National Defence | Défense nationale

Canadian Forces College

Collège des Forces Canadiennes

THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE WITH PEACEKEEPING, PEACEMAKING AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

Major Steve Nolan

JCSP 38

Master of Defence Studies

Disclaimer

PCEMI 38

Maîtrise en études de la défense

Avertissement

Canada

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
JCSP 38 - PCEMI 38

MDS Research Paper

The Evolution of International Interventions: The Canadian Experience with

Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and the Responsibility to Protect.

By Maj Steve Nolan

CONTENTS

<u>Abstract</u>

Since the end of World War II, there have been numerous military interventions. Initially conducted under the authority of the United Nations, these interventions have evolved over time to include non-sanctioned interventions, interventions conducted by regional organizations like NATO. Understanding the historical changes of how international interventions are conducted and how the need for these changes came about is only part of the picture. It is equally important to understand the shift towards the pre-eminence of human security outlined by the responsibility to protect. International interventions must be judged on their efficacy. Therefore, the final section of this paper will examine how the human security agenda has been operationalized by examining three international military interventions Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Libya (2011) by how well the missions fit in to the Responsibility to Protect construct.

The evolution of peacekeeping to peacemaking was merely an attempt by the international community to make the military forces more robust. The reason for this response was simple, the United Nations and the international community as a whole believed that global security was a military problem that required a military solution. The United Nations envisioned a solution to the failings of traditional peacekeeping that would allow for the UN to retain both the firm respect for state sovereignty as well as the requirement for impartiality. Unfortunately, peacemaking proved equally insufficient to further the goal of international peace. Canada initially proposed a new way of framing this problem and the United Nations later implemented it. The Responsibility to Protect views the problem in human terms. It is not tied to geography, sovereignty nor would it seem to the impartiality considered tantamount by the United Nations in previous years. The focus is squarely placed on human security. Interventions will focus on the protection of human rights and the prevention of threats to human security. This third generation of peace operations outlined in the responsibility to protect doctrine offers a roadmap for furthering the goal of global peace.

"He may be justly hunted down, as the enemy of mankind, that can choose to snatch, by violence and bloodshed, what gentler means can equally obtain."

Samuel Johnson

Introduction

There has been a marked expansion in the number and scope of third party peacekeeping missions since the end of the cold war. There is a perception that peacekeeping is evolving from its traditional form into peacemaking and some would argue that in the post 9/11 world it has evolved further into outright intervention. In order to frame this question correctly, a careful examination of the reasons for this shift in peacekeeping will be conducted. The utility of peacemaking will be examined in order to determine if it holds more promise for achieving sustainable peace. The Responsibility to Protect doctrine will be reviewed to determine if this concept holds hope for the future.

The operational application of these concepts in international missions will give the examination the best understanding of how peace operations have evolved over the last 25 years. The international interventions in Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001) and Libya (2011) will provide operational examples as well as provide a timeline that can give an indication if these concepts have evolved over the past twelve years. As these concepts are examined, it will become apparent that in order to become more effective at furthering the cause of global human security, the United Nations has had to re-examine the concept of state sovereignty. As well, the UN has had to make hard choices about whether it should remain impartial during crises or whether it should sacrifice that impartiality in protecting human rights.

The first section of this paper will examine the traditional notion of peacekeeping. Establishing a historical starting point will provide a basis to make a comparison as to the

reasons for undertaking an intervention. Historically, peacekeeping was an impartial force placed in between two combatant forces. The combatant states that were involved were required to agree to this intervention. Historically, peacekeeping was focussed on the prevention of war. Either the resumption of hostilities or the spillover of war into neighbouring states was to be avoided. One proposed avenue of inquiry is whether or not Canada's peacekeeping policy evolved over this time frame and has this evolution been in step with international trends.

The second area is a matter of effectiveness. In the mid-1990s the efficacy of United Nations peace operations came into question. In determining whether or not peacekeeping missions had succeeded or failed the concept of sustainable peace was introduced. A sustainable peace, one that is lasting and would allow the peacekeeping force to withdraw, has been difficult to define. The UN spent a lot of effort determining how to achieve a sustainable peace and whether or not peacekeeping was the proper tool for this task. The key determinants of achieving sustainable peace by a third party intervention (UN, regional alliance, or ad hoc group of interested states) and the form of intervention that occur will be examined in order to develop a definition of sustainable peace.

The UN reformed the peacekeeping model by developing clearer mandates for the deployed military force. These mandates provided an exit strategy to the peacekeeping mission. An exit strategy is an attempt to codify the conditions that are required for success to be achieved. Essentially, the changes to from peacekeeping towards more of a peacemaking force were intended to re-invigorate peace operations and provide the international community a tool that could help create a more secure environment.

The viewpoint of the UN during these reforms began to change over the last decade. The UN began to see that the effects of war and perhaps not the war itself was where its efforts should be directed. What this means is that the focus began to be place more upon the humanitarian suffering that these was caused. If the focus becomes the people who suffer during a war, then understandably, the focus is removed from the sovereign states participating in the conflict. This is a key shift. In order to develop policies aimed at providing human security, then the UN's traditional respect of the rights of sovereign states and the UN's views about its own impartiality will come into question.

A study by Greig and Diehl, makes a comparison of peacekeeping and peacemaking and the likelihood that they lead to gaining a diplomatic agreement (one facet of sustainable peace). [1] Comparing this study to the findings of Mullenbach, who examines why certain missions are chosen by individual states and the international community, will lead to a better understanding of whether peacemaking is a more effective strategy than traditional peacekeeping. [2] Understanding what situations lend themselves to a higher probability of success. Another key work that will be examined is by Virginia Fortna. [3] She examines if peacekeeping in post-civil-war conflicts can lead to a durable peace. Using the results of Fortna, in light of the details about mission choice (Mullenbach) and whether it would be and effective peacemaking mission (Grieg and Diehl) will allow for a better understanding of the utility of peacemaking.

---

[1] Greig, J Michael, and Paul F. Diehl. "The Peacekeeping - Peacemaking Dilemma." *International Studies Quarterly* 49.4 (2005): 621-46.

[2] Mullenbach, Mark J. 'Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions.' *International Studies Quarterly* (2005) 49, 529–555.

[3] Fortna, Virginia Page. "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly* 48.2 (2004): 269-292.

The United Nations' International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) initially developed the Responsibility to Protect doctrine in 2001. This doctrine has been heavily debated throughout the decade and was eventually adopted by the United Nations. In 2009, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki Moon, in his report to the General Assembly on implementing the Responsibility to Protect outlines that "each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."[4] This codifies the belief that human rights supersede sovereignty rights. Initially proposed and supported largely by the efforts of the Canadian government, Responsibility to Protect deals with the broad spectrum of the global human security environment. The main thrust of the report is that each sovereign nation is charged with the responsibility of protecting the fundamental human rights of its citizens. A failure to protect these rights is the impetus for the international community to intervene and correct the injustice. The report's focus on prevention, scaled intervention -with military intervention as a last resort- and finally a re-building phase would leave one believing that this policy will lead to a more stable world. A careful analysis of this policy shows that this may not necessarily be the case. The main tenet of the intervention section is the list of guiding principles for potential military interventions. The Canadian experience with traditional peacekeeping and its post-cold war evolution towards larger more robust missions called peacemaking will be examined in the light of how the international community and specifically the United Nations attempted to create a more stable international system. In turn, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine was developed out of the perceived failures of

---

[4] United Nations. 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly. *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General*.(New York: United Nations, 2009): 1.

the international community's ability to react to grave incidents of human rights abuses. A careful analysis of the Responsibility to Protect will give a better understanding of the difficulties facing international security by showing the where the operational implementation of this doctrine may create de-stabilizing factors as it attempts to create greater levels of human security. There is a need to understand Canada's international intervention policy in order to determine if the responsibility to Protect is an efficient vehicle to be used in helping to secure a place for Canada in the international security landscape.

Understanding the historical changes of how international interventions are conducted and how the need for these changes came about is only part of the part of the picture. It is equally important to understand the shift towards the pre-eminence of human security outlined by the responsibility to protect. International interventions must be judged on their efficacy. Therefore, the final section of this paper will examine how the human security agenda has been operationalized by examining three international military interventions Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Libya (2011) by how well the missions fit in to the Responsibility to Protect construct.

The evolution of peacekeeping to peacemaking is merely an attempt by the international community to make the military forces more robust. The reason for this response is simple, the United Nations and the international community as a whole believed that global security was a military problem that required a military solution. The United Nations envisioned a solution to the failings of traditional peacekeeping that would allow for the UN to retain both the firm respect for state sovereignty as well as the requirement for impartiality. Unfortunately, peacemaking proved equally insufficient to

further the goal of international peace. Canada initially proposed a new way of framing this problem and the United Nations later implemented it. The Responsibility to Protect views the problem in human terms. It is not tied to geography, sovereignty nor would it seem, to the impartiality considered tantamount by the United Nations in previous years. The focus is squarely placed on human security. Interventions will focus on the protection of human rights and the prevention of threats to human security. These peace operations outlined in the responsibility to protect doctrine offer a roadmap for furthering the goal of global peace.

This paper will show that the Responsibility to Protect has had a profound effect on the United Nations by placing human security above all of the other fundamental guiding principles including the rights of the sovereign member states and of the UN's need to remain impartial in the international community.

Chapter 2

Historical Precedents and the Reasons for Change

Peacekeeping for the purpose of this study, can be defined simply as military personnel deployed by one or more third party state under the auspices of a regional or global organization into a conflict or post conflict situation for the purpose of preventing the resumption of military hostilities between two parties and or for creating an environment conducive for negotiations.[5]

David M. Last argues that the aim of peacekeeping is to establish a just and stable peace. It is the "prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers."[6] Last's view is consistent with the mid-nineties view that peacekeeping is very military-centric. The focus of peacekeeping is a wholly military action that separately intends to set the conditions for peace by curbing hostility. This view is quite similar to the formative period of peacekeeping in Canada. Prior to the 1964 Defence White Paper[7] there was no official Canadian peacekeeping role for the military nor were there any foreign policy peacekeeping objectives. This changed in 1964 when peacekeeping was included as a military role. Canada had participated in peacekeeping missions (Suez, Congo etc.) without this policy. However, peacekeeping was seen by Canada and the international community as a means to help keep the major powers apart and thus prevent direct

---

[5] Mullenbach, Mark J. 'Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions.' *International Studies Quarterly* (2005) 49, 529
[6] Last, David M. "Peacekeeping Doctrine and Conflict Resolution Techniques." *Armed Forces & Society* 22.2 (1995): 187.
[7] Rod B. Byers "Peacekeeping and Canadian Defence Policy: Ambivalence and Uncertainty". In H. Wiseman (ed.) *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*, Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1983, pp. 130-156

conflict that could cause another world war. Of note, however, is that in 1965 the United

Nations 'Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations' failed to establish guidelines

or principles for peacekeeping.[8] Interestingly, during a similar time period, Canadian

public opinion voiced a sense of the futility about the inability to secure peace by the UN

peacekeeping mission in the Suez. Peacekeeping was not seen to be successful, yet the

international community Canada included, continued to engage in peacekeeping

operations, and participate in the debate about peacekeeping within the United Nations.

A pattern begins to emerge when the perceived utility of peacekeeping is

compared to the defence policies of the 70's. The 1971 White Paper reaffirmed

Peacekeeping as a distinct role[9] and the Defence Force Structure review of 1974

confirmed it by noting Canada's participation in missions in Vietnam (ICSC), Lebanon

(UNIFIL) and Egypt (UNEF II) in order to give reason for future expenditures. This was

done despite the government's reservations about peacekeeping. In a speech to the UN

general assembly in 1974,[10] Canada expressed its displeasure at the inability of

peacekeeping to do anything other than maintain the status quo. This period of

peacekeeping occurred after the end of the Vietnam War while there was strong public

opinion against military expenditures, yet Canada's forces were more engaged in

Peacekeeping missions than they were during the sixties.

Byers shows a clear gap between Canadian policy and peacekeeping actions

however, he does not go far enough in determining the cause for this gap. Byers'

suggestion that Canada might be an example to other countries looking to link

---

[8] Rod B. Byers "Peacekeeping and Canadian Defence Policy: Ambivalence and Uncertainty". In H.
Wiseman (ed.) *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*, (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1983): 186.
[9] Ibid. 186.
[10] Ibid. 188.

peacekeeping to international policy appears weak because the policy came while peacekeeping missions were already well underway. Taking this into consideration, it seems as if Canada has made a choice at times to use peacekeeping in order to justify its international engagement and at other times to justify its domestic defence spending.

During the period of 1967 –1974 Canadians did not see peacekeeping as a method to create lasting international security. However, successive Canadian Defence policy documents support peacekeeping in light of ongoing deep reductions in military personnel and capabilities.[11] This divergence of action from policy would indicate that the real policy of Canada was to under-support peacekeeping. Using this snapshot of the origins of Canadian peacekeeping policy and practice and holding it up to other global examples of the period should indicate if there is an international trend.

A distinct similarity emerges when the Canadian example is compared to that of the United Nations. During this period the UN had no mention of peacekeeping in its charter, there was no definition, criteria, composition, nor were there any guidelines for when to implement a peacekeeping operation.[12] Yet, throughout the same period numerous peacekeeping missions were conducted. These missions, many of which Canada was a participant, continued within the traditional definition of peacekeeping well into the mid-1990's. When the cold war ended the typical threat of vetoing Peacekeeping missions within the UN Security Council was removed and many more missions occurred. Originally perceived to be an excellent opportunity to finally make a concerted effort towards international security it quickly changed the perception of peacekeeping of

---

[11] Specifically the cuts were in the Army, which is the main force generator of peacekeepers and peacekeeping missions.
[12] Guehenno, Jean-Marie. "On the Challenges and Achievements of Reforming UN Peace Operations." *International Peacekeeping* vol. 9 issue 2 (2002): 69.

many. The difficulties and the outright failures of the missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and especially Somalia caused the international community to re-think the traditional nature of peacekeeping.

In response to this, the UN commissioned The Brahimi Report, which was to address peacekeeping and make recommendations for change. In examining the mission in Somalia, it determined that failure was, in part, caused by a lack of a clear mandate that included long-term goals. The report called for an end to half-measures and recommended that serious peacemaking efforts are necessary in order to transform a cease-fire into a durable and lasting peace settlement. [13]

The Brahimi report concluded that United Nations peacekeeping operations had for too long been used by member nations as a means to be seen to be "doing something" in the face of public outcry, especially in complex situations where the will to do the right thing was lacking.[14] Canada should include itself within the group that exhibited this trait of under-supporting missions which lacked the required focussed efforts to bring about a lasting peace. The Brahimi report found that peacemaking would be effective if the UN would strengthen its abilities to plan, deploy, manage and sustain a peacekeeping operation. The key factor that needed strengthening – a predictive capability, able to determine in the early stages of conflict if peacemaking would become necessary- is lacking in the Brahimi report. The UN traditionally shied away from intelligence

---

[13] Gray, Christine. "Peacekeeping After the *Brahimi Report*: Is there a Crisis of Credibility for the UN?" *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 6.2 (2001): 267-88

[14] Guehenno, Jean-Marie. "On the Challenges and Achievements of Reforming UN Peace Operations." *International Peacekeeping,* 9.2 (2002): 73.

gathering[15] for fear of diminishing its international impartiality. This will be examined in the third section of this paper.

We have seen that peacekeeping evolved out of a policy void and only received the half-hearted endorsement of individual states and of the UN. This un-focused approach is believed by many to have been the root cause of the failures of peacekeeping in the mid-nineties. The change towards peacemaking forces with strong mandates, large military forces, and clear exit strategies should bring greater success to the international community in its efforts to end conflicts and increase international stability.

---

[15] Dorn, A. W. "The Cloak and the Blue Beret: Limitations on Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping." *International Journal of Intelligence & Counterintelligence,* vol. 12 issue 4 (1999): 415.

Chapter 3

Defining Success- Mandates and Exit Strategies

The prescription to fix the United Nation's peace-building capacity tended to deal with how peacekeeping could be conducted better, yet the question of when to begin a peace operation still remains. There are generally understood to be four phases of conflict. A peacemaking mission can commence prior to the outbreak of violence, during active combat, following a cease-fire or after an effective peace agreement has been signed.[16] In the past, in order to protect its impartiality as well as to continue to ascribe to a Whestphalian state sovereignty system, the UN would habitually wait until a diplomatic peace settlement had been put in place before considering an intervention. These actions led to severe criticism of the United Nations as the change to peacemaking was made in order to address these issues. As outlined in Green et al, the size of missions and the overall number of peacekeepers has greatly increased. [17]

In the Brahimi report, increasing the size and improving the organization of peacemaking forces were both recommendations. Another key recommendation was to develop a clear mandate for each peace operation. A clear mandate will have concise and achievable objectives that are intended to lead towards peace. A mandate will allow the planners to task-tailor a military force that can achieve these objectives. So an effective mandate was seen to be the crucial ingredient that would lead to success.[18]

---

[16] Greig, J Michael, and Paul F. Diehl. "The Peacekeeping - Peacemaking Dilemma." *International Studies Quarterly* 49.4 (2005): 622.

[17] Green, David Michael, Chad Kahl, and Paul F. Diehl. "Predicting the Size of UN Peacekeeping Operations." *Armed Forces & Society* 24.4 (1998): 487.

[18] United States General Accounting Office Report on Implementing International Peace Operations, GAO-02-707R, Washington DC, (25 May 2002): 2.

A study by Albert Legault and Manon Tessier, entitled *The International Debate*, turns the discussion towards reform of the United Nations as the best way to increase the utility of peacekeeping. Institutional, organizational and incremental reforms are all examined with the overall aim of making peacekeeping more effective. One conclusion is that "the UN will improve its peacekeeping capability …if the mandates of operations are clarified"[19] This point adds little to the UN reform debate. A key absence in the recommendations about the requirement for a predictive capacity or about the conditions required for a peacemaking operation to be considered a success.

Although these structural and organizational changes helped define a better force for peace-making they concentrated on how to conduct this task and not why or when to conduct this task. In developing the future of peace operations, attempts were made to define success. Unfortunately, large order concepts such as lasting and sustainable peace that are hard to measure were set out as objectives. Nation-rebuilding and providing security to enable the nation to conduct elections was also common tasks within new peace-making mandates.

These initial attempts to define success led to the concept of the exit-strategy. An exit strategy is essentially a short definition of the conditions that must be met before a military intervention or peace operation can be terminated. This concept served many purposes. Participating nations were able to gain their citizen's support for a mission with an exit strategy to limit costs and to outline when soldiers can return to their home nations. The development of exit strategy helped to address the tendency to under-support mentioned earlier by giving the public an understanding of when the military

---

[19] Albert Legault & Manon Tessier, *Canada and Peacekeeping: Three Major Debates*, Clemensport, (Halifax: The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Institute, 1999) :22.

commitment would end. Second, it helped focus the mission by keeping it on track towards the time when it could finish.

However, the concept of an exit-strategy has several flaws. The term is not congruent with military operations and only made its way into the peace operations vernacular post-Somalia.[20] The military problem with a published exit-strategy which is included in the peacekeeping force's mandate is that it will give an advantage to those that wish to see the mission fail or for those that wish to see the mission remain for extended periods of time. Elements, within a country with an ongoing intervention, may profit financially from the re-building efforts that are being undertaken and would thus seek to prolong the mission. Conversely, as can be seen currently in Afghanistan, the announcement of an exit strategy that has an end date is like labelling the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with a "best before date" that enables Taliban leadership to develop strategies for when ISAF departs.

The second problem with an exit strategy is that it does not allow for a flexible response to changes as they occur. The ability to respond to large changes within the mission is essential for success and the research conducted on the UN mission in Namibia by Lise Howard bears this out. It was the ability of the peace-building mission "UNTAG to adapt to the needs of the post-war environment in Namibia that was the critical factor sealing the stable Namibian peace."[21] Although intended to help develop greater mission focus and thus increase the likelihood of success, the concept of the "exit-strategy" only highlights the inability of the international community to develop an understanding of what constitutes an effective peace-making success. The inability to understand this

---

[20] Rose, Gideon. "The Exit Strategy Delusion." *Foreign Affairs* 77.1 (1998): 57.
[21] Howard, Lise Morjé. "UN Peace Implementation in Namibia: The Causes of Success." International Peacekeeping 9.1 (2002): 99

concept is not from lack of trying, it is merely indicative that the effort is not in the right area. Instead of trying to define success it should develop a mechanism to detect, define, and analyse the threat to peace.

In dealing with peacemaking in the post-Brahimi report era, Theo Farrell analyses several peacekeeping missions in order to determine the causes of their failures[22] He identifies this style of peace-making as conducting a 'war of choice.' Traditionally, when a country has waged war it has been because it has perceived a distinct threat to its national interests and understandably that war will be fought until that threat is neutralized. Participation in a war of choice is subject to debate, as are the ultimate goals of the war. In a war of choice inevitable questions will arise about the necessity of the war, how early does one enter a war of choice, how is mission success defined, and when can the public see its sons and daughters return home.

It is ironic that some of the peacekeeping mission failures of the 1990's have been attributed to the lack of an exit strategy. Developing exit strategies for current missions has proven quite difficult and achieving those objectives has proven even more difficult. Interventions are wars of choice and that is why they are subject to the effects described by catch phrases such as 'body-bag effect' and 'CNN effect.'[23] What is missing is the exploration of the effects of a country's reluctance to participate in a war of choice as a condition that degrades the utility of a peacekeeping mission. The traditional understanding is that an ineffective peace operation causes a lack of public support, while it may actually be that the lack of public support that causes an ineffective peace operation.

---

[22] Theo Farrell, "Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations" In John Baylis et al, *Strategy in the Contemporary World. A Introduction to Strategic Studies*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2005) 289.
[23] Ibid. 296.

Often times public support is garnered for a peacekeeping mission because the situation in question is deemed to be a 'threat against peace,' which is a direct quote from Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Johnny Holloway explores the notion of 'threat' in *The Changing Nature of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions and the Transformation of State Sovereignty.* Holloway uses his examination of the interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo to illustrate that the definition of 'threat against peace' is evolving. UN interventions are changing because of the new normative structure that a 'threat against peace' might possibly be the internal abuse of power[24] within a sovereign state. This intra-state conflict is in addition to the problems that arise when a country becomes a 'failed state' that has been the domain of the UN in the past. The changing nature of what constitutes a threat opens a myriad of questions. These questions are not only about the universal applicability of this policy but of how threats are perceived by individual states. Simply put, when does the 'war of choice' become a war of necessity because of the evolving definition of threat?

The international viewpoint changed somewhat and adhered to more defined mandates in order to explicitly outline to peacekeeping forces exactly what was needed for the mission to be considered successful. However, as the fidelity of these mandates expands in detail, the ability to achieve that success becomes more and more difficult. The problems of peacekeeping missions and the perceived lack of ability to apply military force were seen to have been fixed by increasing the size of the force, when in reality it just increased the size of the problem. In response to peacekeeping's

---

[24] Johnny Holloway "The Changing Nature of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions and the Transformation of State Sovereignty" Prepared for Presentation at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California August 30th—Sept 2, 2001, 28.

shortcomings, deployed forces were increased in size and their mandate was made more robust. The UN could make this adjustment without violating its core values of respecting sovereignty and remaining impartial. Viewing the problem strictly as a military issue, the UN could apply a simple military solution –larger and more robust forces without having to adjust any of its core values. However, the problem is not actually a military problem and thus the UN's solution suffered the same poor outcomes that the peacekeeping forces suffered.

Perhaps it is not the exit strategy or the size of the force, but how the problem is defined that has led to peacekeeping's inability to create peace. If only certain types of interventions are attempted then that may skew the results. All of the variables such as regional actors, degree of violence, duration of conflict prior to intervention etc. affect the decision to intervene.

In any endeavour to solve a problem, that problem must first be defined. The need and parameters of a peacekeeping mission can be defined with an accurate and thorough examination of the threat. Once the threat is understood then definition of success becomes easier, simply eliminate that threat. Perception of the threat and popular support for engaging in a 'war of choice' is also facilitated when the threat is clear and well understood. The waters only get murky when the threat is ill defined.

Canada for its part has made a significant contribution to the world of peacekeeping. The Canadian sponsored UN position, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), is one such attempt to define the threat in general terms. It is in this key area – the definition of what constitutes a threat to peace- R2P may hold some key answers.

Chapter 4

The Responsibility to Protect

In the UN Secretary General's report, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, the concepts of; determining when an intervention is justified; authorization of the mission; and, scope of the intervention are outlined. It is clearly stated in Responsibility to Protect that a military intervention is the last option to be considered. However the following three key reasons indicate that adopting this policy may mean that t that military interventions will increase vice the stated intent of only using them as a last resort. First, the historical precedents of how sovereign nations interact with each other in a self-interested way have created friction. If the current system of non-intervention and the sovereign rights of nations is weakened by Responsibility to Protect, then more friction will occur, the opposite of the intent of this policy.

Second, the prescriptive flaws in the policy, specifically lack of available, efficient, and acceptable prevention mechanisms as well as the onerous approval process for these types of non-military interventions will lead to situations where a downward spiralling human security concern cannot be stopped because of slow administration and ineffectual reactions from the international community and its governing bodies. This will in turn devolve into a situation where only a military intervention can ameliorate the humanitarian concerns. The occurrence of more military interventions and the strains on the international system of sovereignty would mean greater international instability that may affect the human security environment.

Third, there is a need in these cases for a complete regime change in order for the cessation and prevention of further humanitarian abuses. Although Responsibility to

Protect states that only a minimum amount of intervention will be attempted to correct the humanitarian transgressions, the fact of the matter is that if a nation has forfeited its sovereignty because it has not adhered to the UN humanitarian standards and is subsequently subject to a military intervention then that country will require a completely new governance structure. Taking all of these factors in to account, it is clear that the International community as well as Canadian foreign policy support military intervention on the basis of stopping human rights abuses through the Responsibility to Protect doctrine will skew the issue of military intervention from a force of last resort to a force of choice. This section will seek to analyze the Canadian policy in the context of the Responsibility to Protect, examine the historical precedents leading to this position, and determine the policy implications for Canada as it furthers the Responsibility to Protect doctrine in the international community.

It is important to understand the tension between Responsibility to Protect and how it affects the sovereignty of nations. Essentially, Responsibility to Protect can be seen as a natural evolution in international relations and has significant historical support in both policy and convention. The idea of international governance in the field of human rights is by no means new. Thomas Gillespie establishes a timeline that includes the treaty of Westphalia as a supporting document for addressing the human security agenda. This treaty is a document that is used to uphold the non-interventionist sovereignty of nation's concept of international relations by establishing the modern nation state system. However, the underlying intent of the Treaty of Westphalia was to "to protect specific groups within states from inhuman treatment"[25] This is the initial development of international standards governing internal state jurisdiction and viewed with the abolition

---

[25] Gillespie, Thomas R. "Unwanted Responsibility." *Peace & Change*, Jul93, Vol. 18 Issue 3, 225.

of the slave trade by nineteenth century treaties, the prescription for the treatment of war related human suffering by the Geneva Convention of 1864 and other such agreements form a nascent trend towards human security importance.

The idea that human rights can be legislated across borders by international convention has historical precedent. Illustrated by the operation of the United Nations, which has "generated more than fifty formal human rights statements is evidence of a general belief in human rights principles among its membership"[26]
Although the international community has long held a belief that human rights should be protected, it has often relied on individual states to self-regulate their behaviour. Intervening in the internal affairs of another sovereign state for the sole purpose of ameliorating a human rights injustice is a relatively new concept. A humanitarian intervention which conceivably can include any diplomatically coercive action by one state or a group of states upon another state, is an action aimed at changing the domestic behaviour of the targeted state "in order to remedy mass and flagrant violations of the basic human rights of foreign nationals by their government." [27]

The Responsibility to Protect puts forth the idea that the predictive analysis abilities of the international community need to be improved, expanded and more widely employed in order to identify threats to human security as early as possible. This is easily stated but would become very difficult in practise for several reasons. First, the countries that are conducting the prediction and analysis have to conduct these actions in a completely non-biased manner. Second, the international community would have to see

---

[26] Ibid. 232.
[27] Donnelly, Jack. "Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign Policy: Law, Morality, and Politics." *Journal of International Affairs*, Winter84, Vol. 37 Issue 2, 311.

the analysis and recommendation for an intervention as correct and bereft of any economic or political benefit to the nation conducting the analysis and requesting the intervention as well, any intelligence gathering capability that the UN has is completely dwarfed by many members of the international community.[28] Last, the country that is potentially being analyzed would have to allow this action to occur in the first place. This initial act of a sovereign nation giving up some degree of its sovereignty to allow predictive analysis or inspection is not likely to occur in many cases. Even the ICISS report acknowledges this as a hurdle to its proposal. Countries "are becoming reluctant to accept any internationally endorsed preventative measures at all- even of the softest and most supportive kind." The fear is that any action carried out by foreign entities or international bodies whether they are prescriptive measures for reform or encompass inspections by international teams will lead not to less interference by the international community but to more interference and may begin down the slippery slope to intervention.[29]

In order for the Responsibility to Protect to reach its full potential, the predictive portion of the doctrine needs to be worked out. The international communities' ability to identify and analyze the existence of weapons that pose a large threat to humanity have given a good example of just how weak and malleable the prediction and analysis aspect of international relations really are. The current international mood and the general opposition to intervention because of the United States' invasion and occupation of Iraq, will remain a hurdle for the Responsibility to Protect and how likely it is to be fully

---

[28] Dorn, A. W. "The Cloak and the Blue Beret: Limitations on Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping." *International Journal of Intelligence & Counterintelligence,* vol. 12 issue 4 (1999): 414.
[29] ICISS Report Chap3 Sect 34

implemented by the international community. The prediction section of the Responsibility to Protect report remains the weakest portion. A greater examination of the predictive abilities and Responsibility to Protect's reliance on them need to be completed. The lack of credible international predictive abilities will continue to be a hurdle to the success of Responsibility to Protect.

The United Nations report by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change proposed a suite of preventative measures designed to stop human rights abuses by garnering international awareness and then support for a spectrum of preventative measures including in extreme cases, military intervention.[30] A recurring theme throughout the various UN reports supporting the Responsibility to Protect, is the genocide experienced by the people of Rwanda. The call for effective response by the international community gains real momentum as a result of the genocide in Rwanda. It was seen that the United Nations Security Council were aware of the intention of certain Rwandan officials connected to the government had concrete plans to commit genocide. The UNSC was also aware of some credible strategies and mitigating actions that could have been used to prevent or lessen the genocide that happened but "the Security Council refused to take the necessary action. That was a failure of international will."[31]

The Responsibility to Protect uses this example to develop a model on how the international community should act towards countries that have or are appended to have a grave human rights situation within its borders. The committee determined a broad spectrum of intervention. The tools available to the international community include

---

[30] United Nations. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.* (New York: United Nations, 2004): 38.
[31] ICISS Report, Chap 1 Sect 1

economic inducements as well as economic sanctions. As well development assistance in the fields of governance, human rights and the rule of law may also be used and in extreme cases "prevention can also involve the preventative deployment of military assets/ troops to mitigate or staunch and ongoing crisis."[32] These types of mission are seen to be preventative measures designed to avert a possible conscience-shocking event or series of events. The Responsibility to Protect doctrine sees prevention as the primary effort.

Even though the Responsibility to Protect goes into detail about how prevention must be the focus of the international community and how a military intervention can only be used as a last resort, the majority of doctrine is made up of the Principles for Military intervention. The amount of attention the document pays to military intervention belies its stated intent of concentrating on prediction and non-military intervention. The real focus of the report is the use of a military intervention to stop extreme cases of human rights abuses. Understandably, military interventions –be they for humanitarian or economic reasons- are the pre-eminent topic of international relations. The main thrust of Responsibility to Protect can be seen in the four principles for military intervention. These principles include the just cause threshold, the precautionary principles, the concept of the right authority, and finally the operational principles that define how military missions should be conducted.

The just cause threshold is what appears to be the primary decision making consideration for the use of military force in a humanitarian mission. It explains the

---

[32] "Canadian Non-Paper on The Responsibility to Protect and the Evolution of the United Nations' Peace and Security Mandate: Submission to the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change." Foreign Affairs Canada, April 2004. http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada_un/HLP_submission-en.asp

boundaries of what types of actions constitute crimes that would warrant a military intervention to be considered. In order to invoke the just cause threshold,

> there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind: large scale loss of life, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large scale ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.[33]

Although no one would argue with the large-scale loss of life portion, some may have concerns with the section that includes the states in ability to act. If a state suffered a large-scale loss of life, even though there was no genocidal intent and the state was unable to respond to the aftermath of the crisis this state may be open to an intervention by a predatory neighbour or regional group. In a related vein, the use of the term apprehended gives a lot of room for interpretation. It is in line with the attempt to prevent these crimes but it could be subverted by any number of international or non-state actors to bring about a change of government or the like. Although these scenarios are seemingly farfetched, they are used to illustrate the fact that Responsibility to Protect is perhaps taking away some of the key factors that keep the international system of law working. Responsibility to Protect may make the world of international relations even more difficult. The intent of Responsibility to Protect is to ameliorate human suffering throughout the globe. If it creates more instances of chaos and strife by breaking down the norms of international law and giving some justification to the predatory actions of certain states then it may find itself doing more harm than good despite the best intentions of the policy.

---

[33] ICISS Report Chap 4, Sect 19

Interventions because of a state's inability to act or because of an appended threat expand the current list of possible missions for international military interventions. An expanded list of qualifying scenarios may lead to an increase in military interventions. Canadian Defence policy outlined in the 1994 Defence White Paper indicates that Canada will support military intervention into 'failed states' although the type of support is a little vague. The policy uses the term 'humanitarian' generally only for disaster type missions and offers up medical and engineering resources for short-term humanitarian efforts. However, it does give an indication that the Canadian Forces could be deployed for missions that "address genuine threats to international peace and security (as for example in the Former Yugoslavia) or emerging humanitarian tragedies (such as the situations in Rwanda)."[34] Canada's military policy has been supportive of the preventative aspects of Responsibility to Protect and because of the enlarged list of possible missions –including humanitarian intervention- has seen its number of deployments increase significantly since this policy was first proposed. The increase in military interventions carried out by the Canadian Forces (including Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya) in the years following the end of the Cold War, is an indication that the Responsibility to Protect has changed how the international community views human security and because of this change the number and scope of military interventions may increase in the future.

Responsibility to Protect has developed four principles used to caution decision makers when an intervention is being considered. These precautionary principles are the right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects. The right intention states that the military intervention must be completely about humanitarian rights and have no benefits –economic, political, or otherwise- to the intervening force. It

---

[34] Chapter 6 1994, White Paper

goes on to state that a multilateral operation that is supported by regional opinion is the best way to assure that the intervention adheres to the principle of 'right intention.'

Ironically, this then supports a regional organization authorizing and conducting a military intervention. Regional power bases, often dominated by a dominant state can subvert this policy to achieve their own regional goals.[35] Local interests and bias will have a negative effect on a human security intervention. This policy is contrary to what the Responsibility to Protect states in a subsequent section that deals with the authority to approve such missions. These competing sub-sections of the policy serve to add more room for debate adding possible delays to the approval process and possibly allowing the concept to be subverted for national interests.

The final principle, the principle of proportional means, explains how the military force must be the minimum size necessary to achieve a reversal in the human rights transgression it was sent to correct. The scale of the force and the length of the intervention are again open to debate. An analysis of the Responsibility to Protect report shows that any country that would require an intervention has failed in its responsibilities to its citizens and is therefore a 'failed state'. This extension could both broaden the definition of failed state as well as require that any military intervention stop at nothing less than a complete regime change. This interpretation of the policy would lead to larger and longer deployments of military forces.

Forcing or engineering change may represent the Achilles heel of the intervention for human rights policy. Even the best reconstruction policy or plan does not account for the huge cultural and normative changes that are required for an enduring

---

[35] Walter Dorn. "Regional Peacekeeping is Not the Way." *Peacekeeping & International Relations* vol. 27 issue 3 (1998): 1.

peace and the entrenchment of the human rights that initiated the intervention and are now trying to be protected. The precautionary principle entitled, 'reasonable prospects' outlines a seemingly obvious concept that the military intervention should first have a reasonable chance of success and that the intervention should not cause consequences greater than the intervention is try to stop. If there will be a greater use of military forces with bigger and larger forces deployed for regime change and re-building, the caveat of reasonable prospects may mean that only the really easy missions will be attempted in the future. Conversely, this may mean that the really dire cases can be discounted as not falling within the 'reasonable prospects' envelope and thus never receive the international community's attention at all.

Alluded to earlier, the 'right authority' principle, a proposed approval process is laid out for potential military interventions. Internationally the only recognized entity for the authorization of a military intervention in support of human security is the United Nations Security Council, and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine seeks to strengthen the UNSC. However, "The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work better than it has."[36] Even though it appears to support the UN process, the policy really spells out a recipe for reform and then goes so far as to say that if the UN Security Council does not support a proposed action to relieve human suffering then, "concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation."[37] The tacit approval of how states are justified in acting without the consent of the United Nations Security Council is

---

[36] ICISS Report, Chap 8 Sect2

[37] Canadian Non-Paper on The Responsibility to Protect and the Evolution of the United Nations' Peace and Security Mandate: Submission to the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change," Foreign Affairs Canada, (April 2004).

problematic for two reasons. First relates to progressive nature of interventions encouraged by the Responsibility to Protect. Measures undertaken by the international community tend to flow towards a military intervention, generally starting with much lesser measures such as monetary inducements, sanctions, and escalating to the threat of military intervention. This progression may take a significant amount of time. That amount of time combined with the arduous approval process of the UN, acknowledged by the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, would lead one to be believe that by the time a conscience-shocking event such as genocide or ethnic cleansing is believed to be imminent the UN approval response time will be so long into the event that by the time it actually occurs, military intervention will be the most likely, and perhaps the only option that is left available to the international community. Canadian Defence Policy is surprisingly supportive of this and in a very prescient way, has supported this policy for quite some time. The 1994 White Paper states that the military could be deployed for "the protection of civilian populations and refugees, national reconstruction, upholding international law and opposing aggression."[38] The Canada First Defence strategy of June 2010 echoes this sentiment and indicates that Canada is prepared to deploy military forces in support of international organizations such as the United Nations to conduct a range of missions from "humanitarian missions to stability operations…"[39] The ongoing support for military intervention by governments such as Canada, lend credence to the notion that the number of international interventions will increase over time.

A second problem encountered when adhering to the Responsibility to Protect doctrine is that there is no time stipulated between the request to the UN and when a

---

[38] 1994 White Paper on Defence
[39] 2010 Canada First Defence Strategy

nation or group can act on its own, as was the case with the Kosovo intervention. In cases of humanitarian intervention a mere appeal to the UN on day one and then an armed intervention on day two can occur with the injunction that 'lives were at stake' as the rationale. This is another instance of how this doctrine's noble principles can be subverted. The problem is not that this policy can be subverted, it is recognized that all policies can be, the core issue is that it opens the justification of military actions up for debate yet again, based on the age old arguments of self-interest versus peace and order in international relations. The fact that Responsibility to Protect does not address this aspect, may make it no better than the current system of international order. However, it is likely that Responsibility to Protect may severely weaken the current –albeit limited- system of international order centred on the United Nations and replace it with a system where regional groupings, nations, and even non-state actors can theoretically justify any of their actions using the policy.

The approval process for an intervention is so lengthy and complex that once a potentially conscience-shocking event is identified the time available for prevention is limited and thus an intervention will again be the more likely course of action. Conversely, the extended approval timelines in situations such as this may relegate the international community to a more punitive role, using the international court vice a preventative role using predictive and less-than military inventions in order to further the cause of human security. It many cases the impetus driving the international community's decision to intervene has not coalesced into action and "its efforts have been too late, its mandate insufficient, and its resources and commitment lacking."[40]

---

[40] Axworthy, Lloyd. "Human Rights," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. 66 Issue 19(July 2000): 580.

In the post intervention country, there will be a need to implement a system of governance to replace the regime that allowed the human rights violations in the first place, much like the intervention in Libya. This theoretically will lead to greater global stability. Along with the cultural problems that re-building a nation entails there also exists the problem of whether or not the coalition or regional actor that is conducting the re-building is doing so for no economic, military, or political gain. The reality is that nations will act in their self-interest and that will always bring questions about the justification of the intervention in the first place, especially if it means greater economic gains from rebuilding contract or by trade agreements. Countries will only engage in an intervention if there is some gain for them in the long run, more specifically "the threshold of pain for states undertaking humanitarian intervention in which their national interests are not substantially involved will be low."[41] Analysis of the rebuilding section of Responsibility to Protect indicates that the only interventions that will occur are not the ones based on humanitarian need but the ones that satisfy another country's greed. Countries that offer no economic or political gain for the intervener are not likely to gain the necessary support to allow a full Responsibility to Protect style intervention and rebuilding effort. Responsibility to Protect states that it does not aim to conduct regime change but to aim its policies specifically at the human rights problems. This view is somewhat short-sighted because "in the past intervention for humanitarian purposes were targeted at a specific behaviour, the new objective must be to replace the offending regime."[42] This is what it truly means when it is said that a country loses it right to

---

[41] Ayoob, Mohammed. "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty." *International Journal of Human Rights* Vol. 6 No.1 (Spring 2002): 83

[42] Gillespie, Thomas R. "Unwanted Responsibility." *Peace & Change*, Jul 93, Vol. 18 Issue 3, :219

sovereignty when it engages in human rights abuses. Rebuilding cannot be completed unless a future stable environment where human rights are protected is created. In turn this environment cannot be created unless the regime that was responsible for the human rights transgressions or the governance structure that was unable to prevent the aforementioned crimes is removed. Again this means a larger military force, a greater commitment by the international community in terms of resources and an increase in time for these interventions in order to affect some aspect of required regime change.

The Responsibility to Protect doctrine that focusses on military intervention gives a prescription on how military interventions should be conducted, the types of missions that should be undertaken and the operational constraints that should be placed upon the forces conducting the intervention. One of the key principles that the Responsibility to Protect report tries to put forth is that;
"…the objective being the protection of a population, not the defeat of the state."[43]

As shown earlier, this objective is contradictory to many of the other key aspects of the Responsibility to Protect. Countries that warrant a human rights intervention have essentially given up their right to be treated as a sovereign nation. Under the program prescribed for these countries every effort would have been attempted to prevent a crime against humanity before a long-term military intervention and regime change would occur. Missions that are not solely about military objectives but concern themselves with the macro view supporting real change that allows for future stability. Again it is seen that the somewhat idealistic intentions of Responsibility to Protect cannot

---

[43] ICISS Report Chap 8 sec 8

be physically replicated in the real world without some definite changes, the implicit need for regime change once an intervention has begun is only one example of this.

The rebuilding policy put forth by Responsibility to Protect is essentially a sound concept for moving towards a more stable world where human rights is brought to the forefront of how to achieve global security. It does however suffer some failings when the policy is analyzed. The fact that countries will be seen to be acting a self-serving way regardless of their true motivations will give cause for suspicion and approval problems when an intervention is proposed. Secondly, the need for a complete regime change once an intervention is undertaken. Finally, the subtle shift to the responsibility to protect in not only domestic but also international affairs and the subsequent increase in interventions this will bring. All of these concerns are limiting factors for the successful implementation of Responsibility to Protect.

The subtle change of responsibility to protect would seemingly be an evolution towards international security. However, if the international community is responsible to protect human rights globally, then this can only result in a dramatic increase in military interventions and a further strain on international order. The traditional notion of peacekeeping seemed to serve the world well, however as it was used as the panacea for instability in the post-cold war era many of its flaws were exposed. The distinct lack of military capability, weak organizational abilities and the increasingly complex situations that peacekeeping was being used for signaled that the traditional concept of peacekeeping needed to change. It was thought that if these weaknesses were changed then success would follow. Unfortunately, making a military organization stronger does

nothing to developing an understanding of the nature of neither the conflict nor how to return a country to a state of peaceful existence.

Peacemaking, was not an evolution towards a more secure world, it merely applied greater amounts of resources to the same problem in the same fashion. It is not surprising then that the result of peacemaking is the same as peacekeeping. Strengthening the military mandate of these forces was still approaching the problem from the wrong angle. A more thorough understanding of the threat to peace, and of analysing that threat would naturally lead to an accurate definition of success and would not become tied down by inflexible 'exit-strategies' Other benefits to this approach would be a better predictive ability of when a threat to peace would reach a critical level that required the reaction of the international community.

Responsibility to Protect seeks to avoid an increase to interventions by stressing that the international community must develop better predictive abilities allowing for corrective action to be initiated sooner. This policy would be very difficult to implement. The current predictive capabilities are quite weak, and there isn't any impetus for the international community to dedicate any more resources towards these capabilities. Further, the fact that targeted countries for these prediction assets and inspection would not likely allow their sovereignty to be breached and the international community has not often demonstrated the resolve to breach a country's sovereignty on the suspicion of impropriety.

Once a transgression is detected, Responsibility to Protect offers a prescription for the prevention of further human rights abuses. Implementing Responsibility to Protect will most likely cause more discord in international relations than it seeks to correct.

Responsibility to Protect allows for regional actors to intervene if it is felt that the United Nations is not acting fast enough. This increases the number of scenarios that would warrant an intervention, thus possibly leading to more interventions. Understandably a greater number of military interventions around the globe would quite likely lead to a greater level of instability- quite the opposite of the intended effect.

Finally, the implicit return to an imperialist type of occupation one that initially sets out to alleviate human suffering but then is required to set up governance structures and assist the targeted country to develop and support itself will mean a greater length of military intervention and occupation. This is an obvious expansion of the original mandate. Taking all of these factors in to account, it is clear that both International and Canadian foreign policy that support military intervention on the basis of stopping human rights abuses through the Responsibility to Protect doctrine skews the issue of military intervention from a force of last resort to a force of choice.

It appears that the change from peacekeeping to peacemaking came about because there was a lack of focus and a lack of a succinct policy outlining how peacekeeping should be used. The move to peacemaking attempted to correct this error and the development of strong organizational abilities and clear mandates improved the perceived utility of this form of intervention. Yet achieving success with peacemaking is seemingly just as difficult to attain as it was during the peacekeeping era. The Responsibility to Protect seems to add some more clear definitions of success by approaching the problem from a human rights viewpoint. The predictive capabilities of the international community to determine a threat to peace should be increased if human rights are to become the primary focus of international stability operations. More interventions will be

more destabilizing and will drain the international resources so that the lessons learned in

the Brahimi report of focussing the efforts of a peace building mission might not be

achievable. It appears that there hasn't been an evolution in the tools used to achieve

international stability but the prospects for achieving a significant change exist if the

focus moves towards understanding the threats to peace.

Chapter 5

Application – Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya

In order to understand how international interventions in support of peace

operations have changed because of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, an analysis of

these types of interventions must be completed. Three interventions will be examined in

order to understand how have changed over the last fifteen years. The first intervention to

be examined will be Kosovo. This intervention has been chosen because the justification

for the intervention was on human security grounds and because it was unsanctioned by

the United Nations. Although three separate UNSC resolutions regarding the situation in

Kosovo were passed, it can be argued that NATO undertook this mission without the

explicit authority of the UN. This action began a fresh round of debate about which was

more important, sovereignty of states or the basic human rights of its citizens. Comparing

how the United Nations dealt with the issues of state sovereignty over time will give an

indication of how Responsibility to Protect came into being and where international law

is heading in terms of military intervention in support of human security issues.

The second intervention to be examined will be the international mission in

Afghanistan. This intervention began as primarily a counter-terrorism mission, however

it quickly transformed into a counter-insurgency mission that aimed to ameliorate and

protect the lives of the Afghan citizens. This mission has been chosen because of the

interesting notion that the UN tried to accomplish with the early deployment of the

United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA). Initially, UNAMA was to

have a very small footprint of foreign assistance. The UN envisioned a small international

team that would support Afghans who would then in turn conduct the majority of the

work necessary for guaranteeing the safety of the Afghan people. The UN chose this route in order to remain impartial in this intervention. As the intervention progressed there was a growing requirement for UN involvement. Comparing how the UN dealt with the issue of protecting its impartiality during a human security intervention over time should shed light on how these interventions are evolving.

The third and final international intervention to be examined will be the UN sanctioned, NATO led intervention in Libya. This intervention is relevant to this study because the reasons cited by the UN for authorizing this mission relate directly to the Responsibility to Protect. This mission originally was intended to be primarily concerned with enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya in order to protect the Libyan citizens from the state controlled military aircraft that were being used against seemingly innocent protestors. This intervention moved towards more of a forward defence of human rights by destroying the Libyan military loyal to Muhmar Qudhafi and brought about a complete regime change within the country. Comparing how a regime change can affect the outcomes of a humanitarian intervention will also prove to be a useful tool in gaging how interventions have evolved over time.

Each of the three interventions is unique yet each of them has a distinct degree of purpose centred on the protection of human rights. During the Kosovo intervention, the sovereignty of states had a large influence on international affairs. As Afghanistan unfolded the UN had a difficult time in protecting is impartiality. Later, the United Nations and the international community essentially supported a complete regime change in Libya in order to protect the lives of the citizens of that country.

Using these three key aspects of interventions -sovereignty, impartiality, and the requirement for regime change - an examination of humanitarian interventions will be conducted. This analysis should show if the Responsibility to Protect doctrine has had an effect on international interventions. As well, it may give an indication of the forward trends of these peace operations. This will in turn enable some informed speculation on the justification for and the conduct of international interventions in the future.

In March 1999, NATO began an air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in response to the government of that country's treatment of one of its ethnic minorities. NATO targeted specific Serb dominated forces that had been reported to be 'cleansing Kosovo of ethnic Albanians.' Although it may seem that this intervention occurred in a unilateral fashion there were numerous efforts made to avoid a military intervention. During the months and years leading up to the NATO intervention there had been no less than three United Nations Security Resolutions, UNSC 1160, 1199 and 1203. These resolutions outlined cease fire agreements, gave authority for observers to enter Kosovo and even authorized NATO over-flights of the region.[44] It was only after the March 1999 peace talks in Ramboilett, France had broken down did the Serb military begin mass deportations of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. These actions caused NATO to determine that a humanitarian crisis was imminent and it was only then that NATO dropped its first bomb.

NATO acted in a case where the UNSC refused to act. Of the fifteen member nations of the UNSC at the time of this crisis, twelve supported a draft resolution

---

[44] James P. Terry. "Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo: Legal Reality and Political Pragmatism." *The Army Lawyer* (August 2004): 39.

authorizing NATO forces to conduct an intervention on humanitarian grounds. Russia and China threatened to veto the resolution and therefore it was never proposed.[45]

The bombing was allowed by the deputy secretary-general Kofi Annan when he suspended the UN's power to decide on air-strikes and abdicated that responsibility to NATO.[46] This example of how a UNSC resolution failed to materialize and how NATO came to see itself as authorized to begin the conduct of an air campaign has often been heralded as a prime example of UN bureaucratic inefficiency as well as how ineffectual it had become in dealing with international crises. This may be so, however what it also indicated was a key aspect of the United Nations' culture of supporting the sovereignty of individual states.

The United Nations was designed in the post WW II world that had two superpowers vying for control. The UN's primary role was to prevent another world war and for over fifty years it had accomplished this mission admirably. However with the collapse of the Soviet Union the UN found itself in a difficult position, it tried to maintain international order in a world with one peerless superpower - the United States. This coupled with a history of Peacekeeping that had stopped or stagnated regional conflicts made the UN the obvious and impartial choice to be the primary body to resolve conflict. Interestingly, the UN had always made ever effort to respect the sovereignty of each of the member nations and therefore it was not in favour of military interventions. Peacekeeping missions were conducted primarily to enforce peace treaties that were agreed to by both sides and the Peacekeeping force was required to be invited in to the conflict zone by both parties. It would need to respect the sovereign rights of all of the

---

[45] Ibid. 39.
[46] Diana Johnstone. "Humanitarian War: Making the Crime Fit the Punishment" in *Masters of the Universe: NATO's Balkan Crusade* Tariq Ali ed. (New York, Verso 2000) 148.

signatories to the peace accord that it was trying to implement. Traditional peacekeeping was viewed by the UN as an impartial military vehicle that could be used to sustain a peace accord, all the while protecting the sovereignty of all the member states as well as operating within the confines of international law.

The issue with Kosovo was that a humanitarian crisis was happening inside a sovereign territory which meant that the UN could not endorse a military action without violating the rights of sovereign Yugoslavia. In this instance, the problem of the UN's requirement to respect sovereignty outweighed the rights of the ethnic Albanians who were suffering at the hands of a Serb dominated government. It can be argued that the UN wanted to act but was held back by certain members of the Permanent Security Council or that it was unable to act because of legal constraints or even because of bureaucratic inefficiency. What cannot be argued is that the UN did not act. In Kosovo, it was NATO that launched air strikes and demanded that the Republic of Yugoslavia respect the basic human rights of all its citizens. By not acting, the UN may have defended the principles of sovereignty, however it lost some legitimacy in the eyes of the international community by not defending human rights. The Kosovo intervention certainly opened up significant debate on the which concept within international law had primacy – sovereignty or human rights. This debate eventually lead to the Responsibility to Protect which moved the primacy from sovereignty to human rights.

In 1999, the United Nations was expected to act in Kosovo but didn't and this left the task of protecting human rights to NATO. Conversely, in 2001 NATO invaded Afghanistan for purely military reasons and the UN was expected to later lead an international team that was primarily concerned with ameliorating the deplorable

humanitarian standards that the citizens of that country were suffering from. In December 2001the NATO force, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was authorized under Chapter VII of the UN charter, in response to the Bonn agreement calling for a force to deploy into the area around Kabul. The original mandate was to provide a secure environment for the Afghan Interim Authority and for United Nations personnel deployed to that area. UNAMA was developed in an attempt to coalesce all of the existing UN initiatives under one single mission. One of the key tenets of UNAMA was to develop an assistance programme focused on human rights and the protection of vulnerable sections of Afghan society.[47] UNAMA was mandated to implement and monitor the Bonn agreement. It was to accomplish this mission because it was seen as the "internationally recognized impartial institution."[48]

In order to accomplish its mission UNAMA adopted a 'light footprint' approach that sought to rely on the augmentation and support of Afghan personnel on the ground in order to develop and enhance the governance capacities of the host nation. The intent was to place Afghans at the centre of the process of rebuilding the country. The UN attempted to maintain its impartiality by limiting its public association of the re-building efforts by supporting the interim Afghan government. The UN also wanted to lower the appearance of outside influence in the nation building that was required in Afghanistan at that time.

Unfortunately for UNAMA, the 'light footprint' approach did not work. The UN was seen by the international community as the organization that was in charge of the state building efforts in Afghanistan and as the mission continued into 2004, the efforts of this state building were severely hampered by insurgent forces in the outlying provinces.

---

[47] United Nations. Security Council Resolution 1401: on the Situation in Afghanistan. 23 March 2002.
[48] United Nations. Secretary General address to the President of the Security Council. 5 December 2001.

The Special Representative of the Secretary General in Afghanistan made repeated requests to ISAF to deploy reconstruction teams to the provinces[49] and in 2004 the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) began to deploy to the outer provinces. This was what led Canada to change its primary mission from training in Kabul to a PRT and supporting security force in Kandahar province.

In supporting the deployment of more forces to the outlying provinces the UN was backing away from its original intent of remaining as impartial as possible. First, more ISAF forces conducting reconstruction would take away from the approach of supporting Afghans while they improved the governance, development and security of their provinces. Also it can be argued that the PRTs were supporting an effort by the central government to exert influence over the provinces[50] by controlling aid and development money. The Kabul government's "decision making about assistance prior to the forthcoming election bypassed local and provincial power-holders." In essence, UNAMA facilitated attempts to influence the provincial populations before elections, clearly a step back from impartiality. However even though it was a step back from impartiality it was a step towards effectiveness as countless Afghans living outside of Kabul now would receive the benefits of the UN mission.

The PRTs required security forces to operate and because of this we saw a greater ISAF presence deployed to the provinces. Not only did ISAF deploy to the provinces in greater and greater numbers but so too did the nascent Afghan security forces, the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). The security forces were heavily reliant on ISAF in the fight against the Taliban. This support was primarily in

---

[49] Hasegawa, Yuka, "The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Impartiality in New UN Peace Operations," *Journal of Intervention & State-building* vol. 2 issue 2 (July 2008): 217.
[50] Ibid. 218.

combat enablers such as attack helicopter support for ground forces as well as logistic

supplies and transportation support for the forces deployed to the provinces. ISAF and the

Afghan security forces brought security to the provinces. ISAF also brought development

money and construction capability to the provinces. It is only logical that ISAF, through

the PRT would also have a huge influence over the provincial governors as well. This

militarization of development, governance and security by ISAF is a distinct difference

from the original intent of UNAMA. This migration of strategy in the human security

field was necessary in the "complex intervention context of Afghanistan."[51]

In Afghanistan, the UN's peace operation changed from a minimal foot-print

strategy towards a more realistic delivery of the necessary requirements for state re-

building. This is clearly a move away from impartiality; however a human security

operation is by definition something that cannot be impartial. The side of human rights is

taken before a conflict is joined and 'loyalty' to this side must be maintained throughout.

The Afghanistan mission saw a military action by NATO evolve into a humanitarian

action that involved the UN. Conversely, in Libya a NATO humanitarian intervention

was only brought about by UNSC Resolution 1973.[52]

In early 2011 the situation in Libya was becoming dire. There were numerous

reports of the regime of Qadhafi committing crimes against humanity in cities where

there were massive public demonstrations for political reform. It was reported that

government forces were firing on crowds of un-armed civilians and that over one

thousand people had been killed.[53] The UNSC saw the situation in Libya as crimes

---

[51] Ibid. 221.
[52] United Nations. Security Council Resolution 1973: The Situation in Libya. 17 March 2011.
[53] Gazzini, Claudia. "Was the Libya Intervention Necessary?" *Middle East Report* (Winter 2011): 3.

against humanity[54] and issued UNSCR 1973 which authorized the use of force under

Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. UNSC 1973 made it clear that regional

organizations were to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian

populated areas. This UNSCR is seen to be the first instance of the use of the

Responsibility to Protect as the authorization for a military intervention.[55] NATO under

UNSCR 1973 immediately established a no-fly zone, however over the course of the

mission the targets of NATO changed from the Air assets of the Qadhafi regime, to his

Command and Control (C2) structure, to the ground forces fighting against the rebels to

eventually Qadhafi himself. Although NATO claims that Qadhafi himself was not a

target, it was a NATO Predator UAV that struck his convoy leaving Sirte[56] that led to his

capture and eventual demise at the hands of the rebels.

In the Libya intervention, we see the first instance where regime change becomes

an unstated mission objective of the intervening force. NATO vehemently denies this

claim; however in the months leading up to UNSCR 1973, the International Criminal

Court (ICC) began deliberations on the events in Libya in order to determine if

international crimes against humanity were being committed. It was the ICC chief

prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, who declared that he had reasonable grounds to

believe that Qadhafi and his sons had committed crimes against humanity. This

condemnation on 3 March 2011[57] led directly to UNSCR 1973 issued fourteen days later

on the 17th of March. Naming the leaders of Libya in an indictment such as this indicates

if not an overt intent; then at least a covert intent for regime change.

---

[54] United Nations. Security Council Resolution 1973: The Situation in Libya. 17 March 2011.
[55] Murphy, Jim, "The UK's Responsibilities Beyond Our Borders" *Public Policy Research* vol. 18, no. 1 (Mar 2011): 11
[56] Gazzini, Claudia. "Was the Libya Intervention Necessary?" *Middle East Report* (Winter 2011): 5.
[57] Ibid. 8.

Interestingly there is a parallel between UNSCR 1973 and the ill-fated draft resolution that was to authorize a similar air campaign in Kosovo. Both China and Russia abstained from voting during the approval of UNSCR 1973, while before Kosovo they had threatened the draft UNSCR with their veto. The grounds for their actions in the UNSC in 1999 and 2011 are not entirely clear; however they have argued that any intervention (humanitarian or otherwise) lends itself vulnerable to being subverted for ulterior means.[58] It can be argued that NATO used the pre-text of a humanitarian intervention in order to bring about regime change. The death of Qadhafi lends credence to this position. As well, it can be seen that by using the indictment of Qadhafi as grounds for its UNSCR, the United Nations itself implicitly adopted the policy of instituting a regime change in Libya in order to fulfill its humanitarian mandate.

Beginning in 1999 the UN began to develop a new doctrine on humanitarian interventions. Initially, it was met with resistance on the basis of the need to protect sovereignty. The UN developed the Responsibility to Protect as a response to UN inaction when faced with genocide. It was Kofi Annan as the UN Secretary General who postulated,

> To those for whom the greatest threat to international order
> is the use of force in the absence of a Security Council
> mandate, one might ask – not in the context of Kosovo –
> but in the context of Rwanda: if in those dark days and
> hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of states had
> been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi population, but
> did not receive prompt authorisation, should such a
> coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to
> unfold?

The attitudes and core values of the UN had changed. No longer were the sovereignty rights of member states a primary guiding principle – the human rights of the

---

[58] Ibid. 6

citizens trumped sovereignty. Approximately six years later another of the key principles of the UN, that of impartiality, is moved to a subordinate position in comparison to effectively protecting human rights. In Afghanistan, the UN supports the interim government through its distribution of development aid. Further, the UN argues for the militarization of development by the PRTs in the outlying provinces of Afghanistan. Finally, the UN sees the utility for regime change in prosecuting the humanitarian intervention in Libya. Twelve years have seen some tremendous reform in the UN. The Responsibility to Protect can be seen as the primary driving force behind many of those changes. The UN has placed humanitarian rights in a position of primacy over the concepts of sovereignty and impartiality and has through it actions, given notice that a government that does not protect the rights of its citizens has forfeited its right to govern.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Peacekeeping was a revolutionary idea at the time of its conception. However, the practice of peacekeeping did not evolve over time. It was a military centric endeavour that sought to separate warring factions in order for peace negotiations to be completed. In this way, peacekeeping was solely aimed at preventing war. It respected the sovereign rights of each of the states involved and sought to remain as impartial as possible in order to further the prospects of an effective negotiation. The UN saw a peaceful negotiation as its ultimate goal, humanitarian crises such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, deportation and torture, although deplorable were more or less well within the domain of an individual state's responsibility to deal with. Therefore, the UN's primary focus was not necessarily on peacekeeping but on bringing about effective peace negotiations.

The Canadian experience with peacekeeping is very similar. Although, the Canadian military participated in the majority of peacekeeping missions, this was not its primary role. Canadian Defence policy rarely lists peacekeeping as a mission form the mid-fifties until the mid-nineties. Throughout the cold war both the UN and Canada viewed peacekeeping as almost a secondary task. However, as the cold war ended, the expectations placed on peacekeeping increased.

The mid-nineties brought about the first evolution in peacekeeping. Studies of the failures of some peacekeeping missions called for an increase to the size of the military component of the force. Increasing the scope of the military force's mandate to include the use of more forceful means in order to enforce a cease-fire or to implement an international peace plan were considered to be the way to make peace operations more

effective. These peacemaking missions were given an exit strategy. Essentially a list of conditions that must be met before the mission could be considered a success. Unfortunately, this view point saw international crises still in military terms. If peacekeeping failed in the past it postulated, then a larger military force tasked with peacemaking will surely succeed in the future. Again, the United Nations focused on the prevention or pre-emption of war and not on the causes of war or on the effects on the human population.

The Responsibility to Protect sought to change this view. It placed the primacy of human security above all other concepts. Individual states had a primary responsibility to its citizens in guaranteeing their basic human rights. If a sovereign state failed in this responsibility, it would become the responsibility of the international community to protect those human rights. States would forfeit their sovereignty under international law if they did not secure the human rights of the people within their borders.

In adopting this policy the UN would be committing to perhaps more international interventions which would have a destabilizing effect on international relations. The Responsibility to Protect made the protection of human security the primary goal of the UN. This took the previous focus on war prevention and changed it to crimes against humanity prevention. This is a positive shift for the UN because it dealt more with the effects of the crisis and not only the crisis itself. However, the UN still did not develop the tools to focus on the causes of international conflict and perhaps the biggest failing of the UN remained, the lack of a predictive capability that inform the international community about international crises.

The UN shifted its focus towards human security and over time and successive missions it struggled as human security became more important that some of the key founding tenets of the UN. The examination of the NATO mission in Kosovo and the UNSCR's actions leading up to that crisis give a clear view of the struggle the UN had with amending its position on state sovereignty. After Kosovo the UN was clearly committed to the idea that the Responsibility to Protect to precedence over state sovereignty.

The UN mission in Afghanistan illustrates a further evolution of how the UN conducts peace operations. The UN did not altogether abandon the concept of remaining impartial in international disputes, however it has developed a more realistic view of how it can achieve positive outcomes in terms of ameliorating human suffering. In Afghanistan, UNAMA requested and encourage the militarization of development aid and local governance support. The UN sought to achieve the greatest good, in terms of human security, and to do this it required the help of ISAF. In this instance, the UN backed away from its principle of impartiality in order to have a positive effect on the lives of the Afghans.

The final example used was that of the intervention in Libya. A UN sanctioned intervention that used the Responsibility to Protect as its primary reason for military action. The UNSCR authorized NATO to use 'all means necessary" to protect civilians in the ongoing civil conflict. Clearly, the UN had subordinated the concepts of state sovereignty as well as sacrificing the UN's impartiality in passing this resolution. The ICC had named Qudhafi (and others) in a war crimes indictment. Using this indictment as the impetus for UNSCR 1973, the UN moved towards advocating regime change.

The United Nations has moved away from some of its founding principles in order to adopt and implement the Responsibility to Protect. It has sacrificed a certain degree of its impartiality. It has also subordinated the sovereign rights of member states to the basic human rights of people within its borders and it has gone so far as to implicitly seek a regime change in cases where a sovereign nation fails in its responsibility to its citizens.

The evolution from peacekeeping to peacemaking to the Responsibility to Protect gives a firm indication that there will be many more humanitarian interventions in the future and the protection of human rights has become the norm and not the exception.

Bibliography

"From Oslo to Benghazi," *The Economist*, March 26, 2011, 31-32.

"The Blue Berets." *Canada & the World Backgrounder*, 71.1 (2005): 11-13.

"U.N., Afghanistan: A Move to Appeal to the Taliban" *Stratfor Analysis* (Jan 25 2010): 18.

Aitken, Rob, "Cementing Divisions?" *Policy Studies* 28 no.3 (September 2007): 247-267.

Amer, Ramses, "The United Nations' Reactions to Foreign Military Interventions," *Journal of Peace Research* 31, no.4 (Nov 1994): 425.

Axworthy, Lloyd, "Human Rights," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. 66 Issue 19, (July 15 2000): 578.

Ayoob, Mohammed. "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty," *International Journal of Human Rights* Vol 6, No.1 (Spring 2002): 81-102.

Badescu, Cristina G., "Canada's Continuing Engagement with United Nations Peace Operations," *Canadian Foreign Policy,* Issue 16 vol. 2 (September 2010): 45-60.

Berdal, Mats, "Organizational and Policy Responses to the Peacebuilding Challenge: The Case of the UN and its Peacebuilding Commission," *Adelphi Series* 49 no. 407, (Aug 2009): 135-170.

Bickerton, Chris J., "State-building: Exporting State Failure," *Arena Journal no.*32, (July 2009): 101-123.

Byers, Rod B. "Peacekeeping and Canadian Defence Policy: Ambivalence and Uncertainty". In H. Wiseman (ed.) *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*, (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1983), 130-156.

"Canadian Non-Paper on The Responsibility to Protect and the Evolution of the United Nations' Peace and Security Mandate: Submission to the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change," Foreign Affairs Canada, (April 2004) accessed on 21 Nov 2011 at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada_un/HLP_submission-en.asp

Cann, John P. "Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice After the Cold War (Review)." *Journal of Military History* vol 6n no.1 (2005): 291-293.

Christoff, Joseph A. "Issues in Implementing International Peace Operations" *United States Government Accounting Office Report 707R*." (2002): 1.

Diehl, Paul F. "Institutional Alternatives to Traditional U.N. Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and Multinational Options." *Armed Forces & Society* vol. 19 no.2 (1993): 209-230.

Department of National Defence. *Canada First Defence Strategy*. Ottawa: DND, 2010. accessed at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first on Feb 19 2012.

Dobbins, James, and James Shinn, "Afghanistan: Guidelines for a Peace Process," *Survival* vol. 53, (Aug 2011): 5-12.

Donnelly, Jack, "Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign Policy: Law, Morality, and Politics," *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 37 issue 2, (Dec 1984): 311.

Dorn, A. W. "The Cloak and the Blue Beret: Limitations on Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping." *International Journal of Intelligence & Counterintelligence,* vol. 12 issue 4 (1999): 414-447.

---. "Intelligence at UN Headquarters? The Information and Research Unit and the Intervention in Eastern Zaire 1996." *Intelligence & National Security* vol. 20 issue 3 (2005): 440-465.

---. "Intelligence-Led Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2006-07." *Intelligence & National Security* vol. 24 issue6 (2009): 805-835.

---.. "Regional Peacekeeping is Not the Way." *Peacekeeping & International Relations* vol. 27 issue 3 (1998): 1.

Dorn, Walter, and Michael Varey. "Fatally Flawed." *International Journal* vol. 63 issue 4 (2008): 967-978.

Farrell, Theo "Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations" In John Baylis et al, *Strategy in the Contemporary World. A Introduction to Strategic Studies*, (Oxford: University Press), 286-308.

Fortna, Virginia Page. "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly* vol. 48 issue 2 (2004): 269-292.

---. "Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects." *World Politics* vol.56 (Winter 2004): 481-519.

Gazzini, Claudia. "Was the Libya Intervention Necessary?" *Middle East Report* (Winter 2011): 2-9.

Gillespie, Thomas R., "Unwanted Responsibility," *Peace & Change*, Vol. 18 Issue 3, (Jul 93): 219.

Goldstein, Lyle J., "General John Shalikashvili and the Civil-Military Relations of Peacekeeping." *Armed Forces & Society* vol. 26 (March 2000): 387-411.

Gray, Christine., "Peacekeeping After the Brahimi Report: Is there a Crisis of Credibility for the UN?" *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* vol. 6, issue 2 (2001): 267-88.

---. "Peacekeeping and Enforcement Action in Africa: The Role of Europe and the Obligations of Multilateralism." *Review of International Studies* vol.31 (September 2005): 207-223.

Green, David Michael, Chad Kahl, and Paul F. Diehl. "Predicting the Size of UN Peacekeeping Operations." *Armed Forces & Society* vol. 24 (Dec 1998): 485-500.

Greig, J Michael, and Paul F. Diehl. "The Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma." *International Studies Quarterly* vol. 49 (Dec 2005): 621-646.

Guehenno, Jean-Marie. "On the Challenges and Achievements of Reforming UN Peace Operations." *International Peacekeeping* vol. 9 (June 2002): 69.

Hanson, Victor Davis. "War Without Strategy," *National Review* vol. 63, issue 7 (March 18 2011): 26-30.

Harvey, Michael, "Progressive Interventionism Redux?" *Public Policy Research* vol.18, no. 1 (Mar 2011): 17-22.

Hasegawa, Yuka, "The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Impartiality in New UN Peace Operations," *Journal of Intervention & Statebuilding* vol. 2 issue 2 (July 2008): 209-226.

Howard, Lise Morjé, "UN Peace Implementation in Namibia: The Causes of Success." *International Peacekeeping* vol. 9, issue 1 (2002): 99-132.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. "The Responsibility to Protect," (Ottawa: IDRC Books), 2001.

Jensen, Rod. "Dark Threats & White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism (Review)." *Canadian Journal of Law and Society* vol 20 no.1 (2005): 225-229.

Johnstone, Diana. "Humanitarian War: Making the Crime Fit the Punishment" in *Masters of the Universe: NATO's Balkan Crusade* Tariq Ali ed. (New York, Verso 2000)

Katzman, Kenneth. "Residual Issues from Past Conflicts," *Congressional Research Service: Report* (June 3 2011): 89.

Lacquement Jr., Richard A. 2004. "Winning Peace: Post-conflict Stability Operations and Lessons from U.S., NATO and U.N. Experiences," (United States Naval War College: Aug 2004): 1-34.

Lake, David, "The Practice and Theory of US Statebuilding," *Journal of Intervention & Statebuilding* vol. 4 issue 3 (Sept 2010): 257-284.

Lambourne, Wendy, and Annie Herro, "Peacebuilding Theory and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: Implications for Non-UN Interventions," *Global Change, Peace & Security* vol. 20 no.3 (Oct 2008): 275-289.

Last, David M. "Peacekeeping Doctrine and Conflict Resolution Techniques." *Armed Forces & Society* vol. 22 (June 1995): 187-210.

Margesson, Rhoda, "United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues: R40747" *Congressional Research Service: Report,* (July 30 2009): 1-24.

Meyer, Berthold. "OSCE Missions of Long Duration - Evaluating a Multifunctional Instrument of Peacekeeping." *International Peacekeeping* vol. 6 (Mar 2000): 77-83.

Morphet, Sally. "Current International Civil Administration: The Need for Political Legitimacy." *International Peacekeeping* vol. 9 (June 2002): 140.

Mullenbach, Mark J. "Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions." International Studies Quarterly (2005) 49, 529–555

Murphy, Jim, "The UK's Responsibilities Beyond Our Borders" *Public Policy Research* vol. 18, no. 1 (Mar 2011): 10-14.

Naidu, M. V., *Perspectives on Human Security: National Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention*. Brandon, Manitoba: Canadian Peace Research and Education Association, 2001.

O'Halloran, Patrick J., *Humanitarian Intervention and the Genocide in Rwanda*. London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1995.

Prins, Gwyn. "Lord Castlereagh's Return: The Significance of Kofi Annan's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change." *International Affairs* vol. 81, (June 2005): 373-391.

"The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration." *International Peacekeeping* vol. 6, (Mar 2000): 113-122.

Rose, Gideon. "The Exit Strategy Delusion." *Foreign Affairs* vol. 77, no. 1 (Nov 1998): 56.

Rubin, Barnett R., and Ahmed Rashid, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain," *Foreign Affairs* vol. 87, no. 6 (Nov 2011): 30-44.

Rupp, Richard, "Best Intentions or False Promises: Multilateral Interventions in Darfur, Afghanistan, and Southern Lebanon," *Mediterranean Quarterly* vol. 18, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 85-106.

Saikal, Amin, "The UN and Afghanistan: A case of Failed Peacemaking Intervention? *International Peacekeeping* vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 19-34.

Seiglie, Carlos, "Efficient Peacekeeping for a New World Order." *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy* vol. 11 (June 2005): 1088.

Shimizu, Hirofumi, and Todd Sandler. "NATO Peacekeeping and Burden Sharing: 1994-2000." *Public Finance Review* vol. 31 (June 2003): 123-143.

Smith, Dan, "Intervention and Humility" *Public Policy Research* vol. 18, no.1 (Mar 2011): 14-17.

Spieker, Heike, "Changing Peacekeeping in the New Millennium - the Recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations of August 2000." *International Peacekeeping* vol. 6 (June 2000): 144-152.

Standifer, Cid, "Surge in Afghanistan Falling Short, says U.N. Report," *Navy Times* vol. 60, issue 45 (August 2011): 8-9.

Terry, James P. "Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo: Legal Reality and Political Pragmatism." *The Army Lawyer* (August 2004): 36-46.

United Nations. Secretary General address to the President of the Security Council. 5 December 2001. Accessed at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N01/681/67/PDF/N0168167.pdf?OpenElement

United Nations. Security Council Resolution 1401: on the Situation in Afghanistan. 23 March 2002. Accessed at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ country, UNSC, AFG, 3d5282162, 0.html

United Nations. Security Council Resolution 1973: The Situation in Libya. 17 March 2011. Accessed at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/ 39/PDF/N1126839.pdf

United Nations. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. *The Humanitarian Decade: Challenges for Humanitarian Assistance in the Last Decade and into the Future*. New York: United Nations, 2004.

United Nations. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*. New York: United Nations, 2004.

United Nations. 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly. *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General*. New York: United Nations, 2009. Accessed at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/SGRtoPEng%20(4).pdf

Weinberger, Naomi. "Civil-Military Coordination in Peacebuilding: The Challenge in Afghanistan." *Journal of International Affairs* vol. 55 (June 2002): 245.

Weissman, Fabrice. "Humanitarian Action and Military Intervention: Temptations and Possibilities." *Disasters* vol. 28 (Feb 2004): 205-215.

Zyck, Steven A., "Former Combatant Reintegration and Fragmentation in Contemporary Afghanistan," *Conflict, Security & Development* vol.9 issue 1 (April 2009): 111-131.