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GETTING IN IS HALF THE BATTLE: AN APPROACH TO THEATRE ACTIVATION FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES

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JCSP 38

Master of Defence Studies

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**GETTING IN IS HALF THE BATTLE: AN APPROACH TO THEATRE
ACTIVATION FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES**

**S'Y RENDRE C'EST À MOITIÉ GAGNÉ: UNE APPROCHE À LA
CAPACITÉ D'ACTIVATION DE THÉÂTRE DES FORCES CANADIENNES**

By/Par Maj Devon P. Matsalla

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ABSTRACT

As a result of the inefficiencies observed during OP KINETIC in 1999, a concept was developed whereby a specialised Theatre Activation Team (TAT) would deploy in advance of the main force to establish the initial footprint required to support the safe staging and in-flow of the rest of the Joint Task Force. A contingency plan (CONPLAN) DISCUS was drafted to capture the mandate for a new organisation called the Joint Support Group (JSG) that would generate and employ the TAT for any given mission. Although the first activations were somewhat successful, the initiatives devised to develop this capability have never achieved approval as they were overtaken by since CF Transformation and the mission in Afghanistan.

With OP ATHENA coming to a close, there is a renewed interest in the Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) to regenerate the capability. However, as a result of challenges experienced during some recent missions, notably OP HESTIA and OP PODIUM, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) have taken initiatives to generate independent TA capabilities, in much the same way that Service Chiefs in the United States and Australia generate their own Theatre Opening capabilities. As the Canadian Forces (CF) enters a future security environment (FSE) that foretells a higher requirement for TA with depleting resources, CANOSCOM has little choice but to leverage these new capabilities that have been developed by the Army and RCAF. Further than that, the integration of TAT should be transferred to the lead Environmental Chief of Staff (ECS) of a given operation, where the readiness of the limited skilled resources can be managed in synchronisation with other FG activities. CANOSCOM will maintain some oversight as the Centre of Excellence for TA, but this burden is sufficiently small so that they can focus on the employment of forces in an increasingly dynamic security environment.

GETTING IN IS HALF THE BATTLE: AN APPROACH TO THEATRE ACTIVATION FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES

INTRODUCTION

When the Army is landed, the business is half done.

- MGen James Wolfe at the Battle of Quebec, 1759.¹

Like all militaries, the Canadian Forces (CF) aim to produce highly-deployable professional forces that can conduct operations in the entire spectrum of conflict environments. However, as General Wolfe stated above, a very significant part of the effort, perhaps one that is often underestimated, is the establishment of a foothold in the theatre from which the force can conduct operations. Despite all the effort spent on preparing a highly effective force, if that force cannot enter effectively into a theatre environment there is little effect that they can bring. From a deployment point of view, getting in really is half the battle.

There are many names used to describe the act of establishing a foothold in a theatre of operations –Australians refer to it as “Entry Operations,” Americans as “Theatre Opening,” the French as “*la capacité d’entrer en premier*,” and in 1999, Canada developed the term “Theatre Activation” (TA). All these terms involve sending a team of specialists forward before the main body, whose tasks are to establish a port of disembarkation (POD), to set up support and bed-down arrangements for staging and to establish an initial framework for the conduct of operations in a given theatre. Unless the organisation that is mandated to conduct these activities is well prepared and well equipped for the task, valuable time can be lost during which the forces are less effective.

¹ Robert Deb Heinl, *Dictionary of military and naval quotations*, (Annapolis, ML: The U.S. Naval Institute, 1966), 11.

As Canada and other militaries enter into what future security analysts identify as the “arc of instability”, or those areas where forces are most likely to be employed in the future, modern infrastructure is the exception rather than the norm.² Thus the task of activation is becoming increasingly complex. Also, as has been apparent in Haiti and in Libya, the public appetite for rapid effects is increasing with the proliferation of imbedded media on the battlefield; so the TA has even less margin for error.

Canada adopted the concept of TA in 1999, in response to deficiencies observed during deployments of the 1990s.³ The CF sought to increase their deployability by devising an organisation called the Joint Support Group (JSG) whose primary tasks would be force generation (FG) and force employment (FE) of a Theatre Activation Team (TAT), who would “deploy to a new theatre of operations and support the reception and initial employment phase of a new mission until such time as the support group for the first rotation is deployed.”⁴ It was acknowledged that this capability, if it was to deliver the personnel and materiel required to perform the full spectrum of TA functions in both expeditionary and domestic environments, would require a restructure of the current operational-level organisations, as well as an investment of personnel and materiel. As a result, a project called the National Military Support Capability (NMSC) was initiated. To validate the concept, a skeleton TAT was assembled, which conducted a number of deployments with some success.⁵ However, before any strategic direction could formalize the concept, the JSG was overtaken by CF Transformation in 2005. Also, the increasing intensity of the Afghanistan mission would dominate the focus of the operational commands. Although the requirement never actually changed for these

² Brig Gen Patrick Donahue II and Lt Col Frank Womble (ret), “Getting There is Half the Battle: How to Fix Ground Mobility,” Internet; <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2011/10/7613840>; accessed 20 Feb 2012.

³ There were a number of inefficiencies observed during campaigns in the Balkans from 1992 to 1999; however it was Kosovo in 1999 that spurred this initiative. This is discussed in Chapter 1.

⁴ Department of National Defence, *National Military Support Capability: NMSC Support Concept*, (Ottawa: DND, 21 Sept 2000), 7.

⁵ Initial deployments of the TAT were into Eritrea, Haiti and Afghanistan, as shown in Table 1

additional TA resources, these other priorities detracted from ever developing the TA contingency plan (CONPLAN) DISCUS from achieving approval.⁶

Since 2010, with the Afghan mission coming to a close, there has been a renewed interest in TA and in a follow-on capital project called Canadian Forces Operational Support Capability (CFOSC). For the first time since 2004, the Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) is about to dedicate staff time to address CONPLAN DISCUS deficiencies and to create official doctrine to define the TA concept.⁷ As these organisations embark on this planning effort, it is therefore highly pertinent to capture the origins and the lessons learned of its history. It is also useful to evaluate how Canada's allies are conducting TA. This will help determine if Canada should be building on the concepts already developed, or it needs to take a new direction.

This paper will show that the integration of activities and resources required for the FG of TATs should be transferred to the lead Environmental Chief of Staff (ECS) of a given operation, where the readiness of the limited skilled resources can be managed in synchronisation with other FG activities. This will further enable organisations charged with force employment (FE), namely CANOSCOM, to focus on the employment of the TATs and on the expansion of the capability to meet future requirements. In the ECS, the generation of TATs can also be better synchronised with the rest of the Joint Task Force (JTF) that they will be supporting, which contributes to the continuity of operations.

The paper will be broken down into four chapters. The first chapter will show that various attempts in the past to combine the FG and FE of TATs into a single, robust organisation have not achieved any lasting success. For one, the NMSC was being presented as a *support* project, with no direct stakes or mandates to other Level-One

⁶ CONPLAN DISCUS is the name of the contingency plan that governs the application of the TA concept for the CF.

⁷ Maj J.J. Reynders, "Future Update of COP DISCUS (Theatre Activation)," Briefing Note for OS J5 (Ottawa: DND, 17 May 2010), 1.

organisations (L1s).⁸ As a result, this project, and the TA concept overall, never gained priority among the operator community to fulfill its objectives.

Chapter 2 will show that despite their lack of expertise in certain TA functions, the ECS have been able to make significant progress in the FG of TA capabilities. Essentially, the Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) experienced a number of challenges because CANOSCOM was unable to generate a TA capability during a number of past missions. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), on the other hand, by their deployable nature, did not encounter the same challenges. The Army and the RCAF therefore took the initiative to develop their own TA capabilities in an attempt to mitigate these challenges for the future. With some training and education and only minimal support from CANOSCOM, these ECS demonstrated the effectiveness of their TA capabilities. With such a shortage of skilled resources, CANOSCOM would have much to gain by leveraging these new capabilities.

The third chapter will show that a number of Canada's allies have already adopted a model in which the service chiefs (i.e. the ECS) conduct the FG of TA capabilities, and that Canada could benefit by following their lead. Specifically, the U.S., Australia and France also encountered some of the same challenges as Canada at the end of the Cold War. Although each of their approaches are unique, the analysis will show that there is merit to having the Army and the Air Force conduct the FG of TATs, then to be employed by operational-level commanders. Also, where skilled resources are limited, the CF can share resources and responsibilities with their allies.

Finally, Chapter 4 will show that in order to meet the requirements of the Future Security Environment (FSE), CANOSCOM should devolve the responsibility for the integration of TATs to the services. Specifically, the ECS that is predominant in a given theatre should be the one to generate the TAT, augmented as required by capabilities

⁸ Level-one (L1) organisations are those that report directly to the Chief of Defence Staff or the Deputy Minister. Those referred to specifically in this paper are the Army, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), CANOSCOM, CEFCOM and ADM(Mat) – all organisations that would have some stake in the activation of operational theatres and in projects that facilitate this.

from CANOSCOM and the other services. The chapter begins with an analysis of the FSE, showing that demands for TA are increasing but the resources to accomplish this are decreasing. Therefore, the CF have to leverage all possible resources of TA, especially those that the ECS have recently developed. Specifically, it should be the predominant ECS in a given operation, be it either domestic or international, that generates the TAT. However, for those capabilities that are still not in the ECS, CANOSCOM still has an augmentation role. To ensure that these capabilities are thoroughly understood and standardized across the country, CANOSCOM should also serve as the Centre of Excellence (CoE) and guide and counsel the ECS in their FG efforts. Then, with time, more capabilities can be devolved to the ECS with the support of the CFOSC project.

CHAPTER 1 – THEATRE ACTIVATION: A RUNNING START

INTRODUCTION

Victory is the beautiful, bright-coloured flower. [Sustainment] is the stem without which it could never have blossomed. Yet even the military student, in his zeal to master the fascinating combinations of the actual conflict, often forgets the far more intricate complications of supply.

- Winston Churchill⁹

As so eloquently described above, there is a known phenomenon that military operators tend to place less emphasis on the sustainment of their own forces than on their effects on the enemy. As the military leadership's gaze fixates on a struggling operation, it may be quick to attribute problems to the "fog of war", or the abominations of a keen foe, rather than shortcomings in its own sustainment. When these deficiencies are finally identified, the effort to address the problem are very easily distracted by more "flower-like" activities.

This phenomenon is useful to explain how TA has largely taken a backseat to other priorities over the past 12 years. At its inception in 1999, there was a large push with the creation of the NMSC project to build a organisation that would conduct both the FG and FE of a robust TA capability.¹⁰ However, the strategic direction that was given for this project never actually made it to signature, nor did the CONPLAN DISCUS ever achieve approval.¹¹ As a result, the internal moves to create this capability had only limited success overseas. Instead of addressing the remaining capability deficiencies, other priorities, such as CF Transformation or the mission in Afghanistan have overtaken much of the progress that NMSC had made since 1999. Now, as forces

⁹ Winston Churchill, *The River War*, Revised Edition (London: Longmans Green, 1902), 162.

¹⁰ Department of National Defence, *National Military Support Capability: NMSC Support Concept* (Ottawa: DND, 21 Sept 2000), 4.

¹¹ Maj J.A. Lycon, "TA Minute," Project Definition Support (Ottawa: DND, 17 Apr 2007), 1.

pull out of Afghanistan, there is renewed interest in the follow-on Canadian Forces Operational Support Capability (CFOSC) project. However, the scope of this new project has yet to be determined.

This chapter argues that the most important lesson to be learned from the past is that TA will not likely gain sufficient priority to fulfill the objectives outlined in the NMSC project in the medium term, and it is therefore not logical to mandate a single organisation to manage both FG and the FE of TA until such resources are available.

In order to show the weaknesses of the NMSC, this work will consider the factors that influenced its progression since 1999. It will be shown how the NMSC project, which was so well supported initially, could be overtaken by other priorities because it was being presented as a purely *sustainment* project. It will also be shown that the inconsistencies in the definition of TA also contributed to its lack of support.

1.1 – ORIGINS OF THEATRE ACTIVATION

In this section it will be shown that significant deficiencies observed during the deployments of the 1990s led to the TA concept in 1999. However, since those initial actions, there has been little success in developing the concept any further. Rather, TA has largely been over-taken by other priorities.

Although the term “theatre activation” was developed in Canada only in 1999, this was by no means a new concept, as the CF had been involved in numerous theatres of operation during the Cold War. What changed was the approach that the CF were taking in an increasingly complex deployment process. During the Cold War, deployments were generally conducted into areas with familiar, modern port facilities and lines of communication, such as Germany, Cyprus and Israel. After 1990, the CF deployed significant force levels into unfamiliar areas such as the Balkans and in Central and West Africa where “...operational demands [were] weighted far more heavily in favour of combat service support and combat service support organisations – logistics,

communications, medical services and engineer support – than at any time in the past.”¹² Also, with the proliferation of media on the battlefield, there was less tolerance for delays and inefficiencies.

In 1999, the Canadian mission in Kosovo, OP KINETIC, set a precedent in terms of the speed in which forces were being deployed.¹³ The 1 PPCLI TF advance party, augmented by 1 Area Support Unit (ASU), had not even established a suitable basing area as troops and equipment began to flow into Macedonia.¹⁴ “Due to the rush to get into theatre, none of the kit was properly transferred into the theatre accounts.”¹⁵ Other observations spoke about inadequate transport and ground to conduct the reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOMI) activities. In the words of the TF commander in his article *Adapting Operations to a Changing Security Environment*, Colonel Ward argues,

“In retrospect, [the strategic deployment] was the least professional aspect of the operation and threatened failure at a very early stage... Given Canada’s remoteness from possible operational theatres, the Canadian Forces must have better and more reliable strategic deployment capability.”¹⁶

Despite the fact that sustainment experts had already expressed concern about deployments, it was the deficiencies observed during OP KINETIC that mobilized the CF towards change. Before the end of the rotation, a National Level Units Working Group (NLU WG) was set up to determine how to address the problems associated with the

¹² Department of National Defence, “VCDS Force Structure Guidance” (Ottawa: DND, 26 Nov 1999).

¹³ Colonel Michael Ward, “Task Force Kosovo: Adapting Operations To A Changing Security Environment” *Canadian Military Journal* (Spring 2000), 69.

¹⁴ Department of National Defence, “Details/Information for Canadian Forces: Operation KINETIC,” Internet; <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=96&CdnOpId=110>; accessed 4 Feb 2012.

¹⁵ Department of National Defence, “International Post-Operation Report, OP KINETIC R0.” (Ottawa: DND, 1999), 2.

¹⁶ Colonel Michael Ward, “Task Force Kosovo: Adapting Operations To A Changing Security Environment” *Canadian Military Journal* (Spring 2000), 69.

activation of OP KINETIC.¹⁷ The result was the initiation of a capital project, the NMSC, that would invest over \$350M to establish a high-readiness Joint Support Group (JSG) designed specifically to “undertake theatre activation and high readiness tasks for contingency operations.”¹⁸ It was an unprecedented undertaking, and one that would generate some resistance from the ECS, who would be required to give up 627 positions to the JSG in order to establish a permanent stand-by force for providing support to any new mission.¹⁹ Nonetheless the memories of the deficiencies in Kosovo were keen enough to reduce the claims of any opposition.

For the first few years, the effort to develop a TA capability went quite well. Even before any strategic direction had been formalised, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) conducted internal moves to generate a skeleton JSG to support the activation of OP ECLIPSE, OP HALO and OP ARCHER.²⁰ Even though these activations were largely ad hoc, they were still quite successful: the TAT had managed to secure PODs, host-nation support (HNS) arrangements and engineering services. The reports even remarked on the quality of the infrastructure being used for the staging of personnel and equipment:

“Not all of the TAT was trouble free, but the TAT concept, and the process whereby it was implemented, showed considerable improvement from past operations and was the envy of other nations.”²¹

However, the Lessons Learned reports largely camouflaged some of the more significant tactical and strategic issues that were not being addressed. For one, there were significant tactical challenges with respect to communications, local security and the

¹⁷ Department of National Defence, *National Military Support Capability: NMSC Support Concept* (Ottawa: DND, 21 Sept 2000), 3.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 4

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 14

²⁰ See Table 1 for details about these operations.

²¹ Department of National Defence, “OP ATHENA Lessons Learned Staff Report,” J4 Log Lessons Learned (Ottawa: DND, 2005), 1.

materiel control, that significantly affected the capabilities of the force on the ground.²² These capabilities, which had been promised by the NMSC, were delayed from their original scheduled delivery in 2002.²³ From a strategic perspective, there were a number of missions for which the JSG was simply unable to generate TATs because of the delays of the NMSC project. The JSG was unable to generate a TAT for OP TOUCAN and for OP APOLLO due to a lack of available personnel.²⁴ This contributed to significant shortfalls in the activation, including the failure to implement a status of force agreements (SOFA) and memoranda of understanding (MOU) in time to support the deployment.²⁵ The lack of resources also prevented Canada from fulfilling a request from the United Nations:

“When asked for a... Theatre Activation Team as part of the United Nations Mission to Sudan (UNMISUD), the response was that no resources were available, resulting in a comment by a senior Canadian officer that this was a ‘disappointing response which will ultimately result in the death of [the United Nations High Readiness Brigade] as a relevant organisation.’”²⁶

There were certainly limits to which this very small pool of resources could support TATs, and these were beginning to have a negative impact at the strategic level.

²² These challenges are outlined in the following references: Department of National Defence, “Visit Report ALLC Visit to OP ECLIPSE,” Army Lessons Learned Centre 1630-1(Dir ALLC) (Kingston: DND, Jun 2001); Department of National Defence, “SO Trg ALLC Visit to OP ECLIPSE (TFEA) 17-22 Apr 01,” Army Lessons Learned Centre 1760-1(SO Trg) (Kingston: DND, June 2001); Department of National Defence, “Army POR OP HALO Phases 1-3,” (Kingston: DND, Feb 2002); and Department of National Defence, “OP ATHENA Lessons Learned Staff Report,” J4 Log Lessons Learned (Ottawa: DND, 2005).

²³ The trail of NMSC correspondence never progressed past the Preliminary Project Approval (PPA) stage before being taken over by CF Transformation activities. In the 2001 SS(PPA), the deliveries were scheduled to be begin in 2002.

²⁴ Department of National Defence, “OP APPOLLO J4 Log Lessons learned,” J4 Log (Ottawa: DND, 2004). This is also depicted in Table 1.

²⁵ *Ibid*

²⁶ Major David A. Wu, “Canada’s Past, Present and Potential Future Contributions to A United Nations High-Readiness, Rapid Reaction Military Capability,” *Canadian Military Journal* (Autumn 2005), 32.

In summary, the TA capability was initially a very effective solution to the problems associated with the increase in operational deployments in the 1990s. By pooling these resources under the JSG, the skill-sets required for the successful activation of theatres could be focused on this increasingly complex task. However, as the operational tempo continued to increase, these very limited strategic resources became overtasked, and they could no longer support the entire spectrum of requirements.

With CF Transformation and the mission in Kandahar, Afghanistan on the horizon, this situation would only deteriorate.

1.2 – CF TRANSFORMATION, SCTF AND CFOSC

This section will show that the work invested in the generation of TA within the JSG would meet its greatest challenge in 2005, when the CF turned its attention to transformation and to the increasingly taxing mission in Kandahar. Since then, it has been in the FG of the TA capability that deficiencies have been the greatest.

CF Transformation was a significant venture, which touched virtually every operational and strategic organisation across the entire Department, so it was an excellent opportunity to further a project such as the NMSC. By 2005, the JSG was still lacking the structure and resources that had been promised by this project, and it lacked the momentum to gain control of such organisations as the 3 Canadian Support Group (CSG) and the 4 Canadian Forces Movement Control Unit (CFMCU), which were still in the Assistant Deputy Minister Materiel (ADM(Mat)) Group.²⁷ Acknowledging the deficiencies of the NMSC, the CDS decreed that “The NMSC will be overtaken by the CF Transformation. Its mandate and work so far should be re-aligned to support the new CF vision and the creation of CANCOM/CEFCOM.”²⁸ This was positive from the

²⁷ Department of National Defence, CDS Action Team 1 (Command & Control), *Part IV - Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) C2 Structure* (Ottawa: DND, 2005), B12.

²⁸ *Ibid*, B11

perspective that it facilitated the transfer of those organisations from ADM(Mat) allowing the JSG to provide a higher level of operational support.

However, the benefits of CF Transformation were limited for TA. Although it was not initially apparent, it has now become clear that the additional resources and personnel that were promised by the NMSC project were lost in CF Transformation. For one, many of the resources that had originally been identified for the command and control (C2) of TA activities would be transferred to the newly conceptualized Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF).²⁹ However, this concept was short lived, “due to operational and fiscal pressure, and work on the SCTF was stood down in early 2007.”³⁰ Since then, the matter of the 627 positions that were to be transferred from the ECS to the JSG has never been resuscitated. It is certain, in any case, that by 2007 there would not have been any appetite to transfer any personnel from the ECS, which had become so overwhelmingly taxed in the mission in Afghanistan. Surely, with the significant resources invested in this theatre, there was little effort left to dedicate to a standing capability for some new mission. After five years in Afghanistan, the corporate memory of these 627 positions has essentially disappeared.

There was also the matter of the \$350M of capital funds that were originally allocated to the NMSC to purchase materiel resources for the TAT within the JSG. By 2008, the requirement for this funding was resurrected in the Strategic Capability Investment Plan (SCIP) with the creation of an omnibus Canadian Forces Operational Support Capability (CFOSC) project.³¹ Among the series of child projects that were initiated to address the various operational support gaps, a project called “Theatre Activation” was budgeted for \$350M.³² Contrary to the NMSC, which had at least

²⁹ Department of National Defence, CDS Action Team 1 (Command & Control), *Part IV - Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) C2 Structure* (Ottawa: DND, 2005), 3.

³⁰ “Royal Canadian Marine Corps: Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF),” Internet; <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/canada/scf.htm>; Accessed 19 Dec 2011.

³¹ MGen Daniel Benjamin, “Reachback with Key Stakeholders,” CANOSCOM Powerpoint Presentation (Ottawa: DND, 2008), 24.

³² Maj Bruce Brunelle, “Canadian Force Operational Support Capability (CFOSC),” Powerpoint Briefing by the Project Director (Ottawa: DND, 4 Nov 2011), 8.

achieved Preliminary Project Approval (PPA) by 2004, this new project was restarted at the very beginning of the project cycle, and to this day it has not advanced to the point that NMSC had achieved in 2002.³³ It is also noted that this new project does not include the 627 positions that were to be generated in the context of the NMSC. One can ask if the scope can now justify exactly the same amount of capital funds (i.e. \$350M) be allocated. Until the project reaches PPA, the cost analysis will not explore this level of detail.

Since CF Transformation, the deficiencies associated with TA continue to be related to FG. As was the case with OP APOLLO, the inability to meet TA requirements have been as a result of a constant battle between FG and FE within CANOSCOM. Rightly so, Commander CANOSCOM directed in his 2006 guidance that “FE and its associated support must remain our priority 1. FG and then Force Development (FD) will come after in terms of staff effort, in that order.”³⁴ Unfortunately, because of the constant focus on such a demanding mission in Afghanistan, all attempts to conduct any work on CONPLAN DISCUS “did not make much progress before it was suspended due to higher priority operational requirements given to the associated planning staff.”³⁵ In the past three years, the number of missions has also increased the workload for those constrained resources within CANOSCOM that would normally be available for TA. As a result, as can be seen in Table 1, most missions in which a TAT could have been deployed since CF Transformation in 2005 have not been supported by CANOSCOM-generated TAT.

³³ Department of National Defence, “SS(PPA), Omnibus Project 00000283 National Military Support Capability (NMSC)” (Ottawa: DND, 2001), 2.

³⁴ Department of National Defence, *CANOSCOM Commander’s Guidance*, 3000-1 (Comd) (Ottawa: DND, 3 Feb 2006), 2.

³⁵ Maj J.J. Reynders, “Future Update of COP DISCUS (Theatre Activation),” Briefing Note for OS J5 (Ottawa: DND, 17 May 2010), 2.

Table 1. Timeline of Theatre Activation Activities. This includes select operations that involved troops in sufficient numbers as to require a formal TA, not including missions that were uniquely DART or the NEO Company deployments.³⁶

Year	Mission	Mission Type	Sp by TAT?	Number of Pers in TAT and result
1999	OP KINETIC (Kosovo)	Expeditionary	No	0. Incited TA concept.
2000	OP ECLIPSE (Eritrea)	Expeditionary	Yes	82. Proved the concept.
2000	OP TOUCAN (East Timor)	Expeditionary	No	0. CF was integrated into lead-nation (Australia) support structure.
2002	OP HALO (Haiti)	Expeditionary	Yes	89
2004	OP APPOLLO (Afghanistan)	Expeditionary	No	0
2005	OP ATHENA (Afghanistan)	Expeditionary	Yes	305. “Most successful TA to date.” ³⁷
2008	EX TROPICAL HAMMER 0802 (Jamaica)	Expeditionary	Yes	50 from CANOSCOM. ³⁸
2010	OP HESTIA (Haiti)	Expeditionary	No	0. Many issues resulted from lack of TAT.
2010	OP PODIUM (Vancouver)	Domestic	Yes	15. CANOSCOM provided JTFSE leadership
2010	OP CADENCE (Toronto G8)	Domestic	No	0. LFCA conducted TA.
2011	OP ATTENTION (Kabul)	Expeditionary	Yes	75. ³⁹ CANOSCOM planned and executed.
2011	OP MOBILE (Libya)	Expeditionary	Yes	10. CANOSCOM contributed specialist support. ⁴⁰
2011	OP LOTUS (St-Jean-sur-Richelieu floods)	Domestic	No	0. LFQA conducted their own TA.
2011	OP NANOOK (SOVOP in Resolute Bay, Nunavut)	Domestic	No	CANOSCOM contributes 5-10 pers to assist in TA.

There was one recommendation that was identified in the process of CF Transformation that was perhaps not fully addressed in the reorganisations:

³⁶ The details of the TAT OP HALO, ECLIPSE and ATHENA was extracted from the Canadian Forces Taskings, Plans and Operations (CFTPO) software on 24 Feb 2011.

³⁷ Maj J.A. Lycon, “TA Minute,” Project Definition Support (Ottawa: DND, 17 Apr 2007), 1.

³⁸ The details about EX TROPICAL HAMMER is inferred from the capabilities that were provided that the TAT as detailed in: Department of National Defence, “EX TROPICAL HAMMER Theatre Activation Team,” CFJSG LL Report (Ottawa: DND, 14 Jan 2009).

³⁹ Department of National Defence, “Canadian Contribution Training Mission – Afghanistan,” Internet; <http://www.army.gc.ca/IAOL/143000440001753/143000440001754/HTMLFiles/CCTM-A%20Backgrounder.pdf>; accessed 20 Feb 2012.

⁴⁰ Department of National Defence, “AAR - Theatre Activation Team Task Force Libeccio,” 3350-1 (TAT Comd) (Ottawa: DND, 17 May 2011).

“It does not make sense to separate the Force Generation of support elements while also force generating a Task Force for deployment in two different commands, since the interaction and dependencies are closely linked.”⁴¹

Although this statement referred to the split of the National Support Elements (NSE) between the DCDS and ADM(Mat), the same logic could be applied to shortcomings of the TA capability. This statement captures the conflict between the FG of support personnel in the TAT, a CANOSCOM responsibility, and the FG of support personnel within the ECS for the follow-on force. When support resources are limited, as they have been since the inception of the TA concept, then they are most efficiently allocated when they are within the same organisation. Whether or not the support personnel truly have unique skillsets in CANOSCOM in order to be able to perform TA tasks is thus an important question, and one that will be addressed in the next chapter.

In summary, the inability of the DCDS to generate the full range of TA requirements was never fully addressed with CF Transformation. In one sense, CF Transformation did advance the NMSC project, as it facilitated the creation of the JSG structure, but it also witnessed the termination of the NMSC capital project, as its capabilities were foreseen to be captured in the new SCTF capability. However, SCTF would also be short-lived, and by 2008 the capability requirements would be recaptured in a child project within the CFOSC, new project much less far along the acquisition cycle than the NMSC had achieved in 2002. The personnel increases that were promised were lost with the short-lived SCTF and the resource-intensive mission in Afghanistan. As a result, the problems associated with the FG of TA continue unresolved today within CANOSCOM, as those resources are already tasked on FE tasks.

⁴¹ Department of National Defence, CDS Action Team 1 (Command & Control), *Part IV - Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) C2 Structure* (Ottawa: DND, 2005), B11.

1.3 – DEFINITIONS OF THEATRE ACTIVATION

As shown in the previous sections, when previous TA projects, such as the NMSC, were presented as a primarily sustainment function, they have been quick to lose support from the central leadership, who has to balance constrained resources with the requirement to achieve operational effects. In this section, it will be shown that the definitions for TA have lacked congruency with the entire range of activities that must be conducted, including tasks at tactical and strategic levels as well. These inconsistencies have contributed to the lack of support that TA projects have been able to gain.

First of all, it is important to note that TA has largely been understood by its parent organisation as being an activity that is much larger than operational-level support.⁴² The CANOSCOM J3 will attest that many of the first actions conducted during a TA are actually tactical-level activities, and this is reflected in the structure depicted in Figure 1.⁴³ For example, before bed-down and real-life support (RLS) arrangements can be developed, there is an intrinsic requirement for local (i.e. tactical) security of the TAT and of any enablers that are accompanying it, hence the requirement for a Defence and Security (D&S) Company. There is also a requirement, before the various PODs can be fully exploited, that situational awareness be developed about any tactical threats, to ensure that ingressing forces can be received safely into the joint operations area (JOA).⁴⁴ These activities are often referred to as “reconnaissance”, rather than “activation” by the operator community. However, these tactical activities are nonetheless important to enable the conduct of operational-level TA tasks, such as bed-down and support arrangements.

Along with tactical tasks, CANOSCOM personnel would also acknowledge an increasingly important strategic-level requirement, which is to create a public perception that forces are conducting immediate effects as quickly as possible. During OP HESTIA,

⁴² By “parent organisation”, this refers to the JSG prior to 2006 and to CANOSCOM after 2006.

⁴³ Col Ann-Marie Tardif, “Notes d’entrevue,” CANOSCOM J3, E-mail exchange with author, 13 February 2012.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*

for example, the requirement to respond publicly to the desperate situation following the 2010 Earthquake in Haiti led to the first air chucks being filled almost completely with media and public affairs personnel.⁴⁵ Even though this delayed the activation process, these first images of Canadian soldiers distributing humanitarian aid were essential to reassure both the Haitian and Canadian populations that help was on the way. It would be inappropriate if one were to conduct TA without also considering this strategic requirement.




Figure 1. TA Composition for a Battlegroup-Size (i.e. 1500+) JTF

Source: Col C.C. Thurrott, "Comd TA Presentation Brief – V4." Powerpoint Presentation. Ottawa: DND, 18 April 2007.

⁴⁵ Lcol Daniel Rivière, "2012-02-12 (U) Sondage-Questionnaire MDS Devon Matsalla," E-mail exchange with author, 12 February 2012.

However, the definition of TA, as outlined in NMSC, failed to capture these non-sustainment activities that the operational support community deem so essential. For example, the NMSC Synopsis Sheet for Preliminary Project Approval (SS(PPA)) limited its definition of TA to

...the establishment of movement control, RSOI, reality assessment, bed-down of forces, support arrangements, coordination of allied support, the establishment of contracts and environmental assessments.⁴⁶

It does not acknowledge the requirement for synchronisation with local security, reconnaissance, intelligence, or for public affairs outlined in the last paragraph. Of course, other documents, such as draft CONPLAN DISCUS, would outline a requirement for a liaison reconnaissance team (LRT) to be among the first elements to deploy in order “to commence information gathering, host nation and allied liaison”.⁴⁷ However, this CONPLAN was never approved, so its documentation would not have accompanied the NMSC SS(PPA) when it was being discussed at NDHQ.⁴⁸ Unfortunately, PMB was presented with NMSC as a largely *sustainment* project, without acknowledging the role or mandate of other L1s to facilitate it.⁴⁹ This is perhaps a factor that contributed to its eventual cancellation.

Despite the fact that TA contains so many activities, the responsibility for generating a TAT has still been depicted as a mainly *sustainment* role, which raises challenges when key elements are required by L1s other than CANOSCOM. CANOSCOM’s role to generate most of the TAT stems from the CDS Initial Planning Guidance, “to generate task-tailored operational support organisations for employment in

⁴⁶ Department of National Defence, *National Military Support Capability: NMSC Support Concept* (Ottawa: DND, 21 Sept 2000), 5.

⁴⁷ Department of National Defence, “CONOP DISCUS 9201/02: Operational Level Theatre Activation – Version 6-01,” CF Joint Operations Group (Kingston: DND, 2004), 2.

⁴⁸ Department of National Defence, “SS(PPA), Omnibus Project 00000283 National Military Support Capability (NMSC)” (Ottawa: DND, 2001), 1.

⁴⁹ In particular, the Army, RCAF and RCN are among the L1 organisations that would not likely have perceived the benefit to their own organisations as compared to their own projects that were being considered in competition with NMSC. Footnote 8 provides explanations about L1 organisations.

theatre activation and opening...”⁵⁰ As such, it is not surprising that the FG breakdown of CONPLAN DISCUS, shown Figure 1, would be so heavily dependent on resources from CANOSCOM. The problem lies when CANOSCOM is unable to generate the full spectrum of these resources, which is inevitable considering the massive size of the organisation of over 500 personnel.⁵¹ Whatever holes that CANOSCOM is unable to fill are automatically tasked to other L1s to generate reinforcements. However, in this approach, the ECS are entirely reactive: no matter no important they may see the activity, they are not positioned to assign a high priority to generate reinforcements for a mandate that is seemingly CANOSCOM’s to fill. Without a specific mandate to FG any specific elements of the structure, the ECS cannot lean forward and maximize their contribution to TA.

In reality, the FG of TATs has in fact turned out to be a significant challenge for CANOSCOM, which explains why the sizes of the TATs in Table 1 were nowhere close to the requirement outlined in Figure 1. Originally, back in 2004, the NMSC intended to address these deficiencies by reinforcing the JSG with additional resources. The SS(PPA) mandated that L1s transfer as many as 627 positions to the JSG, in addition to 362 new positions that would be funded by the project, horsepower that the JSG required to be able to fulfill its FG role.⁵² When NMSC was cancelled, these additional resources were also lost, and the new CFOSC project has not recaptured these within its scope.⁵³ So for recent missions, when a TAT was required, CANOSCOM has had the unfortunate burden of negotiating with other L1s to provide individual augmentees until the full effective strength of the TAT is generated. However, because the ECS have no mandated priority to support the TAT, these augmentees have largely been deficient, many with no

⁵⁰ Chief of the Defence Staff, *CDS Initial Planning Guidance – Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM)* (Ottawa: DND, 26 January 2006), 2.

⁵¹ The JSG J5 attests that the complete generation of an organisation of this size would be unfeasible without external reinforcements. Maj Dwayne Atkinson, “TAT Questions,” Email exchange with the author, 23 February 2012.

⁵² Department of National Defence, “SS(PPA), Omnibus Project 00000283 National Military Support Capability (NMSC)” (Ottawa: DND, 2001), 2.

⁵³ The CFOSC TA child project current only has a capital component, with no references to the transfer or addition of personnel resources.

background or experience in TA. Once again, because the FG of TA is portrayed as falling primarily on the support community, other L1s will invest little efforts to support.

Finally, there have been inconsistencies with respect to the form that TA organisations have taken in the past few years. If, as CONPLAN DISCUS defines, “TA is the process to project a military task force to allow it to be deployed and employed in a theatre of operations,” then one would expect that any organisation called a “TAT” should be fully equipped to do so. In terms of the size, CANOSCOM has concluded that a TAT should vary from as small as 83 personnel, for a “small scale deployment (less than a battlegroup)”, to the 518-man organisation shown in Figure 1.⁵⁴ In Table 1, the first deployments from 2000-2005 appear to support these orders of magnitude. However, since then, a TAT has meant much less in terms of numbers. For example, the “TAT” that was deployed to OP MOBILE consisted of only 10 persons, and their After Action Report (AAR) makes no mention that they lacked any specific capabilities.⁵⁵ Even the 75-man TAT in OP ATTENTION seems to be well under CANOSCOM’s analysis.⁵⁶ As a result, it would have been the forces in place, as generated by the ECS, that took on the tasks that these “TATs” were not manned to conduct. This illustrates a migration of responsibility for TAT-type tasks from CANOSCOM to the forces generated by the ECS. Once again, if these tasks are already being conducted by the ECS, it is difficult to justify a project that would see these same capabilities developed in CANOSCOM.

⁵⁴ The smallest TAT organisation was found in Department of National Defence, “NDHQ Proposal, Tab B – TAT Org.” JSG Powerpoint presentation (Ottawa: DND, 18 January 2005). The largest reference to a TAT organisation was in Col C.C. Thurrott, “Comd TA Presentation Brief – V4,” Powerpoint Presentation (Ottawa: DND, 18 April 2007). This document further states that this composition is for a “deliberate TA,” where the organisation starts initially at 180 days notice-to-move. In the last version of CONPLAN DISCUS, there is no mention of a “deliberate TA”, and all elements of the TA are at either 2 days or 7 days notice to move. This further illustrates the lack of consistency in the definition of TA over the past 10 years.

⁵⁵ Department of National Defence, “AAR - Theatre Activation Team Task Force Libeccio,” 3350-1 (TAT Comd) (Ottawa: DND, 17 May 2011).

⁵⁶ Col C.C. Thurrott, “Comd TA Presentation Brief – V4,” Powerpoint Presentation (Ottawa: DND, 18 April 2007).

If anything has been learned from the past, it is that TA initiatives are unlikely to gain lasting support if they focus uniquely on the sustainment aspects of establishing a theatre footprint. It was for this reason that the L1s were so reluctant to support and provide positions to the NMSC project, which eventually led to its termination. Future TA projects, such as CFOSC, must capture the entire spectrum of tactical, operational and strategic activities that must be performed during the first critical days of a deployment, and the FG mandate of these troops also needs to be directed to a larger community than just the operational support organisation. Only a clear, stated mandate for the FG of specific capabilities will allow the ECS to be more proactive in maximizing their contribution to TA activities.

CONCLUSION

In summary, it was because of the deficiencies during the Canadian mission in Kosovo that the NMSC project was initiated to develop a TA capability. Some initial moves were made to prove the concept; however no formalized strategic direction or an approved contingency plan was ever formalized. CF Transformation overtook the project in 2005 and succeeded in establishing the JSG in order to conduct both FG and FE of TA capabilities. However, the project itself, as well as the personnel and funding it encompassed, were cancelled, largely because the operational tempo in Afghanistan was focusing attention to projects more directly in support of operations. Since then, the CFOSC has been created to recapture some of the same capabilities that the NMSC espoused; however, its approvals are far behind where the NMSC had succeeded in obtaining, and the requirement to generate additional personnel never followed suit.

Some of NMSC's challenges could be attributed to its definition of TA, which focused so heavily on *sustainment* activities, rather than acknowledge the broad range of operational, tactical and strategic activities that must inevitably be done during activation. As a result, it paled when presented to PMB alongside other, more holistic, projects. Even the plan to generate TATs, as outlined in CONPLAN DISCUS, focuses the responsibility almost entirely on CANOSCOM, with no specific mandate to other L1s

other than for individual reinforcements that CANOSCOM is unable to generate. As a result, the ECS have been largely reactive in supporting to the generation of TATs, and their contributions have been heavily weighted against their own activities. Future TA projects and revisions of CONPLAN DISCUS should assign specific responsibilities to the ECS' to allow them to be proactive in developing their contribution to TA. After all, they have proven to be able to fulfill requirements effectively even during recent operations, when CANOSCOM's contribution has been limited to only a handful of soldiers.

The next chapter will expand on the ECS' capabilities to generate TA when they are given a specific mandate.

CHAPTER 2 – THE OPERATIONAL CHOKEPOINT

INTRODUCTION

The operation of landing in face of an enemy is the most complicated and difficult in war.

- Sir Ian Hamilton: Gallipoli Diary, 1920.⁵⁷

The “firsts” of any operational venture are usually the most complex and most important. Establishing a first support arrangement is more complex, and more important, than calling upon an existing offer. Establishing a first camp bed-down is generally more complex than erecting a building on an existing camp, and building a first satellite link is more complex than maintaining an existing one. Therefore, in the conduct of such a “first” activity, such as TA, it is logical to pool the resources with the skillsets and experience within CANOSCOM.

However, in the past two years, the CF have been involved in an unprecedented number of deployments, much more than CONPLAN DISCUS had ever predicted.⁵⁸ 2010 alone experienced the activation of at least four significant deployments, including OP PODIUM at the Olympics, OP HESTIA in Haiti, OP CADENCE in Toronto and OP NANOOK in the Northwest Territories. Plus there was a large exercise, EX RAPID REFLEX, involving over 2000 Canadian soldiers in California, and planning had begun for the activation of OP ATTENTION in Kabul.⁵⁹ Where the requirement for TA has exceeded the capacity of CANOSCOM to generate TATs, the deploying forces have had to ad-hoc their activations. Some results were, as one could expect, a repeat of the issues

⁵⁷ Robert Deb Heintz, *Dictionary of military and naval quotations* (Annapolis, MD: The U.S. Naval Institute, 1966), 11.

⁵⁸ CONPLAN DISCUS Draft assesses that the JOG could only deploy a maximum of two TATs per year. Department of National Defence, “CONOP DISCUS 9201/02: Operational Level Theatre Activation – Version 6-01,” CF Joint Operations Group (Kingston: DND, 2004), 4.

⁵⁹ Department of National Defence, “Canada Command: OP NANOOK 2010,” Internet; <http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca/daily/archive-nanook10-eng.asp>; accessed 19 Dec 2011.

experienced in early missions that were not supported by a TAT. However, the ECS have taken measures to mitigate the damage, and the results are remarkable.

This chapter shows that although some special skill-sets are required for TA, most are transferable, and with some guidance from CANOSCOM, the ECS have been able to generate competent TA capabilities for FE tasks.

This chapter will specifically look at TA in those missions in the past three years for which CANOSCOM could not contribute a TAT. It will be shown that as a result of the deficiencies experienced during OP HESTIA, Land Force Québec Area (LFQA) took measures to develop their own TA capability that eventually proved effective during the 2011 St-Jean floods (OP LOTUS). It will also be shown that the RCAF is taking measures to improve their expeditionary capabilities as a result of deficiencies observed during OP HESTIA and OP MOBILE. If, as suggested in Chapter 1, it is so unlikely that CANOSCOM will be resourced to support the activation of such a high tempo of operations, there is at least an alternative within the ECS.

2.1 – THE THEATRE ACTIVATION OF OP HESTIA:

OP HESTIA is an ideal scenario to study how TA should have been conducted because so many influencers at the tactical and strategic levels were working against the operational-level tasks. For the first month of the deployment into Haiti following the 2010 Earthquake, there were both successes and failures at all levels and many lessons to be learned.

At the strategic level, there was much pressure in Haïti to publicize the successes being conducted by the CF as quickly as possible. Independent of their ability to bed themselves down and begin conducting operations, there was a requirement to provide images of Canadian military personnel arriving en masse into the theatre, distributing humanitarian aid and demonstrating Canadian resolve. The following quote from the Globe and Mail captures the strategic impact of the robust Canadian presence:

Mr. Dee was able to see and hear what exactly was going on at the Port-au-Prince airport. “I’m sitting in the flight deck on our descent into Port-au-Prince and I cannot be more proud to be Canadian,” he told *The Globe* in an email Saturday. “There are four aircraft on approach to the airport – three are Canadian – us, the Canadian Forces Hercules and a Canadian Forces C-17. The fourth is a Russian Ilyushin. The banter between the tower and the aircraft is music to our ears – ‘Air Canada, CanForce, Air Canada, CanForce.’ You’d think the only ones here are the Canadians.”⁶⁰

The fact that CF members on the ground were working in highly austere conditions, helping others in despair despite their own discomforts, perhaps even reinforced this message of dedication to the cause.

Also from a strategic perspective, the earthquake in Haiti was also the first opportunity since the 2005 CF Transformation and the ill-fated SCTF to conduct a truly joint mission, so there was bound to be growing pains.⁶¹ Land, Air and Maritime, plus such strategic-level resources as the Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) and the 1st Canadian Field Hospital (CFH) would all come together and compete for the same few resources that could provide TA support.⁶² It could scarcely have been more complex, because those resources that would normally have been involved in TA were already committed in the support to the 2010 Vancouver Olympics, Operation PODIUM, or to the continuing support of the mission in Afghanistan.⁶³ The only TA resources available, such as contracting, engineering and information support personnel, were prioritized to the DART, which had been mandated to deploy with its own integral TA resources as it had practised in four previous missions.⁶⁴ However these were only sufficient to support

⁶⁰ Jane Taber, “Jann Arden Raises a Glass with the Harpers”, *Globe and Mail*. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-notebook/jann-arden-raises-a-glass-with-the-harpers/article1434703/>, 18 Jan 2010.

⁶¹ Department of National Defence, “OP HESTIA – MCC End of Tour Report,” 3350-1 (MCC Ops), JTF(H) Maritime Component (Halifax: DND, March 2010), 5.

⁶² Department of National Defence, “Operation HESTIA,” Internet; <http://www.cefc.comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/hestia/index-eng.asp>; accessed 19 Dec 2011.

⁶³ Lcol Daniel Rivière, “2012-02-12 (U) Sondage-Questionnaire MDS Devon Matsalla,” JTF(H) JTFSE CO, E-mail exchange with the author, 12 February 2012.

⁶⁴ Department of National Defence, “The Disaster Assistance Response Team,” Internet; <http://www.cefc.comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/fs-fr/dart-eicc-eng.asp>; accessed 19 Dec 2011.

the bed-down and support requirements for the 200-strong organisation.⁶⁵ So, when 6 Griffon helicopters, a Mission Support Flight (MSF), the CFH and 3rd Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment (3R22R), began to reach PAP, the DART's TA personnel were already preoccupied with the establishment of a DART camp some four-hour drive away in Jacmel.⁶⁶ As this was a "first" in terms of Joint missions since CF Transformation, there was no means in place to generate additional TA capacities to support the remainder of the force.

At the tactical level, there were also factors that prevented an effective TA during the first month of the mission. Following the earthquake, there was a huge requirement for medical support, water and humanitarian materials for the population of over 3 million affected Haitians. As a result, aircraft that did not contain humanitarian aid and medical supplies were being denied entry into the various airports of disembarkation (APODs).⁶⁷ Any resources that were specifically designed to support the force, including logistic, maintenance, construction engineering (CE), contracting and military police, were being delayed in the flight schedules, replaced by organisations such as the 1st CFH and Red Cross humanitarian flights. Also, those organisations that had deployed were faced with a desperate population, which was resorting to violence to gain access to humanitarian aid.⁶⁸ Any extra seats in the flight were therefore being filled with combat arms personnel to address the mounting security threat, rather than TA capabilities.

The lesson learned that has been most frequently cited by all three services about the deployment into Haïti was the requirement to balance the inflow of both effects and sustainment capabilities. Despite the strategic and tactical factors that were acting against the ingress of support, the theatre reports are filled with assessments that

⁶⁵ Maj Dwayne Atkinson, "TAT Questions to J3 CFJSG," E-mail exchange with the Author, 12 Feb 2011.

⁶⁶ Department of National Defence, "Operational and Strategic Lessons – Op HESTIA," *Joint Lessons Learned Report* 01/10, 3350-1 (Joint LL Team Leader), (Kingston, ON: DND, 12 April 2010), 1.

⁶⁷ Devon Matsalla, and Daniel Rivière, "Sustainment of Hasty Deployments: Lessons Learned from OP HESTIA," *Canadian Army Journal* Vol 13.3 (Autumn 2010), 90.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 95

additional measures should nonetheless have been taken to facilitate a better deployment timeline:

“Self-sufficiency is vital so that the forces can focus on the delivering effects immediately on deployment vice seeking support.”⁶⁹

“Better planning, management of airflow would have led to greater operational effectiveness earlier.”⁷⁰

“Both the DART and the Role 2 Hospital would have benefited from a more streamline deployment into theatre”.⁷¹

“Many elements that were receiving personnel with no kit or equipment, or receiving equipment with no personnel to use it [which] did nothing to increase our capability.”⁷²

“One must deploy the equivalent of a Forward Logistics Group (FLG) in advance of the main body of the JTFSE focused on LPO, contracting and transport.”⁷³

Perhaps one of the most important lessons captured was that during this period of high operational tempo, the JTF could not count on a TAT from CANOSCOM. It is therefore not surprising that these organisations would immediately take actions to develop their own contingencies to conduct their TA if required in the future.

It has been shown that a number of strategic factors prevented a TAT from being generated and deployed to Haïti during the first month of the mission. The resulting impact was particularly serious on the operability of the force, and the lessons learned documentation unanimously recommends that actions be taken to mitigate these effects in the future. In the following two sections, it will be shown what actions were taken by land and air components.

⁶⁹ Department of National Defence, “Operational and Strategic Lessons – Op HESTIA,” *Joint Lessons Learned Report* 01/10, 3350-1 (Joint LL Team Leader), (Kingston, ON: DND, 12 April 2010), 2.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*

⁷¹ *Ibid*

⁷² Department of National Defence, “OP HESTIA – MCC End of Tour Report,” 3350-1 (MCC Ops), JTF(H) Maritime Component (Halifax: DND, March 2010), 2.

⁷³ Department of National Defence, “Air Component,” 3350-165 (ACC), (Winnipeg: DND, 21 March 2010), 9.

2.2 – ACTIONS TAKEN BY LFQA

Among the various services that were involved in OP HESTIA, the one that was perhaps most affected by the lack of adequate TA was the Land Component Commander (LCC) generated by LFQA. The Maritime Component Commander (MCC) is a deployable capability in its structure, and it was therefore able to support itself by the establishment of a hub in Kingston, Jamaica for most services not available in Haiti.⁷⁴ The Air Component Commander (ACC) as well, although it certainly had some challenges, had nonetheless the operational mobility to secure resources through links with Canada, with Canadian ships and with other APODs in the region. Also, as mentioned previously, the DART had deployed with its own TA capability. As the largest element in Haiti, whose equipment would arrive by ship only a month after the earthquake, the LCC had the greatest requirement for such services as transport, water, waste and engineer support.⁷⁵ The LCC therefore had good reason to develop their own contingency plan so as to prevent similar situations during future deployments.

Bound to address this problem, the Commanding Officer (CO) of the JTFSE would have the opportunity to apply these lessons learned in the year following OP HESTIA. In February 2011, exercise GUERRIER NORDIQUE would involve the deployment of over 1600 soldiers and airmen from three different countries into an austere operational theatre in Northern Québec for over a month, and the JTFSE CO would have the mandate to provide all means of operational and tactical support, including TA.⁷⁶ He recognized that this exercise was truly an operational-level event, and that the task of TA would be significant, perhaps even near the same level as the activation as a theatre such as OP HESTIA.⁷⁷ For one, the ground lines of

⁷⁴ Department of National Defence, “OP HESTIA – MCC End of Tour Report,” 3350-1 (MCC Ops), JTF(H) Maritime Component (Halifax: DND, March 2010), 2.

⁷⁵ Major Jean-François Claveau, “Op HESTIA Planning : A Great Big Puzzle,” *The Army Lessons Learned Centre Bulletin*, Vol 15, No 2, (Dec 2010), 2-4.

⁷⁶ Lcol Daniel Rivière, “2012-02-12 (U) Sondage-Questionnaire MDS Devon Matsalla,” JTF(H) JTFSE CO, E-mail exchange with the author, 12 February 2012.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*

communication (GLOCs) would stretch over 1700 km, and most soldiers would have to drive four days over treacherous icy roads in blizzard conditions just to reach the base camp at La Grande, QC.⁷⁸ Also, infrastructure was limited, with only a few services available, and the Aboriginal populations in the area were very unfamiliar with the Canadian military. This exercise was therefore an ideal opportunity to design a TA capability within LFQA that could perhaps be used to address some of the issues that had been experienced in Haiti.

The first conclusion that was fully supported by the LFQA Chain of Command was the designation of the Theatre Support (TS) Company that would have the mandate of all measures of operational support, most importantly TA.⁷⁹ This company was resourced with CE, contracting, HSS, logistic and military police elements from all around LFQA in a construct very similar to that identified in CONPLAN DISCUS.⁸⁰ Because they lacked some of the all-so-important expertise and experience in TA, their second conclusion was that they would require a significant training programme to bring the TS Company up to the task. A four month program involved both specialist and collective training, as this 100+-man organisation was asked to activate progressively more complex scenarios during a series of training events.⁸¹ Finally, the third conclusion was to keep the TS Company under the same command as the Company assigned with tactical support, the Close Support (CS) Company. This way, as the priority ebbed and flowed between TA and general support tasks, personnel could be “more easily organised as a function of the priorities set by the Commander.”⁸²

⁷⁸ Maj Nathalie Boisvert, “MDS – Theatre Activation,” E-mail exchange with author, 12 February 2012.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*

⁸⁰ Structure of the organisation chart from Department of National Defence, “EX GUERRIER NORDIQUE, Annexe A, Organisation pour la tâche – ESI (période de pointe),” O OP 01 (BFC Valcartier: 5e Bn S du C, 8 février 2011), is evidently similar to that depicted in Department of National Defence, “Theatre Activation Adv JTF (Large),” CFJOG Powerpoint Presentation (Kingston: DND, 2004), suggesting consistency in the capabilities required for TA.

⁸¹ Lcol Daniel Rivière, “2012-02-12 (U) Sondage-Questionnaire MDS Devon Matsalla,” JTF(H) JTFSE CO, E-mail exchange with the author, 12 February 2012.

⁸² *Ibid*

By EX GUERRIER NORDIQUE, the TS Company was able to deploy and establish a robust set of in-flow, bed-down and support arrangements that were applauded by troops that were being RSOI into the region.⁸³ As a result of a successful activation, there were no delays in training despite very significant environmental challenges, and there was adequate support throughout the exercise.

With a hind view of OP HESTIA, the CO decided to maintain the TS Company in tact even after the exercise, justifying it as a requirement to support domestic operations. This decision would pay off. Three months after EX GUERRIER NORDIQUE, in May 2011, the Richelieu River flooded to historic levels, and the provincial government requested a military force to provide humanitarian support to the affected population. In the context of OP LOTUS, the TS Company would receive its first operational mission to activate the theatre of St-Jean, QC. Even despite an understandable enthusiasm of the combat manoeuvre elements to deploy as rapidly as possible into the Richelieu region, the TS Coy was still able to deploy in advance and facilitate the bed-down and support arrangements of the entire force of 800 soldiers.⁸⁴ Although there were still a few challenges that had to be worked through, the deployment certainly validated the concept of a TAT within LFQA.⁸⁵

If there was to be a similar earthquake in Haiti today, it is very likely that a LFQA-based LCC would live a very different deployment. The lessons learned from OP HESTIA, EX GUERRIER NORDIQUE and OP LOTUS have demonstrated to the Army the pertinence of keeping a TAT at high readiness and deploying it among the first units on the ground. The capabilities for specialised services such as contracting personnel and construction engineers have now been pooled and prepared so that they can conduct those

⁸³ Maj Nathalie Boisvert, “MDS – Theatre Activation,” E-mail exchange with author, 12 February 2012.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*

⁸⁵ The only expertise SQFT lacked was a contracting capability. An infantry Captain with no prior experience had been provided a two-day contracts training course by CANOSCOM before being designated as the Contracting Officer for the contingent. However in hindsight the TS Coy Commander admits that the capabilities were still deficient. Maj Nathalie Boisvert, “MDS – Theatre Activation,” E-mail exchange with author, 12 February 2012.

key tasks as soon as possible during the deployment. The time that will be taken to guarantee a RSOMI capability for the JTF will not only increase their flexibility and sustainability, but it will prevent the significant costs associated with a loss of in-transit visibility (ITV). In the words of the former JTFSE CO:

“[LFQA] can now maintain and, with ease, assume a solid command and control of operational level elements, since, following OP PODIUM, OP HESTIA, OP CADENCE and OP LOTUS, a culture of competence in deployed operations has been formally reinforced. In the past two years, we have rethought the means through which we force-generated and maintained the readiness of a modular support element, adaptable to any mission (expeditionary or domestic), including in the specialised realm of NBC, with all the enablers required (or at a minimum access to these), with a view that never again can we permit the difficulties that we encountered during OP HESTIA. Contingency plans are now in place, investments have been committed, the posture is viable (even enviable). In short, we are *supporting soldiers and their systems, anywhere, anytime, together.*”⁸⁶

Whether or not this capability was actually mandated by the CF, it now exists within LFQA. It would be wise for the strategic decision makers to make best use of this new resource, especially when the strategic TAT is unavailable.

In summary, LFQA learned a hard lesson in Haiti as a result of the lack of a TAT on the ground. However, EX GUERRIER NORDIQUE, only a few months after OP HESTIA, would provide an ideal framework in which a solution could be developed. Through a deliberate mounting process, a TS Company was designed using resources coming from within the LFA to perform the TA for a force of 1600 pers from three nations and various OGDs. The capability was then applied to the TA of OP LOTUS during the flooding of the Richelieu River, once again demonstrating its effectiveness. It is true that significant expertise is required for TA and that these resources in CANOSCOM are rare; however, LFQA has effectively proven that these skillsets can be developed outside of CANOSCOM as well. Now that this capability exists, it would be wise for CANOSCOM to leverage its potential.

⁸⁶ Lcol Daniel Rivière, “2012-02-12 (U) Sondage-Questionnaire MDS Devon Matsalla,” JTF(H) JTFSE CO, E-mail exchange with the author, 12 February 2012, translated from French by author.

In the next section, it will be shown that not only the Army, but the RCAF has also been successful in developing a TA capability.

2.3 –THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE CONCEPT

Following CF Transformation, it was identified that the RCAF would also be required to deploy an expeditionary capability, which resulted in an Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) CONPLAN draft in 2008. OP HESTIA was the AEW's first deployment and one in which they had to conduct many of the tasks that a CANOSCOM-generated TAT would have done. Although there were many challenges, the AEW was nonetheless able to conduct their own activation because they had built redundancies within their organisation. They have since had an opportunity to apply the lessons learned during OP MOBILE in Libya in 2011 and continue developing their own TA capabilities.

The RCAF has always had a solid understanding of their requirement to deploy an expeditionary capability, the success of the bombing campaign in Serbia in 1999 being a prime example. However, it would not be until 2008 that 1 Canadian Air Division (CAD) would finally capture in a formal contingency plan the deployment and employment of an AEW Task Force.⁸⁷ The concept involved the ability to operate in “relatively austere conditions, under medium-high ground and air threat conditions.”⁸⁸ As a result, a key aspect of the deployment included the activation of the theatre, at least that part of the theatre that deals specifically with the operation of the APOD.

Although 1 CAD acknowledged the role of CANOSCOM to provide a TAT, many of the tasks that would typically have fallen on the TAT were in fact being conducted by the AEW. For example, the pre-deployment phase sees 1 CAD generating “a recce team to be deployed to the [theatre] to confirm HNS arrangements and available

⁸⁷ Department of National Defence, “1 Canadian Air Division Air Expeditionary Wing CONPLAN,” 3350-1 (A3 FTR NATO) (Winnipeg: 1 CAD HQ, 31 Aug 2008), 1.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 2

infrastructure as soon as is reasonably possible.”⁸⁹ Also, the rear-link communications for the recce party is being provided by 8 Air Communications and Control Squadron (ACCS).⁹⁰ CONPLAN DISCUS rather states that these responsibilities for HNS, infrastructure and rear-link would normally have fallen on the TAT generated by CANOSCOM, not on the deploying force.⁹¹ In fact, 1 CAD appears to see the TAT *in support of* an activation conducted by 1 CAD, rather than conducting the activation itself, in that CANOSCOM “will *assist* in the deployment and reception of the forces... and *assist* with the preparation of the bed-down plan.”⁹² In fact, according to the AEW timeline, the TAT would not deploy before Day 7 after the activation order; whereas elements of the AEW operational recce would deploy as soon as Day 2, which is also in contrast with CONPLAN DISCUS, which sees the TAT deploying within 48 hours.⁹³ Clearly there is a disconnect between these two CONPLANS.

When questioned about these tasks, experts in 1 CAD attest that the requirements for bed-down, communications and support are highly specialised for the AEW and require expertise from within the organisation. Such issues as fleet airworthiness and aircraft maintenance procedures have very specific requirements for rear-link communications, for example, so 8 ACCS retains the mandate to conduct the entire spectrum of activation and operational support for these elements.⁹⁴ Bed-down and infrastructure arrangements also have to meet specific requirements for aircrew and flight safety during sustained operations, and as a result, aviators prefer to have some influence on the conduct of the bed-down arrangements made during TA.⁹⁵ It is also of note that CONPLAN DISCUS had not been updated since its 2004 draft, and it did not take into

⁸⁹ *Ibid*

⁹⁰ *Ibid*. Note that 8 ACCS is the primary communications provider for 1 CAD.

⁹¹ Department of National Defence, “CONOP DISCUS 9201/02: Operational Level Theatre Activation – Version 6-01,” CF Joint Operations Group (Kingston: DND, 2004), 4.

⁹² Department of National Defence, “1 Canadian Air Division Air Expeditionary Wing CONPLAN,” 3350-1 (A3 FTR NATO) (Winnipeg: 1 CAD HQ, 31 Aug 2008), 17.

⁹³ *Ibid*, 33

⁹⁴ LCol Cathy Blue, “Interview – TA Points,” E-mail exchange with the author, 28 February 2012.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*

account the AEW's requirements, which were published in 2008. Also, until 2010, there had been no opportunity to test the plans together during an operational deployment, so in the absence of any data, there was likely no urgency to address the issue.

In 2010, it was those redundancies in the AEW concept that would contribute to the success of its first implementation during OP HESTIA. Although CANOSCOM never generated a TAT, the ACC was nonetheless equipped to secure infrastructure and rear-link communications for their 6 CH-146 helicopters, a MSF and an Airlift Coordination Element (ALCE).⁹⁶ Arriving as soon as Day 2 after the earthquake, the ACC were "amongst the first CF units to arrive in Haiti, and they became the de facto RSOM location for deploying elements into theatre."⁹⁷ As 8 ACCS had already managed to establish a rear-link connection, they could also provide limited bandwidth to the first elements of the JTF HQ, to the JTFSE's movement control (MC) det as well as support non-military flights.⁹⁸ There were nonetheless significant challenges for the ACC as well, particularly in those areas where they had not built redundancies to the CANOSCOM TAT. Such key enablers as mechanical unloading equipment, supply, transport and contracting services remained deficient until the JTFSE was deployed into theatre a month after the earthquake, and this made the working conditions extremely difficult for the ACC.⁹⁹ However, because of the AEW's redundancies, as well as the ingenuity of some of their staff, the ACC was still able to meet all of JTF(H)'s demanding requirements for tactical and operational mobility.

1 CAD was able to apply some of the lessons learned from OP HESTIA during its next deployment to Libya in the context of OP MOBILE in 2011. To begin, the OP MOBILE Task Force, which was not referred to as so much of an AEW in the literature,

⁹⁶ Department of National Defence, "Air Component," 3350-165 (ACC), (Winnipeg: DND, 21 March 2010), 1.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, 3.

⁹⁸ LCol Cathy Blue, "Interview – TA Points," E-mail exchange with the author, 28 February 2012.

⁹⁹ Department of National Defence, "Operational and Strategic Lessons – Op HESTIA," *Joint Lessons Learned Report* 01/10, 3350-1 (Joint LL Team Leader), (Kingston, ON: DND, 12 April 2010), 5.

still had to conduct its own TA.¹⁰⁰ Many of the functions that would normally have been the responsibility of the TAT, such as the bed-down by construction engineering section, were conducted with much success because the MSF was integrated into the theatre support structure.¹⁰¹ Only a few capabilities were identified as being deficient within the Task Force, and so a “TAT” of only 10 pers was provided by CANOSCOM with contracting, medical and ammunition specialists.¹⁰² The rest of the TA had inevitably to be conducted by the force on the ground.¹⁰³ Effectively, OP MOBILE confirmed once again that other than a few specific capabilities, 1 CAD has been able to conduct its own TA when required.

This section has described how some specific airworthiness requirements have encouraged the RCAF to develop certain capabilities that would complement and reinforce those of a TAT generated by CANOSCOM. It was these redundancies that allowed the ACC to achieve such success during their deployment to OP HESTIA in the absence of a TAT, and to support the activation of other theatre elements. There were still deficiencies observed, and 1 CAD was able to further develop the activation capabilities during its subsequent deployment to OP MOBILE. As CANOSCOM moves forward with the revision of CONPLAN DISCUS, it is essential that it acknowledge the capabilities that the RCAF now brings to TA.

¹⁰⁰ OP HESTIA issues were report in Department of National Defence, “1 CAD OP HESTIA Lessons Learned Conference Summary,” (Winnipeg: DND, May 2010). According to Department of National Defence, “AAR - Theatre Activation Team Task Force Libeccio,” 3350-1 (TAT Comd) (Ottawa: DND, 17 May 2011), it was reconnaissance elements of the ACC that established the initial staging capabilities at APODs in Libeccio, Trapani and Sigonella and Poggio Renatico.

¹⁰¹ Department of National Defence, “OP LIBECCIO ETR MILE,” Annex I to 1630-1 (Comd TF LIB), (Winnipeg: DND, Nov 2011), 1.

¹⁰² Department of National Defence, “AAR - Theatre Activation Team Task Force Libeccio,” 3350-1 (TAT Comd) (Ottawa: DND, 17 May 2011).

¹⁰³ As outlined in Chapter 1, the size of the TAT according to CONPLAN DISCUS varies anywhere from 83 to 500+ soldiers. A “TAT” of 10 persons is inconsistent with the CONPLAN.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has explored the capabilities required to conduct those all-so-important “first” activities in theatre and of the abilities of the ECS to take these on. It was shown that in the past three years, there have been a number of missions for which CANOSCOM was unable to generate a TATs, and so the ECS had to conduct their own activation. As a result of deficiencies observed during OP HESTIA in 2010, LFQA developed their own TA capability that was then tested during a large northern exercise GUERRIER NORDIQUE and then fully validated during operation LOTUS in 2011. The ACC were also affected by the lack of a TAT; however they had a certain amount of redundant TA capabilities within their AEW concept. As a result, they were able to conduct their own bed-down and rear-link capabilities, as well as assist the rest of the force in doing theirs. During OP MOBILE, they again conducted the majority of the TA tasks, and any deficiencies were addressed by a 10-man TAT from CANOSCOM.

All three FG organisations, the Army, at least in LFQA, the Air Force within 1 CAD, and the Navy, which is an intrinsically deployable organisation, have been able to perform an adequate level of TA. Other than a few key functions, for which they still require guidance from CANOSCOM, the ECS have been able to arm themselves well for future missions.

As CANOSCOM addresses the TA of future missions, they must take into account the non-sustainment, strategic and tactical requirements and incorporate these into the TA plan. They would also be wise to incorporate these robust capabilities that the ECS have developed these past years. As the operational tempo is not likely to slacken any time soon, they will likely continue to have difficulty in generating a full TAT for every domestic and international mission, so they need to leverage the resources that already exist elsewhere.

In the next chapter, it will be shown that this is also largely being done in other countries as well.

CHAPTER 3 – THEATRE ACTIVATION IN OTHER MILITARIES

INTRODUCTION

Canada was not the only nation to note deficiencies in its ability to conduct TA following the end of the Cold War. The U.S. as well, had observed inefficiencies in their force structure, which were manifesting themselves in unacceptably long deployment timelines during Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999 and Operational DESERT STORM in 2003.¹⁰⁴ U.S. Army Transformation in 2004 involved the significant restructure of all Army sustainment functions based on a new modular organisation called the Sustainment Brigade, who would conduct all matters of operational sustainment including Theatre Opening (TO). The Australian Army adopted a different approach in 2007 by assigning the responsibility for the generation of Theatre Entry (TE) capabilities to the Service Chiefs. The French military responded to the new environment again with a different approach with the implementation of the *Quartier-Général du Corps de réaction rapide de la France* (QG CRR-FR), a TA capability that leverages other nations in NATO and the EU. Each of these nations now prides itself on the successes of their approach in meeting the demands of the post-Cold-War environment, and Canada should look to these as it further develops its TA capability.

This chapter will show that although these three approaches are very unique, they all indicate that Canada would better serve its interests by delegating the FG of TATs to its ECS. This would position Canada to better synchronise its FG activities with the ECS of its allies and make the most efficient use of limited specialised resources. Also, activities can be better conducted in a multi-national setting when the organisations

¹⁰⁴ Col John M. Menter, *The Sustainment Battle Staff and Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) Guide* (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse Books, 2009), 6.

responsible for TA have strategic links already established with their international ECS counterparts.¹⁰⁵

3.1 – THE UNITED STATES

It is difficult for Canada to base its military structure to that of the U.S. simply because of scale. The vastness of the U.S. Army and the fact that it is established in a network of operational hubs across the globe allow it to create niches that would be inefficient in a military so small as Canada's. However, Canada has nonetheless the mandate to be able to integrate into a coalition with its most important ally.¹⁰⁶ Canada could then benefit from using the resources of its southern neighbour as it generates its own TA capabilities.

If Canada is to conduct TA effectively within a bi-lateral setting, it is important that its forces maintain strategic links with its U.S. counterparts. However, unlike Canada, the responsibility for TA in the U.S. Department of Defence (DOD) are divided between three different organisations. For one, the responsibility for the activation of APODs and SPODs falls under the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), who manages all means of inter-theatre transportation for DOD.¹⁰⁷ Once a POD in a given theatre has been established, then it is the Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander that “opens” the theatre, or establishes a sustainment footprint to facilitate the inflow of the rest of the JTF. Finally, it is the U.S. Army Forces Command (ARFORSCOM), or his representative the Geographic Component Commander (GCC), who generates those forces for the employment of the JTF Commander, and as such, ARFORSCOM

¹⁰⁵ The United States Army, Australia and France were selected because they represent very different approaches for study and because there was sufficient doctrinal references available to the author in English and French. A more complete analysis, outside the scope of this paper, should also consider other approaches, such as other services in the U.S., the U.K., Israel and South Korea.

¹⁰⁶ Canada, *Canadian First Defense Strategy* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2009), 8.

¹⁰⁷ Norman M. Wade, *The Sustainment & Multifunctional Logistician's SMARTbook* (Lakeland, FL: The Lightning Press, 2009), 2-6.

maintains all expertise and training facilities required for the continued improvement of TA. So, in order for Canada to leverage the capabilities of the U.S., it should have the ability to coordinate its activities with each of these strategic organisations.

The first link that Canada needs is with USTRANSCOM, which, fortunately, CANOSCOM already maintains. When a given U.S. Geographic Component Commander (GCC) needs to establish a new operational hub, it is USTRANSCOM that generates a Joint Task Force Port Opener (JTF-PO) to conduct the port opening on behalf of the GCC.¹⁰⁸ CANOSCOM, since its creation in 2006, has learned that it is advantageous to coordinate its own port-opening operations with USTRANSCOM as well.¹⁰⁹ During OP HESTIA, for example, the exchange of liaison officers between the two commands facilitated sharing of intelligence about the state of airfields and seaports following the earthquake.¹¹⁰ However, CANOSCOM J5 Plans still assesses that port-opening actions could be better coordinated “to attain a clear logistics intelligence picture and to achieve significant economies of scale for logistics support.”¹¹¹ As Canada continues to improve its TA capabilities, its transportation component must continue to develop these links with USTRANSCOM.

The next link that Canada should nurture is with the U.S. Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander in order to coordinate the employment of TA within a multi-national theatre. As shown in Figure 2, the JTF Commander is designated by the GCC to command operations within the JOA. The JTF is very much the force employer of resources that are generated from within the Theatre Army, Maritime and Air Service Component

¹⁰⁸ United States, Department of Defence, The Sustainment Brigade. FMI 4-93.2, (Washington, DC: Headquarters of the Army, 12 February 2009), 1-10.

¹⁰⁹ Although one of the stated objectives of CF Transformation was to foster a “strong CAN/US partnership” and “alignment with NORAD”, there is no mention of establishing bilateral relationship in CANOSCOM Commander’s Guidance.

¹¹⁰ Col Virginia Tattersall, “OP HESTIA – Strategic Coordination,” E-mail exchange with the author, 8 Mar 2012.

¹¹¹ *Ibid*

Commanders.¹¹² Once a POD has been opened, then the organisation that conducts Theatre Opening (TO) on behalf of the JTF Commander is a Sustainment Brigade, which is generated by the Theatre Support Command (TSC), or its operational command post, the Expeditionary Support Command (ESC).¹¹³ The TO task encompasses all activities required to prepare the theatre of operations, such as building the theatre base, establishing support arrangements and contracts, and conducting the RSOI plan for the JTF. Contrary to the Canadian concept, TO does not include any tactical tasks, such as the collection of intelligence, which is done by other elements within the JTF Command. Nonetheless, a Canadian TAT working within a multi-national JOA would need to coordinate its activities with the responsible U.S. JTF Commander.

¹¹² United States Department of Defence, *The Sustainment Brigade*, Field Manual Interim No. 4-93.2 (Washington, DC: Headquarters of the Army, 4 February 2009), 4-30.

¹¹³ *Ibid*, 1-19




Figure 2. FE of Sustainment Brigades in Theatre

Source: United States Department of Defence, *Theater Army Operations (Final Draft)*, Field Manual No. 3-93 (100-7). (Washington, DC: Headquarters of the Army, 15 July 2010), 1-4.

The last link that Canada should develop is with ARFORSCOM in order to leverage their capabilities for generating TA. As suggested earlier, it is the responsibility of ARFORSCOM, and their component GCCs, to generate Sustainment Brigades. A given Sustainment Brigade could be called upon to support any given TO task either within their respective GCC's AOR, or anywhere else as may be required by

ARFORSCOM. As a result, the training of Sustainment Brigades is normalized across a large network of Centres of Excellence (CoE), so that they are able to perform an adequate range of activations in any theatre. Canada, on the other hand, would perform only a few TAs per year, and it would be inefficient to develop a full-time CoE for each function on the same scale as the U.S.¹¹⁴ It is therefore advantageous for Canada to leverage the architecture already in place in ARFORSCOM in order to conduct cyclical training of its own TAT personnel. The best Canadian organisation for this is the Army, who is already engaged in coordinating many other FG activities with ARFORSCOM.¹¹⁵ Similarly, if one wishes to leverage the U.S. TO capabilities, it would be much simpler if it was the FG of Canadian TATs was service-specific.

Perhaps one of the strengths of the U.S. Army approach to TO is its flexibility to be able to adapt the FG of its Sustainment Brigades in accordance with operational requirements. With a significant amount of sustainment resources centralised within ARFORSCOM, this organisation can either increase or decrease its generation of Sustainment Brigades as required.¹¹⁶ CONPLAN DISCUS, on the other hand, designates a fixed number of personnel within CANOSCOM, a structure of up to 518 personnel (from Figure 1), to conduct TA tasks when a theatre arrives. However, if more resources than this were ever required, the CONPLAN does not specify a means by which these resources can be surged without a concerted effort on the part of the ECS. Had it been the Canadian ECS the responsibility to generate TATs, just as ARFORSCOM has, then they would have had better flexibility to adjust its FG task in accordance with the operational requirements.

¹¹⁴ CONPLAN DISCUS outlines in its assumptions that Canada could not support any more than two TA per year.

¹¹⁵ In 2007 and 2009, the author participated in validation and training exercises in Fort Bliss, TX. As the M777 field equipment manager in 2008, the author coordinated M777 technician training with the U.S. Army in Hattiesburg, MI.

¹¹⁶ A number of Sustainment Brigades have been created as a result of the increase in operational tempo in Afghanistan and North Africa, for example. “21st Theatre Sustainment Command,” Internet; <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/21tsc.htm>; accessed 19 Dec 2011.

It would be inefficient for Canada to model its TA structure based on a U.S. military several orders of magnitude larger. However, Canada can maintain links with the U.S. for the FG and the FE of TAT in order to leverage the U.S. capabilities. As the U.S. services are responsible for the generation, training, and mounting of their Sustainment Brigades, then it is simpler to coordinate Canada's FG activities along service lines. As USTRANSCOM and the U.S. JTF Commander are responsible for FE, then it is its Canadian counter-part, CANOSCOM, that should continue to develop those relationships so that the activities of the two nations can be synchronised in a multi-national setting.

3.2 – AUSTRALIA

As Canada develops its TA capability for the future, it is pertinent to consider the Australian model, whose military force size is closer to Canada's than that of the U.S. Australia, who has had its share of expeditionary service, also changed their focus with respect to the mounting of operations shortly after 2000. Their concept for Theatre Entry (TE), which is synonymous with TA, is similar to the U.S. in that it is the Service Chiefs that generate the TE organisations for use by force employers. However, where this approach differs is that it is the JTFs that are equipped to conduct their own TE using their own integral resources. If the U.S. is at one end of the spectrum with respect to the manner in which they conduct TA, in that they generate specialised organisations for TO, then Australia is at the other end.

Since their transformation in 2004, the responsibilities for the FG and FE of Australian forces are very similar to that of Canada. Australian Service Chiefs are now responsible to generate forces, and it is the Australian Joint Operations Command (JOC), similar in mandate to CEFCOM and Canada COM, who employ them.¹¹⁷ However, where Australia differs is in the fact that their Service Chiefs generate all forces, be them

¹¹⁷ Department of National Defence, CDS Action Team 1 (Command & Control), *Part IV - Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) C2 Structure* (Ottawa: DND, 2005), B21/26.

at the tactical or operational levels, and TE is no exception. This acknowledges an Australian premise that “the best organisation to manage mounting of units and elements are the commands from which they are drawn.”¹¹⁸ In some cases, it is the Commander of the Joint Task Force (ComJTF) that conducts the TE for the JTF and the RSOI of the force.¹¹⁹ In other cases, the JOC may create a Joint Logistic Component Commander (JLogCC), who is usually separate from the ComJTF but has the responsibility “to deliver coherent, coordinated logistic support within the theatre in accordance with ComJTF priorities.”¹²⁰ In either case, however, the forces that are deployed to conduct TE, be it in the ComJTF or in the JLogCC, are generated by the Service Chiefs.

Like Canada, Australia still considers the task of TE a crucial step in the deployment process. Australian doctrine emphasises the importance for the JOC to integrate capabilities early in the deployment process, ensuring that there is an effective balance of all necessary specialist functions.¹²¹ Their doctrine mentions that TE requires numerous specialists, including supplies and services, transportation, movements, infrastructure engineering support, personnel services, health services, materiel maintenance, equipment issue, security (FP), military police and legal services.¹²² In Australia, the Service Chiefs are responsible to generate all these specialised functions, even contracting and rear-link communications, which are generated by CANOSCOM in Canada, not by the ECS.¹²³ Even transportation and movements responsibilities, which

¹¹⁸ Australian Department of Defence, *Logistics Series: Support to Operations*, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 4.2, 1st Ed. (Canberra: Australian Defence Publishing Service, 2004), 5-3.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, 5-10.

¹²⁰ Australian Department of Defence, *Logistics Series: Distribution Support to Operations*, Australian Defence Force Publication 4.2.2, 1st Ed. (Canberra: Australian Defence Publishing Service, 2006), 4-18.

¹²¹ Australian Department of Defence, *Logistics Series: Support to Operations*, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 4.2, 1st Ed. (Canberra: Australian Defence Publishing Service, 2004), 2-13.

¹²² Australian Department of Defence, *Operations Series: Mounting Operations*, Australian Defence Force Publication 3.0.3, 1st Ed. (Canberra: Australian Defence Publishing Service, 2009), 6-9.

¹²³ Australian Department of Defence, *Logistics Series: Support to Operations*, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 4.2, 1st Ed. (Canberra: Australian Defence Publishing Service, 2004), 5-8 adds, for example, that the chiefs maintain the capability to generate contracting personnel, a capability which is currently not resident in the Canadian Army, Air Force or Navy.

in the U.S. are assigned to a completely separate Command, are still most often performed by specialists within the JTF, and not necessarily within their 1st Joint Movements Group (1 JMOVGP).¹²⁴

An argument could be made that in the Australian approach, TE is less “joint” than Canadian TA because the responsibility for FG is with the Service Chiefs and not with a joint equivalent to CANOSCOM. This is because the Australians acknowledge that there is almost always a service that has predominance in a given mission, and it is that service that is given the role to integrate all joint capabilities, including TE. For a mission that is dominated by air operations, for example, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) generates what is called an Expeditionary Combat Support Squadron (ECSS) that “is structured and stocked to support TE operations with such capabilities as cargo handling, air traffic services, refuelling, in transit visibility and, as may be required, ground-based air defence (GBAD).”¹²⁵ For a land-centric mission, the Australian Army generates a Force Support Battalion (FSB) for TE, reinforced as may be required by reconnaissance, force protection and movements personnel.¹²⁶ In the case of a predominantly maritime mission, the Royal Australian Navy generates a Logistic Support Element (LSE), to establish its SPOD support arrangements.¹²⁷ In the particular case of amphibious forces, then the Army generates elements of the FSB in order to conduct RSOI in the POD.¹²⁸ Because each of the services has very specific requirements for support arrangements in the theatre of operations, it is understood that TE is a service-specific function.

¹²⁴ Australian Department of Defence, *Logistics Series: Support to Operations*, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 4.2, 1st Ed. (Canberra: Australian Defence Publishing Service, 2004), 5-6.

¹²⁵ Australian Department of Defence, *Logistics Series: Distribution Support to Operations*, Australian Defence Force Publication 4.2.2, 1st Ed. (Canberra: Australian Defence Publishing Service, 2006), 4-27.

¹²⁶ Australian Department of Defence, *Logistics Series: Support to Operations*, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 4.2, 1st Ed. (Canberra: Australian Defence Publishing Service, 2004), 5-5.

¹²⁷ Australian Department of Defence, *Operations Series: Mounting Operations*, Australian Defence Force Publication 3.0.3, 1st Ed. (Canberra: Australian Defence Publishing Service, 2009), 6-18.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, 6-18.

As outlined in Chapter 2, the Canadian military has actually been, in many ways, migrating towards this Australian model for TE. In 2010, LFQA and 1 CAD developed TA capabilities in the same way that the Australian Army and RAAF generate their own TE teams. From Chapter 1, each ECS does have very specific requirements for RSOI, communications and support arrangements, so it makes sense for these FG tasks to be delegated to them. There are, of course, challenges with this approach because the Canadian ECS do not yet have certain capabilities in their “core” training, such as contracting and rear-link communications.¹²⁹ If the responsibility for the generation of TA was to be delegated to ECS, like in Australia, then it is likely that these capabilities would still have to be reinforced by CANOSCOM in the short term, until these capabilities can be developed in-house. Nonetheless, this option may be realisable in the short to medium term with fairly minimal effort and may resolve some of the issues with respect to the lack of available TA resources in CANOSCOM.

In summary, the Australian model is different than the U.S. model, in that the responsibility for TA is captured within the full range of support that the JTF elements are expected to provide. However, it is similar in the sense that it is the responsibility of the Service Chiefs to generate. If Canada were to adopt such a concept, there would be a training delta in capabilities for which the ECS currently look to CANOSCOM to generate. However, as CANOSCOM has lacked some of these resources in the past few deployments, the Canadian Army and RCAF have already taken steps towards generating these capabilities internally and adopting a more Australian approach to TA.

3.3 – FRANCE

The French military currently has a structure for *la capacité d’entrer en premier* which merits a certain regard both for the multi-nationality of their concept and because it is so similar to what the NMSC sought to develop back in 2000. As it has been a

¹²⁹ From Department of National Defence, “OP ATTENTION Operational Support Recce – 9-24 Jan 2011, Annex E - Contracting,” 3350-1 (OS J5), (Ottawa: DND, 26 Jan 2011), during the TA of OP ATTENTION in Kabul 2011, it was ADM(Mat) that generated the contracting capabilities.

successful venture for the French military, there are perhaps aspects of this approach that could be useful to consider for Canada.

Developed in 2005, *le quartier-général du corps de réaction rapide-France* (QG CRR-FR) is a concept based on a single organisation that is charged with both the FG and FE of a highly specialised multi-national force.¹³⁰ An element of 425 soldiers, of which 16% are provided by other European Union (EU) and NATO nations, is maintained at high readiness at Lille, France in order to activate a theatre and provide command and control for a force of up to 60,000 soldiers anywhere in the world.¹³¹ While the QG CRR-FR maintains its posture on a permanent basis, it also functions as the NATO Response Force (NRF) for a period of one year in rotation with six other NATO high-readiness organisations. Contrary to the Australian or American models, the QG CRR-FR is not associated with any of the Service Chiefs, but is rather a completely separate joint capability designed specifically for TA. Also, contrary to the American model, this single organisation captures the entire breadth of operational and tactical skills that are required to generate and deploy a TA capability, in addition to the command and control of the main force. As shown in Figure 3, aspects that deal specifically with TA are captured in the Rear Support Command (RSC), in the CIS, and in the CSS divisions.¹³² The force also operates at the strategic level by interacting with the public during its initial deployment and at the tactical level through its force protection element.¹³³ More so than other TA organisations, the QG CRR-FR is very much an autonomous organisation at all levels.

¹³⁰ Translation: Headquarters of the Rapid-Reaction Corps – France.

¹³¹ France, Ministère de la défense et des anciens combattants, “Quartier-général du corps de réaction rapide-France,” Internet; <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/presentation/organisation-des-forces/qg-crr-fr/quartier-general-du-corps-de-reaction-rapide-france>; accessed 20 Feb 2012.

¹³² France, Ministère de la défense et des anciens combattants, “Quartier-général Corps de réaction rapide-France,” Internet; http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/92/QG_CRR-Fr_pr%C3%A9sentation_2010_fran%C3%A7ais.pdf; accessed 20 Feb 2012.

¹³³ *Ibid*




Figure 3. The Structure of the QG CRR-Fr

Source: France, Ministère de la défense et des anciens combattants, “Quartier-général Corps de réaction rapide-France,” Internet; http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/92/QG_CRR-Fr_pr%C3%A9sentation_2010_fran%C3%A7ais.pdf; accessed 20 Feb 2012.

The QG CRR-FR has proven its effectiveness during a number of missions since its establishment. Deployed in Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008 and in Afghanistan in 2010, its success is largely attributed to the significant investment by France and by other parties in a dedicated suite of equipment, shelters, communications, support and medical systems.¹³⁴ Although all nations are encouraged to contribute to the pool of resources in the Rear Support Command (RSC), France has maintained adequate

¹³⁴ France, Ministère de la défense et des anciens combattants, “Quartier-général Corps de réaction rapide-France,” Internet; http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/92/QG_CRR-Fr_pr%C3%A9sentation_2010_fran%C3%A7ais.pdf; accessed 20 Feb 2012.

infrastructure and contracting capability to support RSOI for itself and for the first elements of the follow-on force.

In a sense, the QG CRR-FR concept is similar to what was to be developed by the NMSC project in the early 2000s, in that a single organisation is responsible both for FG and FE of a TA capability. However, QG CRR-FR has managed to sustain this model, where the CF have moved to sharing TA generation responsibility among the Services. As discussed in Chapter 1, the cost was too great for Canada to transfer the positions required of the NMSC, especially for specialists that were in such high demand in Afghanistan. Surely, this cost would be significant for France as well; however, they have succeeded in sharing the burden with other European nations to compensate for this. Also, the organisation serves a strategic end as the only high-readiness organisation within NATO to be completely integrated multi-nationally.¹³⁵ The QG CRR-FR is therefore a medium to demonstrate France's dedication to the alliance and to interoperability and information sharing with its allies.

If Canada indeed prefers to group its TA capabilities within a single high-readiness organisation, then it is perhaps advantageous to consider the French approach, and share the personnel burden with other nations. Perhaps Canada could look at becoming a member of the QG CRR-Fr with the other 12 nations, contributing elements of the C2 and sustainment organisations that have been developed within CEFCOM and CANOSCOM since NMSC. While compensating for some of the deficiencies in TA during the past three years, this concept would also offer an opportunity to exchange with NATO allies. Alternatively, Canada could leverage capabilities of the U.S. by integrating the current TA capability with one of the high-readiness Sustainment Brigades. During other missions, such as in Afghanistan, Canada and the U.S. have shared a number of

¹³⁵ France, Ministère de la défense et des anciens combattants, "Quartier-général du corps de réaction rapide-France," Internet; <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/presentation/organisation-des-forces/qg-crr-fr/quartier-general-du-corps-de-reaction-rapide-france>; accessed 20 Feb 2012.

support arrangements.¹³⁶ Canada could potentially benefit from a bi-lateral approach to TA, similar to how the French benefit from the presence of other nations in the QG CRR-Fr. There are potentially many options in which Canada can leverage allied nations, or even other government departments, in order to address the TA deficiencies.

In summary, France has developed a high-readiness capability that is not only able to activate a theatre quickly, but is also able establish a command for a force of 60,000 soldiers. By leveraging its allies, France has been able to achieve considerable success. If Canada is set upon maintaining TA in a central organisation, such as the NMSC project advocated, then it would benefit from a similar approach to mitigate the significant costs associated.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, three very different concepts were analysed to show that Canada can gain from aligning its TA capabilities along with its allies. The analysis of the U.S. showed that Canada can leverage the significant FG capabilities that are currently resident within ARFORSCOM. Because the services already maintains these links with their U.S. counterparts for the coordination of other FG activities, it is logical that they take on the coordination of training and development for TA as well. It was also shown that the expertise that deal specifically with the opening of PODs in the theatre of operations is best kept at the strategic level, at an organisation such as CANOSCOM, where it can continue to coordinate bilateral TA activities with USTRANSCOM. The analysis of the Australian military showed that in a military where specialised resources are limited, the capabilities required for TA can in fact be provided by the Service Chiefs. This approach would represent for Canada somewhat of a training delta for those operational-level skills not already part of the training curriculum; however the steps

¹³⁶ Throughout OP ATHENA, Canada acquired many RLS services from the U.S. Kellog Brown and Root (KBR) contract arrangement (author's personal experience as the OP ATHENA National Support Element Operations Officer).

taken by the Canadian ECS in the past few years have reduced this delta significantly. Finally, the analysis of the French QG CRR-FR showed that it is possible to assign the FG and FE of a TA capability to a single dedicated organisation; however, in France it was achievable because the organisation did not have other associated tasks, such as operational support. Furthermore, where deficiencies and personnel may be lacking in certain skill-sets, Canada could seek to gain by leveraging the capabilities of other nations through multi-national arrangements.

In summary, Canada could benefit by assigning the FG of many tasks associated with TA to the ECS. The ECS are in a better position to leverage the FG capabilities of its allies and to coordinate the efficient use of limited resources as the operational requirements ebb and flow between TA and other support tasks. However, the oversight by the FE organisation, CANOSCOM, continues to be essential to ensure that all requirements are captured.

CHAPTER 4 – THE FUTURE OF THEATRE ACTIVATION

INTRODUCTION

Up to this point in the paper, some basic themes have been identified. For one, the CF are not ready to delegate a single organisation the responsibility for the FG and FE of TA capabilities for all theatres, both international and domestic, as was attempted by the NMSC project. The skilled resources within CANOSCOM are too stretched to be able to support FE as well as generate the full breadth of TA requirements simultaneously, and there appears to be no appetite to inject additional resources. Rather, there is a move within the ECS to develop their own TA capabilities for both domestic and international applications. Their employments have even been fairly successful, other than a few niche areas, such as contracting, strategic communications, engineering support, etc, where the expertise is still best maintained by CANOSCOM. Nonetheless, it would appear that the CF is already on a natural course towards a model similar to the Australians for generating TA capabilities, wherein the ECS have the responsibility to generate TATs for their employment by operational commanders.

However, before recommendations can be made, it is essential to understand the environment in which the CF will be operating over the next five to ten years. Without a solid appreciation about how the future security environment (FSE) will influence the *next* theatres of operation, one can fall into the trap of designing the force to meet the needs of the *last* war.

This chapter will show, based on an in-depth analysis of the FSE, that the most effective TA framework for the CF, and one that will most likely achieve greatest acceptance by other L1s, is to leverage the ECS for the coordinated FG of TA, thereby allowing CANOSOM to focus its efforts on FE in an increasingly demanding environment.

This chapter will begin with an analysis of the most recent literature describing the FSE in order to predict requirements for TA in the next five to ten years. Then, a

framework will be presented that takes into account the lessons learned from the past, from allies, and from the FSE. The framework begins with clarifying the definition of TA. Then, a model will be presented for the generation of TATs by the Army and the RCAF that serves both domestic and international requirements. Finally, a methodology will be presented to address the various organisational and training gaps in the medium term, making maximum use of the CFOSC project.

4.1 – THE REALITY OF THE FUTURE

In order to formulate recommendations for the future of TA for the next five to ten years, it is important to understand the environment in which the CF will be operating. Notwithstanding the observations from the past, the FSE holds varied security challenges that will have an impact on the way the CF conducts operations. Also, there are fiscal realities, as a result of the 2008 global financial crisis, that must be taken into consideration before planning to invest in this capability.

According to the Chief of Force Development's *Future Security Environment, 2008-2040* and Peter Gizewski's "Army 2040: The Global Security Environment", Canada is not likely to see any decrease in the demand for a deployable military force in the period from 2015 to 2025.¹³⁷ Areas of sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Asia will continue to be "especially hard hit by crucial deficits in renewable resources," and the resulting competition for water, energy and minerals could potentially increase the levels of conflict in the world.¹³⁸ Also, the increase in trans-national crime and extremist non-state actors will likely surpass the ability of many nation-states to deal with these problems internally. The Director of Land Strategic Concepts' *Land Operations 2021: the Future Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow* suggests that Canada

¹³⁷ Department of National Defence, "The Future Security Environment 2008-2030. Part 1: Current and Emerging Trends," Chief of Force Development (Ottawa, ON: DND, 27 January 2009), 4.

¹³⁸ Peter J. Gizewski, "Army 2040, The Global Security Environment: Emerging Trends and Potential Challenges," Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association (Ottawa, ON: Carlton University, 27 May 2009), 7.

will be pressured to commit military forces to address these increasing problems to “retain a seat at the table in international organisations and coalitions, and also the ability to function as a trading nation and a responsible and respected member of the international community.”¹³⁹ What is of most concern is that the demand is increasing mostly in those areas of the world where the infrastructure is in poor state.¹⁴⁰ In order to operate in these areas, forces therefore have to be able to activate a theatre without reliance on HNS and in an increasingly high-threat environment. The TA force structure developed should therefore reflect this greater complexity.

The 2009 *Canadian First Defence Strategy* also acknowledges an increase in the requirement for domestic TA, particularly in the Arctic.¹⁴¹ “As the polar ice melts... the government will call increasingly upon CF assets to help with sovereignty patrols, search and rescue operations, resource protection, and the monitoring of international military activities.”¹⁴² As the competition for resources around the world intensifies, it will be “Canadian resources (such as energy, minerals, fresh water and fish stocks) that will require greater protection.”¹⁴³ Also, with the withdrawal of the U.S. as the world’s only superpower since the economic recession of 2008, Canada may not be able to rely as heavily as it has in the past on the protection that is offered by its position north of the border. As Ron Wallace identifies,

¹³⁹ Department of National Defence, B-GL-310-001/AG-001 *Land Operations 2021: The Force Employment Concept for Canada’s Army of Tomorrow*, Directorate of Land Concepts and Design (Kingston, ON: DND, 2007), 4.

¹⁴⁰ Department of National Defence, “The Future Security Environment 2008-2030. Part 1: Current and Emerging Trends,” Chief of Force Development (Ottawa, ON: DND, 27 January 2009), 69.

¹⁴¹ Canada, *Canadian First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2009), 6.

¹⁴² Department of National Defence, “The Future Security Environment 2008-2030. Part 1: Current and Emerging Trends,” Chief of Force Development (Ottawa, ON: DND, 27 January 2009), 5.

¹⁴³ *Ibid*, 89

As Canada has been so economically and militarily reliant on the U.S. in the past, one could infer that Canada may soon have to consider doing ‘more’, and not just for national defence. Indeed, perhaps *much* more.¹⁴⁴

Again, like the theatres that could be opening in sub-Saharan Africa or in the Middle East, the infrastructure available to support deployments in the Arctic is extremely limited. If, as shown in Chapter 2, the current concept for TA is already insufficient, then a significant investment is required *now* to keep up with these requirements.

The analysis of the FSE also highlights the requirement for certain specific capabilities within TA. For one, force protection will continue to be important as the theatres of operation are likely to be highly unstable. Also, the increase in “global urbanisation without proper health and sanitary infrastructure will accelerate the spread of infectious disease,” and it will therefore be important to have a robust preventative medical (PMed) capability within the team to conduct the necessary analyses and safeguard the force.¹⁴⁵ The FSE highlights an increasing *interconnectedness* of global society, which “garners global attention and requires international intervention” when conflicts occur.¹⁴⁶ As a result, the public’s thirst for information that was observed during the activation of OP HESTIA will likely be indicative of future missions. The CF must ensure to capture these capabilities – force protection, medical support, and a robust public affairs element – within future TA teams.

This public *interconnectedness* also hints that the CF will never be alone in the theatre of operations, and its TA must be coordinated with other players. Future challenges “will require contribution from all instruments of national power, including allied defence teams, other government departments, the private sector and, where

¹⁴⁴ Ron Wallace, “Redefining Security in the Post-Afghanistan Era: The Future of Canadian Military Policy in an Uncertain World,” (Calgary, AB: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, November 2010), 12.

¹⁴⁵ Department of National Defence, “The Future Security Environment 2008-2030. Part 1: Current and Emerging Trends,” Chief of Force Development (Ottawa, ON: DND, 27 January 2009), 5.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 5

applicable, non-governmental organisations (NGOs).”¹⁴⁷ This is nothing new to the CF, as there was multi-national and inter-agency cooperation during the deployments of the 1990s.¹⁴⁸ Yet, neither the Strategic Theatre Activation Plan nor CONPLAN DISCUS, ever made any mention of this requirement.¹⁴⁹ At a minimum, TA policy must at least make reference to the requirement that a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) be coordinated, normally by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), with the host nation before the TA can even begin. The CONPLAN DISCUS deployment plan must also consider the specific requirements for civilians from DFAIT, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) or OGDs that the TA may have to support in addition to the main force. CFDS makes a point of highlighting the importance of the “whole-of-government” to operations, so it is vitally important that these requirements be included during the TA plan development.¹⁵⁰

While the demand for robust TA capabilities may be increasing, FSE literature shows that the resources available to build these capabilities are on the decline. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the limiting factors for TA are usually the skilled personnel with the experience necessary to conduct the range of TA tasks. With the aging of the Canadian population, “the CF will be competing with the private sector and other government departments for recruits from a dwindling labour pool.”¹⁵¹ The demographics of Canada are also changing, and many immigrants from Asia and Africa are less inclined to support military activities.¹⁵² So not only will personnel with these skills be in high demand, but the support of the changing electorate may wane in coming

¹⁴⁷ Department of National Defence, “The Future Security Environment 2008-2030. Part 1: Current and Emerging Trends,” Chief of Force Development (Ottawa, ON: DND, 27 January 2009), 91.

¹⁴⁸ As an example, the author was a CIMIC officer in Bosnia in 1999 and coordinated on a daily basis the CF activities with dozens of OGDs, NGOs and IOs.

¹⁴⁹ Neither document makes any references to the requirement to cooperate with OGDs, NGOs, international organisations or other nations that are also operating in the theatre of operations.

¹⁵⁰ Canada, *Canadian First Defense Strategy* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2009), 9.

¹⁵¹ Department of National Defence, “The Future Security Environment 2008-2030. Part 1: Current and Emerging Trends,” Chief of Force Development (Ottawa, ON: DND, 27 January 2009), 6.

¹⁵² *Ibid*, 89.

years. There may therefore not be a means to develop an additional cadre of skilled personnel dedicated to TA; rather, it will be necessary to leverage the few limited resources and build the capability within the existing structure.

The impact of the 2008 financial crisis continues to be felt around the industrialised world, including in Canada. “Unemployment and significant declines in economic activity continue stubbornly today in spite of massive financial stimulus actions.”¹⁵³ Yet, this crunch comes immediately following an ambitious expenditure plan outlined in CFDS, including new fleets of ships, aircraft and combat vehicles, as well as significant investments in infrastructure.¹⁵⁴ In light of recent announcements of impending cutbacks, DND will have such a hard enough time delivering all of the capabilities mentioned in CFDS, let alone the \$1.2B CFOSC and its child TA project that are not mentioned in the document. This is not to say a change of priorities is not possible in the near future; however, it is important that the development of a TA capability not be completely dependent on a rapid capital investment.

In summary, the literature of the FSE suggests that the demand for the CF’s already taxed TA capabilities will most likely increase in the next five to ten years. The complexity of the theatres in which the CF will be operating, the threat, and the demand for public visibility, will also increase. Also, future TA will have the additional burden of supporting other members of the Canadian “whole of government” contribution, something that has been largely neglected in TA documents to date. Most importantly, where these demands are increasing, the resources to address these deficiencies are in decline, a function of the changing Canadian demography, and the continued effect of the 2008 economic crisis. Without any TA project currently reflected in CFDS, it is unlikely that a significant investment will be possible in the near term. The only feasible solution,

¹⁵³ Ron Wallace, “Redefining Security in the Post-Afghanistan Era: The Future of Canadian Military Policy in an Uncertain World,” (Calgary, AB: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, November 2010), 7.

¹⁵⁴ Canada, *Canadian First Defense Strategy* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2009), 9.

at least in the near term, is to leverage as much as possible capabilities that already exist in the ECS.

Having identified the environment in which TA will be conducted in the future, the next sections will set the framework in which this can be accomplished.

4.2 – PROPOSED TA DEFINITIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The analysis of the FSE in the previous section has confirmed indications from the introduction of this chapter. The forecasted increases in the requirement for TA will only reduce the flexibility of CANOSCOM to integrate TATs in the future. Also, the forecasted decrease in available resources will inevitably affect CANOSCOM's ability to generate specific capabilities. As a result, CANOSCOM will have no choice but to leverage capabilities from the ECS more than they have in the past. This section will show that of the range of options available to accomplish this, the CF can seek the greatest benefit by transferring the task of integration of TATs to the lead ECS in a given operation.

Before CANOSCOM can develop a plan to leverage the ECS, they must make it clear that the ECS have an essential role to play. As suggested in Chapter 1, the term TA must involve more than simply an operational sustainment function; it must encompass the full range of activities conducted during a TA, including those that ECS would perform. However, Chapter 1 also identified that the current definition, as outlined in the 2004 version of CONPLAN DISCUS, is deficient in this regard. It is therefore useful to consider two alternative definitions, which have recently been drafted.¹⁵⁵ The first definition, currently proposed in the draft CFJP 4.0 manual, defines TA as

The establishment of theatre-level support infrastructure, such as camps, PODs, the selection of staging areas, the development of strategic

¹⁵⁵ Department of National Defence, *CFJP 4.0 Support (Draft)*, (Ottawa: DND, 15 December 2011), 47.

communications networks, and the coordination of multinational or HNS.¹⁵⁶

This definition faces the same critique as *2004 CONPLAN DISCUS*, in that it defines TA as being a purely “support” function, with no regards to tactical or strategic activities outlined in Chapter 1.¹⁵⁷ An alternative definition is outlined in the *CANOSCOM Integrated Managed Readiness System (CIMRS) Directive*:

Theatre Activation is the task of establishing a CF footprint in a new theatre of operations, in both austere or developed infrastructure environments where the theatre has not been opened by forced entry.¹⁵⁸

This definition is written in broad enough terms to include the full range of activities that would be conducted during the activation of a theatre, including such roles that the Army, RCAF or RCN could have. There is just one element missing, which is the inclusion of other whole-of-government partners that are expounded in the FSE literature, so the following variation is proposed:

Theatre Activation is the task of establishing a footprint *of all whole of government (WoG) forces* in a new theatre of operations, in either austere or developed infrastructure environments, where the theatre has not been opened by forced entry.

This new definition is also likely to obtain support from other L1s that can now perceive their own role in establishing the theatre footprint. It is essential that this definition be widely disseminated and that all previous definitions be removed from the various draft documents to avoid misunderstandings.

In the definition of TAT, there should be an understanding of the tasks that are to be conducted. In addition to the tasks outlined in the draft *JTFSC Concept Paper*, the

¹⁵⁶ Department of National Defence, *CFJP 4.0 Support (Draft)*, (Ottawa: DND, 15 December 2011), 47.

¹⁵⁷ As a reminder, these functions included all the non-support activities, such as local tactical security, intelligence collection, situational awareness, as well creating a public perception that actions are being done as quickly as possible.

¹⁵⁸ Department of National Defence, *CANOSCOM Integrated Managed Readiness System (CIMRS) Directive*, 3000-1 (OS J3) (Ottawa: DND, 2011).

analysis from chapter 1 suggests that the tasks should include such tactical tasks as force protection and intelligence collection.¹⁵⁹ Strategic tasks should include the establishment of diplomatic clearances (i.e. by DFAIT personnel) as well as a public affairs element. Finally, the FSE analysis concluded that the organisation must also include PMed support as well as liaison support for any NGOs and OGDs that would also be supported in this WoG operation. The organisation chart from Figure 1 should therefore be sure to include these capabilities, as well as the mandates for each ECS to provide them.

Another constraint that must be respected in the development of options for TA is that the integration effort must be unified. From the previous section, the increasing complexity of deployments will require that the actions of all forces be synchronised so that they can react quickly and efficiently to changes in the environment. TA should therefore not be understood as just a smattering of section-sized organisations, such as it was in OP PODIUM or OP MOBILE.¹⁶⁰ TA should rather be understood as the synchronisation of all elements from both the CF and OGDs that have some role to play during activation. In other words, although various TA capabilities may be generated by different organisations for a given mission, the *integration* of these capabilities into a TAT must be done by a single command. Viewed as a multi-faceted effort with a centralised command and control, rather than the sum of a series of disconnected parts, there are less likely to be gaps in its execution.

With these constraints in mind, the range of options in which CANOSCOM can leverage the ECS boils down to this integration effort. A conservative approach, for example, would be to maintain the *status quo* with respect to the integration of the TAT within CANOSCOM. The only difference would be that more functions within the TAT would be provided by the ECS, particularly those functions that recur throughout a given

¹⁵⁹ Department of National Defence, JTFSC Concept Paper, Draft (Ottawa: DND, 17 January 2012), 29 outlines the tasks for TA to include: command and control, contracting, general engineering, CIS, logistics, equipment management, military police and personnel support.

¹⁶⁰ Recall from Chapter 1, the full “TAT” for these two operations only consisted of 5-10 specialists in support of the activation effort already underway by forces generated by the ECS.

deployment, such as integral support and RSOMI.¹⁶¹ However, the problem with this is the fact that CANOSCOM's priority to support current operations (i.e. FE activities) will inevitably detract from its ability to lead the integration and training of the TAT for some new operation before it leaves Canada (a FG activity).¹⁶² When resources are restrained, as they are likely to be in studying the FSE, then it will always be this FG effort that will take second place, and situations similar to OP HESTIA will reoccur in the future. It was also shown in Chapter 3 that the opportunities to leverage allies, in particular the impressive capabilities of the U.S. services, is improved by housing the FG within the Canadian ECS. Finally, by combining the FG of the TAT from that of the rest of the force, the sharing of information and resources becomes more natural. In the more complex, more demanding environment of the future, one has to maximize these opportunities for coordination.

But *which* ECS should lead the integration of the TAT for a given mission? Recalling from Chapter 3, the Australians identify one of the Service Chiefs as having a predominant role for a given theatre; and it is that service that integrates the key joint capabilities, such as the theatre entry package. Conveniently, Canada also tends to have a lead service for most of its missions. For example, the command and headquarters in OP HESTIA was integrated by the Army (based on the LFQA headquarters). In OP MOBILE, this was primarily the RCAF. Like for Australia, it would make sense in Canada if the organisation generating the TAT had as much in common as possible with the majority of the main force.

There are nonetheless challenges associated with assigning integration responsibilities to the ECS. For example, the ECS are not accustomed to integrating certain specialised capabilities, such as contracting teams, movements control detachments or strategic communications detachments, skills that are primarily resident

¹⁶¹ As outlined in Chapter 1, this is in contrast with those functions that are performed once in a given theatre, such as the establishment of initial contracts and environmental assessments, whose specialised nature would likely see them remain within CANOSCOM.

¹⁶² Department of National Defence, *CANOSCOM Commander's Guidance*, 3000-1 (Comd) (Ottawa: DND, 3 Feb 2006). This is further elaborated in Chapter 1.

in CANOSCOM.¹⁶³ However, it was shown in Chapter 2 that the ECS are still able to make this transition with a fairly small amount of effort and guidance.¹⁶⁴ To mitigate any transition issues, it is suggested that CANOSCOM retain the authority as the Centre of Excellence (CoE) for the generation of TATs, and as such, a role in the formation of the ECS FG plan. Also, giving CANOSCOM the authority to declare TATs operationally ready (OPRED) would provide a mechanism for the standardization of TATs between the various ECS.¹⁶⁵ In this way, CANOSCOM can retain the essential oversight over the TA generation process, while the predominant ECS manages its administration.

This section has outlined an approach to resolve many of the TA deficiencies that have been observed in the past in order to meet the increasing demands of the future. It was shown that the definition of TA must be inclusive of all activities that must be accomplished during TA in order to gain the support of other L1s. It was also shown that the responsibilities for the FG, specifically the integration, of TATs should be transferred to the ECS, while CANOSCOM retain a supervisory role as the CoE for TA. This is essentially the thesis of this paper and the key takeaway from this entire exercise.

Having accomplished the aim of this paper, some effort can be dedicated to outlining a means by which the FG responsibilities can be transferred to the ECS in the foreseeable future.

¹⁶³ This speaks to capabilities resident within the current JSG construct in CANOSCOM, in such units as 4 CFMCU, the JSR and 3 CSU.

¹⁶⁴ From Chapter 2, LFQA was able to generate, within the space of a few months a TAT that conducted the activation of two domestic theatres of operation during EX GUERRIER NORDIQUE and OP LOTUS. Although these are domestic theatres, they were shown to be equally complex in terms of the tasks required for activations.

¹⁶⁵ At least in the short term, CANOSCOM will likely retain responsibility for those activities that are conducted *once* in the course of a mission, as described in Chapter 2. With time, there may be a migration of some of these capabilities to the ECS as well (to be discussed in Section 4.3).

4.3 – METHODOLOGY

While it is now clear that the FG of TATs is best integrated by the ECS, this section will identify a plan by which this responsibility can be transferred and developed. There are certain actions that can be done in the near term that will satisfy the requirements forecasted in the FSE literature. Then, in the medium term, the capability can be developed to meet even more complex challenges in the medium term with some investment using the CFOSC project.

In the short term, the ECS could feasibly be tasked to generate TATs, providing that they were sufficiently supported by CANOSCOM. In the Army, for example, LFQA has already demonstrated that an LFA can generate an effective TAT with little support.¹⁶⁶ Now if CANOSCOM were to provide capabilities in which the LFA is deficient, such as contracting and strategic communications for example, then the LFA is even better positioned to succeed. Not only that, but LFAs could feasibly be tasked to generate TATs in succession with one another, in synchronisation with the Managed Readiness Plan (MRP).¹⁶⁷ In this way, there would always be a TAT at high readiness, a TAT in training, and a TAT in reconstitution. In just one cycle of the MRP, one could already imagine a significant improvement from the current structure.

This approach also produces a secondary effect that is extremely attractive for domestic operational commanders. It is noted that LFA commanders are also double-hatted as operational Regional Joint Task Force (RJTF) commanders within Canada Command.¹⁶⁸ This is convenient in the way it allows LFAs to generate Immediate

¹⁶⁶ From Chapter 2, the training period specifically dedicated to TAT training for EX GUERRIER NORDIQUE, which was described by the JTFSE CO as comparable in complexity to an international deployment, was four months.

¹⁶⁷ The MRP is used to synchronise the generation of JTFs between three LFAs – generally LFWA, LFQA and a combined effort between LFCA and LFAA. The MRP has typically consisted of three training phases of approximately six months each, so the entire cycle is for 18 months.

¹⁶⁸ Department of National Defence, *Canada Command Concept of Operations* (Ottawa: DND, 01 Feb 06), 4.

Response Units (IRUs) for employment by their domestic alter-egos.¹⁶⁹ Well, by giving the task to LFAs to generate TATs, then each JTF would also have an integral TA capability, able to support domestic deployments in addition to its international obligations in line with the MRP. Just as U.S. operational commanders (i.e. GCCs), each have their own dedicated sustainment brigades, so Canadian operational commanders would have the ability to conduct TA with their domestic JOAs. No longer would an operational commander have to rely on external resources to operate within their own JOA; he will have a suite of tools to conduct a more complete spectrum of operations.

The RCAF could also expect to develop an effective TAT in a relatively short term. From Chapter 2, the AEW concept had already mirrored many of the TA capabilities that would normally have been provided in the course of CONPLAN DISCUS, reason for their successes in OP HESTIA and OP MOBILE. Transferring the responsibility for the FG of a full TAT would therefore be possible providing some level of augmentation and guidance by CANOSCOM and other L1s. Because there is already an AEW at high readiness at all times, then the CF could also count on their being an RCAF-generated TAT at high readiness as well.

In the medium term, it is advantageous that additional operational-level capabilities be devolved to the ECS, so that they have to rely less on CANOSCOM for augmentation. The increasingly dynamic FSE will only increase requirements for operational-level capabilities at lower levels. For example, contracting was the greatest deficiency observed by LFQA as it developed its own TAT in 2011. The Australians resolved this issue by including this skill-set as core training for logistics officers, or at least for those that are expected to conduct theatre entry.¹⁷⁰ Canada should also look at devolving contracting training to officers within the ECS as part of “core” logistic officer

¹⁶⁹ Department of National Defence, *Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations*, Draft. (Ottawa: Commander Canada Command, February 2012), 16.

¹⁷⁰ Australia, Department of Defence, *Logistics Series: Support to Operations*, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 4.2., 1st Ed. (Canberra, ACT: Australian Defence Publishing Service, 2004) purports that contracting personnel are generated from within the Service Chiefs, as opposed to in Canada, where the capability is mainly resident within CANOSCOM and ADM(Mat).

training. This would ensure that organisations such as LFAs and the AEW that are tasked to generate TATs could do so even if CANOSCOM was so preoccupied with FE that it was unable to augment the generation effort. At least the TAT would be able to provide a limited capability without having constantly to refer to higher levels of authority.

Also in the medium term, it is likely that the capabilities that CANOSCOM has to provide to each TAT will become overtasked. For example, there may come a point when the National Command and Control Information System (NCCIS) capabilities in the JSR will be unable to support each of the various TATs being generated in the Army and RCAF.¹⁷¹ It is therefore proposed that the CFOSC project incorporate an effort to provide additional NCCIS autonomy to each of the organisations that would be generating TATs, including the LFAs and the AEW.¹⁷² Another suggestion is to increase the numbers of deployable camps, a capability primarily only resident within 1 ESU, and perhaps mirror this capability within each of the LFAs. In the end, a technical analysis is required to determine which of the strategic-level capabilities should migrate down to operational-level TATs, and the CFOSC project should be the vehicle to capture these initiatives.

The CF should also look in the medium term at sharing its burden with its allies, such as the French have done with their QG CRR-FR. For example, training facilities in the U.S. can be used to expand the engineering capabilities within the Canadian Army and RCAF. Also, plans for Canadian deployments should be coordinated with such organisations as USTRANSCOM, who will undoubtedly have a leading role in the assignment of strategic transport priorities and capabilities.¹⁷³ Perhaps Canada could consider participating as a member in an existing TA organisation, such as the QG CRR-

¹⁷¹ Depending on the size, location and mandate of the TA, the CIS elements provided can vary, but it typically would consist of a Light NCCIS Detachment in the first 48 hours, followed by elements of the heavy NCCIS detachment and Line/Cable Plant Design organisations. Currently these organisations are only resident within the CFJSR. Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Joint Signals Regiment Concept of Operations* (Kingston: DND, March 2004), 11.

¹⁷² A more technical analysis would be required to determine what NCCIS capabilities could be integrated into the LFAs and into 1 CAD structure, but this is outside the scope of this paper.

¹⁷³ It is acknowledged that this coordination has been done in the past. The recommendation is to continue in this vein.

FR, or establish a relationship with one of her allies in order to create some new, multi-national deployable organisation. Not only do these ideas leverage capabilities and expertise from other nations, but they also provide opportunities to enhance Canada's interoperability with its allies. In light of predictions about a tighter-than-ever fiscal environment, this approach may just be the most efficient one that will maintain an adequate level of operational readiness in the future.

A last effort required to meet the future needs of TA is expanding the relationships with OGDs and agencies that the CF will expect to support in the future. If, as the analysis of the FSE predicts, the CF are expected to act as a team alongside OGDs and agencies, then these organisations must fully integrate into the TA plan. The deployment of the TAT, for example, should also incorporate a compliment from each of these organisations, and the requirements for support should be established long before the deployment itself. TA must be considered a joint, interagency, multinational and public (JIMP) activity, and the roles of each of these players need to be incorporated in each phase of the operation. Otherwise, the CF will be faced once again with the same surprises experienced during OP HESTIA.

CONCLUSION

An analysis of the FSE has shown that the increasing complexity and publicity of operational deployments will increase the demands for TA and reduce the margins for error. Also, an increasingly tight fiscal environment will limit Canada's ability to fulfill these demands. The most effective TA framework for the CF in the next five to ten years, one that will achieve greatest acceptance by other L1s, is therefore to leverage the ECS for the coordinated FG of TA capabilities, thereby allowing CANOSCOM to focus on FE in an increasingly demanding environment.

To achieve this, it is shown that the definition of TA needs to be defined as a multi-faceted operation, in which the ECS are stakeholders. Also, TA needs to be understood as a coordinated effort, under a single chain of command. With this in mind,

the best option to leverage the ECS would each be to transfer to them the integration of all TA capabilities. For the Army, it is proposed that each of the LFAs generate TATs in synchronisation with the MRP. This way, each of the RJTF commanders within Canada COM would have their own TA capability. Plus, the redundancy would allow TATs to be regenerated quickly as they are committed to operations. For the RCAF, this plan sees leveraging the AEW CONPLAN and expanding it to include the full range of TA requirements.

In the medium term, the contracting function has to be devolved to the ECS as “core” training, as this has been a deficiency in most recent operations. Those capabilities such as strategic communications and engineering suites should also migrate to the ECS with the assistance of the CFOSC project and by leveraging allied capabilities. This approach will provide a means by which TA capabilities are more effectively generated for operational deployments, whereby operational commanders are given more flexibility to activate theatres within their JOA, and this, in a quick timeline and with minimal resources.

CONCLUSION

In the short period since the development of the concept in 1999, the success of TA has largely been limited by the ability of CANOSCOM, or its predecessors, to generate the specialised capabilities required to conduct a full spectrum of activations. Chapter one described the genuine will to address these capabilities with the NMSC project, and the relatively successful employment of TATs from 2002 to 2004. These efforts were overtaken by CF Transformation in 2006 and the creation of the SCTF. After that, the efforts to establish a high-readiness organisation to activate future missions would continue, although somewhat dissipated with the rigour of OP ATHENA in 2007. Since then, there has been a renewed interest in TA; however, the focus on operations has continued to hinder the CF's ability to generate complete TATs for missions in Haiti and Libya. As the CF recharges its forces for the next mission, there is perhaps a hunger for change, which this paper aims to satisfy.

Chapter two described the efforts that the Army and the RCAF took to improve their own TA capabilities as a result of the challenges that they had experienced during OP HESTIA. Following a very deliberate reorganisation and training effort, LFQA was actually able to generate a 200-man TAT and activate a major exercise in Northern Quebec as well as the theatre of the Richelieu River for OP LOTUS. Although there were some challenges, the LFA nonetheless proved that, with some support and guidance, it is able to generate a TAT within their own resources. The RCAF was also able to refine their AEW concept, in which redundancies had already been built, to activate the theatre of Libya. These ECS have shown that they are able to perform TA tasks with little external support.

Chapter three showed that other nations have also developed concepts for TA that are useful to consider by Canada. The U.S., for one, developed a system in 2004 whereby the capabilities for TO are housed within specialised organisations called Sustainment Brigades. Their generation by ARFORSCOM is conducted through a significant network of CoE, capabilities that Canada could potentially leverage for their own FG. Australians, on the other hand, include TE capabilities as core functions of the

JTF. As such, the ECS are equipped to generate capabilities such as contracting and strategic communications, which are held at higher levels in the CF, and this gives a greater flexibility to operational commanders. The French military has a system that is closer to the model proposed by the NMSC, whereby TA capabilities are both generated and employed by a centralised strategic organisation. However, the French succeed in managing these readiness tasks in addition to their FE obligations by leveraging other nations' capabilities. Canada could learn from the French by sharing the burden of FG with its allies. Most importantly, the analysis has showed that Canada's restrained resources are best managed when they are generated by an organisation that is already conducting other FG activities.

The analysis of the FSE in Chapter 4 confirmed that there will likely be no more resources available to plug the gaps that exist in CANOSCOM's current TA capabilities. On the contrary, an increasingly complex environment will increase TA demands and reduce the margin of error. The CF would therefore benefit if the integration of activities and resources required for the FG of TATs are transferred to the lead ECS of a given operation, where the readiness of the limited skilled resources can be managed in synchronisation with other FG activities.

In order to meet the demands of the FSE, the CF has to revise its definition for TA to include all capabilities involved in establishing a theatre footprint, where all members of the Whole-of-Government perceive themselves as stakeholders. Within the Army, the integration of TATs should be devolved to LFAs, synchronised with other FG activities in the MRP, while CANOSCOM maintains a supervisory role as the CoE. In this way, one TAT would be ready to support expeditionary tasks, while others could either reinforce or support some domestic theatre. In the RCAF, the AEW mandate should be expanded to include TA, and its structure augmented by CANOSCOM to facilitate this. In the medium term, one foresees the migration of certain capabilities from CANOSCOM to the ECS, such as contracting, strategic communications and deployable camps. The CFOCS project would be a suitable vehicle to deliver these additional capabilities. Also, the ECS should leverage the capabilities of their American counterparts in order to share some of the burden of this new role.

The transfer of these FG tasks to the ECS should not be seen as a loss of capability for CANOSCOM. Rather, it represents a gain of capability for the CF and its operational commanders, who should not have to relive the challenges that occur when a theatre is not adequately activated. CANOSCOM nonetheless retains a pivotal role as the CoE of the TA effort, with the expertise, continuity and the authority to release these capabilities. This oversight represents a reduction from CANOSCOM's current task to generate the entire range of TA for every operational theatre. It also represents a means by which it can better focus on operational support. In the end, the entire CF will be better postured to meet the challenges of future deployments.

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