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INFORMED-INFLUENCE THEORY: A POLITICAL MODEL FOR MODERN TIMES

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Master Thesis

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TIMES**

By Jeffrey R. Orr

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Abstract

The analysis will examine, for the most part, the point of view of a highly-developed Western democratic state which no longer commences wars like an unrestricted dictator fighting only for power, control, wealth and self-interests. This monumental change has evolved due to two key variables, the first of which is an ever increasingly *informed* population which has a greater knowledge and understanding of governments and the facets of war. The second variable is the expanding *influence* that these populations have had and continue to have on their leaders. The combination of these two changing variables has resulted in a gradual movement away from the original motives for warfare towards one based more upon morals and principles, such as the right to protection.

INFORMED-INFLUENCE THEORY: A POLITICAL MODEL FOR MODERN TIMES

INTRODUCTION

Political science theorists are having more and more difficulty relating, describing, and explaining modern society in spite of political models having been relatively successful with this endeavour up until about 150 years ago, and in spite of the gradual evolution of conflict and the way in which the world has waged wars over the last six thousand years. Commencing with tribal conflicts using spears and advancing to blocks of nation-states employing modern technological weapons, including ballistic nuclear missiles, the weapons of conflict have altered warfare, the result of which is an exponential shift of the latent destructive effects from the use of a single weapon. So much has been transformed that today should only one of the world's most destructive nuclear weapons be employed, millions of people would likely lose their lives. So powerful are the weapons of mass destruction held worldwide, that the arsenal could quite literally destroy the world many times over.

Concurrent with these enormous technological developments, the reasons for conflict or for going to war have, for the greater part of this period, remained consistent. In simplified terms, wars have been fought for power, control, wealth and self-interest, or in defence of these aims. Commencing with tribes, developing into empires, and then to the modern day nation-states operating within worldwide organisations like the United Nations (UN), for the most part leader-rulers, like pharaohs, monarchs, emperors, or dictators, have been among the few who have exerted the most influence surrounding the decisions to commit parties to conflict for the better part of six thousand years, yet their

motives have remained curiously stagnant. Remarkably however, over the last century and a half, there has been a striking change registered regarding the causes of warfare and a widening sphere of influence surrounding the key decision-makers who commit to conflict. This is the premise that leaders of peoples, who commit to warfare or modern day conflict, are considering much more than just self-interest and the aforementioned motives. As this evolution has taken place and registered, both the reasons surrounding a leader's commitment criteria have evolved directly related to an expanding sphere of influence placed upon these decision makers.

Of late, that is commencing relatively recently since the end of the 19th century, the sphere of influence surrounding leaders and the ideals or concepts of morality, including the Right to Protect (RtP) have taken on a much more dominant role behind the commitment to conflict or war. This is not to discount the right to self-defence or indeed national self-interest as a reason behind warfare, only that these additions, the expanding sphere and motives, have seeped into the decision-makers' consciousness. So much has changed that over the last quarter of a century that additional revolutionary changes have started to erode the sovereignty of the modern day nation-state. As the world has witnessed, the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) are targeting governments and compelling countries to cease brutal activities aimed at their own populations. Recent examples in Libya and Syria come to mind as occasions when the Security Council had been aspiring to influence sovereign governments through the world's developing legal frameworks, at times with some success, at times, unsuccessfully, as has been the case in Syria. However, the story is not yet complete

when it comes to Syrian President Bashir al-Assad, the brutal dictator who remains in power in Damascus.

Indeed, for the most part, the major conflicts of the twentieth century, when there has been large participation involving the Western world, a world which has seen its leadership migrate from Western Europe to the United States, have been less about direct control, wealth, and myopic self-interest and more about these ideals and morals, all in part due to this expanding influence. During the mid-nineteenth century, the European intervention into Lebanon, specifically the French action taken to protect Christians from Ottoman troops, is viewed by historians as the premiere humanitarian intervention, however, this intervention proved more of an exception than the rule.¹ And although during the United States' Civil War, a conflict fought over the Confederate succession and to a lesser degree, emancipation of the slaves this, registration of these evolving variables did not occur worldwide until the First World War. This evolution continues today as observed during the potential intervention in modern day Syria. The Western World now enters into conflicts primarily for a chance at peace and wars are no longer fought for a victory of occupation or the treasures of supremacy. Using the Second World as an example, the results of which have been nothing less than remarkable, today, when considering the three Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan, one will find three of the most developed countries in the world; indeed they are the third, fourth, and

¹ Caesar E. Farah. *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861* (London: Victoria House, 2000), 564.

seventh largest economies of the world.² In general terms, when wars were waged prior to this period, the victors would generally remain until such a time that the occupied countries could displace the victors. Consider the stark differences to the Mongol campaigns pre-twentieth century where forces of the victor dominated those who lost on the battlefield, often times resulting in mass slaughters and complete dominance.³ In contrast, as is the case of the Second World War, not only are these former Axis countries not occupied, they make up some of the most developed western democracies in the world.

Furthermore, the West won the Cold War, the major conflict that followed the Second World War; yet Western troops have neither conquered nor marched in the cities of the Warsaw pact. What has changed? From the point of view of a highly-developed Western democratic state, the answer is that conflict no longer commences based on the likes of an unrestricted dictator fighting only for power, control, wealth and self-interests. This human evolution surrounding conflict and war is the result of two key variables. The first is an increasingly *informed* population that has a greater knowledge and understanding of governments and the facets of war. The second variable is the expanding *influence* that these populations have had and continue to have on their leaders. The combination of these two changing variables has resulted in a gradual movement away from the original motives for conflict and warfare towards ones based more upon morals and principles, such as this right to protection as the sphere of

² Government of Canada, "G8 Economies," http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/about-apropos/members-membres.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=23&view=d. Internet; accessed 28 January 2012.

³ David Morgan. *The Mongols* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007).

influencers has grown. This has not been an instantaneous registration but more of a trend towards the reasons for warfare and has not necessarily resulted in fewer casualties within the conflicts themselves. On the contrary, in some cases as was witnessed during World War II, there were significant casualties to civilians and non-combatants.

Informed-Influence Theory or what will be referred to throughout this writing as these two variables operating complementarily, can be applied to previous periods in history. However, for there to be a registered application of the theory variables, there has to be a minimum threshold of both. Without a minimum level of informed population and mechanisms to influence the leadership, these variables will not operate as complementary. In that case, the theory does not register differences either marginal or gross, and warfare may be more appropriately studied using the more traditional models of Realism or Liberalism theories and the like. Simply put, the lack of one of the two variables, which is to state the lack of robust ability to influence and control leaders, or just ignorance due to limited information flows, will limit the utility of the model. Like Realism, Liberalism, and Constructionism, this theory can be used to describe and explain the world, but only when the minimum threshold required for this theory to be adequately employed as a political science theory is present. Without these factors, we must look at other reasons which influence the decisions of leader-rulers. Of most benefit regarding this theory, and where some of the other theories fail, Informed-Influence theory will well explain the modern political dynamics, a criticism often cited when attempting to apply the more traditional theories to modern conflict, especially post-Cold war Western interventions.

What should be acknowledged are the fallibility of human beings and their true understanding of events and the accurate situation. The model, or theory is termed Informed-Influence theory but a more appropriate and indeed accurate title for the theory would be at times, the Perception of Being Informed–Influence Theory, as populations are as imperfect as the information available to them. When considering the theory as it applies to the twentieth century we will learn how ill-informed the population was during large periods of the century. Propaganda and disinformation through the partial and full compliance of the media, as well as the general population’s potential tendency to follow charismatic people, have exploited many of the imperfections of humanity, and continue to affect the Western world in the 21st century.

ROADMAP

What will follow in the paper will be a description of the theory, along with the two variables described separately. Commencing with the theory variables’ decisive beginning and their ability to gain traction, there will be consideration beginning with each of the variable’s nascent developments. The influence variable commences with the Magna Carta, the point at which the hereditary monarchs of the Western World started to yield power to the people, leading to the highly developed systems of democracies found in the Western world today. And from the point of view of an ever increasingly informed public, beginning with the invention of the printing press, through the industrial revolution to the development of radio, television, and electronic social media, the growth in literacy, and therefore the growth in public information, has moved in parallel with the growth in democracy.

In general terms, the subsequent sections will then consider the significant Western world conflicts, commencing with the First World War and continuing to the potential conflicts involving Syria and Iran of today. There will be a predominance of considerations regarding the United States' domestic audience/electorate due to this country's leadership role in the Western world within this same timeframe. It is this reality that has propelled this subset of the world's population, the remaining super power, to being the key population with the most important influence in the world. This paper will consider this population the most often when considering the theory, as a result of the reality of its size, wealth, and economic power. Specifically, consideration and analysis will occur relating to the conflicts but will also regard the inactions surrounding situations like Rwanda. The concluding section will tackle the Arab Spring and the situations found within the Middle East in 2012.

It should be noted that Informed-Influence Theory describes and explains from the point of view from the Western world and the two ever-evolving variables and how these two variables work within the world's systems, which evolve with them. In so doing, the theory accounts for organizations like the United Nations as a means to both increasing the West's ability to become informed as well as a means to influence.

THE INFORMED-INFLUENCE MODEL

Political science or political theories are developed and exist in order to describe and explain the political world in which we live, and while some can successfully describe and explain the world over most of human history, in these modern times there have been a growing number of calls to view the world from the lens of a model which

provides explanations specifically in the modern world. A number of political scientists have called for new theories which can explain modern political environments, especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001. The challenge is to create a political science theory designed to explain the modern realities and to test some of the more well-known models, such as Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism as some analysts, including Jack Snyder, an American political scientist, argue that these theories, as they exist at present, fail to meet the realities of today.⁴

Informed-Influence Theory is this type of model, as it is an evolving theory born out of the failure of these aforementioned models to describe and explain the modern post-industrial revolutionary world, most specifically, the post-Cold War period. The model derives itself from a questioning of how Political Realism or Idealism views and explains the world and the basis for the leader's decision making process. In the same manner that some argue Nurture versus Nature, as it relates to human behaviour, the mutual exclusivity concept has severe limitations. With this in mind, Informed-Influence behaviour traces exercise of political power through an evolutionary lens, one which tracks the changing source and relative ignorance of this authority.

With its two developing variables, that is, the increasing levers of influence on the decision makers, coupled with an ever-increasing informed variable reflecting the knowledge and understanding of the world by those with influence, this paper will consider this model and how its ever-advancing variables have affected decision-makers in the modern Western World. Gone are the days of a few isolated decision makers; in favor of days when consideration of how an upcoming mid-term election factors large

⁴ Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories." *Foreign Policy*, no. 145 (Nov-Dec 2004): 53-62.

and sometimes larger than the more pragmatic, long-term realities of a decision. How different would the world look if the Kings and Queens of medieval times needed to consider an upcoming election? This is not to suggest that hereditary monarchs would operate free of constraints and restraints, it is that their retention of power through an upcoming election was not one of them. Whereas this factor, with today's leaders, is oftentimes their most important consideration.

It should be noted that for the ease of explanation, these two variables will be explicitly stated and considered separately in the following two sections. This is in no way to infer that they exist mutually exclusive of each other, on the contrary and as previously described; these two variables are inextricably linked and complementary to one another. If they existed in isolation, the results would be having to evaluate political and conflict decisions using one or the other theories. However, in order to provide better understanding and clarity of the model they will first be considered separately as a starting point and then subsequently, considered collectively and in conjunction with the major conflicts commencing with the First World War.

While this theory could be used to analyse any region or country in any era, to best illustrate the changing variables there will be a focus on the highly developed Western democracies, as this model is best applicable to this phase of world history, due to the existence of the minimum thresholds required. Simply put, the political realities have to exist where and when these thresholds are met, otherwise we would be evaluating situations without the required influence or information available. If a situation exists that a nation-state has an informed public but no means to influence, it is an exercise in futility. A Stalinist Soviet Union is a great example of this circumstance as it had a

population informed of their leader's atrocities but were in no position to influence them. From an alternate perspective, an electorate who displays complete apathy to its potential wielding of influence suffers a similar discourse. Some subsets of the population in modern day democracies display elements of this phenomenon and are registered in voting rates within some demographics. In view of this information, the following section will contemplate the expanding influence of the population since the Magna Carta, and the section immediately following it will consider the nature of an increasingly well-informed population base.

EXPANDING INFLUENCE

Historically, and over the greater portion of the last 6000 or so years of human history, power has rested in but one office or in one person. The final decision to commit a tribe or empire to combat was left to a single individual with just a few close advisors, exerting the ability to influence the decision or outcome.⁵ Tribal leaders, emperors or kings wielded the influence of power with very little formal or informal restrictions to their ability to commit to conflict or war. One of the best examples of a tribal leader who became an Emperor is Genghis Khan. He was a ruler who headed one of the most brutal, yet longest continuously controlled dynasties found in human history.⁶ In what is now modern-day Iran, ancient historians claim that the Mongols reduced the population of Persia alone to 10 percent of what it once was.⁷ Stalin and Hitler, once well positioned

⁵ Erik Hildlinder, *Warriors of the Steppe: A Military History of Central Asia 500 B.C. to 1700 A.D.* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2001), 133.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 166-175.

⁷ David Morgan. *The Mongols* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007).

within the power bases of their countries, operated similarly to medieval dictators who had few challenge their authority and terrorized their enemies in much the same manner. Illustrating this enormous progression, imagine how Genghis Khan might have considered upcoming mid-term elections? Or from another point of view, imagine how foreign a concentration of power, held by Khan would be to US President Barak Obama.

While chosen as an extreme example, the Mongol empire serves to illustrate the extremes of not only the brutality of an empire, as some would argue, the most brutal example in our history, but also the concentration of power in but a very few key figures. The supposition is that most authorities, save the seldom seen benevolent dictator, exude similar traits throughout history and it is for these reasons that people initiated steps to place limits on this concentration of power. As the saying goes, “absolute power corrupts absolutely”.

The case in point is readily illustrated in actions taken by many monarchs and emperors reigning in Europe throughout the dark ages. Most monarchs and other rulers throughout history have needed to give little thought to the people whom they ruled. King Edward I of England had but a few advisors who maintained power in the Kingdom and they engaged in conflict as they pleased. Unquestionably, rulers, monarchs and emperors, for the most part hereditary, operated with fewer restrictions from the people whom they ruled for the better part of human history. This is not to suggest that there were not constraints and restraints within which rulers operated. However, from the point of view of the developing Western world, that is those countries found throughout the world that display Western world ideals, 1215 marks the first real meaningful

restriction upon a ruling monarch, beginning the reduction of concentration of power.⁸ Simply put, from a modern Western perspective, the signing of the Magna Carta in that year was the beginning of the end of the dictatorial rule that had been historically predominant to that point in time.

It must be acknowledged that this was not the first time in human history when there has been a representative system of government. On the contrary, there have been periods when the general populations have had legitimate influence on their leaders and Informed-Influence Theory can account for these operating realities. Some examples include, but are not limited to, elections during the Roman Republic and the Athenian democracy during the Greek dynasty at which time the population was kept informed through poets and political satire, something the West sees as a recent phenomenon as a result of the invention of television.⁹

However, starting with the Magna Carta, the developing Western world began to place restrictions upon its monarchs, signifying the beginning of the general population wielding influence on its leaders. Specifically, the path of this increasing level of influence is tied, but not limited to, the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in England in 1688¹⁰, the United States War of Independence (1775-1783)¹¹ and extends throughout other portions of the Western world to include the French Revolution (1789-

⁸ Henrietta Heald, *Chronicles of Britain and Ireland* (London: Random Century Group, 1992), 263.

⁹ Ryan K. Balbot, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 145-147.

¹⁰ Henrietta Heald, *Chronicles of Britain and Ireland* (London: Random Century Group, 1992), 617.

¹¹ Alexis DeTocqueville, *Democracy in America* (Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1998), 73.

1799).¹² The point is that, although incredibly slow by twenty first century standards, there have been gradual restrictions on the power of heads of state and a resonant increase to a population's influence.

The first President of the United States, George Washington, and his fellow Founding Fathers understood better than most the importance of this limit to the concentration of government. They identified that a Jeffersonian democracy has its limitations in the risk of potential paralysis but also recognized that this form of government designed with checks and balances, is much better than a concentration of power in one office.¹³ Indeed, there have been and continue to be, times when the U.S. republic struggles to move legislation through Congress, such as the recent near-default on borrowed funds during the government debt ceiling crisis of 2011. This crisis resulted in the downgrading by Standard and Poor's of the US "Triple A" credit rating for the first time in history, yet the Founding Fathers, and most pundits today, still deem this potential deadlock to be a better alternative to concentration of power and an expected and necessary evil.

Although most political analysts would argue that the US form of government has the most checks and balances against a concentration of power, these restrictions to this concentration of power are present and common to most Western democracies. Common to all modern Western democracies are restrictions to its leaders from the entrenchment of the judicial branch of the government, designed to operate at arm's length. Of similar

¹² Henrietta Heald, *Chronicles of Britain and Ireland* (London: Random Century Group, 1992), 893.

¹³ Alexis DeTocqueville, *Democracy in America* (Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1998), 73.

importance, this judicial arm of government, again in most Western democracies is predicated upon a constitution, itself created in order to ensure that a government could not operate outside of some basic agreed upon principles. No longer was there a risk of suffering the injustices of arbitrary imprisonment. Members of the general population could genuinely criticize the government of the day; indeed there was a built-in counter-balance which developed in the form of a professional media, free from persecution. More important, the general population could choose their leaders and representatives in government, at least now possessing some abilities to influence or imply consent.

Combined with the ability to elect and criticise, was the number of people who were now in a position to directly influence leaders and governments increased as well. At the time of the Magna Carta, the initial restrictions placed on the monarch were minor and had no real influence on the reigning monarch; however, as time went on, the ability of some people to influence the monarch expanded, as did the group's size. At first the influence was extended to aristocratic members, who were awarded the right to vote: only those who held land titles had the right to suffrage. The right to vote started to widen in most Western democracies to include free men, those who rented property, and those who were not enslaved. Gradually, and literally over hundreds of years, the percentage of eligible voters in any given Western population steadily increased to a point that all adults, finally including women in the twentieth century,¹⁴ were given this ability to influence leaders and government. Society went from having its fate held by one or a small number of individuals to the entire adult population. Although this has occurred in an evolutionary fashion, the result is truly revolutionary.

¹⁴ Henrietta Heald, *Chronicles of Britain and Ireland* (London: Random Century Group, 1992), 1028-1048.

At present, in most Western developed democracies, voting rights are extended to all citizens above a certain age, normally between 16 and 21 years of age, without exception in regard to gender, religion, race, language, creed or colour.¹⁵ The Western world has evolved from one of control and power to one of choice, hinged on the basic principle of living with entrenched reasonable freedoms to include freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and freedom of peaceful gathering.¹⁶ Many of these freedoms were completely unheard of during the preceding six thousand years. The scope of potential influence has been transformed from a few to many. Although in modern societies many portions of the electorate are choosing not to vote and thereby negate their influence and imply their consent.

One criticism of this increasing influence is that the population is too ill informed to govern itself, and that the risk of moving towards progressively being able to influence leadership is that the population as a whole is not knowledgeable enough to wield this power. Further criticisms rest with the argument that the world, or a country or region would be ruled by referenda and popular choice. These criticisms, although valid, if taken to the extreme, are weakened due to limited referenda, term lengths and constitutions. The ideas of direct democracy illustrate these limitations however, with a perfectly informed electorate, direct democracy could thrive. That stated, a flawlessly informed population is a long way off. At present, and although the population has some capabilities to be better informed, this model merely recognises that influencing abilities are growing as is the potential to be informed. There is little doubt that the electorate can

¹⁵James John Guy, *People, Politics and Government: A Canadian Perspective* (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 2001), 290-293.

¹⁶Ibid., 269-270.

be uninformed and apathetic towards issues and this theory is recognition that both are evolving. Moreover, the most modern of democracies employ means to impeach individuals, or in the case of the Westminster system, the system of non-confidence, should the lower house achieve the required number of votes against a sitting government or leader;¹⁷ however, both of these mechanisms of influence are on the extreme scale of influence within modern democracies.

Of course there are difficulties surrounding this increasing influence, but what is undeniable is that this increase has taken place and what will follow the next section, which describes the informed aspect of the theory, will be how this increasing sphere of influence has occurred in conjunction with an ever increasing informed population.

THE POPULATION INFORMED

Inextricably linked to being able to influence one's leaders or government is the ability to have an informed population, or at least the perception of understanding principles of government and warfare. This, over the greater part of human history has been easier said than done. In the beginning and as humans have developed, the sharing of knowledge and information was via pictures, word of mouth, and through legends, shared from generation to generation. Until relatively recently, the occasions when the population was relatively better informed occurred rarely, such as during Roman times when news would be read to the population. This revolution for its time however, has been the exception rather than the norm.

¹⁷ Ibid., 256.

In spite of the invention of the printing press during the mid-15th century, access to books and the written word did not become widespread until the mid-18th century and the time of the industrial revolution. Up until this point in time, there were relatively rudimentary ways to disseminate information resulting in few individuals being exposed to the working of leaders, governments and the world.¹⁸ Some argue that religious extremism is a result of individuals lacking the ability to form their own opinions of a religion due to illiteracy, and is believed to be a core precondition for the likes of the Afghanistan/Pakistan Taliban to flourish.¹⁹ Indeed, and in addition to these types of extreme conditions, societies began to use written language as a means to capture history and many monarchs and leaders throughout history used it as a means to control their populations, albeit normally in a less extreme fashion, although the crusades could be considered as a time when religious extremism has been employed violently. During medieval times, by way of an example, the Roman Catholic Church mastered this technique, tightly creating and controlling the message sent to the population.²⁰ Furthermore, and common to almost all solutions proposed to our modern day conflicts is the call for better knowledge and understanding of government, conflict and war. This is best illustrated through the persistent and almost universal call for basic education, and spreading the ability to read and write as a fundamental building block of democracy. For example, this is seen as the starting point for international interventions such as in Afghanistan, where one of the most fundamental building blocks is literacy.

¹⁸ Robert J. Brym and John Lie. *Sociology: Your Compass for a New World* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2010), 75-98.

¹⁹ David J. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 4 (August 2005): 596-617.

²⁰ James Vanderkam and Peter Flint, *The Meaning of the Dead Sea Scrolls* (London: T&T Clark International, 2002), 321-323.

The process of developing an informed population in the Western world began in the industrial revolution, the period when literacy, books and newspapers became available. The nascent development of literacy in this period was a fundamental building block and one of the most powerful mechanisms for educating and indeed informing the population, and it exponentially increased the general population's knowledge and understanding of the world in general.²¹ An explosion by any standard however, was the increase of literacy. By the beginning of the 20th century, literacy rates had increased to levels never conceived of in the past. For most of the previous 500 years, literacy was reserved for the Church and the nobility or aristocratic class. The astonishing result was that for the first time in human history the entire population was exponentially more knowledgeable than at any period of time in the past. This alone represents a monumental accomplishment and an increased ability for a population to become better informed.

The next quantum leap in informing the population came from the development of the radio and with it, the ability to broadcast to hundreds of thousands of people simultaneously.²² This was a feat that rendered it unnecessary to gather a group into a single place to pass on information. And no matter how large the gathering could have been, radio broadcasts surpassed it with its staggering ability to reach the masses. Strikingly, during the early days of the 1920's the growth of this technology exploded, becoming mainstream in a matter of years with the introduction of the vacuum tube and its method of amplification. The invention of radio and the vacuum tube were two

²¹ Jackson J. Spielvogel, *Western Civilization: Since 1500, 7th ed.* (Toronto: Thomson Wadsworth, 2009), 607-610.

²² Robert J. Brym and John Lie. *Sociology: Your Compass for a New World* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2010), 75-98.

quintessential accomplishments that tremendously increased the population's ability to remain informed.

On the heels of this radio and vacuum tube technology, and this increasingly informed population, was the invention of television. Once again there was a crucial leap in the ability of human beings to become better informed. Now, it became commonplace to have visual messages, coupled with audio ones, transmitted into the home of many people across the Western world. Once again and with the addition of this technology, the population was awarded yet another enormous opportunity to become and remain informed. One of the drawbacks to this television medium was that unlike the written word or radio waves, the ability to produce a TV signal was limited to a relative few within the world and the population was limited to seeing what was produced for their consumption. To this day, this is one of the larger drawbacks to the technology, although there are increasing abilities within this realm. What television and radio did do was draw together friends and family so that they had an increased ability to be informed and an ability to discuss matters resulting in a better potential of understanding issues.

The Internet, in a lot of ways, has addressed the limitations on television technology. This medium, accessible to anyone with a personal computer, is the newest revolutionary informational technology, which, now combined with mobile phones and social media, enables the public to share near real-time information globally. The fact that this information does not need to be produced by a team of professionals in a studio is a critical variable in Western societies.

The criticism of this process of an ever-increasingly informed public is that with the right messaging, the population can be easily controlled and convinced to follow

specific issues. Yet the population can still be manipulated with things which are far from the truth. Over the past hundred years, there have been a number of examples when propaganda and half-truths have been used to control a message and incite a population. Hitler's rise to power in the 1930's is an excellent example, illustrating the power of propaganda and the ability of what started out as a democratic government to be able to control the message, through which they were able to manipulate a majority of the German public.²³ This really reinforces the incredibly important role of a robust free media.

In addition to this previous criticism, there are concerns that leaders will aim to gain and maintain power by simply running campaigns through polling and popular surveying, not taking any leadership positions on issues; this is the idea of leadership by referenda. This is a valid concern and criticism, one that once again reinforces the need for a free media and the requirement that the population truly remains informed, and does not just believe what they are fed. Some have argued that a truly informed population, through a more challenging free media, would have demanded irrefutable proof regarding Iraq's 2003 Weapons of Mass Destruction programs, instead of accepting the government's spin as reflected in the favourable polling support which led to the invasion. However, this will be analysed in more detail in the coming sections.²⁴ Indeed, what will follow will be a brief description of a conflict or event, and a discussion of the level of information of the population and ability to influence how events unfolded.

²³ Felix Gilbert and David Clay Large, *The End of the European Era: 1890 to the Present*, 4th ed. (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1991), 255-290.

²⁴ Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay and Evan Lewis, "Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War." *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 118, no. 4 (2003-2004): 569-598.

MECHANISMS OF CHANGE

The following portion of the paper presents a targeted analysis of the registrations and turning points of change; however, it is important to note that this will be from a macro perspective. It will not be an exhaustive consideration of all of the conflicts occurring since the beginning of the twentieth century, but rather a general analysis that considers specific factors or thresholds of the evolving variables and how Western populations have seen both their levels of understanding, perceived or real, and their influence evolve. With this acknowledged, there will be broad consideration of conflicts and war, with a focus on periods of time when these changes are most easily seen.

The premier section will introduce the First World War and how electoral bodies had a large part in how conflict and war emerged, and how the decision-makers interacted with the populations' real influence. As well, there will be a portion devoted to examining the perception of being informed through the mainstreaming of radio, newspapers, books and film, but through governments' use of propaganda, the reality is quite different. Indeed, governments well understand that populations can be influenced and this has resulted in an additional desire by governments to control the message and to tap into nationalistic tendencies across the spectrum of the nation-states involved in any conflict. This factor will be illustrated by the population's extreme desire for reparations in the Treaty of Versailles.

Moving chronologically the paper will introduce a discussion of World War I, there will then be a consideration of the interwar period and World War II as well as the mainstream adaptation of radio and the increased flow of information, reaching the masses much more quickly. Following this, there will be an analysis and consideration of

the Cold War period including the Vietnam War and the addition of television to the flow of information. The importance of a very robust free media and the effect that this had on this conflict will be dissected. In addition, there will be an introduction to what is now viewed as mainstream protests. This type of influence technique had never previously been seen with this frequency nor with these results.

There will then be a discussion of the period that followed the Vietnam War through 1990 up to the present and the effect of changes that occurred with the introduction of internet technologies, including social media and polling. An analysis of this period will include both the times when conflict was initiated as well as times when the world has chosen to sit a potential conflict out. Specifically, there will be discussion surrounding when the West has chosen to intervene or to remain on the sidelines. This model accounts for the lack of universality, the idea that recognizing that the Right to Protection (RtP) policy has not been universally applied and that this evolution to RtP has been more focused to Western self-interest and emotive reactions to varying and similar circumstances. Recent situations in Africa, North Korea, and the Middle East will be considered. The evolution of the concepts of Responsibility to Protect will be considered in light of the growth of the flow of information; however, it will be seen that people in the West are also becoming aware of the costs both human and monetary in military intervention.

In addition the relationship between the costs of nation building and the variables of the Informed Influence model will be discussed both in terms of how the West does it and for how long. Throughout the following sections, the reader should be asking him or herself, how a conflict or war would have been different with the new forms of

information flow and what influence, if any, would the population have had on any given government of the time. To be specific, how would the populations of the world have reacted during World War I, had they had the access to the modern technologies of the 21st century and the propaganda had not been as successful as it was? What would have been different as they exercised their influence nightly, watching on the evening news the mass casualties, common to the conflict? Embedded in the answer is how this increasing ability to be informed, coupled with this influence changed the way the West wages conflict.

WORD WAR I

Although an informed population did exercise its influence during the US Civil War, as there had to be a real consideration of popular opinion, especially from the point of view of President Lincoln and the way in which he waged it, due to the concentration of the Western world leadership in Europe at the time, the colonial battle did not get the traction nor recognition with the Europeans as it was seen as relatively unimportant²⁵. Instead, World War I was a conflict that can be seen as the first major turning point in which the population's influence played a significant role. From the point of view of all major actors in the conflict, nationalist tendencies were present at levels unseen up to this period of Western development²⁶.

It began during the late stages of 1914, and although World War I was not to be the last of the European conflicts, in spite of it being called "the war to end all wars."

²⁵ James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 45-77.

²⁶ David Fromkin, *Europe's last summer: Who started the Great War in 1914?* (New York: Knopf, 2004), 260-262.

Some would argue that if you include World War II as an extension of this conflict, the peace that resulted from the Second World War did indeed turn out to be monumental for the region as there has not been any major conflict in the region since the completion of hostilities. That stated, for the purpose of this paper, the two European conflicts will be considered separately; however, few historians would not argue that, at least from the European actors' point of view, the winning nationalistic populations' demands for severe reparations, were directly related to the type of peace that was achieved by the November 1918 armistice.²⁷

The Great War, as it was known, involved the great powers and certainly the key actors in Europe. The total numbers of those involved was upwards of 70 million people, an astonishing statistic given the population of Europe at the time.²⁸ This “Great War” had commenced with both sides entering with a genuine belief in their noble causes, and with the requirement to have popular support. Throughout the conflict nationalistic tendencies were tapped for this support and yet, and in spite of these beginnings it turned out to be one of the largest conflicts in human history and which bred the term “total war.” Gone were the days of limited battles and conflict in a far-off land. This total war transformed warfare and for the next five years consumed much of Europe and its colonies. Although the conflict was initially expected to be a relatively quick campaign and one where the winners would finally put to rest the persistent conflicts of the previous 1000 years, dating back to the Viking raids and the Battle of Hastings, it turned

²⁷ Ibid., 301.

²⁸ History Learning Site, “Casualties of First World War,” <http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/FWWcasualties.htm>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2012.

out to last much, much longer.²⁹ For the first time on such a large scale, the general populations on both sides of the battlefield were engaged in the reasons for initiating, and for that matter, continuing this conflict. The nascent developing democracies were genuinely engaging the electoral bodies of their domestic audiences; however, truthful engagement turned out to be a bridge too far as this would have risked the loss of this required public support, desperately, and for the first time required. The evolving restrictions on the previously held absolute power in Western Europe, forced governments, having gradually seceded power was on such a large scale, to engage their populations almost as a precondition to conflict. Public opinion relating to conflict mattered for the first time, and it mattered significantly. Indeed, most historians acknowledge that propaganda, a way to influence popular opinion of a domestic audience, was used by all countries on both sides of the conflict. What turned out to be a watershed was that for the first time in history the people across the conflict mattered greatly when it came to the march towards, and the continuation of the conflict.³⁰

Having evolved democratically through gradual steps from the Magna Carta on to other revolutions, the leaders of the West had to actively pursue support in order to garner the appropriate and required levels of buy-in and understanding of the general population. The population had achieved the minimum threshold of exercising influence that was predicated on an ever-increasingly informed, or at least a perception of being informed, population. Primarily this was accomplished through the use of newspapers. Since the

²⁹ Henrietta Heald, *Chronicles of Britain and Ireland* (London: Random Century Group, 1992).

³⁰ Bookrags, "How Did the British Government Shape Public Opinion During the First World War?" <http://www.bookrags.com/essay-2005/2/26/105744/261>; Internet; accessed 3 March 2012.

mid-nineteenth century, rapidly increasing literacy rates, coupled with well-established access to the news, which had never been achieved to this level in history, provided this enormous opportunity to inform the populace. But as the government soon realized, as valuable as this mechanism was for establishing support for its cause, its rapid decay could also occur and its usefulness could easily backfire, hence control of the war message became a critical requirement for this continued support.

Amazingly, in the case of the United Kingdom, very strong support grew in spite of it being an isolated island. Moreover, and due in large part to the propaganda machine, the government of the UK was responsible for maintaining this support in spite of massive human losses and costs never before seen in the history of battle. The casualties of the “Entente”, an alliance that included the French, British and Americans, totalled more than twenty-three million and accounted for more than fifty percent of those involved.³¹ The central powers had casualties of sixteen million of their twenty-five, statistics unheard of in modern times and yet the support continued in spite of brutality never before witnessed in human history. US President Woodrow Wilson’s office saw such intrinsic value in maintaining this propaganda that it created “The Committee on Public Information,” an arm’s length branch of the government born out of the desire to influence this now important public opinion.³² It is incredibly ironic that the population who could now influence the government became itself the target of government influence through the newfound and skilfully applied techniques of propaganda.

³¹ History Learning Site, “Casualties of First World War.” <http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/FWWcasualties.htm>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2012.

³² George T. Blakey, *Historians on the Homefront: American Propagandists for the Great War* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1970).

The manner in which, the warring factions sought to accomplish this goal, was through tightly controlling the message, and therefore placing many restrictions on the media. The end result during this period was that journalists began seeking protection for freedom of expression, policies of protection, and non-interference for the media were initiated. The media had morphed from propaganda peddlers to critical cogs in the Western world's system of keeping the population truly informed and the government honest. Out of this phenomenon stemmed the phrase "Truth is the first thing lost in war".

Historians and pundits can only speculate on the effect a truly free media might have had on public opinion during the Great War. Imagine the results, had the population, with its newfound threshold ability to wield influence, been truly informed of the costs of the conflict. Could the war have possibly gone on for as long as it did had most people known there were many twenty-four hour periods on the battlefield when it was common to lose the lives of tens of thousands of human beings?

An additional irony of the massively successful propaganda campaign resulted in the winning side being full of such hatred for the losing side that the treaties resulting at the close of hostilities were so severe that satisfaction came not from the winning itself, but rested in the pain and suffering imposed on the defeated at its conclusion. This of course, and as previously mentioned, led to conditions being set for the next major conflict to affect the world, and although they are named as two separate wars, many would argue it was but one war with a "break" in the middle.

However, before consideration of the Second World War, recognition of some monumental adjustments to the Western world is in order. The governments of the Western world must now never operate without considering their domestic and indeed

global publics, a factor, which will loom large from this point forward. There is a ready recognition that the influence now established in electoral bodies, must be considered by governments, especially since there are now new and developing mechanisms through which people may remain informed, or at least attempt to become informed. Also at this time, governments deliberately controlled the message to the population through the use of propaganda, and in some cases, it is utilized relatively flawlessly. An interesting point that can be seen during this time was that minorities tended to remain outside the sphere of influence, as was the case with Irish conscripts. During the First World War, the Irish, although largely opposed to the war on mainland Europe, had limited influencing abilities with London and they were unable to stay out of the conflict due to this inability to influence. From their point of view, they were aware and unsupportive of the conflict but were without a means to influence, leaving the population impotent on the issue—a fact that reinforces this Informed-Influence Model. Indeed, most historians view this policy by London as pivotal to the increased desire by the Irish to secede from the UK. The result was that the Irish would form a new Republic as a means towards increasing their own influence over their lives and destiny.

INTERWAR PERIOD/ WORLD WAR II

During the interwar period, there were small skirmishes, but in terms of discussing the Informed-Influence model and an increasingly informed population willing and able to pull on the levers of influence, the paper will focus on the Second World War. For the major players in Europe during the twenty or so years between these major conflicts, there continued to be advances in technologies relating to mass media reaching the public. As previously mentioned, radio was developed and it enabled the

population not only to be reached in large numbers but also much more on a real-time basis. Instead of the days and weeks required for the passage of information, knowledge flowed much more quickly. The mainstreaming of radio changed the established dynamic of informing the electorate and led to the increasing difficulties for governments to control the messages, as there were now just too many media to control.

During this time, the Western democratic population's ability to influence was somewhat limited, but one important factor unfolding at this time was that twice as many individuals held the right to vote. By 1939 women's suffrage had gained traction, thereby doubling the electorate and therefore the number of people with the ability to exercise influence.³³

As previously mentioned, most historians point to the Treaty of Versailles as one of the root causes of the Second World War, and some consider, at least in Europe, the two conflicts as one. In the case of the ever-evolving variables of the model, post-World War One Germany proves to illustrate a decisive point in Western development. Interwar Germany was a democracy in which people had the minimum prerequisite levels of being informed as well as being able to exercise their influence. It is very important to understand that the Nazi party, with Hitler at the helm, developed within this democracy, although once they attained varying positions of power, they took away the population's ability to continue to influence. The situation illustrates how a population can be manipulated to wield its influence without being at all informed of the true desires of the manipulators, and illustrates the emotive behaviours that populations can have a tendency to display. Acute emotive reactions are again seen in the US domestic reaction to the

³³ Henrietta Heald, *Chronicles of Britain and Ireland* (London: Random Century Group, 1992).

Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, as well as the reactions by the US and the world to the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001. These two examples will be considered separately within this paper.

The close of World War I began with Germans feeling the effects of the punitive terms of the Treaty of Versailles which led to Hitler's march of aggression. The victors of the First World War, with their desire for damages, created a large portion of the political conditions for Hitler's rise to power. With the electorate now having so much more importance, in terms of its potential influence on leadership and decision makers, the Nazi's recognized this reality and were able to manipulate the population, transform most of German society into believing the Nazi propaganda being perpetuated, and in so doing propel the mobilization of total war and all of the industrial requirements that go along with it.

The Allies, on the other hand, many still with major concerns surrounding the possibility of war, were convinced that an overt policy of appeasement would have this, developing aggressive Germany, simply go away.³⁴ As is well established, many Western countries, including France and Britain, sought a means to achieve some form of peace through this policy of appeasement, a philosophy of hope that somehow it was possible to quench the thirst of a Hitler-controlled Germany to re-establish its regional stature, where the population could no longer wield their influence against its neighbours. For the electorate of Nazi Germany to be strongly driven towards war so few years after the conclusion of hostilities is remarkable. The population had to be intensely motivated as post World War I Germany was a burgeoning democracy with an electorate holding

³⁴ National Geographic, *Apocalypse: The Rise of Hitler: Becoming Hitler*, DVD. Directed by Isabelle Clarke and Daniel Costelle (Washington, DC; National Geographic, 2011).

influence on its leaders. Ultimately, Hitler's early rise to power came primarily through the ability to manipulate this electorate's newfound influence and through the ability to misinform the population.

In far off portions of the British Commonwealth, dominions like Canada were coming to the aid of Great Britain; however, not all of the Entente actors were as quick to respond to hostilities again in Europe. When it came to the developing superpower, the United States chose to remain on the sidelines, nominally neutral, in spite of President Roosevelt's belief that the US ought to have been engaged, or at the very least, that they were destined to be involved.³⁵ Roosevelt was more than convinced of the justness of the cause and yet the US domestic audience was unsupportive and approval ratings for remaining uninvolved remained high.³⁶ Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of Britain during the first stages of the war, coming on the heels of Neville Chamberlain and his policies of appeasement, was a man who can be credited with oration skills never before witnessed by the masses. His communicating and speaking skill set could now readily be received by dozens of thousands, thanks to the recently established radio technology. It is remarked that few others could have been as successful in this achievement, especially without the ability to speak to and reach the masses. Churchill recognised this capability and harnessed it throughout the war. Undeniably, the newfound capability of radio influenced the domestic and international audiences in a manner never seen before in human history. Through its use, Churchill successfully rallied the populations of the Allies and he was successful in maintaining public support for his war policies, and

³⁵ Douglas M. Charles, "Informing FDR: FBI Political Surveillance and the Isolationist-Interventionist Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 211-232.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 242.

although there had been propaganda campaigns in WWI, they could not be as successful, as the information flowed so much more easily only two short decades later.

Unfortunately for the Allies in 1939, the influence of Winston Churchill, in spite of his incredible gift, was unsuccessful in adequately influencing the US audience to compel its leaders into an early entry into the war. As previously stated, Roosevelt was a man who could easily see the need for the US to support Great Britain and France and to enter the war in order to stop Hitler's Germany. However, the domestic US population's support was so against this course of action through its formal and informal mechanisms that it swayed Roosevelt from committing US troops into what the public deemed as yet another European war of waste. Both Roosevelt and Churchill, along with many others, were unsuccessful in getting the US population to support the war effort with troops until Japan carried out its attack at Pearl Harbour. Roosevelt used this attack as a means to harness the domestic audience and to mobilize a total war effort, proving to be the difference in both Europe and the Pacific theatres as US forces contributed decisively during both campaigns.

When the US finally did enter the war, Roosevelt, having already understood the risks in Europe, made this campaign the priority instead of the Pacific theatre, despite the Pacific campaign being directly linked to American interests of self-defence. Once again, propaganda played a large role in the campaign and although there had been steps taken to ensure a free media, controls and limitations were placed in order to adequately control the message. War bonds and contributions back home are a few examples, but what turned out to be much more truthful this time around were the atrocities being committed by the Nazis.

Quiet rumblings began over the persecution of Jewish Europeans and anyone who would challenge Nazi policies in occupied Europe. As these truths began making their way to the masses through the free-flow of information, ideals, principles and morals associated with protecting human beings began to receive traction. This idea, the Right to Protection, was a rather inspiring concept when one considers that most often in human history, protection of anyone but your own was a relatively foreign concept, as conflict was usually about wealth, control and power. One interesting note of late is that limits are now acceptable on the absolute sovereignty of a nation state, whereas during World War II, it happened with hostilities already established.

In a lot of ways, World War II was a watershed moment for the Western world as populations began to influence their governments surrounding these new motives for potential conflict. The ashes of World War II spawned international organizations like the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). All of these agencies, although miles from perfection, have significantly increased a population's ability to influence and increased their capacity to stay informed, not solely through their own government, but through governments, leaders and countries other than their own. Like the Magna Carta, these were significant milestones marking the beginnings of an increasingly influential population of the world.

There were some advances in the ability to inform the population during the war: television had been invented, but it was suspended in the UK until after the war so that it didn't act as a beacon to enemy aircraft.³⁷ Nonetheless, the population's overall ability to influence took on a whole new meaning when it came to their level of influence. As

³⁷ BBC Archive, "The BBC 'War Book': Variety Programmes," <http://bbc.co.uk/archive/ww2outbreak/7953.shtml>; Internet; accessed 8 January 2012.

stated, the governments of both the Allies and Axis powers recognized both the limitations and benefits of harnessing this “informed population”. This is seen through both Hitler’s ability to manipulate the German population in order to attain power in Germany and the US domestic audience, compelling its government to remain on the sidelines. At the end of this period, the Western world continued to manage these fresh realities and both variables significantly increased the population’s capabilities to influence and to stay informed.

THE COLD WAR

In addition to the birth of the burgeoning institutions of the UN, NATO and the European Economic Community, the predecessor to the EU, came a relatively calm period of international conflict. The Cold War, which would last nearly forty-five years and cost billions upon billions of dollars for weapons systems, troops and ammunition, included the firing of few actual bullets. In macro terms the main actors were the Soviet Union and its bloc coupled against the United States and other Western powers. The lessons from the model to this point in time at the end of the Second World War hold true. For the West, it meant that the population attempted to maintain an adequate level of understanding of the issues and for the most part supported their governments in maintaining a corresponding level of defence. Of course there were some conflicts on both sides, but the Cold War, as an illustration of significant changes to the model’s variables, is fairly straightforward. The Soviet Union’s population lost all ability to influence, and as previously stated, one variable without the other leaves the leaders to operate much like a monarch in the dark ages, or as is the case with the post-war Soviet Union under Stalin, some say much worse. It did not matter what the population knew of

its government's actions, there was nothing to be done, as their levels of influence were so low as to make the people impotent.

On the informing side of the model, the mainstreaming of television during this time period proved to be yet another large mechanism contributing to the ability of people to be informed. This burgeoning technology is most described as a means to send the message of the dangers of nuclear annihilation. And even though movie houses had played a large role previously, this technology ended up in the living rooms of most middle class families. Perhaps it was the power of the combination of pictures and sound to illustrate the dangers of atomic weapons so much so that the population made them taboo for consideration other than as a choice of last resort. The effect of the 1983 film "The Day After" on Ronald Reagan has been speculated as having being profound effects on the United States' nuclear Strategic arms Reduction Treaties (START).³⁸

This is not to infer that the television did not have other enormous impacts on sub-conflicts within the greater construct of the Cold War. On the contrary, the influence of this medium is striking and its impact will be considered specifically to the watershed moment of this medium during the conflict in Vietnam. It was a period that proved to be simply remarkable, in terms of how the significant increases in informational technology relates during this period of the Cold war, and indeed in terms of the continuing implications on the populations today.

Unfortunately, not all of the burgeoning organisations had as much influence on the Soviet Union as one would have hoped, as they were conceived post World War II.

³⁸ Simon Braund, "How Ronald Reagan Learned to Start Worrying and Stop Loving the Bomb," *Empire Magazine*, November 2010, 134-140.

Obviously NATO grew out of this mutual agreement of self-defence; the hope was that the UN could have had more impact. However, it was the West and its wealth creation, which proved to be the mightier of the two, as the war was won because of the West's marginal ability to generate wealth and outspend the Soviets.

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND THE VIETNAM WAR

Within the aforementioned period from 1945 to the fall of the Berlin wall in 1990, there were instances where our two variables had massive mutations in the form of technologies, and on the influence side of the model, coming both informally and formally. The United States' participation in both the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam conflict began as relatively natural extensions of the Cold War, although they ended up being monumental moments to show the applicability of Informed-Influence Theory and the two events will be considered separately below.

In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, careful consideration will be paid to how close the world came to a nuclear exchange and yet how relatively supportive the Western world's populations were during the crisis itself. Quite astonishing, public support both domestically, that is the US domestic audience, and worldwide was relatively high in spite of the potential, enormous repercussions. In the case of the Vietnam War, there were similar beginnings and accompanying public support, but domestic popular opinion compelled the American leadership and government to exit the conflict at any cost.

Reacting to the potential, yet likely, attempt to permanently base nuclear weapons on the Soviet-influenced island of Cuba, US President Kennedy, with the support of the domestic audience and world public opinion, chose to engage in a game of chicken. This

was no small feat, given the close proximity to the closing of World War II, when the world had witnessed for the first time the perils of utilizing nuclear weapons and an all-encompassing war. The point is that the incredibly popular President Kennedy had so much public support that he had high approval ratings throughout the crisis in spite of the incredible stakes during such a risky endeavour. Through the multiple mediums of radio, television, and the written word, Kennedy³⁹ was able to maintain this support, illustrated by his achieving an average approval rating of 70.1 percent according to polling by Gallup Historical Statistics.⁴⁰

Under Kennedy, the conflict in Vietnam also began as a relatively popular stand against the expansion of Communism worldwide. This early stage turned out to be the period when the most drastic increases of troop and engagement levels occurred. During John F. Kennedy's brief time in office he maintained a policy, which turned out to be relatively aggressive, succinctly illustrated during his inaugural address, when he related his intent to continue this popular policy, saying the US would "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty."⁴¹ Ironically, the Vietnam conflict developed into what most historians view at the least popular war in which the US has ever participated, and in spite of light casualty rates relative to that of World War II.

What was the difference? Surely this was not a war unlike any other? The difference, simply put, was that for the first time in human history one could watch the

³⁹ Richard Reeves, *Portrait of Camelot* (New York: Abrams, 2010).

⁴⁰ Gallup, "Presidential Approval Ratings-Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends," <http://www.gallup.com/poll/116677/presidential-approval-ratings-gallup-historical-statistics-trends.aspx>; Internet; accessed 9 April 2012.

⁴¹ Bartleby Books, "John F. Kennedy Inaugural Address." <http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres56.html>; Internet; accessed 8 January, 2012.

brutality of warfare daily in one's living room. The invention of television now enabled the general population of the West to view firsthand the brutalities of war. Walter Cronkite, the American CBS broadcaster, was credited in large part, with changing public opinion in the United States, compelling the government to end the war.⁴² This was a monumental occasion in terms of a population being able to directly influence a government's decision-making process regarding the end of a war. The My Lai Massacre, a significant event during the Vietnam conflict is seen as a turning point in public opinion. The mass murder of hundreds of civilians committed by a company of US infantry was made known by the free flow of information and proved to be a decisive event affecting how the population viewed the conflict. Knowledge of this event caused reactions through various means of influence, both formally in votes and informally in protest and waning public opinion. Sadly, but quite clearly, this war was not any more brutal than those of the past, especially when considering the casualty rates of the First and Second World Wars. In total, over 50,000 Americans were killed during the conflict, a number that frankly pales in comparison to the casualty rate in conflicts of the first half of the century. In addition to casualty rates of combatants, World War II claimed the lives of millions of innocents. Or consider the British treatment of Boer War non-combatants, including women and children. Today the South Africa Conflict is known by historians as the first Western use of concentration camps. How was this loss, although tragic, as are any in any conflict, viewed so differently? The answer comes in the form of knowledge, and thereby an intimate emotional connection with the events, and this was

⁴² Tony Rogers, "Cronkite's Influence and Excellence as an Anchor Will Never be Matched." *About.com Journalism* (17 July 2009) (journal on-line); available from <http://www.journalism.about.com/b/2009/07/17/cronkties-influence-as-an-anchor-will-never-be-matched.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 December 2011.

primarily the result of the capabilities of television to inform the population of the brutalities of war. As in previous conflicts, there have been many instances when innocents have been killed in large numbers, such as through the two nuclear bombs dropped on Japan and the many non-military targets destroyed with their use. The difference was the proximity and personal effect of television beamed into the public's living rooms informing the public, who in turn, exercised their influence. An influence, which was taking on a much more fluid and informal nature, as protesting became the means by which, populations routinely displayed their displeasure over government decisions.⁴³

Further to this phenomenon, the media had reinforced its freedoms and relative to the previous wars, the government was unable to control the message as well as they would have liked, despite great attempts⁴⁴. During the US conflict in Southeast Asia, the world saw a popular exponential increase in its knowledge and understanding of the brutalities of war and coupled this knowledge in such a robust manner that public opinion, casualty rates and collateral damage would never be seen in the same light again. No leader will ever forget that in this conflict the influence of the public forced a superpower into retreat from a much smaller enemy. Important to note is that enemies of the West began to understand this dynamic and how much influence the population exercises on government policies. Out of this realization began the understanding that by simply holding out past the West's ability to maintain public opinion could come victory, a phenomenon that exists today and will be covered in greater detail in further sections.

⁴⁴ BBC News, "Murder in the name of war-My Lai," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/64344.stm>; Internet; accessed 6 January 2012.

With the withdrawal of US forces from Southeast Asia, the West came to the realization that the demands placed on Western militaries were to be large and complex. They would need to aim at maintaining the moral high ground and minimizing collateral damage to the maximum extent possible, especially when they were not involved in a war of self-defence. Why did this matter all of a sudden? The answer harkens back to this increasing informational flow and the corresponding levers of power. The population now demanded this of their troops and if their leaders did not uphold this demand, it was at their own peril.

GULF WAR I

Jumping ahead to the early nineties, the first conflict the West had with Saddam Hussein's Iraq proves to be another decisive example for the Informed-Influence Theory. Ironically, the hostilities unfolded right on the heels of the Cold War and during a time when the peace dividend was to be cashed in. But in spite of this dividend, Hussein invaded Kuwait. Then following UN Security Council Resolutions, which opposed the aggression, calling for the return of Saddam's forces to Iraq, the coalition, led by the US initiated military operations to drive the Iraqi forces. This conflict is relatively well known and seemingly straightforward, so how does it relate to the Informed-Influence model? There were two key adjustments to these ever-evolving variables. The first was a result of the close of the Cold War and the beginning of the West's ability to look at conflict beyond the limits of two warring super power and their allies. In the case of Kuwait, the West came to its aid based on principles of the right to protect and just war theory. There is no denying that common to most Western governments was an aim for stability in the oil-rich Middle East as the West was dependent on this resource, although

the West can be just as happy dealing with a stable dictator who sells his oil too, as the West has purchased oil from Libya for the better part of a quarter of a century⁴⁵. To be clearer, the world backed the use of force to oust the Iraqi forces with a coalition of more than 100 countries. This was a fairly significant achievement, considering the normal tendencies during the Cold War and the resulting divided nature of the world. Populations that felt great support were compelling governments to act and therefore these governments were forced to get onboard.

The second major transition that can be seen in this conflict was the digitalization of war and how effective and clean modern warfare was perceived to have become, for this situation anyway. After a 45 day air campaign when day after day hundreds of sorties were conducted, the allies rolled into Kuwait and literally in a matter of days displaced the aggressor with relatively very few casualties, a monumental achievement considering that the previous major conflict in Vietnam had resulted in nearly 50 000 dead.⁴⁶

So how does this inform the public? The public viewed this modern warfare as easy, cheap and relatively risk-free, save the few fratricide resulted deaths and a few aircrew losses during the air campaign. In short, and as previously acknowledged, the objectives were achieved with almost no casualties and the public was literally able to watch the targeting feeds of 2,000 pound weapons exploding on their targets with, compared to what had been seen in the past, alarming accuracy. With this lesson came

⁴⁵ Nick Squires, "Libya: Italian oil giant suspends supply from Libya," <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8341220/Libya-Italian-oil-giant-suspends-supply-from-Libya.html>; Internet; accessed 10 April 2012.

⁴⁶ Navy Department Library, "American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics," <http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/american%20war%20casualty.htm>; Internet; accessed 14 March 2012.

the idea that modern, robust technological Western forces were almost superhuman; however, the informed population, or as the world would soon learn, the ill-informed populations' conclusions were, at the very least incomplete.

SOMALIA, THE FORMER YUGOSAVIA, AND RWANDA

The great success of the massive military intervention in Iraq led the West into believing that it could deploy forces of “good” in smaller numbers around the world with little to no risk. This perception was reinforced due to some of the myths surrounding the peacekeeper, because the West perceived that a force in blue helmets was in itself enough to keep warring factions apart. This practice, although noble and predicated on the ideals previously referenced in this writing, proved to be very messy and indeed dangerous. What was quickly learned in Somalia, when the West deployed military forces to the horn of Africa, was that things were not quite that easy. The Somalia mission began as a humanitarian campaign, and evolved into a peace enforcement undertaking incorporating US elite Special Operations Forces. Within the subset of this mission were snatch and grab raids that resulted in changing the balance of power in the region. During one such endeavour, dozens of Elite American Forces were killed and their bodies dragged through the streets of Mogadishu.⁴⁷ A mission that began with security and humanitarian objectives, required to set the conditions for food distribution, evolved quite naturally to one of security, and ended in what the public viewed as a disaster. This brutal disaster was one that resonated with Western populations, especially within the general public of the United States. The populations of the West were starting to come to grips with the

⁴⁷ Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004).

dangers of international peacekeeping and peacemaking missions and the risks, utility, and rewards of military force applied worldwide.

Coupled with the difficulties witnessed in the horn of Africa were the rapidly degrading situations in the former Yugoslavia. Here, the west reacted to genocide in the former Tito controlled republics. The West deployed a peace-enforcement coalition for stability operations throughout the region although the Rules of Engagement (ROE) employed contributed to a limited ability to keep warring factions apart and they were less than successful in places like Srebrenica, where thousands were killed over a few weeks.⁴⁸ These costs associated with large peacekeeping and peacemaking operations were beginning to take their toll on the same population that influenced its leaders in the first place to begin deployments where peace enforcement objectives were the goal, were disappointed by some results.

WHAT HAPPENED IN RWANDA?

In considering Rwanda, the analysis will focus not on what the West did but on what the West did not do, as the influence side of the model can mean that the West can, when the appropriate influence is not applied, sit one out, and in the case of Rwanda, this is exactly what occurred. Acknowledging that the leaders are the decision makers, the relationship between government and this leadership cannot be understated, as has been established thus far with the theory and President Clinton maintains the genocide in Rwanda is one of his largest regrets⁴⁹. In fairness to Western populations, technology

⁴⁸ Center for Defense Information, "Lessons of Kosovo: Operation Allied Forces," <http://www.cdi.org/adm/1248>. Internet; accessed 25 February 2012.

⁴⁹ Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004).

was not what it is today and therefore populations were nowhere near as informed and emotionally involved as in later conflicts such as the Arab spring. Ironically, there are many parallels between Rwanda and Syria in spite of the enormous differences of the information technology of the day. Most of the difference can be attributed to apathy or fatigue of the West.

When the Rwanda situation arose, the West had recently completed the main hostilities in Gulf War I and was actively engaged in the breakdown of the Former Yugoslavia, although not committed to the extent that it would become in the not so distant future. Most important was the recent—and as viewed by the West—failed deployment into Somalia. Leading the West, neither the US government nor its population wanted to get involved in another African dispute. It is interesting to note that the actions or lack of action currently being taken by the West in Syria has resulted from a similar sentiment.

In Syria's case the fatigue and apathy had come on the heels of the war in Afghanistan, ten years in Iraq, and Libya, a conflict that was based on the will of the people, but had to be restricted to "clean" air power, as there was no appetite for the potential for casualties. In general the situation in Syria is seen as much more messy. Consider as well, the genocide in Rwanda, which actually occurred prior to the abilities of social media to share information in near real-time. At the time, information flowed via television, with some basic Internet technologies, but without the speed of modern social media. But what if this had occurred today? There may well have been the critical mass to influence the West, if more than what actually made the evening news was able

to flow out as the massacres occurred. What if the horrifying images could have been able to influence the West to compel its governments into action instead of remaining on the sidelines?

Ironically, out of ashes of Rwanda, and to a lesser extent, the genocide carried out in the former Yugoslavia, specifically in Srebrenica with the stabilization force on the ground, came the action taken in Kosovo. This much more aggressive action in Kosovo, was taken as the populations demanded that brutalities would be stopped, even with less than the full UNSC Resolutions that most of these types of missions would demand. Yet again with the correct political environment, Western Governments could be compelled into action. An interesting note to this political reality was the prewar stated caveat to limit the Western coalition force from employing ground troops. President Clinton was so overt about this restriction that he openly stated the limitation to Serb Forces before the commencement of hostilities. The statement made by Clinton has been criticized by nearly all military pundits, and yet it was made for the strategic population realities at the cost of the tactical consequences. Clinton, who understood that his power was a direct result of an influencing population, illustrates the Informed-Influence model eloquently with this example.

AFGHANISTAN AND GULF WAR II

The situations in the war in Afghanistan and the second major conflict led by the United States in Iraq were both unique and decisive moments. In examining the Informed-Influence model there has been consideration of the many emotional reactions to events; sometimes people are given only parts of the information and when they finally start to truly understand the nature of war, they are, in large part, opposed. Calls for

peace - i.e., saying during a fight, “Why can we all not just get along? - can be empty if there is no attempt to address the root causes of conflict.

The aftermath of the two collapsed towers in Lower Manhattan had left the world raw, emotional, and open to a policy of revenge, a situation which can lead to emotive, irrational reactions. In the case of Afghanistan, many of the world’s populations backed the United States and their leadership role in the building of a large coalition that ousted the Taliban from power and still remain in the war-torn country more than a decade later. Out of the gate, and for the first few years of the war, opinion polls, especially in the US, were exceptionally supportive of the initiative. There were similar levels of support around the world even though it was a direct attack on the United States, metaphorically and in a lot of ways, quite literally, it was an attack on the world financial system and the population of the world. The emotional reaction played an enormous part in the influence wielded by these Western populations, so much so that the “robust and free media” of the West were almost cheerleaders to the conflict.

In the case of Iraq however, there was a larger disconnect of popular support between the United States and some key allies. The people of the United States, to include for the most part the media, were by in large, incredibly supportive of the push to invade Iraq even though there were no legitimate correlations to the attacks in New York City⁵⁰. Ironically, polls taken in the US today indicate that this misunderstanding still exists⁵¹. Of course, one must recognize that the US administration was positioning itself to act because it based its stance on the Iraqi charade of keeping the inspectors out of the

⁵⁰ Josh Catone, “Number of Americans who believe Saddam- 9/11 tie rises to 41 percent,” http://rawstory.com/news/2007/Poll_41_of_Americans_believe_Saddam_0624.html; Internet; accessed 3 March 2012.

⁵¹ Ibid.

country. This act of defiance against the international community was likely designed by Saddam Hussein to be a feint meant for his Shia enemies in Iran. It was an attempt to maintain the perceived upper ground regarding Iraq's regional balance of Weapons of Mass destruction. This was important to Iraq as it did not want to show weakness given the legacy of conflict between the two countries. It should be noted that up until this point of the UN enforced no fly zones, the international coalition had shown few signs that they would take additional, significant offensive military action. The West had failed on many occasions to meet previous Iraq deviances to adhere to UNSC Resolutions.⁵² Saddam Hussein was playing a game of chicken with the US led coalition in order to keep up the perception of strength regionally. The point is not to debate the merits of the decision to invade, rather to illustrate how an "informed" or as referenced in the paper up to this point, the perception of being informed, population set the stage nonetheless. However, the world at large was split on the evidence and so the differing opinions of populations were influenced differently, with the largest factor being the closeness to the emotional attacks against New York. Some will point to the fact that this action was not sanctioned by the United Nations; however, as in Kosovo, even without such legitimacies, governments can be compelled into action. The recent case in Syria is again a great example where the West could have acted earlier than it had and in spite of very slow UNSC resolutions to come out of the world body.

An additional note to the Informed-Influence Theory stems from the significant use of embedded journalists with allied troops on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq. This practice, although hardly the first of its kind, was taken to a new level and was

⁵² BBC News, "No-fly zones: The legal position," http://new.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1175950.stm; Internet; accessed 6 January 2012.

utilized, some might say exceptionally well, during the period so that governments could better control the message, a common theme which we have seen throughout this analysis. These embedded journalists played a large part in gaining and maintaining public support for the missions. Indeed, an analysis of the media during these periods is something that cannot be overlooked, especially its role during the run up to the hostilities with Iraq the second time. Looking back, and as previously stated, the cheerleading was directly correlated to the emotional reactions to the actions on the World Trade Towers and directly utilized these embedded practices.

ARAB SPRING: EYGP, LIBYA AND SYRIA

The Arab Spring is another event that can be analyzed through the ever-evolving steps of the Informed-Influence model. In Egypt, the Western world was rather happily dealing with a dictator with whom they could work, but was forced to support the uprisings of the people in their pursuit for democracy due in large part to public demands worldwide. In the end, these same governments, including the Obama administration, which delayed a weigh-in for the debate until the very last moment, were forced to politically aid the transition.

Libya was a very similar case in which the people of a dictatorship sought to convince the people of the West to not only aid by way of sanctions or recognition, but to actually compel the West to take up arms against a sovereign state in order to achieve stated objections of RtP, and what turned out to be a regime change.

In Syria, where the story is not completely written, the West finds a situation not unlike Libya or Egypt, but there has been what most would describe as a very slow mobilization to decisive action. Once again, the Western world could point to the slow

movements of the UNSC as the reason behind the inaction, and no doubt this has been part of the story. Some would point to the difficulties surrounding the risks of the campaign, but as previously stated, the world has chosen to act in the past when the action was desired and so, as these intuitions are flawed, there are always ways around complications, should that be the will of the people. In Syria, the will of the Western world has recently just not been present. This has not been due to the lack of brutal images: the statistics show more than 10,000 innocent deaths from a brutal ruler against his people, so there is no lack of videos or stories from the oppressed people.⁵³ The sad reality has been that the cries, which were so compelling in Egypt, and to a greater degree Libya, have fallen on apathetic, fatigued and deaf ears. Sadly, as previously acknowledged, this was also the case in Rwanda and it does a great deal to explain the lack of universality of the RtP policy.

In terms of decisive points in the evolution of the variables within the model, Libya is an example of the people being unable to convince their own government, a brutal dictatorship, but able to influence Western governments. They persuaded the West to come to their aid primarily through the use of social media.⁵⁴ The population of one country was able to inform the population of another country such that it compelled its leader or government to act. It is striking to see the change in how fast a population can

⁵³ New York Times, "New York Times Index; Syria," <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/syria/index.html>; Internet; accessed 27 April 2012.

⁵⁴ Emad Mekay. "One Libyan Battle is Fought in Social and News Media". *New York Times*, 23 February 2011 (newspaper on-line); available from <http://www.newyorktimes.com/2011/02/24/world/middleeast/24iht-m24libya.html>; Internet; accessed 22 December 2011.

be informed; it has moved from pictures and word-of-mouth techniques over generations, to literally millions of people in a matter of seconds.

In considering the Libyan example, it should be noted that the aid from the West was not limitless. On the contrary, due to the Western population's informed understanding of the difficulties of their extended nation-building experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, they wanted no part of that type of exercise in Libya. The strategic political conditions were "no boots on the ground" and that the campaign "should progress quickly" and as the enforcement went on, so too did the calls for the West to achieve its objectives.⁵⁵

As briefly stated, the knowledge of wars and their corresponding realities have recently made Western populations very sceptical of nation building, especially given the enormous cost expended in Afghanistan and Iraq. An interesting addition to the model can be made regarding these long nation-building endeavours. Specifically, how patient would the Western populations have been watching and demanding results following the end of the combat of World War II? How patient would the domestic audience have been of the Marshall plan, designed to take multiple decades, had the population been able to watch the limited progress made? In stark contrast, the stabilization period in Afghanistan has been deemed by many pundits as a failure, considering the war to be lost. Yet the benefits witnessed in Japan, post-WWII, were measured after decades not months and years. Even today, US forces remain based on the island of Japan, the treaties for which were signed at the close of World War II. But the pundits do not view

⁵⁵ Rami Al-Shaheibi, "Libyan protesters supporting self-rule attacked in Benghazi." *Toronto Star*, 17 March 2012.

Afghanistan under this timeline and the public has grown fatigued at the costs spent in lives, money and time.⁵⁶

One of the more difficult criticisms of the Western world and therefore this theory is the Western world's far from universal application of these ideals, such as the right to protect. As has been discussed earlier, why is it that we chose Somalia and not Rwanda? The answer, in addition to those previously laid out in this paper, lies in human nature and our ability to remain emotionally attached or detached. For example, someone walking home in an urban centre would likely pass by a dozen homeless persons, paying little to no attention to the individuals. Yet on a different night threatened with robbery, do you pay a disproportionate amount of time and effort trying to track the robber down through pursuit, calling and engaging the police? The point is that in a lot of ways, the Western world has this exact same reaction to countries. That is, we walk by or ignore the down-trodden countries only to pay a disproportional amount of attention to ones who attack us.

SUMMARY

Informed-Influence Theory, like other political science models, was developed in order to describe and explain the political world in which we live. While some models, like Political Realism or Idealism, have been somewhat successful describing and explaining some periods of world history, they are unsuccessful in modern times as they do not account for the two primary factors of today's political realities. Informed –

⁵⁶ George Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 233.

Influence Theory was born for exactly this purpose as it describes and explains the complex evolution of these two variables; the increasing potential abilities of a population to become informed, coupled with a similar adjustment of its potential influence on decision makers and how this affects the causes and motivations for conflict and war. Humans have been waging war since before the beginning of recorded history with tools ranging from spears to nuclear weapons; however, the reasons for waging war, until recently, have largely remained unchanged. Wars have been a means to achieve power, control, and additional wealth or self-interest. Remarkably though, during the last hundred and fifty years of human history, the reasons for fighting wars have changed from this status quo. The reasons for these revolutionary changes can be explained by two ever-evolving variables relating to the availability of information to a population, coupled with its ability to influence the decision makers of the day. When these two variables have achieved their required thresholds, as they have at times in the history of the human race, populations were for limited periods of time and under severe limitations able to wield influence over the decision to go to war. Informed-Influence Theory accounts for the gradual march to this state and the subsequent realities surrounding conflict and war. Beginning with the Magna Carta, Western populations began to establish influence on their monarchs and rulers and thereby started to affect these leaders who command and commit nations and forces to war. It was not that the populations were free of the motivations of the past, but that they started to fully consider morals and principles when considering war; these humble beginnings have evolved into a transformation of the Western world.

This theory has limited utility when scrutinizing historical circumstances due to the prerequisite to have both a minimum ability to be informed coupled with an equally important ability to influence. Accordingly, this paper focused its analysis from the perspective of the developed Western nation-state in order to best illustrate the evolving variables of the model. For developed Western nations, gone are the days when a ruler can wage a war without having to answer to his or her citizens. From a Western perspective, gone are the days of a hereditary monarch's Crusade or a war of aggression in order to expand one's power, control, wealth and self-interest. Due to an informed and influential public, leaders are not free to act without accountability and the retention of power, once viewed as an entitlement, is now, for leaders, sometimes the most important.

Concurrent and inextricably linked to this phenomenon, citizens and the electorate at large have gradually become more informed and aware of their leaders, and those leaders' behaviours, motives, and limitations. Beginning with higher levels of literacy, populations continue to inform themselves through the use of radio, television, and Internet developments, along with the vast sharing of near real-time information through social media. Today, Western democratic leaders are now influenced, such that they may be compelled to fight, or restricted from, a war through well-articulated principles that their electorate are able to know, understand and ultimately use in order to influence whether or not wars are fought, and this influence is exercised both formally and informally.

Having established how important the influence that populations in Western democracies wield the more important it is for them to strive to remain informed on the many important issues affecting them. As has been referenced throughout the paper, the

Western world has proved to be less than truly informed and the model could more appropriately referred to as the Perception of Being Informed-Influence Theory, as there have many times over this period when the population got it wrong. There has been a requirement to maintain a true, free, and robust media and societies and indeed the world have seen the downsides of societies losing this focus, with the example given about the democratic pre-war Germany of the thirties and the cheerleading period surrounding the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

We have seen the perils of propaganda and the sometimes-present desire of governments to control the message, and as such the West must strive for this level of understanding on issues so that when they influence leaders and governments they do so with this understanding. This implies that there is an ever-present requirement to remain informed and the right to vote needs to be complemented with a requirement to remain truly informed. Human beings and their imperfections are very susceptible to manipulation as has been the case throughout the period analyzed. In many ways, apathy of a population is the most dangerous factor in the Western world. As the lack of universality evidences, highly developed Western democracies are far from perfect, but as the saying goes, “we always get the governments we deserve” so it is the population who must remained truly informed and must influence accordingly.

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