, with particular attention to how this middle power with no state-based military threat employs military force to gain power and influence. Canadian reliance on armed forces in effecting security policy at home and abroad is discussed, as is its development and adaptation to the changing international security environment from Confederation to the present day. The broad debate between maintaining armed forces strictly for war, or strictly for peace keeping and other non-military functions is discussed. Ultimately, both perspectives are shown to fall short of what Canada requires in the world today: the flexibility that is afforded only by armed forces capable of both warfighting and non-military functions alike.

**INTRODUCTION:
CHANGE IS CONSTANT, WAR IS CERTAIN**

The history of man is the history of war. Although the nature of war as a uniquely human phenomenon may persist unchanged throughout our history, it can be argued that the nature of *warfare*, as a social process, is beholden to the nature of the political entity employing it. War presents itself in the form of an abstract social construct regardless of the era or society, persistent in human social interaction from Cain's slaying of Abel to the violent acts of various non-state actors in this age. The notion of warfare, in contrast, is fluid in the extreme: the manner in which humans take up arms is linked inextricably to the structure of the particular individual, group or society in question. In this, it can be observed how so much of the study of war provides a thematic constancy in human history, while at the same time allowing us to better understand the nature of a particular international system through examining the way in which its actors employ armed force.

The current phase of our history, that is to say of human civilization and warfare, is understandably and necessarily a constant topic of debate. Events such as the Second World War, the end of the Cold War, the September 2001 attacks on the United States of America and the 'Arab Spring' of 2011 are generally agreed upon to be watershed moments heralding changes in the international system, even if those changes are not widely agreed upon. A fundamental aspect of the international system, preceding the Canadian state itself, has been the primacy of the state as the dominant actor in the international system. For the overwhelming majority of human beings, the state is of such basic importance today as the focal mechanism by which we interact. More importantly, the state remains the vehicle in which we address and seek to resolve conflict with each other. Consequently, professional standing armed forces remain the preferred instrument by which states of all types seek to ensure survival and pursue their strategic interests.

Much seems to have changed since the end of the Second World War, in terms of what armed forces are asked to do for their governments at home and abroad. Although the key roles described above generally persist for militaries, today's soldier, sailor or airman/airwoman is more likely to be found conducting counter insurgency, policing, development assistance, or diplomatic activities than preparing for and carrying out traditional forms of warfare. Certainly, some of this is due to the varying demands or strategic interests of the particular state. For example, military forces in Central and South American countries have often formed an integral part of the state's internal security apparatus, while militaries in some former Soviet republics often exist almost exclusively as ready pools of labour for infrastructure projects.¹

Outside of mere cultural and geopolitical differences between states however, it remains consistent that military forces today are perhaps busier than ever, but not, it would seem, in the area of traditional warfare. These other activities are understandably varied, and while referred to in this paper as non-military roles and tasks, they are represented in countless other works under many labels: Operations Other Than War (OOTW), stability operations, Counter Insurgency operations (COIN), constabulary operations, humanitarian and disaster relief, security sector reform, capacity building, military training and cooperation, defence diplomacy and so on. For the purposes of this discussion, the term 'non-military' is used to refer to all activity conducted by armed forces that is not defined simply as warfighting, or the pursuit of purely military objectives. Naturally, even this distinction will present a certain degree of ambiguity, as even a purely military objective today will almost always comprise other, non-military lines of operation in some way. The fact that these philosophical areas of warfighting

¹ Timothy Edmunds, "What are armed forces for? The changing nature of military roles in Europe," *International Affairs* 82, no. 6 (November 2006): 1073; Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed February 11, 2012).

and non-military are far from easy to render completely separate from each other might appear problematic, but will effectively lend support to the assertions made in this paper.

Canada, as both a would-be middle power and an arguably stalwart proponent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and other forms of collaborative uses of armed force outside its own borders, provides an interesting perspective for examining this trend. As will be discussed, the geopolitical realities of the international system seem at first glance to afford Canada the option to forgo the use of armed force as both unnecessary and untenable in ensuring its survival as a state. Yet, no shortage of record exists detailing the extent to which this middle power has generated significant contributions of armed force for direct use in both the major wars of the twentieth century and other international efforts.

Canada's involvement in the international security environment has not been limited to support to allies and like-minded states in times of national peril alone. Interestingly, despite what some theorists consider a historical lack of any comprehensive, rational, national defence policy², Canada has been an enthusiastic international actor. Acting decisively to preserve peace and stability abroad, assisting in shaping the United Nations (UN) charter, developing the North Atlantic treaty, and resolving the Suez Crisis of 1956 has effectively established a "solid record of responsibly internationalist involvement in world affairs."³ Canadian governments have proven consistent since the Second World War in their use of military forces abroad in the pursuit of strategic objectives in war, and far more often, in peace. Is this trend of non-military duties for armed forces a perversion of their traditional role? Has the world changed so

² Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century* (Kingston, ON: Queen's University Press, 2004), 151.

³Douglas Alan Ross, "Canada's International Security Strategy," *International Journal* 65, no. 2 (April 1, 2010): 355. <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed January 11, 2012).

significantly that Canada no longer requires armed forces capable of full spectrum warfare?

Considering the paucity of national resources, and relative safety of the Canadian homeland from state-versus-state incursion, the reliance of the Canadian state on the use of military forces for its national interest warrants explanation.

Western militaries are increasingly called upon by their governments to fulfill distinctly non-military functions outside their own borders, with Canada in particular relying on military force as a critical element of her international security policy. As events shape the international system, the state shares an increasingly complex stage with non-state actors of every description. Owing to the unchanging nature of war, states continue to require the same fundamental purpose of their armed forces – the defence of the state. Owing to the ever changing nature of *warfare*, the manner in which armed forces provide this service is necessarily complex, requiring progressively more attention and competence in both warfighting and non-military functions. This paper will argue that it is not merely advantageous but essential for Canada to employ military forces in non-military functions abroad in the pursuit of national interest.

**CHAPTER ONE:
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY**

Having identified the trend, and having posited that use of the military for non-military roles in operations serves the best interests of the Canadian state, it naturally follows next to discuss why this phenomenon concerns some. One of the commonalities among western governments is the principle of civilian control of the armed forces, which underlines a key concern that arises for governments employing forces in non-military roles – determining the appropriate level of military influence over government policy. Caution in this area has long been espoused by those involved in the discussion of civil – military relations, with democratic governments of the west being well aware of Samuel P. Huntington’s assertion that politics is “beyond the scope of military competence” and that the “military officer must remain neutral politically.”⁴ Those of a more cynical outlook may occasionally accuse policymakers as well as the defence and security sector of self-interest. Concerns exist over the manufacturing or at least overemphasizing the requirement for the use of armed force and correspondingly the maintenance of inappropriately large standing militaries and associated industry. In some states, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, institutional survival undoubtedly contributes some degree of rationale for finding new roles and functions for permanent armed forces.⁵ Even allowing for less sinister motivations, the perspective that well-intentioned western militaries have increasingly tended to encroach on the territory of other government departments as well as

⁴ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 456.

⁵ Edmunds, "What are armed forces for?...", 1062.

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) is an understandable source of anxiety for those holding what can be termed the “traditionalist”⁶ perspective.

Institutional or systemic change of any sort is inevitably and necessarily upsetting for some party involved, and merely observing the change in roles for militaries and determining it to be inappropriate would be a disservice. This paper is less concerned with the preservation of sacred cows (the re-examining of so-called traditional roles being itself a central theme) than it is with discussing the effectiveness and utility of this trend to the state. For one, the notion of sinister intent can largely be dismissed, as the greater involvement of militaries, particularly those of the west, in development and other non-military spheres has been due not to ambitious bureaucracies, but to the “paucity of national and international *civilian* crisis management capabilities, particularly in violent environments.”⁷ In many cases, the argument that armed forces are appropriate for use in non-military roles merely because they are the only option at hand, is sound. As will be discussed, the argument for armed forces in these non-traditional roles goes even further than descriptions of a ‘last resort,’ particularly for the Canadian state.

To what is owed the credit for this shift in responsibilities among the armed forces of the world? For some, it is unexpected - the end of the Cold War ‘should’ have ushered in a new era requiring less of armed forces, as states in an increasingly multipolar world were expected to resolve conflicts without the use of force. Globalization proponents continue to offer the perspective that as states see their economic interdependency increase, the prospect of violent

⁶ Jennifer Morrison Taw, "Stability and Support Operations: History and Debates," *Studies In Conflict & Terrorism* 33, no. 5 (May 2010): 400. Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed February 11, 2012).

⁷ Stuart Gordon, "Exploring the Civil–Military Interface and its Impact on European Strategic and Operational Personalities: ‘Civilianisation’ and Limiting Military Roles in Stabilisation Operations?" *European Security* 15, no. 3 (September 2006): 341. Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed February 11, 2012). Emphasis in the original.

war and instability ought to decrease. The failure of this logic surprises some, notwithstanding the historical examples that suggest differently, such as the healthy pre-hostilities trade relationships between the belligerent powers of both twentieth century World Wars. More recently, the first Gulf War saw a universal consensus in the UN in favour of both the condemnation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as well as the subsequent and successful coalition war to restore peace in the region.⁸ At the start of that decade, things were arguably looking bright for the prospect of global stability, and for international confidence in the UN and other symbols of consensus building to address the security challenges of the coming century without the use of armed forces.

As the 1990s progressed, it became clear that harmonious relations between states were not necessarily a natural outcome of the new, multipolar international system. As Douglas Bland outlines, wars and instability in many areas throughout Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans were demonstrating to the west by the mid-1990s that international order and security would increasingly require their forces to be used to intervene in the workings of other states to "remove a state's governing regime, to disarm and arrest lawless factions, or to separate warring bands in civil clashes or in regional conflicts."⁹ These security operations have been characterized by participation of military forces conducting tasks at all points on a spectrum of conflict, with one end being 'total peace' and one being 'total war.' Governments of western nations have differed in the levels of resources expended in the conduct of these operations, and for defence spending in general, but are similar in their increasing reliance on armed forces to pursue strategic, non-military objectives outside of their own borders.

⁸ Douglas L. Bland, "The Fundamentals of National Defence Policy Are Not Sound," in *Canada Without Armed Forces?* ed. Douglas L. Bland, 1-24 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 5.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

Clearly, there exist states today whose neighbours oblige them to maintain the more traditional purpose of armed forces, that of the physical defence of their territory and citizens. The governments of India, Pakistan, and South Korea for example, face particularly compelling geopolitical circumstances that require no explanation for maintaining combat ready armed forces. For most of today's western governments, the rationale for armed forces is seldom as clear. The remainder of this chapter is intended to discuss three broad western perspectives in addressing the security challenges of today: Europe, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Each of these perspectives addresses the international security environment in ways different from each other, and also from the Canadian experience. Naturally, these differences flow from the disparate requirements of each, whether culturally, geopolitically, or even economically. What is of greater significance, is the extent to which the Canadian national interest echoes each of these broad perspectives in some way, resulting in a uniquely Canadian requirement for the use of armed forces in the pursuit of national objectives.

For most of Europe, the post-Cold War period has ushered in an age almost completely devoid of any external, state-based military threat.¹⁰ Although the responses of European governments have been varied, the common implication has been to force states to re-examine what they wish of their armed forces, if not the more traditional role. Complicating the issue has been the rise in security challenges related to transnational crime and terrorism, requiring the use of armed forces to participate in greater numbers in other non-military efforts such as internal security, counter terrorism, and combating the traffic of illicit narcotics as well as illegal immigration.¹¹ For many European states seeking greater influence in the multilateral arena, the

¹⁰ Edmunds, "What are armed forces for?...", 1065.

¹¹ Ibid., 1071.

perceived national requirement to field expeditionary-capable forces for peacekeeping has led to tough choices aimed at reducing capabilities in other, more traditional areas.¹²

In contrasting the response of European states as a community and other western entities to the challenges of the post-Cold War world, Stuart Gordon describes a distinctly ‘civilian’ approach. Compared to other western entities, such as NATO, the United Kingdom, or the United States, the European Union (EU) perspective on crisis management has generally been to coordinate military means “within an essentially civilian framework.”¹³ This emphasis likely stems from the EU’s particular origins as a civilian entity, and would seem to offer a perspective far more progressive than the efforts of other entities to address security issues with forces and mechanisms born and bred for state-versus-state warfare. However, as Gordon illustrates, the nature of the EU as a relatively incoherent body for international security issues, lacking for example any foreign minister or unified European External Action Service, makes it largely untested in resolving instability outside the borders of its member states.¹⁴ Clearly some European states cast suspicious eyes towards the enemies of yesteryear, eyeing developments in Russia for example, with unease. For the majority of European states, however, a state based military threat is not an unfamiliar concept, but neither is it among the threats to national interest faced today.

The United Kingdom has been obliged to address much of the same challenges facing other western states, Canada included, but has evolved particular national strategies consistent with both their pre-Cold War history as a colonial power, as well as their experiences in security

¹² Ibid., 1070.

¹³ Gordon, "Exploring the Civil–Military Interface . . .," 350.

¹⁴ Ibid., 355.

operations in the recent past. In comparing the UK and US historical approaches to counter insurgency, John A. Nagl attributes a great deal of credit for British success in Malaya to their unique approach to warfare, born of a strategic culture that employed the army as “an expeditionary force when European affairs absolutely demanded British involvement.”¹⁵ Owing to the geographical advantage conferred by not only the English Channel, but also the Atlantic Ocean, the UK has historically relied on naval forces to safeguard the homeland, allowing them to raise armies only when required for expeditionary use to pursue national objectives abroad.

British success in non-traditional security operations to this day owes a great deal to the state’s long history of using armed forces for all of the various tasks associated with maintaining an empire. In many ways, the British government has been obliged to learn the same hard lessons as her allies, in failing to adequately plan for post-conflict operations in Iraq, for example.¹⁶ Clearly, states retain the capacity to fail to apply the lessons of their own experience. In the case of the British Empire, military and defence culture has long embraced the notion of armed forces being used in all aspects of colonial policing, state building, governance and security as the appropriate government authority.¹⁷ For Britain, the sheer size and breadth of her imperial holdings required armed forces to be proficient in both military and non-military tasks for years.

Colin Gray writes a great deal about the particular non-traditional use of armed forces, COIN, and the British experience in its development. Describing irregular warfare as possibly

¹⁵ John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam*. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2002), 36.

¹⁶ Gordon, "Exploring the Civil–Military Interface ...," 344.

¹⁷ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup ...*, xxii.

the core competency of the British army throughout its history,¹⁸ Gray is clear in his assertion that considering war and peace as separate contexts for modern operations is unhelpful.¹⁹ Referring to recent efforts to highlight the importance of approaching COIN from neither a purely military nor civilian perspective, he is candid in assessing this as no more than “recognition of the blindingly obvious.”²⁰

In addressing the challenges of the modern international security environment, the United States has historically employed armed forces in both military and non-military roles with varying degrees of success. The most recent US policies on the subject are unequivocal, with Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05, issued in 2005, promoting stability and support operations to be a core mission alongside warfighting, rather than a secondary function.²¹ In the assessment of Jennifer Morrison Taw, this is a “radical change that represents a new *raison-d’être* for the U.S. military.”²² This perspective embraces the notion that today’s armed forces better serve the state when able to conduct operations from ‘total war’ to ‘total peace,’ but it has not been without detractors.

As in Canada and other western democracies, concerns over the use of armed force to pursue non-traditional operations tended in the US to revolve around two central debates: the appropriateness of using a military for ‘political’ objectives, and the negative effects of non-military operations on the military’s primary warfighting function. The principal argument for

¹⁸ Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 1, no. 2 (Winter 2007), 48.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 41.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.

²¹ Taw, "Stability and Support Operations....," 387.

²² *Ibid.*, 387.

the first debate cites the importance of maintaining a distinct line between military and civilian tasks, and the necessity of separation of the two. Taw and others have examined the US decision making process prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2002, and noted the influence of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) approach in contributing to the optimism (hubris) regarding the requirements for post-conflict planning.

Part of the problem was that, despite past experiences, military and civilian planners failed to account for potential outbreaks of violence following combat operations in Iraq ... Rumsfeld had a vision of a streamlined operation in which messy long-term commitments played no role; nation-building was perceived as a tar-pit to be avoided at all costs.²³

False lessons of the Vietnam War had caused many in US circles to conclude not that it was important to improve the ability of armed forces to pursue non-traditional functions, but that they should avoid them entirely.²⁴

The second debate, as to the notion that preparing forces for non-military functions will compromise their ability to fulfill their primary function, appears to find support both in the US and Canada. The substantial personnel demand on the US military today on international operations causes serious concerns for those who would advocate a more traditional role for armed forces. For some US military and political leaders, the proliferation of non-military operations stretches conventional forces too thin, forcing an unhealthy reliance on private military security companies (PMSC) in order to meet manpower demands,²⁵ and ultimately compromising combat capability.²⁶

²³ Ibid., 395.

²⁴ Ibid., 392.

The history of the US military is replete with numerous examples of the consequences of using armed forces inappropriately, to negative effect. Considering this, the November 2005 decision of the US government to devote equal attention and importance to non-military roles for their military takes on even more significance. Canada and all other western governments clearly do not, and will not have the capacity of the US to conduct the range, amount, and scale of operations possible with armed forces. That said, the two central debates governing the US example exist for the Canadian case as well. In fact, in view of the severe limitations that middle power status inherently places on military ambition, these debates are arguably even more valid in Canada.

The modern international system poses different challenges for each state. Like Europe, Canada has used armed forces to defeat and deter state based military threats, demonstrate resolve and otherwise pursue an internationalist agenda. In recent years, the absence of a true state based military threat has given rise to renewed debate as to the question of national armed forces. While Europeans wrestle with increasing interdependence and political and economic integration, The UK faces first-world security responsibilities in an uncommonly austere fiscal environment. In a manner similar to the British Empire of old, albeit reduced in scale, Canada seeks an international voice while remaining focused on a 'home game' that continues to require professional armed forces to govern effectively. Among these interests at home, is the complex relationship with the US, a foremost aspect of Canada's international security interests. While perhaps culturally interwoven and strategically inextricable from the US, Canadian capacity for

²⁵ Christopher Spearin, "What Montreux Means: Canada and the New Regulation of the International Private Military and Security Industry," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 16, no. 1 (April 1, 2010): 7; <http://www.proquest.com/>; Internet; accessed January 11, 2012.

²⁶ Taw, "Stability and Support Operations....," 394.

maintaining and employing armed forces are far removed from any straight comparison to her greatest ally. Yet, much of the demands faced by the world's lone superpower in the international security environment hold crucial importance for Canadian sovereignty and defence. In the next chapter, Canada's use of armed forces in the furtherance of national objectives from Confederation to the early twenty-first century will be examined.

CHAPTER TWO: DEFENDING CONFEDERATION FROM 1867 TO 2005

The history of the Canadian state from 1867 to 2005 illustrates a defence policy that is consistently determined less by proximate military threats than it is by more abstract representations of the perceived national interest. As this chapter will discuss, Canada has been influenced throughout its history by its relationships with its closest allies, its complex hemispheric interests, and even its vast and rugged territory. These influences have established a historical practice of Canadian armed forces being used to great effect in the furtherance all interests of the state, not merely those considered traditionally military in nature.

Geography has provided Canada with a secure position, which although not completely unassailable, has allowed the state throughout its history to organize and maintain armed forces for expeditionary use without worrying about leaving the homeland undefended in their absence. Desmond Morton likens two of the three oceans bordering Canadian territory to “huge moats,” which when combined with the polar ice cap to the north, had long rendered Canada “virtually impregnable” on three sides.²⁷ Even with the advent of air power and expeditionary capabilities that tended to make the world smaller with each technological advance, Canada emerged from the chaotic twentieth century unscathed. The twentieth century wars in Europe and elsewhere carried huge costs to all countries involved, Canada included, but particularly those whose territory played host to the fighting. Apart from subsurface attacks on Canadian assets and sea lines of communication on the Atlantic coast and other, more negligible attacks on the Pacific coast, the physical boundaries of Canada were never directly challenged with military force. Neither, for that matter, have they been in the entire history since Confederation. A glance at Canada’s position atop the North American continent reveals the simplistic but accurate

²⁷ Desmond Morton, *Understanding Canadian Defence* (Toronto: Penguin, 2003), 10.

conclusion that physical isolation affords Canada almost complete immunity from wars of territorial conquest, border disputes, or any obvious vulnerability that would suggest to a would-be aggressor that their holdings would be improved by military adventure and conquest in Canada.

Geography confers an even more powerful advantage to Canadian defence than its tangible properties. The fortunate circumstance of having one's territory securely tucked under the defence umbrella of the two principal western military powers of the previous two centuries has protected the Canadian state more ably than any mere physical obstacle. Of course, even the largest moat or barrier is no obstacle to a determined enemy if undefended. Perhaps fortunately for Canada, protection of the moats, ramparts and approaches has been essentially provided for since Confederation. Even after the threat of war with the United States had all but disappeared, the defence of Canadian territory was essentially a British problem, with Canadian defence policy being "subsumed in the broader strategic relations between the British Empire and the rest of the world" until the end of World War One.²⁸ As the twentieth century began, there may have been an increasing reluctance on the part of the British Empire to provide for the defence of Canada, but in no way did this precipitate a requirement for the fledgling state to protect themselves from external threats. In the years between Confederation and 1900, Canada spent an average of one million dollars a year on defence, approximately 2.5 percent of total federal spending, guarding the forts in Quebec and Kingston and maintaining an "ill-armed, poorly trained militia" of forty thousand – just enough to "keep order in communities and along the border without alarming the neighbours."²⁹

²⁸ Joel J. Sokolsky, *Defending Canada* (New York: Priority Press, 1989), 3.

²⁹ Morton, *Understanding Canadian Defence ...*, 8.

Ultimately, the twentieth century would see one benefactor exchanged for another. A Canadian share of the victory in Europe after World War One brought about the emergence of a truly national identity for Canada, an independent voice on the world stage, and more importantly, the attainment of “*de jure* as well as *de facto* control over its foreign and defense policies.”³⁰ Now that membership in the Commonwealth would no longer come with a homeland defence package, Canadians would finally be obliged to adopt as the primary focus for their armed forces the physical defence of the state from all aggressors, including the United States. That the militarization of the Canadian homeland largely did not occur, is due of course to the peaceful relationship formed by this point between the British Empire (and consequently, Canada) and the United States. Morton explores below a theoretical alternative history had Canada not made its greatest threat into its greatest ally.

With a firm shove from the British, Canadians found that one good way to keep the peace is not to prepare for a hopeless war. Imagine if Canadians had dutifully assumed the old British defence burden. Instead of going to school or working in farms, mines and factories, hundreds of thousands of Canadians would have spent their youth drilling and manoeuvring for a war they could never win. Ottawa would have spent millions of dollars on defence, but it could never be enough. Alarmed at military threats on their borders, Americans would have mobilized armies and matched cannon for cannon. Instead, with their ‘peace dividend,’ Canadians built railways, branch plants and farms, and felt righteous about the follies of militarism.³¹

Certainly, this is no quantitative analysis of the economic and opportunity cost benefits realized by the Canadian state in avoiding the burden of physically defending its territory from the United States. This does provide a picture, however, of the utility of Canadian armed forces, and their relative freedom from the encumbrance of physically guarding the impossibly vast perimeter of Canadian territory from immediate threats to her survival.

³⁰ Sokolsky, *Defending Canada...*, 3.

³¹ Morton, *Understanding Canadian Defence ...*, 10.

As an influencing factor on Canadian defence policy, the United States contributes a great deal more than just a quiet frontier, or a mere absence of threat. The mere proximity, physical and otherwise, of what would become the world's pre-eminent superpower has tended to dominate Canadian defence objectives from the early twentieth century to the present day. 'Dominate' is undoubtedly a troublesome word, particularly when discussing concerns related to the nationalist identity of a country finding itself 'sleeping next to an elephant.' In the context of this paper, it is a wholly appropriate term, given the magnitude of influence wielded by this particular elephant.

The burden of defending the Canadian state has been made unquestionably lighter by virtue of Canada being "dependent on American power for both its security and prosperity."³² Lighter, perhaps – but not less complicated. This dependence is shared south of the border, but in an unquestionably lopsided arrangement. Setting aside the various economic and cultural interdependencies that have grown between the two states, the United States has also come to consider the territory of Canada as necessary to keep under their own protection of the American homeland.³³ Threats to the United States have been, throughout their history, of the sort that are best met well outside their borders. This is evidenced not only in the covenants established in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in 1940, but also the substantial military collaborative efforts, largely financed by the United States, towards continental defence throughout the Cold War.³⁴ The threats to the North American continent have changed significantly since the fall of the Soviet Union, as have both the United States' and Canada's requirements of their respective

³² Patrick Lennox, "John W. Holmes and Canadian International Relations Theory," *International Journal* 65, no. 2 (April 1, 2010): 382. <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed January 11, 2012).

³³ Morton, *Understanding Canadian Defence ...*, 11.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 12.

armed forces. What has not changed, and remains germane in discussions of Canadian use of armed forces from Confederation to the present day, is that Canada need face no enemy alone. Advantages conferred both by geography as well as cultivated diplomatic relationships permit Canada the ability to protect itself from external threats while simultaneously preserving an armed force for use abroad in pursuit of national objectives.

A historical challenge to the view that Canada's employment of armed forces abroad is essential today for its national interests is the notion of 'soft' power. This perspective, generally referring to Canadian foreign policy in the 1990s under then Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, was supported by many in bureaucratic and academic communities, and has persisted in the minds of some as an appropriately Canadian approach to international security challenges.³⁵ Similar to what is proposed in this paper, global influence was seen then by proponents of soft power as the desired net effect. What is strikingly different is the perceived importance, or lack thereof, of the use of armed forces in achieving these ends.

According to Sean Maloney, soft power implicitly rejects the idea of military capacity having any utility, particularly for Canadian armed forces, outside of a UN Peacekeeping context.³⁶ Maloney goes further, and is forceful in his assessment that the seeds of this policy, sown as early as the Trudeau era, have been the single largest contributing factor to a catastrophic weakening of Canadian military capacity, as well as a major cause of Canada's "descent into irrelevancy" in the late 1990s.³⁷ The arguably significant cuts to military budgets from the 1970s to the late 1990s may be lamentable and often written of, but the question of

³⁵ Sean M. Maloney, *The Roots of Soft Power: The Trudeau Government, De-NATOization, and Denuclearization, 1967-1970* (Kingston, ON: Queen's University, 2005), 1.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

whether or not soft power was appropriate and effective for Canada in the late twentieth century is actually outside the scope of this discussion.

Until the end of the Cold War, the predominant activity on UN peacekeeping operations was cease-fire monitoring, after hostilities had ended, in order to create conditions necessary for political negotiated solutions.³⁸ In the post-Cold War era, Canadian interests require an armed force to be able to deploy not to areas suffering inter-state conflict, but more likely those suffering from intra-state conflict - consistent with the situation in failed and failing states. Even if it were to be conceded that soft power had its time and place as an effective means in affording the state power and influence, itself a dubious concept, it is today a concept that is ill-suited to Canada's international security interests.

The Arctic region has historically been an area of concern for Canadian international security policy, and tends to demand a national response oriented neither along purely military nor civilian lines, but a combination of the two. With the rise of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the Cold War, a defined and unprecedented military threat to Canada had emerged. To some degree, the use of armed forces in the arctic during the Cold War would seem to be ideologically simple – a traditional use of the military to address a purely military problem. The precise nature of the military threat to Canada would vary as developments in technology introduced new challenges to address in the Arctic, from bomber attack vectors, land-based invasion routes, and ultimately intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.³⁹ Even at the height of these most traditional of military challenges, the use of Canadian armed forces in the Arctic was conceived “less as a means of countering a questionable Soviet threat

³⁸ Holger Schabio, "The UN Role in Future Military Conflicts," *Baltic Security & Defence Review* 8, (January 2006); 129, Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed February 11, 2012).

³⁹ Sokolsky, *Defending Canada...*, 36.

than of forestalling a massive American over-reaction, with all the pressures that that would bring to bear on Canadian sovereignty in the area.”⁴⁰ Even taking into account this duality of purpose, echoed throughout this paper as a particularly Canadian requirement of middle power status, the use of armed forces in the Arctic during the Cold War had at least the solid bedrock of traditional state versus state conflict to rest on. Later years would find the Arctic, as in the rest of the world, requiring more of the Canadian Armed Forces than simply the military defence of the state.

The use of armed forces in securing national objectives in the Arctic is today a stated and established priority⁴¹ for the current Canadian government – an apparent contradiction of traditional military necessity following the fall of the Soviet Union. Writing in 1995, David Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown outlined the ebb and flow of Canadian strategic interest in the Arctic since the end of the Second World War, citing the dual objectives of addressing the threats to Canadian sovereignty from both Soviet aggression as well as US pressures.⁴² At the time, it was believed that the decline of the Soviet threat would almost certainly eliminate any requirement for Arctic states to use armed forces for national objectives in the region. In that initial decade following the end of the Cold War, Dewitt and Leyton-Brown ultimately considered a future resurgence in military activity to be unlikely, and offered instead that international efforts in a general demilitarization of the region could be expected.⁴³

⁴⁰ David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown, *Canada's International Security Policy* (Scarborough, ON: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1995), 82.

⁴¹ Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2008), 8.

⁴² Dewitt and Leyton-Brown, *Canada's International Security Policy...*, 105.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 105.

Today, notwithstanding occasional out-of-area sorties flown by Russian Strategic Aviation, of debatable consequence to Canada, there is “no war, no combatants, no current threat to life and democracy in or around the Arctic.”⁴⁴ The threats that characterized the Cold War period, particularly those that demanded Canadian military presence in the Arctic, have largely passed from view. Certainly, much is written about future security concerns related to the Arctic region, given the vast resource wealth potential, unresolved legal claims, and the possible implications of climate change. Some, like Rob Huebert, saw the Arctic in the post-Cold War period as the logical setting for a future Russian military challenge to US naval supremacy, were that remote possibility to occur.⁴⁵ However, as Arctic issues continue to occupy those concerned with international security, the predominating message from Arctic governments continues to be that “geological research and international law - not military clout”⁴⁶ will be the forces that resolve the existing continental shelf debates and other concerns. Yet, the fact that armed forces have remained essential in national strategies for the Arctic states, particularly Canada, requires explanation. Understanding why armed forces are necessary in the pursuit of national objectives in the north requires an examination of why they are necessary in operations not only abroad, but at home.

The challenges to the Canadian state in the Arctic today are reflective of the non-military use of armed forces in securing the national interest, particularly in domestic operations. Among

⁴⁴ John Kozig and Sylvia Bogusis, “Canada’s Northern Strategy: A Case Study in Horizontal Management,” in *Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach* ed. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, 149-163 (Montreal, Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011), 149.

⁴⁵ Rob Huebert, "Canadian Arctic Security Issues: Transformation in the Post-Cold War Era," *International Journal* 54, no. 2 (1999): 203-229, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/220807151?accountid=9867>; accessed April 9, 2012.

⁴⁶ Whitney P. Lackenbauer, "Mirror Images?: Canada, Russia, and the Circumpolar World," *International Journal* 65, no. 4 (2010): 879-897, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/847118695?accountid=9867>; accessed April 9, 2012.

the organizational changes to the Canadian Forces in the wake of the transformed international system of the early twenty-first century was the creation of more operationally focused hierarchies of command and control for military operations. Chief among these new commands were Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM), responsible for operations outside of Canada, and Canada Command (Canada COM), responsible primarily for the defence of Canada from a foreign military threat.⁴⁷ The apparent creation of a military force structure solely for use in the defence of Canadian territory seems at first to counter the theme of this paper, as well as any assertion that armed forces should not be maintained only for traditional military roles. Certainly, the most current operational orders appear to reinforce the notion of the Canadian Forces to be only “a force of last resort”⁴⁸ in support of non-military tasks. However, the nature of the Canadian state requires armed forces to pursue non-military objectives at home as well as abroad.

Whether officially considered a last resort or not, the armed forces provide the Canadian government with the means to effect national policy not just in the north, but the whole of Canadian territory. Some of these aspects are explicit, such as the responsibility of the Canadian Forces as the primary government authority for the provision of aeronautical search and rescue. Although the importance of this role may require no explanation in a country covering nearly ten million square kilometres and bordered by three oceans, it is a role that will only see greater use in the years to come. As agreed in the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, the Arctic coastal states recognized the increasing importance of coordinating search and rescue response and

⁴⁷ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-302/FP-001 *Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP) 3-2 Domestic Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2011), 1-1.

⁴⁸ Department of National Defence, 6397-03000-01 VOL 005 *Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations DRAFT* (Ottawa: Canada Command, 2012), 9.

capabilities, citing the inevitable increase in tourism, shipping, research and resource development and the corresponding rise in accidents expected in the future.⁴⁹ Arctic states also acknowledged in the same Greenland conference the necessity of protecting the fragile ecosystem through strengthening existing legal measures, the enforcement of which is already significantly contributed to by the Canadian Forces routinely in their domestic capacity.⁵⁰

While current domestic policy and orders continue to reflect the notion of ‘last resort’ as outlined earlier, examination of this ‘secondary’ function of the Canadian Forces instead illustrates its indispensable nature as an enabler for national objectives. Some theorists criticized the Defence Policy Statement of 2005 as unsuitably vague, ultimately promoting the use of the Canadian Forces to conduct operations at home and abroad not to address specific security challenges, but in order to improve Canada’s international status.⁵¹ As unprecedented as Prime Minister Paul Martin’s strategic vision of international security policy may well have been in 2005, the traditional lines between military and non-military objectives would blur even further with the succeeding government. In the Canada First Defence Strategy of 2008, it is explicitly stated that armed forces will play a “vital role” even in those circumstances where other departments and agencies will be the official lead.⁵² Current orders reflect the ‘last resort’ notion, indicating that support or assistance to OGDs be limited “to those capabilities that are unique to the CF or when primary response municipal, provincial and federal capabilities are

⁴⁹ Kozig and Bogusis, “Canada’s Northern Strategy...,” 162.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 161.

⁵¹ Michael Roi and Gregory Smolynech, "Canadian Civil-Military Relations," *International Journal* 65, no. 3 (July 1, 2010); 719. <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed January 11, 2012).

⁵² Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy...*, 7.

exhausted.”⁵³ In practical terms, and most importantly for this discussion, the use of armed forces in Canada for non-military national objectives is by no means a recent phenomenon.

Not only is this use of armed forces in a domestic role well established in the culture and history of the Canadian state, it is well founded in both constitutional law and practice. Unlike the US, for example, Canada is not constitutionally impeded in its employment of national armed forces for policing or other non-military tasks, abroad or at home in Canada. The Constitution Act of 1867 and subsequent provisions recognize Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II as the executive authority for the government of Canada.⁵⁴ While most of this executive authority has been diminished over time through Canadian parliamentary statutes, the residual power that remains unchanged is referred to as the Crown prerogative. This powerful national mechanism allows the government to exercise uncontested privilege of certain executive powers, particularly in the use of armed forces for national defence.⁵⁵ Where the US and other states have enshrined safeguards in law to prevent the abuse of national armed forces for nefarious political objectives, Canadians are apparently relatively untroubled by such fear.

That persistence of the Crown prerogative over matters of armed forces employment throughout Canada’s history is not accidental, but deliberately mindful of the importance of armed forces in Canada as a tool for national objectives, military or otherwise. To suppose that this aspect of Canadian common law has remained essentially unchanged because government authority had never been sufficiently challenged would be to ignore the history of the state, even as early as the years prior to Confederation.

⁵³ Department of National Defence, *Standing Operations Order for Domestic...*, 1-3.

⁵⁴ Department of Justice, “The Constitution Act, 1867,” http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/PRINT_E.PDF; Internet; accessed 28 March 2012.

⁵⁵ Department of National Defence, *CFJP 3-2 Domestic Operations...*, GL-2.

Within weeks of the first volunteer units being formed in 1855, militia had fought Orange rioters in Guelph, Ontario. In 1870 and 1885, Canadian militia travelled west to the Red River and to Batoche to assert Canadian state authority against Louis Riel and his Metic followers. In 1913-14, militia occupied Nanaimo for a year to break a miner's strike. Cape Breton coal-mining towns were occupied for similar reasons in 1909-10 and again, repeatedly, in the 1920s. Magistrates summoned militia to fight strikers in Belleville in 1877, Sault Ste. Marie in 1902, Valleyfield (Quebec) in 1904, and Stratford in 1933. Militia did not go to fill sandbags or to fight forest fires or to shovel snow; they went to control and, if necessary, to shoot at crowds of fellow Canadians.⁵⁶

Even before the October crisis of 1970, and the deployment of soldiers to Oka in 1990, the notion of 'Aid to the Civil Power' was not without precedent. Current orders, policy documents and public statements will continue to advertise the use of the armed forces in Canada for non-military activities as a last resort, perhaps necessarily so. When observing the historical record, the development of domestic legislation as well as government practice, it becomes clear that the armed forces has been an effective, necessary tool for use in enabling governance of the state of Canada for some time.

⁵⁶ Morton, *Understanding Canadian Defence ...*, 15.

**CHAPTER THREE:
2005 AND BEYOND - MIDDLE POWER STATUS AND OBLIGATIONS**

To understand the requirement for employing armed forces abroad, it is necessary to examine how national interests today are dependent on Canada being active in the international system. A full understanding of this process is made difficult not only because of the privileged position in the international system discussed earlier, but also because of what some term as a distinct “absence of strategy and strategic dialogue”⁵⁷ in Canada. Even so, the most recent period of Canada’s history, from 2005 to the present, provides us with the clearest picture yet of Canadian national interests, an international security policy, and a corresponding and inextricable role for the military in enabling them.

The ambitious foreign policy objectives outlined in various government documents related to defence and international security released since 2005 demonstrate a particular worldview, the recognition of which requires an armed force equally capable of combat and non-combat roles abroad. The Defence portion of the International Policy Statement (IPS) released in 2005 does not pull punches when describing the nature of the force that is and will continue to be required by Canada for use outside its borders.

The ability to respond to the challenge of failed and failing states will serve as a benchmark for the Canadian Forces. While this focus will not see the Forces replicate every function of the world’s premier militaries, the task of restoring order to war zones will require Canada to maintain armed forces with substantial capabilities. These same capabilities will also enable the Canadian Forces to respond to other international contingencies, providing insurance against unexpected developments in an ever-changing world.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Roi and Smolyne, "Canadian Civil-Military Relations....," 705.

⁵⁸ Department of National Defence, A-JS-005-000/AG-001 *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005), 3.

Kimberly Marten provides some analysis of the political context that existed when the Defence section of the IPS (also referred to as the Defence Policy Statement or DPS) was issued. Unlike previous government communications that were generally indicative of a foreign policy reactive to and tailored for UN efforts, Marten describes it as absolutely “unprecedented” as a strategic policy document.⁵⁹ For the first time, Canadian policy was linked to the use of armed forces to achieve objectives abroad outside of traditional warfighting concepts. This, and successive iterations in policy and direction, would further reinforce the notion that armed force exists in Canada as an essential foundation for enabling foreign policy.

Numerous theorists have pointed out apparent shortcomings in classical international relations theory, when dealing with so-called middle powers. Patrick Lennox argues that while a hierarchical system does clearly exist, state survival for what he terms as “subordinate states” is not based on building up arms to counter rival powers, but on specialization in “an array of international behaviours that are geared towards the maintenance and amelioration of the status-quo international system.”⁶⁰ Certainly, Canada’s place in the world poses some challenges to determining a rational, fixed policy on defence and international security. With neither a mortal threat to the state’s survival poised at the gates, nor a nearby state weak enough for Canada to intimidate or threaten, the notion that armed forces are essential in order to directly defend the state’s interests requires a more detailed examination.

The use of Canadian armed forces for national objectives, viewed from a realist perspective, suggests a certain degree of irrational policy-making, but is in fact an apt reflection

⁵⁹ Kimberly Marten, "From Kabul to Kandahar: The Canadian Forces and Change," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 40, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 218. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed January 11, 2012).

⁶⁰ Lennox, "John W. Holmes and...", 385.

of Canada's true position in the modern international system of today. The problem with offering a case for the necessity of armed forces is the fact that by virtue of its status as a middle power, Canada will likely never wield enough military force to be truly influential in any classic realist sense. John W. Holmes observed in 1983 that Canadians had generally failed to determine a rational strategy due at least partially to the fact that their state itself was "irrationally conceived."⁶¹ Justin Massie and others go farther, stating that Canadian foreign policy is shaped by distinct, occasionally conflicting strategic cultures.⁶²

This necessarily impacts the development of international security policy, and has created a pattern where Canadian armed forces are employed not in response to traditional military requirements in a realist sense. Instead, armed forces are used to address the disparate objectives of the Canadian state abroad, including what Massie terms as defensive internationalism, continental soft-bandwagoning, and atlanticism.⁶³ Absent a state-based military threat, Canada increasingly requires the armed forces to assist the state's efforts along these lines above in order to achieve multiple objectives, respectively: improved stature abroad; improved bilateral relations with the US; and increased relevance among like-minded western partners, particularly NATO states.

For Canada, the process of determining what the critical components of the state's international security interests are is unsurprisingly complex. Current policy echoes previous iterations of Canadian policy since the end of the Cold War, in that armed forces are asked, essentially, to be prepared to do it all – military and non-military roles alike. The DPS released

⁶¹ Ross, "Canada's International Security Strategy," ... 349.

⁶² Justin Massie, "Making Sense of Canada's "Irrational" International Security Policy: A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures," *International Journal* 64, no. 3 (July 1, 2009); 629. <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed January 11, 2012).

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 629.

in 2005 signalled a new emphasis in Canadian foreign policy on employing all of the elements of national power, particularly armed forces, in combating instability abroad in failed and failing states. Although the government responsible for the DPS subsequently fell, successive strategic policy documents provided by the current Conservative government in 2008 continued to cite a direct link between instability abroad and the security of Canadian lives and interests.⁶⁴ Even more recently, the Speech from the Throne in June of 2011 reinforced ‘Standing on Guard for Canada’ as one of the seven priorities for the 41st parliament.⁶⁵ As strategic direction goes, to say that this stated priority is somewhat vague is clearly an understatement.

Critics may decry the hazy nature of the publically stated principles behind Canadian international security policy, but the fact is that this ambiguity affords Canada a degree of flexibility in choosing where to apply armed force in order to best recoup the benefits. Massie is not the only author who points out the particularly irrational nature of Canadian international security policy, describing abstract foreign policy goals that “imply that almost any strategic behaviour can justified as an appropriate response.”⁶⁶ For some, concepts such as ‘soft power’ and human security that came to the fore during the Axeworthy years pose uncomfortable questions for the Canadian state today. Noha Shawki examines the failure of the international community, including Canada, to fully address the problems in the Darfur region of the Sudan as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) would appear to oblige them.⁶⁷ The more cynical of

⁶⁴ Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy...*, 6.

⁶⁵ Department of National Defence, *DND/CF Communications Strategy 2011-2013* (Ottawa: Assistant Deputy Minister Public Affairs, 2011), 6.

⁶⁶ Justin Massie, "Making Sense of Canada's "Irrational" International Security Policy: A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures," *International Journal* 64, no. 3 (July 1, 2009); 629. <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed January 11, 2012).

observers may conclude, as Kim Richard Nossal does, that in the case of Canadian foreign policy “rhetoric and reality operate in discrete spheres, with the rhetoric itself far more important than policy action.”⁶⁸ On one hand, the promise of R2P suggests that a new norm has been established, with state sovereignty no longer being an absolute quantity, challenging the defining principle of the international system since 1648.⁶⁹ In reality, interventionist ideals such as R2P are somewhat incompatible with the dynamics of the international system, particularly when dependent on the authority of the UN to enforce them. Intervention in an unwilling state, even on occasions where humanitarian suffering would seem to trump concerns of state sovereignty, appears to remain the domain of the ad-hoc coalition or the superpower.

Encouraging developments have occurred in recent history in terms of the willingness of western states to intervene militarily in states that repress, torture and murder their own inhabitants. However, despite the noblest intentions of those 1990s champions of ‘soft power’ and human security, the current system will all too often “hamper attempts by middle powers” to successfully intervene in the affairs of another sovereign state.⁷⁰ Unfortunately for the proponents of democracy and human rights, these and other obstacles will ensure that while some threats may be addressed with diplomacy, sanctions and other forms of pressure, others will require the armed forces of the west to address more directly. For Canadian decision makers, the importance of maintaining an armed forces that is highly effective whether employed unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally becomes even more evident.

⁶⁷ Noha Shawki, "Civil Society, Middle Powers, and R2P: An Analysis of Canada's Response to the Crisis in Darfur," *Peace Research* 40, no. 1 (January 1, 2008); 27. <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed January 11, 2012).

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁶⁹ Schabio, "The UN Role...," 136.

⁷⁰ Shawki, "Civil Society, Middle Powers...," 48.

**CHAPTER FOUR:
OPERATIONS ABROAD – PURSUING THE NATIONAL INTEREST**

It is virtually impossible to follow discussions of Canada's place in the world for any length of time without encountering the phrase 'punching above their weight.' This oft-repeated gem usually arises in descriptions of importance and influence in the world, particularly when contrasted with Canada's relatively benign presence, modest standing armed forces, and complete lack of imperialist or expansionist agenda. The premise to be examined is that Canada does not require the rattling sabres of a menacing military to intimidate other states, but that it remains nonetheless highly influential. While this has historically described Canadian expeditionary operations during the Cold War period, participation in security operations today is important not merely for showing the flag, but in countering international instability. This chapter will examine select specific functions that the Armed Forces perform not only in enabling Canada's advertised status as 'influential beyond their means,' but more importantly in defending the international system itself.

An enduring perception of the Canadian peacekeeper exists in the minds of many as the archetype of Canadian armed force. This is a well-deserved credit, to be sure, reflective of the lives lost and faithful service given by Canadian Forces personnel throughout many challenging international missions in the service of peace. In many ways the peacekeeping model, like soft-power theory, is appropriate only in the immediate context of its particular period in Canadian history. The peacekeeping legacy in Canada owes as much thanks to the diminished capacity of the Canadian Forces in the 1960s and 70s as it does to Lester B. Pearson's ground breaking initiative during the Suez Crisis of 1956. As Howie Marsh describes it, peacekeeping allowed the Canadian governments during the Cold War to tolerate a steady decline in capacity by

“understating requirements, taking risks, and controlling military activities.”⁷¹ This notion is today generally accepted to be an increasingly inaccurate picture of Canadian use of armed forces in the national interest. At time of writing, the Canadian Forces contribute over 1200 personnel abroad in 14 named missions, not including a number of exchanges, capacity building initiatives, and other operational taskings and activities conducted as part of national, alliance and coalition efforts around the world.⁷² Over the past five years, the Canadian government has used armed forces to engage actively in Counter Terrorism, Counter Insurgency, Counter Piracy, Counter Narcotics, Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, Counter Human Trafficking, Capacity Building, Security Sector Reform, Justice Sector Reform, and a host of other activities related to permutations of the various subsets above, all outside the territory of the Canadian state.

Canada has, since 2005, consistently identified in both its official policies as well as its relationships with the international community that its national interests require participation in international security operations abroad. Melissa Rudderham advocates for greater Canadian participation in international security operations, not in order to support ‘soft power’ notions of Canadian influence, but the more realist objective of national self-defence. Echoing similar themes expressed in the Defence Policy Statement⁷³ as well as the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS),⁷⁴ Rudderham writes that Canadians have “a direct interest in exporting stability to conflict areas, where security gaps give rise to the transnational organizational crime groups that

⁷¹ Howie Marsh, “The Gathering Defence Policy Crisis,” in *Canada Without Armed Forces?* ed. Douglas L. Bland, 83-103 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 85

⁷² Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, “International Operations,” <http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/index-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 14 March 2012.

⁷³ Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement...*, 2.

⁷⁴ Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy...*, 6.

operate on Canadian streets, as well as terrorist groups that pose a threat to Canadians.”⁷⁵ The challenges presented by failed and failing states today may not be ‘total war,’ but neither are they ‘total peace.’ Modern international security operations simply do not and will not require the capability for one or the other, but a balance between the two.

These operations are performed in support of national objectives, very little of which could be termed ‘military’ in the most traditional sense. Today, Canadian Armed Forces are almost universally employed either in support of OGD objectives or as part of a Whole-of-Government (WoG) strategy tailored to a particular national purpose. As new as the Comprehensive Approach (CA) may sound, it is arguably nothing more novel than a repackaging of earlier terminology such as 3D, or Development, Diplomacy and Defence strategy.⁷⁶ The fact that militaries, particularly Canada’s, are kept busy in the world today would surprise few observers. What is of critical difference in the post 9/11 environment, are the particular demands of the operations, and of the nations and armed forces that are called on to conduct them. On one hand, demands for states to contribute military personnel for UN peace support missions have only increased in the post-Cold War period.⁷⁷ Limiting participation, as in the past, to the deployment of little more than token measures of uniformed observers is no longer sufficient to the requirements of the Canadian state. COIN operations offer a particularly powerful example of the challenges of what this paper terms as non-military tasks. As a category of security operations, COIN is decidedly non-traditional in terms of the used of armed force, in spite of its

⁷⁵ Melissa Rudderham, "Canada and United Nations Peace Operations," *International Journal* 63, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 375. <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed January 11, 2012).

⁷⁶ Rostek, Michael, "The Comprehensive Approach: An Emergent International Norm?" *Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach*, ed. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, 227-236. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011), 236.

⁷⁷ Holger Schabio, "The UN Role in Future Military Conflicts," *Baltic Security & Defence Review* 8, (January 2006); 129, Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed February 11, 2012).

often dangerous volatility, presence of an armed enemy, and frequent reliance on military forces for its effective conduct.

COIN operations of the sort currently conducted under NATO leadership in the Afghanistan theatre are certainly on the end of the spectrum closest to ‘total war’ as opposed to ‘total peace.’ Modern COIN operations occupy a great deal of western military thought in two broad areas. States concerned with the scourge of extremist violence and the safety of their citizens and interests at home and abroad wish to address the threat posed by failed and failing states. On the other hand, these same states remain wary of the implications of participation in COIN and stability operations on their own armed forces, as well as other domestic and international pressures. The sheer number of active UN Peacekeeping operations provides one partial indicator of the general decrease in global stability, expanding from 18 operations total between 1948 and 1990, to more than 41 ongoing in the years since 1990.⁷⁸ This post-Cold War trend is even more evident when examining the number of military and police personnel deployed on UN operations, from 18,600 in January 2000 to greater than 82,000 in February of 2006, even without including the 68,000 personnel deployed on international security operations under the auspices of regional organisations such as NATO, the EU, and the African Union (AU).⁷⁹ These numbers are not evidence in and of themselves of global instability, but rather an indicator of the willingness of member states to commit forces to counter instability abroad.

As challenging as COIN and stability operations are, western governments have often found the use of conventionally trained armed forces to be the most effective means available for the task at hand. The history of the United States provides for an interesting comment on the

⁷⁸ Schabio, "The UN Role...", 129.

⁷⁹ Rudderham, "Canada and United Nations...", 363.

perception that employing armed forces in counter insurgency, stability or related operations is without precedent, Americans themselves having been “involved in hundreds of stability operations and only 11 conventional wars” in their history.⁸⁰ For those that would denounce the use of armed forces for tasks related to state-building and stability operations, Taw points out that the United States “occupied [their] own country long before [they] occupied Germany, Japan, or Iraq.”⁸¹ History and convention aside, there exists no shortage of concern about using military forces in these (non-military) roles, whether related to effectiveness (military forces are inferior to civilian expertise) or incongruity (using the military in non-military roles contributes to degradation of the primary warfighting role).

As suggested in the preceding paragraph, western governments’ reliance on armed forces as the tool of use in unstable regions is often born out of a lack of any other real option. John Nagl and Brian Burton acknowledge that non-military tools such as economic aid, foreign service efforts, public diplomacy, and cultural outreach would be more appropriate and effective weapons for the United States in addressing failed and failing states, but unfortunately never seem to exist in sufficient quantity.⁸² Compounding the problem, the inability of civilian agencies to either deploy sufficient numbers of personnel, or even operate at all in less-than-permissive environments without armed protection means that armed forces end up, by default, providing the only readily available capability to perform what is generally understood to be non-military tasks.⁸³ Certainly, the experience of the Comprehensive Approach in Canadian

⁸⁰ Taw, "Stability and Support Operations..." 389.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 389.

⁸² Brian Burton and John Nagl, "Dirty Windows and Burning Houses: Setting the Record Straight on Irregular Warfare," *The Washington Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (April 2009: 91-101), 93.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 93.

security operations has shown that military forces are generally “uniquely skilled in planning and resourcing administrative solutions to complex problems in high-threat environments, where the typical civilian with an MBA degree would not be willing to venture.”⁸⁴ Regardless, however, of the particular strengths that military officers bring to a Whole-of-Government effort, they are unlikely to possess the same degree of specific expertise in areas related to development or diplomacy as their confreres in other government departments or NGOs. The challenge to states, and to Canada in particular, is how to generate the required expertise, and deploy it in force at the right time and the right place, in order to achieve the decisive effect required by national objectives abroad.

Using armed forces in the furtherance of state objectives has not caused the denigration of the traditional role for armed forces in Canada, but rather an expansion of it. National interests have required much of the Canadian Forces in recent years: a force capable of joint combat operations, but more importantly, a force able to fight and win in concert with like-minded states, across military and non-military lines of operation, all while structured as a conservative, moderately-priced standing force. The experiences of the past decade have seen no evidence to suggest that Canada can expect to enjoy influence and power in the international system without maintaining the military capacity to underwrite and implement same. This is an ambitious undertaking, the viability of which the next chapters will seek to examine.

⁸⁴ Marten, "From Kabul to Kandahar...", 223.

CHAPTER FIVE: CANADA – A TEAM PLAYER IN THE WORLD

As a relatively prosperous state, Canada undoubtedly possesses an enviable ability to invest military resources and capability where it wishes, to a degree. The mere fact that armed forces can be sent far from home shores to do the government's bidding speaks to all of the advantages and privileges of the Canadian state outlined in previous chapters. As in the case of the majority of European governments, and all other governments not burdened with a definitive state-based military threat to their survival, the Canadian government is burdened by the luxury of choice. While Canada is somewhat free to elect the occasions and efforts for which she wishes to employ armed forces abroad, the seemingly boundless nature of her policy does not extend to her capability to do so. As this chapter will discuss, the limits of Canadian capacity, coupled with the limits of other international actors, tends to oblige Canada to conduct her international security policy in concert with others.

In discussing the state of civil – military relations in Canada, Michael Roi and Gregory Smolynech examine the decision to redeploy the Canadian battlegroup in Afghanistan to Kandahar in 2005 and point out “the gap between the ambitions of Canadian international policy and the reality of limited military capacity.”⁸⁵ General Rick Hillier (ret'd) referred to his discussions with then Prime Minister Paul Martin and then-Defence Minister Bill Graham at the time as the model of strategic political – military decision making.

... this was the way that all CDS's [Chief of the Defence Staff] should work, sitting down with the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister and walking through key issues, in good detail, so that we all understood the Prime Minister's broad intent and so that any concerns would be aired and discussed ... It was an extraordinary chance to really discuss issues in detail with a Prime Minister, without fifty onlookers all taking copious notes so they can run back after the

⁸⁵ Roi and Smolynech, "Canadian Civil-Military Relations...", 705.

meeting and debrief their fifty bosses. ... what was happening here was incredibly invaluable and, unfortunately, all too rare between a Prime Minister and a CDS.⁸⁶

Hillier was, to put it lightly, a central figure in the political discussion of Canada's armed forces in 2005, and can be credited for a great deal of making use of the political opportunity of the day to bring about a revitalization of the Canadian Forces as a critical tool of foreign policy, detailed further in a later chapter.⁸⁷ Yet, from examining both Martin's and Hillier's recollections of the decision to redeploy to Kandahar, Roi and Smolyneec argue that the commitment was made in the absence of any "Canadian strategy, or even a coherent set of policy goals."⁸⁸ This error is compounded, in their view, by the inherent lack of capacity of the Canadian contingent, in light of the specific demands of securing Kandahar province – a reality not fully articulated to the political leadership at the time.⁸⁹

Debates over the precise number of troops required for stability operations in general, in Kandahar in particular, and whether the Canadian contingent (less than 3000 at their peak) was sufficient to control an area of responsibility of 50,000 square kilometers, continue to persist. Some recent operations may present a basis for comparison, with the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) initially requiring 32,000 troops to control a similarly-sized area in Bosnia-Herzegovina, eventually reducing to 7000 at the time of drawing down.⁹⁰ Skewing the debate further are the multitude of factors making Kandahar an even more violent, unstable and challenging environment for stability operations, be they the proximity to Pakistan, the fierce resurgence of

⁸⁶ Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War* (Toronto :HarperCollins, 2009), 344.

⁸⁷ Marten, "From Kabul to Kandahar...", 225.

⁸⁸ Roi and Smolyneec, "Canadian Civil-Military Relations...", 711.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 712.

⁹⁰ Marten, "From Kabul to Kandahar...", 215.

the Taliban in 2006, the particular resonance of the city as a heartland to the insurgents, and so on.⁹¹ Whether or not Canada is capable of deploying sufficient military forces to be principally responsible for the conduct of stability operations in an area the size of Kandahar province is certainly debatable, but not actually essential to the matter at hand. What transpired in Afghanistan is not a warning to middle powers not to involve themselves in military operations abroad, but a larger, more constructive lesson. Western militaries, particularly those of Canada's size and geography, will rarely have the capacity to control all of the levers governing a modern international security operation. Only when all of the elements of national power (and more frequently, international power of a coalition or alliance of like-minded states) is brought to bear, can success be achieved.

The pursuit of Canada's national interests abroad cannot be fully realized by restricting military participation to those occasions where armed forces operate in direct support of resolutions of the UN Security Council. Previously, the point was introduced that the UN peace observer missions typical during the Cold War no longer offer a sufficient benefit to the Canadian state. While these missions continue to exist, the UN has evolved as well in an effort to address the changing dynamics of the international security environment. As Matthew Bouldin describes it, the post-Cold War world has seen the role of the peacekeeper merging with that of the warfighter, as conflict now increasingly centres on failed and failing states.⁹² While this evolution may suggest that the UN remains the ultimate authority by which the will of the

⁹¹ Ibid., 215.

⁹² Matthew Bouldin, "Keeper of the Peace: Canada and Security Transition Operations," *Defense & Security Analysis* 19, no. 3 (September 2003): 270. Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed February 11, 2012).

international community is determined for the betterment of all, the reality of the international system dictates otherwise.

Where Canadian security policy may have (prior to the end of the Cold War) been more or less aligned with the objectives and activities of UN Peacekeeping efforts, the question of the UN's ability to intervene in intra-state conflict demonstrates a widening gap between Canadian and UN interests. Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan summarizes the inherent conflict preventing the UN from acting as the international actor of choice in the intra-state conflicts of today:

...the Security Council was precluded from intervening in the Kosovo crisis by profound disagreement between Council members over whether such an intervention was legitimate. Differences within the Council reflected the lack of consensus in the wider international community. Defenders of traditional interpretations of international law stressed the inviolability of State sovereignty; others stressed the moral imperative to act forcefully in the face of gross violations of human rights.⁹³

In the years since Canada played a major contributing role in the NATO campaign in Kosovo, opportunities for Canada and the international community to employ military forces in the pursuit of coalition, alliance or national objectives have arisen on several occasions. The decision to intervene in another sovereign state is far from simple, and there is no easy method to determine whether Canadian interests are better served by direct involvement, passive support, or vocal opposition in a particular case, be it the defence of Kuwait in 1991, the bombing of Kosovo in 1999, the invasion of Iraq in 2002, the limited naval and air campaign in Libya in 2011, or a future campaign to oppose the Assad regime in Syria, and so on. Canada will have to make these and other case-by-case assessments on their own national merits, not by virtue of consensus in the UN.

⁹³ Ibid., 136.

Canadians are principled people, and the policy documents published by their governments would suggest that they continue to be in favour of principled action in the international system. The situation in Kandahar province described earlier is perhaps an example of falling victim to one's own success. Having revitalized the Canadian Forces with a renewed identity and martial purpose, decision makers sought and accepted responsibility for an incredibly challenging mission, one whose focus may have been primarily, but by no means exclusively military in nature. History may ultimately conclude that the Canadian effort in Afghanistan was simply a case of one's reach exceeding one's grasp, particularly in terms of national capacity, if not military capability. Regardless, recent operations have reinforced that among allies, despite national assertions to the contrary, only the US arguably retains the ability to act unilaterally in any meaningful sense in the conduct of international security operations. Great strides have been made in advancing the Comprehensive Approach in Canada, this most recent of iterations of what Colin Gray and others remind us has always been present in 'Grand' or 'National Security' Strategy.⁹⁴ As Canadians become increasingly attentive to the requirement to lash up 'Whole-of-Government' efforts in modern security operations, they will need to remain aware of the more pressing requirement to ensure that their armed forces can do the same with their international partners.

⁹⁴ Gray, "Irregular Warfare...", 38.

CHAPTER SIX:
THE TRADITIONAL MILITARY: IN CASE OF WAR, BREAK GLASS

There is no shortage of opinions in favour of preserving the so-called traditional role for armed forces, all stemming from diverse and in some cases valid concerns at ‘misusing’ the noble institutions of professional western militaries. The so-called traditionalist perspective tends to adhere to the notion of a distinct separation between the distinct ‘spheres’ of military and non-military tasks. The premise, ultimately, is that the military is unqualified to intrude in the affairs of civilian governance, and the political level is unsuited to meddle in issues that are purely ‘military.’ To be fair, this perspective is well grounded in historical uses of western militaries, and is evocative of the tenets of just war theory, with its concepts of armed force being used only as a last resort, and only when success is considered probable.⁹⁵ There are two areas where this perspective is lacking, and ultimately fails the Canadian state: the occasions where a conventional-only armed force is employed in non-military roles to poor effect, and the occasions where a conventional-only force fails to be used at all.

Examples abound of conventional forces, untrained and unprepared for non-military roles, failing spectacularly in the attempt. What appears at first glance to be substantiation for the position of keeping armed forces out of the business of non-military roles, it actually serves the opposite purpose. Operation Deliverance, the Canadian deployment of an expeditionary force to Somalia in 1992 as part of Unified Task Force (UNITAF), was aimed at providing security for humanitarian relief efforts and provided two concrete lessons for the Canadian government in the use of armed force.⁹⁶ The first, unsurprisingly, was the realization and

⁹⁵ Taw, "Stability and Support Operations..." 400.

awareness of several systemic failures in leadership that had permitted catastrophic damage to the professional culture, defence ethos, and character of a storied regiment, contributing to criminal and disgraceful conduct, including torture and murder.

Understandably, this tended to overshadow the ‘good news’ that despite incredible examples of poor and inadequate planning, preparation and support at almost every level, the Canadian Forces performed well operationally, achieving all mission objectives and creating relatively peaceful conditions in their area of responsibility.⁹⁷ As suggested above, this is one such example that seems to testify to the perils of sending ‘warfighters’ to conduct non-military tasks, a theme circulating among much of the commentary and finger-pointing taking place around the disbanding of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR). More important for this discussion however, is the inference that a combat-capable armed force can be both of two things: inherently capable of operational success in a non-military role (without any theoretical corresponding degradation in combat readiness), and requiring a fair degree of political acuity over the non-military aspects of the battlefield in order to achieve strategic success (or at least, avoid strategic failure).

The prospect of taking a high readiness combat-capable unit off the line and thrust into a complex COIN environment and be automatically predisposed to success in operations is clearly neither the lesson of the CAR in Somalia, nor of this paper. Certainly, as able as conventional forces are, conventional *training* alone is insufficient in and of itself as preparation for non-military roles.⁹⁸ That the principal purpose of a western military is to “fight and win in war” is a

⁹⁶ Bouldin, "Keeper of the Peace..." 266.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 267.

⁹⁸ Brad O'Neill, *Counterinsurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 2nd ed. (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books Inc., 2005), 159.

common theme in the doctrines of western states.⁹⁹ For Canada the whole truth is undoubtedly more complex, but the statement is not a false one.

A rigid extrapolation of this concept to the extent of withholding the armed forces from the politically murky territory of non-military roles fails to best serve the interests of the state. Taw writes about the increasing profile in US foreign policy of what she terms as Stability and Support Operations (SASO) and comments on the philosophical debate between the ‘traditionalist’ and ‘crusader’ perspectives. Her descriptions of the ‘Powell Doctrine’ focus on General Colin Powell’s reservations about the use of armed forces for political uses, contrasted to then-Ambassador Madeleine Albright’s position that the post-Cold War military ought to be an effective element of foreign policy.

My [Powell] constant unwelcome message at all meetings on Bosnia was simply that we should not commit military forces until we had a clear political objective. ... [Albright] asked me in frustration, ‘What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?’ I thought I would have an aneurysm. American GIs were not toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game board.¹⁰⁰

Albright would later describe the frustration experienced at Pentagon resistance to using armed forces for intervention in Bosnia as “the Vietnam syndrome (don’t get involved in anything) and the Gulf War syndrome (don’t do it unless you can deploy 500,000 marines).”¹⁰¹ General Powell’s apprehension and wariness of the misuse of soldiers by careless political manoeuvring is not unfounded. Perhaps to the chagrin of traditionalists however, Powell’s depiction of a global game board is unintentionally an apt one. To propose that the use of armed forces in non-

⁹⁹ Kim Richard Nossal, "The Army as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy: Implications for the 'Army of Tomorrow,'" in *Towards the Brave New World: Canada's Army in the 21st Century* ed. Bernd Horn, 23-31 (Kingston: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2003), 24.

¹⁰⁰ Taw, "Stability and Support Operations...", 400.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 400.

military roles betrays a supposed apolitical autonomy is not merely outdated, but untrue. The ‘game board,’ as Powell terms it, does not exist only in cases outside the pure, traditional use of armed forces in war – it persists throughout peace, war, and everything in between. Efforts to divorce war, and the soldiers who conduct it, from the machinations of political intercourse remain, as they did in Carl von Clausewitz’s time, “devoid of sense.”¹⁰²

¹⁰² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 605.

CHAPTER SEVEN:
AN EVOLVED MILITARY: FOREIGN POLICY CORPS

The natural antithesis to the idea of an armed force preserved for use only in war is the notion of an armed force designed and maintained for everything else – an instrument that for Canada would, like the military focused only on traditional warfare, not be effective in securing national objectives abroad. This alternative naturally presupposes the requirement for an armed force in some form. Having examined the national imperative to remain involved in the world, this paper is not considering the merits of absolute pacifism, or Swiss-like neutrality for the Canadian state. This perspective encompasses several variations on the same theme, whether considered as a purely peacekeeping force, or the more balanced ‘foreign-policy army’ envisioned by Kim Richard Nossal.¹⁰³ These perspectives, whether motivated by budgetary pressures, notions of ‘soft power,’ or philosophical apprehension at relying on military readiness, are analogous in their dependence on the irresponsibly naïve notion that future challenges can be determined with certainty.

As discussed earlier, some proponents of downgrading the warfighting capability from the armed forces see the promise of cost savings possible given the lack of state-based military threat to Canada. Avi Kober provides an incisive examination into the poor operational performance of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) in the Second Lebanon War of 2006, attributing many factors, significantly including the effects of specialization of the IDF in non-traditional warfare since 1987. For the IDF, fighting against an Intifada had evolved the force into a highly efficient and effective instrument at combating poorly equipped and trained adversaries when provided “excellent tactical and operational intelligence, ... massive logistical and technical

¹⁰³ Nossal, “The Army as an Instrument...,” 28.

support, and a familiarity with combat environment.”¹⁰⁴ Israeli defence priorities had undoubtedly allowed the IDF to specialize according to the dominant threat of the day, but had also “significantly weakened the IDF’s operational capabilities”¹⁰⁵ to fight the next war. It would be imprudent to describe Canada’s geopolitical situation as similar to that of Israel, having no comparable wolf at the door to justify the retention of a robust ‘total war’ capability to defend the homeland, but the lesson remains applicable.

Canadian planners need to remain focused on the uncertain future, rather than the privileged past, when determining defence requirements. Colin Gray paints a less than rosy picture of likely security challenges as the west moves forward in this century.

Great power rivalry. Adverse climate change. Resource rivalries and shortages (food, water, and energy). Overpopulation. Disease pandemics. Jihadi terrorism and insurgencies. Nuclear proliferation. The "unknown unknowns" (the things to worry about if we know about them, for example, asteroids). ... Military power, unfortunately, is highly relevant to many of the possible consequences of the existing trends. The future is unpredictable, and our present security condition may well become a great deal worse than it is today.¹⁰⁶

Merely listing the possible catastrophic events that might occur as evidence for the continued requirement for the maintenance and employment of armed forces would naturally be irresponsible in the extreme. For government and military planners to do so, would play into the most cynical of opposing viewpoints, its supporters convinced already as to the fear-mongering nature of proponents of military readiness. On the other hand, history does provide the west with sufficient cause to pay heed to what some would term the alarmist perspective.

¹⁰⁴Avi Kober, "The Israel Defence Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, no. 1 (February 2008), 15.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 14.

¹⁰⁶ Colin S. Gray, "The 21st Century Security Environment and the Future of War," *Parameters* 38, no. 4 (08, 2008); 25 <http://search.proquest.com/docview/198180376?accountid=9867> (accessed March 15, 2012).

Canada's privileged status, conferred by geography, alliances and other factors discussed earlier, did not permit her to turn a blind eye to the security challenges overseas during the twentieth century. As historians note, the fact that Canada may not have figured prominently in the strategy of the principal threats to stability and peace in the last century did not stop Canadians from contributing significantly at virtually every opportunity.¹⁰⁷ In spite of the relative safety of the Canadian state, or perhaps in part due to that safety, Canadian armed forces have been used to aggressively pursue national interests abroad throughout its history in every possible permutation of 'total peace' and 'total war.' Even if Canada were to remain fortunate in avoiding the worst consequences of the chaotic years to come, it will not release her of the obligation to be ready to address them directly, in concert with her allies, possibly far from her borders, with the use of armed forces.

¹⁰⁷ Morton, *Understanding Canadian Defence* ..., 23.

CHAPTER EIGHT:
A MILITARY ROLE FOR A MIDDLE POWER

An effective military for the Canadian state cannot afford to be focused solely on either one of the philosophies described in the previous two chapters. Having discussed the perils associated with exclusivity of purpose, whether warfighting or non-military roles such as peace keeping, a danger exists in drawing out an obvious, but erroneous conclusion. When conventionally trained forces fare poorly in non-combat tasks, the deduction that military forces are naturally ill-equipped and dangerous when employed outside of traditional tasks appears sound. In terms of damage to the national interest, the results are similar to when forces exposed purely to non-military tasks attempt to take on more conventional threats. Either way, decision makers responding to operational and strategic failures of either type can find it tempting, as Albright lamented in an earlier example, to eschew the use of armed forces entirely excepting those cases where the expected tasks are purely military in nature. Like the U.S., the most recent Canadian policy clearly indicates an acknowledgement of a role for the armed forces more appropriate than merely choosing one of the two perspectives offered earlier. This chapter will discuss the competing perspectives in the context of the Canadian Forces and offer a case for avoiding philosophically based restrictions on the scope of their employment.

The complexity of modern conflict requires armed forces to possess non-military competencies to be effective even in the more traditional warfighting role. In comparing the relative merits of American and British perspectives on COIN, Nagl writes that the size and structure of the U.S. armed forces has contributed to an institutional mindset that tends to define combat power only in conventional terms.¹⁰⁸ Reminiscent of one side of the Powell-Albright debate outlined earlier, this mindset can clearly restrict adaptability in general, and in the case of

¹⁰⁸ John Nagl, "Let's Win the Wars We're In," *Joint Forces Quarterly* no. 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 25.

the U.S. has contributed to a rigidity that stifles creativity, and has hindered success even in conventional military operations.¹⁰⁹ While this mindset can act as a hindrance for the U.S., it could hold potential catastrophe for Canada: a state dependent not only on its ability to act internationally when considered necessary, but also on its ability to field combat forces in the defence of allies and like-minded states.

This mindset does further harm to the state's ability to effect national objectives abroad: not only by keeping armed forces on the shelf at the wrong time, but also in failing to prepare them for the environment they will operate in. Where at one time the nature of the battlefield suggested to some that military lines of operation existed in isolation from non-military ones, the modern security environment has demonstrated that this apparently simple relationship now warrants a fresh look. David Kilcullen wrote of COIN that "cultural competence is a critical combat capability."¹¹⁰ This is of great significance in the most challenging security operations of this age, particularly for the western states that seek to effect national objectives in environments that could not possibly be more alien in terms of climate, culture and socio-religious dynamics. In truth, cultural competence promises to be as relevant in future conflicts as ever, considering the plurality of significant state and non-state actors in the modern, globally connected battlefield. Rather than armed forces merely creating the conditions for the civilian work to begin, Bernd Horn describes modern operations as "war amongst the people"¹¹¹ with military lines of operation crossing all aspects of non-military factors: economic, political and social.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 25.

¹¹⁰ David Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 4 (August 2005), 613.

¹¹¹ Bernd Horn, "From the Cold War to Insurgency: Preparing Leaders for the Contemporary Operating Environment," in *The Difficult War: Perspectives on Insurgency and Special Operations Forces*, ed. Emily Spencer (Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 198.

As Roi and Smolyneec point out, this phenomenon is even more evident in the Canadian context, where armed forces “cannot avoid policy in the conduct of operations.”¹¹² Proponents of preserving armed forces for war alone may lament the watering-down of what they consider to be their primary function, and debate among themselves when the last ‘pure’ war took place in the world. Huntington advocated the distinct separation of military and political spheres of activity, and there remain today undeniable perils in allowing undue influence of one over the other. Nevertheless, the notion that the forces conducting operations in the military sphere can be effective whilst remaining ignorant and unsophisticated in the aspects of the political sphere is dependent on an impermeable barrier between the two that no longer exists – if it indeed ever did.

An inappropriate insistence on the separation between military and political circles can hinder non-military objectives as well. An earlier chapter discussed the positive factors of employing armed forces in non-military tasks as a corollary of the often challenging physical circumstances present in failed and failing states. As crucial as the ability to provide physical defence is, armed forces and particularly the Canadian Forces, present far more potential capability to the state in the pursuit of national objectives. Mathew Bouldin writes in favour of maintaining a peace keeping role for the Canadian Forces, even at the cost of having to rely on allies as necessary for warfighting capabilities.¹¹³ Ultimately, this perspective is flawed: the premise itself carries with it the potential to allow the same atrophy that was allowed to take place during periods of reliance on soft power and other tenets of human security as discussed in an earlier chapter. However, Bouldin’s recognition of the necessity of armed forces for the

¹¹² Roi and Smolyneec, "Canadian Civil-Military Relations...", 721.

¹¹³ Bouldin, "Keeper of the Peace...", 275.

success of security transition operations at all stages is worth noting. As he puts it, any distinction between warfighting and non-military spheres in modern operations such as state-building efforts in Afghanistan cannot be seen as evidence of “some fundamental difference between the missions, but instead as a failure of leaders to understand the unity of the mission or to prepare their forces to handle the entirety of the mission.”¹¹⁴

Expeditionary non-military activities provide a challenge to those already concerned with the level of military influence on civic policy. As Benjamin Beede illustrates, the nature of modern security operations require more capacity than is typically to be found in law enforcement organisations, even when public security, not national security, is the primary focus.¹¹⁵ Once again, the particular demands of Canadian national interest provide an even stronger case for blending these two spheres to a certain degree.

Canadian Forces expertise in defence organization, command and control of forces, security and defence planning, intelligence processing, training, communications, and other technical matters ... suggest that the Canadian Forces ought to be a central player in efforts to assist all levels of government and their agencies in the development of a truly national security policy and structure.¹¹⁶

As part of their assessment in 2004 of the development of international security policy in Canada, Bland and Maloney described the role of the Canadian Forces as far more extensive than accomplishing the objectives subsumed in the Defence leg of the 3D footstool. As outlined earlier, concepts such as 3D, CA, WoG and so on are similar in their accurate assessment that modern security operations require military efforts to be aligned with non-military efforts in order to achieve national success. For the Canadian example, it is evident that mere alignment

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 271.

¹¹⁵ Benjamin R. Beede, "The Roles of Paramilitary and Militarized Police," *Journal Of Political & Military Sociology* 36, no. 1 (Summer2008 2008): 59. Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed February 11, 2012).

¹¹⁶ Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security...*, 201.

may no longer be sufficient. Military efforts and non-military efforts are not merely operating in parallel, but are increasingly interdependent, and requiring true harmonization for national success.

Were a state to restrict the use of its armed forces only to major combat roles, it would find its ability to operate internationally in all circumstances compromised in two ways. First, as discussed earlier, the increasing proportionality of security operations demanding non-military efforts virtually guarantees that such a state would be forced to observe from the sidelines. More importantly, were such a force deployed in conventional operations today, they would be unprepared to integrate into what has become the modern battlespace: rife with state and non-state actors too numerous to count, with the actions of all parties broadcast in real-time to a global audience. To propose that armed forces are either immune to or unsuited for use in the non-military sphere of modern operations is to misunderstand in the extreme the unchanging nature of war. Although the methods and means vary greatly between conventional warfare, COIN and other security operations, these represent no more than different means dedicated to the same end: achieving success in war. As Nadia Schadlow writes, any such separation that prompts focusing armed forces exclusively on any one of these means creates a “false dichotomy.”¹¹⁷ Modern security operations, even supposedly simple conventional ones, necessitate political and social expertise: expertise in areas that are unlikely to be taught in the war colleges of a state terrified at tainting an imagined political purity of their armed forces.

The use of armed forces in the pursuit of Canadian national interests is assigned manifest importance in both modern Canadian policy and this paper. As a state that has enjoyed a

¹¹⁷ Nadia Schadlow, "A False Dichotomy: Critics of the Army's COIN Focus Ignore World and War Realities," *Armed Forces Journal* (September 2010, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/09/4707126> (accessed 12/7/2011), np.

generally peaceful existence throughout its history, the level of strategic intent inherent in CFDS is undoubtedly ambitious. Given the wide international mandate pledged therein, and the resource limitations constantly in effect, traditional perspectives can tend to cast Canadian military efforts in an unfavourable light – a privileged state pretending at an often supercilious international security policy made possible only by the good graces of powerful allies. In reality, Canada’s interests can be satisfied only by such ambition, and the power it does wield in the modern system can only be realized by such a policy - enabled as it is by armed forces employable for all purposes conceivable from peace to war.

The uncertainty of the future and the nature of the international system are themselves perhaps reason enough for forces to maintain capabilities in both of these two areas. Compounding this, the nature of security operations today have demonstrated not only the requirement to be able to conduct warfighting and non-military tasks alike, but also that proficiency in one area will often provide critical competencies for the other. The flexibility that the Canadian Forces afford the state in allowing a choice of which constabulary action, development initiative, COIN operations or military engagement it wishes to pursue provides the means to ‘punch above their weight’ in the world today. To actively restrict this flexibility in the pursuit of efficiency or any other fleeting benefit would be to squander what power and influence has been earned to date.

CONCLUSION: DEFENDING THE FUTURE

War never changes. Human nature requires all entities desiring survival to take action to protect themselves from the necessarily hostile political environment that is the world we live in. However peaceful a particular era appears, ideas and the entities that champion them will need to be opposed and, if not resisted, displaced by competing ideas. Until the day arrives where no ideas remain in conflict among the survivors of humanity, states must be prepared to use all available means to ensure their own survival.

Moats, ramparts and fences protected states in centuries past. Oceans, British garrisons, and distance protected Canada during her early years as a colony, and later as a young state. In the conflicts of the twentieth century, whether Cold War or otherwise, the security of the Canadian homeland became no longer protected by mere bricks and mortar or spears pointed outward. Instead, Canadians learned that efforts to ensure their own survival were best expended in reinforcing their two critical fortifications: a resilient international system that recognized Canadian influence, and the powerful capacity of the United States to defend the North American continent. These remain valid today.

To strengthen these defences, Canada has at times employed the instruments of diplomacy, soft power, rhetoric, shame, peer pressure, barter, and guile over the course of its history as a state, as would any middle power wishing to remain relevant. Underwriting and enabling these methods in order to achieve any success has been the use of armed forces in peace, in war, and everything in between. Determining what challenges lie ahead for the Canadian state with any certainty is difficult, if not impossible. Examining the events of past few years, we can at least consider that certain trends observed over the twentieth century are continuing apace.

This paper began by examining the trend of western militaries increasingly conducting non-military tasks outside their own borders. There are certainly factors and influences common to states that share values and interests, as seen in the various forms of collective military initiatives, agreements, alliances and even *ad hoc* coalitions. In the final analysis, states maintain and employ armed forces according to particular national objectives. Although Canada shares a great deal with like-minded states and allies, it has shown historically that the use of armed forces has always been in the pursuit of the furtherance of the national interest first and foremost.

Despite recurring misrepresentations to the contrary, the notion of an essentially 'Canadian' defence function as either exclusively warfighting or exclusively peace keeping is equally flawed. For the maintenance of a robust warfighting capability to be considered inappropriate, two facts would need to be ultimately ignored: the uncertainty of the future security environment, and the international reputation and influence gained thus far by virtue of the significant contributions made by Canadian military forces in the wars of the past two centuries. To adopt an equally unsound position, that of a military maintained exclusively for its utility in a warfighting role, would be to ignore the incalculable value and effectiveness of the Canadian Forces in enabling all aspects of a necessarily ambitious international security policy.

Many of the works cited here offer answers to the question faced by Canadians since the creation of their sovereign state: What does Canada need from their armed forces? Whether forceful or ambivalent, all who write on Canadian international security policy have something to offer. The most useful of these are those that observe that Canada will continue to require much of their armed forces, for distinctly different, but complementary reasons. Armed forces are required not only for the physical defence of the homeland, but also the homeland of those whom Canadians wish to help. They are required not only to support U.S. strategic interests, but

also to allow Canadians the freedom to occasionally and effectively register dissent with the U.S. and other partners in the international system. They are required not to empower the U.N. or other actors wholesale in all their functions, but in those functions which are determined to be in the national interest. The flexibility enjoyed by the Canadian state in the use of armed force for these purposes is both conferred by chance and earned in blood. The modern Canadian Forces has not seen the last of transformation, and neither has Canadian international security policy seen the last of updating and revision post CFDS. In order to best serve the interests of the Canadian state, transformation promises to be an ongoing process – a testament not to the irrationality of the Canadian government, but to the value of the Canadian Forces as the definitive instrument of Canadian foreign policy.

Western states, particularly Canada, are finding today that the defence of the state is achieved not at home, but out in the world. It is threatened not only in times of war, but at all times. It is fought not only with the tools of war, but with all of the elements of national power. To answer the question posed in the introduction, the world has not changed – at least, not in its implications for the Canadian Forces. For a ‘safe’ country like Canada, there will always be debate as to what the particular objectives ought to be for the maintenance and employment of armed forces. Some make impassioned calls for swords, some for plowshares, and some envisage a hybrid of the two, for which there sadly exists no fitting adage. Certainly the threats of today are complex, and the future is uncertain – as trite as this statement is, to suggest otherwise is careless. The principal role, and in the final analysis - the only role, of the Canadian Forces is to ensure the survival of the Canadian state. While it may not be clear which security challenges abroad will require the sword and which will require the plowshare in the defence of

the state, the Canadian Forces of tomorrow will undoubtedly need to remain competent in the use of both.

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