

Canadian
Forces
College

Collège
des
Forces
Canadiennes



OH CANADA! WHAT HATH THOU BECOME?: TERRORISM IS A NEW-LOOK CANADA

Lieutenant-Commander C.N. Steiro

JCSP 38

Master of Defence Studies

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2012

PCEMI 38

Maîtrise en études de la défense

Avertissement

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2012.

Oh Canada! What hath thou become?: Terrorism in a new-look Canada

By: LCdr CN Steiro
Par le: Captc CN Steiro

This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

Word Count: 16,500

La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

Compte de mots : 16, 500

ABSTRACT : Terrorism is a complex issue with multiple facets. It is also a global phenomenon that continues to evolve. Islamic and non-Islamic terrorist groups combine historic injustices with contemporary social issues to justify violence directed against a specific population to instill fear or in retribution for perceived injustices. Canada is not immune to these global influences and as Canada's population changes, the line between national and international issues is becoming increasingly blurred. This means that Canada needs to be aware, and remain vigilant in defence of a very wide variety of global injustices, which may be used as justification by extremist groups, who may seek to use Canada for nefarious purposes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Introduction.....	3
Chapter 2. Origins of Islam.....	17
Chapter 3. Rise of the <i>Wahhabiist</i>	30
Chapter 4. Shia Revivalism.....	44
Chapter 5. Implications for Canada.....	57
Conclusion.....	71
Annex A: Glossary of Terms.....	74
Bibliography.....	75

Oh Canada! What hath thou become? Terrorism in a new-look Canada

Death is Paradise

Sheik Jabri al Khataj

INTRODUCTION

The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) identifies Sunni inspired terrorism as the greatest threat to Canada.¹ Public Safety Minister Vic Toews acknowledges that there are groups or individuals located within Canada that are involved in global terrorism. To support these assertions, and to instill confidence in the Canadian population that the Government of Canada (GoC) takes the threat of terrorism seriously, Minister Toews provides several examples of successful arrests of terrorism suspects in Canada. These include the infamous Qadr family with alleged ties to Al Qaeda (AQ), the “Toronto 18” that planned to attack several targets in Toronto and Ottawa including the Prime Minister of Canada, and Moma Khawaja who remains in custody for his involvement in the London subway bombings in 2004.² This list also includes Ahmed Ressam who was arrested in 1999 while crossing the border from British Columbia (BC) into Washington State. Ressam was planning to bomb Los Angeles Airport (LAX) as part of an AQ conspired plot during Millennium celebrations.

Each of the examples above represents a changing trend in Canadian society. Whether these individuals were foreign born, or first generation Canadian born, they

¹ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *CSIS Public Report 2009/2010* (Ottawa, Ontario: Government of Canada,[2011]).

² Gary Dimmock, "Terror Convict Moma Khawaja in 'Painful State' After Quebec Prison Attack: Father," *The Montreal Gazette*, sec. National, 2012 Jan 26.

associate with extremist ideals, thus proving Canada is not immune to global terrorism.³ These examples are evidence that portions of the Canadian population are willing to conduct violent activity and have received some type of indoctrination.

Initial data released by Stats Canada in 2006, and reinforced by additional data released in 2011, indicate Canada continues to change at a pace that will see one in three Canadians belonging to a visible minority by 2031.⁴ Cities such as Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver will see more than half of their populations consisting of first generation immigrants, increasingly from African, Asian or Middle Eastern countries. This is a significant shift from the traditional Euro-Christian immigrants of previous generations.

Associated with this shift is that many immigrants are arriving from conflict zones or failing states. Somalia, for example, has held the number one ranking in the failed state index for four consecutive years.⁵ Correspondingly Canada has become host to one of the largest Somali diaspora in the world with many Somali-Canadians retaining strong links to Somalia, including some in senior positions of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG).⁶ Additionally many immigrants escaping the civil war in Sri Lanka have also re-established themselves in Canada, thus making Canada home to the largest

³ Global Terrorism means that issues which may precipitate acts of violence transcend national borders. Therefore, extremist activity can manifest itself anywhere where portions of a population sympathize with religious or political goals.

⁴ The Government of Canada, *Projections of the Diversity of the Canadian Population: 2006-2031* (Ottawa: Minister of the Interior,[2010]).

⁵ Blaine Sheldon, *The Failed State Index 2011*; Foreign Policy,[2011]).

⁶ Government of Canada, "Canada- Somali Relations," Government of Canada, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/kenya/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada-somalia.aspx?menu_id=59&view=d (accessed April/23, 2012).

contingent of Tamils outside of Sri Lanka at between 200,000 and 300,000.⁷ Moreover, while it is too early to assess the impact of the “Arab Spring” on global migration, it is highly probable that Canada will receive more Middle Eastern immigrants as a result of the increased instability in this region.⁸

While this does not imply immigrants are terrorists, the probability is increasing that Canada will see more terrorist associated activity conducted in Canada in support of foreign issues that correlate to Canada’s changing demographics. This is based on the premise that terrorism and globalism are related and immigration brings with it issues which may transcend national boundaries.

Notwithstanding the government emphasis on security, using the events of September 11, 2001 as a contemporary benchmark, it still took the GoC more than eleven years to develop and publish its own counter-terrorism strategy. This is despite the fact that prior to 9/11 the deadliest act of aviation terrorism occurred in 1985 when Sikh militants from British Columbia were responsible for the Air India bombings. This resulted in 329 people being killed, 280 of them Canadian. Then, as early as 1999, CSIS warned Parliament that it was investigating 350 individuals representing at least 50 terrorist organisations. In 2004, CSIS further warned the Government that terrorist activity in Canada had evolved from fund-raising to planning terrorist acts within Canada.⁹

⁷ International Crisis Group, *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora After the LTTE: Asia Report no 186* International Crisis Group, [2010].,2

⁸ Sheldon, *The Failed State Index 2011*

The delay in publication suggests that were significant issues in developing this strategy. There could be many reasons for this such as inter-departmental politics, funding issues, or legislative issues. What is certain is that while Canada was developing its strategy, both terrorism and globalism have evolved and the lines between domestic and international issues have blurred.

This paper will argue that Canada's changing demographics will increase the threat of terrorist activity being conducted either in Canada or organised from within Canada. In this definition terrorism is not restricted to attempting to influence government or state decisions, but rather when violence is directed towards specific populations in order to instil fear. In this definition the state may simply be a third-party to what may be an inter-ethnic conflict based on historical grievances which may have no relation to the host nation. What is considered acceptable behaviour will increasingly challenge existing norms as a result of competing value systems, and will lead to an increase in morality based conflict. In extreme circumstances this could result in violence or terrorist related activity such as fund-raising, recruitment or planning.

Although the majority of terrorism related activity in Canada will likely continue to be such things as fund-raising and recruitment, the possibility of a terrorist attack on Canadian soil cannot be discounted. Given the position of CSIS and the fact that majority of recent global terrorism attacks have been committed by Sunni extremists, this paper will start by discussing fundamentals of Islam. This will be followed by an

⁹ Dwight Hamilton, *Inside Canadian Intelligence: Exposing the New Realities of Espionage and International Terrorism*, ed. Dundurn, Second ed. (Toronto: Dundurn, 2011), 316., 38

analysis of *Wahhabism* and *Salafism* and the subsequent impact on all Sunni insurgent groups.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Following September 11, 2001 much of the focus in the contemporary literature has been on Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) and his AQ organisation. In general the research has gradually expanded from AQ, to also include AQ inspired groups. This can be attributed to the fact that other Sunni based extremists groups have begun to emulate AQ. This is likely due to the success AQ have achieved in promoting its jihadist ideology following their attacks on September 11, 2001 in which AQ permanently changed the American psyche. AQ conducted near simultaneous attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. This event killed over three thousand people and resulted in a pre-occupation with counter-terrorism focused primarily on *Sunni* extremism. Unfortunately this gives the false impression that other forms of terrorism, such as Hezbollah or Hamas no longer exist, or have become less a threat to global security. In fact as recent events in the Middle East associated with the “Arab Spring” indicates *Shia* based extremism remains a significant threat to global security and also needs to be considered.

A significant portion of the contemporary literature focuses on the mechanisms of terrorism, rather than the origins and goals. There is a body of thought that discounts the importance of root causes because they believe modern terrorist groups are not rational actors, and seek only to cause death and destruction. Academics such as Dr. Egerton of Dalhousie University attribute personal defects including psychosis, alienation,

disenfranchised poverty stricken youth, and ethnic exclusion.¹⁰ This stance was echoed in a brief prepared by the Georgetown University Center for Peace and Security Studies in 2007 for the US Army War College.

This school of thought is superficial and implies that if the current goals of groups such as AQ are met, terrorism will no longer exist. It promotes stopping individual acts of terror, rather than eradicating terrorism and places responsibility on the individual, rather than the organisation. Proponents of this theory simplify terrorism to simple acts of terror, as opposed to being a tool that terrorist groups can use in support of specific goals. This implies that terrorism can be eradicated by eliminating terrorists, or by preventing them from becoming terrorists in the first place. It ignores factors such as ideology and leadership and focuses on individuals and assumes that something must be wrong with an individual in order to participate in terrorism, rather than attempt to understand how a terrorist organisation functions. This approach also implies that if personal defects can be identified, it is possible to identify potential terrorists who can be prevented from becoming terrorists. However, without understanding the motivations and fundamental beliefs of extremist groups, it is impossible to create a strategy that is comprehensive enough to address the full range of threats.

An interesting dynamic reflected in much of the contemporary literature revolves around whether terrorism is a religious issue or a political issue. It is rarely considered to be both simultaneously. This is probably because terrorism is generally defined by secular analysts who, by default, disassociate the two elements. This is further

¹⁰ George Egerton, "Lester B. Pearson and the Korean War: Dilemmas of Collective Security and International Enforcement in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1950-53," *International Peacekeeping* (13533312) 4, no. 1 (Spring97, 1997), 51-74., p.23-53

complicated by discussing terrorism as the enemy, and not defined as a tactic that can be used by the enemy in pursuance of ideological goals.

Colonel Andrew Dobrot, in a paper for the United States Strategic Studies Institute, debates whether *jihad*, is a religious issue or a political one. He correctly asserts that AQ and other Sunni inspired terrorist groups use tenants of Islam to justify *jihad* against the United States.¹¹ However, he argues that the way for the US to achieve its strategic goals is to build more democratic institutions within Islamic countries.¹²

Dobrot highlights the fact that the enemy represents a small percentage of Muslims that seek to do harm to the US. Significantly, he states that the enemy is not monolithic, nor is it equally committed.¹³ In other words, there is a great deal of flexibility in defining the enemy based on Islamic principles that can be used by a small minority to inflict harm. The key for Dobrot to understanding the strategic environment, is to first understand the history and culture of Islam. Dobrot is significant because he recognizes the importance of tribal culture and its impact on the evolution of Islam. He focuses on the nuances which differentiate the way Islam is practiced and understood by different populations. He argues that by understanding the subtleties, it is easier to understand the grievances and how they developed.

There is also a wealth of literature which focuses on the political aspects of Islam. Saudi Arabia and Iran are not only nation states, but they are also champions of *Sunni*

¹¹ Lawrence A. Dobrot, *The Global War on Terrorism: A Religious War* (US Army War College: US Government,[2007]), 1

¹² *Ibid.*, 1

¹³ *Ibid.* , 3

and *Shia* Islam respectively. The formation and development of Islam is inextricably linked to the politics of the region, which continue to expand as Muslims move to new areas. This is as true now as it was during the time of Mohammed.

In 2005, Chas W. Freeman moderated a meeting in the US Capitol. This meeting brought together several globally acknowledged academics in the field of Middle East politics to discuss what “A Shia Crescent in the Middle East” would mean for the US. During this conference Juan Cole, Kenneth Katzman, Karim Sadjadpour and Ray Takeyh presented a series of presentations outlining the role of Islam in Middle Eastern politics. They contend that it is crucial to understand the role of *Shia* Islam in the Middle East security. It is impossible to develop any regional security plan without understanding Islam’s role in regional politics. Moreover they opine that the United States intervention in Iraq inadvertently created the necessary conditions for the establishment of a Shia crescent in the northern portion of the Arab world.¹⁴

Cole et al, writing in 2005 argue that the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq has resulted in considerable concern for other Arab countries that have significant *Shia* populations.¹⁵ Iran, through its proxy forces, may seek to influence *Shia* minorities in countries such as Bahrain or Kuwait. The main concern is that this activity risks undermining local stability, and possibly regional security. There have been some more recent allegations that Iran has influenced internal populations in Syria and Lebanon and

¹⁴ Juan Cole et al., “A Shia Crescent: What Fallout for the United States?” *Middle East Policy* 12, no. 4 (Winter 2005, 2005), 1-27. , 1

¹⁵ *Ibid.* ,1

has been partially responsible for some of the unrest witnessed in 2011's "Arab Spring".¹⁶

Ken Katzman argues that it is the radical *Shia* Islamists responsible for the 1979 Islamic revolution that made Islam an international political issue.¹⁷ This affected relations with the US and caused both the Reagan and Bush Senior Administrations to view the threat from Iranian inspired *Shia* extremism as so significant, that they backed Saddam Hussein's regime in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. The anticipation was that Iraq would suppress *Shia* fundamentalism. This initial fear was later displaced by fear of *Sunni* extremists, and US political assessments later resulted in the US toppling the Hussein regime. This allowed disparate *Shiite* groups the first opportunity to organize, and participate in the political process in centuries.¹⁸ Arguably, it is this sense of empowerment, combined with feelings of centuries of oppression, that is now manifesting itself throughout the entire Middle East.

In 2011, the CSIS released its annual report for the 2009/2010 year. In it CSIS identifies Islamic based terrorism as the greatest threat to the safety and security of Canada.¹⁹ Specifically CSIS identifies Sunni Islamic terrorism as the greatest risk, and highlights the arrests of the "Toronto 18" and Momin Khawaja to demonstrate that self-radicalisation does occur in Canada. While the focus is on Islamic terrorism the CSIS

¹⁶ Greg Miller, "Senators Question Intelligence Agencies' Anticipation of Egypt Uprising," *The Washington Post*, sec. World, 2011.

¹⁷ Cole et al., "*A Shia Crescent: What Fallout for the United States?*", 1-27 ,4

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 3-4

¹⁹ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *CSIS Public Report 2009/2010*, 1-55

report does acknowledge the Air India bombings from 1985 as proof of Sikh based extremism in Canada. The presence of groups such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), Hamas and Hezbollah is also identified to demonstrate the range of threats in Canada.

CSIS highlights that globalisation blurs the line between the domestic and international realms and admits that presently very few issues in Canada do not have some international nexus.²⁰ This means that as immigrants come to Canada, they remain connected to issues in their respective homelands. This also means that although the great majority of new immigrants come to Canada in search of better opportunities than available in their homelands, a small percentage will remain engaged in nefarious activity. These threats may include direct action in Canada, or the utilisation of Canadian territory to facilitate terrorism activity elsewhere. This could include fundraising, recruitment or making travel arrangements for personnel or material.

The CSIS report briefly discusses global terrorism developments focusing on AQ and AQ inspired groups who direct their followers to attack western targets. Most significant for Canada is the attraction some of these groups are for those extremists living in Canada who seek to travel abroad to conduct violent attacks. Al Shabaab, for example, and its recent merger with AQ, is a recent development that currently sees individuals from the international Somali diaspora joining or supporting their cause. This also includes many Canadian Somalis. This argument also can be applied to diasporas of other nations who exist in Canada but support extremist causes in other parts of the globe.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

In 2011, the GoC introduced its first ever counter-terrorism strategy entitled, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy*. This document was created as a result of the events of 9/11 in the United States and the resulting impact this event had on global perceptions of terrorism. It does, however, acknowledge the Air India bombings of 1985 and the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) crisis to draw attention to Canada's own history with terrorism. Additionally, it highlights Canada's contribution in Afghanistan and draws a connection to contemporary extremists and their use of Canadian territory to plot terrorist activity in other parts of the world. Furthermore, it acknowledges threats from non-Sunni insurgent groups such as Hezbollah and the LTTE that have a known significant presence and a corresponding destabilising influence on Canadian security.²¹ This document suggests the threat to Canada is significantly more comprehensive than the CSIS report previously referenced.

The GoC outlines a strategy built upon four pillars: prevention, detection, denial and response. It delineates specific agencies which have requisite capabilities and mandates that correspond to the various pillars. The problem is not with the approach, but that it lacks specifics and treats each group as an equal threat implying that to counter all of the identified threats requires the same knowledge and skill-sets. It focuses on the commonalities amongst groups and suggests that one sufficiently vague strategy is sufficient to allow disparate groups in Government to coordinate effective responses.

The fact it took over a decade to publish this strategy, despite the stated importance of the events of 9/11, supports statements made by former CSIS Director Jim

²¹ Government of Canada, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada,[2011]).

Judd, who compared the GoC's stance on security as an "Alice in Wonderland" approach.²² It is commendable that the GoC now has a strategy that is complimented by the creation of the National Security Advisor position, the Government of Canada Operations Centre, and Marine Security Operation Centres (MSOC), as these are elements of identified in the overarching National Security Policy.²³ The problem is this the strategy does not discuss coordination, command relationships should an actual event take place in Canada, or information exchanges and technological requirements necessary to permit inter-departmental flow of information. It simply intimates that groups will coordinate based on their mandates, and suggests that all government departments use the same definitions and apply the same standards. Until provisions are made to accommodate specific sharing of information, and all government departments use the same definitions and apply common standards which are irrefutable, it will remain difficult to implement such a strategy at all levels in every region of Canada.

Relative to the purpose of this paper is what Canada's changing demographics means to the threat of terrorism in Canada. Evidence produced by Stats Canada indicates that Canada is not reproducing fast enough to sustain itself. Therefore, Canada depends on immigration to maintain its population. Data from Stats Canada in 2006 and Census data from 2011 indicates that new immigrants to Canada are more likely to come from South East Asia, Africa or the Middle East, than from the historical European countries such as Italy, the United Kingdom or France as examples. Other factors, such as they relate to demographics and national security, are increasing urbanisation and

²² Mark Kennedy, "Canadians have 'Alice in Wonderland' Approach to Security, Wikileaks Documents Say," *The Vancouver Sun*, sec. News, Nov 29, 2010.

²³ The National Security Policy

globalisation. Today approximately a third of Canadian's population lives in one of the three largest cities, Toronto, Montreal or Vancouver. This has significant implications for resource allocation and ethnic relations within Canada. This is true for everything from government and police services, to cultural and religious requirements reflective of Canada's increasing diversity. The fact that Canada's ethnic makeup is changing means that new Canadians can stay engaged with a broader range of international issues in a much more interactive fashion than previous generations, using new social media tools such as Facebook and Twitter.

When globalisation is combined with modern social media tools, issues that were historically separated by virtue of geography are likely to influence, or be influenced, by Canadians of various ethnic backgrounds. Essentially, globalisation means that it is becoming increasingly rare for any issue to remain a domestic issue. This is equally true for international terrorist groups who may seek to export their ideals globally, and have significant diaspora around the world. Groups such as Somalia's Al Shabaab, or Sri Lankan's LTTE for example, depend on their international diaspora for funding, for recruits and for logistics support. Increasingly this also includes participation in directed violence and radicalisation through local mosques and radical Imams. Canada's changing demographics indicate that countries such as Saudi Arabia, who would seek to export Sunni Islam now, have an increased capacity to influence Canadian's Sunni Muslim population. This is equally true for Iran, who would export *Shia* Islam, by use of proxy forces such as Hezbollah in communities with large ex-patriate populations, such as Vancouver, Toronto or Montreal. Evidence from Stats Canada indicates that countries like Sri Lanka and India also have growing ex-patriate populations in Canada, both of

which are known to have organic sophisticated terrorist organizations that rely on their own global diaspora for support.

Given that the demographic make-up of Canada is changing, and that terrorism is a global phenomenon, it is increasingly likely that a percentage of Canadians will identify with extremism, and be motivated to act based on radical influences. With that in mind this paper will begin by focusing on Islam as an underlying ideology, which certain Islamic terrorist groups use to justify their nefarious activity

Chapter 2: Origins of Islam

INTRODUCTION

To reiterate this project's start, CSIS identifies Sunni based terrorism as the greatest threat to Canadian security.²⁴ In this vein, the 2010 United States' National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) attributes approximately 60 percent of all worldwide terrorism related deaths to Sunni extremists.²⁵ The challenge for Canada is to understand the degree to which Sunni terrorism could manifest itself within Canada. As there may be factors that may predispose an individual to conduct acts of terrorism, there are other factors which may mitigate potential terrorist activity. The challenge is to understand how these factors interact to develop a realistic appreciation of what Sunni extremism actually means to the safety and security of Canada.

In order to assess the threat Sunni extremists presents to Canada, it is first necessary to understand certain fundamentals of Islam. It is important to understand how Islam evolved because many issues that separate modernists from fundamentalists originate from the beginning of Islam itself. These fundamentals, therefore, provide a starting point in trying to assess how Islamic based terrorist related activity could occur in Canada.

At this point a distinction needs to be made between fundamentalists and extremists. While fundamentalists and extremists both seek a pure version of Islam as it

²⁴ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *CSIS Public Report 2009/2010*, 1-55

²⁵ United States Government, *2010 NCTC Report on Terrorism* United States Government,[2011]), 6

was practiced by the Prophet, not all fundamentalists are extremists. While fundamentalists on the one hand may view the West as the being responsible for the corruption of Islam, they truly believe Islam has strayed from its original teachings. They seek a return to the manner of Islam as practiced by the Prophet. They either direct their energy towards their own rulers, who they view as corrupt, or towards the West. Extremists, on the other hand, utilise radical means to enforce a radical version of Islam and see those who do not share in their belief system as enemies of Islam. They seek to impose their strict version of Islam on others because they believe it is the right thing to do, and that they will be rewarded for their efforts in the after-life. In the extreme, AQ, for example, advocates *takfirism*, a doctrine that requires the elimination of all non-believers irrespective of their background or religion.²⁶ This means that AQ and those inspired by this organisation believe it is their duty to eradicate the world of those who do not share in their belief.

Before focusing specifically on Sunni terrorist groups, it is important to understand the cultural conditions that existed when Islam was formed. It is necessary to understand how Islam evolved because this provides a context for grievances made at various times in history in the name of Islam. By understanding the social and cultural conditions that existed during Islam's formative years, it is easier to understand why extremists would choose to act in support of their fundamentalist belief system today and how they may direct their energies.²⁷ While still extremely difficult, by understanding

²⁶ Dobrot, *The Global War on Terrorism: A Religious War*, 119,2

the basis of underlying grievances, and by having a realistic appreciation of a group's intent and capability, this will make it is easier for the GoC to better assess the threat Sunni terrorism represents to Canada.

ISLAM AND TRIBALISM

Islam is simultaneously a political and religious movement that provides Muslims an identity and a loyalty that often transcends all others.²⁸ The reason for this can be traced back to tribal norms when Mohammed was born into the Hashim clan of the Quraysh tribe. At that time the Qurash was the dominant tribe around Mecca and had many enemies. Due to tribal conflict, Mohammed was forced to leave and escaped to Medina where he eventually consolidated sufficient tribal power to eventually suppress his tribal enemies and return to Mecca. He consolidated his power in what is now Saudi Arabia before beginning an expansionist campaign that would see Islam expand throughout the Middle East and into North Africa.

Prior to Mohammed, it was common for tribes to trade allegiances to increase the strength and wealth of one's tribe, thus making the notion of expansion fundamental to tribal survival.²⁹ Additionally, individuals had significant freedom to choose and changing religions and allegiances was not uncommon.³⁰ As a leader in this context, Mohammed successfully consolidated power in the name of Islam, and then began

²⁷ Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (United States of America: Random House, 2003), 164., 24

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 17

²⁹ Dobrot, *The Global War on Terrorism: A Religious War*, 119, 4

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 4

expanding the strength and influence of his tribe with allegiance to Islam being what united his followers. Claiming the status of an apostle of God gave Mohammed religious authority, and complete submission to Islam was expected to be absolute.

His authority, however, was based on a notion, common at the time, that the leader was vested with both state and religious authority. Although Mohammed used traditional tribal practices to resolve conflicts, the freedom to change religion no longer existed. Mohammed ensured that tribes were united in the belief that Muslims were predestined to be superior to Christians, Jews or pagans.³¹ Instead of simple tribal affiliation, Islam became the most important thing that differentiated groups and provided an identity. It is not insignificant that Islam by definition means submission.

As Muhammed's prophesies were codified in the Koran and his life chronicled through *hadithas*, these recordings represent a romanticised idea of Islam to which fundamentalists and extremists seek to return. Unfortunately through time, traditional customary practices such as the distribution of war-booty, blood-feuds and the duty of all members to conduct *jihad*, have become associated with Islam simply because they are mentioned in the Koran and *hadithas*, and reflect Mohammed's revelations and life at the time. Fundamentalists and extremists see no distinction between customary tribal practices and Islam. For those who seek a return to the origins of Islam, the Koran provides a blueprint, not only for what is acceptable and what is not, but what is expected of a good Muslim. More than that, Islam is a duty that obligates Muslims to act in a

³¹ *Ibid.*, 119

specific manner and justifies extremist behaviour based on historical tribal norms if taken literally and not understood in contemporary context.

RELIGION OR POLITICS

The confusion of religion and politics remains the most significant issue that needs to be understood by those combatting Islamic based terrorism. As previously discussed, the dominant social and cultural patterns prevalent at the time of the Prophet shape contemporary Islamic understanding because both religious truth and political power are inherent in the ruler.³² Therefore, Islamists, of which fundamentalists are a part, associate Islam with the exercise of both political and religious power. In other words, fundamentalists do not differentiate religious authority from political authority.³³ This is critical to understand because any counter terrorism strategy that treats the two issues as separate is unlikely to be effective.

LEADERSHIP AND AUTHORITY

Another critical concept to understanding fundamentalism is the notion of leadership and authority. This concept includes many different interpretations and is one of the most important issues responsible for sectarian violence. The idea of leadership, for example, forever separated Islam into two primary sects when Ali, a direct descendant of Muhammad, was the *caliph* and was subsequently murdered. For those who saw this murder as an affront to Islam because of the Ali's linkage to the Prophet, a schism

³² Jonahan P. Berkey, *The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600-800* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 269., 75

³³ Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, 164, 26

developed between Muslims based on whether Mohammed's immediate successors had any legitimacy at all, and by extension their successors. This division has resulted in significant bloodshed between Sunnis and Shia which continues to this day.

For those who do not believe in the need to understand root-causes, one only has to look to modern day Iraq following the removal of Saddam Hussein's Sunni based regime. The Shia population is re-emerging as a dominant political factor throughout Iraq, which has subsequently caused considerable concern throughout the Middle East. King Abdullah of Jordan has warned of a Shia Crescent which includes Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The Saudi Arabia Saudi Foreign Minister has also expressed concern over a Shia revival, and called that the toppling of Hussein a turnover of Iraq to Iran.³⁴ Shia based militias, with direction and backing from Iran, have effectively conducted nefarious activity targeting their Sunni competitors. Arguably the immediate outcome in Iraq, following the US-led military activity in 2003 which resulted in the toppling of Saddam Hussein and subsequent sectarian violence, may have been different if the United States and their allies had a better appreciation of the Sunni-Shia schism that existed.

When Saddam fell, various Shiite currents came into play. They had the opportunity, for the first time in a long time, to organize freely, and they appear to have amongst them geniuses at grass-roots campaigning that make Karl Rove look like a piker.³⁵

Another significant historical development that helps understand contemporary Sunni and Shia relations is when Ali's son, al-Husayn, led an expedition in 680 to

³⁴ Amir M. Haji Yousefi, "Whose Agenda is Served by the Idea of a Shia Crescent?" *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 1 (Spring 2009, 2009), 114-135. , 116

³⁵ Cole et al., "*A Shia Crescent: What Fallout for the United States?*", 1-27 ,3

Karbala to avenge his father's murder and ended with al-Husayn and his followers being wiped out. This event resulted in feelings of extreme animosity between those who supported Ali's claim as heir because of his relationship to Mohammed, and those associated with the murder of Ali who disagreed with his claims. The latter believed him to be blasphemous and deserving of death. This event precipitated violence throughout the eighth and ninth centuries that is often categorized as the first Islamic civil war.³⁶

Fundamentally this conflict is based on different understandings of where Islamic authority originated, and therefore, who can exercise it. Sunni Muslims believe only the *ummma*, or the community, is authorized to select successors and leaders of the faithful. Shia, however, believe the *caliph* should be a direct descendent of the Prophet and therefore reject the legitimacy of the first three *caliphs*. Accommodations have been made to account for the lack of legitimate heirs in recent decades, however there is a belief amongst some, that there is a hidden Imam who will return to retake his place as legitimate heir to the *caliphate*. The lack of an authoritative institutional structure, therefore, has underscored conflicts over religious identity since the eighth century.³⁷ For Sunnis there is no special status by virtue of lineage, and those who claim right of succession because of any link to the Prophet are committing idolatry.

In the decades following Mohammed's death the issue of leadership was also a political issue, albeit with an underlying religious current that resulted in a two year revolt led by an individual named al-Mukhtar.³⁸ Participants in this revolt were usually

³⁶ Dobrot, *The Global War on Terrorism: A Religious War*, 119, 5

³⁷ Berkey, *The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600-800*, 269, 83

identified as Kaysaniyya or as *ghulat*, meaning “extremists”.³⁹ The Kaysaniyya included Arabs with their pre-Islamic beliefs and religious heritages upon which they developed their doctrine.⁴⁰ While this was viewed primarily as retaliation for the murder of a tribal leader, the revolt automatically assumed a religious connotation as well because of Ali’s linkage to the Prophet.

In reality, divisions within the *umma* had begun to appear even before the death of Ali. Following the death of Muhammad, certain tribes believed their allegiance was terminated. This resulted in Muhammad’s father-in-law, Abu Bakr, successfully fighting and subduing those tribes. Abu Bakr fought to keep the followers of the Prophet unified through an authority he believed to have been vested in him through Islam as *caliph*, and not because of any relationship to Mohammed. This is a significant development because Abu Bakr fought to keep Muslims united when their commitment to tribal unity through Islam was wavering. For many this reinforced the notion that tribal identity was more important than allegiance to Islam.⁴¹ However, this marked a significant milestone because for the first time in history, Islam, not tribalism, became the primary issue that individuals were willing to fight and die to protect.

Of note, subjugation of Islam to tribalism was not universally agreed upon and successive *caliphs* who used favouritism to promote their own tribes to the detriment of others, sparked significant animosity amongst those who did not recognize their

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 88

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 89

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 90

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 71

legitimacy. The practice of favouritism was exemplified by the third *caliph*, Uthman. He appointed many members of his own clan to important administrative posts. This resulted in considerable opposition from those less favoured and eventually resulted in his murder. Mohammed's cousin and son-in-law, Ali, was then chosen to be the fourth *caliph* over Muawiya. This decision also caused significant resentment and led to the assassination of Ali by a group of militant Islamic Priests known as the Kharijites, who believed the only way to the end the conflict between Ali's followers and those of Muwaiyah was to assassinate them both.⁴² Muawaiya survived and became the fifth *caliph*. The installation of Muawiya as the fifth *caliph* is considered the advent of the Umayyad dynasty and marks the first Islamic *caliph* built on the claims of one family.⁴³ This also led to the first Islamic Civil War which permanently separated Shiites and Sunnis.⁴⁴ For their part, the Kharijites elevated the role of religion over all others and they emerged as the first identified sectarian group organised from a pious opposition.⁴⁵

The Kharijites crystalized the question of political leadership and its impact on Islamic religious identity. Later known as Azariq, after their leader Ibn al-Azraq, they conducted several campaigns in southern Iraq and Iran in the name of their purified view of religion.⁴⁶ Of significance, Ibn al-Azraq claimed that Muslims who did not participate

⁴² *Ibid.*, 76

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 76

⁴⁴ Dobrot, *The Global War on Terrorism: A Religious War*, 119, 5

⁴⁵ Berkey, *The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600-800*, 269, 86

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 87

in these expeditions could legitimately be robbed or killed due to his belief that they compromised their commitment to God and thus were no longer considered Muslims.⁴⁷

MODERN ISLAM

This sense of religious piousness still exists and guides fundamentalists who believe it is their duty to purify Islam of all corrupting influences. For example after Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses* was published, Ayatollah Khomeini issued the following fatwa:

The author of *The Satanic Verses*, a text written, edited, and published against Islam, against the Prophet of Islam, and against the Koran, along with all the editors and publishers aware of its contents, are condemned to capital punishment. I call on all valiant Muslims wherever they may be in the world to execute this sentence without delay, so that no one henceforth will dare insult the sacred beliefs of the Muslims.⁴⁸

Then in 2006, following the publication of cartoons in a Dutch newspaper characterizing the Prophet Mohammed, there were riots in multiple communities throughout Europe and Scandinavia. In 2008, following a re-broadcast there were also riots throughout many of the same communities. In 2012, a Florida pastor burned a Koran in protest. This resulted in four days of riots in Afghanistan in which 24 people were killed, including two US soldiers. Less than a year later US soldiers, accused of desecrating the Holy Koran at the Bagram Air base in Afghanistan, resulted in several days of riots in Afghanistan. This resulted in the US President Obama issuing a formal apology, and calls from Afghan President Karzai to have those responsible be brought forth to face justice.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 87

⁴⁸ , <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~owend/interests/islam/fatwa.html>.

Additionally this event precipitated the shooting of two more US soldiers, and may have influenced the 2012 murder of seven people in France, which included several schoolchildren and a Jewish Rabbi by French extremist Mohammed Merah.⁵⁰ Although there was no associated activity in Canada, this action did have a Canadian connection when Commonwealth Graves were desecrated in Libya in 2012 by Muslims who viewed the Koran incident as an insult to all Muslims. At least one Canadian memorial tombstone was desecrated and resulted in some negative backlash demonstrated through editorials in various Canadian newspapers. To highlight the global nature of this sense of indignation there was the attempted murder in 2010 of the cartoonist responsible, Kurt Westergaard, by a Somali with alleged ties to Al Qaeda, and the previous murder of film maker Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam by Mohammed Bouyeri, a Dutch-Moroccan Muslim in 2004.⁵¹

Of significance to Canada, specifically, AQ previously issued a fatwa calling for attacks on several western countries, including Canada. This has resulted in at least six specific threats by AQ or one of its affiliates to carry out operations in Canada similar to that of New York, Madrid and London.⁵² While all of the other countries mentioned have experienced terrorist attacks on their own soil, Canada remains the only country not

⁴⁹ Eltaf Najafizada, "Obama Apologizes for Koran Burning as Afghan Riots Continue," *Bloomberg*, sec. News, 2012.

⁵⁰ Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, "How did Mohammed Merah Become a Jihadist?" *CNN*, sec. World, March 26, 2012.

⁵¹ David Batty, "Somali Charged with Murder Attempt on Muhammed Cartoonist," *The Guardian*, sec. World News, Jan 2, 2010.

⁵² Christian Leuprecht and Conrad Winn, "What do Muslim Canadians Want? the Clash of Interpretations and Opinion Research," *The Macdonald-Laurier Institute True North in Canadian Policy* (Nov, 2011), 1-44. , 27

directly targeted outside of Afghanistan. Calls to attack Canada have reemerged by Somali based Al Shabaab, whose recent amalgamation with AQ, shows a renewed interest in exporting jihad through global diaspora. Despite the death of UBL, historical grievances still dictate intra-Islam relations. When modern issues associated with nationalism, tribalism and globalisation are also considered, there are a number of reasons which may provide justification for extremists to conduct violent activity.

CONCLUSION

Islam emerged at a time of significant ideological development dominated by monotheistic religions such as Christianity and Judaism. This era was characterized by tribal politics and competition amongst clan and familial lines for influence and control. This necessitated expansion in the name of survival. Mohammed consolidated both religious and political power in the name of Islam because common at that time was the belief that the leader embodied both state and religious authority. As a recognized Prophet he demanded obedience to Islam, and those not belonging to the *umma* or community were defined as the enemy.

While there is little disagreement during the time of Mohammed, understanding what occurred in the decades following Mohammed's death is critical to understanding fundamentalist thinking. The integration of politics and religion and the authorities inherent in Islamic leadership remain critical for those trying to understand what Islam means in contemporary society, and to what extremes radical fundamentalists will go to in the name of Islam. For fundamentalists and extremists alike, their position is Islam has become corrupted and it is necessary to return to Islam to its pure form as practiced by

the Prophet. An important distinction is that extremists are more likely to see eradication of those of different beliefs as justifiable through their version of Islam, whereas while fundamentalists may agree that Islam has been corrupted, their focus is on Islam itself and Islamic leadership.

Islam is a very complex issue of which there are many dimensions. Sunni Islam represents the sect of Islam followed by the majority of Muslims around the world. However, Islam, which purports to be a religion of peace, is often misrepresented by Islamic extremists for nefarious purposes. The question becomes, how can such a peaceful religion be used to justify directed violence? The next chapter will discuss this issue and will address Sunni extremism by focusing on *Wahhbiism* and *salafism*. This chapter will discuss the root causes of Sunni extremism and how globalisation is important for the exportation of this extremist ideology. Furthermore, this chapter will discuss how *Wahhabiism* is changing, and what this means for Sunni Extremist groups who now need to seek out new sources of inspiration to justify their violent methods.

Chapter 3: Rise of the Wahhabist

INTRODUCTION

There is currently a revivalist movement within Islam that has the goal of returning Islam to its roots. *Wahhabiism* is the form of Sunni Islam most often associated with this revivalist movement.⁵³ The term *Salafism*, on the other hand, is derived from the Arabic word, *Salif*, which refers to the first generation after Mohammed's death. *Salafists* view this first generation as the only pure version of *Islam* and seek to emulate life today as it was practiced then in every possible way. *Wahhabi* refers to a very strict and puritanical form of Islam often associated with severe punishments for relatively trivial transgressions. It was introduced the prominent Sunni Scholar, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, in the 17th century. Contemporary *Salafists* seek to re-establish Islam as it was practiced at the time of Mohammed and the first generation after his death. They view modern Islamic leaders as corrupt and often blame foreign influences for this. While both *Wahhabiis* and *Salifists* are concerned with returning Islam to its original state, it is the extreme beliefs of the *Salifs* that could result in directed violence.⁵⁴

The purpose of this chapter is to identify how *Wahhabiism* may inspire radical extremists to violence. This chapter will discuss how these terms have come to dominate current Sunni extremist ideology. This chapter will identify the root sources of extremist ideologies and the reasons why they have successfully permeated radical Islamic

⁵³ Christopher M. Blanchard, "Islam: Sunnis and Shiites: RS21745," *Congressional Research Service: Report* (01/23, 2008), 1-CRS-6. ,4

⁵⁴ John Turner, "From Cottage Industry to International Organisation: The Evolution of Salafi-Jihadism and the Emergence of the Al Qaeda Ideology," *Terrorism & Political Violence* 22, no. 4 (Oct, 2010), 541-558., 543

thinking. Furthermore, this chapter will identify the role of Saudi Arabia in promoting *Wahhabism* and its influence on Islamic thinking throughout the Middle East and beyond. Specifically, the Muslim Brotherhood and emerging radical cleric al-Maqidis will be discussed to show how *Wahhabiism* has influenced more extremist elements throughout the Middle East. Lastly, this chapter will discuss how issues such as modernisation, globalisation and new mediums now allow radical messaging to reach larger audiences and more diverse populations.

WAHHABISM

Wahhabism was named after its founder, Muhammed ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. He was a 17th century theologian in the Najd area of Arabia who believed that foreign influence had corrupted Islam. He sought to purify Islam by removing and destroying any and all perceived distortions of Islam. He viewed Christians, Jews, Shias, Sufis and mainstream Sunnis as valid targets for elimination.⁵⁵ For him, all others are considered *infidels* or non-believers.

This dichotomy relates to the Middle Eastern tribal dynamic of balanced opposition. While allegiance may be to a specific group, identity is defined by opposition, thereby requiring an enemy.⁵⁶ Mohammed, himself, first shaped Islamic identity based on the idea of Muslims and *infidels* as opposing tribes. Related to allegiance is the concept of honour. This is particularly true for individuals of Arabic

⁵⁵ Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (New York: Random House, Inc., 2003), 190., 120

⁵⁶ Philip Carl Salzman, "The Middle East's Tribal DNA," *Middle East Quarterly* (Winter 2008, 2008), 22-33.

background who believe that honour can only be found in resistance and conflict.⁵⁷ This means that individual actions affect the reputation of the entire tribe, and individual actions dishonour not only the individual, but the entire tribe. This makes conflict integral to both intra-tribal and inter-tribal relations because conflict reinforces tribal identity and honour must be defended at all times.

Muhammed ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was influenced by previous Islamic scholars such as Ibn Kathir, Ibn Qayyim al-Jaziyya and Ibn Tamiyya who were prominent in the Middle-Ages. They formed a body of Islamic jurisprudence known as *Hanbali*, dating to approximately 855. This body of Islamic law is a very strict and conservative school of Islamic thought named after Ahmad ibn Hanbal.⁵⁸ This body of literature continues to be an important source of inspiration for contemporary extremists because this belief system exists in a pure form, unaltered by modern factors. For this reason it is important to understand Abd al-Wahhab’s influences because they still inspire a certain element of radical extremists.

SAUDI INFLUENCE

In the 17th century *Wahhabis* directed their energy towards those they viewed as betraying and degrading Islam from within. They were opposed to any other school or version, and enforced their beliefs by demolishing tombs, desecrating what they perceived as idolatrous holy places. They slaughtered men, women and children whom

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Joas Wagemakers, "Defining the Enemy: Abū Muhammad Al-Maqdisīs Radical Reading of Sūrat Al-Mumtahana," *Welt Des Islams* 48, no. 3 (11, 2008), 348-371., 364

they judged did not meet their standards of Islamic purity.⁵⁹ Eventually, they placed significant responsibility for the corruption of Islam on foreign influence. This fit nicely with Saudi leadership at the time, which was trying to expand its area of control, while simultaneously preventing the Ottoman Empire from expanding westward. They did this through a campaign of expansion that saw the Saudis attack the shi'ite holy place at Karbala, before “cleansing” the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. This was a clear sign to non-Sunni neighbours, in particular that of the Ottoman Sultan, whom the Saudi ruler denounced as being a heretic for his support to *Sufism*, a form of Islam known for mysticism and exoteric rituals.⁶⁰

Abd al-Wahhab was effective in promoting Wahhabiism because he had the backing of Sheiks from the House of Saud who made *Wahhabi* the state doctrine. The result was a symbiotic relationship that continues to this day which sees *Wahhabiism* promoted and sponsored by the Saudi State. For its part, Saudi Arabia benefits because the House of Saud is viewed as having a legitimate leadership role in Islam. This relationship currently sees many decisions by the ruling family of Saudi Arabia done so, with the blessing of *ulema*. This has blurred the lines of Islamic authority because secular decisions have the allusion of being religious decisions because of the relationship with the House of Saud and the *ulema*.

Starting in the 20th century, the *ulema* has increasingly deferred certain decisions to the Saudi Royal Family that were previously the sole purview of Islamic scholars. In many ways this is tacit recognition that *Wahhabiism* is ill-equipped to deal with modern

⁵⁹ Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, 190, 122

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 122

realities. Moreover, this acknowledges that *Wahhabiism* benefits by having a strong Saudi Arabia, and the *ulema* is not likely to do anything which may weaken Saudi Arabia's global influence and its ability to be able to spread Islam.

The deference of specific decision making to a secular authority relieves the *ulema* of certain responsibilities and gives the illusion that the decision making of the Saudi Royal Family is sanctioned by the *ulema*. A critical example of this is that the authority to decide if someone can be identified to be a *believer* or an *infidel* now lies with the Saudi leadership. In previous generations the reverse was true. It was the *ulema* that provided validation for Saudi leadership to attack its neighbours in previous centuries. Early in the 20th century, however, the *ulema* concluded that they, the *ulema*, did not have the right to determine who was a believer or infidel. Since 1919 that decision belongs exclusively to the Saudi rulers.⁶¹

Another crucial decision by the *ulema* was that only the ruler could declare *jihad*. This is also a dramatic departure in *Wahhabi* thinking.⁶² This means extremist groups are becoming increasingly ideologically separated from the *Wahhabiism* they once used to justify their extremist actions. This also leaves significant room for interpretation and makes it easier for individuals to interpret Islamic teachings radically if not provided with proper Islamic guidance.

GLOBAL INFLUENCE

⁶¹ David Commins, "Chapter Three: Abd Al-Aziz Ibn Saud and the Taming of Wahhabi Zeal," in I.B. Tauris, 2009), 71-103., 86

⁶² *Ibid.* 86

In terms of regional politics, *Wahhabism* became a major force in the 20th century. This began with the expansion and consolidation of the Saudi Kingdom and the subsequent control of the Hijaz area which included the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina.⁶³ Then the end of World War I effectively destroyed the Ottoman Empire, leaving Sheik ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Saud able to defeat his rival Ibn Rashid and annex his territories. As a result Ibn Saud became the internationally recognized leader of an independent Saudi Arabia. More importantly, for this discussion, he was able to convince an all-Islamic Congress that he was the ruler of the Hijaz and that he would fulfill his duties as custodian of the holy places and protector of the pilgrimage.⁶⁴ By doing so he made himself indispensable to Islam and inextricably linked the Saudi Royal Family to the preservation of *Wahhabiism*.

Until the mid-20th century Saudi Arabia was undeniably the pre-eminent regional power in the Middle East. Following the discovery of oil reserves Saudi Arabia transformed into one of the richest and most influential countries in the world and gained immediate global influence. When in 1933 the Saudi Minister of Finance and Standard Oil signed an agreement with the United States, this had two significant consequences. First, it guaranteed a source of funding for Saudi Arabia that further funded the expansion of *Wahhabism*.⁶⁵ Second, this started a relationship with the West, primarily the United States, which has become an obsession with AQ and other AQ inspired insurgency groups. AQ and other inspired groups have disavowed Saudi Arabia and no longer view

⁶³ Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, 190, 122

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 125

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 126

the House of Saud as a legitimate leader within Islam. AQ has called for attacks on the Saudi Royal Family because of its relationship with the West, primarily because the Royal Family permitted the US to station troops in Saudi Arabia to protect Saudi interests. AQ, and others, view this as further evidence of that Saudi leadership is weak and corrupt and not able to fulfill their duties as custodian of the two holy sites and the *Hajj*.⁶⁶ This has resulted in several attacks within Saudi Arabia by extremists in recent years.

Saudi Arabia is in a difficult position because of its relationship with the West. It cannot abandon its *Wahhabiist* doctrine, built upon ridding Islam of foreign influences, because it risks losing its credibility within Islam. However, Saudi Arabia cannot function as a modern country without assistance from the West, and is heavily dependent upon western technology and innovation. This requires periodically acquiescence to foreign demands. The recent example of a Saudi blogger forced to flee Saudi Arabia in early 2012 for disparaging comments against Mohammed, only to be subsequently arrested in Malaysia and sent back to be tried for apostasy is a telling example of this dilemma.⁶⁷ Many Islamic clerics have called for his execution, whereas the rest of the world has called for amnesty. The most likely consequence of acquiescence to the West will be to further incite fundamentalists who view foreign influence as being responsible for the corruption of Islam. However, to execute a person for using modern social media tools to express one's own personal views, risks further alienation by the West.

⁶⁶ Anonymous, "Al Qaeda 'Threat to Saudi Royals'," *BBC*, sec. World News, November 12, 2003.

⁶⁷ Stuart Grudgings, "Hamza Kashgari Reportedly Sent Back to Saudi Arabia to Face Execution for Tweets," *The Huffington Post* Feb 12, 2012.

INFLUENCE ON EXTREMIST GROUPS

According to the Koran, God predetermined Islam to be the one true religion and man will be judged by God by what he did on earth. Sunni extremists groups such as Al Qaeda use this philosophy to attract individuals fully committed to their cause because they believe their destinies are predetermined. They see their actions as necessary to secure their place in paradise.⁶⁸ Groups such as AQ and other Sunni inspired extremist organisations interpret the Koran literally and focus on the *jihad*, or holy war. AQ, and AQ inspired groups, see themselves as warriors conducting *jihad* in the name of Islam and *Sharia*, or God's law, is the only authority they recognize. They can be defined by four key concepts, *salafism*, *jihad*, *hijra* and *jahiliya*. For extremists, *Jihad* is the struggle that will end *jahiliya*, or the corruption of society as determined by the *Salafists*. *Hijra* is the preparation that is necessary for *jihad* UBL once stated, "we left our country on *jihad* in the path of Allah, and it is for the sake of Allah, praise and glory be upon Him, that we made this blessed *Hijra* to facilitate the implementation of the *Sharia*."⁶⁹ For extremists, the reward is in the after-life, and it matters how you get there.

Extremist groups depend on their own Islamic scholars to justify their extremist activity. Consequently, traditional *Wahhabiists*, while providing the baseline for fundamentalism, does not necessarily justify extremism. The Muslim Brotherhood and will be examined briefly, to show how this Islamic political entity has influenced radical Islamic scholars that promote extremist ideology and justify violent behaviour. Then

⁶⁸ Dobrot, *The Global War on Terrorism: A Religious War*, 119, 7

⁶⁹ Turner, *From Cottage Industry to International Organisation: The Evolution of Salafi-Jihadism and the Emergence of the Al Qaeda Ideology*, 541-558

radical cleric Abu Mohammd al-Maqdisi will be examined as an example of how a *Wahhabi* inspired scholar subsequently affected AQ and AQ inspired terrorist groups because of his belief that all politicians are corrupt because they make laws that do not come from God. In effect, these examples show how extremist groups will seek out radical scholars that support their views. They may use *Wahhabiism* as an ideological foundation, but they focus on the extreme messaging while ignoring the more moderate teachings. These radical scholars provide the Islamic justification that links contemporary issues, such as the stationing of US troops in Saudi Arabia, to pure Islamic fundamentalism. This justifies using the origins of Islam to fight a contemporary enemy based on historical and fundamental principles.

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

The Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 by Hasan al-Bana as a bulwark to British interference in the domestic affairs of an Islamic country which, to some, was viewed as corrupting Islam itself. While the Muslim Brotherhood initially was established as a political entity, Sayyid Qutb became increasingly militant following his arrest in 1954 for plotting to overthrow the government of Egypt's Abdel Nasser whom he viewed as corrupt and illegitimate. In the 1960s, he would later begin to challenge the *Wahhabii* hegemony as a foundation in order to justify direct action specifically aimed at the leadership of an Islamic country, whom he viewed as corrupt because it had become so susceptible to foreign influence.⁷⁰ Qutb compared 20th century Muslims to the first generation of believers and called for an Islamic revolution led by a vanguard Islamic

⁷⁰ David Commins, "Chapter Five: The Wahhabi Mission and Islamic Revivalism," in I.B. Tauris, 2009), 130-154., 148

party to conduct *jihad* and overthrow *jahili*, or non-believer governments. Although *Wahhabi* scholars critique Qutb and his understanding of Islam and do not view him as a legitimate scholar, he has undoubtedly influenced many past and present insurgents, including current Al Qaeda leader Zayman al-Zawhiri.⁷¹

AL MAQDISI

Al-Maqdisi is a contemporary *Wahhabi* inspired Sunni cleric who has influenced AQ and militants such as Mohammed Bouyer who murdered Dutch film director Theo van Gogh. He is considered one of the most influential ideological influences among modern radical Muslims, and is significant because of his disdain for foreign governments and his belief that they are valid targets because followers of secular governments follow rules not created by God, but by man.⁷² Therefore, they are apostates deserving of death. Al-Maqdisi focuses on a concept of complete loyalty to God, Islam and other Muslims while at the same time avoiding everything else known as *al-wala' wa-l-bara'*.⁷³ For Al-Maqdisi and his followers, true believers only follow *Sharia*, or Islamic law, and subordinating oneself to anything else is unacceptable. He is dangerous because his messaging resonates with Muslims who view all governments as corrupt, and seek to follow the only authority they understand, God's laws as articulated in the Koran and codified in *Sharia* law.

GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS

⁷¹ Wagemakers, *Defining the Enemy: Abū Muhammad Al-Maqdisī's Radical Reading of Sūrat Al-Mumtahana*, 348-371

⁷² *Ibid.*, 342

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 351

It is impossible to consider Middle East politics without taking into consideration the Islamic make-up of any population. Islam is important in this context because it has often been used as the legitimizing force allowing one tribe to rule over another. Historically, Shia populations have been dominated throughout the Middle East from Bahrain through Iraq. This has inevitably resulted in a certain amount of oppression and resentment throughout the Middle East. While Iraq has recently elected a Shia majority, lingering resentment over centuries of Sunni domination is a significant factor in regional politics.

This discussion has global implications because radical messaging resonates with certain individuals around the world. It is no longer restricted to the Middle East or North Africa. Although the NCTC 2011 report indicates the vast majority of terrorist attacks in 2011 occurred in the Middle East with the majority of them being directed against religious targets, religious violence is a constant theme from Iraq to Pakistan.⁷⁴ Furthermore, through modernisation, globalisation, the internet and changing demographics it is becoming increasingly easier for radical messaging to reach greater audiences and Canada is not immune to this phenomenon.

CONCLUSION

Wahhabiism has provided an Islamic foundation that has supported violent activity for hundreds of years. Islamic theologian Muhammed ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab introduced *Wahhabiism* in the 17th century because he believed Islam was being corrupted by outside influences. Drawing upon scholars from the medieval ages, Abd al-

⁷⁴ United States Government, *2010 NCTC Report on Terrorism*, 1-57

Wahhab advocated purifying Islam from all corrupting influences which included Christians, Jews, and other sects of Islam that did not meet a certain purification standard.

Saudi Sheiks at the time of Ibn al-Wahhab legitimized their expansionist campaigns using *Wahhabiism* as their doctrine. This not only sent a warning message to the Ottoman Empire, but it started a symbiotic relationship between the House of Saud and the *Wahhabi ulema* that exists to this day. Saudi Arabia contains the two holiest cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, and the House of Saud is considered the Custodian of the Two Holy Sites. This has resulted in Saudi Arabia taking a stewardship position in Islam which allows Saudi Arabia to influence the spread of Islam globally. This relationship has also evolved to the point where secular decisions are given with tacit support of the *ulema*, and the *ulema* has deferred specific decision making to the House of Saud. This is largely because of issues such as globalisation and modernisation, which the *ulema* is ill-equipped to deal with because of its pre-occupation of returning Islam to the state it was in when it was practiced by the Prophet and the first generation of followers, the *Salifs*.

Contemporary *Salifs* are concerned with returning to its original state and use *Wahhabiism* as justification to attack perceived enemies of Islam. *Salifs* are also concerned with corrupting influences and view only God as the only legitimate authority. Therefore, for *Salifs* anyone that follows man-made laws is considered a heretic or apostate and deserve to be killed. For them only *Sharia*, or Islamic law, is the only law they recognize.

Extremist groups are attracted to *Wahhabiism* because it legitimizes violence against enemies of Islam. *Wahhabiism* defines enemies of Islam as *infidels*, and describes anyone that does not subscribe to their specific version of Islam as an *infidel*, making even Muslims possible targets of violence. This is a reflection of traditional tribal dichotomy used at the time of Mohammed to identify with a particular tribe by a shared enemy. However, it is still a significant factor in contemporary extremist circles because they view themselves as warriors fighting *jihad* in order to purify Islam. Foreign influence remains the key reason why extremists will take up arms in support of *jihadist* ideology. Following World War I countries such as Egypt, Pakistan and India started to resent colonial influence and blamed it for the corruption of Islam and leaders in Islamic countries. The formation of the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, inspired radical elements to conduct targeted violence against what they perceived leaders. This resentment has evolved to direct targeting of foreign influence such as the 9/11 attacks, the London Tube attacks, and the Madrid Train attack in Spain Emerging clerics, such as al-Maqdisi, have significant influence on groups such as AQ and other Sunni inspired groups, who are attracted to their radical messaging and are willing to conduct violent attacks in support of these extreme beliefs.

Despite the current preoccupation with AQ and Sunni influenced terrorism, Iran continues to increase its influence throughout the Middle East. To do this, Iran depends on Shia Islam to justify its existence. The question then becomes, to what end is Iran trying to achieve, and how far will they go to achieve it? Iran is known to control the activities of groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, who base their extremist ideology on

Shia Islam. Consequently the next chapter will discuss Shia Islam and the role of Iran in promoting Shia Islam globally.

Chapter 4: Shia Revivalism

INTRODUCTION

Shia Islam is often considered “the protest movement within the Islamic World.”⁷⁵ British author Edward Mortimer describes Shi’ism as “the doctrine of opposition with the starting point being the defeat of Ali and his house.”⁷⁶ Reza Aslan, a research associate at the University of Southern California’s Center on Public Diplomacy, calls it “the protest movement within Islam.”⁷⁷ Michael Petrou of *Macleans* calls it “the religion of opposition, protest and defeat.”⁷⁸ This sense of indignation is an underlying theme that characterizes its relations with Sunni Muslims.

At the strategic level the conflict between Shia and Sunni is represented by a struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran as each country seeks to be the true leader of the Islamic world. While Saudi Arabia is known for exporting *Wahhabiism*, Iran is known for the 1979 Islamic Revolution and its subsequent ability to influence Shia populations throughout the Middle East. Consequently, this chapter will examine how Iran influences events in the Middle East through its Shia populations, and what global consequences this may have. This will include the role of proxy forces such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria. This will also address how Iran uses its Al Quds force in its international embassies to monitor and control Iranian populations around the world.

⁷⁵ Michael Petrou, "Rise of the Shias," *Maclean's* 119, no. 40 (10/09, 2006), 38-39. , 38

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* , 38

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* , 38

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

TWELVER SHIISM

Twelver Shiism is the most common form of Shiism and is common in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain. Twelvers accept a line of twelve infallible imams, descendent from Ali and believe they were divinely appointed from birth.⁷⁹ Twelvers accept that the last *imam* “disappeared” in the late ninth century and await his return to lead the community. However, they have reconciled the idea of direct line lineage when the line of direct descendants from Ali ended by allowing, religious leaders, *mujtahids*, the right to interpret religion and lead the community.⁸⁰

Ayatollahs are considered the most learned of the *mujtahids*. In an Islamic Republic such as Iran, it is the *Ayatollah* who wields the most influence. This makes the President subordinate to the *Ayatollah*. In a trend of *Islamic Revivalism*, this is best demonstrated by the late Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini who seized power from the late Shah of Iran in 1979. He then imposed a Shia based theocracy, *velayat-e faqi*, on what is now called the Islamic Republic of Iran. This has resulted in a Middle East rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Each nation considers themselves as the legitimate leader of Islam. Additionally, since the collapse of Iraq in 2003, Iran has steadily increased in influence throughout the Middle East, which has caused both Israel and Saudi Arabia great concern.⁸¹ When nationalist and ethnic issues are added to intra-

⁷⁹ Blanchard, *Islam: Sunnis and Shiites: RS21745*, 1-CRS-6 ,5

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* ,5

⁸¹ Sam Razavi, "Reassessing Iran and the "Shi'a Crescent"" (New Orleans, International Studies Association 51st Annual Convention, Feb 18, 2010, 2010),11

Islam issues, there is significant risk of regional destabilisation throughout the entire Middle East.

ORIGINS OF SHIA ISLAM

The origins of *Shia* Islam date back to the death of the Prophet Mohammed when his son-in-law and cousin, Ali, was initially bypassed to succeed Mohammed as the *caliph*. Shia Muslims believe Ali was the rightful heir, not simply because they believe Mohammed had previously indicated so, but because he was a blood relative to the prophet. Even when Ali was eventually selected, there remained deep-seeded animosity amongst the various camps about who should lead the community. This was related to the Shia belief that divine authority was vested in the leader, and could only be passed through blood relations. *Shia* believe that the *Imam*, or head of community, is chosen by God, therefore not subject to election or designation by a group.⁸² This is in opposition to the belief of an earthly caliphate in *Sunni* Islam where the *Imam*, or leader, is selected because he is the most knowledgeable, and not because he has any divine connection.

As previously mentioned, Ali was murdered by Kharjite priests who believed the only way to stop the on-going feud between Ali and his primary rival Muwaiyn was to assassinate them both. While Muyaian survived and emerged as the subsequent *caliph* Ali's son Hussein attempted to avenge his father's murder at Karbala, only to be killed by Muywain and his supporters. This single event galvanized *Shiats*, or supporters of Ali, from those who would form Sunni Islam and led to what is considered the first civil war in Islam. This also resulted in rituals such as *Ashura*, in which followers engage in self-

⁸² Blanchard, *Islam: Sunnis and Shiites: RS21745*, 1-CRS-6 ,4-5

flagellation, while retracing the steps of Ali's son, Hussein, where he was martyred attempting to avenge his father Ali's murder.⁸³ Moreover, this has heightened the animosity between the two sects as *Shia*, on one hand, feel shame and demonstrate their guilt because of what happened to Hussein. *Sunni*, on the other hand, view this as a form of idol worship and see rituals such as this, as blasphemous and punishable by death.⁸⁴

While Islamic tensions have smouldered since the 16th century, there has been a relative peace throughout the Middle East until the 21st century. However, the Sunni-Shia conflict has re-emerged as a contemporary flashpoint with potential global repercussions. This was demonstrated following the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003, where not only did known Sunni extremists such as Zarqawi mobilise in order to take advantage of the resultant power vacuum, radical Shia clerics such as al-Sadr also raised their own Shiite militias. This essentially resulted in a civil war between Sunni and Shia as each tried to consolidate power along sectarian lines.⁸⁵

The removal of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent violence raised significant concern throughout the Middle East. The Saudi Foreign Minister asked the United States why they effectively turned Iraq over to the Iranians, particularly after they previously supported Iraq to block *Shia* Islam from expanding during the Iran-Iraq war.⁸⁶ Jordan King Abdullah warned that a Shia "crescent" from Tehran to Beirut would destabilise the

⁸³ *Ashura* is the ritualistic remembrance on the tenth day of the Islamic month of Muharram and distinguishes Shia from Sunni followers.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* , 5

⁸⁵ "Cradle of War, School of Jihad," *Economist* 376, no. 8435 (07/16, 2005), 41-42. ,41

⁸⁶ Cole et al., "*A Shia Crescent: What Fallout for the United States?*", 1-27 , 18

entire Middle East.⁸⁷ Former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stated that Shiites residing in Arab countries are more loyal to Iran than they are to their own countries.⁸⁸ These statements speak to a fear that exists throughout the Middle East that Shia populations may seek retribution for centuries of perceived oppression. Saudi Arabia and other Sunni dominated governments worry about Iranian influence through organic *Shia* populations because they know *Shia* are loyal to Iran, much the same manner as Sunnis are to Saudi Arabia. This has resulted in a proxy war with Saudi Arabia and Iran attempting to manipulate events in the region to their advantage in order to be seen as regional leaders. Islam is the one issue that supersedes Arab or Persian Nationalism.

Of significance is that Iran controls Hezbollah in neighbouring Syria and Lebanon, and Iran has the ability to influence Shia populations around the world, Canada included, for support. This is supported by recent statements made by US Officials attributing increasing lethality in Syria to Iranian involvement providing military and intelligence to President Assad.⁸⁹ A recent report by *The Globe and Mail* further corroborates allegations of Iranian influence throughout the so-called “Arab Spring” *Shia* uprisings, which has resulted in Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Gulf States dispatching troops to quell the largely predominantly *Shia* protests.⁹⁰

IRANIAN INFLUENCE

⁸⁷ Petrou, *Rise of the Shias*, 38-39 ,39

⁸⁸ Haji Yousefi, *Whose Agenda is Served by the Idea of a Shia Crescent?*, 114-135 , 116

⁸⁹ Joby Warrick and Liz Sly, "U.S. Officials: Iran is Stepping Up Lethal Aid to Syria," *The Washington Post*, sec. World, March 3, 2012.

⁹⁰ Barbara Surk and Reem Khalifa, "Violence Breaks Out in Bahrain as Arab Spring Anniversary Nears," *The Globe and Mail* Feb. 13, 2012.

Shia has become associated with Iran since the Safavid dynasty in the 16th century.⁹¹ However, despite periodic upheavals, *Shia* Islam was largely subordinated to nationalist issues which resulted in a status quo that existed until the 21st century. Similar to *Sunni* extremists who view foreign intervention as detrimental to Islam, *Shia* scholars have used anti-Americanism as a focal point to unite disparate groups within Iran. This was fundamental to the 1979 Islamic Revolution. *Ayatollah* Khomeini, for example, united disparate local groups consisting of the clergy, intellectuals, and a traditional devout middle class through Islam because of a growing hostility to the Shaw and his close relationship with the United States.⁹²

Ayatollah Khomeini was able to capitalize on growing tensions between the US and Iran due to then President Carter's criticism of Iran's human rights abuses. Khomeini then seized control of Iran through a bloodless coup and replaced the Shaw's empire with a theocracy called *velayat-e faqih*. However, he was able to use religion to orchestrate mass demonstrations throughout the country focused on the hatred for the Shaw, which resulted in a regime change and a fundamental shift in Middle East politics.

MIDDLE EAST POLITICS

In 1982, when Saddam Hussein invaded Iran, hundreds of thousands of Iranians died during the eight year Iran-Iraq war. Many of them "were martyred" walking across known mine-fields. This affected the ideology of many young Iranians because they identified with the martyrdom of Hussein. Khomeini expertly linked the sacrifices of

⁹¹ Razavi, *Reassessing Iran and the "Shi'a Crescent"* , 12

⁹² Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002), 454. ,109

Iranian warriors fighting against Iraq, to Hussein's attempts to avenge his father's death. Khomeini then ensured those *martyrs*, who sacrificed themselves in defence of Islam, were revered, and their families compensated. This affected connotations surrounding certain rituals, such as the ritual of self-flagellation associated with the *ashura*. For radicals, ideology shifted from guilt and shame to power by self-sacrifice through suicide attacks.⁹³

Another significant impact of the Iran-Iraq war was that Iranian nationalism was replaced by Islamism as the principal factor in Iranian identity.⁹⁴ Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Revolutionary Islam has been defended by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the *Pasdaran*, which was created specifically to protect the *Ayatollah* and his revolutionary ideas.⁹⁵ The *Pasdaran* has tremendous asymmetric warfare capabilities and includes the Al Quds Force which works both covertly and overtly in support of Revolutionary Islamic goals.⁹⁶ The Al Quds force is known to provide support to Hezbollah and other Shia militias throughout the region. In addition, they have offices in many Iranian embassies where they can monitor and control the Iranian diaspora around the world.⁹⁷ It is the naval forces of the IRGC that routinely

⁹³ *Ibid.* ,116

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* ,118

⁹⁵ Anthony Cordesman, *Iran's Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence and Paramilitary Forces: Rough Working Draft* (Washington, DC: Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy,[2007]). ,5

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* ,3

⁹⁷ Global Security, "Homeland Security," Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/mohammed_hamdi_al-ahdal.htm (accessed Dec/17, 2011).

harasses US shipping in the littorals off of Iran, and captured fifteen British sailors and marines in 2007 for allegedly violating Iranian Territorial waters.

HEZBOLLAH

During the first years of Hezbollah, Iran provided most of its funding in support of Iranian and Syrian political interests.⁹⁸ Similar to Khomeini, Hezbollah exploited celebrations of Hussein's martyrdom as a recruitment opportunity to disenfranchised Shias who identified with being oppressed. These new militants saw martyrdom as a legitimate way to strike at more powerful enemies. For example, in 1983 Hezbollah conducted suicide attacks against French and American contingents, which resulted in they, as well as Israel withdrawing the troops they had stationed in Lebanon.⁹⁹ This also resulted in increased confidence that a smaller grass-roots movement could have such influence on the larger international community. Since then it has continued to become more efficient, at least in part, because of support from Iran.

Iran uses Hezbollah to spread its influence outside of its borders, which has a destabilising influence because it undermines legitimate authorities in neighbouring countries. Iran's influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, through Hezbollah, gives Iran a *de facto* voice in Lebanese and Syrian politics.¹⁰⁰

GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS

⁹⁸ Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, 454 , 129

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* , 128

¹⁰⁰ Razavi, *Reassessing Iran and the "Shi'a Crescent"* , 6

It should be no surprise that both Sunni and Shia militias, supported by Sunni backers, and Iran respectively, have fought so fiercely to control the Iraqi population. This is one of the reasons Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980, one year after the Islamic Revolution. He feared Shia expansionism and did not trust *Ayatollah* Khomeini. The strategic location of Iraq, centred between Iran and Saudi Arabia, means Iraqi stability is intrinsically tied to Middle East stability. This is reinforced by testimony given by General Petraeus to the US Congress in 2007 that the US military in Iraq had significant evidence that Iran was meddling in internal Iraqi affairs through the IRGC as well as the Al Quds directorate.¹⁰¹ Tehran believes that influencing Shi'a population in Iraq is an effective way of influencing Iraq because Iran presumably does not want another anti-Shia government.

This has significant implications for global stability as it inevitably involves the United States and its allies, which includes Canada. This could be military contributions in the Persian Gulf, or diplomatic efforts seeking to contain Iranian expansionism. This also makes it likely that the increasing number of Canadians of Iraqi and Iranian descent will seek to influence Canadian foreign policy as well, similar to Canada's Tamil diaspora in support of activity in Sri Lanka.¹⁰² As Geoffrey Kemp discusses, because of its ability to influence domestic issues within Iraq, Iran cannot be ignored in any plan for regional stability.

¹⁰¹ Cordesman, *Iran's Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence and Paramilitary Forces: Rough Working Draft*, 1-18

¹⁰² CTV, "Hundreds of Tamil Migrants Arrive at B.C. Base," CTV, <http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/TopStories/20100813/tamil-ship-arrives-100813/> (accessed Dec/17, 2011).

Without satisfactory working relationships among Washington, Tehran, and Baghdad, the future stability of the new Iraqi regime could be in doubt. Iran has immediate influence on Iraqi politics because of history and geography, as well as economic, ethnic, religious, and paramilitary ties. The extent to which Iran uses this influence to negatively affect events in Iraq will be determined in large part by the future relationship between Iran and the United States.¹⁰³

This fact has not gone unnoticed in Iran, where President Ahmadinejad has correspondingly become increasingly vocal in expressing opposition to the United States and Israel. As Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow, Middle Eastern Studies, indicates, “the new Iranian leadership is refreshingly indifferent to the United States. For them the United States is just another actor, a pernicious, sinister one, to be sure, but just another country on the global landscape.”¹⁰⁴ President Ahmadinejad takes this a step further, by combining Iran’s emerging influence with hostility towards the United States and Israel, in an effort to increase Iran’s influence by joining Arabs and Persians, Sunni and Shia, and any others who may only be united in their mutual dislike of the United States and Israel.¹⁰⁵

The ability for Iran to effectively control global *Shia* populations implies that *Shia* opposition groups are themselves united, which is not the case. In Iraq, for example, the two primary *Shia* militias, the Badr Organisation and the Mahdi Army, continue to fight each other for control of key areas. There are many other divisions between sects and sub-sects that will result in conflict, until such time as one group emerges victorious. Unfortunately, the lack of a dominant authority increases the likelihood of regional power

¹⁰³ Geoffrey Kemp, *Iran and Iraq: The Shia Connection, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Factor* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, [2005]). ,2

¹⁰⁴ Cole et al., “*A Shia Crescent: What Fallout for the United States?*”, 1-27 , 11

¹⁰⁵ Vali Nasr, “The SHIA REVIVAL,” *Military Review* 87, no. 3 (May, 2007), 9-13. , 12

struggles continuing throughout the Middle East for the foreseeable future, and the risk of these issues being exported to other countries is a very real possibility.

CONCLUSION

The first division in Islam centers on the fourth *caliph*, Ali who was the cousin and son-in-law of Mohammed. When he was murdered and his son Hussein was martyred trying to avenge his father's death, this resulted in what is considered the first Islamic civil war which lasted through the 8th and 9th centuries. The main issue, which still affects relations today, is how successive leaders chosen. Another significant issue is how Ali's sympathisers came to ritualize the death of his son Hussein. Rituals such as the *ashura*, which are characterised by mourning and disgrace for not having aided Hussein in his quest, have come to distinguish Shia from Sunni and remain a focal point of division between the two primary sects.

Followers of Ali believe that Ali was the rightful heir because he was a blood relative of the prophet. They do not recognize the legitimacy of the *caliphs* Umar and Uthman, who succeeded Mohammed in respective order. Furthermore, they believe that *imams*, or Islamic leaders, have a divine connection to God. Therefore, it should not be a community decision to pick leaders within Islam. However, this is in sharp contrast to Sunnis who view such views as heretical. Inevitably this has resulted in sectarian conflict which has precipitated significant bloodshed through the centuries.

Starting in the 16th century with the Safavid dynasty, Islam has been associated with the region now known as Iran. This resulted in a status quo in the Middle East with Persian Iran and its Shia Islam bordering the rest of the Middle East, predominated by

Sunni Arabs. In 1979, *Ayatollah* Khomeini took power from the Shah of Iran in a bloodless coup by harnessing anti-American sentiment and using Shia Islam as the primary rallying point. Since then, Iran has positioned itself to be the legitimate leader of all Islam, not just *Shia*. This has resulted in significant tensions throughout the Middle East and into the Eastern Mediterranean. Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni governments such as Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, worry about Iran's ability to influence Shia populations throughout the Middle East. They believe Iran will use their influence to undermine domestic stability, which will impact regional security. This is largely because governments in the Middle East have seen Iran support Hezbollah in Lebanon and how effective this relationship has become.

Ayatollah Khomeini expertly linked *Shia's* feelings of sacrifice, originating with Hussein's death at the hands of Sunnis, to modern day warriors ready to sacrifice themselves for the greater good. This was evidenced during the Iran-Iraq war in which soldiers who sacrificed themselves became national heroes whose families were compensated for their losses. This also affects Hezbollah, which views self-sacrifice as an honourable way to serve Islam.

It was not until 2003 when United States forces removed Saddam Hussein from Iraq, that the majority Shia population mobilised to take advantage of a power vacuum that emerged. This changed the dynamic of the entire Middle East as there is a genuine fear that Shia populations will rise up against Sunni minority governments supported by Iran. This has been reinforced by the "Arab Spring" which has seen long-time dictatorships toppled through popular uprisings fueled by increased use of social media. This has also been accompanied by strong oppressive tactics in countries such as Syria

and Bahrain that have used their militaries in an attempt to stifle internal opposition. This is undoubtedly having a destabilising effect throughout the Middle East. The consequences will be felt throughout the world, whether it be in increased gas prices, or increased migration as people flee the conflict zones.

This project has focused on Islamic extremists to this point. The next chapter will focus on implications for Canada for both intra-Islam relations, and potential consequences for Canada vis-à-vis Canadian foreign policy. The next chapter will also discuss, albeit briefly, non-Islamic extremism with a specific look at the LTTE and the Indian extremism group Babbar Khalsam. These two groups have a known presence in Canada and have undertaken activity within Canada that has undermined national security. For these reasons, they will be addressed to highlight the range of potential domestic threats there are in Canada which are related to other transnational issues.

Chapter 5: Canadian Implications

INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters have focused on Islamic radicalism, and how it could manifest itself in the modern world based on historical grievances. This makes sense because on a global scale the majority of Islamist extremist activity remains concentrated in the Middle East. However, extremism and *jihadist* ideology are being exported to various parts of the world as evidenced by the London bombings in 2005, the Madrid train bombings in 2004, the Bali bombings before that in 2002, and obviously the 9/11 attacks in the United States. While Canada has not yet been the site of a direct attack, both AQ and Al Shabaab have named Canada as a legitimate target of terrorism because of its role in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, the GoC indicates a variety of Canadians are suspected of spreading violent propaganda, raising money for terrorism and facilitating travel for extremists.¹⁰⁷

Despite the fact there have been no attacks on Canadian soil, Canada does have its examples of Sunni extremism. These include the “Toronto 18” who sought to destroy financial and security symbols in Toronto and Ottawa, the infamous Qadr Family with links to Al Qaeda, the arrest of Mohammed Momin Khawaja for his involvement in a failed terrorist plot in the UK, and Ahmed Ressam, who was arrested attempting to cross the border in Washington State. Furthermore, evidence given by a detainee at Guantanamo Bay corroborates indicates that the Al Sunnah Al Nabawiah Mosque in

¹⁰⁶ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Examples of the Terrorist Threat to Canada," Government of Canada, <https://www.csis.gc.ca/prts/trrsm/xmpls-eng.asp> (accessed March 6, 2012).

¹⁰⁷ The Government of Canada, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 1-38 , 1-38

Montreal was used by Al Qaeda in the late 1990s, and likely was involved in planning the foiled millennium bombing plot targeting Los Angeles Airport.¹⁰⁸

Globalisation and changing immigration patterns, mean that Canada is facing more decentralised and diverse threats.¹⁰⁹ Consequently, this chapter will focus on what are the implications to Canada as more immigrants are coming from religious conflict zones. The intent is not to provide a comprehensive and exhaustive list of all terrorist entities. Rather this chapter will focus on Islamic groups such as AQ and Hezbollah as representative examples of radical extremism, to indicate how historical grievances are no longer geographically restricted to the Middle East and North Africa. Additionally non-Islamic groups, such as the LTTE or the Babbar Khalsa, will also be briefly discussed, only because they have a known presence in Canada, and have previously exploited Canada for their own nefarious purposes. Lastly, this chapter will discuss the role of social media in spreading propaganda, and look at the threat of self-radicalisation.

SUNNI EXTREMISM IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA

With riches derived from its massive oil reserves, Saudi Arabia is able to export its version of *Wahhabism* throughout the world. This includes non-Islamic countries such as Canada and the United States through private schools, religious seminars, mosques and even prisons.¹¹⁰ For this reason it is crucial that moderate Islamic Imams continue to speak out against misinterpretations and issue their own *fatwas*. This was

¹⁰⁸ Anonymous, "U.S. Lists Montreal Mosque as Al-Qaeda 'Recruiting' Place," *CBC*, sec. Canada, April 25, 2011.

¹⁰⁹ Government of Canada, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 1-38 m4

¹¹⁰ Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, 190, 128

recently demonstrated by Canadian Imam Syed Soharwdy, who issued a *fatwa* condemning honour killings as un-Islamic, following the alleged honour killing trial in Kingston, Ontario of an Afghan-Canadian family by other family members.

The Canadian Government needs to continue working with moderate Muslims across Canada to ensure Canadian laws are upheld and that religious fundamentalism does not destabilise Canadian society. To this point Canadian Somali Congress President Ahmed Hussein does not believe Canada is doing enough to mitigate the “poisonous ideology of extremists” and is worried Al Qaeda will continue to recruit Canadian Somali youth.¹¹¹ As Canada’s Muslim population grows, it is essential that Moderate Imams provide strong leadership in the Islamic communities to mitigate the likelihood of extremist views propagating within Canada. However, they can only do it with the support of the Government. As one of the pillars of the Canadian counter-strategy is prevention, this necessitates a positive relationship between the GoC and Canada’s Muslim community.

SHIA EXTREMISM IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA

Canada has significant Iranian populations, particularly in Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal. Moreover, there are also significant Lebanese and a growing number of Syrians immigrating to Canada. Some members of these communities have alleged ties to Hezbollah.¹¹² While most immigrants move to Canada to avoid conflict in their home

¹¹¹ Stewart Bell, "Al-Shabab Suicide Bomber Urges Terrorist Attacks Against Canada," *National Post*, sec. News, March 6, 2011.

countries, many still retain significant ties and remain connected to events in their native countries. They also represent a source of funding, recruitment and source of intelligence for insurgent groups seeking to either conduct operations in Canada, or use Canada to support global terrorism.

The Auditor General 2012 Spring Report suggests that there may be illicit Iranian activity in Canada, intimating that the IRGC is active in Canada.¹¹³ The IRGC is known to operate through Iranian embassies and Canada would be no exception. The GoC has confirmed the presence of Hezbollah and Hamas in Canada making the likelihood of Iranian influence through its Iranian population very plausible. This is supported by statements by former IRGC member Reza Kahlili, now living in the US, that Canada is a major target of Iranian espionage. He further indicates Iranian intelligence regularly spies on Iranians in Canada for evidence of dissidence, which places their families at risk when visiting Iran.¹¹⁴

OH CANADA!

Canada depends heavily on immigration to maintain its workforce and this trend is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. For their part, immigrants come to Canada for many different reasons. A significant change to Canadian migration, however, is that recent data shows a shift from European immigrants, to more migrants

¹¹² The Government of Canada, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 1-38 , 4

¹¹³ The Government of Canada, *2012 Spring Report of the Auditor General* (Ottawa, ON: The Government of Canada,[2012]).

¹¹⁴ Sheryl Saperia, "Are Iranian Spies Slipping through our Immigration Loopholes?" *The Huffington Post*, sec. Canada, April 5, 2012.

coming from African, Middle Eastern, or South Asian countries.¹¹⁵ In other words, many new immigrants are coming to Canada from conflict zones, or from failed or failing states.¹¹⁶ Moreover, immigrants from Iraq, Somalia, Syria, Pakistan, Yemen or Lebanon, for example, loosely correlate to areas where there has been increased Islamic revivalism.

What this means for Canada is because Canada is dependent on immigration, Canada will likely see an increase in migrants and refugees seeking to come to Canada to avoid conflict in their native countries. As University of Toronto Sociologist, Jeffrey Reid indicates, modern immigrants, “may have roots that tie them to Mumbai, as much as Toronto.”¹¹⁷ Physical proximity is no longer a requirement for active participation, and because of the conveniences associated with social media, it is easier to stay involved. As globalisation continues, the list of global injustices affecting Canadians will also grow. Global activism will likely see a certain element translate social injustices into excuses to engage in in global extremism. While most will seek peaceful means to address these issues, there will always be a radical element that will seek retribution to correct perceived injustices.

This means that Canada’s foreign policy decisions will undoubtedly anger various elements of its population from time to time. Even if those sub-populations contain a small percentage of radical extremists, this raises the possibility of violent activity in retribution for Canada’s stance on specific issues. The “Toronto 18” are believed to been

¹¹⁵ The Government of Canada, *Projections of the Diversity of the Canadian Population: 2006-2031*, 1-67

¹¹⁶ Sheldon, *The Failed State Index 2011*

¹¹⁷ Joe Friesen, "The Changing Face of Canada: Booming Minority Populations by 2031," *The Globe and Mail*, sec. National, March 10, 2010.

self-radicalised in Canada, and were united in their opposition to Canadian Military involvement in Afghanistan, and the plight of Muslims.¹¹⁸ They proved that Canadian political symbols, such as the Prime Minister, CSIS Headquarters, and Canadian Forces Bases (CFB) are all potential targets due to Canada's involvement in global affairs.

Of the 18 members only three were born in Canada, but were first generation Canadians. The adults were from Afghanistan, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia. The ethnicity of the youths cannot be determined. This trend is likely to continue and it places Canada in a precarious position as it welcomes new immigrants from around the world. Canada needs to balance the security of all, with individual freedoms, knowing that some may be, or become involved in global terrorist activity. The fact that three were born in Canada, and all were radicalised in Canada speaks to an undercurrent of extremism that currently does exist in Canada, the exact level of which is unknown.

SOCIAL MEDIA

The power of social media to incite change and to coordinate real activity is a relatively new phenomenon that provides technological opportunities to all groups, regardless of affinity, in support of a multitude of purposes. The so called "Arab Spring" is an example of how individuals in foreign countries can influence domestic activity through organising and coordinating activity using the safety of distance as protection

¹¹⁸ Isabel Teotoni, "Toronto 18," *The Star* 2012.

from retribution.¹¹⁹ Social Media is largely credited for accelerating regime change from Egypt to Tunisia.

While the majority of this global activism has been specific to Middle East politics, globalisation and technological advancements have resulted in the ability to influence regional activities from anywhere in the world. Canada is often cited for being technologically advanced and having one of the highest degrees of internet usage in the world. Of interest, data from 2011 indicates that political news sites saw a 47% increase from the previous year.¹²⁰ This is not surprising given the requirement for an increasingly diverse populations desire to keep abreast of political developments, while maintaining communications with friends and family around the world.

The sheer volume of on-line activity, let alone the global nature, is a daunting task for any security agency attempting to monitor and track emergent threats to stability. However, following the anti-government demonstrations in Egypt at the start of the “Arab Spring”, the intelligence community was heavily criticised for not paying sufficient attention to social media websites such as Twitter and Facebook.¹²¹ This suggests that counter-terrorism experts also need to be technological savvy. Not only do they need to be aware of multiple historical grievances, modern injustices and global immigration patterns, they also need to keep abreast of changing communication patterns,

¹¹⁹ Much activity in 2011 was in fact coordinated through social media by individuals resident in other nations who could exercise a command and control relationship to organise large groups of individuals.

¹²⁰ Omar El Akkad, "Canadians' Internet Usage nearly Double the Worldwide Average," *The Globe and Mail*, sec. Technology, March 8, 2011.

¹²¹ Miller, *Senators Question Intelligence Agencies' Anticipation of Egypt Uprising*

and virtual organisations in addition to real ones. Another aspect of concern to security officials is social media's ability for individuals predisposed to extremism, to participate in a process called "self-radicalisation".

SELF-RADICALISATION

CSIS is concerned about the development of so called "home-grown terrorists" through self-radicalisation.¹²² This is particularly alarming when combined with the fact that western educated individuals, familiar with European and North American culture, are valuable assets to insurgent groups. The United States born Yemeni radical cleric Anwar Al Aulaqi, who was killed by a US strike in Yemen, epitomised this danger because of his ability to speak English and his ability to influence so many disenfranchised Muslims in the western world.¹²³

This threat has become more pronounced in Canada with the recent merger of Al Qaeda and Somali terrorist group Al Shabaab due to the significant Somali diaspora in Canada. Not long after the announcement in 2011, Al-Shabaab urged attacks against Canada. A message attributed to Al Shabaab states, "My brothers and sisters, do jihad in America, do jihad in Canada, do jihad in England [and] anywhere in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, in China, in Australia – anywhere you find *kuffar* [infidels]," This reinforces allegations that US and Canadian Somalis have gone to Somalia to engage in terrorist activity.¹²⁴ Moreover, this addresses how radical youth in North America may associate

¹²² Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *CSIS Public Report 2009/2010*, 1-55 , 10

¹²³ *Ibid.* ,9

¹²⁴ Bell, *Al-Shabab Suicide Bomber Urges Terrorist Attacks Against Canada*

with specific issues in their homelands, and highlights an available path of self-radicalisation should they choose to participate in direct action in support of ideological goals. This is despite the fact many of the Somali youth in discussion were born in North America.

LTTE

In addition to Islamic based extremism, there are examples of non-Islamic extremists in Canada. For nearly thirty years, the LTTE was one of the most sophisticated and deadliest terrorist insurgencies in the world.¹²⁵ They are known to use front organisations in places such as Canada and the UK to help manage, control and integrate the support of their expatriate communities. As late as 2008 the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) asserted that the LTTE use such World Tamil Movements (WTM), which work through a “mother” WTM in Toronto, Ontario. These organisations allow LTTE leadership, through the Tiger Organization of Secret Intelligence Services (TOSIS), to effectively control the Tamil diaspora and coordinate LTTE activities internationally.

In 2008, intelligence officials in Ottawa indicated that illegal migrants and refugees coming to Canada paid between \$18,000 and \$32,000 to be smuggled into Canada. This money allegedly funds LTTE activity which has historically included activity ranging from assassinations to battalion sized assaults against Sri Lankan forces. The most famous example is the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 by an 18 year old female LTTE member. In 2009 and 2010 two boatloads of Tamil

¹²⁵ Chalk

nationals arrived on the west coast of Vancouver Island with over 600 irregular migrants seeking refugee status in Canada. Some of these refugees are alleged to be part of an LTTE cadre that seeks to reconstitute its leadership and intelligence branch from within Canada.

The LTTE are known for their sophisticated logistics infrastructure, and their own merchant vessels. This has allowed them to transport fighters, ammunition and supplies as necessary. Allegations of LTTE members being smuggled amongst other Tamil passengers should not be surprising because the LTTE and its diaspora are intimately linked.¹²⁶ In North America the Tamil diaspora is primarily concentrated in Toronto, Ontario and New Jersey. This diaspora has provided international support to the domestic struggle for decades and has long been considered an essential lifeline to the Tamil struggle in Sri Lanka.

Although the LTTE were defeated in Sri Lanka, they did manage to wage a civil war for approximately 30 years and elements of the LTTE still exist. It is well documented that Canada has been a source country for LTTE activity for many years. The recent boatloads of Tamils to the West coast is further evidence an entity exists within Canada that has a complex logistical and planning capability, and is capable of smuggling people and material vast distances. While the end state of creating an independent homeland for Sri Lankan Tamils may no longer be a reality, the fact an

¹²⁶ Chalk, 102

organization known for its violence, ingenuity and culture of “martyrdom” may exist within Canadian borders is reason enough for concern.¹²⁷

BABBAR KHALSA

The Babbar Khalsa is a Sikh extremist group that wants to create a Sikh nation known as Khalistan within India. This organisation was created by Talwinder Singh Parmar, who is believed to have masterminded the Air India bombings. With an increasing number of immigrants coming to Canada from India, the possibility of further terrorist activity in support of this cause also increases. British Columbia has already witnessed very significant clashes in its Sikh community between its moderates and more extremists, and the possibility of ethnic conflict amongst extremists from other ethnicities cannot be ignored.

The Sikh uprisings in British Columbia were treated primarily as a religious issue, isolated to the Temples of the Lower Mainland. It was not treated as a mainstream Canadian issue. One of the criticisms why the inquiry was not released until over 25 years after the original incident, and only one person, Inderjit Singh Reyad was convicted, was because this event was viewed more as a foreign issue than a Canadian one.¹²⁸ The fact that 280 Canadians died in the largest act of aviation terrorism prior to 9/11, and the bombings were orchestrated from Canada did not matter. The GoC did

¹²⁷ Peter Chalk, "The Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 9, no. 2 (08, 2008), 97-104., 102

¹²⁸ Kent Roach, "The Air India Report and the Regulation of Charities and Terrorism Financing," *University of Toronto Law Journal* 61, no. 1 (Winter2011, 2011), 45-57.,

finally call a full public inquiry in 2006 and not surprisingly this resulted in significant criticism of Canada's counter-terrorism strategy.

BACKLASH

A related aspect which deserves mention was recently demonstrated in Norway. In July 2011, an anti-Islamic lone gunman, Anders Behring Breivik, killed 77 people in two separate attacks in some type of psychological response to what he perceived as "the cultural destruction" of Norwegian culture.¹²⁹ While there have been hate crimes committed in Canada, specifically aimed at such religious symbols such as mosques and synagogues, this level of Sunni backlash has not yet been seen in Canada. However, the possibility of a backlash needs to be considered as Canada is not so dissimilar to Norway.

In this environment it is possible that feelings of resentment could develop by those who feel threatened by change, and individuals could act against what they perceive as being responsible for inducing change. The recent Canadian census indicates that immigrants are arriving in increasing numbers from countries that are different than the traditional European Christian based countries. This is also at a time that Canada is becoming increasingly vocal in its pro-Israeli stance, which by default alienates pro-Palestinian causes. With increasing visible minorities coming to Canada from areas that more sympathetic to Palestinian causes, including the destruction of Israel, this is creating the conditions for increased culture conflict in Canada.

CONCLUSION

¹²⁹ Gwladys Gouche, "Victims of Norway Massacre Weep, Ridicule Anders Breivik as Killer Decries 'Cultural Destruction'," *National Post*, sec. International, Feb. 6, 2012.

In the current environment it is increasingly easier for radical messaging to spread globally. This means that more individuals are susceptible to this messaging and could become attracted to extremist ideologies committed to conducting violent activity. Canada has proven it is not immune and Canadian officials have arrested a number of individuals in recent years who had committed themselves to attack political and religious targets both within Canada and abroad. Consequently, Canada needs to remain vigilant to the threat of Sunni inspired terrorism by constantly monitoring extremists groups and their sources of inspiration. Canada needs to continue working with moderate Islamic scholars to counter potentially alarming messaging, whether these originate from within Canada, or broadcast on the internet through increasingly available social media tools.

The tools available to Sunni extremist groups also extend to non-Islamic entities as well. The LTTE and Babbar Khalsa are just two non-Islamic terrorist groups that demonstrate that the threat of terrorism in support of ideological goals is not restricted to Islamic groups. This complicates Canada's counter-terrorism strategy as ideologies of non-Islamic groups are substantially different than that of Islamic groups, even though their actual tactics may be similar. It is one thing to identify and prepare for single acts of terrorism. An effective counter-terrorism strategy requires a comprehensive approach that not only eliminates terrorists, but also discredits the ideology that motivates people to conduct acts of terrorism. It is important to reiterate that terrorism is simply a tactic used by extremist groups in pursuance of an ideological goal.

Based on the premise that terrorism is an extreme expression of political or religious activism makes it increasingly likely that Canada will become a new battlefield

in the competition of opposing ideologies. This may be virtual support through social media sites such as Facebook or Twitter. In the extreme, this may mean Canadians planning and participating in acts of terrorism, in Canada or abroad. There is already evidence that this type of activity has occurred in Canada. Unfortunately the possibility of a terrorist attack on Canadian soil cannot be discounted with both AQ and Al Shabaab having called for attacks on Canada. Prior to 9/11 this activity was primarily restricted to the Middle East. However, since then Islamic terrorism has become more global in nature and has manifested itself from Europe to Bali. Canada is not immune, nor impregnable.

A developing trend in which Canada should pay particular attention is the possibility of extremism backlash. A Norwegian citizen, Anders Behring Breivik, demonstrated to the world how an individual may take matters into his own hands and conduct mass murder based on what he called “the cultural destruction” of Norwegian culture. As Canada continues to change based on immigration, it is increasingly likely that opposing value systems will eventually collide in Canada. For example, terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, supported by Iran, have called for the destruction of Israel at a time when the GoC has become increasingly vocal in support of Israel. With both Iranian populations and Jewish populations, concentrated in Canada’s major cities, the possibility exists that previously considered Middle Eastern issues, will become Canadian issues as well. The line between national and international issue is likely to continue to blur as immigrants remain engaged in global issues. It becomes a threat to Canadian security, however, when radical extremists in Canada use terrorism in support of specific goals.

Conclusion

The Air India 182 Flight in 1985 should have been proof enough that Canada is not immune to terrorism. However, with the arrests of “the Toronto 18”, Moamin Khawaja, and Ahem Rassam and Omar Qadr in the US and Afghanistan before that, there is growing evidence of extremist activity originating in Canada that supports global terrorism. Despite the death of UBL, this type of activity is not likely to stop. Canada needs to prepare itself.

While the majority of terrorist activity remains concentrated in the Middle East, the London bombing, the Spanish Train bombing, and the Bali Bombing in addition to 9/11 itself, are stark reminders, however, that no country is immune and that internal vigilance is vital to national security. Terrorism is a global phenomenon and Canada is not immune. The possibility of a terrorist act on Canadian soil cannot be discounted. In fact the “Toronto 18” were planning to execute exactly this type of activity in Canada, and both AQ and Al Shabaab have called for direct attacks on Canada.

Terrorism is also complex because extremists who would use terrorism may do so for different reasons. Additionally, as the NCTC previously indicated, the problem of attributing acts of violence to terrorism is knowing whether an act was terrorism or criminal. Many groups are known to have used Canada, primarily to fund-raise, recruit and organize activity in support of goals in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East and South Asia. AQ is known to have used Canada in support of their international terrorism goals because Canada, similar to the United States, generally represents a pool

of young talented people that are familiar with western culture and are able to speak English.

Globalisation and social media tools continue to evolve and are blurring the line between domestic and international issues. This means Sunni Muslims, Sri Lankan Tamils or Iranians living in Toronto, Montreal or Vancouver, may be solicited to support nationalist causes even though they have no physical connection to an issue. As Canada continues to recruit immigrants from Asia, the Middle East and Africa, many of them remain connected to issues in their countries of origin. While this does not mean they will become radical activists and conduct acts of terrorism, it does mean, that Canada could become a satellite site for ethnic based, religious based, or political based conflict.

Canada's changing demographics means that regulatory agencies need to become increasingly sophisticated in monitoring and tracking potential threats. This means establishing and monitoring relations with moderate community leaders in areas where known threats have been identified. This means having a cadre of professionals who have cultural and linguistic skills, combined with academic and technological knowledge, that can be used to counter both the extremist, and the underlying ideologies which determines the identity of the group. It is not sufficient to counter terrorism, by simply identifying and arresting the terrorist.

Lastly the activity of Anders Behring Breivik in Norway is worthy of further attention. In response to what he called "the cultural destruction of Norway" Breivik conducted acts of mass murder. While this one act represents only one example of backlash, it is not unfathomable to think this type of activity could not occur elsewhere in

the world. When people's fundamentals are challenged, it is impossible to tell what may transform someone into becoming an extremist.

This study supports CSIS and the GoC assertions that Sunni Islam remains the most significant threat to Canada. However, it acknowledges that threats originate in other regions as well, thus requiring a more comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism than just simply focusing on *Sunni* terrorist groups. Recent boatloads of Tamils from Sri Lanka, seeking to circumvent the normal immigration process, reinforce that groups other than AQ, seek to use Canada in support of transnational goals. The LTTE and India's Babbar Khalsa, who were responsible for Air India 182, are poignant reminders that there are many diverse motivations which may incite extremist activity. Therefore it is imperative that any counter-terrorism strategy acknowledges not just the terrorist, but also the organisation who would seek to use terrorism in support of their own specific goals.

In terms of Canadian security and potential terrorism activity originating from Canadian territory, it is important to remember that the line between domestic and international issues will continue to blur. Important issues in other regions, could easily become important issues in Canada. Therefore, what is considered a Canadian issue, compared to a transnational issue, will need to be constantly re-examined in light of Canada's changing new look.

Annex A: Glossary of Acronyms

Canadian Security Intelligence Service	CSIS
Government of Canada	GoC
Al Qaeda	AQ
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam	LTTE
Front de Liberation du Quebec	FLQ
Marine Security Operation Centres	MSOC
National Counter Terrorism Center	NCTC
Usama Bin Ladin	UBL
Islamic Republic Guard Corps	IRGC
Royal Canadian Mounted Police	RCMP
World Tamil Movement	WTM
Tiger Organization of Secret Intelligence Services	TOSIS
Canadian Forces Base	CFB

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- "Cradle of War, School of Jihad." *Economist* 376, no. 8435 (07/16, 2005): 41-42.
- "Will the Bloodstained Shias Resist the Urge to Hit Back?" *Economist* 370, no. 8365 (03/06, 2004): 39-40.
- Anonymous. "U.S. Lists Montreal Mosque as Al-Qaeda 'Recruiting' Place." *CBC*, April 25, 2011, sec. Canada.
- David Batty. "Somali Charged with Murder Attempt on Muhammed Cartoonist." *The Guardian*, Jan 2, 2010, sec. World News.
- Stewart Bell. "Al-Shabab Suicide Bomber Urges Terrorist Attacks Against Canada." *National Post*, March 6, 2011, sec. News.
- Luke Bencie. "Ayman Al-Zawahiri: Al-Qaeda's Former Number #2 Now Becomes HVT #1." *Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International* 17, no. 3 (Fall, 2011): 14-16.
- Christopher M. Blanchard. "Islam: Sunnis and Shiites: RS21745." *Congressional Research Service: Report* (01/23, 2008): 1-CRS-6.
- . "Islam: Sunnis and Shiites: RS21745." *Congressional Research Service: Report* (01/23, 2008): 1-CRS-6.
- E. D. BLANCHE. "OBAMA'S NEW SECRET WAR. (Cover Story)." *Middle East* no. 425 (Aug, 2011): 12-17.
- Ed Blanche. "After Bin Laden." *Middle East* no. 423 (06, 2011): 20-23.
- Bill Braniff and Assaf Moghadam. "Towards Global Jihadism: Al-Qaeda's Strategic, Ideological and Structural Adaptations since 9/11." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 5, no. 2 (05, 2011): 36-49.
- Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. "U.S. Lists Montreal Mosque as Al-Qaeda 'Recruiting' Place." *CBC*, April 25, 2011, sec. World.
- Peter Chalk. "The Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 9, no. 2 (08, 2008): 97-104.
- Juan Cole, Kenneth Katzman, Karim Sadjadpour, and Ray Takeyh. "'A Shia Crescent: What Fallout for the United States?'" *Middle East Policy* 12, no. 4 (Winter2005, 2005): 1-27.

David Commins. "Chapter Five: The Wahhabi Mission and Islamic Revivalism." In , 130-154: I.B. Tauris, 2009.

———. "Chapter Three: Abd Al-Aziz Ibn Saud and the Taming of Wahhabi Zeal." In , 71-103: I.B. Tauris, 2009.

———. "Conclusion." In , 205-209: I.B. Tauris, 2009.

Anthony Cordesman. *Iran's Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence and Paramilitary Forces: Rough Working Draft*. Washington, DC: Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, 2007.

Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister. "How did Mohammed Merah Become a Jihadist?" *CNN*, March 26, 2012, sec. World.

Owen Dunn. *The Fatwa on Salman Rushdie*.

Omar El Akkad. "Canadians' Internet Usage nearly Double the Worldwide Average." *The Globe and Mail*, March 8, 2011, sec. Technology.

Leland Erickson. "God's Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad." *Journal of Strategic Security* 3, no. 3 (08, 2010): 78-80.

Thomas Froneberger. "Support Networks of Terrorists within the United States." *Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International* 16, no. 4 (Winter, 2010): 20-24.

Government of Canada. "Canada- Somali Relations." Government of Canada, accessed April/23, 2012, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/kenya/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada-somalia.aspx?menu_id=59&view=d.

Frédéric Grare. "The Evolution of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan and the Ever-Changing Face of Islamic Violence." *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 30, no. 1 (04, 2007): 127-143.

———. "The Evolution of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan and the Ever-Changing Face of Islamic Violence." *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 30, no. 1 (04, 2007): 127-143.

Amir M. Haji Yousefi. "Whose Agenda is Served by the Idea of a Shia Crescent?" *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 1 (Spring 2009, 2009): 114-135.

- Dwight Hamilton. *Inside Canadian Intelligence: Exposing the New Realities of Espionage and International Terrorism*, edited by Jennifer McKnight, edited by Dundurn. Second ed. Toronto: Dundurn, 2011.
- Vera Heuer. "Strategic Suicide Campaigns: A Comparative Study of the LTTE and Hamas." *Conference Papers -- Western Political Science Association* (2008): 1-30.
- International Crisis Group. *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora After the LTTE: Asia Report no 186*: International Crisis Group, 2010.
- Allen Keiswetter. "Political Islam: A Primer for the Perplexed." *Foreign Service Journal* 85, no. 5 (05, 2008): 16-22.
- Geoffrey Kemp. *Iran and Iraq: The Shia Connection, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Factor*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2005.
- Mark Kennedy. "Canadians have 'Alice in Wonderland' Approach to Security, Wikileaks Documents Say." *The Vancouver Sun*, Nov 29, 2010, sec. News.
- Adnan R. Khan. "Ready for Jihad." *Maclean's* 117, no. 18 (05/03, 2004): 33-35.
- Christian Leuprecht and Conrad Winn. "What do Muslim Canadians Want? the Clash of Interpretations and Opinion Research." *The Macdonald-Laurier Institute True North in Canadian Policy* (Nov, 2011): 1-44.
- Kanan Makiya. "Revenge of the Shia." *NPQ: New Perspectives Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (Winter2006, 2006): 30-32.
- William McCants. "Al Qaeda's Challenge." *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 5 (Sep, 2011): 20-32.
- Greg Miller. "Senators Question Intelligence Agencies' Anticipation of Egypt Uprising." *The Washington Post*, 2011, sec. World.
- Assaf Moghadam. "Shia Ideology Atlas: Initial Findings." *Conference Papers -- International Studies Association* (2009): 1.
- Vali Nasr. "The SHIA REVIVAL." *Military Review* 87, no. 3 (May, 2007): 9-13.
- Michael Petrou. "Rise of the Shias." *Maclean's* 119, no. 40 (10/09, 2006): 38-39.
- David Pinault. "Sunni-Shia Sectarianism and Competition for the Leadership of Global Islam." *Tikkun* 25, no. 1 (Jan, 2010): 45-75.
- Srinath Raghavan. "A Coercive Triangle: India, Pakistan, the United States, and the Crisis of 2001-2002." *Defence Studies* 9, no. 2 (06, 2009): 242-260.

- Kent Roach. "The Air India Report and the Regulation of Charities and Terrorism Financing." *University of Toronto Law Journal* 61, no. 1 (Winter, 2011): 45-57.
- John Rollins. "Implications of the Death of Osama Bin Laden." *Congressional Research Service: Report* (05/05, 2011): 1-4.
- Sheryl Saperia. "Are Iranian Spies Slipping through our Immigration Loopholes?" *The Huffington Post*, April 5, 2012, sec. Canada.
- Michael Scheuer. "The Zawahiri Era." *National Interest* no. 115 (Sep, 2011): 18-26.
- Victoria Sentas. "Terrorist Organisation Offences and the LTTE: R v Vinayagamoorthy." *Current Issues in Criminal Justice* 22, no. 1 (07, 2010): 159-169.
- Fred Siegel. "Islamic Crossfire." *Blueprint* 2006, no. 4 (10, 2006): 40-43.
- Gurharpal Singh. "Gurdwaras and Community-Building among British Sikhs." *Contemporary South Asia* 15, no. 2 (06, 2006): 147-164.
- Maximilian Terhalle. "Are the Shia Rising?" *Middle East Policy* 14, no. 2 (06, 2007): 69-83.
- The Government of Canada. *2012 Spring Report of the Auditor General*. Ottawa, ON: The Government of Canada, 2012.
- . *Projections of the Diversity of the Canadian Population: 2006-2031*. Ottawa: Minister of the Interior, 2010.
- Jack Thomas Tomarchio. "Al-Qaeda 5.0: The Threat to the U.S. After Bin Laden." *Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International* 17, no. 3 (Fall, 2011): 18-21.
- John Turner. "From Cottage Industry to International Organisation: The Evolution of Salafi-Jihadism and the Emergence of the Al Qaeda Ideology." *Terrorism & Political Violence* 22, no. 4 (Oct, 2010): 541-558.
- Jon Kyl US SENATOR. "U.S. Senator Jon Kyl (R-Az) Holds Hearing on Growing Wahhabi Influence in the U.S." *FDCH Political Transcripts*.
- de Voorde Van. "Sri Lankan Terrorism: Assessing and Responding to the Threat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)." *Police Practice & Research* 6, no. 2 (05, 2005): 181-199.
- Joas Wagemakers. "Defining the Enemy: Abū Muhammad Al-Maḳḳiḳīs Radical Reading of Sūrat Al-Mumtahana." *Welt Des Islams* 48, no. 3 (11, 2008): 348-371.

J. M. Waller. "Wahhabi Lobby Spreads its Wealth." *Insight on the News* 19, no. 25 (11/25, 2003): 22.

Peng Wang. "Women in the LTTE: Birds of Freedom Or Cogs in the Wheel?" *Journal of Politics & Law* 4, no. 1 (03, 2011): 100-108.

Joby Warrick and Liz Sly. "U.S. Officials: Iran is Stepping Up Lethal Aid to Syria." *The Washington Post*, March 3, 2012, sec. World.