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“UNITED WE STAND, DIVIDED WE FALL”: UNIFICATION OF THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS BRANCH

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CANADIAN ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS BRANCH**

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ABSTRACT

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Logistics Branch was created in 1968 with the CAF unification and reorganization act. From its inception of having one environmental uniform serving all three environments in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the Canadian Army (CA), the Logistics Branch has since reverted back to pre-unification with three distinct environmental uniforms serving across the CAF while remaining under the auspice of a unified governance and management system. This paper discusses and demonstrates that full unification of the CAF Logistics Branch under one service/champion is required to improve its operational effectiveness.

Major arguments brought forth in this paper include: the requirement of a central environmental authority in terms of the occupation (including sub-occupations and specialties) and generation (e.g. training); the reduction of the multi-level governance structure; a paradigm shift as it pertains to the actual Logistics Branch self-perpetuating reality; a lack of synchronization between the different strategies and visions present in the Branch; the distorted career and succession management (e.g. talent management) of its occupations and ultimately the improvement of recruitment and retention of logistics members.

Through the use of the McKinsey 7s theoretical framework, the paper confirms the validity of its thesis and makes three recommendations: the requirement to conduct a full organizational analysis with all CAF stakeholders; to increase academic and operational research to bring CAF Logistics to the year 2015; and have the CAF Strat J4 create a CAF Logistics framework

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

A house divided against itself cannot stand.

Abraham Lincoln

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Logistics Branch has been considered the “Fourth Service”¹ in support of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and Canadian Army (CA) but has continued to be a multi-environmental branch with a loose and fragile governing structure. As early as 1968, the notion of creating a separate and independent support service/environment reporting directly to the Chief of Defence Staff was being discussed and continues to be, although not executed nor completely dismissed by Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) leadership. These initial discussions were part of the implementation of the CAF unification bill C-243 that were in fact an effort to reduce defence spending in line with the fiscal environment as well as the Defence White Paper published in 1964.² According to J.L. Granatstein, the Minister of Defence Hellyer basically dismissed with CAF unification, the traditions and service identities as "buttons and bows" not related to efficiencies.³ To completely unify the Logistics Branch under one service is argued to be associated with operational effectiveness versus Hellyer’s efficiency goals and thus allowing “... effectiveness [to be] determined without reference to costs and,

¹ House of Commons. *Royal Commission on Government Organization. Report 20: Department of National Defence* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1968), 72.

² Ross Fetterly. “The Influence of the Environment on the 1964 Defence White Paper.” *Canadian Military Journal*, (Winter 2004-2005): 50.

³ J.L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian military?* (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd, 3rd ed., 2008), 78.

whereas efficiency means doing the thing right, effectiveness means doing the right thing.”⁴ This important paradigm shift⁵ of breaking away from old traditions (e.g. “every service has its own Logisticians”) and ways of thinking (e.g. “I need my Logisticians to be a sailor/aviator/soldier to be able to support my operations”) would be for certain military leaders (e.g. combat operators as the pilot and infantry communities) very provocative and disheartening indeed. In R.M. Farley’s book *Grounded: the Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force* written in 2014 on the other hand, the author advocates the complete abolishment and decentralization of the United States Air Force based organizational structures, culture and changes to the security and policymaking environments in the post 9/11 era (vice centralizing the Logistics Branch) to improve military effectiveness in the new reality of the joint operational environments.⁶

History has demonstrated over the past centuries that a sound military campaign inside or outside a sovereign state’s borders is dependent on the organization of its “logistics tail”. Without it, combat ineffectiveness and inefficiencies risk negating any technological or informational advantages a state’s military may have in comparison to its foe or possible foes. Military logistics entails more than structures and processes, and must be agile to adjust

⁴ Business Dictionary. Accessed on 23 March 2015, <http://www.businessdictionary.com>

⁵ Stephen R. Covey, *The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People – Restoring the Character Ethics* (New York: Free Press. 2004), 29.

⁶ Robert M. Farley. *Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014), 17.

and overcome operational and transformational challenges associated with current and future security environments.

Canada's Military History

Canada's military history was influenced by many factors to include geography, political reality (e.g. French/British colony, dominion, confederation) and traditions of having ad hoc organizations assembled in time of war or threat. It was not until 1898 with Sir Frederick Borden and Major General T.H. Hutton that a formal acknowledgment that a capability gap existed in terms of logistical support of its militia: "...the militia force of Canada is not under the existing system, an army, in the true sense... and without those military departments by which an army is moved, fed, or ministered..."⁷. Experiences in the First and Second World War as well as lessons/learned during the Korean War, only increased the need for strong and ultimately independent logistical structures in each of the CAF services (e.g. the CA/Militia created in 1868⁸, the RCN created in 1910⁹ and the Canadian Air Force created in 1919¹⁰) be it for force employment during operations or generating future logisticians with separate schools and development paths.¹¹

⁷ Department of National Defence. A-LM-031-000/AG-000. *A Handbook on the CAF Logistics Branch* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1983), 3-20.

⁸ Militia Act, S.C., c. 40, s. 6 (1868)

⁹ Martin Pelletin, "Bourassa, Laurier and the 1910 Naval Service Act: Canadian Identity and the Birth of a Navy," *Canadian Naval Review*, Volume 6, no 3 (Fall 2010): 14.

¹⁰ Department of National Defence. B-GA-400-000/FP-000. *CAF Aerospace Doctrine*, 2nd ed. (Winnipeg: DND Canada, December 2010), 7.

¹¹ Department of National Defence. A-LM-031-000/AG-000. *A Handbook on the CAF Logistics Branch* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1983), 4-1.

Canadian Defence Reform in 1960s

The Canadian Government came to realize in the 1960s that its defence organization and business model were being affected by a series of large deficits, increasing levels of national debt, with defence expenditures representing the biggest government cost.¹² The 1963 Glassco Royal Commission report on government department inefficiencies made cross-departmental recommendations in order to eliminate duplication and uneconomical operations¹³. This report ultimately led to the 1964 White Paper and Minister of defence Hellyer tabling Bill C-243 (i.e. the Unification Act¹⁴). The first gave the basic philosophy and rationale of the forces with the later being the parliamentary legislative change of the National Defence Act¹⁵. The change involved the reorganization of the institution in a twofold approach: 1) the integration of its civilian and military headquarter into one organization; and 2) the unification of its three services (to include logistics) in order to rectify inefficiencies. The Bill came into effect on 1 February 1968 which marked the creation of the one service CAF as well as the CAF Logistics Branch¹⁶, which was in turn integrated. The creation of the

¹² D. Gosselin, "From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier: Understanding the Fundamental Differences Between the Unification of the CAF and its Present Transformation." *Canadian Military Journal* (Winter 2005-2006): 7.

¹³ Department of National Defence. *Task Force on Review of Unification of the CAF – Final Report*, (Ottawa, 15 March 1980), 27.

¹⁴ D. Gosselin, "From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier: Understanding the Fundamental Differences Between the Unification of the CAF and its Present Transformation." *Canadian Military Journal* (Winter 2005-2006): 6.

¹⁵ Vernon J. Kronenberg, *All Together Now: the Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973), 20.

¹⁶ Initially, the Logistics Branch encompassed the finance, supply and transportation functions. The foods function followed suit in 1977 and finally the personnel administration function in 2007.

Logistics Branch was intended to consolidate “... duplicative support services common to two or more of the three services”.¹⁷

Following a recrudescence of a “strong-service tug of war”¹⁸ in the 1980s, the return of three distinct service uniforms in 1984 and ultimately the rebirth of the service chief at the Canadian Armed Forces Councils resulted in the retrenchment of the 1968 unification.¹⁹ Even though the Logistics Branch remained “unified” in terms of governance, its three logistic services began to revisit environmental specific training and in due course a branch divide based on environmental lines. But what of the impacts of this dis-unification on the Logistics Branch in relation to the identified advantages of the 1964 White Paper that imposed CAF unification in the first place (e.g. horizontal/vertical command/support relationships would greatly be simplified and standardized or reduction of overhead²⁰)?

2005 Defence Transformation

The arrival of General Hillier as chief of Defence Staff marked a new unification transformation phase for the CAF in terms of operational effectiveness with the creation of the CAF Transformation Team that oversaw and managed

¹⁷ Vernon J. Kronenberg, *All Together Now: the Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973), 34.

¹⁸ J.P.Y.D. Gosselin, “A 50-year Tug of War of Concepts at the Crossroads: Unification and Strong-Service Idea.” in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives – Context and Concepts* (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 129.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 183

²⁰ G.L. Hopkins, “Organizational Influences in the CAF Headquarters Since Unification.” (master’s thesis, Carleton University School of Public Administration, 1971), 35.

transformation on behalf of the CDS²¹. The key initiatives were aligned with the envisioned Chief of Defence Staff principals to include operational focus (i.e. effectiveness) that could arguably be considered an evolution of Minister Hellyer's unification goal of 1968:

Within the CF, operations and operational support take primacy over all activities and considerations... however, every strategic decision must be measured against the effect, positive or negative, that will have on the CF's ability to effectively execute its assigned missions. Transformation initiatives that increase CF operational focus should be given the highest consideration.²²

Even though some changes affected the Logistics Branch as second and third order effects (e.g. creation of the Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) in 2006²³ and the integration of the personnel administration specialties in 2007); no profound changes to its governance processes, organizational structures, vision, mission or operational effectiveness occurred. Furthermore, these strategic support transformation initiatives were ephemeral as demonstrated with the disbandment and integration of the CANOSCOM in the new Canadian Joint Operations Command in 2012²⁴. As Tighe identified for the 1968 unification shortfalls, the 2005-2012 period can be considered on a Logistics Branch stand point, a missed opportunity to "...look at ways in which support services can be consolidated and economized."²⁵

²¹ Michael K. Jeffery, *Inside CAF Transformation: Institutional Leadership as a Catalyst for Change* (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 26.

²² *Ibid.*, 125.

²³ National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. "Canadian Joint Operations Command." Accessed 1 April 2015. <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-org-structure/canadian-joint-operations-command.page>

²⁴ *Ibid.*

2012 Defence Renewal

The 2012 Defence Renewal (DR) initiative “6.1 Lean Headquarters²⁶” may once again offer a new occasion for the Logistics Branch to embark on positive and possibly required change. This initiative may also allow the analysis and determination by the Branch to see if its current organizational structure in terms of personnel, training, culture, vision and systems based on environmental lines (i.e. Air Force, Navy and Army) is the most effective in terms of generating/sustaining logistics and Logisticians for CAF operations in support of Government of Canada orders as well as priorities on the domestic and international scene.

Research Questions

This research paper will endeavor to answer the following key research question: How does the CAF Logistics Branch organizational structure achieve effectiveness? Coupled with this research question will be the following sub-themes: 1) How do the Environmental Chiefs of Staffs service cultures impact the Logistics Branch? What is the impact for all stakeholders’ operational effectiveness?; 2) As another cross-environment branch, how is the Royal Canadian Electrical Mechanical Engineers (RCEME) Branch structured? What is its historical and operational effectiveness reasoning with being aligned under one

²⁵ D.W. Tighe, “Unification of Forces: The Road to Jointness?” (Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1991), 44.

²⁶ Department of National Defence. *Defence Renewal Plan* (Ottawa: DND Canada, October 2013), 70.

service (i.e. Army)?; and 3) What initial 1968 unification and/or CAF 2005-2012 transformation principals are applicable to the Logistics Branch to increase its effectiveness?

Research Thesis

In an effort to qualitatively confirm that the actual organizational structure of the Canadian Armed Forces Logistics Branch is not the most effective in terms of governance and force generation, the intent of this paper is to demonstrate that full unification of the CAF Logistics Branch under one service/champion would improve its operational effectiveness. At this stage of the research, the term unification will be generally defined as the process of unifying two or more military services under a single service in terms of uniform, governance, system, personnel, etc.

Research Limitations

In conducting this research, it is important to state its limitations. Firstly, due to the requirements associated with Research Ethic Boards and scope of the Masters' in Defence Studies program, no human subject research (e.g. interviews, questionnaires or surveys) was conducted. Secondly, no differentiation was made between Regular Force and Reserve Force component Logisticians. Finally, this paper strived not to use a myopic Army logistics lens but a holistic view of the overall Logistics Branch components.

Research Structure

In order to conduct a logical and comprehensive research, a literature survey will be initially conducted as to identify prior researches that have been conducted on the different CAF unification processes as well as the Logistics Branch over the past 50 years. Included in the literature survey will be papers that considered potential organizational changes to the Logistics Branch and that concluded the opposite to this current research thesis statement.

Having reviewed past research, an analysis of three key unification periods of considerable CAF transformation or some may say evolution will be undertaken as to determine the external (e.g. political, economic) and internal (e.g. force architecture) environments that led to the initiatives, the initial goals, intents, aftermaths, while ultimately identifying the applicable themes to the current logistics Branch reality of 2015. The key periods analyzed will be the 1968 unification period, the 2005-2012 operational effectiveness transformation and the on-going efficiency DR 6.1 Lean Headquarters initiative.

Before proceeding to the actual qualitative organizational analysis portion of this paper, a historical and an organizational study of the Logistics Branch will be conducted. Included in the organizational review will be the current state of the branch in terms of established versus actual manning, recruitment (e.g. Strategic Intake Plan), the governance policies as they relate to Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs), committees, vision, strategic plan, strategy and operational relevance, the training and specialty differences between the three environmental components of the branch and the main challenges of the Logistics

Branch of the past decades. The chapter will conclude with a comparison with the RCEME structures, governance and operational effectiveness assessment.

The research paper will then turn to the actual Branch analysis by applying the McKinsey 7s organizational analysis model. The model was originally created by T. Peters, Julien R. Phillips, and Robert H. Waterman in 1980 as a revolution to how business looked at and understood organizational frameworks. Based on seven interdependent critical organizational tenets (e.g. structure, strategy, system, skill, staff, style and shared values), the authors contended that an organization could not and would not be operationally effective and would remain in a survival mode. This model is still taught in business schools around the world in 2015. The reasoning behind the choice of the model, a description of the model's tenets and architecture will then be given to ultimately apply the framework to the CAF Logistics Branch. It is assessed that this qualitative research design will allow a thorough analysis of the current Logistics Branch to be conducted in order to confirm or refute the paper's thesis statement.

CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE SURVEY

The intent of this chapter will be to “... provide a framework for establishing the importance of the study as well as a benchmark for comparing the results with other findings.”²⁷ This literature survey will illustrate that this subject has been documented and analyzed in civilian academia as well as military circles over the years and decades since the 1968 unification. As such, this chapter will be divided into two literature groups as it pertains to this paper. The first group of literature analyzes the motivation, the tenants and impacts of the events that resulted with the unification and reorganization of the CAF. This group is not restricted to Canadian academia but also includes an analysis from an American standpoint. The following group of literature will assess the CAF Logistics Branch specifically with discussion of current challenges to its effectiveness but also debate on unification and de-unification of the institution. Both groups of literature, spanning from 1971 to present, discuss the need or desire to create what is suggested in the intent of this paper: an eventual unification or what some have called the creation of “fourth service”²⁸.

Integration and Unification of the CAF

G. Hopkins wrote in 1971 as part of his Masters’ program at Carleton University a thesis analyzing the organizational influences of the unification upon

²⁷ John W. Creswell, *Research Design – Qualitative, quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. 3rd ed. (USA: Sage Publications Inc, 2009), 25.

²⁸ J.P.Y.D. Gosselin, “A 50-year Tug of War of Concepts at the Crossroads: Unification and Strong-Service Idea.” In *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives – Context and Concepts* (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 177.

the CAF. His key assessment was that the environmental influences in 1971 continued to make themselves felt and were continuing to do so post unification.²⁹ The author makes use of four different research lenses in order to demonstrate that environmental chiefs/services (e.g. air, land and sea) were still present and against unification in 1971. Specifically to operational support and its structures, Hopkins ascertains by means of the 1964 White Paper on defence, that CAF support functions of all environments needed to be centralized under one huge command as to achieve four important advantages: 1) functional commanders would be freed of responsibility for detailed administration; 2) commanders could potentially devote more time to their military specialty; 3) horizontal/vertical and command/support relationships would greatly be simplified and standardized; and 4) there would be a reduction of overhead management and leadership.³⁰ The author even goes to state that the total unification of technical services would be a good thing for economic reasons.³¹ Counter-balancing these integration³² advantages, the author identifies “... that moral and esprit de corps is weakened... and that competition is diminished.”³³ This paper would then be in support of the unification of the current Logistics Branch and would make 1971 economic, governmental and organizational examples valid in 2015.

²⁹ G.L. Hopkins, “Organizational Influences in the CAF Headquarters Since Unification” (Master’s Thesis, Carleton University School of Public Administration, 1971), 2.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 34.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 60.

³² The author interchanges the terms unification and integration throughout the paper even though the two have different meanings and implications.

³³ *Ibid.*, 48.

J.C. Hood in his 1975 research paper titled ““Defence Policy and the Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces: An Analysis” identifies four governmental reasons to justify CAF unification in which one specifically identifies that the execution of the parliament act would bring standardization and support service integration in order to increase operational effectiveness.³⁴ In opposition to Hopkins paper, the argument of the benefits associated with the unification of logistics/technical services are contradictory. For example, a critical assessment of the unification act ascertains that “... the centralization of functions leads to entropy among the components of the system”³⁵ and the associated civilianization of the National Defence Headquarters contributed to the return of the environmental command untimely allowed “de-unification” of the CAF. The unification counter-argument may apply to certain combat functions but is the preceding argument a correct generalization as it pertain to the unification of logistics functions present in all environment that has its foundation on having the common baseline training and specialties? For example, is an air force supply technician incapable of operating and be effective in a land or sea environment?

Academic analysis and the exportation of the CAF unification concept have been very limited inside other military forces of the world. The Goldwater-Nichols Defence Reorganization Act of 1986, the end of the Cold War era and the realities associated with diminishing defence budget due to national US debts in the 1980s influenced D.W. Tighe to declare in his monograph that “... perhaps the

³⁴ J.C. Hood, “Defence Policy and the Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces: An Analysis.” (Master’s Thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1975), 30.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 144.

Goldwater-Nichols Act did not go far enough” in order for the US Department of Defence (DoD) to increase the jointness of its services.³⁶ His analysis of the CAF experience with the use of three criteria (e.g. feasibility, suitability and acceptability) demonstrated "... internal competition... permeates the excellent companies. It entails high costs of duplication...yet the benefits are manifold, especially in terms of commitment (and) innovation..."³⁷ He nonetheless makes two key recommendations/observations as they pertain to military logistics governance/structure that are relevant to the current research paper: there is a requirement to “look at ways in which support services can be consolidated and economized”³⁸ and that “the support services had service identity problems and had lost sight of the goal of providing support to operational forces.”³⁹ The author ultimately states that unification is neither recommended nor achievable for the US DoD due the belief that service parochialism and interservice rivalries are required in the US defence construct to include its logistics structures. Does this US reality apply to the CAF when size, defence budget and global engagements are compared?

The resurgence of CAF unification analysis and academia discussions occurred in the early and late 2000s. D. Gosselin wrote a series of articles and a thesis paper on the impact, results and relevance of the 1968 organizational changes to the CAF at the turn of the century. In a review of strategic/political

³⁶ D.W. Tighe, “Unification of Forces: The Road to Jointness?” (Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1991), 4.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 44.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 19.

historical events dating back to Minister Claxon in 1947 up to and including the return of environmental chiefs in the 1990s, the author explains his two competing ideas of strong-service ideas and unification by means of a “tug of war” metaphor:

“... the concept of unification in the CF, as envisaged by Minister Hellyer in 1964, is still very much alive, albeit hidden under a cover of several other ideas and initiatives, and, more importantly, winning the “tug of war” over the strong-service idea.”⁴⁰

As with D.W. Tighe in 1991, Gosselin declares that without a clear top-down definition for the military chain of command of desired capabilities (e.g. operational outputs) or without political policy direction, environmental service chiefs will regain power in terms of independence to the detriment of CAF strategic and operational effectiveness.⁴¹ Another key point explored by Gosselin, and relevant to this paper’s thesis, is the positive and negative impacts of service protectionism to the (more than often) detriment of the CAF institution can be found in his “Powerful Service Filters” model represented in Figure 1. This model identifies the requirement to understand and focus on the inner rings as to conduct positive and effective transformational changes to the service environments. Most environments would consider the Logistics Branch and the current effects it bring to environmental chiefs as being part of the “interest ring”. Based on literature reviews and historical researches, would Logistics not be required to be part of

⁴⁰ J.P.YD. Gosselin, “Unification and the Strong-Service Idea: a 50 Year Tug of War of Concepts at Crossroads.” (National Security Studies Course Paper, CAF College, 2004), 5.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 43.

the two inner rings? Is the current Logistics Branch trichotomy the reason for not being considered inside the two inner rings?




Figure 1: The Powerful Service Filters

Source: Gosselin, *Unification and the Strong-Service Idea: a 50 Year Tug of War of Concepts at Crossroads*, 32.

The final article related to the impacts and key outcomes of the CAF unification and a complete counter-weight to its foundational tenants is R. Bryson's paper titled "The Impacts of Unification and Civilianization on the Culture of the CAF, 1968-1993". Through his thesis on the effects to the CAF culture system, Bryson describes how the unification process and its execution created significant and inappropriate cultural shifts throughout the defence institution.⁴² The author discusses the Logistics Branch requirement to change the very nature of its superordinate goals (i.e. culture) in order to become more than

⁴² R. Bryson, "The Impacts of Unification and Civilianization on the Culture of the CAF, 1968-1993" (Master's Thesis, University of Calgary, 2012), 4.

an “occupation” but a calling or even a vocation.⁴³ This element will be re-evaluated in Chapter 5 of this paper as to identify if the actual Logistics Branch culture system can bring recruitment and employment of its personnel through the next decade of operations and required transformation to adapt and overcome to changes brought about by the future security environment. The paper does bring somewhat confusion when the author associates the 1968 reorganization act with the concept of normative isomorphism: “... the paradox of military change is that, as militaries innovate to change their capabilities, they become more similar to other militaries that operate within the same level of capabilities”⁴⁴. Yet only Canada’s defence has applied this reorganization and consolidation (i.e. unification) to its military forces and no other international country⁴⁵ has undergone this type of “organizational chaos.”⁴⁶

CAF Logistics Branch

The depth and relevance of literature from 2004 to 2014 associated with the CAF Logistics Branch as it relates to transformation and organizational successes/gaps are somewhat limited. Furthermore, the existing literature is restricted to Canadian Forces College papers and could demonstrate a lack of military and academic writing enthusiasm on the subject outside the academic halls of the Toronto higher learning facility the Canadian Forces College. Is this

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 58.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁴⁵ D.W. Tighe, “Unification of Forces: The Road to Jointness?” (Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1991), 11.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

lack of literature due to the lack of importance of logistics in the sea/air/land, a lack of professional writing interest inside the logistics community or an operational research shortfall at the CAF War Center?

S.E. Irwin's "CAF Transformation and Logistics" paper, analyzes how the logistical community at the tactical, operational and strategic levels are and should be adjusting the future security environment. Ultimately, Irwin advocates that the key to military transformation is linked to the clear definition and establishment of the military logistics institution.⁴⁷ Furthermore, a discussion on the impacts of all service/environment identities could be extrapolated in that the CAF Logisticians strong service loyalties to their environment and occupational specialties are incompatible with any desire to have/create a holistic and relevant CAF Logistics vision/strategy. Thus are the environmental requirements from the service chiefs too great and incompatible with unification to allow its success in terms of effectiveness? The other key items mentioned in Irwin's paper as well as relevant to the current research would relate to the author's statement that a "... push towards a single logistics organization is substantial". This argument could be extrapolated to indicate and support the creation of the operational support level headquarter in 2005 called the Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM). Point of note, the operational organization was disbanded in 2012 and amalgamated into the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC).

⁴⁷ S.E. Irwin, "CAF Transformation and Logistics" (Master of Defence Studies Research Paper, CAF College, 2006), 2.

That stated “push” supports the unification of the Logistics Branch under one “champion”.

The unification of the Logistics Branch argument addressed in the 2014 K.J. Mill paper in addition to John Conrad’s 2004 thesis on erosion of the Canadian Logistics thought since the Hundred Days demonstrate the requirement to have command interest and support towards logistics in order to be successful. Mill’s main thrust to justify this integration of all three environments into one single process owner is due to a “...lack of strategic ownership in logistics reinforces an environment that does not promote integration or understanding and therefore will not evolve.”⁴⁸ Furthermore, Mill’s thesis statement supports the unification of the Logistics Branch in that they aligned to the overall goal of increasing the effectiveness of logistics and therefore the CAF organization.⁴⁹ Comparison studies on Western military organizational changes are discussed in the paper with a key outcome that states that to be operationally effective, a function (i.e. military logistics) must have a single and empowered process owner. This analysis of the CAF logistics organization is very important in that it identifies shortfalls in the current Logistics Branch Advisor (LBA) organization (e.g. service rivalries) and concludes that an organizational structure *status quo* (i.e. three distinct environments/services) is not an viable option if operational effectiveness is the desired end state. Ultimately, the paper does not offer concrete answers to question “who should be the process owner of an integrated Logistics

⁴⁸ K.J. Mills, “Logistics: Reducing Friction Through Understanding, Integration, and Ownership” (Master of Defence Studies Research Paper, CAF College, 2014), 8.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, vi.

Branch?” but does offer possible solution sets as: 1) the founding principles that established the now defunct CANOSCOM; and 2) the soon to be created CAF Strategic J4.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, K.A.M. Doucet’s research paper declares that in order to maintain relevancy and effectiveness, the CAF Logistics Branch must complete secession⁵⁰ based on environmental lines.⁵¹ The author argues that logistics doctrine and training since the end of the Second World War have been streamlined in order to facilitate cost reductions and increase efficiencies which he believes secession would resolve due to the environment chiefs reacquainting themselves with their tactical and operational support.⁵² The key criticism and ultimately the downfall of the paper could be argued that the author has narrow and constrained CA Logistics service paradigm towards his research topic. What of the Navy and Air force Logistics in Doucet’s logic model? The same criticism could be made of John Conrad’s 2004 paper that demonstrates a myopic army view of logistics and its transformation requirements towards doctrine and training.⁵³ Moreover, his arguments for having a divided Logistics Branch during force generation and force employment (e.g. on deployed operations) are contrary to Canada First Defence Strategy as well as the CAF joint operations *modus operandi* that has been in effect for the past decade.

⁵⁰ Oxford Dictionary definition of secession; “The action of withdrawing formally from membership of a federation or body, especially a political state”, Last accessed 14 April 2015. <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/secession>

⁵¹ K.A.M. Doucet, “Restructuring Logistics: Reflecting Reality, Change for Tomorrow” (Master of Defence Studies Research Paper, CAF College, 2009), 4.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 64.

⁵³ John Conrad, “Wind Without Rain: The Erosion of Canadian Logistics Thought Since the Hundred Days” (Master of Defence Studies Research Paper, CAF College, 2004), 7.

A key realization came to light during the conduct and completion of this research paper's literature review/survey: a lack of academic and documented analysis on the organizational concepts, structure, governance and goals of military logistics organizations. The survey demonstrated that military logistics literature currently fall into two categories: 1) the theoretical (e.g. operational research) realm of military logistics (e.g. Moshe Kress' *Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations*); and 2) the operationalization of military logistics and its application in the conduct of war (e.g. Henry E. Eccles' *Logistics in the National Defense*, Martin Van Creveld's *Supplying War* or William G. Pagonis' *Moving Mountains – Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War*). The current paper will attempt to broaden the categories of research, debate and analysis in the Canadian military logistics field. Hopefully this project will encourage “top to bottom” discussions in the CAF as well as academia (e.g. CAF Warfare Center) on the actual effectiveness of the Branch and possibly incite organizational change to benefit combat effectiveness throughout the environmental realms (e.g. land, air, sea, space, etc). The acceptance that CAF Logistics “... innovation with few exceptions, virtually stopped with the capture of Mons [in November 1918] and remained stagnant to this day”⁵⁴ is not acceptable to Canadian citizens nor its soldiers, aviators and sailors. This type of deliberate, professional and relevant research must be conducted and brought to the fore front in order to avoid the apparent stagnancy and state of complacency in which Canadian Logisticians as well as the CAF

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

seem to have positioned themselves since the “de-unification process” in the 1990s (i.e. return of distinct environmental based logistic services). Furthermore, the associated independence in thought and purpose of the three environments is in turn detrimental to the Logistics Branch unity of effort and operational effectiveness for the force employers such as CJOC overseas or Regional Joint Task Force Commanders on Canadian soil is apparent in the literature survey. The following chapter will bring forward the fundamental baseline concepts associated with the unification and integration that have influenced and set the course for the logistics community over the past decades.

CHAPTER 3 – UNIFICATION CONCEPT IN THE CAF: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

The notion of unifying the Logistics Branch has been discussed, both before and after the 1968 CAF unification process as well as at different Logistics governance discussions since the services returned to pre-unification status in the 1990s. These discussions (or lack of consensus) are deeply rooted to the emotionally charged accepted wisdom of its leadership and constituents centered on traditions, loyalties and service identity.⁵⁵ The opponents of integration often remark that the Glassco report used as the basis for Hellyer’s “crusade” for reorganizing the CAF did not specifically recommend integration of neither CAF

⁵⁵ D. Gosselin, “From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier: Understanding the Fundamental Differences Between the Unification of the CAF and its Present Transformation.” *Canadian Military Journal* (Winter 2005-2006): 13.

services nor its branches.⁵⁶ This chapter will identify the key ideas and principles of the 1968 reorganization act, the 2005 CAF transformation and ultimately the CAF Defence Renewal Team desired outcomes as they relate to the identification of possible solutions sets for the Logistics Branch to increase its effectiveness with unifying its different environmental components.

1968 CAF Unification

The 1982 report on integration and unification from R.L. Raymont mentions that one of the reasons that the 1968 unification created such confusion and angst among not only its logisticians but also the supported operators throughout the services was due to ambiguous definitions as they relate in differentiating unification from amalgamation from integration models.⁵⁷ Since the publication of the former document, developments in Canadian military doctrine and theories have occurred in order to support its *modus operandi* towards joint and/or combined operations. There is also a need to define these terms before continuing with this paper. The denotation of unification and amalgamation, for the purpose of this research paper, will be interchangeable due to their definitions: 1) unification is “the act, process, or result of unifying”⁵⁸; and 2) amalgamation is “the action or process of amalgamating/unifying”⁵⁹ associated

⁵⁶ Vernon J. Kronenberg, *All Together Now: the Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973), 20-21.

⁵⁷ R.L. Raymont, *Report on Integration and Unification 1964-1968* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1982), 238.

⁵⁸ Merriam-Webster. “Merriam-Webster – An Encyclopædia Britannica Company.” Last accessed 16 April 2015. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unification>

with the terms. In contrast, the action of integration, even though used in the literature and research documents is not this paper's objective as it pertains to the Logistics Branch due to its limitative nature. The word integration is defined as "the act or process or an instance of integrating: incorporation as equals into society or an organization of individuals of different groups (as races).⁶⁰ The 2007 decision of integrating (vice unifying/amalgamating) the Personnel Administration Branch into the Logistics Branch and the unification/amalgamation of the Administration Clerks with the Finance Clerks demonstrate the differences between these three definitions and how they will be used throughout this thesis paper. Other key terms to understand but that will not be discussed or used in this thesis as they are related to ways of conducting military operations vice an organizational analysis perspective are joint⁶¹ and combined⁶² operations.

Col M. Pope in 1937 wrote to the Canadian government cabinet that unification of Canada's services was required based on effectiveness and concentricity.⁶³ The goal of the 1963 Glassco Commission "...was put in place to

⁵⁹ Merriam-Webster. "Merriam-Webster – An Encyclopædia Britannica Company." Last accessed 21 April 2015. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/amalgamation>

⁶⁰ Merriam-Webster. "Merriam-Webster – An Encyclopædia Britannica Company." Last accessed 16 April 2015. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/integration>

⁶¹ "A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces". United States. Department of Defense. JP 3-0. Joint Operations. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 11 August 2011. P. GL-12.

⁶² Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations, in which elements of more than one nation participate. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NATO Standardization Agency (NSA). AAP-6 (2008). NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (Brussels: NATO Headquarters, 2008), 2-c-9.

examine the whole of government services, to eliminate duplication and uneconomic operations”⁶⁴. Triplication of logistical structures, processes and resources were omnipresent in the CAF at the time. The 1964 Defence White Paper was the Ministry of National Defence upshot of the Glassco report and emphasized the requirement for the unification of the CAF in order to meet the report’s findings for two core reasons.⁶⁵ Firstly, Minister Hellyer emphasized a critical necessity in improving management and civilian control of the CAF based on the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis where the military leadership, without government consent or knowledge, deployed resources in support of a US request.⁶⁶ Secondly, the influence of raising defence costs as they pertained to personnel, maintenance and operations in 1964 compared with actual funding (e.g. 4.5% reduction in Defence program in 1964 compared to 1963⁶⁷) were having a detrimental impact on the CAF capability to renew its aging fleets by obtaining capital project funds. It could be argued that the 1964 financial realities are no different from the 2015 in which the CAF find themselves in.

⁶³ J.P.Y.D. Gosselin, “A 50-year Tug of War of Concepts at the Crossroads: Unification and Strong-Service Idea.” in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives – Context and Concepts* (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 134.

⁶⁴ Department of National Defence. *Task Force on Review of Unification of the CAF – Final Report*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 15 March 1980), 27.

⁶⁵ Paul Hellyer (address, House of Commons, Ottawa, Canada, 7 December, 1966)

⁶⁶ J.C. Hood, “Defence Policy and the Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces: An Analysis.” (Master’s Thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1975), 40.

⁶⁷ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). *The Military Balance*. Vol. 64, Iss. 1 (1964), 38.

1968 Unification of the Logistics Branches

The Logistics Branch was unified on 1 February 1968 through bill C-243⁶⁸. The three environmental branches and their sub-branches were amalgamated under the one Branch in order to minimize and eliminate what Granastein describes as a system with "... little effective cooperation between the services when each concentrated almost exclusively on its own interests."⁶⁹ Furthermore, the climate between the three environments service chiefs were confrontational due to the fact the three environmental requirements were completely distinct, not synchronized and in direct competition without any consorted link to national defence program or priorities. As the Minister of National Defence, Hellyer saw "open competition among the services and constant political manoeuvring as each svc had direct access to the MND."⁷⁰ The unification of the three branches was to increase effectiveness and "... was a sensible posture for the comparatively small size of the CAF."⁷¹ The opponents to unification leading up to and following the enactment of the reorganization act, centered on a perceived dissatisfaction of the members in the services and the argument that the change was too one-dimensional as an organizational model to impose on the institution.⁷² Even though the unification did cause negative

⁶⁸ J.P.Y.D. Gosselin, "A 50-year Tug of War of Concepts at the Crossroads: Unification and Strong-Service Idea." in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives – Context and Concepts* (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 130.

⁶⁹ J.L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian military?* 3rd ed. (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd, 2008), 70.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 73.

⁷¹ R.L. Raymont, *Report on Integration and Unification 1964-1968* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1982), 290

⁷² D. Gosselin, "Hellyer's Ghosts: Unification of the CAF is 40 Years Old – Part One." *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 2 (2003): 7.

impacts and discord (real or perceived could be debated), four key principles as they pertain to the Logistics Branch were introduced: 1) the “Fourth Service” creation/discussion; 2) meeting military operational demands; 3) economy of scales and effort; and 4) employment motivation.

The 1963 Glassco report on government discussed the creation of a “Fourth Service” for military support/logistics services and its benefits’ towards CAF effectiveness. This “Fourth Service” would create, for all intents and purposes, a centralization of all logistics services that were considered triplicate under one independent authority reporting to the Chief of Defence Staff to the same level of the Navy, Air Force and Army Chiefs of Staffs.⁷³ Hellyer’s read of the report also led him to ascertain that centralizing pay, communications, the supply chain of the three services would be the creation of a “Fourth Service”.⁷⁴ Internal to the Logistics community of the time, the LBA (e.g. senior Logistics advisor) to the Chief of Defence Staff was also in the same mind set and open to the idea of creating this independent service:

“... while it is desirable to have logisticians who specialize within a particular environment, and while continued employment within the environment is something to be encouraged, such employment patterns are not cast in concrete - there can be no absolute barriers to transfers between environmental commands.”⁷⁵

⁷³ J.P.Y.D. Gosselin, “A 50-year Tug of War of Concepts at the Crossroads: Unification and Strong-Service Idea.” in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives – Context and Concepts* (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 177.

⁷⁴ Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes – My Fight to Unify Canada’s Armed Forces* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1990), 37.

⁷⁵ Department of National Defence. *Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the CAF* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 31 August 1980), 25.

Using D. Gosselin's *Powerful Service Filters*⁷⁶ in Figure 1, it could be assessed that the unification of the CAF Logistics Branch is supportable and desirable as an interest filter (e.g. operators and services being supported). This would in turn require the understanding of the different service cultures in order to ensure that a unification of the Logistics Branch would not create "... a serious loss in efficiency ... from integrating support service under one or other of the armed forces ... would no longer have full control of their supporting service."⁷⁷ This service chief requirement towards the Logistics Branch perspective will be analyzed in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

A military force's *raison d'être* is ultimately to be able to meet its country's operational demands be it national defence, ensuring trade routes remain open or fulfilling the country's international commitment to allied nations/alliances (e.g. United Nations, NATO, etc). Unification allows an increased agility and adaptability in order to allow the CAF to prepare, deploy, and redeploy for the current and future security environment. The military logistics system is critical in all of the previous transition phases. Environmental divides for a force of 66,000 regular force and 30,950 reserve force personnel⁷⁸ needs to be minimized in order to achieve governmental intent and missions. Furthermore, the higher loyalty to the overall Logistics Branch that presents itself

⁷⁶ J.P.Y.D. Gosselin, "Unification and the Strong-Service Idea: a 50 Year Tug of War of Concepts at Crossroads." (National Security Studies Course Paper, CAF College, 2004), 32.

⁷⁷ J.P.Y.D. Gosselin, "A 50-year Tug of War of Concepts at the Crossroads: Unification and Strong-Service Idea." in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives – Context and Concepts* (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 170.

⁷⁸ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). *The Military Balance 2015*. Vol. 115, Iss. 1 (2015), 37.

with unification is linked in meeting those operational demands. No longer can specific environments dictate operational objectives that would require jeopardizing the overall limited logistics support architecture (e.g. technicians, inventory, stock levels, force generation of future workforce) to the defence of Canada.

The third principle associated with the 1968 unification was the economy of scales and effort in unifying the Logistics Branch. The requirement to have three distinct support apparatuses was and still is uneconomical for the CAF. The centralization of human resource procedures, the reduction and consolidation of depots be it equipment or ammunition, career management of Logisticians and reductions in the overhead leadership are but some examples of the economies of scales achieved through unification. As stated previously, the unification of the Logistics Branch would allow members and the overall organization to synchronize their efforts in attaining the government objective using coordinated and effective means. Furthermore, unification "... ensures policy coherence, increases coordination, reduces waste and overhead costs, and realizes greater administrative efficiencies in the end."⁷⁹ Finally, the unification of the Air Force, Navy and Army logistics architectures would allow conformity to the western military principal of war of unity of effort;

“Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation among all participants in the AOR toward a commonly recognized political objective, even if they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. Unity of command may not be possible during operations

⁷⁹ D. Gosselin, “Helleyer’s Ghosts: Unification of the CAF is 40 Years Old – Part One.” *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 2 (2003): 11.

involving other agencies or other nations in a comprehensive-approach environment; however, the requirement for unity of effort remains paramount.”⁸⁰

The final main principal of unification for the Logistics Branch was in regards to the employment and retention of Logistics personnel. The unification into one environment/service allowed a better management of its personnel: “...a unified service ... permit them to advance across old service barriers and so provide greater avenues for service and greater opportunities for personnel...”⁸¹

Environmental divides based on the environmental uniform a sailor/aviator/soldier wears should not be interfering and making a difference in completing technical responsibilities. The goal should always remain assigning the correct person to the correct position with the right technical acumen. Environmental acumen can be learned in a “just in time” process and requires limited time compared to the common technical training personnel receives. The artificial barriers created by the three environments need to be taken/removed in order for the CAF to benefit from having cross environmentally trained support personnel.⁸² As indicated in previous sub-section, a major counter-argument to unification relates to individual loyalty to the Navy, Air Force or Army, and corps and regiments, ships and squadrons, which was vital in 1968. Will the new millennium generation associate itself to the higher loyalty hoped for by Hellyer towards the CAF or remains entrenched inside specialty and regimental structures?

⁸⁰ Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-300/FP-001. *CAF Joint Publications 3.0 – Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, September 2011), 1-3.

⁸¹ Paul Hellyer (address, House of Commons, Ottawa, Canada, 7 December, 1966).

⁸² Department of National Defence. *Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the CAF* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 31 August 1980), C-6.

2005 CAF Transformation's Quest for Effectiveness

In 2005, the Chief of Defence Staff of the time, General Hillier, led the CAF through an organizational transformation process which led amongst other initiatives to the creation of the CANOSCOM to deliver operational support. The Leslie transformation report of 2011 identified CANOSCOM as a:

“very laudable quality of extending upon the extremely potent operational focus that characterizes the success of the CANOSCOM model, which in turn reflects the positive and enduring impact of the 2005 Transformation on the CF organizational culture.”⁸³

Interestingly enough in 2012, this same organization was dismantled and its personnel integrated inside a new operational level command called CJOC⁸⁴. Unfortunately, the logistical roles and responsibilities that had been centralized in CANOSCOM have been de-centralized sometimes without the “Authority-Responsibility-Accountability (ARA)” throughout the CAF structure making the management and coordination of the Logistics Branch even more difficult. This new transformation period in CAF Logistics was not a complete distinct initiative nor a revolution in organizational change but more of an evolutionary development.⁸⁵ The 2005 transformation obtained its foundations on past transformation initiatives to include the 1968 unification, the implementation of

⁸³ Martin Shadwick, “The Report on Transformation 2011,” *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 12, no. 1(Winter 2011): 69.

⁸⁴ National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canadian Joint Operations Command.” Accessed 1 April 2015. <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-org-structure/canadian-joint-operations-command.page>

⁸⁵ Department of National Defence. *Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the CAF* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 31 August 1980), 40.

the Vance Report⁸⁶ and the Management Command and Control Re-Engineering Team (MCCRT) initiative established to streamline organization and administration to improve efficiency and maintain effectiveness.⁸⁷ Contrary to the thesis statement on achieving effectiveness, General Hillier's vital ground⁸⁸ was operational primacy and efficiencies in the command and control apparatus of the CAF. But the concepts included in bill C-243 were still relevant and communicated in General Hillier's strategy:

"Our first loyalty is to Canada. Beyond this fundamental imperative, all service personnel must look past environment, component or unit affiliations to most closely identify with the CF. The greater good of Canada and the CF will, in every instance, take precedence over considerations of service, component or unit affiliation".⁸⁹

Furthermore, D. Gosselin also indicated that the ideas behind the 1968 unification were still relevant in the 2005 transformation: increase centralization of resources and activities, focus on jointness and interoperability, integration of more defence support functions, continued civilianization of the department, and the improvement of the department's overall efficiency.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Douglas L. Bland, *Canada's National Defence – Volume 2 – Defence Organization* (Kingston: Queen's University School of Policy, 1998), 345.

⁸⁷ Michael K. Jeffery, *Inside CAF Transformation: Institutional Leadership as a Catalyst for Change* (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 6.

⁸⁸ NATO AAP-6(2008) defines vital ground as "Ground of such importance that it must be retained or controlled for the success of the mission." NATO Standardization Agency (NSA). AAP-6 (2008). *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions* (Brussels: NATO Headquarters, 2008), 2-v-2.

⁸⁹ Michael K. Jeffery, *Inside CAF Transformation: Institutional Leadership as a Catalyst for Change* (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 121.

⁹⁰ J.P.Y.D. Gosselin, "A 50-year Tug of War of Concepts at the Crossroads: Unification and Strong-Service Idea." in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives – Context and Concepts* (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 130.

2012 Defence Renewal Quest for Efficiencies

A further evolution and pursuit for CAF efficiencies, which in turn is believed to be able to increase effectiveness, has materialized with the 2012 Defence Renewal Charter and follow-on Plan. The DR re-investment targets have been established at \$1.2B and 4800 employees⁹¹ and ordered to be completed by 2018. Some organizational initiatives exist but no specific logistics organizational initiative exists as a stand-alone. The objectives of the 6.1 “Lean HQ” initiatives could enable better logistical operational outputs (e.g. effectiveness in terms of rationalizing the number of managers in the Logistics Branch that all three environments have in addition to the Logistician leadership/responsibility present in the CJOC). This would/could in turn identify “clear career paths, resulting in improved employee morale.”⁹² Results, impacts and feasibility will not be known until the completion of the project in 2018. C. Davies’ 2014 Vimy Paper identified the dangers associated with finding and applying too rapidly what the 2011 Leslie Report identified as a need to reduce the CAF “tail”⁹³:

“... The risk remains that the current Defence Renewal initiative will culminate much the same as most previous efficiency and cost reduction efforts - required savings are extracted and victory is declared without actually delivering and institutionalizing the

⁹¹ Department of National Defence. ADM(PA)/SMA(AP) DGM-13-06-01472. *Defence Renewal Charter - Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Force* (Ottawa: DND Canada, October 2013), 10.

⁹² Department of National Defence. *Defence Renewal Plan* (Ottawa: DND Canada, October 2013), 70.

⁹³ Martin Shadwick, “The Report on Transformation 2011,” *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 12, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 68.

promised systemic improvements that were supposed to minimize or avoid the negative impacts of the reductions."⁹⁴

Conclusion

The analysis of the 1968, 2005 and 2012 change initiatives as they relate to unifying the Logistics Branch allows the identification of key arguments and challenges as it pertains to unifying CAF Logistics under one “champion” be it the RCN, RCAF, CA or the outright creation of a new and distinct “Fourth Service”. The actual organizational models of the Logistics Branch and the CAF “balanced force”⁹⁵ principle are no longer sustainable in terms of governance and operational effectiveness. The requirement to meet operation demands of the services and government with “... a tiny military with limited funds, divisive strategic concepts and a wasteful organization are simply intolerable.”⁹⁶ Throughout the reorganization initiatives it was clear that they were not only directed towards making the institution effective in terms of business process/structure but also brought forth human resource management concepts that can be applicable to the current state of affairs in the CAF Logistics Branch (e.g. motivation of workforce by diversifying employment opportunities). The size and business model of the Logistics Branch in comparison to what it is bound to

⁹⁴ Charles Davies, “Defence Transformation and Renewal: Teeth, Tails and Other Myths”. *Vimy Paper 18* (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute May 2014): 8.

⁹⁵ D. Gosselin, “Helleyer’s Ghosts: Unification of the CAF is 40 Years Old – Part One.” *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 2 (2003): 8.

⁹⁶ J.L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian military?* 3rd ed. (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd, 2008), 94.

support in all three environments and the CJOC will be brought forward in the next Chapter in order to set the conditions for the use of the McKinsey 7S model to be used in the subsequent Chapter 5 to prove the thesis statement.

CHAPTER 4 – THE CAF LOGISTICS BRANCH

The military logistics domain has been analysed and discussed across the millenniums. Furthermore, the essence of what is military logistics⁹⁷ is defined and understood by most strategists, academics and military members. Its function towards military forces and/or campaigns remains an “... art rather than a science.”⁹⁸ Many examples of the importance of logistics in military campaign successes and failures are also well documented by historical accounts and war diaries. The tactical acumen required and how to achieve it is also standardized at the tactical and operational level through detailed doctrine and procedures located in the environmental commands and not specifically at the national level that is the Logistics Branch. The CAF organizational framework on how to maintain the overall military logistics institution’s relevance and the institutionalization of gateways in order to force generate capabilities (e.g. resources, equipment and personnel) now and in the future has unfortunately not received as much attention

⁹⁷ Military logistics is defined as: “the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, logistics is the aspects of military operations that deal with: design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; transport of personnel; acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and acquisition or furnishing of services.” Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-400/FP-001. CAF Joint Publications 4.0 – Support. 1st ed. Ottawa: DND Canada, 24 February 2014. p. 1-2

⁹⁸ Henry E. Eccles, *Logistics in the National Defense* (USA: The Stackpole Company, 1959), 50.

in the past decade as have operations in Afghanistan. This chapter will delve into the foundational guidelines associated with the CAF Logistics Branch institution since its unification (i.e. creation) in 1968. In order to understand the current Logistics Branch paradigm and its service trichotomy reality in terms of how it is structured and its functions to support the Government of Canada's intent in forward projecting its military forces, a short review of its historical roots will be conducted. An analysis of the Logistics Branch organization and governance structure will then be carried out to ascertain how the Branch achieves what the Royal Commission on Government Organization of 1968 identified as the key role if not *raison d'être* of the Canadian military:

"... the test of each component of the Forces is its ability to perform in wartime task virtually without notice. The structures and procedures of the headquarters establishment must therefore be such as to enable it to discharge its responsibilities in the most economical and efficient manner consistent with its obligations to the combat formations under operational conditions."⁹⁹

The mention of "... its ability to perform in wartime task virtually without notice"¹⁰⁰ is directly linked with the thesis statement of this paper in identifying the effectiveness of the Logistics Branch through the means of complete unification. The chapter will conclude with a comparison of another CAF Branch unified under one "champion" service/environment: the Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RCEME) Corps.

⁹⁹ House of Commons. *Royal Commission on Government Organization. Report 20: Department of National Defence* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1968), 67.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 67.

Origins of the CAF Logistics Branch

The CAF Logistics Branch can trace its origins to both the French and British regimes of the 16th to the 19th centuries. Through the centuries and experiences from European warfare, the sustainment of Canadian militia/military forces were developed, forgotten and then re-learned in the 19th century when the functions of transportation and supply functions were centralized under the British Army's Service Corps during the Red River Expedition in 1870¹⁰¹. With the departure of British forces from Canada in 1871, the responsibility of supporting Canada's militia was given to a civilian organization called the Canadian Stores Department¹⁰² until the formal creation of several distinct logistics services: the CA Service Corps in 1899¹⁰³, the Canadian Ordnance Corps in 1903¹⁰⁴, the CA Pay Corps in 1907¹⁰⁵ and the Canadian Postal Corps in 1911¹⁰⁶. The creation of the RCN in 1910 and Canadian Air Force in 1919 brought the requirement of the two newly created services (e.g. Accountant/Paymaster/Supply and Secretarial Branch for the Navy and the Royal Flying Corps (Transportation) for the Canadian Air Force) to have distinct and independent logistics organizations from the Army. A few interdependencies did exist between the Army and Air Force as the CA Pay Corps was used for both¹⁰⁷ but for the most part the three logistics environmental functions were distinct.

¹⁰¹ Department of National Defence. *Logistics Branch Secretarial Handbook* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2000), 31.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 34.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 67.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 66.

With the 1964 White Paper on Defence, the Development of Integrated Logistics¹⁰⁸ committee was established to analyze and recommend how to better employ (e.g. effectiveness) and create economies (e.g. efficiency) within the different military organizations responsible for maintenance, transportation, supply and finance. The divisiveness and competition between the logistics support community and the environments finally came to an end with the 1968 unification intended to put a stop to the triplication of visions, intents, procurement plans, capability development, funding as well as force generation structures. The main effort was to create financial economies without looking into effectiveness, as the government of the day was experiencing difficult financial woes. The Logistics Branch unification was finally concluded in 2001 when the Personnel Administration Branch was integrated into the overall logistics organisation.¹⁰⁹

Current Logistics Branch

The total number of Logisticians in the CAF has ebbed and flowed over the years but has remained relatively stable since the Force Reduction Program of the 1990s. This program resulted in the CAF personnel total force numbers going from over 120K military personnel¹¹⁰ to the current level of 95K military

¹⁰⁸ Interestingly enough the committee's acronym was "DEVIL" which would make anyone wonder if the services or the creator of the committee's name supported the unification plan.

¹⁰⁹ Department of National Defence. *Logistics Branch Secretarial Handbook* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2000), 67.

¹¹⁰ Jungwee Park, "A Profile of the CAF." Statistics Canada: Perspectives, no. 75-001-X (July 2008): 17.

personnel.¹¹¹ Table 1 identifies the total number of Logisticians in the CAF as 13 707 members divided by occupation, environment (e.g. Land, Sea and Air) and component (e.g. Regular Force or Reserve Force). Of this total, 74% of Logisticians wear the land environment uniform. Even though every effort is made to keep personnel employed inside their environment throughout their career, based on operational requirements and manning shortfalls, military Logisticians do work in other environmental commands (e.g. CA, RCN, RCAF) or what are considered “purple” commands (e.g. CJOC, ADM Fin CS, NDHQ¹¹²) as demonstrated in Tables 2 through 4. Thus 77% (i.e. 10 504 / 13 707) of military Logisticians are employed in the “big” three environmental commands. Furthermore, in relation to the overall CAF military manpower, the Logistics Branch is the biggest branch representing 14% of the entire military force.

¹¹¹ National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Frequently Asked Questions.” Accessed 28 April 2015. <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/faq.page#q12>

¹¹² The definition of a purple trade is an organization that does not have a specific environmental designation/affiliation and is present in all environments.

Table 1 – CAF Logistics Branch Manpower by Occupation

	Regular Force			Regular Force Total	Reserve Force			Reserve Force Total	Grand Total
	Air	Land	Sea		Air	Land	Sea		
Logistics Officer Air	476			476	88	3		91	567
Logistics Officer Land		696		696	1	338		339	1035
Logistics Officer Sea			257	257			93	93	350
Ammunition Technician		180		180				0	180
Cook	171	481	285	937	22	136	132	290	1227
Mobile Equipment Operator	390	1099		1489	95	535		630	2119
Postal Clerk		129		129				0	129
Resource Management System Clerk	935	1471	523	2929	275	908	242	1425	4354
Supply Technician	560	1482	365	2407	107	436	84	627	3034
Traffic Technician	462	209		671	37	4		41	712
Grand Total	2994	5746	1431	10171	625	2360	551	3536	13707

Source: CAF Monitor Mass System. Logistics Branch Occupations, Accessed 28 April 2015.

Table 2 – Logisticians Assigned in the RCN

RCN	Air	Land	Sea	Grand Total
AMMO TECH		2		2
COOK	23	48	302	373
LOG – AIR	2			2
LOG - LAND		3		3
LOG – SEA			122	122
LOG - SEA NAV RES			88	88
MSE OP	24	58		82
POST CLK		1		1
RMS CLK	90	108	414	612
SUP TECH	49	75	292	416
TFC TECH	15	10		25
Grand Total	203	305	1218	1726

Source: CAF Monitor Mass System. Logistics Branch Occupations, Accessed 28 April 2015.

Table 3 – Logisticians Assigned in the RCAF

RCAF	Air	Land	Sea	Grand Total
AMMO TECH		4		4
COOK	65	78	26	169
LOG – AIR	308			308
LOG - LAND	1	5		6
LOG – SEA			1	1
MSE OP	247	254		501
POST CLK		6		6
RMS CLK	506	173	54	733
SUP TECH	291	205	38	534
TFC TECH	317	108		425
Grand Total	1735	832	120	2687

Source: CAF Monitor Mass System. Logistics Branch Occupations, Accessed 28 April 2015.

Table 4 – Logisticians Assigned in the CA

CA	Air	Land	Sea	Grand Total
AMMO TECH		104		104
COOK	81	403	61	545
LOG – AIR	7	3		10
LOG - LAND		702		702
LOG – SEA			4	4
MSE OP	147	1097		1244
POST CLK		42		42
RMS CLK	262	1454	125	1841
SUP TECH	190	1242	56	1488
TFC TECH	89	58		147
Grand Total	776	5105	246	6127

Source: CAF Monitor Mass System. Logistics Branch Occupations, Accessed 28 April 2015.

Management of the Logistics Branch

The day to day system management of the 13 707 members of CAF Logistics Branch is coordinated through two distinct national level positions and staffs: the LBA and the Logistics Branch Integrator. The LBA position was created in September 1971¹¹³ to be the logistics focal point for the military chains of command in terms of branch identity as well as the advisor to the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) (ADM (Mat)) at the National Defence Headquarter (NDHQ) on logistics personnel management. Of note, until the Armed Forces Council decision to create the LBI (i.e. position and staff) in 2008,¹¹⁴ the LBA roles and responsibilities were considered secondary duties for a Regular Force Colonel occupying a distinct position inside the CAF or NDHQ and thus were somewhat personality and operational tempo driven. The question that may be asked was how much “available” time would a LBA designate have towards the Branch’s health and challenges/opportunities over and above his/her primary responsibilities? For example, during the high operational tempo of the 1990/91 Gulf War, Lieutenant General W. Leach (e.g. the LBA) was also the Director of Logistics Plans and Operations on the National Joint Staff. It could be argued that priorities dictated his focus away from the Logistics Branch during that period and thus minimized the importance given by the CAF institution towards the logistics generation function. In 2008, the LBI and his/her staff were given the following mandate in order to assert a dire needed focus on CAF Logistics:

¹¹³ National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Logistics Branch.” Accessed 28 April 2015. <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/caf-community-branches-logistics/about-us.page>

¹¹⁴ Department of National Defence. CANFORGEN 189/08 04/08. *Log Branch Re-alignment Concept* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 16 October 2008).

“To develop a logistics branch training and management framework that will produce tactically and technically competent personnel capable to successfully operate in all environments, at all levels, using the full range of available logistics systems to achieve mission success. The overarching objective is to provide a more coherent and visible log capability and to generate the optimum support to sea, land, air, and joint operations.”¹¹⁵

In addition, five key operationally focused tasks were given to the LBI staff to develop and accomplish: 1) a governance structure; 2) doctrine, lessons learned, training and employment opportunities; 3) strategic logistics capabilities; 4) the LBI way ahead; and 5) a Branch communication plan.¹¹⁶ Interestingly enough, all these goals and tasks have been achieved (or strived to be achieved at different levels of success) over the past 7 years with a total of only nine LBI staff officers (including the LBA who is double-tasked as LBI Director). Due to the limited workforce and output capacity of its staff since 2010, the LBA and LBI have instituted a Logistics Governance Framework¹¹⁷ structured on different levels of advisory ranging from General Officer/Flag Officer¹¹⁸ level committees for strategic guidance to working level committees in order to maintain occupational development amongst the occupations. A conceptual image of the network can be found at Figure 2. Some among the Logistics community, as J. Conrad, have criticized the Logistics Branch institutionalization of being too bureaucratic and less responsive towards operations: “our soldiers possess a marked

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ J.P.G.M. Charron, *Logistics Branch Governance Framework* (Logistics Branch Adviser: file 1948-01 (LBI), 19 March 2010), 31.

¹¹⁸ General level officers are called General Officers in the RCAF and CA and Flag Officers for the RCN.

resourcefulness and a warrior ethos that is alarmingly incongruous with the valued bureaucratic principles of the CAF Logistics Branch.”¹¹⁹




Figure 2: Logistics Branch Governance Network

Source: Charron, *Logistics Branch Governance Framework*, 31.

Mission and Vision of Logistics Branch

The vision and mission of the Logistics Branch have evolved through the years but have not fundamentally changed since the official inception of the LBI in 2008. Its strategic level communication statements have remained truthful to its foundational origins and have maintained their aim of building operationally focused, relevant and professional logisticians in order to meet operational demands from across the environments. Furthermore, the Logistics Branch *raison*

¹¹⁹ John Conrad, *What the Thunder Said – Reflexions of a Canadian Officer in Kandahar* (Canada: The Dundurn Group and Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 40.

d'être of supporting force employers with adaptive and responsive Logisticians in high states of readiness is demonstrated with the alignment of its mission statement within CAF capstone sustainment documents: the CJOC CAF Joint Publications 4.0 (Support), the RCAF CAF Aerospace Doctrine and the CA's Sustainment of Land Operations.¹²⁰

Unfortunately, two of the five key LBI tasks have not demonstrated any development possibly due to a lack of production capability, disagreement amongst the Logistics environments or a combination of both. The first makes reference to doctrine and lessons learned development as to allow the Logistics Branch to become a learning institution for its logistics community. The current LBI does not have the manpower nor the recognized "Authority, Responsibility and Accountability" (ARA) from the environmental services and commands to coordinate doctrine across all the different environments. Due to little value that is being put on honing a body of best practices, J. Conrad identified that this lack of doctrinal focus is not only affecting the CA logistics world, but is also applicable to the entire Logistics Branch: "...this flawed culture among the logistics community has contributed to the erosion among the logistics credibility and effectiveness as a corps inside the army [Logistics] family."¹²¹ Without an increase of LBI staff levels in order to complete this task, a task realignment needs to occur in order to officially withdraw it from the LBI and have the environmental commanders be the sole owners of logistics doctrine. The

¹²⁰ The RCN does have strategic documents but no defined maritime sustainment/logistics capstone document.

¹²¹ John Conrad, *What the Thunder Said – reflexions of a Canadian Officer in Kandahar* (Canada: The Dundurn Group and Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 68.

second misstep is linked to the continual work of the Logistics Branch communication plan for internal but also external purposes (e.g. CAF as well as Government of Canada stakeholders). This plan has seen a multitude of iterations throughout the years without ever being formally published or enforced. The available documents found for this paper suggest that as early as 2010¹²², the LBI staff worked and officially presented recommendations to the LBA in order to create and establish a Logistics Branch Communication Plan. Furthermore, key messages for Logistics leadership seemed to have been developed in 2013¹²³ by the LBI staff but no documentation was found indicating if these were published or approved. A renewed interest in the Branch's communication plan by the Logistics Branch Senate in November 2014¹²⁴ in addition to the existence of a University of Ottawa cooperative student on the LBI staff resulted in the submission of a problem definition paper in December 2014.¹²⁵ The senior leadership discussions and analysis of the paper will most likely occur in 2015 with intent of having the LBA generate key Branch messages and hopefully the publication of a supported Strategic Communications Plan. This keystone document in the civilian industry is an essential internal tool to foster *esprit de corps* as well as an external strategic tool for its stakeholders and competitors. Associated with and a recurring theme amongst different Logistic Branch

¹²² S.M. Raby, *Comms Strat and Plan* (Logistics Branch Integrator: Briefing Note, 30 August 2010), 1.

¹²³ Department of National Defence. *Logistics Branch Communication Strategy (v 2)* (Logistics Branch Integrator: Briefing Note, August 2013), 1.

¹²⁴ Department of National Defence. *Record of Discussion Logistics Branch Senate – 26-27 November 2014* (Ottawa: DND Canada, December 2014), 2.

¹²⁵ P. Beauchamp. and Julie Boileau, *Logistics Branch- Problem Definition Paper* (Logistics Branch Integrator: Briefing Note, December 2014).

governing boards/committees' record of discussions, the cohesion of the Branch was strongly criticized by J. Conrad in his 2009 book *What the Thunder Said* as the "... the biggest factor in the erosion of logistics strength was ourselves - the leadership of the logistics community."¹²⁶

The alignment of the LBI under the ADM (Mat) in 2008 also created challenging realities that could be compared to a split personality syndrome. On one hand the LBI was focussed on developing operationally focused personnel, doctrine and capabilities for the different environments that reported directly to the CDS. On the other, organizationally speaking, the ADM (Mat) reports¹²⁷ to the Deputy Minister and its focus is not on operations but the efficient institutional management and support towards the accomplishment of the CAF operational goals "...to acquire new equipment to help enable the readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)."¹²⁸ With the creation of the CAF Strategic J4 under the Strategic Joint Staff in the summer of 2014, this offered an opportunity to correct a problematic situation created in 2008 by re-aligning the LBI under the Strategic J4.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ John Conrad, *What the Thunder Said – reflexions of a Canadian Officer in Kandahar* (Canada: The Dundurn Group and Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 66.

¹²⁷ Adm (Mat) does not report to CDS but directly to the DM of the MND.

¹²⁸ National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. "Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel)." Accessed 28 April 2015. <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-org-structure/assistant-deputy-minister-materiel.page>

¹²⁹ T.J. Lawson. *Transfer of Logistics Branch Integrator to Director General Support – Strategic J4* (Chief of Defence Staff: Letter, 27 August 2014), 1.

Employment and Generation of Logisticians

The development and employment of Logisticians in every environmental and purple command compounded by the fact that it is dispersed into eight different occupations with as many qualification standards and specifications, results in a complicated management system. Further to this, the occupational authority (OA)¹³⁰ and training authority (TA)¹³¹ of the Logistics Branch are decentralized into two organizations outside the LBA/LBI sphere of responsibility organizations namely the Assistant Chief of Military Personnel (CMP) as the OA and Chief the Defence Academy (CDA) as the TA. Both have important and distinct roles and the separation of these roles allows for un-biased decisions. The CMP organization directly reports to the Chief of Defence Staff and the CDA is one of the CMP's subordinate organizations coordinating and executing training requirement for over 38 other support trades that are not "combat arms"¹³² in the three environments.¹³³ Thus in order to influence and guide the development of future Logisticians responding to the operational requirements of the department, the LBI and LBA must coordinate with the different environments as well as with CMP staff that are all outside its chain of command and influence. For example, the Director of Personnel Generation Requirements, working under the CMP, is the coordinator of the annual Logistics Branch Strategic Intake Plan (SIP) that

¹³⁰ According to DAOD 5070-0 (Military Employment Structure), the OA provides advice and input to the Chief of Military Personnel and appoints/oversees the occupation advisor.

¹³¹ According to DOAD 5070-1 (Military Employment Structure Framework), the TA

¹³² A combat trade for the RCAF would be pilots, for the Navy a Maritime Surface and Sub-Surface Officers and for the Army, infantry soldiers/officers. Logisticians are not considered "combat trades" but of the "support trade" designation.

¹³³ Department of National Defence. *DAOD 5070-1. Military Employment Structure Framework* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 10 February 2015).

dictates required recruitment numbers based on attrition forecasts of the Branch. The recruitment centers that execute and strive to meet the SIP also fall under CMP. To make the situation even more challenging for the Logistics Branch to plan for its force development now and in the future, CMP would be undergoing an establishment restructure that may see the OA transitioning to the same organization that holds TA responsibilities: CDA.¹³⁴ This initiative is currently being debated and representations from the Logistics Branch leadership are ongoing to maintain distinct and separate entities with OA and TA roles. This paradigm shift could see the TA, during departmental funding restrictions; reduce training outputs without having analyzed institutional impacts by lowering qualifications standards of the occupations without requiring approval from environmental chief or the Logistics Branch. This possible situation would be a dangerous perspective for the Logistics Branch as well as the other 38 support occupations.

At its core, the Logistics Branch is comprised of seven different Non-Commissioned Member (NCM) occupational trades subdivided into eight different specialties reflective of the NCM occupations/trades and three Officer career paths based on environmental lines. The occupations and specialties (e.g. Officers) are based and comparable to key logistics functions found in the civilian industry: transportation, movement, supply, postal, finance, human resource management, ammunition and foods services. A diverse array of CAF recruitment

¹³⁴ Department of National Defence. *Separation Between Occupational Authority and Training Authority* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 18 March 2015).

entry plans exist that depend and are influenced by position vacancies as well as internal members from other military trades (e.g. airspace controllers, public affair, artillery, etc) requiring a voluntary or compulsory occupational transfer. The NCM entry plans fall into five categories: 1) direct entry from the Canadian population; 2) component transfer from the Reserve Force to the Regular Force (or vice versa); 3) voluntary or mandatory occupational transfer from another existing occupation; or 4) reclassification from Officer to NMC. The environmental classification (e.g. air, navy or army) for both the NCM and the Officers is determined at the recruitment center based the member's desire as well as meeting the environmental allocations determined by the LBA/LBI advisory groups and position vacancies. The Officer entry plans are more diverse based on member desire of speciality/environment in addition to his/her educational background (e.g. with or without graduate degree). The Officer entry plans can be summarized into four main programs: 1) the Direct Entry Officer Program where a graduate with a degree from a civilian institution enrolls; 2) the Regular Officer Training Program which is sub-divided into members being enrolled and completing their graduate education in a civilian university/college or members being enrolled in the Royal Military College of Canada. While enrolled in both sub-programs, the students are considered on a military status; 3) the University Training Plan for NCM allows accepted NCMs to have undergraduate degree studies funded and get an Officer commission upon graduation; and 4) the Continuing Education Officer Training Plan allows NCMs to obtain paid undergraduate education in view of being commissioned as an Officer.

The CAF Logistics Training Center¹³⁵ (CFLTC) in Borden, Ontario, with exception of the Postal specialty, is the central training center for all CAF Logistics Branch specialties and environments. The Postal specialty courses are conducted at the CAF Postal unit in Trenton, Ontario. Further complicating the management of the Branch for the LBA/LBI, the CFLTC is but one of six training centers under the CAF Support Training Group (CFSTG) that is a CDA subordinate command. For fiscal year 2014/15 and 2015/16, the training center conducted an overall average of 250 courses¹³⁶ across all specialties and qualifications (e.g. basic entry level courses for junior members and advanced course for the senior ranking members) with an estimated 50%¹³⁷ of these being filled by Land Logisticians. For the NCMs, apart from “just-in-time” environmental and leadership training specific to sea, land and air environments, all logistics specialty training duration and content were similar in order to reach the Occupation Function Point (OFP) as shown in Table 5. The OFP is defined as “the point in the training flow of each officer and non-commissioned member occupation when individuals can be considered trained resources”¹³⁸ and identifies an individual as having completed his/her Development Period 1 (DP1).

“The purpose of the DP 1 is to develop the required skills and knowledge for CAF entry level employment and further training. The formal developmental requirements include achievement of the Basic Military Qualification (i.e. NMC) [or Basic Military Officer

¹³⁵ Until 12 July 2012, the training center was known by its original 1967 nomenclature: CAF School of Administration and Logistics.

¹³⁶ K. Gash, *CAF logistics Training Center to Army Logistics Council (CFLTC Comdt: Presentation*, 22 April 2015).

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Canada. Public Works and Government Services Canada. Termium Plus. Accessed 28 April 2015. <http://www.btb.termiumplus.gc.ca>

Qualification (i.e. Officer)], environmental and occupational qualifications. After achieving the developmental requirements of DP 1, NCM [and Officers] are deemed to be occupationally employable at the introductory level.”¹³⁹

The DP architecture is a fundamental building block of the CAF Professional System that identifies in a structured process how career management and progression is regimented throughout the environments and commands. All environmental services abide and follow the development system. The differences between the DP1 for a Logistics member’s development within the environments can be counted in terms of days and are related to wing, station or base realities. Any logistics member can complete environmental training of the other two environments (e.g. land supply technician assigned to an Air Force wing) in order to be employed in that other environment establishment without changing environmental uniform.

¹³⁹ National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Education and Training – Professional Development.” Accessed 29 April 2015. <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page>

Table 5 – CAF Logistics NCM Duration to Attain OFP

	Development Period Duration (BMQ + BMQ-L/S/A + QL3)
Cook	90 + 96 days
Postal Clerk	90 + 26 days
Supply Technician	90 + 37 days
Ammunition Technician	90 + 112 days
Traffic Technician	90 + 88 days
Mobile Support Equipment Operator	90 + 88 days
Resource Management Services Clerk	90 + 49 days

Source: Hervé, B.D. *Director Canadian Army Logistics Annual Brief to CCA, DCCA and ASM*. 28 March 2014.

Logistics Branch Occupations, Specialties and Environments

Table 6 illustrate the different occupational breakdowns and demographic information of the different trades. As shown in the table, the Distinctive Environmental Uniforms (DEUs) allocation can be different depending on the authorized operational requirement levels communicated by the three environmental services. Some occupation are strictly “land” centric (e.g. Postal Clerk and Ammunition Technicians) but are employed throughout the environmental commands. During a Logistics NCM or Officer’s career, an individual may transit from one environmental command (or purple command) to another without ever changing his/her environmental uniform. The generalized argument for the change of uniform is for what some have called “credibility

through appearance” from the combat arms components of the environmental command (e.g. pilots, operators, commanding officers of ships/squadrons). This hypothesis has not been studied or analyzed academically and no documentation could be found supporting or disclaiming the value of the argument. In addition, these arguments and logic seem to be emotion based and are not one of the research questions of this paper. The environmental uniform change does not affect an individual’s occupational qualifications for which (or his/her leadership skills) she/he was ultimately chosen for in order to occupy new assignments. Interestingly enough, the 2002 CAF General Message (i.e. policy)¹⁴⁰ on change of Distinctive Environmental Uniforms (DEUs) explicitly states that: 1) change of DEU is not an entitlement; 2) can only happen once in a career; 3) has nothing to do with operational effectiveness¹⁴¹; and more importantly 4) “posting personnel in the CAF will continue to be based on selection of the person best suited for the position.”¹⁴² It could then be argued that a Logistician color of DEU should have nothing to do with career progression, nomination to key positions, assignments or employability. As stated in the CAF policies and the Logistics Branch capstone documents (e.g. Vision), Logisticians must be “...technically competent professionals that are operationally responsive and adaptive to the CAF mission

¹⁴⁰ Department of National Defence. *CANFORGEN CANFORGEN 029-02. Change of Distinctive Environmental Uniform (DEU)* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 3 April 2002).

¹⁴¹ CANFORGEN states the “change will promote morale and enhance operational focus, and whether approval of the request would help the CF achieve its DEU distribution target for the MOC in question. Operational effectiveness is not based on color of uniform but level of experience and knowledge an individual has.

¹⁴² Department of National Defence. *CANFORGEN CANFORGEN 029-02. Change of Distinctive Environmental Uniform (DEU)* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 3 April 2002).

requirements.”¹⁴³ It should never have anything to do with wearing the right colored uniform on an environmental command parade. Furthermore, the emotional attachments/arguments for the “right colored uniform” should be disregarded based on having the right person with the right skills set (qualification and leadership) in any CAF organization. Environmental feuds as they pertain to the Logistics Branch need to cease for the benefit of operational effectiveness in order to respond to the missions while demonstrating that Logisticians are professionals and technically advanced military warriors. Even though efficiency gains (e.g. Defence Renewal) is not part of this paper, research and analysis on the costs associated with a change of DEU uniform in terms of time (e.g. for the member, the different chains of command that review and support, the career management sections and the national level), resources (e.g. financially, supply system issuing new environmental uniforms and divest the old) and emotions (e.g. to member changing uniform after decades) could be required on a Defence Renewal perspective. Single DEU branches employed in all CAF environments do exist and can be used as a baseline for comparison and analysis: the Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineering (RCEME) Branch.

¹⁴³ A.M. Banville. *Logistics Branch Advisor/Integrator to Army Logistics Council* (Logistics Branch Advisor: Presentation, 22 April 2015).

Table 6 – CAF Logistics Branch DEU Allocation and Demographics

	Average YOS	Average Age (all)	Average Age (BTL)	Attrition Rate /yr	DEU Allocation
Log Officer	16	39	30	5.8%	RCN - 18% CA - 47% RCAF - 35%
Cook	12	37	27	7.7%	RCN - 31% CA - 51% RCAF - 18%
Postal Clerk	16	41	33	8.2%	CA - 100%
Sup Tech	12	38	29	6.1%	RCN - 21% CA - 56% RCAF - 23%
Ammo Tech	11	34	28	7.6%	CA - 100%
Tfc Tech	13	38	26	6.2%	CA - 28% RCAF - 72%
MSE Op	13	37	29	7.9%	CA - 65% RCAF - 35%
RMS Clerk	12	40	31	6.9%	RCN - 25% CA - 50% RCAF - 25%

Source: Hervé, B.D. *Director Canadian Army Logistics Annual Brief to CCA, DCCA and ASM. 27 April 2015.*

Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Branch

Due to its size in terms of personnel (e.g. 14% of the CAF), it is difficult to compare the Logistics Branch to any other branch based on the total number of personnel alone. Nonetheless, a key comparison factor is the presence of the Logistics Branch across the environment/command lines¹⁴⁴, which does apply to other branches. For this paper, the RCEME Branch will be used to justify the unification requirement of the Logistics Branch. The RECME is a 100% land DEU centric branch created as a distinct and independent branch of the CAF since 1944. Prior to 1944, its origins came from the Royal Canadian Ordnance Branch. Through the years of CAF transformation, integration and unification phases, the RCEME has seen its name change (e.g. LORE) and some capabilities come and go (e.g. RCAF radar technicians) but its primary mission remained the

¹⁴⁴ The common expression for this type of multi-environment branch is called “purple branches” in the CAF.

same through the different and sometimes rapid technological advancements of military equipment/material: “... provide high quality leadership and land equipment management that will enable and sustain successful CF operations.”¹⁴⁵ All of the CAF land equipment/material is under the stewardship of the RCEME present in all environmental commands. The four RCEME NCM occupations (e.g. Electronic/Optic Technicians, Materials Technicians, Weapons Technicians and Vehicle Technicians) and one Officer occupation remain under the Land DEU and the CA in terms of governance and stewardship. Tables 7 through 10 illustrate the detailed breakdown amongst the occupations and the employment of the RCEME members in the three environments which accounts for 83% of the Corps. The remaining 587 RECME technicians and Officers are dispersed across national level organizations under the DM or are deployed overseas. The governance of the RCEME is controlled through a formal Commander of the CA approved governance framework reaching across the different environments and commands.¹⁴⁶ Based on the Branch’s employment model, it remains under the control and supervision of one environmental “champion” (e.g. the CA). Contrary to the Logistics Branch, the RCEME OA¹⁴⁷ is the Commander CA and the TA¹⁴⁸ is the Commander of the CA Training and Doctrine Command under the authority of the Commander of the CA. The RCEME Branch members do not have the

¹⁴⁵ Corps of the Royal Canadian Electrical Mechanical and Engineering. “Vision, Mission and Organization.” Accessed 29 April 2015. <http://www.embranchgem.ca/english>

¹⁴⁶ Department of National Defence. *CANARMYGEN 015/14. Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RCEME) Corps* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 4 September 2014).

¹⁴⁷ Department of National Defence. *DAOD 5070-0. Military Employment Structure* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 4 March 2014).

¹⁴⁸ Department of National Defence. *DAOD 5070-1. Military Employment Structure Framework* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 10 February 2015).

possibility to change DEUs unless altogether changing occupation through the occupational transfer programs mentioned previously. Furthermore, RCEME members are present in non-land environmental command parades, exercises and operations without impact to operational readiness or emotional angst from non-Army leadership (e.g. a RCEME LCol commands the Transportation and EME functions for the RCN CAF Base in Halifax). What paradigm shift would be required from the Logisticians and the environmental chains of command to accept that the Logistics Branch would be in only one DEU under one “champion”? The structure and organizational framework of the RCEME allows it to have unity of command, unity of effort, maintenance of one aim and a clear operational focus that are not attainable by the Logistics Branch under its current organizational construct.

Table 7 – CAF RCEME Branch Manpower by Occupation

RCEME TOTAL	Regular Force	Reserve Force	Grand Total
RCEME Officer	245	14	259
Electronic/Optic Technician	323		323
Material Technician	207		207
Vehicle Technician	1763	362	2125
Weapons Technician Land	347	133	480
Grand Total	2885	509	3394

Source: CAF Monitor Mass System. Logistics Branch Occupations, Accessed 28 April 2015.

Table 8 – RCEME Assigned in the RCN

RCEME in RCN	Regular Force	Grand Total
RCEME Officer	3	3
Electronic/Optic Technician	4	4
Material Technician	7	7
Vehicle Technician	43	43
Weapons Technician Land	8	8
Grand Total	65	65

Source: CAF Monitor Mass System. Logistics Branch Occupations, Accessed 28 April 2015.

Table 9 – RCEME Assigned in the RCAF

RCEME in RCAF	Regular Force	Reserve Force	Grand Total
RCEME Officer	5		5
Electronic/Optic Technician	8		8
Material Technician	14		14
Vehicle Technician	85	6	91
Weapons Technician Land	7		7
Grand Total	119	6	125

Source: CAF Monitor Mass System. Logistics Branch Occupations, Accessed 28 April 2015.

Table 10 – RCEME Assigned in the CA

RCEME in CA	Regular Force	Reserve Force	Grand Total
RCEME Officer	107	14	121
Electronic/Optic Technician	262		262
Material Technician	155		155
Vehicle Technician	1311	342	1653
Weapons Technician Land	293	133	426
Grand Total	2128	489	2617

Source: CAF Monitor Mass System. Logistics Branch Occupations, Accessed 28 April 2015.

Conclusion

The key foundational tenants and guidelines discussed in Chapter 4 identified challenges currently (and in the future) facing the Logistics Branch organization. Firstly, the decentralized authority, responsibility and accountability structure of the Branch's management and force generation responsibilities (e.g. training and education) were put to the forefront. Separate and distinct chains of responsibilities and reporting (e.g. CMP, SJS and environmental services) currently in place do not allow the Logistics Strategic Vision and Mission statements to be achievable nor relevant to the different environmental chiefs. The misalignment of the LBI, until recently, under ADM (Mat) was also a key challenge that made it difficult for it to maintain its aim of professional and responsive Logisticians towards operations at home (e.g. institutional support and domestic operations) and abroad (e.g. expeditionary operations). The challenges of maintaining the largest proportion of the CAF cohesive and focused was also identified in terms of a yet to be published Logistics Branch Strategic Communication Plan that would be required to be officially blessed by the higher leadership and governance circles. Ultimately, these three key challenges in turn bring into question how the Logistics Branch identifies for/with the environmental services the force employer requirements/demands required of a Logistician in 2015 as well as in the future security environment. Further to this, does the current qualifications/specialties structure and environmental demands support enable the CAF to conduct rapid and responsive military operations across the battle space? The different leadership and advisory committees are all

centered towards the Logistics Branch but should they not need “honest brokers” from non-affiliated but operationally supported components of the CAF (e.g. Directors of other branches, operators, and operational/strategic commanders). No formal and decisive interaction with the environments (e.g. non Logisticians) exists, ultimately making the Logistics governance structure somewhat incestuous. Is the Logistics Branch aligned for the current and future security environment forecasting uncertainty, complexity and chaos? Has the Logistics Branch of 2015 positioned itself to overcome future challenges based on its current organizational construct? The RCME Branch aligned under “one champion” demonstrated the possibility of having the Logistics Branch centralized under “one champion” as well. Furthermore, the overall size and operational scope of responsibility associated with the logistics functions demand an analysis of its organization to confirm its effectiveness. The 1968 unification’s (or what is left of it) status quo is no longer acceptable due to: 1) new CAF capabilities (e.g. cyber, new aircrafts, etc) continue to come into service without any increase to current CAF manning levels thus identifying the Logistics Branch personnel levels as potential targets; 2) no real consolidation in CAF Logistics organizational by allowing the logistics functions in the environments to be duplicated (e.g. governance) and thus impacting negatively its operational effectiveness; and 3) the desired Defence Renewal objectives conflicting with the actual organizational structure of the Logistics Branch. The following Chapter will conduct an organizational analysis of the Logistics Branch through the use of the McKinsey 7s model in order to further demonstrate that the status quo is untenable on an effectiveness perspective.

CHAPTER 5 – ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS BRANCH

The work of an organization is never done, and the structure has to be continually adapted to new and anticipated conditions.

Ralph J. Cordiner

One of the goals of public or non-public institutions is not only to survive open competition in its portion of the free market, but also achieve effectiveness and ultimately efficiencies. The Logistics Branch can and should be considered an institution striving towards the same equivalent of military operational effectiveness. P.H. Wilson's definition of institution is applicable to the Logistics Branch as "...an established, significant, and recognized practice, relationship, or organization in a society or culture."¹⁴⁹ Is the current Logistics Branch's effectiveness sufficient or does it require minor or major adjustments in order to better reflect the new security realities and ways military organizations sustain their forces across the full spectrum of operations? To achieve sustained effectiveness, it could be argued that the knowledge of the organization's environment (e.g. internal and external) through a structured organizational analysis with the use of proven models allow the identification of detrimental shortfalls of the organization as well as improvement opportunities (e.g. complete unification of the Logistics Branch) or possible alternatives (e.g. remaining under three different environment) to better meet the situation at hand. The outcomes of

¹⁴⁹ Peter H. Wilson, "Defining Military Culture." *The Journal of Military History*, 72 (January 2008): 16.

a thorough organizational analysis should in turn allow strategic planning¹⁵⁰ to occur. In combination with the information and research data collected from the previous chapters, this chapter intends to apply the McKinsey 7s organizational analysis model towards the Logistics Branch. The model and its tenants will first be introduced. It will then be followed by a review of precedent analyses that have used this model in past studies. The key findings and their extrapolations will determine if the thesis of this paper is proven or disproven.

Theoretical Model

The McKinsey 7s model was initially developed between 1977 and 1982 by three business writer/researchers/consultants working for McKinsey & Company: T.J. Thomas, J.R. Phillips and R. H. Waterman. The impetus of their research was based on “concerns by business leaders in 1980s on the inherent limitations of structural approaches could render their companies insensitive to an unstable business environment marked by rapidly changing threats and opportunities.”¹⁵¹ Through their interviews and research of over sixty multinational companies, the authors identified that the old business theories and paradigms that revolved around the structure, systems and strategy¹⁵² were no longer adaptive to the changing business markets continually adjusting to the early stages of

¹⁵⁰ “A deliberative, disciplined approach to producing fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an org is, what it does, and why it does it.” taken from Bryson, John M., *Strategic Planning for Public and Non Profit Organizations*. Fourth Edition. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2011. P. 8

¹⁵¹ Thomas J. Peters, Julien R. Phillips, and Robert H. Waterman. “Structure is not Organization.” *Business Horizon*, Vol. 23, Issue 3 (June 1980): 16.

¹⁵² John Keifer, Michael D. Michalisin, and Frank L. Winfrey. “Super-organizations: Refinement or Reconceptualization?” *Business Change & Re-engineering* Volume 2, no. 4 (1995): 57.

globalization. The results although not earth shattering, were contrary to the then accepted and academically thought rationalist approaches that encouraged abstract and heartless philosophy.¹⁵³ The McKinsey 7s model identified seven key factors subsequently sub-divided into soft systems and hardware systems that permit business effectiveness as well as obtaining the capability of rapidly adjusting to the market if correctly balanced. The rational theories of the time would concentrate on the identified McKinsey *hard* systems and avoid the analysis or altogether ignore the *soft* systems existing in all organizations but difficult to rationalize or quantify. This led the authors to state:

“All the stuff you have been dismissing for so long as the intractable, irrational, intuitive, informal organization can be managed. Clearly, it has as much or more to do with the way things work (or don’t) around your companies as the formal structures and strategies do. Not only are you foolish to ignore it, but here’s a way to think about it.”¹⁵⁴

According to the model, achieving alignment of all seven factors allows an institution/organization to successfully adapt to internal and external environments threats and opportunities. The naming convention decided upon was influenced by marketing techniques and memory hooks¹⁵⁵ the authors claim was: “... that organizational change is really the relationship between structure, strategy, system, style, skills, staff and shared values.”¹⁵⁶ Figure 3 illustrates the model and demonstrates the interdependency of each factor towards management

¹⁵³ Peters, Thomas J, and R.H. Waterman. In Search of Excellence. New York: Collins Business Essentials, 2006. P. 45

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁵⁶ Thomas J. Peters, Julien R. Phillips, and Robert H. Waterman. “Structure is not Organization.” *Business Horizon*, Vol. 23, Issue 3 (June 1980): 16.

and organizational effectiveness. The model does not identify nor imply that one factor supersedes any of the other six even though “shared values” is put at the center of the model.




Figure 3: McKinsey 7-s Framework

Source: Peters and Waterman, *In Search of Excellence*, 10.

Critics and Proponents of the Model

Since the publication of *In Search for Excellence* in 1982, the factors and overall framework has been applauded but also critiqued. P. Grant in his 2008 article in *The International Journal of Clinical Leadership*¹⁵⁷ identified numerous flaws with the framework. First, the author infers that the McKinsey model and associated literature falls short and does not explain nor gives guidance to how to proceed when an unbalance between the seven factors is identified. Secondly, no performance measurement framework is associated with the McKinsey 7s model

¹⁵⁷ Paul Grant. “The Productive Ward Round: a Critical Analysis of Organizational Change.” *The International Journal of Clinical Leadership*, Vol. 16 (2008): 194.

which in turn makes difficult the identification of improvements or regressions. The performance measurement literature was only nascent, if even present when *In Search for Excellence* was initially published in 1982 which could possibly explain the absence of associated key performance indicators (KPI). Third, the difficulty in accessing and measuring the *soft* systems factors makes the McKinsey framework complicated in identifying shifts in external environment (e.g. culture shift of the workforce). Ultimately, P. Grant assesses the framework as over simplistic (e.g. all factors start with letter “s”) and the consultants that use it as “...people who come in and use PowerPoint to state the bleeding obvious.”¹⁵⁸

A second detractor, C. Hirst in his 2002 article entitled *the Might of the McKinsey Mob*, also criticises the framework but more importantly the company that created and still uses the framework: McKinsey & Company. The journalist identifies the company (and its framework) as “... it does not follow through and imposes business solution to the market vice the ones applicable to the industry being assessed.”¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, C. Hirst critiques the lack of rigour, professional ethics and ultimately the unfulfilled expectation of the framework as “[t]hey come in and then a few years later changes that have or have not been made are changed again by another McKinsey alumni.”¹⁶⁰

Proponents of the framework, on the other hand, do exist in larger numbers and have used the model in support of academic research and organizational analysis. A. Singh successfully completed an analysis in 2013

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ Clayton Hirst. “The Might of the McKinsey Mob.” *The Independent*, 20 January 2002.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

identifying how to amplify organizational improvement, alignment, and effectiveness as it pertains to “... the role of a transformational leader in solving the communication problems related to the private service sector.”¹⁶¹ In 2014, Naipinit, Kojchavivong and Kowittayakorn determined that that the McKinsey framework permitted small and medium Thai enterprises to identify shortfalls and achieve their intended goals through the use of the seven McKinsey factors.¹⁶² Finally, P.T. Bartone used the framework in 2009 towards his volunteer organization STAR-TIDES. Contrary to detractors of the McKinsey 7s model previously identified, P.T. Bartone recognized improvement opportunities not only in the traditional *hard* systems but also inside the *soft* systems that translated into actionable plans for his porous network organization. The following section of this chapter will analyze each McKinsey factor individually.

¹⁶¹ Ashu Singh. “A Study of Role of McKinsey's 7S Framework in Achieving Organizational Excellence.” *Organization Development Journal*, Vol. 31, Issue 3 (Fall 2013): 41.

¹⁶² T. Naipinit, S. Kojchavivong, V. Kowittayakorn, and T.P.N. Sakolnakorn. “McKinsey 7S Model for Supply Chain Management of Local SMEs Construction Business in Upper Northeast Region of Thailand.” *Asian Social Science* 10, no. 8 (2014) : 36.

McKinsey 7s Factors – CAF Logistics Branch

Structure

The Logistics Branch governance, accountability, roles and responsibility structure as illustrated in Figure 2 and discussed in Chapter 4 could be qualified as what P.T. Barton describes as a porous structure (versus functional or divisional structures).¹⁶³ The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines porous as “having small holes that allow air or liquid to pass through or easy to pass or get through.”¹⁶⁴ Due to its size and complexity, the Logistics Branch cannot quickly adapt and overcome external challenges. Unfortunately, the level of decentralization with which the Logistics Branch currently functions under also creates misalignments in vision, mission and effectiveness. For example, the Logistics Branch occupational/functional authorities are different from the training authorities which reside in a different CAF organization than the LBA/LBI. Secondly, the number of hierarchal levels between the LBA and Logisticians is further complicated with the different official and un-official sub-governance structures based on specialties, occupation co-advisors, career managers, succession planning construct (e.g. talent management), environmental Logistics directors, regional logistics networks (e.g. formal and informal) and occasionally the input from environmental chiefs (e.g. RCAF, RCN or CA). The creation of the Strategic J4 in 2014, is assessed as key and an important enabler to

¹⁶³ Paul T. Bartone, and Linton Wells II. “Understanding and Leading Porous Network Organizations – An Analysis Based on the 7-S Model.” (monograph, National Defence University, September 2009), 3.

¹⁶⁴ Merriam-Webster. “Merriam-Webster – An Encyclopedia Britannica Company.” Last accessed 16 April 2015. www.merriam-webster.com

synchronize roles and responsibilities between the multiple levels of governance which in turn will increase effectiveness of the Logistics Branch. The current complexity of the structure and its multiple levels however, limit the Logistics Branch's flexibility to empower its Logisticians and increases the probability that senior leadership's messaging and plans are distorted.¹⁶⁵ An example of this divergence of thought and possible personality challenges are discussed in numerous Logistic Branch governance meetings (e.g. Senate Meeting of 21 April 2015¹⁶⁶) with no concrete decision based on the Logistics Branch trichotomy reality of "decision by consensus". The unification of the Logistics Branch under a "fourth service" or one of the environmental chiefs would in fact allow the Logistics Branch to synchronize and align the different aims currently present in the Branch, reduce the number of governance levels and ultimately increase effectiveness of Logisticians to support operations. Just as it was mentioned for the RCEME, unification of roles and responsibilities under one environment would create unity of effort and unity of intent.

¹⁶⁵ Ashu Singh. "A Study of Role of McKinsey's 7S Framework in Achieving Organizational Excellence." *Organization Development Journal*, Vol. 31, Issue 3 (Fall 2013): 44.

¹⁶⁶ Department of National Defence. *Record of Discussion Logistics Branch Senate – 21 April 2015*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 21 May 2015).

Strategy

The most current Logistics Branch campaign plan is dated from 2013¹⁶⁷ and is currently under revision by Logistics Branch leadership. A. Chandler, once professor of business history at Harvard Business School and Johns Hopkins University, declared that “...structure follows strategy”. As stated previously, Peters and Waterman’s organizational analysis framework on the other hand refutes this tenant by advocating interconnectedness between the seven factors. In conducting the research for this paper, it has been realized that past as well as current Logistics Branch strategy is lacking or has been developed by a very limited number of logistics leaders and never come to fruition inside or outside the Logistics Branch. Furthermore, limited indications were found demonstrating that the environmental chiefs had reviewed, brought environmental requirements forward or ultimately gave their support to a Logistics Branch strategy. The inculcation of a strategy by the members of the Branch could also be questioned due to a lack of knowledge and comprehension of its existence. At its core, a strategy needs to “... transform an organization from the present position to the new position described in the objectives, subject to constraints of the capabilities.”¹⁶⁸ The Logistics Branch is influenced not only by external factors (e.g. business benchmarks, enemy threats) but also internal (e.g. changes in CAF force development, budget adjustments) and must be able to anticipate and overcome its competitors and demands from it’s “customers” (e.g. RCAF, RCN,

¹⁶⁷ Y. Morin, *Log Branch Campaign Plan Framework*. Logistics Branch Advisor: Briefing Note, 15 April 2013.

¹⁶⁸ Ashu Singh. “A Study of Role of McKinsey's 7S Framework in Achieving Organizational Excellence.” *Organization Development Journal*, Vol. 31, Issue 3 (Fall 2013): 44.

CA). Based on organizational theory literature, an organization's strategy development must not only involve top management but also mid level leaders that will become the senior leaders of the institution of tomorrow.¹⁶⁹ As stated previously, results from a formal LBA initiative with all senior CAF logistics leadership began in 2015. The unification of the Logistics Branch under one "champion" would require an enormous organizational change¹⁷⁰ in order to improve the effectiveness of the entire organization but would ensure a cohesive Branch and the recognition of the importance of Logistics to the profession of arms in Canada. For example, the RCAF, the CJOC, and the CA have sustainment doctrine but the RCN has limited publications on a strategic/operational level.¹⁷¹ The importance of a sound, relevant, affordable and achievable Logistics Branch strategy is critical in maintaining its institutional credibility towards the CAF, operations and the Canadian Government.

Systems

An organization's *system*, as it relates to the McKinsey 7s framework, is defined by P.T. Bartone as "rules and regulations, standards, and processes for getting things done and managing the activity of the organization, both formal and informal."¹⁷² The Logistics Branch is administratively recognized in the CAF

¹⁶⁹ Ann Armstrong, and Richard L. Draft. *Organization Theory and Design*. 2nd Canadian Edition. (United States of America: Nelson Education Ltd, 2012), 35.

¹⁷⁰ Tupper F. Cawsey, Gen Deszca, and Cynthia Ingols, *Organizational Change – An Action-Oriented Toolkit*. 2nd Edition. (California: Sage Publications Inc., 2012), 2.

¹⁷¹ Department of National Defence. *Commander's Guidance and Direction to the Royal Canadian Navy – Executive Plan 2013-2017*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 13 January 2013).

administrative orders and other directives in terms of managing the production of personnel (e.g. force generation) as illustrated by Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs) 5070-0¹⁷³ and 5070-1.¹⁷⁴ The CA is the only environment, through its Logistics director and officially supported by the Commander of the CA, to have instituted a formal management system. This resulted in a regional governance system identifying key appointed senior officers and NCM responsible for managing and advising regional chains of commands as it relates to career management, talent management and force generation of Logisticians for operations. The other environments have internal governance and generation systems but not officially recognized by their environmental chiefs. As discussed in the *strategy* factor, the actual Logistics Branch *system* is very internally oriented to its different sub-sets or is limited to its logistical sphere. As with market oriented civilian businesses, the Logistics Branch and its components (e.g. specialties, logistics environments) is not a self-perpetuating system. It exists to enable military operation sustainability not only through time (e.g. period) but also in space (e.g. location). The *system* forming the management of the Logistics Branch has ebbed and flowed since the initial unification of 1968 but has never reached a true unity of effort with its current division under three environments. The centralization through unification of the Logistics Branch *system* under one

¹⁷² Paul T. Bartone, and Linton Wells II. “Understanding and Leading Porous Network Organizations – An Analysis Based on the 7-S Model.” (monograph, National Defence University, September 2009), 7.

¹⁷³ Department of National Defence. *DAOD 5070-0. Military Employment Structure*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 4 March 2014).

¹⁷⁴ Department of National Defence. *DAOD 5070-1. Military Employment Structure Framework*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 10 February 2015).

“champion” would bring synchronization and possibly a slight change of its perceived paradigm of self-perpetuation towards an increased adaptability to evolving external opportunities (e.g. creation of new military capabilities) and/or threats (e.g. force reductions).

Skills

The *skills* of an organization can be defined as the specific attributes and capabilities associated with its production output in its sphere of activities. The Logistics Branch mission statement of April 2015 identifies key *skill* elements: “To foster a Logistics capability that includes operationally focused professional Logisticians who utilize their expertise at all levels, using the full range of available logistics systems in the accomplishment of the CAF mission.”¹⁷⁵

First, the Logistics Branch is the only entity in the CAF responsible and accountable for the sustainment of military operations in Canada and overseas. No other branch has the skills set or the training to deliver the logistics effects brought forth by the Logistics Branch. Secondly, based on the education, training and experience gained through training establishment as the CAF Logistics Training Center, CAF Logisticians are recognized professional enabled members of the military. The attainment of these skills is centralized and consolidated under the only logistics training system and insures control measures are in place as to maintain relevance with new technological advances and processes. The

¹⁷⁵ A.M. Banville, *Logistics Branch Advisor/Integrator to Army Logistics Council* (Logistics Branch Advisor: Presentation, 22 April 2015).

division of the CFLTC to the three environments as it was pre-unification of 1968 would de-synchronize training milestones and possibly make Logisticians less polyvalent in regards to the future security environment and less flexible to be employed across the full spectrum of CAF operations (e.g. land, sea, air, joint). This organizational factor as it relates to the McKinsey 7s framework is balanced, adaptable to external opportunities and is harmonized with the unification principles of 1968. The key aspect will none the less remain that the actual Logistics skills must always be in accordance of the environmental chiefs requirements and periodically reviewed for their specifics operations without which the Logistics Branch will become irrelevant to CAF operations, institutional support and their skills sets will be open to be replaced by non-logistics trades or alternate delivery methods (e.g. civilian contractors).

Style

The *style* factor associated with organizations may well be the most difficult factor of the McKinsey 7s framework to define and subsequently measure as it relates to “... the leadership approach of the top managers of the organization.”¹⁷⁶ How the senior leadership of the Logistics Branch interact not only within its own environment (e.g. Branch and the CAF) but also how it influences and reacts to external challenges (e.g. allied nations, Government of Canada) is a profound and complex dynamic to analyse as it relates to the thesis

¹⁷⁶ Paul T. Bartone, and Linton Wells II. “Understanding and Leading Porous Network Organizations – An Analysis Based on the 7-S Model.” (monograph, National Defence University, September 2009), 11.

of this paper. Being a supporting element of the CAF, the Logistics Branch is required to be open and self-motivated in not only understanding the current and future needs of military operations being developed by the force generating environments (e.g. RCAF, RCN and CA) but also the force employing elements of the CAF (e.g. CJOC and Canadian Special Forces Command).

Very little hard and concrete documentation was found pre-2014 that would allow ascertaining the level of Logistics Branch *style*. Since the beginning of 2014, it would appear, based on memorandums (e.g. *Logistics Branch Strategic Review and Reassessing the Logistics Branch Governance Framework*), initiative papers (e.g. creation of Strategic J4) and presentations to senior members of the CAF (e.g. Army Logistics Council), that the LBA, the senior CAF Logisticians Representative and the Strategic J4 are relying on their relationships and shared future goals to influence not only stakeholders but also the membership of its logistics institution. The identified danger with this McKinsey factor as identified by the framework's authors and critics is that *style* is greatly influenced by personalities of the leading individuals that change in the CAF every 2 to 4 years. As of 2014, the LBA position was held by a RCAF Logistician and the senior CAF Logistician Representative was of the RCN. Previous to 2014, a CA Logistician held the position of LBA and an RCAF held the senior CAF Logistician Representative responsibilities. The military being a conservative and sometimes change adverse organization is in continual flux and transformation based on changes in its leadership personalities every 2-3 years. Further compounding this are the structure realities associated with the Logistics Branch trichotomy and not having environmental oversight (e.g. "one champion)

with actual accountability of the effectiveness of CAF Logistics to the Chief of Defence (e.g. sustainability of military operations) and Minister of National Defence (e.g. departmental compliance). This continual change of personalities in the Logistics Branch leadership not only adversely affects the internal workings of the Branch members (e.g. talent management, specialty specifications, career management, training, etc) but also its credibility in the eyes of the environment chiefs that look towards their sustainment chain for stability and reliance. The 1982 Report on Integration and Unification identified the challenges:

"This brings home the truism that organizations drawn on charts in tidy lines can only be made to work if the personalities, the skills and willingness to cooperate exist between the people within the organization."¹⁷⁷

Staff

The personnel that comprise the Logistics Branch and CAF is the cornerstone of the organization over and above the information technologies, weapons systems, structures and systems that compose it. As seen in Chapter 4, unlike other business organizations, the Logistics Branch "... cannot directly hire into positions of responsibilities, they must promote from within."¹⁷⁸ The McKinsey 7s *staff* factor is comprised of the recruitment, retention, career management, succession planning, release and other processes/programs addressing the employment of personnel. The military apparatus that the Logistics Branch is part of, requires individuals to be indoctrinated and follow a more rigid

¹⁷⁷ R.L. Raymont, *Report on Integration and Unification 1964-1968*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1982), 290.

¹⁷⁸ Department of the Navy. *2014 Navy Retention Study*. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1, 2014), 7.

set of rules and conduct than most organizations. Individuals in the CAF understand the commitments and required individual sacrifices required by the military system and they progress accordingly. The age, years of service and average rate of attrition for Logistics Branch specialties and occupations is comparable to the rest of the CAF and is mostly composed of the Baby Boomer and Generation X generations. Furthermore, A. Singh identified in her research that “organizations need to instill confidence among employees about their future in the organization and future career growth as an incentive for hard work”¹⁷⁹ in order to maintain a strong interdependence link between the *staff* and the other McKinsey 7s framework factors.

In J.N. Hyler’s 2013 case study as well as in other countries studies (e.g. US Navy 2014 Retention Study), indicators demonstrate that the biggest upcoming human resource challenge facing western militaries and national security will be the entry of the Millennial Generation in military institutions. By using the Wilcox Millennial Culture Model in his research and presented here in Figure 4, he identified three key findings that could have major impacts to the Logistics Branch *staff* factor in its present three environment construct: 1) the biggest competitor to military recruiting is the completion of graduate education¹⁸⁰; 2) the value of personal freedom by Millennials is valued a great deal and many do not see the military as an activity that would provide them with

¹⁷⁹ Ashu Singh. “A Study of Role of McKinsey's 7S Framework in Achieving Organizational Excellence.” *Organization Development Journal*, Vol. 31, Issue 3 (Fall 2013): 45.

¹⁸⁰ Jeremy N. Hyler, “Millennial Generation Opinions of the Military: A Case Study.” (masters’ Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 12.

and acceptable, comfortable level of autonomy;”¹⁸¹ and 3) the Millennial is more concerned with extrinsic/tangible benefits (e.g. travel, pay incentives) than intrinsic/intangible benefits (e.g. serving a greater cause).¹⁸²




Figure 4: Wilcox Millennial Culture Model

Source: Hyler, *Millennial Generation Opinions of the Military: A Case Study*, 12.

It is assessed that the unification of the Logistics Branch under one “champion” could in fact position it for success and increase its retention effectiveness of the incoming Millennials. As discussed previously, the goal and foundational tenants of the CAF career management system are not based on having the right color of uniform in the right environment. The intent is to have the right person, with the right competences, in the right position whatever their environmental uniform color. The present career management construct of the Logistics Branch could be considered a replication of the pre-unification career management system that was criticized by the 1980 government review of the 1968 CAF unification and could be a major dissatisfier with the Millennials that

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 64.

recognize promotion due to merit not political environment games: “The career managers [pre-unification] in attempting to fill a land logistics requirement where promotion was involved would be forced to go down the list to find the most highly rated soldier of that environment, perhaps by-passing others who by merit list [based on performance and potential factor] were more deserving of promotion.”¹⁸³ The unification of the Logistics Branch on a *staff* factor perspective would be directly supporting Minister Hellyer’s address in 1966 on some of the intended objectives of the unification which could be more palpable for the new generation of Logisticians joining the CAF over the past few years: 1) “a unified service [environment] will permit them [personnel] to advance across old service barriers and so provide greater avenues for service and greater opportunities for personal advancement;”¹⁸⁴ 2) higher loyalty to the CAF and the Logistics Branch; and 3) “... artificial barriers created by the three services [environments] and the need for representation on staffs by service will be eliminated.”¹⁸⁵

Shared Values

The Logistics branch is composed and managed through a complex system of governance, control measures and reporting apparatuses that were discussed in the previous six McKinsey 7s framework factors. The *Shared Values* factor is linked to the concept of organizational culture and beliefs present at the

¹⁸³Department of National Defence. *Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the CAF*. (Ottawa, 31 August 1980).

¹⁸⁴ Paul Hellyer, (speech on moving second reading of bill C-243 in the House of Commons, 7 December, 1966), 31.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 30.

different levels within profit, non-profit and governmental organizations today.¹⁸⁶ *Shared values* or “super-ordinate goals”¹⁸⁷ can be defined as being critical and guiding concepts created at the inception of the institution and is shared throughout the organization. Closely associated with the concept of culture, *shared values* are fundamental not only to an organization’s survival but more importantly to its competitiveness. The Logistics Branch challenge of not having this McKinsey factor well established was verbalized by A. Singh within her own research: “... organizations with weak values and goals find their employees following their own personal goals that may be different or even in conflict with those of the org or fellow colleagues.”¹⁸⁸ The “personal goals” identified by A. Singh in the previous sentence as it pertains to the Logistics Branch could be construed as: the individual Logistician aviator/sailor/soldier, the different Logistics environments or the different occupations/specialties goals create complexity in defining this factor of *shared values*. What is the *shared values* and/or Logistics Branch culture if it so divided and divisive?

In C. H. Builder’s book *The Masks of War – American Military Styles and Strategy Analysis*, the author analyzes the three different environmental personalities of the US Air Force, Navy and Army. One of the main challenges of the Logistics Branch is the environmental Logisticians argument that to succeed, Logisticians of an environment must be of that environment’s belief. This

¹⁸⁶ Peters J. Thomas, Julien R. Phillips, and Robert H. Waterman. “Structure is not Organization.” *Business Horizon*, Vol. 23, Issue 3 (June 1980): 25.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹⁸⁸ Ashu Singh. “A Study of Role of McKinsey's 7S Framework in Achieving Organizational Excellence.” *Organization Development Journal*, Vol. 31, Issue 3 (Fall 2013): 44.

ultimately is detrimental to the *shared values* factor of the Logistics Branch. The environments personality derivatives and comparatives extracted from Builder's book are interesting to bring forward and to demonstrate that the Branch trichotomy divide is not effective in a *shared values* perspective. The Navy Logisticians are the most opposed to complete Branch unification as the Navy institution is marked by two strong senses of itself: its independence and its stature.¹⁸⁹ RCAF Logisticians are influenced by the RCAF's beliefs that it is the embodiment of an idea, a concept of warfare, a strategy made possible and sustained by modern technology.¹⁹⁰ Finally, the Army Logisticians are influenced by seeing themselves as supporting "... the essential artisans of war... divided into their traditional combat arms but forged by history and the nature of war into a mutually supportive brotherhood of guilds."¹⁹¹ The CA "... accepts (with understandable unease) its utter dependence upon its sister services for air and sea transport and firepower."¹⁹² Furthermore, of the three environments, the CA would be considered to be the "...most supportive of unification and jointness."¹⁹³ As discussed in a previous chapter, the concept of jointness is a critical element of the Logistics Branch as it brings effects throughout the spectrum of operations now and in the future.

¹⁸⁹ Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War – American Military Styles and Strategy Analysis* (United States of America: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 31.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 34.

¹⁹³ J.P.Y.D. Gosselin, "A 50-year Tug of War of Concepts at the Crossroads: Unification and Strong-Service Idea." in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives – Context and Concepts* (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 152.

In their 2012 book on organizational theories, A. Armstrong and R. Draft defined culture as a "... set of key values, beliefs, and norms shared by members of an organization."¹⁹⁴ The Logistics Branch does follow the CAF profession of arms culture and is integrated in the overall warrior ethos defined in CAF publications and doctrine. Unfortunately no Logistics Branch defined and assimilated "Logistics culture" exists. In further exploring the concept of culture, the authors determined that organizations are categorized in four categories of culture depicted in Table 11.

Table 11 – Organizational Culture Categories

Culture Category	Definition
1. Adaptability culture	Is characterized by strategic focus on the external environment through flexibility and change to meet customer needs
2. Mission Culture	Emphasis on a clear vision of the organization's purpose and on the achievements of the goals.
3. Clan Culture	Primary focus on the involvement and participation of the organization's members and on rapidly changing expectations from the external environment.
4. Bureaucratic Culture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have an internal focus and a consistency orientation for a stable environment. • These orgs succeed by being highly integrated and efficient. • Not very flexible

Source: Armstrong and Draft, *Organization Theory and Design*, 360-363.

¹⁹⁴ Ann Armstrong, and Richard L. Draft. *Organization Theory and Design*. 2nd Canadian ed. (United States of America: Nelson Education Ltd, 2012), 383.

The Armstrong and Draft categorization brings to the forefront that the Logistics Branch culture system could be considered to be divided into three sets of culture categories. The first group would be the LBI and training system that seem to be functioning with a “bureaucratic culture” mind-set as efficiencies are key considerations in their workings and, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, are not quickly adaptable to changing situations. Second culture group would be composed of the different environmental logistics advisory groups (e.g. RCAF, RCN, CA and purple commands). This group is considered to function under the “clan culture” as the focus is not on the Logistics Branch specifically as a whole but more on the survival and adaptability of its core membership. This reality has been demonstrated to be challenging as it encourages unhealthy competition between sub-groups and ultimately creates dangers of not always being aligned with the overall Branch goals, vision and mission. Finally, the third culture group that seems to be demonstrating positive development and re-invigoration is the Logistics Senior leadership that is striving to become of a “mission culture”. The existence of these three culture groups compound the misaligned *shared values* factor associated with the Branch thus creating important organizational challenges. It could be argued that a desired end state to endeavour for the Branch would be to attain an overall and holistic mission culture throughout all its components. The actual three environmental construct of the Logistics Branch will not be able: 1) to fully achieve the required culture synchronization and thus attaining operational effectiveness; 2) integrate its aviators/sailors/soldiers membership and create interdependence to one another; or 3) to help the Logistics

Branch adapt to its external environments (e.g. environmental chiefs, the CAF, allied military, national industry base).

Conclusion

The organizational analysis based on the McKinsey 7s framework conducted in this chapter permitted the identification of strengths and weaknesses present in the CAF Logistics Branch organization. The goal of the analysis remained the identification of threats and opportunities for the Logistics Branch to improve its organization in order to increase its operational effectiveness. In addition to the McKinsey framework, organizational theories and researches were used to further define the challenges within the current Logistics Branch environments. Four main inferences can be extrapolated. First, the current Logistics Branch construct cannot allow the institution to create, communicate and operate on shared Logistics Branch values. Secondly, the lack of clear guidance in terms of a relevant and socialized campaign plan (e.g. *strategy* factor) in the past few years have created a lack of focus inside the Logistics Branch organization as well as operational effectiveness for the environmental chiefs. However, current Senior Logistics leadership discussions are intending to correct this misalignment. Third, the Logistics Branch *style* factor is negatively impacted due to its ever changing personalities (e.g. every 2-3 years) and a seemingly self-perpetuating limitation towards how the Logistics Branch supports the environments and operations. This in turn questions the accountability factor of the Logistics Branch: “when everyone is in charge, no one is in charge”. Finally, the Logistics Branch analysis results do not seem to indicate that the current

trichotomy of being divided into three environments under several champions is conducive to operational effectiveness nor does it create synergy between the McKinsey factors as so much of the organization is independent in thought and processes. The illustrated depictions of the results of the deductions as they pertain to the chosen analysis framework are reflected in Figure 5¹⁹⁵.




Figure 5: McKinsey 7s Logistics Branch Model Comparison

Source: Marc Parent extrapolation of Peters and Waterman, *In Search of Excellence*, 10.

CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION

The main objective of this paper was to determine how the CAF Logistics Branch organizational structure achieves effectiveness. Underlying the main objective were several sub-objectives: to determine how the different environmental service cultures impacts the Logistics Branch; to identify the impact of the current Logistics Branch organization on stakeholders' operational

¹⁹⁵ The size of the factors (e.g. small, medium and large) depict if the Logistics Branch framework is balanced and interdependent (e.g. bigger size factor) or desynchronized (e.g. smaller bubble).

effectiveness; to encourage “top to bottom” discussions in the CAF as well as academia on the actual effectiveness of the Branch; to determine how the RCEME Branch was structured in support of CAF environments; and to determine the historical and operational effectiveness reasoning for a potential alignment under one “champion”.

The literature survey conducted in Chapter 2 identified two distinct groups of literature: 1) the integration and unification of the CAF in 1968; and 2) the CAF Logistics Branch. The major findings in the first group demonstrated that the initial objective of the 1968 unification was for economic reasons. The literature did also highlight discussions in 1968 associated with unification that supported this paper's initial thesis: consolidation of the military support services is achievable; the identity problems of the Logistics Branch created by a loss of sight of its *raison d'être* of providing support to the environmental chiefs and operations; and that the service “tug of war”¹⁹⁶, identified by D. Gosselin, would continue post unification.

The second group of research demonstrated that the existing literature on the Logistics Branch fell into two distinct but limited sub-groups: 1) the theoretical (e.g. operational research) realm of military logistics sub-group; and 2) the operationalization of military logistics and its application in the conduct of war sub-group.

¹⁹⁶ J.P.Y.D. Gosselin, “A 50-year Tug of War of Concepts at the Crossroads: Unification and Strong-Service Idea.” in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives – Context and Concepts* (Canada: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 129.

A major finding of the literature survey was the realization that the depth and availability of literature on the CAF Logistics Branch in terms of structure, governance, change and organizational analysis is very limited. The logistics community seems to have difficulties in writing, analyzing and interpreting organizational symbols associated with its construct in order to increase effectiveness and minimize the threats associated with not being able to force generate future generations of Logisticians to support deployed operations and the institution in Canada.

Chapter 3 reviewed three major transformation initiatives as it relates to unification: the 1968 reorganization act, the 2005 CAF transformation and ultimately the 2012 CAF Defence Renewal Team. Key tenants, principles and outcomes of three initiatives were identified and corroborated the need for the Logistics Branch's unification. Some of the key CAF objectives of the 1968 unification were 1) to increase the CAF effectiveness; 2) increase agility and adaptability to allow the CAF to prepare, deploy, and redeploy for the current and future security environment; 3) an economy of scales by ceasing the triplication of CAF support services; and 4) improving employment opportunities and retention of CAF personnel. The analysis of the overall principles permitted the follow-on implications for the Logistics Branch: 1) the "Fourth Service" creation/discussion; 2) meeting military operational demands; 3) economy of scales and effort; and 4) employee motivation. Ultimately, the CAF Logisticians strong service loyalties to their occupational specialties were deemed incompatible with any desire to have/create a holistic and relevant CAF Logistics vision/strategy. Furthermore, the continued status quo of the Logistics Branch within "... a tiny military with limited funds, divisive strategic concepts and a wasteful organization are simply intolerable."¹⁹⁷

The Logistics Branch historical and current processes and roles were reviewed and commented in Chapter 4. The first determination was that the Logistics Branch by its governance structure has a decentralized authority, responsibility and accountability structure dispersed throughout the different levels of CAF organization thus resulting in a lack of well defined ownership. The misalignments of certain reporting and control measures (e.g. LBI) were also addressed and actually re-emphasised the need for a single “champion” for the Logistics Branch. The challenges of maintaining the largest proportion of the CAF (e.g 14% of the CAF) cohesive and focused was also identified in terms of a yet to be published Logistics Branch Strategic Campaign and Communication Plans. The fifth determination was that based on the reviewed research documentation, no formal and decisive interaction with the environments chiefs exists, ultimately making the Logistics governance structure somewhat incestuous and self-perpetuating. Finally, the analysis of the structure and governance of the RCEME demonstrated the actual feasibility of potentially having the Logistics Branch under one “champion” but continuing to serve/support in all of the environments.

In Chapter 5, the actual organizational analysis of the Logistics Branch through the use of the McKinsey 7s framework and its seven factors (e.g. structure, strategy, staff, skills, style, system and shared values) was conducted. This analysis determined that the actual Logistics Branch divided between the

¹⁹⁷ J.L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian military?* 3rd ed. (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd, 2008), 94.

three services is not the most effective means of management. Furthermore, the McKinsey 7s framework demonstrated unbalanced and dis-synchronization between the seven factors. The two factors identified as requiring major attention was the *strategy* factor which is being developed by the 2015 Logistics Branch leadership and the *shared values* factor that is disparate between the different Logistics groups and sub-groups. This factor would need a major re-alignment and change towards a mission culture. Four main inferences were made: 1) the current Logistics Branch construct cannot allow the institution to create, communicate and operate on shared Logistics Branch values that would in turn create effectiveness; 2) the lack of clear guidance of a defined and published campaign plan has been detrimental to the Logistics Branch organization, cohesion, as well its operational effectiveness; 3) the ever changing leadership personalities (e.g. every 2-3 years) and the seemingly self-perpetuation the Logistics Branch experiences towards the support of the environments and operations is counter-intuitive to its effectiveness goals; and 4) the current Logistics Branch trichotomy is not conducive to operational effectiveness nor does it create synergy between the McKinsey factors.

The intent of this paper was to demonstrate that full unification of the CAF Logistics Branch under one service/champion would improve its operational effectiveness. Through the analysis of past unification and transformation initiatives in the CAF and the Department of National Defence, the foundational principals that established the Logistics Branch in 1968, and the use of the McKinsey 7s framework, it is argued that the thesis statement is valid and should be further developed in order to maintain the Logistics Branch's relevance and

operational effectiveness towards its “supported customers” (e.g. Environmental Chiefs, force employers, departmental compliance).

Although many recommendations were implied in this paper, a total of three critical recommendations need to be executed with the aim of further increasing the Logistics Branch’s effectiveness:

Recommendation 1: The conduct of a full organizational analysis

Chapter 5 demonstrated some shortfalls in the way the Logistics Branch is structured, managed and force generates Logisticians. The use of the McKinsey 7s framework is but one model to analyze an organization’s challenges, opportunities and threats. A deliberate and thorough organizational analysis is required to change the current state of affairs. Furthermore, the eventual organizational analysis must not be self-perpetuating but also include senior level operators from the environments that generate expeditionary forces in defence of Canada as well as institutional support inside Canada. Basically, extrapolating and applying to the Logistics Branch what was written by Bryan D. Watson, “... military forces need to face outwards not inwards...”¹⁹⁸

Recommendation 2: Increase in academic studies of the Logistics Branch

As demonstrated in Chapter 2 and 4, the amount of articles as well as peer reviewed research documentation in regards to the CAF Logistics Branch is very

¹⁹⁸ Bryan D. Watson, “A Look Down the Slippery Slope: Domestic Operations, Outsourcing, and the Erosion of Military Culture.” *Air & Space Power Journal* (Spring 2008): 94.

limited in proportion to the importance (e.g. quantity and quality) and institutional challenges the Branch has been facing since its inception in 1968. Deliberate, professional and relevant research must be conducted and brought to the forefront in order to avoid the apparent stagnancy and state of complacency in which CAF Logisticians seem to have positioned themselves since the “de-unification process” in the 1990s (i.e. return of distinct environmental based logistic services). The Logistics Branch needs to increase its demand for operational research from CAF science and technology organizations (e.g. the CAF War Center) as well as demanding professional writing submissions inside the logistics community as to not only “recommend” professional debates/discussion but to be adamant about it.

Recommendation 3: Have the CAF Strat J4 create a CAF Logistics framework

The completion of recommendations 1 and 2, will require the creation of a formalized and approved CAF sustainment framework in order to allow the constant improvement of the health and relevance of the Logistics Branch (e.g. in accordance to the learning institution concept). The proposed lead for this analysis, development and implementation would be the CAF Strat J4 organization in its strategic mandate. However, organizational analyses followed by necessary and required changes identified in this paper are not ends in themselves. A CAF sustainment framework must be part of the overall transformation initiative in order to insure continued and sustainable operational logistics effectiveness in Canada and abroad. A proposed structure that will be

executed in the United States Army is illustrated in Figure 6: the US Army Sustainment Performance Attributes Pyramid. The overall rationale of this model is that “[t]here must be the creation of sustainment performance metrics to analyse the input to output results in order to adjust fires or jump on an opportunity identified during the KPI analysis.”¹⁹⁹ The three tier model identifies at its base the foundational principals associated with their sustainment organizations (e.g. sustainment principles) that exist in the CAF doctrine and policies but would require overall stakeholders (e.g. environments, Department) support and synchronization. The second portion of the pyramid is made of the imperatives associated with the US Army sustainment system which the CAF Strat J4 is the key stakeholder to identify, develop and promulgate for all CAF environments and operations. Finally, the execution and completion of this paper’s recommendation 2 (i.e. organizational analysis followed by alignment) is required before any CAF Start J4 work can begin on building portion three of the pyramid which would enable qualitative indicators to be quantified and measurable in a “learning institution” perspective.

¹⁹⁹ Department of Defence. *Army 2020 and Beyond – Sustainment White Paper* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 30 August 2013), 27.



Figure 6: US Army Sustainment Performance Attributes

Source: United States. Department of Defence, *Army 2020 and Beyond – Sustainment White Paper*, 28.

The Logistics Branch is a complex and fluid organization created in 1968 by the unification and reorganization of the CAF. It is an established and recognizable group in the CAF and is identifiable by Logisticians and non-Logisticians by its symbols (e.g. school house, governance structure, museum, LBA, etc) which in turn define it as an institution inside the CAF.²⁰⁰ The division of this important institution between the three environments in relation to the size (e.g. number of personnel, defence budgets, etc) and operational reach of the CAF

²⁰⁰ Peter H. Wilson, "Defining Military Culture." *The Journal of Military History*, 72 (January 2008), 16.

is no longer sustainable if the goals of the Logistics Branch remain to be a relevant and operationally effective organization. Further research and strategic level decisions will be required in the coming years to better position the Logistics Branch.

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